CRS Reports

Saudi Arabia

Jan 15, 2019

Animal and Plant Health Import Permits in U.S. Agricultural Trade

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is the U.S. government authority tasked with regulating the import, transit, and release of regulated animals, animal products, veterinary biologics, plants, plant products, pests, organisms, soil, and genetically engineered organisms. APHIS provides scientific authorities in trade partner countries and U.S. importers with animal and plant health import regulations. APHIS requires U.S. importers to obtain animal or plant health import permits, which verify that the items being imported meet U.S. import standards. Animal and plant health import permits certify that imports follow U.S. regulations, World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines, and/or trading partner specific requirements. These import permits are a part of broader agreements between the United States and its trading partners within the WTO on established sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. These measures aim to protect against diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. The House and Senate Agricultural Appropriations Committees appropriate funds that allow APHIS to carry out a range of activities, including those involved in issuing import permits. From FY2014 to FY2018, discretionary appropriations for APHIS have averaged nearly $900 million. About 85% of the APHIS budget is allocated to the “Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness/Response” mission area, which includes the administration of health import permits and other efforts to prevent imports of pests and diseases into the United States. APHIS’s authority over agricultural imports is largely provided by the Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§8301 et seq.), the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§7701 et seq.), and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. §§8401). These laws authorize APHIS to administer animal and plant health import permits and conduct agricultural import inspections. APHIS works with other federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP), to conduct animal and plant health monitoring programs and to determine if new pest or disease management programs are needed. In addition, Congress directs the Food and Drug Administration, the Food Safety and Inspection Service, and state-level Departments of Agriculture to participate in inspecting many products regulated by APHIS. APHIS and CBP personnel inspect shipments of imported agricultural products and certify that the required import health permits and SPS certificates accompany each shipment. One of the major flagship programs that APHIS and CBP administer together is the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program, in which APHIS and CBP technical staff work to ensure that the required animal or plant health permits, sanitary certificates (for animal products), and phytosanitary certificates (for plant products) accompany each shipment. APHIS transfers funds to CBP to conduct AQI activities. The ongoing congressional commitment to preventing plant and animal disease and pests from entering the United States through agricultural imports is evident in annual appropriations Congress provides for APHIS. Congress has directed APHIS to monitor pests and diseases and has assigned APHIS to oversee SPS activities in some free trade agreements. Moreover, legislation introduced in the 115th Congress sought to address invasive species (e.g., Areawide Integrated Pest Management, H.R. 5411) and would have directed CBP to enforce APHIS regulations to deter smuggling of plants and animals into the United States.

