CRS Reports

U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What’s Next?

Feb 4, 2019

U.S.-European Relations in the 117th Congress

Feb 4, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: Veteran Farmers and Ranchers

Feb 4, 2019

Is the Trump Administration Rethinking Title VI?

Feb 4, 2019

Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations for FY2019: In Brief

Feb 4, 2019

2019 Tax Filing Season (2018 Tax Year): Itemized Deductions

Feb 4, 2019

“Migrant Protection Protocols”: Legal Issues Related to DHS’s Plan to Require Arriving Asylum Seekers to Wait in Mexico

Feb 1, 2019

The Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Issues

The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is one of the most-tracked single accounts funded by Congress each year. Managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), it is the primary source of funding for the federal government’s domestic general disaster relief programs. These programs, authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), outline the federal role in supporting state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as they respond to and recover from a variety of incidents. They take effect in the event that nonfederal levels of government find their own capacity to deal with an incident is overwhelmed. The appropriation which feeds the DRF predates current disaster relief programs and FEMA itself. It dates back to a half-million dollar deficiency appropriation to the President in 1948 that was drafted to allow him to use these resources to provide temporary emergency assistance to communities in the wake of unspecified potential natural disasters. Although the appropriation was provided with one particular Upper Midwest flooding incident in mind, the legislative language allowed the funding to be used more broadly, if the President wished to do so. This policy of providing general disaster relief was a shift from previous policy, which largely left emergency management, disaster relief, and disaster recovery in the hands of other levels of government and private relief organizations. Prior to the development of the general relief program, when the federal government got involved in disaster response and recovery, it was on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. By comparison, the annual appropriation for the DRF in FY2018—70 years after the initial appropriation for general disaster relief—was $7.9 billion. The evolving federal role in disaster relief is partially illuminated in the funding stream provided for it through the DRF. What is a fixture of federal policy today was not a given a century ago. Examining the history of the program and its funding through the DRF may help Congress consider future approaches to disaster relief. This report introduces the DRF and provides a brief history of federal disaster relief programs. It goes on to discuss the appropriations that fund the DRF, and provides a funding history from FY1964 to the present day, discussing factors that contributed to those changing appropriations levels. It concludes with discussion of how the budget request for the DRF has been developed and structured, given the unpredictability of the annual budgetary impact of disasters, and raises some potential issues for congressional consideration. This report is updated on an annual basis.

Feb 1, 2019

Immigration: “Recalcitrant” Countries and the Use of Visa Sanctions to Encourage Cooperation with Alien Removals

Feb 1, 2019

The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA)

Feb 1, 2019

U.S. Department of the Interior: An Overview

The U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) is a federal executive department responsible for the conservation and administration of the public lands and mineral estate of the United States. DOI describes its mission as protecting and managing the nation’s natural resources and cultural heritage for the benefit of the American people; providing scientific and scholarly information about those resources and natural hazards; and exercising the nation’s trust responsibilities and special commitments to American Indians, Alaska Natives, and island territories under U.S. administration. As part of its responsibilities, DOI oversees and fosters the use of more than 480 million acres of public lands, 700 million acres of subsurface minerals, and 1.7 billion acres of the outer continental shelf. Each year, Congress deliberates legislation that could affect DOI’s management of this vast federal estate. As a result, understanding the roles and responsibilities of DOI’s various components and offices is valuable when crafting legislation that affects the department’s operations and ability to fulfill its mission. DOI primarily implements its responsibilities and mission through nine technical bureaus that make up more than 80% of the agency’s workforce. These technical bureaus are the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), National Park Service (NPS), Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Each of these bureaus has a unique mission and set of responsibilities, as well as a distinct organizational structure that serves to meet its functional duties. In addition to these technical bureaus, DOI has multiple departmental offices, which provide leadership, coordination, and services to DOI’s various bureaus and programs. As of June 2018, DOI employed a staff of 69,563 nationwide across its bureaus and offices. However, total DOI employment figures fluctuate throughout the year, as some bureaus rely on seasonal and part-time staff, increasing staff totals during the summer months. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) reports the average total DOI employment as 65,350 for the four reporting periods from September 2017 to June 2018. The largest bureau within DOI based on number of staff is NPS, which averaged close to 20,000 staff over the same time period—more than twice the size of the second-largest bureau, BLM. The smallest technical bureau by employment is OSMRE, which averaged just over 400 employees. Approximately 10% of all DOI staff are within the District of Columbia core-based statistical area (CBSA), which includes the District of Columbia and selected counties in Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. Congress provides discretionary appropriations for DOI through two annual appropriations bills: the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies bill and the Energy and Water appropriations bill. Enacted discretionary appropriations for FY2018 totaled $14.6 billion. DOI also received $566 million in supplemental emergency appropriations in FY2018, for a total of $15.2 billion in discretionary appropriations for FY2018. The organizational structure of DOI is subject to continual congressional oversight and executive branch examination. In 2017 and 2018, President Trump and then-Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke submitted reorganization plans for the department and its bureaus. These plans put forth several recommendations, including the consolidation and transfer of most functions of the Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works Division to DOI, the merger of the Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service with FWS, and the creation of 12 “Unified Regional Boundaries” across DOI’s various bureaus.

