CRS Reports

The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (P.L. 115-271): Food and Drug Administration and Controlled Substance Provisions

On October 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law H.R. 6, the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention that Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (P.L. 115-271; the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, or the SUPPORT Act). The SUPPORT Act is a sweeping measure designed to address widespread overprescribing and abuse of opioids in the United States. The act includes provisions involving law enforcement, public health, and health care financing and coverage. Broadly, the legislation imposes tighter oversight of opioid production and distribution; imposes additional reporting and safeguards to address fraud; and limits coverage of prescription opioids, while expanding coverage of and access to opioid addiction treatment services. The bill also authorizes a number of programs that seek to expand consumer education on opioid use and train additional providers to treat individuals with opioid use disorders. The SUPPORT Act builds on recent efforts by the federal government to address the opioid epidemic, including the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198) and the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255). CARA addressed substance use issues broadly, targeting the opioid crisis predominantly through public health and law enforcement strategies. The Cures Act, enacted that same year, largely focused on medical innovation but also authorized additional funding to combat opioid addiction and included provisions addressing various mental health and substance use activities. CRS is publishing a series of reports on the SUPPORT Act, which consists of eight titles. This report summarizes the provisions in Title III—the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) and Controlled Substance Provisions, as well as Section 4004 “Modernizing the Reporting Requirements of Biological and Biosimilar Products” in Title IV—Offsets. Subtitle A of Title III addresses FDA medical product regulation and includes provisions that, among other things, facilitate the development of new medical products for treatment of pain, provide for special packaging and disposal mechanisms for opioids, and amend postmarket study and labeling requirements. Subtitle B of Title III addresses Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) regulation of controlled substances and includes provisions that, among other things, provide additional flexibility with respect to medication-assisted treatment (MAT) for opioid use disorders, modify controlled substances disposal requirements at qualified hospice programs, and authorize grants to states to increase participation of eligible collectors in drug-disposal programs. Section 4004 of Title IV amends reporting requirements for certain agreements between brand drug, generic drug, and biosimilar product manufacturers.

Nov 15, 2018

Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering

Nov 14, 2018

DACA: Litigation Status Update

Nov 14, 2018

The Charitable Deduction for Individuals

Nov 13, 2018

Defense Primer: Congress’s Constitutional Authority with Regard to the Armed Forces