Jan 11, 2019

Military Construction Funding in the Event of a National Emergency

The President’s reported consideration of whether to invoke various statutory authorities (including some triggered by a declaration of a national emergency) to direct the Department of Defense (DOD) to construct “a physical barrier” along the U.S.-Mexico border has raised questions about potentially available appropriated funds. This Insight identifies previous military construction projects funded through emergency authorities and unobligated military construction funding balances. Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2808 is entitled Construction authority in the event of a declaration of war or national emergency and depends upon a “declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national emergency in accordance with the National Emergencies Act [NEA] (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) that requires use of the armed forces.” A declaration by the President under the NEA must detail the statute under which action will proceed. For discussion of the authorities the President may utilize after declaring a national emergency in accordance with the NEA, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10242, Can the Department of Defense Build the Border Wall?, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Edward C. Liu, and Jay B. Sykes. Previous Instances Presidents have invoked the NEA twice citing the emergency military construction authority set forth in 10 U.S.C. 2808. During Operation Desert Shield, President George H.W. Bush issued EO 12734 of November 14, 1990. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13235 of November 16, 2001. In the latter, the president was required and able to renew the authority. Previous Military Construction Projects According to DOD information, from 2001 through 2014, the department funded a total of 18 projects under 10 U.S.C. 2808, after the President invoked the NEA, with a combined value of $1.4 billion. With the exception of one project dating from December 2001 related to security measures for weapons of mass destruction at sites in the continental United States, most of the projects took place at overseas locations (see Table 1). Table 1. Department of Defense Use of Authority Per 10 U.S.C. 2808 (2001-2014) Date Component Location Amount (in millions of dollars) Description of Project 11/21/2001 Air Force To support Operation Enduring Freedom 26.7 Expand aircraft parking ramps and build hangars at two forward operating locations 12/4/2001 Army Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon 35.0 Security measures for weapons of mass destruction 11/17/2006 Army Guantanamo 102.0 Secure courthouse and support facilities 9/18/2008 Army Bagram, Afghanistan 38.8 Barracks, power line, and road 5/9/2009 Air Force Afghanistan 41.3 Airfield runway and apron pavement improvements 5/29/2009 Army Afghanistan, Iraq 136.2 Waste management complex, fuel storage, security improvements, ammo storage, medical facility, and logistics support area 6/2/2010 Air Force Afghanistan 59.0 Airfield pavement improvements 8/25/2010 Air Force Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Afghanistan 129.1 Fuel facilities, passenger and freight terminal, cargo holding area, billeting, network control center, satellite communications facility, maintenance center, electrical substation, special operations forces (SOF) aviation complex, and ramp 8/16/2011 Army Afghanistan 74.0 Detention facility expansion, airfield pavement improvements, and tanker truck facility 1/13/2012 Air Force Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti 6.3 Aircraft parking, taxiway, and aircraft shelter 1/30/2012 Air Force Qatar, Afghanistan, Oman, Kyrgyzstan 141.2 SOF apron, taxiway, communications facility, ammo storage area, and airlift apron 3/5/2012 Army Parwan, Afghanistan 53.3 Detention housing and dining facility 6/1/2012 Army Afghanistan 28.0 Logistics hub, security improvements, and waste water treatment plant 6/15/2012 Air Force Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti 187.0 Combat Aircraft Loading Area (CALA) and billeting 6/30/2012 Army Afghanistan 86.0 Waste management complex and utility projects 8/20/2012 Air Force Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti 24.0 Parallel taxiway extension 8/20/2012 Navy Naval Support Act Bahrain 45.2 Waterfront development 6/14/2013 Navy Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti 228.0 Task Force Compound TOTAL 1,441.1 Source: DOD. Funding Section 2808 does not appear to cite a cost limitation per a project. However, it specifies as a source of funding certain available military construction funds. Subsection (a) states, “Such projects may be undertaken only within the total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military construction, including funds appropriated for family housing, that have not been obligated.” According to DOD information, the department reported unobligated balances in the military construction and family housing accounts totaling $13.3 billion at the end of FY2018 (see Table 2). Table 2. Status of Unobligated Balances for Military Construction (MILCON) and Family Housing Titles (in thousands of dollars, as of September 30, 2018) Account Period of Availability Appropriated Amount Unobligated Balance % Unobligated MILCON 2014/2018 7,969,801 244,377 3% MILCON 2015/2018 119,946 3,887 3% MILCON 2015/2019 4,947,617 654,158 13% MILCON 2016/2020 6,791,551 1,774,080 26% MILCON 2017/2021 6,797,713 2,821,042 41% MILCON 2018/2022 9,896,613 6,755,989 68% Base Realignment and Closure 2,836,102 204,806 7% NATO Security Investment Program 7,874,381 196,231 2% Family Housing 2014/2018 229,247 57,598 25% Family Housing 2015/2019 82,698 11,328 14% Family Housing 2016/2020 345,528 176,791 51% Family Housing 2017/2021 319,535 167,082 52% Family Housing 2018/2022 355,906 323,455 91% Family Housing 2018/2018 1,127,108 52,147 5% Family Housing Improvement Fund 4,301,107 18,812 0% Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund 80,332 632 1% Homeowners Assistance Program 2,923,870 40,083 1% MILCON Subtotal 47,233,724 12,458,339 26% Family Housing Subtotal 9,765,331 847,928 9% Grand Total 56,999,055 13,306,267 23% Source: The Report of the Department of Defense on Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 2018 Bid Savings and Unobligated Balances for Military Construction and Family Housing Accounts (Execution as of September 30, 2018). The figures cited above do not account for unobligated balances resulting from FY2019 appropriations. The 2019 Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act (H.R. 5895; P.L. 115-244) appropriated a total of $11.3 billion in military construction budget authority, including $10.3 billion in Title I—Department of Defense (DOD) for the department’s base, or regular, budget, and $921 million in Title IV—Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). These figures can be found in the funding tables in H.Rept. 115-929, the conference report accompanying the bill. These amounts reflect budget authority—not obligations (or unobligated amounts). Because military construction appropriations are generally available for obligation for up to five years, the department likely has a different amount of unobligated military construction funding than the total appropriated amount for any given fiscal year. In general, as part of the President’s annual budget submission to Congress, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer publishes a spreadsheet, entitled “Military Construction, Family Housing, and Base Realignment and Closure Program (C-1),” which details funding amounts, facility title, and installation or location for individual military construction projects. Congressional Notification and Reprogramming The use of Title 10 Section 2808 requires congressional notification. Subsection (b) states, “When a decision is made to undertake military construction projects authorized by this section, the Secretary of Defense shall notify ... the appropriate committees of Congress of the decision and of the estimated cost of the construction projects, including the cost of any real estate action pertaining to those construction projects.” Nevertheless, according to DOD regulations the use of Section 2808 does not require a request to Congress for reprogramming (i.e., a change in the application of funds). The DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR; DOD 7000.14-R), Paragraph 170303, Subsection (A), “Construction in the Event of a Declaration of War or National Emergency,” highlights additional guidance in DOD Directives (DODD) 3025.18 and 4270.5, the latter of which states reprogramming is not required for construction projects under 10 U.S.C. 2808. Kevin Borden, Nicole Carter, Michelle Christensen, Jennifer Elsea, Michael Garcia, Bruce Lindsay, Edward Liu, and Liana Rosen contributed to this Insight.