Jan 31, 2019

Defense Primer: Military Commissaries and Exchanges

Jan 31, 2019

Child Nutrition Programs: Current Issues

The term child nutrition programs refers to several U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in institutional settings. These include the school meals programs—the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program—as well as the Child and Adult Care Food Program, Summer Food Service Program, Special Milk Program, and Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program. The most recent child nutrition reauthorization, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA; P.L. 111-296), made a number of changes to the child nutrition programs. In some cases, these changes spurred debate during the law’s implementation, particularly in regard to updated nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. On September 30, 2015, some of the authorities created by the HHFKA expired. Efforts to reauthorize the child nutrition programs in the 114th Congress, while not completed, considered several related issues and prompted further discussion about the programs. There were no substantial reauthorization attempts in the 115th Congress. Current issues discussed in this report include the following: Nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. The HHFKA required USDA to update the nutrition standards for school meals and other foods sold in schools. USDA issued final rules on these standards in 2012 and 2016, respectively. Some schools had difficulty implementing the nutrition standards, and USDA and Congress have taken actions to change certain parts of the standards related to whole grains, sodium, and milk. Offerings in the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP). There have been debates recently over whether the FFVP should include processed and preserved fruits and vegetables, including canned, dried, and frozen items. Currently, statute permits only fresh offerings. “Buy American” requirements for school meals. The school meals programs’ authorizing laws require schools to source foods domestically, with some exceptions, under Buy American requirements. Efforts both to tighten and loosen these requirements have been made in recent years. The enacted 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334) instructed USDA to “enforce full compliance” with the Buy American requirements and report to Congress within 180 days of enactment. Congregate feeding in summer meals. Under current law, children must consume summer meals on-site. This is known as the “congregate feeding” requirement. Starting in 2010, Congress funded demonstration projects, including the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) demonstration, to test alternatives to congregate feeding in summer meals. Congress has increased funding for Summer EBT in recent appropriations cycles and there have been discussions about whether to continue or expand the program. Implementation of the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP). The HHFKA created CEP, an option for qualifying schools, groups of schools, and school districts to offer free meals to all students. Because income-based applications for school meals are no longer required in schools adopting CEP, its implementation has created data issues for federal and state programs relying on free and reduced-price lunch eligibility data. Unpaid meal costs and “lunch shaming.” The issue of students not paying for meals and schools’ handling of these situations has received increasing attention. Some schools have adopted what some term as “lunch shaming” practices, including throwing away a student’s selected hot meal and providing a cold meal alternative when a student does not pay. Congress and USDA have taken actions recently to reduce instances of student nonpayment and stigmatization. Paid lunch pricing. One result of new requirements in the HHFKA was price increases for paid (full price) lunches in many schools. Attempts have been made—some successfully—to loosen these “paid lunch equity” requirements in recent years.

Jan 31, 2019

Executive Branch Ethics and Financial Conflicts of Interest: Disqualification

Jan 31, 2019

“Affirmative Action” and Equal Protection in Higher Education

When federal courts have analyzed and addressed “affirmative action” in higher education, they have done so in two distinct but related senses, both under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “equal protection.” The first has its roots in the original sense of “affirmative action:” the mandatory use of race by public education systems to eliminate the remnants of state-imposed racial segregation. Because state-sanctioned race segregation in public education violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, in certain cases involving a state’s formerly de jure segregated public university system, a state’s consideration of race in its higher education policies and practices may be an affirmative obligation. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in its consequential 1992 decision United States v. Fordice, equal protection may require states that formerly maintained de jure segregated university systems to consider race for the purpose of eliminating all vestiges of their prior “dual” systems. Drawing upon its precedent addressing racially segregated public schools in the K-12 context, the Court established a three-part legal standard in Fordice for evaluating the sufficiency and effectiveness of a state’s efforts in “dismantl[ing]” its formerly de jure segregated public university system. To that remedial end, mandatory race-conscious measures—in this de jure context—are not limited to admissions. Instead, remedies may also address policies and practices relating to academic programs, institutional missions, funding, and other aspects of public university operations. Outside this de jure context, “affirmative action” has come to refer to a different category of race-conscious policies. These involve what the Court at one time called the “benign” use of racial classifications—voluntary measures designed not to remedy past de jure discrimination, but to help racial minorities overcome the effects of their earlier exclusion. And for institutions of higher education, the Court has addressed one type of affirmative action policy in particular: the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions, a practice now widely observed by both public and private colleges and universities. The federal courts have come to subject these voluntary race-conscious policies—“affirmative action” in its perhaps more familiar sense—to a particularly searching form of review known as strict scrutiny. And even though this heightened judicial scrutiny has long been regarded as strict in theory but fatal in fact, the Court’s review of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education has proved a notable exception, with the Court having twice upheld universities’ use of race as one of many factors considered when assembling their incoming classes. The Court has long grappled with this seeming tension—between the strictness of its scrutiny and its approval of race-conscious admissions policies—beginning with its landmark 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke through its 2016 decision in Fisher v. University of Texas. Though the Equal Protection Clause generally concerns public universities and their constitutional obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment, federal statutory law also plays a role in ensuring equal protection in higher education. To that end, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funding—including private colleges and universities—from, at a minimum, discriminating against students and applicants in a manner that would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Federal agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Education, investigate and administratively enforce institutions’ compliance with Title VI.

Jan 31, 2019

Bureau of Land Management: FY2019 Appropriations

Jan 30, 2019

The Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution

Jan 30, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: SNAP and Nutrition Title Programs

Jan 30, 2019

Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress

Since the first mobile phones were made available in the 1980s, telecommunication providers have been investing in mobile networks to expand coverage, improve services, and attract more users. First-generation networks supported mobile voice calls but were limited in coverage and capacity. To address those limitations, providers developed and deployed second-generation (2G) mobile networks, then third-generation (3G), and fourth-generation (4G) networks. Each generation offered improved speeds, greater capacity, and new features and services. In 2018, telecommunication providers began deploying fifth-generation (5G) networks to meet growing demands for data from consumer and industrial users. 5G networks are expected to enable providers to expand consumer services (e.g., video streaming, virtual reality applications), support the growing number of connected devices (e.g., medical devices, smart homes, Internet of Things), support new industrial uses (e.g., industrial sensors, industrial monitoring systems), perform advanced data analytics, and enable the use of advanced technologies (e.g., smart city applications, autonomous vehicles). 5G is expected to yield significant economic benefits. Market analysts estimate that in the United States, 5G could create up to 3 million new jobs and add $500 billion to the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). Globally, analysts estimate that 5G technologies could generate $12.3 trillion in sales activity across multiple industries and support 22 million jobs by 2035. Experience has shown that companies first to market with new products can capture the bulk of the revenues, yielding long-term benefits for those companies and significant economic gains for the countries where those companies are located. Hence, technology companies around the world are racing to develop 5G products, and some countries (i.e., central governments) are acting in support of 5G deployment. This competition to develop 5G products and capture the global 5G market is often called the “race to 5G.” In the race to 5G, the United States is one of the leaders, along with China and South Korea. Each country has adopted a different strategy to lead in 5G technology development and deployment. China’s central government is supporting the deployment of 5G infrastructure in China. China has a national plan to deploy 5G domestically, capture the revenues from its domestic market, improve its industrial systems, and become a leading supplier of telecommunications equipment to the world. In South Korea, the central government is working with telecommunications providers to deploy 5G. South Korea plans to be the first country to deploy 5G nationwide, and to use the technology to improve its industrial systems. In the United States, private industry is leading 5G deployment. U.S. providers, competing against each other, have conducted 5G trials in several cities and were the first in the world to offer 5G services commercially. The U.S. government has supported 5G deployment, making spectrum available for 5G use and streamlining processes related to the siting of 5G equipment (e.g., small cells). While each country has taken a different approach to capturing the 5G market, there are factors that drive the timeline for all deployments, including international decisions on standards and spectrum. In the United States, 5G deployment may also be affected by the lengthy spectrum allocation process, resistance from local governments to federal small cell siting rules, and limitations on trade that may affect availability of equipment. The 116th Congress may monitor the progress of 5G deployment in the United States and the U.S. position in the race to 5G. Congress may consider policies that may affect 5G deployment, including policies related to spectrum allocation, trade restrictions, and local concerns with 5G deployment. Policies that support 5G deployment while also protecting national and local interests could provide significant consumer benefits, help to modernize industries, give U.S. companies an advantage in the global economy, and yield long-term economic gains for the United States. In developing policies, Members may consider the economic and consumer benefits of 5G technologies, as well as other interests, such as the need to preserve spectrum for other users and uses, the protection of national security and intellectual property when trading, the privacy and security of 5G devices and systems, and the respect of local authorities and concerns during 5G deployment.