Nov 13, 2018

Defense Primer: Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation

Nov 13, 2018

Defense Primer: Legal Authorities for the Use of Military Forces

Nov 13, 2018

Labor Enforcement Issues in U.S. FTAs

Nov 13, 2018

Presidential Proclamation on Unlawful Border Crossers and Asylum

On November 9, 2018, President Donald Trump issued a presidential proclamation to immediately suspend the entry of foreign nationals (aliens) who cross into the United States at the U.S.-Mexico border without inspection. The pronouncement further references that those who enter in contravention of the suspension will be ineligible for asylum under an interim final rule issued jointly by the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice on that same date. The proclamation and the rule are being challenged in federal court. In the words of the proclamation, its issuance was prompted by the anticipated arrival at the U.S. Southwest border of “a substantial number of aliens primarily from Central America who appear to have no lawful basis for admission.” According to the proclamation, such migration “has precipitated a crisis and undermines the integrity of our borders” and requires “immediate action to protect the national interest, and to maintain the effectiveness of the asylum system.” The need to conduct foreign affairs effectively is another reason offered for the proclamation. Citing both constitutional and statutory authority, the President finds that the entry of aliens at the Southwest border without inspection “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions.” The proclamation indicates that its entry suspension and limitation provisions will expire 90 days after its issuance date or on the date that the United States and Mexico reach a bilateral safe third country agreement that allows for the removal of asylum seekers to Mexico, whichever is earlier. Under the interim final rule, as noted, aliens who cross the U.S.-Mexico border unlawfully between ports of entry will be ineligible for asylum. By contrast, aliens without visas or other proper documentation who present themselves at a U.S. port of entry at the Southwest border will continue to be able to pursue asylum. In general, under Section 208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), an alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of entry) may apply for asylum, regardless of his or her immigration status. At the same time, INA §208(b)(2) enumerates grounds of ineligibility for asylum, such as an applicant’s firm resettlement in another country prior to his or her U.S. arrival, and authorizes the executive branch to establish additional ineligibilities consistent with Section 208. In order to be granted asylum, an alien must show, among other requirements, that he or she meets the definition of a refugee in INA §101(a)(42); that is, that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on one of five protected grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). After one year of physical presence in the United States, an alien granted asylum (an asylee) may become a U.S. lawful permanent resident (LPR), provided he or she is otherwise eligible. Under the proclamation and the rule, aliens who enter the United States at the Southwest border without inspection will continue to be eligible for consideration for forms of protection from removal other than asylum—namely, withholding of removal (INA §241(b)(3)) and protections under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). The interim final rule addresses eligibility for asylum and screening procedures for these aliens. There are key differences between asylum on the one hand and withholding of removal and protections under the CAT on the other. These latter forms of protection have a higher standard of proof than asylum. The threshold for an asylum applicant to be considered to have a well-founded fear of future persecution is that “there is a reasonable possibility of suffering [persecution based on one of the five protected grounds] if he or she were to return to that country.” The comparable standard applicable to an applicant for withholding of removal under INA §241(b)(3) is “it is more likely than not that he or she would be persecuted on [one of the protected grounds].” Similarly, the standard for withholding of removal or deferral of removal under the CAT is “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” Withholding of removal under INA §241(b)(3) and protections under the CAT also differ from asylum in that they do not provide a pathway to LPR status. The proclamation directs the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a recommendation jointly to the President about whether to extend or renew the suspension and limitations on entry within 90 days.

Nov 13, 2018

Federal District Court Enjoins the Department of Homeland Security from Terminating Temporary Protected Status

Nov 9, 2018

Defense Primer: The NDAA Process

Nov 9, 2018

Introduction to U.S. Economy: Business Investment

Nov 8, 2018

Defense Primer: Department of the Navy

Nov 8, 2018

Defense Primer: Geography, Strategy, and U.S. Force Design

Nov 8, 2018

Defense Primer: Naval Forces

Nov 8, 2018

Military Medical Care: Frequently Asked Questions

Military medical care is a congressionally authorized entitlement that has expanded in size and scope since the late 19th century. Chapter 55 of Title 10 U.S. Code, entitles certain health benefits to military personnel, retirees, and their families. These health benefits are administered by a Military Health System (MHS). The primary objectives of the MHS, which includes the Defense Department’s hospitals, clinics, and medical personnel, are (1) to maintain the health of military personnel so they can carry out their military missions and (2) to be prepared to deliver health care during wartime. Health care services are delivered through either Department of Defense (DOD) medical facilities, known as military treatment facilities (MTFs) as space is available, or through civilian health care providers. As of 2017, the MHS operates 681 MTFs, employs nearly 63,000 civilians and 84,000 military personnel, and serves 9.4 million beneficiaries across the United States and in overseas locations. Since 1966, civilian care for millions of retirees, as well as dependents of active duty military personnel and retirees, has been provided through a program still known in law as the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS), more commonly known as TRICARE. TRICARE has three main benefit plans: a health maintenance organization option (TRICARE Prime), a preferred provider option (TRICARE Select), and a Medicare supplement option (TRICARE for Life) for Medicare-eligible retirees. Other TRICARE plans include TRICARE Young Adult, TRICARE Reserve Select, and TRICARE Retired Reserve. TRICARE also includes a pharmacy program and optional dental and vision plans. Options available to beneficiaries vary by the sponsor’s duty status and geographic location. This report answers selected frequently asked questions about military health care, including How is the Military Health System structured? What is TRICARE? What are the different TRICARE plans and who is eligible? What are the costs of military health care to beneficiaries? What is the relationship of TRICARE to Medicare? How does the Affordable Care Act affect TRICARE? When can beneficiaries change their TRICARE plan? What is the Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care fund, which funds TRICARE for Life? This report does not address issues specific to battlefield medicine, veterans, or the Veterans Health Administration. Veterans’ health issues are addressed in CRS Report R42747, Health Care for Veterans: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, by Sidath Viranga Panangala.

