CRS Reports

Farm Policy: USDA’s Trade Aid Package

In early 2018, the Trump Administration—citing concerns over national security and unfair trade practices—imposed increased tariffs on certain imported products in general and on U.S. imports from China in particular. Several of the affected foreign trading partners (including China) responded to the U.S. tariffs with their own retaliatory tariffs targeting various U.S. products, especially agricultural commodities. On July 24, 2018, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) would be taking several temporary actions to assist farmers in response to trade damage from what the Administration has characterized as “unjustified retaliation.” Specifically, the Secretary said that USDA would authorize up to $12 billion in financial assistance—referred to as a trade aid package—for certain agricultural commodities using Section 5 of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act (15 U.S.C. 714c). USDA intends for the trade aid package to provide short-term assistance until the ongoing trade disputes are resolved. The aid package includes (1) a Market Facilitation Program (MFP) of direct payments to farmers of soybeans, corn, cotton, sorghum, wheat, hogs, and dairy who are most affected by the trade retaliation; (2) a Food Purchase and Distribution Program to partially offset lost export sales of affected commodities; and (3) an Agricultural Trade Promotion (ATP) Program to expand foreign markets. On August 27, 2018, Secretary Perdue announced details of the trade aid package, including an initial tranche of $6.1 billion in outlays. Under this initial phase, the MFP is to provide $4.7 billion in direct payments to qualifying agricultural producers. To be eligible, a producer must have an ownership share in the commodity, be actively engaged in farming, and be in compliance with adjusted gross income restrictions and conservation provisions. The first sign-up period started September 4, 2018, and extends through January 15, 2019. During this period, an eligible producer may apply for MFP payments—equal to an announced MFP payment rate times 50% of the producer’s 2018 production of eligible commodities. USDA estimates that over three-fourths ($3.6 billion) of the $4.7 billion in initial MFP payments could go to soybean producers. If warranted, USDA may announce a second payment period in early December 2018. MFP payments are capped on a per-person or per-legal-entity basis at a combined $125,000 for eligible crop commodities and, separately, a combined $125,000 for dairy production and hogs. In addition to the initial round of MFP payments, the Administration announced a Food Purchase and Distribution Program that is to undertake $1.2 billion in government purchases of excess food supplies. USDA has targeted an initial 29 commodities for purchases and distribution through domestic nutrition assistance programs. Purchasing orders and distribution activities are to be adjusted based on the demand by the recipient food assistance programs geographically. The smallest piece of the trade aid package is an allocation of $200 million to the ATP to boost the trade promotion efforts at USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service, including foreign market development for affected agricultural products. USDA’s use of its discretionary authority under the CCC Charter Act to make direct payments without further congressional action has historically been somewhat intermittent and limited in its scale. While the use of this authority is not without precedent, the scope and scale of this trade aid package has increased congressional and public interest. Furthermore, the significant variation in the announced MFP payment rates for affected commodities and the general lack of transparency behind the MFP payment rate calculations may elicit questions about equitable treatment among affected commodities.

Sep 12, 2018

Policy Options for Multiemployer Defined Benefit Pension Plans

Multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans are pensions sponsored by more than one employer and maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. In DB pensions, participants receive a monthly benefit in retirement that is based on a formula. In multiemployer DB pensions, the formula typically multiplies a dollar amount by the number of years of service the employee has worked for employers that participate in the DB plan. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a federally-chartered corporation that insures participant benefits in private-sector DB pension plans. Although PBGC is projected to have sufficient resources to provide financial assistance to multiemployer DB plans through 2025, the projected insolvency of many multiemployer DB pension plans will likely result in a substantial strain on PBGC’s multiemployer insurance program. In a report released in June 2017, PBGC indicated that the multiemployer insurance program is highly likely to become insolvent in 2025. In the absence of increased financial resources for PBGC, participants in insolvent multiemployer DB pension plans would likely see sharp reductions in their pension benefits. As a result of a variety of factors—such as the recessions in 2001 and from 2007 to 2009—about 10% to 15% of multiemployer plan participants are in multiemployer DB plans that are likely to become insolvent over the next 19 years and run out of funds from which to pay benefits owed to participants. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), enacted February 9, 2018, created the Joint Select Committee on Solvency of Multiemployer Pension Plans to address the impending insolvencies of several large multiemployer DB pension plans and PBGC. The committee must provide to Congress no later than November 30, 2018, a report and proposed legislative language to improve the solvency of multiemployer DB plans and the PBGC. The report and proposed legislative language must be approved by (1) a majority of committee members appointed by the Speaker of the House and Majority Leader of the Senate and (2) a majority of committee members appointed by the Minority Leader of the House and Minority Leader of the Senate. P.L. 115-123 provides for expedited procedures in the Senate if the committee approves of the proposed legislative language. There are no provisions that provide any special procedures governing House consideration of such legislation. Many policy options have been discussed in committee hearings and in the multiemployer pension plan community by policymakers and stakeholders. Not all options directly address the solvency of financially distressed multiemployer plans or PBGC, but they could be considered as part of a comprehensive package of policy options. The options include assistance for financially troubled multiemployer plans with subsidized loans or partitions; changes to the maximum benefit limit imposed on plans when they receive PBGC financial assistance; changes to PBGC’s premium structure; stricter funding rules; and alternative pension plan designs.

Sep 12, 2018

Tax Policy and Disaster Recovery

Sep 11, 2018

3D-Printed Guns: An Overview of Recent Legal Developments

Sep 11, 2018

U.N. Report Recommends Burmese Military Leaders Be Investigated and Prosecuted for Possible Genocide

Sep 10, 2018

Craft Alcoholic Beverage Industry: Overview and Regulation

Sep 7, 2018

JOBS and Investor Confidence Act (House-Amended S. 488): Capital Markets Provisions

Capital markets provide financing for businesses to fund their growth that would facilitate innovation and jobs creation, and enhance the society’s overall standard of living. They are segments of the financial system in which funding is raised through issuing and trading equity or debt securities, which are forms of financial assets representing ownership or indebtedness of a firm. They are considered the largest source of financing for U.S. nonfinancial companies, significantly larger than bank loans and other forms of financing. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the principal regulator of U.S. capital markets. In recent years, Congress and the SEC began to increasingly direct capital markets regulation away from its traditional “one size fits all” approach. Starting in 2012, the bipartisan Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106) has scaled regulation for smaller companies and reduced regulations in general for certain types of capital formation. It established a number of new options to expand capital access, including a new provision for crowdfunding. Starting in 2015, parts of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (P.L. 114-94)—referred to as JOBS Act 2.0—provided additional scaled disclosure and reporting related regulatory relief for smaller companies. Following the JOBS Act and JOBS Act 2.0, capital markets regulation has become even more tailored to suit companies of different sizes and with different needs. However, concerns over capital formation persisted, given that smaller companies continue to face challenges to accessing capital, and the number of initial public offerings (IPOs) remained at far below long-term average levels post-JOBS Act. To address these concerns, Congress has considered numerous legislative proposals to further expand the scaled approach, with some proposals building on existing JOBS Act provisions. The most notable of these proposals is the JOBS and Investor Confidence Act of 2018 (House-amended S. 488), a capital markets package referred to as JOBS Act 3.0. The House replaced the content of the original S. 488 and passed the amended measure by a 406-4 vote on July 17, 2018. The package includes 32 titles, many of which have previously passed the House with bipartisan support as standalone bills. Of the 32 titles, 18 are more capital markets related. They can be grouped under four general categories: Expand Investor Access. One approach to expand capital access is to expand the investor pool or enhance investor communications. Some of the provisions propose to expand (1) the type of eligible investors by widening certain eligible investor definitions, as seen in Titles IV and X; (2) the number of eligible investors allowed to participate in certain offerings, as seen in Title XXXII; and (3) the communication to eligible investors by allowing broader outreach, as seen in Title I. Reduce Compliance Costs. Some believe compliance costs could potentially outweigh benefits and are disproportionately burdensome for small and medium-sized businesses. In response to these concerns, certain provisions aim to reduce (Titles V and IX) or better understand (required studies in Titles XXII and XXXI) compliance costs for publicly listed companies. Promote Financial Intermediation. Capital markets consist of numerous players. Between investors and company issuers, who are the end contributors and recipients of funding, there are financial intermediaries that serve to channel funding or execute trades. Titles XXVI (a required study) and XXXII would promote the use of pooled investment vehicles to channel funding from investors to issuers. Title XXIV would require a study on investment research of small issuers, and Title XX would create a designated new marketplace for smaller issuer stock trading. Increase Investor Protection. Multiple S. 488 titles would create investor protection safeguards as part of a provision related to capital formation. Other provisions center on investor protection. For example, Titles XXVII (a required study) and XXIX would provide protection to general investors against corporate insiders, and Title XXX would provide targeted protection to senior investors who are victims of financial exploitation.