Jan 11, 2019

Introduction to Bank Regulation: Leverage and Capital Ratio Requirements

Jan 11, 2019

Iraq

Jan 10, 2019

Federal Grand Jury Secrecy: Legal Principles and Implications for Congressional Oversight

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” This provision requires that a federal prosecutor, in order to charge a suspect with a serious federal crime, secure the assent of an independent investigative and deliberative body comprising citizens drawn from the jurisdiction in which the crime would be tried. Federal grand juries serve two primary functions: (1) they aid federal prosecutors in investigating possible crimes by issuing subpoenas for documents, physical evidence, and witness testimony; and (2) they determine whether there is sufficient evidence to charge a criminal suspect with the crime or crimes under investigation. Traditionally, the grand jury has conducted its work in secret. Secrecy prevents those under scrutiny from fleeing or importuning the grand jurors, encourages full disclosure by witnesses, and protects the innocent from unwarranted prosecution, among other things. The long-established rule of grand jury secrecy is enshrined in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which provides that government attorneys and the jurors themselves, among others, “must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury.” Accordingly, as a general matter, persons and entities external to the grand jury process are precluded from obtaining transcripts of grand jury testimony or other documents or information that would reveal what took place in the proceedings, even if the grand jury has concluded its work and even if the information is sought pursuant to otherwise-valid legal processes. At times, the rule of grand jury secrecy has come into tension with Congress’s power of inquiry when an arm of the legislative branch has sought protected materials pursuant to its oversight function. For instance, some courts have determined that the information barrier established in Rule 6(e) extends to congressional inquiries, observing that the Rule contains no reservations for congressional access to grand jury materials that would otherwise remain secret. Nevertheless, the rule of grand jury secrecy is subject to a number of exceptions, both codified and judicially crafted, that permit grand jury information to be disclosed in certain circumstances (usually only with prior judicial authorization). Perhaps the most significant of these for congressional purposes are (1) the exception that allows a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding,” and (2) the exception, recognized by a few courts, that allows a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters in special or exceptional circumstances. In turn, some courts have determined that one or both of these exceptions applies to congressional requests for grand jury materials in the context of impeachment proceedings, though there is authority to the contrary. Additionally, because Rule 6(e) covers only “matters occurring before the grand jury,” courts have recognized that documents and information are not independently insulated from disclosure merely because they happen to have been presented to, or considered by, a grand jury. As such, even if Rule 6(e) generally limits congressional access to grand jury information, Congress has a number of tools at its disposal to seek materials connected to a grand jury investigation. Prior Congresses have considered legislation that would have expressly permitted a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters to congressional committees on a showing of substantial need. However, in response to such proposals, the executive branch has voiced concerns that the legislation would raise due-process and separation-of-powers issues and potentially undermine the proper functioning of federal grand juries. These concerns may have resulted in Congress declining to alter Rule 6(e). As a result, to the extent Rule 6(e) constrains Congress’s ability to conduct oversight, legislation seeking to amend the rules governing grand jury secrecy in a way that would give Congress independent access to grand jury materials may raise additional legal and pragmatic issues for the legislative branch to consider.

Jan 10, 2019

China’s Status as a Nonmarket Economy (NME)

Jan 10, 2019

The 2019-2020 Iran Crisis and U.S. Military Deployments

Jan 9, 2019

The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions (ESRP)

The employer shared responsibility provisions (ESRP), which often are referred to as the employer mandate, generally incentivize large employers to offer adequate and affordable health insurance coverage to their full-time employees and full-time employees’ dependents. If an applicable large employer fails to offer health insurance or offers substandard coverage to its employees, the employer may be subject to a penalty (i.e., assessment payment). All common-law employers, including government entities (such as federal, state, local, or Indian tribal government entities), are responsible for annually determining whether they are considered an applicable large employer (ALE), which is generally an employer that has at least 50 full-time employees (including full-time equivalent employees, which are a representation of non-full-time employees as full-time employees). If an employer qualifies as an ALE in a given year, then it will be subject to the ESRP in the subsequent year, meaning it will have to offer adequate, affordable health insurance coverage to generally all of its full-time employees (and their dependents) or it will risk being subject to one of two penalties. Regardless of penalty type, a penalty will be triggered only if at least one full-time employee receives financial assistance through an exchange. These types of financial assistance generally are not available to employees who were offered affordable and adequate coverage by their employer. If an employer does not qualify as an ALE, then it will not be subject to the ESRP and will not face a penalty for failing to offer health insurance coverage to its full-time employees. Which potential ESRP penalty an ALE may be subject to is contingent upon whether an ALE offered appropriate health insurance to enough of its full-time employees (and their dependents). If an ALE offered appropriate health insurance to 95% or more of its full-time employees (and their dependents) and at least one employee received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy through a health insurance exchange, then the employer may be subject a penalty that is the lesser of (1) an amount based on the number of people who received financial assistance through an exchange or (2) an amount based on the number of the firm’s full-time employees. If an ALE did not offer appropriate health insurance coverage to its full-time employees (or offered appropriate coverage to less than 95% of its full-time employees and their dependents) and at least one employee received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy through a health insurance exchange, then the employer may be subject to a penalty based on the number of the firm’s full-time employees.