Nov 8, 2018

Reclamation Water Storage Projects: Section 4007 of the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation (WIIN) Act

Nov 8, 2018

The Global Research and Development Landscape and Implications for the Department of Defense

For more than 70 years, the technological superiority of the United States military has offset the size and geographic advantages of potential adversaries. The Department of Defense (DOD), due in large part to the magnitude of its investments in research and development (R&D), has driven the global R&D and technology landscape. However, DOD and the federal government more broadly are no longer overriding funders of R&D, and this shift in support for R&D has substantial implications for how DOD obtains advanced technology and maintains the battlefield overmatch that technology has historically provided. In 1960, the United States accounted for 69% of global R&D, with U.S. defense-related R&D alone accounting for more than one-third of global R&D (36%). Additionally, the federal government funded approximately twice as much R&D as U.S. business. However, from 1960 to 2016, the U.S. share of global R&D fell to 28%, and the federal government’s share of total U.S. R&D fell from 65% to 24%, while business’s share more than doubled from 33% to 67%. As a result of these global, national, and federal trends, federal defense R&D’s share of total global R&D fell to 3.7% in 2016. This decline resulted primarily from more rapid increases in the R&D of other nations (public and private) and partially from increases in U.S. business R&D and federal nondefense R&D. Some defense experts and policymakers have recognized the shift in the global R&D landscape and the need for DOD to rely increasingly on technologies developed by commercial companies for commercial markets. Among the challenges DOD faces in acquiring new, innovative technologies and maintaining U.S. military technical superiority are developing/modifying organizations and business models to access this technology; adapting the DOD business culture to seek and embrace technologies developed outside of DOD, the United States, and its traditional contractor base; and finding ways to adapt and leverage commercial technologies for defense applications. Congress plays a central role in how DOD creates and acquires leading-edge technologies, including establishing and refining the organizational structure of DOD R&D activities, providing policy direction, establishing acquisition policies and authorities, and appropriating funds for R&D and innovation-related activities. Congress and the Administration have undertaken a number of actions to address the perceived decline in technical superiority, including establishing the position of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to coordinate DOD’s research enterprise, drive the development of key technologies, and create a more agile and innovative department; increasing DOD collaboration and engagement with industry and academia. For example, DOD has increased its presence in U.S. commercial technology hubs through the Defense Innovation Unit, established partnership intermediary agreements with various organizations, and co-located DOD research and development personnel at partner institutions across the country; and working to alter the culture of DOD to increase the speed technologies are developed, adapted, and acquired, including through the use of other transaction authority. As DOD implements these reform efforts congressional oversight may include monitoring how effectively DOD is addressing congressional directives and intent to create a more risk tolerant and innovative DOD.