Sep 7, 2018

The U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Overview of Department of Energy Sites

Responsibility for U.S. nuclear weapons resides in both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE). DOD develops, deploys, and operates the missiles and aircraft that deliver nuclear warheads. It also generates the military requirements for the warheads carried on those platforms. DOE, and its semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), oversee the research, development, testing, and acquisition programs that produce, maintain, and sustain the nuclear warheads. To achieve these objectives, the facilities that constitute the nuclear weapons complex produce nuclear materials, fabricate nuclear and nonnuclear components, assemble and disassemble nuclear warheads, conduct scientific research and analysis to maintain confidence in the reliability of existing warheads, integrate components with nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, and conduct support operations. The Trump Administration, in testimony before Congress and in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (released in February 2018), has raised concerns about the aging infrastructure of facilities in the nuclear weapons complex. While the Obama Administration proposed, and Congress funded, budget increases for these facilities in the past decade, the Trump Administration has argued that “the United States has not pursued the investments needed to ensure that the infrastructure has the capacity to not only maintain the current nuclear stockpile but also to respond to unforeseen technical or geopolitical developments.” The nuclear weapons complex—what NNSA currently refers to as the Nuclear Security Enterprise—consists primarily of nine government-owned, contractor-operated sites in seven states, and a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) nuclear reactor used to produce tritium for nuclear weapons. The complex began with the establishment of the Manhattan Engineer District in 1942, then grew in size and complexity during the Cold War, before evolving into the current configuration during the 1990s. Facilities at the current nine sites include three laboratories, five component fabrication/materials production plants, one assembly and disassembly site, a geologic waste repository, and one testing facility that now conducts research but was previously the location for U.S. underground nuclear tests. This report summarizes the operations at each of these sites. As Congress conducts oversight of DOE’s and NNSA’s management, operations, and programs, and as it authorizes and appropriates funds for the Nuclear Security Enterprise, it may address a wide range of issues related to the nuclear weapons complex. These include questions about organization and management at NNSA, infrastructure recapitalization, plutonium pit production, and concerns about access to necessary supplies of tritium.

Sep 6, 2018

Agriculture in the WTO: Rules and Limits on U.S. Domestic Support

Omnibus U.S. farm legislation—referred to as the farm bill—has typically been renewed every five or six years. Farm income and commodity price support programs have been a part of U.S. farm bills since the 1930s. Each successive farm bill usually involves some modification or replacement of existing farm programs. A key question likely to be asked of every new farm proposal or program is how it will affect U.S. commitments under the World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) and its Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM). The United States is currently committed, under the AoA, to spend no more than $19.1 billion annually on those domestic farm support programs most likely to distort trade—referred to as amber box programs and measured by the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS). The AoA spells out the rules for countries to determine whether their policies—for any given year—are potentially trade distorting and how to calculate the costs. The most recent U.S. notification to the WTO of domestic support outlays (made on May 1, 2018) is for the 2015 crop year. To date, the United States has never exceeded its $19.1 billion amber box spending limit. However, this has been achieved in some years (1999, 2000, and 2001) through judicious use of the de minimis exclusion described below. An additional consideration for WTO compliance—the SCM rules governing adverse market effects resulting from a farm program—comes into play when a domestic farm policy effect spills over into international markets. The SCM details rules for determining when a subsidy is “prohibited” (e.g., certain export- and import-substitution subsidies) and when it is “actionable” (e.g., certain domestic support policies that incentivize overproduction and result in significant market distortion—whether as lower market prices or altered trade patterns). Because the United States is a major producer, consumer, exporter, and/or importer of most major agricultural commodities, the SCM is relevant for most major U.S. agricultural products. As a result, if a particular U.S. farm program is deemed to result in market distortion that adversely affects other WTO members—even if it is within agreed-upon AoA spending limits—then that program may be subject to challenge under the WTO dispute settlement procedures. Designing farm programs that comply with WTO rules can avoid potential trade disputes. Based on AoA and SCM rules, U.S. domestic agricultural support can be evaluated against five specific successive questions to determine how it is classified under the WTO rules, whether total support is within WTO limits, and whether a specific program fully complies with WTO rules: Can a program’s support outlays be excluded from the AMS total by being placed in the green box of minimally distorting programs? Can a program’s support outlays be excluded from the AMS total by being placed in the blue box of production-limiting programs? If amber, will support be less than 5% of production value (either product-specific or non-product-specific) thus qualifying for the de minimis exclusion? Does the total, remaining annual AMS exceed the $19.1 billion amber box limit? Even if a program is found to be fully compliant with the AoA rules and limits, does its support result in price or trade distortion in international markets? If so, then it may be subject to challenge under SCM rules.

Sep 6, 2018

Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF): Overview, Issues, and Legislation

The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) is the federal authority for regulating contaminants in public water supplies. The act includes the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) program, established in 1996 to help public water systems finance infrastructure projects needed to comply with federal drinking water regulations and to meet the act’s health protection objectives. Under this program, states receive annual capitalization grants from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to provide financial assistance (primarily subsidized loans) to public water systems for drinking water projects and other specified activities. Through FY2018, Congress has appropriated a total of $20.41 billion for the program. From FY1997 through FY2017, states provided $35.38 billion in DWSRF assistance to water systems for 14,090 projects. The latest EPA survey of capital improvement needs indicates that public water systems need to invest $472.6 billion on infrastructure improvements over 20 years to ensure the provision of safe drinking water. EPA reports that, while all of the projects identified in the survey would promote the health protection objectives of the SDWA, $57.6 billion (12%) of reported needs are attributable to SDWA compliance. A study by the American Water Works Association estimates that restoring aging infrastructure and expanding water systems to keep up with population growth would require a nationwide investment of at least $1 trillion through 2035. Program issues include (1) the gap between estimated needs and funding; (2) the growing cost of complying with SDWA standards (particularly for small communities); (3) the ability of small or disadvantaged communities to afford DWSRF financing; and (4) the broader need for cities to maintain, upgrade, and expand infrastructure unrelated to SDWA compliance. Several overarching policy questions are under debate, including the appropriate federal role in providing financial assistance for local water infrastructure projects and potential funding mechanisms that could supplement or replace a program reliant on annual appropriations. Enacted in 2014, the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA; P.L. 113-121,Title V, Subtitle C) authorized a five-year pilot loan guarantee program to promote increased development of, and private investment in, primarily large water infrastructure projects. Congress noted that the pilot program is intended to complement, not replace, the DWSRF program and the similar Clean Water Act State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) program for wastewater infrastructure. For FY2017, Congress provided $30.0 million for the program ($25 million for EPA to provide loan guarantees for water infrastructure projects under WIFIA and $5 million for administrative costs). The Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322) made several revisions to the DWSRF program and authorized $100 million in DWSRF appropriations to Michigan to assist the City of Flint in repairing its drinking water system. In P.L. 114-254, Congress appropriated the DWSRF funding authorized in the WIIN Act. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31), included $863.23 million for the DWSRF program. For FY2018, the President requested $863 million for the DWSRF program and $20 million for the WIFIA program. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), included $1.16 billion for the DWSRF program and $63 million for WIFIA. The state of the nation’s water infrastructure and the challenges many communities face in addressing infrastructure needs continue to receive congressional attention. Numerous bills have been introduced in the 115th Congress to expand DWSRF eligibilities, increase funding authority, and make other revisions to the DWSRF program and to authorize new funding programs. Two such bills have been reported: the Drinking Water System Improvement Act of 2017 (H.R. 3387) and a broader water resources infrastructure bill, America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (S. 2800), which would add new DWSRF and CWSRF provisions to WIFIA.

Sep 5, 2018

Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy

Georgia is one of the United States’ closest non-NATO partners among the post-Soviet states. With a history of strong economic aid and security cooperation, the United States has deepened its strategic partnership with Georgia since Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia and 2014 invasion of Ukraine. U.S. policy expressly supports Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, and Georgia is a leading recipient of U.S. aid in Europe and Eurasia. Many observers consider Georgia to be one of the most democratic states in the post-Soviet region, even as the country faces ongoing governance challenges. The center-left Georgian Dream party has more than a three-fourths supermajority in parliament, allowing it to rule with only limited checks and balances. Although Georgia faces high rates of poverty and underemployment, its economy in 2017 appeared to enter a period of stronger growth than the previous four years. Georgia: Basic Facts Population: 3.73 million (2018 est.) Comparative Area: slightly larger than West Virginia Capital: Tbilisi Ethnic Composition: 87% Georgian, 6% Azerbaijani, 5% Armenian (2014 census) Religion: 83% Georgian Orthodox, 11% Muslim, 3% Armenian Apostolic (2014 census) GDP/GDP per capita: $15.1 billion/$4,099 (2017 est.) Top Exports: copper ores, beverages, iron and steel, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals (2017) Leadership: Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze, President Giorgi Margvelashvili, Defense Minister Levan Izoria, Foreign Minister David Zalkaliani, Parliamentary Chairman Irakli Kobakhidze Sources: National Statistics Office of Georgia and International Monetary Fund (does not include Abkhazia and South Ossetia). The Georgian Dream won elections in 2012 amid growing dissatisfaction with the former ruling party, Mikheil Saakashvili’s center-right United National Movement, which came to power as a result of Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution. In August 2008, Russia went to war with Georgia to prevent Saakashvili’s government from reestablishing control over Georgia’s regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which broke away from Georgia in the early 1990s to become informal Russian protectorates. Congress has expressed firm support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-44, Title II, §253) states that the United States “does not recognize territorial changes effected by force, including the illegal invasions and occupations” of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and other territories occupied by Russia. In September 2016, the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 660, which condemns Russia’s military intervention and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Similar resolutions on Georgia and other countries with territories under Russian occupation have been introduced recently in the House and the Senate (H.Res. 955, H.Res. 1030, S.Res. 106). The United States provides substantial nonmilitary and military aid to Georgia each year. Since 2010, U.S. nonmilitary aid to Georgia has totaled around $60 million a year on average, in addition to a second five-year Millennium Challenge Corporation grant of $140 million to support education. In FY2018, Congress appropriated $68 million in nonmilitary aid to Georgia. U.S. Military aid to Georgia has been estimated at around $74 million a year on average from FY2010 to FY2017. For FY2018, Congress appropriated at least $37 million in military aid (Foreign Military Financing [FMF] and International Military Education and Training [IMET]), not including Defense appropriations. The Trump Administration also has provided major defensive lethal weaponry to Georgia. In November 2017, the U.S. State Department approved a foreign military sale of over 400 Javelin portable anti-tank missiles at a total estimated cost of $75 million. The Georgian Ministry of Defense confirmed that the first stage of two sales was complete as of January 2018.