Jan 9, 2019

Introduction to U.S. Economy: GDP and Economic Growth

Jan 8, 2019

U.S. Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Other Illicit Financial Threats

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to Financial Services: The Federal Reserve

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to U.S. Economy: The Business Cycle and Growth

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to Financial Services: Systemic Risk

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to Financial Services: Capital Markets

Jan 8, 2019

2019 Tax Filing Season (2018 Tax Year): The Mortgage Interest Deduction

Jan 8, 2019

Human Trafficking and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Introduction

Jan 7, 2019

U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview

Jan 3, 2019

Funding U.S.-Mexico Border Barrier Construction: Current Issues

Jan 3, 2019

Targeting Illicit Finance: The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s “Financial Institution Advisory Program”

Jan 2, 2019

The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (P.L.115-271): Medicare Provisions

On October 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention That Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act; P.L. 115-271). The conference report on the bill was approved by the House 393-8 on September 28, 2018, and it cleared the Senate 98-1 on October 3, 2018. The law was enacted in response to growing concerns among the U.S. public and lawmakers about increasing numbers of drug overdose deaths. Opioid overdose deaths, in particular, have increased significantly since 2002. In 2015, an estimated 33,091 Americans died of opioid-related overdoses, almost three times as many as in 2002, around the beginning of the opioid epidemic in the United States. In 2016, that number had increased to 42,249. In October 2017, President Trump declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency. The SUPPORT Act is a sweeping measure designed to address widespread overprescribing and abuse of opioids in the United States. The act includes provisions to bolster law enforcement, public health, and health care financing and coverage, including under Medicare and Medicaid. It imposes tighter oversight of opioid production and distribution; requires additional reporting and safeguards to address fraud; alters programs related to the provision of support to children in the child welfare system because of their parent’s or caregiver’s opioid use; and limits coverage of prescription opioids. It also expands coverage of and access to opioid addiction treatment services. In addition, the act authorizes programs to expand consumer education on opioid use and train additional providers to treat individuals with opioid use disorders (OUDs). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecast that the SUPPORT Act would increase the on-budget deficit by $1,001 million over 5 years (FY2019-2023) but reduce the on-budget deficit by $52 million over 10 years (FY2019-FY2028). The SUPPORT Act is one of several recent laws aimed at addressing the opioid epidemic. The 114th Congress enacted the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198). CARA addressed substance use issues broadly, targeting the opioid crisis predominantly through public health and law enforcement strategies. The 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255), also enacted in 2016, authorized new funding for medical research, amended the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval process, and authorized additional funding to combat opioid addiction, among other provisions. The SUPPORT Act consists of eight titles. The Congressional Research Service is publishing a series of reports on this law, organized by title. This report provides a section-by-section description of Medicare provisions in Titles II and VI, as well as one Medicare budget offset in Title IV. Among significant Medicare changes, the law creates a Medicare bundled payment for an incident of medication-assisted treatment (MAT), which combines medications with counseling and behavioral therapies to provide a holistic approach to treating OUD and makes federally registered opioid treatment programs (OTPs) approved Medicare providers. It also requires private insurers that offer Medicare Part D prescription drug plans to implement “lock-in” programs, starting in CY2022, that limit the number of pharmacies and prescribers used by enrollees identified as at risk of opioid abuse. This report is intended to reflect the SUPPORT Act at enactment (i.e., October 24, 2018); it does not track the act’s implementation or funding. This report will not be updated.