Jan 30, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: Hemp Cultivation and Processing

Jan 30, 2019

Bribery, Kickbacks, and Self-Dealing: An Overview of Honest Services Fraud and Issues for Congress

As the trials of Sheldon Silver and Dean Skelos illustrate, corruption among high-profile public officials continues to be a concern in the United States. Likewise, recent examples abound of powerful executives in the private sector abusing positions of trust for personal gain. Faced with this reality, Congress has shown consistent interest in policing public- and private-sector corruption, enacting a number of criminal provisions aimed at holding corrupt officials accountable for their actions under federal law. However, one of federal prosecutors’ most potent existing tools for combating such corruption—18 U.S.C. § 1346, which defines the crimes of mail and wire fraud as including so-called “honest services” fraud—has been a source of contention between the courts and Congress for years. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 defines the term “scheme or artifice to defraud,” as used in the general statutes prohibiting use of the mails or wires to commit fraud, to include a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services. Congress enacted this provision in the late 1980s in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in McNally v. United States that the mail fraud statute was limited in scope to only the protection of tangible property rights. The McNally decision was grounded in concerns that a broader construction of the statute could leave its outer boundaries ambiguous and unjustifiably involve the federal government in setting standards for good government at the local level. Nevertheless, Section 1346 abrogates McNally’s holding, codifying the understanding of some of the lower federal courts that the mail and wire fraud statutes extend to conduct that deprives a person or group of the right to have another act in accordance with some externally imposed duty or obligation, regardless of whether the victim so deprived has suffered or would suffer a pecuniary harm. Recognizing that this lower court understanding in fact evinced considerable disarray as to the kinds of schemes that would qualify as honest services fraud, however, the Supreme Court subsequently read a limiting principle into Section 1346 in Skilling v. United States in order to avoid invalidating the statute as unconstitutionally vague. After Skilling, mail and wire fraud prosecutions under an honest services theory may extend only to those who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participate in bribery or kickback schemes. Notably, the Skilling decision withdrew from the reach of Section 1346 a significant category of cases that had been prosecuted as honest services fraud up to that point: cases involving more general financial self-dealing or conflicts of interest, where no bribes or kickbacks are given. Congress has considered legislation on more than one occasion that would reinstate the self-dealing category of honest services fraud rejected in Skilling, though the law remains unchanged as of this writing. The conversation between the Court and Congress regarding the scope of honest services fraud and its culmination in Skilling have presented more questions that lower courts have been tasked with answering, including the source of the requisite fiduciary duty and the conduct that qualifies as bribery or kickbacks. Courts have looked to a variety of sources to give content to the fiduciary duty requirement, including federal, state, and common law. Likewise, in fleshing out the contours of the bribery or kickbacks called for in Skilling, lower courts have relied on anti-bribery and anti-kickback provisions found in federal statutes. In the recent case of McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the reach of one of those statutes—18 U.S.C. § 201, which makes it a crime to offer or solicit anything of value to influence an “official act”—by construing the term “official act” narrowly. Nevertheless, alternate routes appear to be available to prosecute bribery schemes involving conduct that may be beyond the scope of McDonnell. Should Congress seek to alter the scope of honest services fraud, it will likely need to be attuned to the concerns that federal courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1346 have voiced over the years. Chief among these have been the concerns that—as written—the statute has the potential to sweep too broadly and regulate ethically dubious conduct of state and local officials in a way that conflicts with the Constitution.

Jan 30, 2019

Unemployment Insurance: Legislative Issues in the 116th Congress

Jan 29, 2019

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs

Jan 29, 2019

Recent Migration to the United States from Central America: Frequently Asked Questions