Nov 8, 2018

Panama: Country Overview and U.S. Relations

Nov 7, 2018

Defense Primer: The United States Air Force

Nov 7, 2018

Defense Primer: Military Officers

Nov 7, 2018

Defense Primer: Military Enlisted Personnel

Nov 7, 2018

Defense Primer: United States Airpower

Nov 7, 2018

Impact Aid, Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act: A Primer

The Impact Aid program, administered by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) and authorized by Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), was originally established in 1950 by P.L. 81-815 and P.L. 81-874, 15 years prior to the enactment of the ESEA. Impact Aid compensates local educational agencies (LEAs) for a “substantial and continuing financial burden” resulting from federal activities. These activities include federal ownership of certain lands, as well as the enrollments in LEAs of children whose parents work or live on federal property and children living on Indian lands. The federal government provides compensation because LEAs are unable to collect property or other taxes from these individuals (e.g., members of the uniformed services living on military bases) or their employers, even though the LEAs are obligated to provide free public education to their children. Thus, Impact Aid is intended to compensate LEAs, in part, for the resulting loss of tax revenue. The Impact Aid program authorizes several types of payments, as detailed in the table below. Table 1. Impact Aid Payments: FY2019 (Dollars in thousands) Impact Aid Payment FY2019 Percentage of Total Impact Aid Funding Payments for federal property (Section 7002) $74,313 5.1% Basic support payments (Section 7003(b)) $1,301,242 90.0% Payments for children with disabilities (Section 7003(d)) $48,316 3.3% Construction (Section 7007) $17,406 1.2% Facilities maintenance (Section 7008) $4,835 0.3% Total $1,446,112 100.00% Source: Table prepared by CRS based on data available from the U.S. Department of Education (ED), Budget Service. Note: Details may not add to totals due to rounding. Overall, the Impact Aid program received about $1.4 billion in FY2019. The largest Impact Aid payment is basic support payments (BSPs) for federally connected children (Section 7003(b)), accounting for nearly 90% of the total appropriation. Federally connected children are those who reside with a parent who is a member of the uniformed services living on or off federal property, with a parent who is an accredited foreign military officer living on or off federal property, on Indian lands, in low-rent public housing, or with a parent who is a civilian working or living on federal property. BSPs are allocated directly to LEAs based on a formula that uses weights assigned to different categories of federally connected children, cost factors to determine maximum payment amounts, and provisions to determine payment amounts when appropriations are insufficient to provide maximum payments. In addition to the Impact Aid programs administered by ED, a smaller set of programs administered by the Department of Defense (DOD) are often referred to as the “DOD Impact Aid” programs. These two programs include one that provides supplemental aid to LEAs serving military children, and one that provides assistance to LEAs serving military children with severe disabilities. For FY2018, total appropriations for these programs were $35 million ($30 million for the first program and $5 million for the second).

Nov 7, 2018

Child Care Entitlement to States: An Overview

Nov 6, 2018

The Plug-In Electric Vehicle Tax Credit

Nov 6, 2018

Robbery, Extortion, and Bribery in One Place: A Legal Overview of the Hobbs Act

The Hobbs Act proscribes obstructing commerce by means of robbery or extortion or attempting or conspiring to do so. The Act applies to individuals and legal entities alike. It permits prosecutions, although the impact on commerce may be minimal. It condemns the robbery—knowingly taking the property of another by force or threat—of drug dealers, mom-and-pop markets, and multinational corporations. Attempted Hobbs Act robbery consists of an intent to rob, coupled with a substantial step toward that objective; conspiracy, a scheme of two or more to rob or extort; and accomplice liability, aiding and abetting a Hobbs Act violation of another. Hobbs Act robbery, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years, often occurs in confluence with the use of a firearm during and in furtherance of its commission, a fact that triggers the mandatory minimum sentences authorized in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The facts present in a Hobbs Act robbery case may also implicate violations of (1) the federal racketeering statute punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years and (2) the federal money laundering statutes, likewise punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Hobbs Act extortion comes in two forms. One is akin to robbery, the other to bribery. Neither requires but a minimal impact on commerce. Both view individuals as well as organizations as potential defendants. As a robbery look-alike, it outlaws the wrongful use of force or fear to induce another to surrender property to which the aggressor has no lawful claim. As a bribery look-alike, it outlaws corrupt quid pro quos, i.e., a public official obtaining a payment, to which he is not entitled, in anticipation of the performance of an official act. The proscriptions also apply to attempt or conspiracy to commit either variety of Hobbs Act extortion and may implicate accomplice liability (aiding and abetting) as well. Hobbs Act extortion in either form is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years. Moreover, in addition to the racketeering and money laundering, the facts in a Hobbs Act extortion case may also implicate the Travel Act, which condemns interstate travel to promote an extortion or bribery scheme and that carries a penalty of imprisonment for not more than five years.