Jan 2, 2019

U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview

Jan 2, 2019

Executive Branch Ethics and Financial Conflicts of Interest: Disclosure

Jan 2, 2019

Selected Issues for National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Reauthorization and Reform

Jan 2, 2019

Broadband Deployment: Status and Federal Programs

Jan 2, 2019

Overview of U.S. International Food Assistance

Dec 31, 2018

Profiles and Effects of Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agricultural Exports

Countries have imposed tariffs on U.S. agricultural products to retaliate against actions the Trump Administration took in spring 2018 to protect U.S. steel and aluminum producers and in response to Chinese intellectual property rights and technology policies. Since then, more than 800 U.S. food and agricultural products have been subject to retaliatory tariffs from China, the European Union (EU), Turkey, Canada, and Mexico. U.S. exports of those products to the retaliating countries totaled $26.9 billion in 2017, according to USDA export data. The choice of agricultural and food products for retaliatory tariffs likely reflects the large volume of agricultural trade involved and that many of these products can be sourced from non-U.S. trading partners. Such tariff hikes threaten to reduce U.S. agricultural exports. China, which is subject to both the U.S. Section 232 steel and aluminum tariffs and separate Section 301 tariffs aimed as punishment for its handling of U.S. intellectual property rights, has placed retaliatory tariffs on the largest number and highest value of U.S. agricultural and food products. More than 800 products—including soybeans, pork, dairy products, fruits and nuts, seafood, and processed products—accounting for almost all U.S. agricultural and food exports to China in value terms in 2017 (the last full year without retaliatory tariffs) are now subject to additional tariffs of 5%, 10%, 15%, 25%, or a combination of those amounts. U.S. exports to China of those products that are subject to retaliatory tariffs were worth about $20.6 billion in 2017. China has fallen from the leading export market for U.S. agricultural products in FY2017 to the third-leading export market in FY2018 due to the retaliatory tariffs, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). USDA forecasts that China will fall to the fifth-leading market for those products in FY2019. Canada and Mexico are each targeting about 20 U.S. food and agricultural products, which accounted for approximately $2.6 billion and $2.5 billion in exports to each respective country in 2017. The EU and Turkey have each put retaliatory tariffs on about 40 U.S. agricultural and food products that were valued at about $1 billion and $250 million, respectively, in 2017. India has threatened to impose tariffs on seven U.S. agricultural and food products, which accounted for about $857 million in exports in 2017. U.S. agricultural exports account for about 20% of U.S. farm income, according to USDA. Thus any loss in exports could have negative economic consequences for U.S. farmers. Commodities that are highly dependent on exports to the retaliating markets may be more severely affected than others by any loss of markets from the tariffs. For instance, commodities for which U.S. exports to the retaliating countries represent 30% or more of its total exports include soybeans, sorghum, pork, cheese, apples, cherries, seafood, ginseng, whiskey, and some processed foods. U.S. soybean exports to China for January through October 2018 are 63% lower than during the same time period in 2017—a change due in large part to the tariffs. USDA is attempting to ease the downside effects of the retaliatory tariffs on farmers and ranchers through a $12 billion trade aid package. Under this initiative, USDA has committed to making direct payments to farmers of selected commodities subject to the tariffs, as well as buying up surplus quantities of some commodities and providing funding for additional trade promotion efforts. In addition, legislation that was introduced in the 115th Congress sought to provide more trade assistance funding for farmers and ranchers, though none of the bills passed.

Dec 31, 2018

U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) FTA and Bilateral Trade Relations

Dec 28, 2018

Federal Correctional Reform and the First Step Act of 2018

Dec 28, 2018

Drug Shortages: Causes, FDA Authority, and Policy Options

Dec 27, 2018

Reauthorization of the Perkins Act in the 115th Congress: The Strengthening Career and Technical Education for the 21st Century Act

The Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act (Perkins Act) is the primary federal law aimed at developing and supporting career and technical education (CTE) programs at the secondary and postsecondary educational levels. Prior to the 115th Congress, the Perkins Act had most recently been reauthorized in 2006 by the Carl D. Perkins Career and Technical Education Act of 2006 (Perkins IV; P.L. 109-270). In the 115th Congress, the Perkins Act was comprehensively reauthorized again, through the Strengthening Career and Technical Education for the 21st Century Act (Perkins V; P.L. 115-224). Perkins V was signed into law by President Trump in July 2018 and is to go into effect on July 1, 2019. Under the Perkins Act, funds for the development and improvement of CTE programs are distributed to states by an allocation formula largely based on population and per capita income factors. States then distribute funds to local CTE providers at the secondary and postsecondary education levels according to within-state allocation formulas specified in statute. Recipients of Perkins funds are required to use them for a variety of purposes that help CTE students attain technical skills and earn an industry-recognized credential, a certificate, or a postsecondary degree. The accountability framework under the Perkins Act requires state and local recipients of Perkins funds to try to achieve target levels of performance on a series of core indicators of performance. The actual levels of performance on each core indicator are reported by the states and disaggregated by a number of special populations and subgroups. If a state fails to meet 90% of any of its target performance levels, it has to implement a program improvement plan for each of the core indicators of performance for which the target performance levels were not met. Perkins V makes a number of changes to the Perkins Act. Some of the key changes include the following: Fund Allocations: The state allocation formula is changed to give each state a base amount equal to its FY2018 allocation. Any additional funds are distributed among the states based on population and per capita income factors, with a greater share going to the states with the smallest initial allocation. Under Perkins V, states are allowed to reserve up to 15% of their allocation for CTE programs in rural areas or areas with high numbers of CTE students, or for innovative CTE programs, instead of 10%, which is the allowance under Perkins IV. Recipient Activities: Provisions in Perkins V require state plans to contain information about how the state’s CTE activities will be coordinated with state activities under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Under Perkins V, local CTE providers are required to carry out a needs assessment to better align the offered CTE programs of study with local labor market needs and in-demand occupations. Accountability Framework: Provisions in Perkins V consolidate and modify the secondary and postsecondary core indicators of performance. Under Perkins V, states are allowed to determine their own performance targets on the core indicators of performance, as long as certain minimum requirements are met. In addition to existing data reporting and disaggregation requirements, Perkins V requires states to disaggregate CTE student achievement data by the CTE program or program of study in which the concentrator is enrolled. Program Eliminations: Provisions in Perkins V eliminate Title II of the Perkins Act, known as the Tech Prep program. New Programs: Perkins V introduces a national competitive grant program aimed at identifying, supporting, and evaluating evidence-based and innovative strategies and activities to improve and modernize CTE and align workforce skills with labor market needs.