Sep 5, 2018

UPDATED: Déjà Vu All Over Again: States Renew Constitutional Challenge to the ACA’s Individual Mandate

Sep 5, 2018

Defense Primer: Lowest Price Technically Acceptable Contracts

Sep 4, 2018

Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview

Conventional wisdom holds that the federal government plays relatively little role in U.S. campaigns and elections. Although states retain authority for most aspects of election administration, a closer look reveals that the federal government also has steadily increased its presence in campaigns and elections in the past 50 years. Altogether, dozens of congressional committees and federal agencies could be involved in federal elections under current law. Congress faces a complex mix of traditional oversight areas with developing ones throughout the elections field. Reports of foreign interference during the 2016 election cycle, and concerns about future interference, have raised the profile of campaigns and elections policy in Congress, at federal agencies, and beyond. As Congress considers these and other developing issues, this report provides the House and Senate with a resource for first understanding the current campaigns and elections regulatory structure. The report addresses those areas of law and public policy that most directly and routinely affect American campaigns and elections. This includes six broad categories of law through which Congress has assigned various agencies roles in regulating or supporting campaigns, elections, or both. These are campaign finance; election administration; election security; redistricting; qualifications and contested elections; and voting rights. No single federal agency is in charge of the federal role in campaigns and elections, just as multiple statutes address various aspects of the field. The Election Assistance Commission and Federal Election Commission are devoted entirely to campaigns and elections. Congress has charged other departments and agencies—such as the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, and component organizations comprising the Intelligence Community—primarily with responsibilities for other areas of public policy, but also with supporting or administering campaigns and elections policy in specific cases. Other agencies or statutes may be relevant in specific cases. This report does not track legislation that proposes changes in the policy environment discussed herein. It will be updated occasionally to reflect new information or major policy developments.

Sep 4, 2018

Securities Regulation and Initial Coin Offerings: A Legal Primer

Initial coin offerings (ICOs)—a method of raising capital in exchange for digital coins or tokens that entitle their holders to certain rights—are a hot topic among legislators, regulators, and financial market professionals. In response to a surge in the popularity of ICOs over the past 18 months, regulators in a number of countries have banned ICOs. Other foreign regulators have cautioned that unregistered ICOs may violate their securities laws, issued guidance clarifying the application of their securities laws to ICOs, or proposed new rules or legislation directed at regulating ICOs. ICOs have also attracted the attention of U.S. securities regulators. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has cautioned that depending on their specific features, ICOs may qualify as offerings of “securities” subject to federal regulation. Whether an ICO involves an offering of “securities” has important legal consequences. Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) requires issuers of securities to register their offerings with the SEC or conduct them pursuant to a specific exemption from registration. Issuers and sellers of securities also face anti-fraud liability under the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act). The SEC has the authority to investigate and punish violations of the securities laws, and has indicated that it will “vigorously” police the burgeoning ICO market for such violations. To determine whether a transaction involves an offering of “securities,” courts employ a four-part test outlined by the Supreme Court’s 1946 decision in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. Under that test, a transaction qualifies as an offering of “securities” if it involves (1) an investment of money, (2) in a common enterprise, (3) with a reasonable expectation of profit, (4) to be derived from the efforts of others. In applying the Howey test, the Court has emphasized the importance of analyzing “the economic realities” of a transaction, as opposed to its form or the label that its promoters give it. Because ICOs are incredibly diverse, it is impossible to draw broad conclusions about their status under the securities laws, which will depend on fact-intensive inquiries into details that vary among different ICOs. As a general matter, though, ICOs are more likely to qualify as offerings of “securities” when token purchasers (1) are motivated primarily by a desire for financial returns (as opposed to a desire to use or consume some good or service for which tokens can be exchanged), and (2) lack a meaningful ability to control the activities on which their profits will depend. In light of these principles, attorneys have developed a method for structuring ICOs—the Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT)—that attempts to avoid classification of the tokens issued pursuant to certain ICOs as “securities.” However, whether the SAFT achieves its intended goal remains subject to significant debate. The SEC has pursued a number of enforcement actions related to unregistered ICOs. In July 2017, the SEC issued a report of investigation concluding that tokens issued by an unincorporated organization called “The DAO” qualified as “securities” under the Howey test. And in December 2017, the agency reached the same conclusion about tokens issued by Munchee, Inc., the creator of an iPhone application involving restaurant reviews. These enforcement actions, and a prominent speech given by an agency official in June 2018, offer some guidance on the SEC’s views on when ICOs will qualify as offerings of “securities.” The Securities Act and related regulations offer a number of exemptions from the Act’s registration requirements for offerings that meet certain conditions. However, some commentators have doubted the attractiveness of the relevant exemptions for ICOs. Commentators have also proposed a number of policies to improve the regulation of ICOs, ranging from a specific registration exemption for ICOs to a “safe harbor” for certain token exchanges.

Aug 31, 2018

Turkey’s Currency Crisis

Aug 30, 2018

India: Religious Freedom Issues

India is the world’s second-most populous country with more than 1.3 billion people and is the birthplace of four major world religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, Sikhism, and Jainism. It is also home to about 180 million Muslims—only Indonesia and Pakistan have more. A small Christian minority includes about 30 million people. An officially secular nation with thousands of ethnic groups and 22 official languages, independent India has a long tradition of religious tolerance (with periodic and sometimes serious lapses). Religious freedom is explicitly protected under its constitution. Hindus account for a vast majority (nearly four-fifths) of the country’s populace. Hindu nationalism has been a rising political force in recent decades, by many accounts eroding India’s secular nature and leading to new assaults on the country’s religious freedoms. The 2014 national election victory of the Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian Peoples’ Party or BJP) brought newly acute attention to the issue of religious freedom in India. Tracing its origins to a political party created in 1951 in collaboration with the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Organization or RSS), the BJP has since gone on to win control of numerous state governments, including in Uttar Pradesh, the country’s most populous state with more than 200 million residents, one-fifth of them Muslim. The BJP’s leader, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, is a self-avowed Hindu nationalist and lifelong RSS member with a controversial past: In 2002, during his 13-year tenure as chief minister of the Gujarat state, large-scale anti-Muslim rioting there left more than 1,000 people dead, and Modi faced accusations of complicity and/or inaction (he was later formally exculpated). In 2005, Modi was denied a U.S. visa under a rarely-used law barring entry for foreign government officials found to be complicit in severe violations of religious freedom, and he had no official contacts with the U.S. government until 2013. Many in the U.S. Congress were critical of Modi’s role in the 2002 violence, and some continue to call attention to signs that religious freedom abuses are increasing under his and his party’s rule, as documented by the U.S. State Department and independent human rights groups. This report provides an overview of religious freedom issues in India, beginning with a brief review of U.S.-India relations and India’s human rights setting broadly, then discussing the country’s religious demographics, religious freedom protections, and conceptions of Hindu nationalism and its key institutional proponents in Indian society. It then moves to specific areas of religiously-motivated repression and violence, including state-level anti-conversion laws, cow protection vigilantism, and perceived assaults on freedoms of expression and operations by nongovernmental organizations that are seen as harmful to India’s secular traditions and the U.S-promoted goal of interfaith tolerance.