Nov 6, 2018

Presidential Disability Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Constitutional Provisions and Perspectives for Congress

Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provide for presidential disability or inability. Section 3 of the amendment sets the procedure whereby a President may declare himself or herself “unable to discharge the powers and duties” of the office by transmitting a written declaration to this effect to the President pro tempore of the Senate (President pro tem) and the Speaker of the House of Representatives (Speaker). For the duration of the disability, the Vice President discharges the President’s powers and duties as Acting President. When the President transmits “a written declaration to the contrary” to the President pro tem and the Speaker, he or she resumes the powers and duties of the office. Section 3 is intended to cover either unanticipated disability, such as injury or illness, or anticipated disability, such as medical treatment. It has been activated three times under circumstances in which the President underwent general anesthesia for medical treatment. It was informally implemented by President Ronald Reagan in 1985 and was formally implemented twice by President George W. Bush, in 2002 and 2007, under similar circumstances. Section 4 provides for instances of contingent presidential disability. It was intended by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s authors to provide for cases in which a President was unable or unwilling to declare a disability. In these circumstances, the section authorizes the Vice President and a majority of either the Cabinet, or such other body established by law (a presidential disability review body), acting jointly, to declare the President to be disabled. When they transmit a written message to this effect to the President pro tem and the Speaker, the Vice President immediately assumes the powers and duties of the office as Acting President. If the President, at a time of his choice, transmits a written message to the President pro tem and the Speaker that no disability exists, he or she resumes office. The Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet or disability review body may, however, contest this finding by a written declaration to the contrary to the aforementioned officers, delivered within four days of the President’s declaration. Congress then decides the question, assembling within 48 hours if it is not in session. If Congress decides by a two-thirds vote of both houses that the President is unable to discharge the duties of the office, the Vice President continues as Acting President until the disability is resolved. If the two-thirds margin is not obtained, or if Congress is in session at the time but does not vote on the question within 21 days of receiving the requisite declaration, then the President resumes the powers and duties of the office. Similarly, if Congress is not in session at the time, and assembles as required by Section 4, but does not vote within 21 days of the day on which it is required to assemble, then the President resumes the powers and duties of the office. Section 4’s complexity and concern about its potential for misuse have raised questions among some observers that it could be implemented for political purposes. During debate on the amendment, its authors and proponents largely rejected such claims. They insisted the section was not intended to facilitate the removal of an unpopular or failed President, in support of which they cited checks and balances incorporated in the amendment that were designed to prevent abuse of the procedure. To date, Section 4 has not been implemented. Two bills pending in the 115th Congress would establish a presidential disability review body as authorized by Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: H.R. 1987, introduced on April 6, 2017, and H.R. 2093, introduced on April 14 of the same year. H.R. 1987 has been referred to the House Committee on House Rules and the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. H.R. 2093 has been referred to Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice.

Nov 5, 2018

The Energy Credit or Energy Investment Tax Credit (ITC)

Nov 2, 2018

National and International Educational Assessments

Nov 2, 2018

National and International Educational Assessments: Overview, Results, and Issues