Dec 21, 2018

Permanent Employment-Based Immigration and the Per-country Ceiling

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) specifies a complex set of categories and numerical limits for admitting lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to the United States that includes economic priorities among the admission criteria. These priorities are addressed primarily through the employment-based immigration system, which consists of five preference categories. Each preference category has specific eligibility criteria; numerical limits; and, in some cases, distinct application processes. The INA allocates 140,000 visas annually for all five employment-based LPR categories, roughly 12% of the 1.1 million LPRs admitted in FY2017. The INA further limits each immigrant-sending country to an annual maximum of 7% of all employment-based LPR admissions, known as the per-country ceiling, or “cap.” Prospective employment-based immigrants follow two administrative processing trajectories depending on whether they apply from overseas as “new arrivals” seeking LPR status or from within the United States seeking to adjust to LPR status from a temporary status that they currently possess. While some prospective employment-based immigrants can self-petition, most require U.S. employers to petition on their behalf. In both cases, the Department of State (DOS) is responsible for allocating the correct number of employment-based immigrant “visa numbers” or slots, according to numerical limits and the per-country ceiling specified in the INA. This report reviews the employment-based immigration process by examining six pools of pending petitions and applications, representing prospective employment-based immigrants and any accompanying family members at different stages of the LPR process. While four of these pools represent administrative processing queues, two result from the INA’s numerical limitations on employment-based immigration and the per-country ceiling. These latter two pools of foreign nationals, who have been approved as employment-based immigrants but must wait for statutorily limited visa numbers, totaled in excess of 900,000 as of mid-2018. Most originate from India, followed by China and the Philippines. Some employers maintain that they continue to need skilled foreign workers to remain internationally competitive and to keep their firms in the United States. Proponents of increasing employment-based immigration levels argue that it is vital for economic growth. Opponents cite the lack of compelling evidence of labor shortages and argue that the presence of foreign workers can negatively impact wages and working conditions in the United States. With this statutory and economic backdrop, the policy option of revising or eliminating the per-country ceiling on employment-based LPRs has been proposed repeatedly in Congress. Some argue that eliminating the per-country ceiling would increase the flow of high-skilled immigrants from countries such as India and China, who are often employed in the U.S. technology sector, without increasing the total annual admission of employment-based LPRs. Currently, nationals from India in particular, and to a lesser extent China and the Philippines, face lengthy queues and inordinately long waits to receive LPR status. Many of those waiting for employment-based LPR status are already employed in the United States on temporary visas, a potentially exploitative situation that some argue incentivizes immigrant-sponsoring employers to continue to recruit foreign nationals primarily from these countries for temporary employment. Others counter that the statutory per-country ceiling restrains the dominance of a handful of employment-based immigrant-sending countries and preserves the diversity of immigrant flows.