Aug 30, 2018

The Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor Provision: Overview of Interstate Air Pollution Control

Notwithstanding air quality progress since 1970, challenges remain to reduce pollution in areas exceeding federal standards and to ensure continued compliance elsewhere. The movement of air pollutants across state lines, known as interstate transport, has made it difficult for some downwind states to attain federal ozone and fine particulate matter (PM2.5) standards, partly because states lack authority to limit emissions from other states. The Clean Air Act’s “Good Neighbor” provision (Section 110(a)(2)(D)) seeks to address this issue and requires states to prohibit emissions that significantly contribute to another state’s air quality problems. It requires each state’s implementation plan (SIP)—a collection of air quality regulations and documents—to prohibit emissions that either “significantly contribute” to nonattainment or “interfere with maintenance” of federal air quality standards in another state. The act also authorizes states to petition EPA to issue a finding that emissions from “any major source or group of stationary sources” violate the Good Neighbor provision (Section 126(b)). EPA and the states have implemented regional programs to address interstate ozone and PM2.5 transport and comply with the Good Neighbor provision. These programs set emission “budgets” for ozone and PM2.5 precursor emissions—specifically, sulfur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxide (NOx) as PM2.5 precursors and seasonal NOx emissions as an ozone precursor. The current program—the Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR)—focuses on limiting interstate transport of power sector SO2 and NOx emissions to eastern states. Power sector emissions in CSAPR states are below emission budgets as a result of regulatory and market factors (see figure). Annual SO2, annual NOx, and ozone season NOx emissions from CSAPR sources decreased 77%, 41%, and 15%, respectively, between 2009 and 2016. CSAPR Emission Trends: 2009-2016 / Source: EPA Air Markets Program Data, https://ampd.epa.gov/ampd/. Notes: The Clean Air Interstate Rule was in effect 2009 through the end of 2014 and was replaced by CSAPR on January 1, 2015. EPA has concluded that regional SO2 and NOx programs have reduced interstate transport of PM2.5 and ozone. The Energy Information Administration’s national-scale analysis identifies market and regulatory factors contributing to emission reductions. It is unclear whether emissions will remain well below budgets, given recent prices of ozone season NOx allowances (i.e., authorization for each ton emitted) and the supply of banked allowances for future use in lieu of emission reductions. Research indicates that ozone transport harms air quality in downwind states. However, stakeholder views vary regarding the extent to which interstate transport impacts air quality. Some note that some coal-fired power plants do not fully use already-installed pollution controls. Several states have sought additional upwind reductions in ozone precursors through Section 126(b) petitions. Others have questioned the feasibility of achieving additional reductions in ozone precursors, raising concerns about emissions from international or natural sources. EPA recently proposed to determine that CSAPR fully addresses Good Neighbor obligations for the 2008 ozone standard but has not yet made a “Good Neighbor” determination for the more stringent 2015 ozone standard. The agency has therefore not yet determined whether and how it will update the CSAPR budgets with respect to the 2015 ozone standard. Members of Congress may have an interest in better understanding how EPA and states implement the Clean Air Act’s Good Neighbor provision, particularly as EPA continues its assessment of Good Neighbor obligations under the 2015 ozone standard. The following issues, among others, may inform deliberations about interstate air transport. First, the extent to which existing programs will improve air quality in areas not meeting the 2015 ozone standard is to be determined. CSAPR has not addressed NOx emissions from nonpower sector sources, such as large industrial boilers. EPA concluded that industrial sources have potential to cost-effectively reduce NOx emissions but is less certain about the structure of potential NOx control strategies. Second, some have questioned whether additional regulatory incentives are necessary to fulfill Good Neighbor obligations, particularly given current NOx allowance prices. These prices are below the marginal abatement cost, which may result in higher emissions. Third, EPA’s current air quality initiatives may indirectly affect its Good Neighbor assessments. EPA recently sought comment on potential flexibilities for the development of Good Neighbor SIPs.

Aug 30, 2018

Made in China 2025 and Industrial Policies: Issues for Congress

Aug 29, 2018

Emergency Relief for Disaster-Damaged Roads and Public Transportation Systems

The U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) provides federal assistance for disaster-damaged roads and public transportation systems through two programs: the Emergency Relief Program (ER) administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and the Public Transportation Emergency Relief Program administered by the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). These programs are funded mainly by appropriations that have varied considerably from year to year. Over time the amounts are substantial. Since 2012, the Highway ER Program has received $5.4 billion; FTA’s ER program has received $10.7 billion, all but $330 million of which was in response to Hurricane Sandy. Roads and bridges that are federal-aid highways or are public-use roads on federal lands are eligible for assistance under FHWA’s ER Program. Following natural disasters (such as Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017, which damaged highways in Florida, Texas, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), or catastrophic failures (such as the 2013 collapse of the Skagit River Bridge in Washington State), ER funds are made available for both emergency repairs and restoration of eligible facilities to conditions comparable to those before the disaster. Although emergency relief for highways is a federal program, the decision to seek ER funding is made by a state government or by a federal land management agency. Local governments are not eligible to apply. The program is funded by a permanent annual authorization of $100 million from the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) along with general fund appropriations provided by Congress on a “such sums as necessary” basis. Appropriated ER funds have averaged roughly $730 million annually since FY2009. FHWA pays 100% of the cost of emergency repairs done to minimize the extent of damage, to protect remaining facilities, and to restore essential traffic during or immediately after a disaster. Emergency repairs must be completed within 180 days of the disaster event. Permanent repairs go beyond the restoration of essential traffic and are intended to restore damaged bridges and roads to conditions and capabilities comparable to those before the event. The federal share for permanent repairs is generally 80% for non-Interstate roads and 90% for Interstate Highways. All ER funding is distributed through state departments of transportation or federal land management agencies such as the National Park Service. Certain “quick release” funds are allocated to help with initial emergency repair costs and may be released prior to completion of detailed damage inspections and cost estimates. Other allocations to the states follow a more deliberate process of completing detailed damage reports, developing cost estimates, and processing competitive bids. Unlike the long-standing ER program in highways, the Public Transportation ER Program dates to 2012. The Public Transportation ER program provides federal funding on a reimbursement basis to public transportation agencies, states, and other government authorities for damage to public transportation facilities or operations as a result of a natural disaster or other emergency and to protect assets from future damage. The Public Transportation ER program provides federal support for both capital and operating expenses. Unlike the FHWA’s ER program, FTA’s ER program does not have a permanent annual authorization. All funds are authorized on a “such sums as necessary” basis and are available only pursuant to an appropriation from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. In the absence of an appropriation, transit agencies must rely on funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Since its creation in 2012, there have been two appropriations to the Public Transportation ER program. More than $10 billion was appropriated in 2013 to respond to Hurricane Sandy and $330 million was appropriated in 2018 to respond to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Two recurring issues drawing congressional attention are funding levels and funding of activities that go beyond restoring transportation facilities to predisaster conditions, such as making damaged highways more resilient to natural disasters. FTA’s ER program has fewer limits and more flexibility than the emergency relief programs administered by FEMA and FHWA; thus it too faces questions about expenditures that go beyond repairing damage from a disaster. The lack of a permanent annual authorization for FTA means FTA cannot provide funding immediately after a disaster or emergency, and transit agencies must rely on FEMA for a quick response.