Over the last decade, migration to the United States from Central America—in particular from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (known collectively as the Northern Triangle)—has increased considerably. Families migrating from this region, many seeking asylum, have made up an increasing share of the migrants seeking admission to the United States at the U.S.-Mexico border. In the past year, news reports of migrant “caravans” from the Northern Triangle traveling toward the United States have sparked intense interest and questions from Congress. Many factors, both in their countries of origin and elsewhere, contribute to people’s decisions to emigrate from the Northern Triangle. Weak institutions and corrupt government officials, chronic poverty, rising levels of crime, and demand for illicit drugs result in insecurity and citizens’ low levels of confidence in government institutions. These “push” factors intersect with “pull” factors attracting migrants to the United States, including economic and educational opportunities and a desire to reunify with family members. Addressing these factors is complex. Under the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, the United States is working with Central American governments to promote economic prosperity, improve security, and strengthen governance in the region. Since 2014, Mexico has helped the United States manage flows of Central American migrants, including a recent decision to allow certain U.S.-bound asylum seekers to remain in Mexico while awaiting U.S. immigration proceedings. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—in collaboration with local and federal governments and civil society—is providing immediate and longer-term support for Mexico’s refugee agency and migrants in transit. Central Americans who wish to request asylum in the United States may do so at a U.S. port of entry before a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer or upon apprehension by a CBP officer between U.S. ports of entry. Those requesting asylum at the border undergo screening to determine whether they can pursue an asylum claim. To receive asylum, a foreign national must establish, among other requirements, that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on one of five protected grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). In 2018, President Trump, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) took various actions to tighten the U.S. asylum system. These actions have been met with legal challenges. For example, on November 9, 2018, the President issued a presidential proclamation to suspend immediately the entry into the United States of aliens who cross the Southwest border between ports of entry. This proclamation and a related DHS-DOJ rule are being challenged in federal court. Chapter 15, Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides general legislative authority for the Armed Forces to provide certain types of support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In October 2018, active-duty personnel were deployed to the Southwest border to provide assistance in air and ground transportation, logistics support, engineering capabilities and equipment, medical support, housing, and planning support. The Posse Comitatus Act constrains the manner in which military personnel may be used in a law enforcement capacity at the border. President Trump has contemplated proclaiming a national emergency pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in order to fund a physical barrier at the southern border with Mexico using DOD funds. Congress provided the President with significant discretion to reduce foreign assistance to Central America in FY2018, dependent on the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras addressing a variety of congressional concerns, including improving border security, combating corruption, and protecting human rights. The President’s ability to modify assistance to the Northern Triangle for the remainder of FY2019 will depend on provisions Congress may include in future appropriations legislation.

Jan 29, 2019

China’s Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agricultural Products

Jan 29, 2019

International Trade and Finance: Overview and Issues for the 116th Congress

The U.S. Constitution grants authority to Congress to lay and collect duties and regulate foreign commerce. Congress exercises this authority in numerous ways, including through oversight of trade policy and consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy issues cover areas such as U.S. trade negotiations, U.S. trade and economic relations with specific regions and countries, international institutions focused on trade, tariff and nontariff barriers, worker dislocation due to trade liberalization, enforcement of trade laws and trade agreement commitments, import and export policies, international investment, economic sanctions, and other trade-related functions of the federal government. Congress also has authority over U.S. financial commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and finance-related agencies of the U.S. government. Issues in the 116th Congress During his first two years in office, President Trump has focused on reevaluating many U.S. international trade and economic policies and relationships. The President’s focus on these issues could continue over the next two years. Broad policy debates during the 116th Congress may include the impact of trade and trade agreements on the U.S. economy, including U.S. jobs; the causes and consequences of the U.S. trade deficit; the implications of technological developments for U.S. trade policy; and the intersection of economics and national security. Among many others, the potentially more prominent issues in this area that the 116th Congress may consider are the use and impact of unilateral tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration under various U.S. trade laws, as well as potential legislation that alters the authority granted by Congress to the President to do so; legislation to implement the proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), which would revise and modernize the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the Administration’s launch of bilateral trade negotiations with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom, as well as key provisions in trade agreements, including on intellectual property rights, labor, the environment, and dispute settlement; U.S. engagement with the World Trade Organization (WTO), proposals for WTO reform, and the future direction of the multilateral trading system; U.S.-China trade relations, including investment issues, intellectual property rights protection, forced technology transfer, currency issues, and market access liberalization; the future of U.S.-Asia trade and economic relations, given President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and China’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative; the Administration’s use of quotas to achieve some of its trade objectives, and whether these actions represent a shift in U.S. policy towards “managed trade”; monitoring the implementation of legislation passed by the 115th Congress, including changes to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CIFUS) and export controls, as well as the creation of a new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation; re-authorization of the Export-Import Bank, the U.S. export credit agency that helps finance U.S. exports; oversight of international trade and finance policies to support foreign policy goals, including sanctions on Iran, North Korea, Russia, and other countries; shifts in U.S. leadership of international economic policy coordination at the Group of 7 (G-7) and the Group of 20 (G-20) under the Trump Administration; legislation to fund the Administration’s commitment to increase U.S. contributions to the World Bank, as well as potential U.S.-led reforms to the institution; and major developments in financial markets, including the impact of other countries’ exchange rate polices on the U.S. economy, high levels of debt in emerging markets, potential economic crises, and the role of the U.S. dollar in the global economy.

Jan 28, 2019

The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure

Jan 28, 2019

Medical Product Regulation: Drugs, Biologics, and Devices

Jan 28, 2019

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards

Jan 28, 2019

Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change

Jan 25, 2019

Veterans Health Administration: Gender-Specific Health Care Services for Women Veterans

Jan 25, 2019

Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Legislation: 108th Through 115th Congresses

Congressional interest in market-based greenhouse gas (GHG) emission control legislation has fluctuated over the past 15 years. During that time, legislation has often involved market-based approaches, such as a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax or fee program. Both approaches would place a price—directly or indirectly—on GHG emissions or their inputs (e.g., fossil fuels), both would increase the price of fossil fuels, and both would reduce GHG emissions to some degree. Both would allow emission sources to choose the best way to meet their emission requirements or reduce costs, potentially by using market forces to minimize national costs of emission reductions. Preference between the two approaches ultimately depends on which variable policymakers prefer to precisely control—emission levels or emission prices. A primary policy concern with either approach is the economic impacts that may result from the program. Expected energy price increases could have both economy-wide impacts (e.g., on the U.S. gross domestic product) and disproportionate effects on specific industries and particular demographic groups. The degree of these potential effects would depend on a number of factors, including the magnitude, design, and scope of the program and the use of tax or fee revenues or emission allowance values. This report includes a separate table for each Congress, comparing GHG emission reduction legislation by the following characteristics: General framework: the proposed program structure and scope in terms of emissions covered, multiple GHG emissions, or just carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Covered entities/materials: a list of the industries, sectors, or materials that would be subject to the program. Emissions limit or target: the GHG or CO2 emissions target or cap for a specified year. Distribution of allowance value or tax revenue: how emission allowance value or carbon tax or fee revenue would be distributed. Offset and international allowance treatment: the degree to which offsets and international allowances could be used for compliance purposes and the types of offset activities that would qualify. Mechanism to address carbon-intensive imports: a U.S. GHG reduction program may create a competitive disadvantage for some domestic businesses, particularly carbon-intensive, trade-exposed industries. Additional GHG reduction measures: other mechanisms designed to further reduce GHG emissions that are not covered in the central program. As the figure below illustrates, between the 108th and 111th Congresses, most of the introduced bills would have established cap-and-trade systems. Between the 112th and 115th Congresses, most of the introduced bills would have established carbon tax or emissions fee programs. Figure 1.Number and Type of Introduced GHG Emission Reduction Bills 108th Congress through 115th Congress / Source: Prepared by CRS. Notes: “Other Approaches” include (1) proposals that did not specify the overall framework but would have authorized EPA to establish a GHG emission reduction program, and (2) proposals that combine elements from a cap-and-trade system with price control features in a carbon tax or emissions fee system, sometimes described as hybrid approaches. The carbon tax/fee proposals from the 115th Congress ranged in their scope from CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion to multiple GHG emissions from a broader array of sources. They also varied in their initial carbon price from $24/ton to $50/ton. In addition, the proposals differ by how, to whom, and for what purpose the new tax or fee revenues would be applied. Depending on the level of the tax or fee, some economic analyses indicate that policy choices to distribute the tax or fee revenue would yield greater economic impacts than the direct impacts of the tax or fee.