Dec 21, 2018

Prescription Drug Importation

Dec 21, 2018

China Primer: Illicit Fentanyl and China’s Role

Dec 21, 2018

Funding for ACA-Established Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF) Expires in FY2019

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) authorized the establishment of a private, nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation called the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI, or the Institute). This built on provisions in prior law that expanded the federal government’s role in the oversight and funding of comparative effectiveness research. The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) provided a total of $1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research; required an Institute of Medicine (IOM, now the National Academy of Medicine) report with recommendations on national comparative effectiveness research priorities; and created the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research (FCCCER), an interagency advisory group. FCCCER was required to report to the President and the Congress annually on federal comparative effectiveness research activities, and was terminated upon enactment of the ACA. PCORI is responsible for coordinating and supporting comparative clinical effectiveness research, which is broadly defined in law to mean “research evaluating and comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or more ... health care interventions ... being used in the treatment, management, and diagnosis of, or prevention of illness or injury.” Health care interventions include a wide range of things, for example, care management and delivery, medical devices, diagnostic tools, pharmaceuticals, and integrative health practices. PCORI was required to identify national priorities for research, and an agenda to carry out the priorities, including attention to chronic conditions, gaps in evidence, quality of care, patient health and well-being, and the effect on national expenditures associated with interventions or conditions, among other concerns. In addition, PCORI can enter into contracts with federal agencies as well as with academic, private sector research, or study-conducting entities for the management of funding and conduct of research. The ACA also required the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to broadly disseminate research findings that are published by PCORI and other government-funded comparative effectiveness research entities, to create information tools, to and develop a publicly available database of government-funded evidence (Public Health Service Act [PHSA] Section 937). Dissemination materials must identify researchers; describe research methodology, limitations, and subpopulation-specific considerations; and must not include practice guidelines or recommendations for payment, coverage, or treatment. AHRQ has to support training of researchers and building of data capacity in coordination with other federal health programs; in addition, other federal agencies are broadly authorized to contract with PCORI for the conduct and support of relevant research. The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF) The ACA created a 10-year, multibillion dollar trust fund—the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF)—to support comparative effectiveness research, and specifically to fund PCORI and its research activities. Funding for PCORTF expires in FY2019. The law provided annual funding to the PCORTF over the period FY2010-FY2019 from the following three sources: (1) annual appropriations, (2) fees on health insurance and self-insured plans, and (3) transfers from the Medicare Part A and Part B trust funds (26 U.S.C. §9511). Three Sources of PCORTF Funds Specifically, the ACA appropriated the following amounts to the PCORTF: (1) $10 million for FY2010, (2) $50 million for FY2011, and (3) $150 million for each of FY2012 through FY2019. In addition, for each of FY2013 through FY2019, the ACA appropriated an amount equivalent to the net revenues from a new fee that the law imposes on health insurance policies and self-insured plans. For policy/plan years ending during FY2013, the fee equals $1 multiplied by the number of covered lives. For policy/plan years ending during each subsequent fiscal year through FY2019, the fee equals $2 multiplied by the number of covered lives. Finally, transfers to PCORTF from the Medicare Part A and Part B trust funds are calculated by multiplying the average number of individuals entitled to benefits under Medicare Part A, or enrolled in Medicare Part B, by $1 (for FY2013) or by $2 (for each of FY2014 through FY2019). Allocation of PCORTF Funds For each of FY2011 through FY2019, the ACA requires 80% of the PCORTF funds to be made available to PCORI and the remaining 20% of funds to be transferred to the Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary for carrying out PHSA Section 937. Of the total amount transferred to HHS, 80% is to be distributed to AHRQ to carry out the dissemination activities authorized under PHSA Section 937. Beginning in the FY2018 budget request, the President proposed to incorporate AHRQ under the National Institutes of Health (NIH) by creating a new institute, the National Institute for Research on Safety and Quality (NIRSQ). Although this proposed change has not been adopted by Congress and AHRQ has continued to be its own stand-alone agency, for FY2018 and FY2019, the funds that are in fact going to AHRQ are shown as going to NIRSQ. Table 1 shows the allocation of PCORTF funds through FY2019. Table 1. Distribution of PCORTF Funding Millions of Dollars, by Fiscal Year Funding Recipient 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 (Est.) 2019 (Est.) PCORI 120 289 376 396 469 476 499 622 HHS 30 72 94 99 117 119 125 155 AHRQ (non-add) (24) (58) (75) (80) (94) (95) — — NIH/NIRSQ (non-add) — (100) (124) Office of the Secretary (non-add) (6) (14) (19) (19) (23) (24) (25) (31) Total 150 361 470 495 586 595 624 777 Source: CRS calculations using data provided in Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government, Appendix (FY2013-FY2019).