Aug 29, 2018

Universal Postal Union to Convene an Extraordinary Congress

The Universal Postal Union (UPU) Established in 1874, the Universal Postal Union (UPU) is the primary forum for multilateral cooperation and negotiation of international postal issues among nations worldwide. According to its website, the UPU “helps to ensure a truly universal network of up-to-date products and services.” The primary decisionmaking body of the UPU is the UPU Congress. Normally, the Congress convenes every four years and was next scheduled to meet in 2020. On September 3, 2018, however, the UPU is scheduled to hold an “Extraordinary Congress” for the first time since 1900. This Insight provides a brief introduction to the UPU and its policies regarding two international mail issues that have been the subject of legislation introduced in the 115th Congress: (1) advanced electronic customs data and (2) international mail rates and procedures for establishing terminal dues (i.e., international mail remuneration rates). The UPU and UPU Congress The UPU became a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1948 and currently has 192 member nations. The UPU Congress is the “supreme authority” of the UPU and the primary forum for negotiation among member nations. The 26th UPU Congress was held in 2016 in Istanbul, Turkey. Representatives from each of the UPU’s member nations met to “decide on a new World Postal Strategy and set the future rules for international mail exchanges.” Other UPU Bodies Besides the UPU Congress, the UPU consists of these bodies The Postal Operations Council (POC) includes 40 member nations elected during the UPU Congress to handle technical and operational issues. The Council of Administration meets annually to ensure the continuity of the UPU’s work between Congresses. Among other things, it is responsible for the UPU’s budget and accounts. The International Bureau is an administrative body that provides logistical and technical support to the UPU. Extraordinary Congress An “Extraordinary Congress” may be convened by request with approval of two-thirds of the current UPU nations. The UPU has convened an Extraordinary Congress on one occasion, in 1900, to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the UPU’s founding. During the 26th Congress, the UPU approved a resolution to convene its second Extraordinary Congress in September 2018. International Mail: Select Issues for Congress Bills on international postal issues have been introduced in the 115th Congress, including several that would require the Secretary of State to renegotiate any portion of an existing UPU agreement where the United States’ obligation conflicts with its provisions (e.g., H.R. 5788, S. 372). Although the POC has authority to make select regulatory changes at its annual sessions, changes to the UPU Acts that require ratification by the member nations may be renegotiated only at the quadrennial Congress. The UPU’s 27th Congress is scheduled for 2020. However, the Extraordinary Congress will convene from September 3 to September 7, 2018, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. On August 23, 2018, President Trump issued a Presidential Memorandum that specified international postal policies and reforms that are “in the interest of the United States.” Many of the policies and reforms listed in the memorandum have been the subject of legislation introduced in the 115th Congress, including (1) rates that do not favor foreign mailers over domestic mailers, (2) terminal dues reform with rates that fully reimburse the United States Postal Service (USPS) for costs, and (3) advance collection of electronic customs data (e.g., H.R. 5524, S. 2638, S. 3057). The President states that future UPU agreements, including those from the upcoming Extraordinary Congress, should be consistent with the policies in the memorandum. Terminal Dues and International Mail Rates Each UPU member nation selects one—or, in rare instances, more than one—Designated Postal Operator (DPO) to “operate postal services and to fulfill the related obligations arising out of the Acts of the Union on its territory.” The USPS is the DPO for the United States. Terminal dues are payments that the destination DPO (e.g., USPS) collects from the originating DPO (e.g., China Post) for the costs of delivering inbound international letter mail in the destination country (in this example, the United States). The purpose of terminal dues is to compensate the destination country for the costs it incurs. Terminal dues, however, are not calculated based on the actual cost of handling and delivery of the mail in the destination country. Instead, terminal dues are based on the originating country’s economic and postal development. Terminal dues paid by less developed countries are lower than those paid by more developed countries regardless of the actual cost incurred by the destination country. The prices an originating DPO charges its customers for outbound international mail are not the same as the terminal dues it pays the destination DPO. Each member nation is responsible for developing its own policies and regulations to determine the prices its DPO charges consumers for outgoing international mail products. International postal rates may be also set by negotiated service agreements or through a bilateral or multilateral agreement between the USPS and DPOs of one or more UPU member nations. Although terminal dues do not apply to these agreements, a 2017 study commission by the PRC noted that the rates are often the baseline point during negotiations. Further, terminal dues apply only to international letter mail (e.g., letters, postcards, small packets) between DPOs. Terminal dues do not apply to express consignment operators (e.g., UPS, FedEx) or to parcel post, which is priced using a system based primarily on the size and weight of each package. Advanced Electronic Customs Data The UPU’s POC is responsible for developing policies and recommendations regarding advanced electronic customs data. Among other things, the POC has conducted outreach and monitored the legislative developments of UPU member nations regarding advanced electronic data requirements. Additionally, in May 2017, the UPU and the World Customs Organization (WCO) launched a joint WCO-UPU survey to assess nations’ preparedness for “capturing, sending, receiving and using data in electronic format.” Sharing of advanced electronic customs data is not required under the 2016 UPU agreements for all member nations. However, a WCO-UPU Memorandum of Understanding and the 2018 WCO-UPU Postal Customs Guide note the importance of developing best practices and standards for nations’ collection and sharing of electronic customs data.

Aug 29, 2018

The “Flores Settlement” and Alien Families Apprehended at the U.S. Border: Frequently Asked Questions

Reports of alien minors being separated from their parents at the U.S. border have raised questions about the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) authority to detain alien families together pending the aliens’ removal proceedings, which may include consideration of claims for asylum and other forms of relief from removal. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) authorizes—and in some case requires—DHS to detain aliens pending removal proceedings. However, neither the INA nor other federal laws specifically address when or whether alien family members must be detained together. DHS’s options regarding the detention or release of alien families are significantly restricted by a binding settlement agreement from a case in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California now called Flores v. Sessions. The “Flores Settlement” establishes a policy favoring the release of alien minors, including accompanied alien minors, and requires that those alien minors who are not released from government custody be transferred within a brief period to non-secure, state-licensed facilities. DHS indicates that few such facilities exist that can house adults and children together. Accordingly, under the Flores Settlement and current circumstances, DHS asserts that it generally cannot detain alien children and their parents together for more than brief periods. Following an executive order President Trump issued that addressed alien family separation, the Department of Justice filed a motion to modify the Flores Settlement to allow for the detention of alien families in unlicensed facilities for longer periods. The district court overseeing the settlement rejected that motion, much as it has rejected similar motions to modify the settlement filed by the government in recent years. (The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has affirmed the earlier rulings but has not yet reviewed the most recent ruling.) In its most recent motion, the government has argued, among other things, that a preliminary injunction entered in a separate litigation, Ms. L v. ICE, which generally requires the government to reunite separated alien families and refrain from separating families going forward, supports a modification of the Flores Settlement to allow indefinite detention of alien minors alongside their parents. Congress, for its part, could largely override the Flores Settlement legislatively, although constitutional considerations relating to the rights of aliens in immigration custody may inform the permissible scope and effect of such legislation.

Aug 28, 2018

U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations

Aug 28, 2018

Overview of Programs Supporting Minority-Serving Institutions under the Higher Education Act

Aug 27, 2018

Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) FY2019 Appropriations: Overview

The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. President Trump submitted his FY2019 budget request on February 12, 2018. The request included a total of $49.1 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $282 million for the CFTC. The House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2019 (H.R. 6258, H.Rept. 115-792) on June 28, 2018. Total FY2018 funding in the reported bill would be $45.7 billion, with another $255 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 5961, H.Rept. 115-706). The combined total of $45.9 billion would be about $3.2 billion below the President’s FY2019 request, with the largest difference in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA) and in government-wide transfers (Section 737). H.R. 6258 was included as Division B of H.R. 6147, the interior appropriations bill, when it was considered by the House of Representatives beginning on July 17, 2018. The bill was amended numerous times, shifting funding among FSGG agencies but not changing the FSGG totals. H.R. 6147 passed the House on July 19, 2018. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2019 (S. 3107, S.Rept. 115-281) on June 28, 2018. Funding in S. 3107 totaled $45.9 billion, about $3.2 billion below the President’s FY2018 request, with the largest difference in the funding for the GSA and in government-wide transfers (Section 737). The Senate began floor consideration of H.R. 6147 on July 24, 2018, including the text of S. 3107 as Division B of the amendment in the nature of a substitute (S.Amdt. 3399). The Senate passed its version of H.R. 6147 on August 1, 2018. Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. The FSGG bills do, however, often contain additional legislative provisions relating to such agencies, as is the case with H.R. 6258/H.R. 6147, which contains language from a number of different bills relating to financial regulation that had previously passed the House.

Aug 24, 2018

Supreme Court Nomination: CRS Products

Aug 24, 2018

Air Force OA-X Light Attack Aircraft/SOCOM Armed Overwatch Program

Aug 23, 2018

Expedited Citizenship through Military Service

Aug 23, 2018

Freshwater Harmful Algal Blooms: An Overview

Aug 23, 2018

CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA

Aug 22, 2018

Trade Remedies: Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974

Aug 22, 2018

Agriculture Appropriations: Animal and Plant Health

Aug 22, 2018

Who Pays for Long-Term Services and Supports?

Aug 22, 2018

Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh: His Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court

On July 9, 2018, President Donald J. Trump announced the nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill retiring Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s seat on the Supreme Court of the United States. Nominated to the D.C. Circuit by President George W. Bush, Judge Kavanaugh has served on that court for more than twelve years. In his role as a Circuit Judge, the nominee has authored roughly three hundred opinions (including majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents) and adjudicated numerous high-profile cases concerning, among other things, the status of wartime detainees held by the United States at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; the constitutionality of the current structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau; the validity of rules issued by the Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Air Act; and the legality of the Federal Communications Commission’s net neutrality rule. Since joining the D.C. Circuit, Judge Kavanaugh has also taught courses on the separation of powers, national security law, and constitutional interpretation at Harvard Law School, Yale Law School, and the Georgetown University Law Center. Prior to his appointment to the federal bench in 2006, Judge Kavanaugh served in the George W. Bush White House, first as associate and then senior associate counsel, before becoming assistant and staff secretary to the President. Before his service in the Bush Administration, the nominee worked in private practice at the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis, LLP for three years and served in the Office of the Independent Counsel and the Office of the Solicitor General. Judge Kavanaugh began his legal career with three federal clerkships—two for judges on the federal courts of appeals and one for the jurist he is nominated to succeed, Justice Kennedy. Judge Kavanaugh is a graduate of Yale College and Yale Law School. Judge Kavanaugh’s nomination to the High Court is particularly significant as he would be replacing Justice Kennedy, who was widely recognized as the Roberts Court’s median vote. Justice Kennedy was often at the center of legal debates on the Supreme Court, casting decisive votes on issues ranging from the powers of the federal government vis-à-vis the states, to separation-of-powers disputes, to key civil liberties issues. Accordingly, a critical question now before the Senate as it considers providing its advice and consent to the President’s nomination to the High Court is how Judge Kavanaugh may view the many legal issues in which Justice Kennedy’s vote was often determinative. In this vein, understanding Judge Kavanaugh’s views on the law is one method to gauge how the Supreme Court might be affected by his appointment. In attempting to ascertain how Judge Kavanaugh could influence the High Court, however, it is important to note at the onset that, for various reasons, it often is difficult to predict accurately a nominee’s likely contributions to the Court based on his or her prior experience. That said, the nominee is a well-known jurist with a robust record, composed of both judicial opinions and non-judicial writings, in which he has made his views on the law and the role of the judge fairly clear. Central to the nominee’s judicial philosophy is the concept of judicial formalism and a belief that the “rule of law” must be governed by a “law of rules.” In addition, Judge Kavanaugh has endorsed the concept of the judge as a neutral “umpire.” In order to achieve this vision of neutrality, the nominee’s legal writings have emphasized (1) the primacy of the text of the law being interpreted, (2) an awareness of history and tradition, and (3) adherence to precedent. Applying these principles, Judge Kavanaugh’s views on several discrete legal issues are readily apparent, including administrative law, environmental law, freedom of speech, national security, the Second Amendment, and separation of powers. At the same time, perhaps because of the nature of the D.C. Circuit’s docket, less is known about the nominee’s views on other legal issues, including business law, civil rights, substantive due process, and takings law. This report provides an overview of Judge Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence and discusses his potential impact on the Court if he were to be confirmed to succeed Justice Kennedy. In particular, the report focuses upon those areas of law where Justice Kennedy can be seen to have influenced the High Court’s approach to certain issues or served as a fifth and deciding vote on the Court, with a view toward how Judge Kavanaugh might approach these same issues if he were to be elevated to the High Court. Of particular note, the report includes an Appendix with several tables that summarize the nominee’s rate of authoring concurring and dissenting opinions relative to his colleagues on the D.C. Circuit, and how Judge Kavanaugh’s opinions as an appellate judge have fared upon review by the Supreme Court.