Jan 25, 2019

A Summary of Federal Education Laws Administered by the U.S. Department of Education

Jan 23, 2019

The Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran

Jan 23, 2019

Homeland Security Research and Development: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress

/ Overview In the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) has primary responsibility for establishing, administering, and coordinating research and development (R&D) activities. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for R&D relating to nuclear and radiological threats. Several other DHS components, such as the Coast Guard, also fund R&D and R&D-related activities associated with their missions. The Common Appropriations Structure that DHS introduced in its FY2017 budget includes an account titled Research and Development in seven different DHS components. Issues for DHS R&D in the 116th Congress may include coordination, organization, and impact. Coordination of R&D The Under Secretary for S&T, who leads the S&T Directorate, has statutory responsibility for coordinating homeland security R&D both within DHS and across the federal government (6 U.S.C. §182). The Director of DNDO also has an interagency coordination role with respect to nuclear detection R&D (6 U.S.C. §592). Both internal and external coordination are long-standing congressional interests. Regarding internal coordination, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in a 2012 report that because so many components of the department are involved, it is difficult for DHS to oversee R&D department-wide. In January 2014, the joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76) directed DHS to implement and report on new policies for R&D prioritization. It also directed DHS to review and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing R&D department-wide. In July 2014, GAO reported that DHS had updated its guidance to include a definition of R&D and was conducting R&D portfolio reviews across the department, but that it had not yet developed policy guidance for DHS-wide R&D oversight, coordination, and tracking. In December 2015, the joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) stated that DHS “lacks a mechanism for capturing and understanding research and development (R&D) activities conducted across DHS, as well as coordinating R&D to reflect departmental priorities.” A challenge for external coordination is that the majority of homeland security-related R&D is conducted by other agencies, most notably the Department of Defense and the Department of Health and Human Services. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directs the Under Secretary for S&T, “in consultation with other appropriate executive agencies,” to develop a government-wide national policy and strategic plan for homeland security R&D (6 U.S.C. §182), but no such plan has ever been issued. Instead, the S&T Directorate has developed R&D plans with selected individual agencies, and the National Science and Technology Council (a coordinating entity in the Executive Office of the President) has issued government-wide R&D strategies in selected topical areas, such as biosurveillance. Organization for R&D DHS has reorganized its R&D-related activities several times. In December 2017, it established a new Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMDO), consolidating DNDO, most functions of the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and some other elements. DNDO and OHA were themselves both created, more than a decade ago, largely by reorganizing elements of the S&T Directorate. The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-387) expressly authorized the establishment and activities of CWMDO. The 116th Congress may examine the implementation of that act. The organization of DHS laboratory facilities may also be a focus of attention in the 116th Congress. At its establishment, the S&T Directorate acquired laboratories from other departments, including the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (from the Department of Agriculture) and the National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, then known as the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (from the Department of Energy). It subsequently absorbed some laboratory facilities from other DHS components (such as the Transportation Security Laboratory from the Transportation Security Administration), but other DHS components retained their own laboratories (such as the U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center). During the 115th Congress, the Federal Bureau of Investigation agreed to assume some of the operational costs of the S&T Directorate’s National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, and DHS proposed to transfer operational responsibility for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility—a biocontainment laboratory currently being built by the S&T Directorate in Manhattan, Kansas—to the Department of Agriculture. Impact of R&D Results In testimony at a Senate hearing in 2018, the Administration’s nominee to be Under Secretary for S&T described the S&T Directorate’s mission as “to deliver results” and referred to “timely delivery and solid return on investment.” Members of Congress and other stakeholders have sometimes questioned the impact of DHS R&D programs and whether enough of their results are ultimately implemented in products actually used in the U.S. homeland security enterprise. Part of the debate has been about finding the right balance between near-term and long-term goals. In testimony at House hearing in 2017, a former Under Secretary for S&T stated that the directorate “has worked hard to focus on being highly relevant—shifting from the past focus on long-term basic research to near-term operational impact.” Yet testimony from an industry witness at the same House hearing stated that “there is a perception among some in the industry that S&T programs only infrequently significantly impact the operational or procurement activities of the DHS components.” The 116th Congress may continue to examine the effectiveness and impact of DHS R&D.

Jan 22, 2019

Introduction to U.S. Economy: Personal Saving

Jan 22, 2019

Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview

Jan 22, 2019

Economics of Federal User Fees

The federal government collects various fees from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from “business-like activities,” in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many national parks charge entry fees, which then help fund maintenance projects. Such fees and charges that result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park, are distinguished from taxes—which stem from the government’s sovereign power to compel payments. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a “fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public.” User fees and charges have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. Some have expressed concerns that user fee arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress’s power of the purse. Collections of fees and charges may also be more sensitive to economic fluctuations, which could complicate financing of programs dependent on those revenue streams. Many user fees or charges are classified as offsetting collections, which are deposited into expenditure accounts. Offsetting collections can be used to offset agency spending and typically require no further congressional approval to use. Other fees and charges are classified as offsetting receipts, which are collected into revenue accounts and typically require congressional authorization to be spent. User fees and charges can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how they are legally authorized. The levels and administration of some fees are specified in detailed statutory text, while other fees are created under broader agency authorities. Certain agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have increased their reliance on user fees in past decades. Some critics have raised concerns that increased reliance on user fees could shift incentives facing those agencies. Some legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 introduced in the 115th Congress, would limit or eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities now funded in whole or in part via user fees directly through the annual appropriations process. Such proposals would mark a departure from past practice. Statutory text governing many fees has evolved over many years and involves substantive policy decisions, often related to the industry or programmatic concerns. A general change in funding from user fees and charges to annual appropriations would likely shift the division of responsibilities between authorizing committees and appropriations committees. Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. Congress could also ask for greater transparency in fiscal data. While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Treasury Bureau of the Fiscal Service provide extensive data on user fees and charges, it is difficult to conduct governmentwide analyses using publicly available sources. Congress could mandate more detailed and more easily accessed data on user fees and charges. Additional funding may be needed to develop the capacity to issue those data.