U.S. students participate in many assessments to track their educational achievement. Perhaps the most widely discussed of these are statewide assessments required by the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which was most recently comprehensively amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95). However, U.S. students also participate in large-scale national assessments, authorized by the National Assessment of Educational Progress Assessment Act (NAEPAA; Title III, Section 303 of P.L. 107-279), and international assessments, authorized by the Education Sciences Reform Act (ESRA; Title I, Section 153(a)(6) of P.L. 107-279). At the national level, students participate in the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). At the international level, U.S. students participate in the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (PIRLS), and Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). Although there are some similarities between statewide, national, and international assessments, they differ in purpose and level of reporting. For example, the purpose of statewide assessments is primarily to inform statewide accountability systems and provide information on individual achievement. By contrast, the purpose of large-scale assessments is to highlight achievement gaps, track national progress over time, compare achievement within the United States, and compare U.S. achievement to that of other countries. Results of these assessments are not reported for individuals. National Assessments: The NAEP is a series of assessments measuring achievement in various content areas. The long-term trends NAEP (LTT NAEP) has tracked achievement since the 1970s and has remained relatively unchanged. The main NAEP assessment has tracked achievement since the 1990s and changes periodically to reflect changes in school curricula. The main NAEP has three levels: national, state, and Trial Urban District Assessment (TUDA). States that receive Title I-A funding under the ESEA are required to participate in biennial state NAEP assessments in reading and mathematics for 4th and 8th grade. Results from the 2017 main NAEP show a small but significant increase in 8th grade reading since 2015. There were no significant changes in 4th grade reading, 4th grade mathematics, or 8th grade mathematics since 2015. Longer term, however, average reading and mathematics scores have increased significantly since the initial administrations in the 1990s. International Assessments: The United States participates in three international assessments: TIMSS, PIRLS, and PISA. TIMSS is an assessment of mathematics and science for 8th grade students. PIRLS is an assessment of reading literacy for 4th grade students. PISA is an assessment of reading literacy, mathematics literacy, and science literacy for 15 year old students. In general, U.S. students have made statistically significant gains since the initial administrations of international assessments; however, achievement did not consistently increase in the most recent administrations of international assessments. Issues of Interpretation of National and International Assessments: Results of national and international assessments are difficult to interpret. One challenge is processing the large amount of data. Another is understanding the difference between statistical significance and educational significance. Reporting statistical significance is standard practice in research, but it does not convey the magnitude of a difference and its associated educational significance. Another issue is the tendency to focus narrowly on one assessment at one point in time. A narrow focus may not provide the appropriate context to interpret results accurately. International assessment results may also be affected by socioeconomic considerations within and across countries. Comparing Results Across Assessments: Comparing results across national and international assessments can be challenging. Each assessment was created for a unique purpose by different groups of stakeholders, which makes direct comparisons difficult. There are a number of issues to consider when evaluating U.S. students’ performance across assessments. For example, consideration must be given to the differences in (1) the degree of alignment of content standards and assessments, (2) the target population being assessed, (3) the voluntary nature of student participation, (4) the participating education systems, (5) the scale of the assessment, and (6) the precision of measurement for each assessment.

Nov 2, 2018

EPA’s Affordable Clean Energy Proposal

In August 2018, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) proposed three actions in the “Affordable Clean Energy Rule” (ACE). First, EPA proposed to replace the Obama Administration’s 2015 Clean Power Plan (CPP) with revised emission guidelines for existing fossil fuel steam electric generating units (EGUs), which are largely coal-fired units. Second, EPA proposed revised regulations to implement emission guidelines under Clean Air Act (CAA) Section 111(d). Third, EPA proposed to modify an applicability determination for New Source Review (NSR), a CAA preconstruction permitting program for new and modified stationary sources. The first action stems from EPA’s finding that the CPP exceeded EPA’s statutory authority by using measures that applied to the power sector rather than measures carried out within an individual facility. In the ACE rule, EPA proposed to base the “best system of emission reduction” (BSER) for existing coal-fired EGUs on heat rate improvement (HRI) measures. EPA did not propose a BSER for other types of EGUs, such as natural gas combined cycle units. In addition, EPA did not establish a numeric performance standard as the agency did in the CPP. Instead, EPA proposed a list of “candidate technologies” of HRI measures that constitute the BSER. States would establish unit-specific performance standards based on this list and other unit-specific considerations. Second, EPA proposed to revise the general implementing regulations to clarify EPA’s and states’ roles under Section 111(d) based on the agency’s current legal interpretation that states have broad discretion to establish emissions standards consistent with the BSER. The proposed changes would, among other things, revise definitions and lengthen the time for development and review of state plans. Third, EPA proposed to revise the NSR applicability test for EGUs. According to EPA, this would prevent NSR from discouraging the installation of energy efficiency measures. EGUs that adopt HRI measures and operate more efficiently may be used for longer time periods, thereby increasing annual emissions and potentially triggering NSR. Under ACE, NSR would not be triggered if the EGU modification did not increase emissions on an hourly basis, even if the modification increases annual emissions. EPA estimated emission changes under multiple scenarios. EPA projected that power sector emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and nitrogen oxides (NOx) would increase under the ACE proposal compared to the CPP. EPA also projected that ACE would, in most scenarios, decrease CO2, SO2, and NOx emissions compared to a baseline without the CPP. Power sector emissions projections, comparing CPP and non-CPP scenarios, provide context for evaluating the potential impacts of the ACE proposal. The CO2 emission reduction differences between CPP and non-CPP scenarios are greater in the studies from earlier years. For example, a comparison between CPP and non-CPP scenarios from the past three Energy Information Administration analyses shows that the percentage difference has decreased from 16% (in 2016) to 8% (in 2018), reflecting the fact that many of the changes EPA expected to result from the CPP (i.e., natural gas and renewables replacing coal-fired units) have happened already due to market forces and other factors. Comparisons between modeling projections of electricity sector CO2 emissions should be made with caution, however, given potential differences in modeling assumptions about future economic conditions and underlying energy inputs (e.g., natural gas prices). EPA estimated that compared to the CPP, ACE would reduce compliance costs and yield lower emission reductions, thereby increasing climate-related damages and human health damages (“forgone benefits”). According to EPA, the estimated value of the forgone benefits would outweigh the compliance cost savings when replacing the CPP with ACE, yielding net costs. Specifically, EPA estimated that this replacement would yield net costs ranging from $12.8 billion to $72.0 billion (2016$) over a 15-year period (2023-2037). Excluding forgone human health co-benefits from these comparisons yields estimates that range from a net cost of $5.4 billion to a net benefit of $3.4 billion over a 15-year period (2023-2037).