Aug 21, 2018

Substance Abuse Prevention, Treatment, and Research Efforts in the Military

Aug 17, 2018

Toward the Creation of a U.S. “Space Force”

Aug 16, 2018

When Does Double Prosecution Count as Double Jeopardy?

Aug 16, 2018

Medicare Coverage of End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD)

End-stage renal disease (ESRD) is the last stage of chronic kidney disease (CKD), which is the gradual decrease of kidney function over time. Individuals with ESRD have substantial and permanent loss of kidney function and require either a regular course of dialysis (a process that removes harmful waste products from an individual’s bloodstream) or a kidney transplant to survive. In 1972, Congress enacted legislation allowing qualified individuals with ESRD under the age of 65 to enroll in the federal Medicare health care program (Social Security Amendments of 1972; P.L. 92-603). The legislation marked the first time that individuals were allowed to enroll in Medicare based on a specific medical condition rather than on age. Medicare benefits for ESRD beneficiaries, including those under the age of 65 who qualify based on the disease, include a thrice-weekly dialysis treatment and coverage for kidney transplant. There is an initial waiting period for coverage for ESRD patients under the age of 65, and coverage for such enrollees terminates 12 months after a patient ends dialysis or after 36 months of follow-up care (including immunosuppressive medications) after a kidney transplant. Many beneficiaries with ESRD also require Medicare services to treat related, chronic health conditions, such as diabetes or heart disease. Because Medicare beneficiaries with ESRD have higher-than-average health care costs, they account for about 7% of Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) spending, while making up about 1% of total program enrollment (FFS and managed care combined). In total, FFS Medicare covers about three-fourths of all U.S. medical spending to treat ESRD. Over the years, Congress has enacted a number of changes to Medicare ESRD-related benefits in an effort to improve the quality of services and control program costs. For example, the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA; P.L. 110-275) instituted a “bundled” payment system for ESRD dialysis providers, which took effect in 2011. The 21st Century Cures Act (CURES; P.L. 114-255) will allow Medicare-eligible individuals with ESRD to enroll in Medicare Part C Medicare Advantage (MA) managed care plans, beginning in 2021. Currently, ESRD patients are not allowed to enroll in most MA plans, with the exception of some special-needs plans. As a result, ESRD patients do not have access to some of the enhanced benefits offered by MA providers. This report provides background on the ESRD Medicare benefit, including information about the disease, Medicare enrollment criteria, covered services, other health care coverage for ESRD, and the Medicare reimbursement policy. The report concludes with a discussion of outstanding payment and coverage issues in ESRD care.

Aug 16, 2018

Emergency Use Authorization and FDA’s Related Authorities

Aug 13, 2018

Military Child Development Program: Background and Issues

The Department of Defense (DOD) operates the largest employer-sponsored childcare program in the United States, serving approximately 200,000 children of uniformed servicemembers and DOD civilians, and employing over 23,000 childcare workers, at an annual cost of over $800 million. DOD’s child development program (CDP) includes a combination of accredited, installation-based, government-run, full-time pre-school and school-aged care in Child Development Centers (CDCs) and subsidized care in Family Care Centers (FCCs) or through private providers under the Fee Assistance program. Childcare services are part of a broader set of quality of life benefits that make up the total compensation package for military personnel and certain DOD civilians. The Department has argued that these childcare benefits help support their recruiting, retention, and readiness goals and that there is generally a high level of satisfaction among servicemembers who use DOD childcare services. Moreover, military family advocacy groups have largely supported existing childcare benefits and have also called for expanding awareness of, access to, operating hours for, and improving or enhancing other aspects of military childcare services. While there has been broad support for DOD’s CDP since its inception, the questions of what benefits should be provided to military servicemembers and their families, how these benefits should be structured, and what resources should be directed to these benefits are issues for Congress when considering the annual defense budget authorization and appropriation.

Aug 10, 2018

Glider Kit, Engine, and Vehicle Regulations

On October 25, 2016, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration jointly published the second phase of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and fuel efficiency standards for medium- and heavy-duty vehicles and engines. The Phase 2 rule affects commercial long-haul tractor-trailers, vocational vehicles, and heavy-duty pickup trucks and vans. It phases in between model years 2018 and 2027. Under the rulemaking, EPA proposed a number of changes and clarifications for standards respecting “glider kits” and “glider vehicles.” A glider kit is a chassis for a tractor-trailer with a frame, front axle, interior and exterior cab, and brakes. It becomes a glider vehicle when an engine, transmission, and rear axle are added. Engines are often salvaged from earlier model year vehicles, remanufactured, and installed in the glider kit. The final manufacturer of the glider vehicle (i.e., the entity that assembles the parts) is typically a different entity than the original manufacturer of the glider kit. Glider kits and glider vehicles are produced arguably for purposes such as allowing the reuse of relatively new powertrains from damaged vehicles. The Phase 2 rule contains GHG and criteria air pollution emission standards for glider vehicles. The rule sets limits for glider vehicles similar to those for new trucks, with some exemptions. Under the rulemaking, EPA and various commentators argued that glider vehicles should be considered new because the glider market had recently become distorted. In the decade leading up to the rulemaking, sales of glider vehicles increased by an order of magnitude—from several hundred annually to several thousand or more. EPA and various commentators interpreted this change to be more than an attempt to replace damaged chassis, seeing it instead as an attempt by glider vehicle assemblers to circumvent various federal regulations. At the time, the older model year engines being used in glider vehicles were not required to meet current EPA emission standards for nitrogen oxide and particulate matter (which began in 2007 and took full effect in 2010), nor did they need to abide by some other federal regulations, including the Department of Transportation’s requirements on electronic logging devices and electronic stability control and the Internal Revenue Service’s excise taxes. With respect to pollution requirements, the Phase 2 rulemaking had estimated that NOx and PM emissions from glider vehicles using pre-2002 engines (prior to exhaust aftertreatment requirements) were 20-40 times higher than current engines. Subsequent to the Phase 2 rulemaking, EPA received petitions for reconsideration for, among other provisions, the glider requirements. On November 16, 2017, EPA (under Administrator Scott Pruitt) proposed to repeal the emission standards and other requirements for heavy-duty glider vehicles, glider engines, and glider kits, arguing that EPA lacks the authority to regulate them under the Clean Air Act. On July 26, 2018, EPA (under acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler) stated that it would “move as expeditiously as possible on a regulatory revision regarding the requirements that apply to the introduction of glider vehicles into commerce to the extent consistent with statutory requirements and due consideration of air quality impacts.” A rule has not been finalized. Some in Congress have supported the Trump Administration’s efforts to reverse the standards and provide relief to the affected glider vehicle assembler industry. However, EPA’s efforts to delay and repeal the rule have prompted criticism from other trucking industry officials, some state air agencies, environmentalists, and other lawmakers who fear that increasing production of glider vehicles could result in a fractured vehicle market and significantly higher in-use emissions of air pollutants associated with a host of adverse human health effects, including premature mortality.

Aug 10, 2018

Private Bills: Procedure in the House

A private bill is one that provides benefits to specified individuals (including corporate bodies). Individuals sometimes request relief through private law when administrative or legal remedies are exhausted, but Congress seems more often to view private legislation as appropriate when no other remedy is available and when enactment would, in a broad sense, afford equity. From 1817 through 1971, most Congresses enacted hundreds of private laws, but since then, the number has declined significantly as Congress has expanded administrative discretion to deal with many of the situations that tended to give rise to private bills. Since 2007, four private laws have been enacted. Private provisions are also occasionally included in public legislation. The Senate considers private bills using the same procedures that are used to consider other legislation.