Jan 22, 2019

EPA Reconsiders Benefits of Mercury and Air Toxics Limits

Jan 18, 2019

Brexit Deal Rejected: What Now?

Draft Agreement Fails to Gain Support On January 15, 2019, the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) House of Commons rejected a draft agreement on the terms of the country’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) by a vote of 432-202. Prime Minister Theresa May is to return to Parliament by January 21, 2019, to present her “plan B” for how to move forward with exiting the EU (“Brexit”) on March 29, 2019. Brexit supporters, including the 118 members of Parliament (MPs) from May’s Conservative Party who voted against the government’s proposal, objected that the deal’s “backstop” provision, which would keep the UK in the EU customs union until the two sides agreed on their future trade relationship, would leave the UK bound indefinitely to EU rules. The backstop seeks to prevent a “hard” border with customs checks and physical infrastructure between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to preserve the peace process and cross-border trade. Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), whose backing is critical to May’s government, objected that the backstop would treat Northern Ireland differently from the rest of the UK, as it would preserve deeper regulatory alignment between Northern Ireland and the EU. Skeptics of Brexit, including MPs in the opposition Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, and Scottish National Party, opposed the deal as not only relegating the UK to a “rule taker” without a say in EU decisionmaking but also failing to provide certainty about permanent membership in the EU customs union or single market. Possible Scenarios—No Easy Answers No-Deal Brexit. The default outcome in the absence of further actions would be a “no-deal Brexit,” a scenario in which the UK exits the EU on March 29 without a negotiated withdrawal agreement. Both UK and EU negotiators have consistently rejected a no-deal scenario, although both sides have been developing contingency plans for such an outcome. Assessments of the full impact of a no-deal scenario remain subject to many unknowns. Many observers maintain that a no-deal Brexit could cause considerable disruption and uncertainty, with negative effects on the economy, trade, security issues, Northern Ireland, aviation, and other issues. Others assert that such fears are exaggerated, and some ardent Brexit supporters argue that a no-deal Brexit would be preferable to a “soft Brexit,” which would retain certain ties and obligations to the EU. There are indications that a majority of MPs would seek to prevent a no-deal Brexit. Parliament could introduce legislation making it illegal to exit the EU without a deal, imposing specific withdrawal conditions, or limiting the government’s ability to implement a no-deal Brexit. This Deal or No Deal? The proposal’s unexpectedly large margin of defeat diminishes the notion that the prime minister could bring the draft agreement back to Parliament for a second vote in the hope that further adjustments and the looming prospect of a no-deal Brexit might prompt enough MPs to reconsider. What Does Parliament Want? Prime Minister May has signaled that the government will enter into cross-party talks to find a consensus way forward. Depending on the outcome, Parliament could effectively mandate a renegotiation of the terms of withdrawal or the draft political declaration on the future UK-EU relationship that accompanied the withdrawal agreement. The EU remains unwilling to reopen the withdrawal agreement but may be open to a shift on the part of the UK toward a closer post-Brexit relationship. Timeline Extension. Analysts suggest an increasing likelihood that the UK might request an extension of the two-year timeline for the negotiation and withdrawal process. An extension would require the approval of the 27 other EU member states. Reports indicate that the EU may be open to a limited extension, provided the UK can explain how it would use that time. Second Referendum. Some opponents of Brexit argue that an extension period should be used to organize a second referendum on UK membership in the EU. Prime Minister May has expressed opposition to a second referendum and asserted that her government intends to respect the verdict of the original June 2016 referendum and take the UK out of the EU. Withdraw Article 50. Other Brexit opponents have argued for the UK to formally retract its intention to withdraw from the EU. The UK could unilaterally halt the withdrawal process by doing so. The European Court of Justice has indicated such a maneuver would indicate a cancellation of Brexit and should not be used as a tactic to gain more time. General Election. A snap election in the UK, which could be triggered by two-thirds of MPs (434 out of 650) backing a motion for an early general election, could provide a new mandate for the winner to pursue Brexit plans and likely would necessitate a timeline extension. Prime Minister May survived a vote of no confidence tabled by Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn on January 16. If May had lost, a new general election would have been held only if no new government could be formed within 14 days. Issues for Congress Given that the UK and the EU are important U.S. partners on a range of global political and economic issues, many Members of Congress have a broad interest in Brexit. Brexit-related developments are likely to have implications for the global economy; U.S.-UK and U.S.-EU economic relations; and transatlantic cooperation on foreign policy and security issues, including sanctions, counterterrorism, and defense cooperation. In 2018, the Administration formally notified Congress of its intent to launch U.S.-UK trade negotiations after the UK leaves the EU, and Congress may consider how developments affect the prospects for an agreement. Members of Congress also may have an interest in how Brexit might affect the peace process in Northern Ireland. For additional background information, see CRS Report RL33105, The United Kingdom: Background, Brexit, and Relations with the United States, by Derek E. Mix, CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick, CRS Report R44817, U.S.-UK Free Trade Agreement: Prospects and Issues for Congress, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, and CRS Report RS21333, Northern Ireland: Current Issues and Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process, by Kristin Archick.