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to Military Operations

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: The Department of Defense

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: U.S. Defense Industrial Base

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: Procurement

Dec 20, 2018

Introduction to Bank Regulation: Supervision

Dec 20, 2018

Argentina: An Overview

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense

Dec 19, 2018

Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

Dec 19, 2018

Defense Primer: Budgeting for National and Defense Intelligence

Dec 19, 2018

International Approaches to Digital Currencies

Since Bitcoin was introduced a decade ago, about 2,100 cryptocurrencies have been developed. Cryptocurrencies are digital representations of value that have no status as legal tender and are administered using distributed ledger technology, running on a network of independent, peer-to-peer computers. Cryptocurrencies are controversial. Some think they will revolutionize the international payments system for the better; others are skeptical of the business model, calling it a scam. The interest and debate surrounding cryptocurrencies has led some central banks to examine whether the technology underpinning cryptocurrencies could be used to create digital versions of fiat currencies, which would have legal status in their jurisdiction of issue. Governments around the world are taking different approaches to cryptocurrencies and digital fiat currencies, an area of increasing focus for international organizations and forums underpinning the global economy. As Congress considers issues related to digital currencies, including whether to regulate further the cryptocurrency industry, the approaches taken by other governments and international bodies may be of interest. National Approaches to Cryptocurrencies Cryptocurrencies span borders and are international in nature, but governments around the world have responded differently to the proliferation of cryptocurrencies. Three types of responses have generally taken shape. First, some governments, such as Malta, Singapore, and Switzerland, are active cryptocurrency hubs; they have been attracting and developing cryptocurrency industries in their countries. Second, some governments, such as China, India, and South Korea, have banned the use of cryptocurrencies or specific activities associated with cryptocurrencies. Third, some governments, including many European countries and the United States, are seeking balance between financial innovation and risk-management through regulation of cryptocurrencies. National Approaches to Digital Fiat Currencies To date, one country, Venezuela, which is mired in a serious economic crisis, has issued a digital fiat currency, and there are serious questions about the new currency’s success and operational viability. A few small countries are in the process of launching digital fiat currencies. Some countries, including China and Sweden, are researching the costs and benefits of these currencies, and Iran and Russia are considering them as a way to evade U.S. sanctions. Many central banks in major economies, including in the United States and the Eurozone, have argued against issuing a digital fiat currency at this time. International Bodies’ Engagement on Digital Currencies Many international organizations and forums are examining the implications of cryptocurrencies and, in some cases, are starting to make policy recommendations. They have examined a range of issues, including the utility of digital currencies for improving the international payments systems, the possible threats digital currencies may or may not pose to international financial stability, the divergence of national-level cryptocurrency regulations and whether international regulatory coordination is desirable, how cryptocurrencies should be treated in bank prudential regulation, and how to adapt international recommendations to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in light of cryptocurrencies. Possible Questions for Congress In November 2018, the Department of the Treasury announced it is developing a report on cryptocurrency regulation, including a legislative framework for Congress to consider in 2019. How do U.S. current regulations, and the proposed regulations when they are released, compare to other countries’ regulations? Some governments are actively developing cryptocurrency industries. Should the United States follow suit, or risk losing market share in the industry? Alternatively, some governments are tightly restricting, or even banning, cryptocurrency activities to protect consumers. In the United States, do consumers have adequate protections in terms of cryptocurrencies? Has the Federal Reserve adequately assessed the potential benefits and costs of developing a digital U.S. dollar relying on distributed ledger technology? How does the U.S. position on digital fiat currencies compare to other countries’ calculations? What are the potential future impacts on the role of the dollar as a reserve currency? What types of digital currency policies is the Trump Administration advocating at various international organizations? How do international recommendations and standards fit with U.S. regulations?

Dec 19, 2018

DHS’s Cybersecurity Mission—An Overview

Dec 19, 2018

Defense Primer: Department of Defense Contractors

Dec 19, 2018

Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies

The Constitution neither establishes administrative agencies nor explicitly prescribes the manner by which they may be created. Even so, the Supreme Court has generally recognized that Congress has broad constitutional authority to establish and shape the federal bureaucracy. Congress may use its Article I lawmaking powers to create federal agencies and individual offices within those agencies, design agencies’ basic structures and operations, and prescribe, subject to certain constitutional limitations, how those holding agency offices are appointed and removed. Congress also may enumerate the powers, duties, and functions to be exercised by agencies, as well as directly counteract, through later legislation, certain agency actions implementing delegated authority. The most potent tools of congressional control over agencies, including those addressing the structuring, empowering, regulating, and funding of agencies, typically require enactment of legislation. Such legislation must comport with constitutional requirements related to bicameralism (i.e., it must be approved by both houses of Congress) and presentment (i.e., it must be presented to the President for signature). The constitutional process to enact effective legislation requires the support of the House, Senate, and the President, unless the support in both houses is sufficient to override the President’s veto. There also are many non-statutory tools (i.e., tools not requiring legislative enactment to exercise) that may be used by the House, Senate, congressional committees, or individual Members of Congress to influence and control agency action. In some cases, non-statutory measures, such as impeachment and removal, Senate advice and consent to appointments or the ratification of treaties, and committee issuance of subpoenas, can impose legal consequences. Others, however, such as House resolutions of inquiry, may not be used to bind agencies or agency officials and rely for their effectiveness on their ability to persuade or influence.

Dec 19, 2018