Aug 10, 2018

Illicit Fentanyl and Mexico’s Role

Aug 9, 2018

The European Deterrence Initiative: A Budgetary Overview

Aug 8, 2018

Title X Family Planning: Proposed Rule on Statutory Compliance Requirements

The Title X Family Planning Program (Title X), enacted in 1970, is the only domestic federal program devoted solely to family planning and related preventive health services. All 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories and Freely Associated States (collectively referred to as states) are eligible to apply for Title X grants, as are other public agencies and nonprofit organizations. Title X grants enable grantees to establish and operate family planning projects. A family planning project refers to a set of activities that a Title X grantee undertakes under its grant agreement to provide a broad range of family planning methods and services to Title X clients. (In 2016, Title X-funded clinics served 4 million clients.) Examples of Title X activities include provider-to-patient counseling, dissemination of educational materials, and the delivery of clinical services. Clinical services provided through Title X projects include contraceptive services and supplies, sexually transmitted disease testing and treatment, and preconception health care services. All services are confidential. Title X is administered through the Office of Population Affairs (OPA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The program was appropriated $286.5 million for FY2018. Federal law (42 U.S.C. §300a-6) prohibits the use of Title X funds in projects “where abortion is a method of family planning.” According to OPA, family planning projects that receive Title X funds are closely monitored to ensure that federal funds are used appropriately and that funds are not used for prohibited activities such as for performing surgical abortion procedures. Under current program guidance, the abortion prohibition does not apply to all Title X grantees’ activities; instead, the prohibition applies only to activities that are part of the Title X project. A grantee’s abortion activities must be “separate and distinct” from the Title X project activities. On June 1, 2018, OPA published a proposed rule in the Federal Register, “Compliance with Statutory Program Integrity Requirements,” that would make several changes to federal Title X family planning regulations, including the following: Title X projects would no longer be required to offer pregnant clients the opportunity to receive abortion information, counseling, and referral upon request. Title X projects would be prohibited from referring patients to abortion services. Title X projects would be required to maintain physical and financial separation between their Title X projects and abortion-related activities. Several terms, including “family planning” and “low-income family,” would have new definitions. Criteria for awarding Title X Family Planning Services grants would be revised. Title X grant applicants and grantees would be subject to new reporting requirements. This proposed rule has sparked a congressional debate about the scope of Title X. The 115th Congress is debating the scope of Title X to determine whether providing an abortion-related service, such as referring a pregnant client to an abortion provider, should be a family planning service under Title X. In addition, Members of Congress are debating whether this proposed rule is a “gag rule”: an attempt to prevent some Title X clients from receiving adequate information that would permit them to make an informed decision about their health care treatment. This report summarizes the proposed rule’s major elements and explains how the proposed rule differs from current Title X rules and guidance. In addition, CRS provides HHS’s rationale for the components of the proposed rule, as well as selected commentary from key stakeholders in reaction to the proposed rule.

Aug 8, 2018

Older Americans Act: Nutrition Services Program

Aug 7, 2018

Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) FY2019 Appropriations and Financial Regulatory Reform

Background On July 19, 2018, the House passed H.R. 6147, which included an FY2019 Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill (originally H.R. 6258) as Division B. The Senate passed a substitute version of H.R. 6147 on August 1, 2018, with the Senate FY2019 FSGG bill (originally S. 3107) as Division B. Although financial services are a focus of the FSGG bill, the bill does not include funding for most of the financial service regulators. Instead, this funding comes through a variety of sources, including fees or assessments on regulated institutions. (See CRS Report R43391, Independence of Federal Financial Regulators: Structure, Funding, and Other Issues.) Federal regulation of the banking industry is divided among the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or BCFP). Credit unions are regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the housing government-sponsored enterprises are regulated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). None of these agencies receive their primary funding through the appropriations process. Federal securities regulation is divided between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), both of which are funded through appropriations bills. CFTC funding is appropriated from the general fund, whereas the SEC funding is offset through fees collected by the SEC. FSGG Financial Regulatory Legislative Provisions Although most funding is not provided by the FSGG bill, legislative provisions affecting financial regulation in general and some financial regulatory agencies specifically have often been included in past FSGG bills. Most of the provisions in Title IX of the House-passed FSGG bill (H.R. 6258/H.R. 6147, Division B) are similar or identical to provisions in other legislation that has passed the House both individually and as part of broader bills, particularly the Financial CHOICE Act (H.R. 10) and the JOBS and Investor Confidence Act of 2018 (S. 488 as amended by the House). Some of these provisions would amend the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. The Senate FSGG bill (S. 3167/H.R. 6147, Division B) does not contain similar legislative provisions. Table 1 contains a full listing of sections from the House-passed FSGG bill Title IX and similar sections of H.R. 10, S. 488, and other individual legislation. Selected policy changes in the House-passed FSGG bill include the following: Capital formation. Some policymakers have concluded that changes in market trends require updated regulations governing capital access to securities markets, particularly for small- to medium-sized companies. The provisions in the FSGG bill generally aim to expand investor access to securities markets, reduce compliance costs, and promote financial intermediation. S. 488, much of which is contained in the FSGG bill, passed the House with close to unanimous support. CFPB structure. The Dodd-Frank Act created the CFPB with structural features that made it more independent than most other agencies. Congress has debated whether the current structure strikes the right balance between the desire for agency independence and accountability to Congress and the Administration. Title IX would reduce the CFPB’s independence by placing the CFPB under congressional appropriations, requiring congressional approval of “major rules” issued by the CFPB, and allowing the President to replace the head of the CFPB at will, in lieu of the current “for cause” removal, among other changes. Enhanced regulation. The Dodd-Frank Act created a new enhanced prudential regulatory regime for large banks and nonbank financial firms designated as systemically important. Title IX would modify the regime’s nonbank designation process, reduce the frequency of “living wills,” and eliminate nonbank stress test requirements, among other changes. Table 1. Financial Regulatory Provisions in the House-Passed FSGG Bill and Other Legislation Topic House-passed H.R. 6147, Division B, Title IX H.R. 10S. 488Individual Legislation Allows general solicitation for angel investorsSubtitle ASection 452Title IH.R.79 Expands information used in credit reporting Subtitle B — Title II H.R.435 Small M&A broker exemption Subtitle C Section 401 Title III H.R.477 Treatment of points and fees in mortgage regulation Subtitle D Section 506 — H.R.1153 Accredited investor definition Subtitle E Section 860 Title IV H.R.1585 Expand audit attestation requirement (SOX 404b) exemption Subtitle F Section 441 Title V H.R.1645 End banking for human traffickers Subtitle G — Title XXIII H.R.6069 Small Business Investment Company funding access Subtitle H — Title VII H.R.2364 Extends annual privacy notification exemption to auto financing companies Subtitle I — — H.R.2396 Limits on deposit account terminations Subtitle J Section 511 — H.R.2706 Expands investor outreach during IPO process Subtitle K Section 499 Title IX H.R.3903 Greater flexibility on rating agency exams Subtitle L Section 851 — H.R.3911 SEC subpoena required for source code disclosure Subtitle M Section 816 — H.R.3948 Family offices deemed accredited investors Subtitle N — Title X H.R.3972 SEC consolidated audit trail data protection Subtitle O Section 813 — H.R.3973 Changes to nonbank systemically important designation process Subtitle P — — H.R. 4061 SEC study of small rural business capital access Subtitle Q — Title XI H.R.4281 Fed-only jurisdiction over Volcker Rule Subtitle R — — H.R.4790 Reduced frequency of living will requirement for large banks Subtitle S Section 151 Title XII H.R.4292 Bank exam appeals expanded Subtitle T Section 536 — H.R.4545 Changes to mortgage settlement statement Subtitle U — — H.R.3978 Delays credit union capital rule Subtitle V — Title XVII H.R.5288 Creates dedicated CFPB Inspector General Subtitle W Section 713 — H.R. 3625 CFPB under appropriationsSubtitle XSection 712—— Nonbank stress test repealSubtitle Y—Title XVH.R.4566 Swaps margin exemption for interaffiliates Subtitle Z — — — Requires consistency in enhanced regulation Subtitle AA — — — Eliminates “for cause” removal protection for CFPB Director Subtitle BB Section 711(a)(1)(D) — — Congressional approval for “major” CFPB rules Subtitle CC Title III, Subtitle Ba — H.R. 26a Source: Congressional Research Service. Notes: M&A=Mergers and Acquisitions; SOX= Sarbanes Oxley Act (P.L. 107-204); IPO=Initial Public Offering. These bills would require congressional approval of major rules for other agencies as well.