Jan 17, 2019

The Child Tax Credit

Jan 17, 2019

The First Amendment: Categories of Speech

Jan 16, 2019

U.S. Immigration Laws for Aliens Arriving at the Border

Jan 16, 2019

Freight Issues in Surface Transportation Reauthorization

Economic growth and expanded global trade have led to substantial increases in goods movement over the past few decades. The growth in freight transportation demand, along with growing passenger demand, has caused congestion in many parts of the transportation system, making freight movements slower and less reliable. Because the condition and performance of freight infrastructure play a considerable role in the efficiency of the freight system, federal support of freight infrastructure investment is likely to be of significant congressional concern in the reauthorization of the surface transportation program. The program is currently authorized by the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), which is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2020. Until recently, the federal surface transportation program did not pay specific attention to freight movement. However, the two most recent surface transportation acts, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141), approved in 2012, and the FAST Act, passed in 2015, encouraged federal and state planning for freight transportation from a multimodal perspective. The FAST Act also directed a portion of federal funds toward highway segments and other projects deemed most critical to freight movement. It did this by creating two new programs: a discretionary grant program administered by the Secretary of Transportation and a formula program for distributing federal funds to states. Trucks continue to move the bulk of freight in the United States. Freight tonnage is projected to increase by an average of 1.4% per year through 2045, according to the Department of Transportation (DOT), and trucks are projected to carry the largest share of the additional freight traffic. Much of the growth in truck traffic has occurred in urban areas, and this trend is expected to continue. Consequently, most truck congestion occurs in urban areas, and comparatively few highway miles are responsible for a disproportionately large share of congestion costs. Highway infrastructure decisions are mainly made by the states, but federal fuel tax revenue is an important source of funds for the projects states pursue. With fuel taxes no longer able to fully cover the cost of existing highway infrastructure programs, Congress has considered strategies to raise new revenue and to make more effective use of federal dollars to facilitate the movement of freight. The trucking industry has favored raising additional revenue by increasing fuel taxes and has generally opposed greater use of highway tolls out of concern that these may disproportionately affect truckers. DOT studies have shown that the structure of motor fuel taxes provides a subsidy to heavily loaded trucks at the expense of passenger vehicles. One significant question is whether additional funding for freight-related infrastructure should be distributed to the states by formula or on a discretionary basis. Federal projections indicate that a relatively small number of Interstate Highway segments and interchanges are likely to face large increases in truck traffic by 2045. However, individual states may have limited incentives to use their federal formula funds to alleviate increasing congestion in those locations, as many of the trucks affected may be passing through rather than serving local businesses. Discretionary grants may be more effective in providing large amounts of federal funding for very costly freight-related projects, particularly those requiring interstate cooperation, but could also lead to fewer projects receiving federal funds. Besides appropriating funds for freight infrastructure, Congress has created programs to support research and development of new transportation technologies. Autonomous and connected vehicle technologies have potential applications in the freight sector, but many federal regulations are written assuming that a single person is in full control of a vehicle at all times. Congress has considered, but not advanced, proposals to update such regulations. Industry is eager to explore the cost-saving potential of new technology, so it will likely remain an issue for Congress.

Jan 16, 2019

The SEC’s Best Interest Proposal for Advice Given by Broker-Dealers

Jan 16, 2019

Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: Issues Raised by the Partial Government Shutdown

At the end of the day on December 21, 2018, the continuing appropriations measure, Making Further Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-298), which encompasses 7 of the 12 regular annual appropriations acts, expired. The resulting lapse in appropriations resulted in the partial shutdown of unfunded agencies beginning on December 22, 2018. Federal agencies that received their FY2019 appropriations under the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-244), and the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-245) are not directly affected by the shutdown. During the lapse in appropriations, the Office of Management and Budget has directed federal agencies to implement contingency plans designed to guide operations during the partial government shutdown. Federal agency operations include administration of over 1,700 congressionally authorized federal grant programs, some of which are administered by agencies currently experiencing a lapse in appropriations. On average, the federal government provides nearly $600 billion annually in outlays to state and local governments through federal grants. A lapse in federal funding for grants to state and local governments raises several potential issues. A federal government shutdown may cause disruption to, or may result in the cessation of, grant administration activities depending on the following factors: the timing and duration of the federal government shutdown; and the choices made by federal, state, and local officials in anticipation of, or during, a shutdown regarding grant program administration. Timing and Duration of the Lapse in Federal Funding Delays in Awarding New Grant Awards and Renewing Existing Awards The timing of a government shutdown may determine the impact on new and existing grant awards. When a shutdown occurs when grant awards have not yet been made, or are in the process of being renewed, uncertainty about final funding can cause delays in awarding the grant. During a shutdown, an agency may also furlough grant personnel and may lack authority to undertake even preliminary grant administration actions in the absence of funding. Preliminary actions may include establishing funding priorities, revising grant program regulations and guidelines, reviewing grant applications, and calculating formula allocations. The lack of personnel and the possible lack of federal agency authority to approve changes in existing grant awards may also prevent grantees from mitigating the impact of the shutdown. Delays in Payments for Existing Grant Awards Though there are variations across states and federal grant programs, the longer the federal government is shut down, generally the greater the impact on federal grant program payments. OMB guidance indicates that grant management activities at the federal agency level for those agencies experiencing a lapse in appropriations would not continue during a shutdown, except in very limited circumstances. These activities include payment processing, routine oversight, inspection, accounting, administration, and other grant management activities. State predictions on how long federally funded/state-administered programs can operate during a shutdown hinge, in part, on how much the state retained in advance payments, how many reimbursement payments they received prior to the shutdown, and whether the other sources of program funding can be used to fund projects during the federal funding gap. Grant recipients that have smaller operating budgets, such as those in rural communities, may face more hardship than larger grant recipients since they have limited resources to cover federal funding gaps that result in delayed payments. For example, some grantees front expenses for the first couple of months of the project and then request federal reimbursement to cover the next months’ expenses. Delays in federal payments may result in no funding availability to cover salaries and other project costs in the months ahead. Consequently, some grantees must stop all grant-funded project activities until federal payments are processed. This could take several weeks after the government reopens due to the likely backlog of reimbursement requests. Additionally, for grant recipients who have a calendar financial year, the delay in receiving reimbursements may also disrupt their year-end financial closeout. Grant Administration Choices at the Federal, State, and Local Levels In anticipation of, or during, a shutdown, federal, state, and local stakeholders make choices in administering grant programs. For some programs, these choices may include whether to cover gaps in federal grant funding using state or local funds with uncertainty of reimbursement after appropriations are provided; furlough grant administration personnel at all levels of government; and involve grant administration personnel in contingency planning. During a funding lapse, certain program activities at the state and local level funded under existing grant awards may continue, but may face limitations based upon state cash flow. Grantees may continue normal activities until advance funding is depleted and then must decide whether to use other funding sources until additional advance or reimbursement payments are received. This decision may be based on the cash flow challenges of the state and the policy priorities of state elected officials. While eventual reimbursement for expenditures made pursuant to existing grant agreements and grant awards is possible, state elected officials have the discretion to decide whether to cover the gap in federal funding or suspend program activities during the lapse in appropriations. At the federal level, delayed grant agreements or expired grant program budget authority may result in federal agencies having limited authority, and limited personnel due to furloughs set forth in contingency plans, to process payments to state and local grantees. In some cases, federal agencies may authorize grant recipients to expend contingency funds to maintain program operations. In other cases, federal agencies may be able to reimburse states under the pre-award activities provisions in federal grant regulations or statutes. In still other cases, it may be an issue for Congress to consider whether to enact specific provisions to reimburse states for covering expenses from before the grant agreement was officially in place if the delay in executing the grant agreement was attributed to a federal government shutdown.