Aug 7, 2018

The Electronic Logging Device (ELD) Controversy

In December 2017, after years of preparation, most commercial trucks were required to be equipped with an electronic logging device (ELD) that would automatically record how long the driver had been driving. There had been little controversy about this requirement during its two-year phase-in period, but after it took effect, portions of the commercial trucking industry began to complain about its impact. Pending legislation would exempt certain drivers from the mandate through FY2019. Most commercial drivers are paid by the mile, and so have an incentive to drive as much as possible. Studies indicate that drivers become less alert and responsive to changing conditions, and thus likelier to be involved in a crash, the more hours they drive in a day. To reduce the risk of driving while fatigued, the federal government has long limited the amount of time a commercial driver can drive in a day and over the course of a week. This Hours of Service (HOS) rule limits commercial truck drivers to 11 hours of driving within a period of 14 consecutive hours spent on-duty (after which the driver must have 10 hours off before returning to duty), and up to 60 hours of driving over the course of a week. The daily driving limit for truck drivers was raised from 10 to 11 hours in 2003 (but remains 10 hours for commercial bus drivers). For decades, the Hours of Service limits were enforced by having drivers fill in paper logs with the amount of time they spent driving each day. Given the incentives to exceed the daily limit on driving hours, and the ease of falsifying such information in paper logs drivers themselves maintained, enforcing the HOS rule was difficult. In anonymous surveys, a majority of commercial drivers admitted to violating the HOS rule at least occasionally. The National Transportation Safety Board and other safety advocates had long called for using an automated method of recording driving time to better enforce the HOS rule. In 2012 Congress mandated that trucks be equipped with ELDs, and in 2015 the Department of Transportation finalized a rule to that effect. Since the rule went into effect, certain sectors of the commercial trucking industry have complained that the new ELD mandate is causing problems. Perhaps the largest source of objection has been the agricultural trucking sector, particularly livestock haulers. Complaints typically point out that agricultural products are perishable, and that limits on the amount of time a driver can drive in a day can create situations in which cargo is put at risk. In hot conditions, having to stop short of a final destination when a driver runs out of driving time can put livestock at risk from heat or from having to be unloaded and reloaded. This can sometimes happen due to factors over which drivers have little or no control, particularly the amount of time spent waiting for a truck to be loaded or unloaded and traffic congestion. Although these complaints have arisen in the wake of the ELD mandate, the concerns pertain to the HOS rule, which was not changed by the ELD mandate. The installation of an electronic logging device merely makes it easier for federal and state inspectors to enforce the long-established HOS rule. Existing law provides agricultural truckers with exemptions from the HOS rules for certain circumstances. For example, when operating within 150 air miles of their origin point, drivers hauling agricultural products are exempt from the HOS rule, meaning there is no limit on how long they can drive in a day. Should they leave that 150 air-mile radius zone, they then become subject to the HOS rule, but the amount of time they spent driving within the 150 air-mile radius zone does not count against their daily driving limit. Drivers of trucks carrying agricultural products are still allowed to record their driving time in paper logs as long as they do not drive outside the 150 air-mile zone more than eight times in a 30-day period. If they drive outside the zone more often than that, they are required to use an ELD. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration officials note that many drivers have been unaware of these exemptions, and once informed of them their concerns about complying with the HOS and ELD rules have been greatly reduced. Congress also temporarily exempted livestock haulers from the ELD mandate through September 30, 2018. The FY2019 transportation appropriations bills passed by the Senate (Division D, Title I of H.R. 6147) and pending in the House (H.R. 6072) would extend this exemption through September 2019.

Aug 7, 2018

Gun Control: 3D-Printed Firearms

In May 2013, Defense Distributed, a federally licensed firearms manufacturer, posted on its website computer assisted design (CAD) files for three dimensional-printing (3D-printing) of a single-shot, smoothbore, .380 caliber pistol that could be made almost entirely with non-metallic material. The design of this firearm, the “Liberator,” does not appear to violate the Undetectable Firearms Act of 1988 (18 U.S.C. §922(p)), because it includes the requisite amount of steel. This statute prohibits the manufacture, importation, transfer, or possession of any firearm that is [not] detectable to “walk-through metal detector[s]” calibrated to detect a security exemplar that resembles a handgun with the same electromagnetic signature as 3.7 ounces of stainless steel; or includes major components (barrels, slides, cylinders, frames, or receivers) that generate an [in]accurate image when inspected with “x-ray machines commonly used at airports.” The Liberator’s design arguably illustrates a possible shortcoming in this statute. Besides the cartridge casing and projectile (bullet), the only operable metallic part of the firearm is its firing pin. The pistol’s design includes a cavity that holds a steel block that is intended to meet the security exemplar detectability requirement described above; however, it is not an operable part of the firearm. The steel block is actually inserted into the cavity after the pistol frame is printed. In other words, it is not permanently embedded into the firearm. Consequently, it could be removed, perhaps allowing a criminal to evade security with an undetected, but still operable firearm. In May 2013, the Department of State (State) invoked a provision of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. §2778) related to technology transfers and ordered Defense Distributed to remove those CAD files from its website. Defense Distributed complied, but it sued State in federal court, arguing that the order violated its First and Second Amendment rights. In April 2018, the parties entered into a settlement that would allow Defense Distributed to upload 3D printer files for firearms and parts, including an AR-15 lower receiver. A federal judge in Seattle, however, granted an emergency motion filed by eight states and the District of Columbia, temporarily blocking making these files available on the internet. Non-metallic firearms and, hence, firearms undetectable to metal detectors or unrecognizable to an inspector under an x-ray machines, could possibly be made from materials that are commonly available in most hardware stores, notwithstanding considerable issues related to performance, durability, and safety. The growing availability of “desktop” 3D printers, however, could make such endeavors more efficient and uniform, but perhaps not less costly. There is also the future possibility that issues related to performance, durability, and safety of non-metallic firearms could be overcome with the use of other non-metallic materials and additional improvements in 3D printers. Also known as additive manufacturing, 3D printers use CAD files to build an object one thin layer at a time, fusing each new layer to the previous layer in an iterative process. While 3D printers have generally become less expensive and commercially accessible, 3D-printer hardware and software capable of fabricating firearms barrels with rifled bores from steel are costly enough that industry experts contend that it is less expensive to produce firearms with computer numerical control (CNC) technology. CNC machines use CAD files to mill, turn, or carve objects from a solid piece of material, as well as drill or punch it, in a subtractive manufacturing process. Under current law, it is legally permissible for any person to build their own firearm, as long as the builder is not prohibited from possessing a firearm and does not build it with intent to sell it. Home-built firearms have been popularly dubbed as “do-it-yourself” (DIY) firearms. DIY firearms are sometimes referred to as “ghost guns,” because unlicensed firearms builders are not required to identify their firearms with a serial number and other markings, whereas licensed manufacturers are required to do so. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives and others have suggested that the Attorney General might have sufficient authority under the 1934 National Firearms Act to regulate the Liberator under the designation of “any other weapon,” because the pistol is smoothbore. Today, pen, cane, umbrella, and belt buckle guns, as well as certain smoothbore, single-shot handguns, are regulated under this NFA designation. NFA firearms, like machine guns and those discussed above, are more strictly regulated than other firearms under the Gun Control Act of 1968 and must be registered with the Attorney General. Some Members of Congress have expressed concern that undetectable, untraceable firearms could proliferate with the growing availability of 3D printer technology, allowing criminals to circumvent the law and possibly breach security systems. Senators Bill Nelson, Richard Blumenthal, Ed Markey, and Representative Theodore Deutch introduced the 3D Gun Safety Act (S. 3304/H.R. 6649), a bill to prohibit the publication of 3D printer files for firearms. Senator Nelson and Representative Ruben Kihuen introduced the Undetectable Firearms Modernization Act (S. 533/H.R. 2033), a proposal to amend current law with regard to more advanced screening technologies and detection standards. Representative Adriano Espaillat introduced the Ghost Guns are Guns Act (H.R. 1278), a bill to amend the federal statutory definition of a firearm to include firearms parts kits. Senator Richard Blumenthal and Representative David Cicilline introduced the Untraceable Firearms Act of 2018 (S. 3300 and H.R. 6643), a bill to require all firearms be serialized and marked and major firearms components be wholly constructed of a material detectable to a metal detector. As of August 10, 2018, no further action has been taken on these bills. The National Rifle Association and National Shooting Sports Foundation, as well as other gun rights groups, maintain that current law adequately regulates firearms manufacturing, including 3D printing of firearms and parts. They maintain that 3D printing does not present a public safety risk, because criminals are not likely to incur the costs and efforts necessary to build firearms with 3D printer technology.

Aug 7, 2018

Iran’s Threats, the Strait of Hormuz, and Oil Markets: In Brief

The exchanges of threats between members of the governments of Iran and the United States, including the presidents of both countries, have again raised the specter of an interruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz (the Strait), a key waterway for the transit of oil and natural gas to world markets. In the first half of 2018, approximately 22 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products, and over 300 million cubic meters per day in liquefied natural gas (LNG) exited the Strait, representing approximately 24% and 3% of global production, respectively. With the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on May 8, 2018, there may be increased potential for Congress to consider legislation regarding sanctions on Iran. A number of bills, mostly prior to the May 8 withdrawal, have been introduced in the 115th Congress targeting aspects of Iran’s leadership, military, and economy. It remains uncertain whether reinstated U.S. sanctions based on the U.S. unilateral exit from the JCPOA will damage Iran’s economy to the extent sanctions did during 2012-2015, when the global community was aligned in pressuring Iran.

Aug 6, 2018