Jan 15, 2019

BUILD Act: Frequently Asked Questions About the New U.S. International Development Finance Corporation

Members of Congress and Administrations have periodically considered reorganizing the federal government’s trade and development functions to advance various U.S. policy objectives. The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act), which was signed into law on October 5, 2018 (P.L. 115-254), represents a potentially major overhaul of U.S. development finance efforts. It establishes a new agency—the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC)—by consolidating and expanding existing U.S. government development finance functions, which are conducted primarily by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and some components of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). While the IDFC is expected to carry over OPIC’s authorities and many of its policies, there are some key distinctions. For example, in comparison to OPIC, the new IDFC, by statute, is to have the following: More “tools” to provide investment support (e.g., authority to make limited equity investments and provide technical assistance). More capacity (a $60 billion exposure cap compared to OPIC’s $29 billion exposure cap). A longer authorization period (seven years compared to OPIC’s year-to-year authorization through appropriations legislation in recent years). More specific oversight and risk management (including its own Inspector General [IG], compared to OPIC, which is under the USAID IG’s jurisdiction). A key policy rationale for the BUILD Act was to respond to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China’s growing economic influence in developing countries. In this regard, the IDFC aims to advance U.S. influence in developing countries by incentivizing private investment as an alternative to a state-directed investment model. The BUILD Act also aims to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. government development finance functions, as well as to achieve greater cost savings through consolidation. The BUILD Act requires the Administration to submit to Congress a reorganization plan within 120 days of enactment of the act, and the IDFC is not permitted to become operational any sooner than 90 days after the President has transmitted the reorganization plan. The 116th Congress will have responsibility for overseeing the Administration’s implementation of the BUILD Act. As the IDFC is operationalized, Members of Congress may examine whether the current statutory framework allows the IDFC to balance both its mandates to support U.S. businesses in competing for overseas investment opportunities and to support development, as well as whether it enables the IDFC to respond effectively to strategic concerns especially vis-à-vis China. Congress also may consider whether to press the Administration to pursue international rules on development finance comparable to those that govern export credit financing. More broadly, the IDFC’s establishment could renew legislative debate over the economic and policy benefits and costs of U.S. government activity to support private investment, and whether such activity is an effective way to promote broad U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Jan 15, 2019

Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA): Overview and Issues for Congress

Congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA; P.L. 92-583, 16 U.S.C. §§1451-1466) in 1972 and has amended the act 11 times, most recently in 2009. CZMA sets up a national framework for states and territories to consider and manage coastal resources. If a state or territory chooses to develop a coastal zone management program and the program is approved, the state or territory (1) becomes eligible for several federal grants and (2) can perform reviews of federal agency actions in coastal areas (known as federal consistency determination reviews). Each level of government plays a role in coastal management under CZMA. At the federal level, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) Office for Coastal Management (OCM) in the Department of Commerce implements CZMA’s national policies and provisions. OCM administers CZMA under several national programs; the National Coastal Zone Management Program (NCZMP) is the focus of this report. To participate in the NCZMP, states and territories (hereinafter referred to as states) must adhere to guidelines set out in CZMA and related regulations. States determine the details of their coastal management programs (CMPs), including the boundaries of their coastal zones, issues of most interest to the state, and policies to address these issues, among other factors. Local governments then implement the approved CMPs, often through land use regulations. The Secretary of Commerce must approve state CMPs. Once the Secretary approves a state’s CMP, the state is eligible to receive the NCZMP’s benefits and is referred to as a participant in the program (16 U.S.C. §1455). Participation in the NCZMP provides several advantages to participants, including eligibility for federal grant programs and the right to review federal actions for consistency with state coastal policies. Thirty-five states and territories (including states surrounding the Great Lakes, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) are eligible to participate. Although all 35 eligible states have at some point chosen to participate, 34 are currently part of the NCZMP. Since 1972, NOAA has allocated over $2 billion in coastal zone management-related grants to eligible coastal states. States have received amounts ranging from $13 million to over $106 million in grant funding, depending on factors such as how long the state has been a part of the NCZMP, the state’s size and population, and extent of the state’s applications to grant programs. CZMA consistency provisions (Section 307) require federal actions that have reasonably foreseeable effects on coastal uses or resources to be consistent with the enforceable policies of a participant’s approved CMP. These actions may occur in the state’s approved coastal zone or in federal or out-of-state waters (which may cause interstate coastal effects). Federal agencies or applicants proposing to perform these federal actions must submit a consistency determination to the potentially affected participant, certifying that the actions are consistent with state coastal policies and providing participants the opportunity to review their determinations (16 U.S.C. §1456). The 116th Congress may consider changes to CZMA. These changes may address issues such as growing population and infrastructure needs and changing environmental conditions along the coast, questions about the effectiveness of CZMA implementation, and expired authorization of appropriations for CZMA grant programs. Some of these concerns were addressed in proposed legislation in the 115th Congress, such as legislation to expand grant programs to cover more topics and affected groups, and may be addressed in the 116th Congress.

Jan 15, 2019

The Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) List

Jan 15, 2019

Asylum and Related Protections for Aliens Who Fear Gang and Domestic Violence

Jan 15, 2019