Nov 2, 2018

VA Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks Act of 2018 (VA MISSION Act; P.L.115-182)

On June 6, 2018, the John S. McCain III, Daniel K. Akaka, and Samuel R. Johnson VA Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks Act of 2018, or the VA MISSION Act of 2018 (S. 2372; P.L. 115-182; H.Rept. 115-671), was signed into law. The Department of Veterans Affairs Expiring Authorities Act of 2018 (S. 3479; P.L. 115-251), enacted on September 29, 2018, made some changes and technical amendments to the VA MISSION Act. This act, as amended, broadly addresses four major areas. First, it establishes a new permanent Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP), replacing the current Veterans Choice Program (VCP). The VA MISSION Act stipulates that the new program must be operational when regulations are published by the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) no later than one year after the date of enactment (June 6, 2018), or when the VA determines that 75% of the amounts deposited in the Veterans Choice Fund (VCF) have been exhausted. Second, it expands the current Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers, in two phases, to all eligible veterans who served prior to September 11, 2001. Third, it establishes an asset and infrastructure review process by establishing an Asset and Infrastructure Review Commission. The purpose of the commission is to examine the VA’s assets and to make recommendations for modernizing and realigning medical facilities. Fourth, it provides various statutory authorities to the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) of the VA to recruit and retain health care providers. Veterans Community Care Program (VCCP) The VA MISSION Act establishes a new permanent discretionary community care program known as VCCP. The act provides conditions under which the VA is required to provide care in the community once the program is established. Generally, all veterans enrolled in the VA health care system would be able to qualify when (1) the VA does not offer the care or service required by the veteran; or (2) the veteran resides in a state without a full-service VA medical facility; or (3) the veteran previously qualified under the 40-mile criterion of the VCP; or (4) the VA cannot provide the veteran with care and services that comply with designated access and quality standards; or (5) the veteran and the veteran’s primary care provider agree that it is in the best interest of the veteran to receive care in the community. In addition, the VA is required to enter into contracts to build a network of private community providers. Expansion of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers The VA MISSION Act expands the Program of Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers to pre-9/11 veterans in two phases. Under the first phase, veterans with serious service-connected injuries incurred on or before May 7, 1975, would qualify for benefits over a two-year period beginning on the date when the VA certifies to Congress that it has fully implemented the information technology system required for this program. Under the second phase, those with serious service-connected injuries incurred between May 7, 1975, and September 11, 2001, would qualify for the Comprehensive Assistance for Family Caregivers program two years after implementation of the first phase. Capital Asset Review The VA MISSION Act establishes a process for realigning and modernizing facilities of the VHA. Under this process, the VA will develop criteria for selecting VHA facilities to dispose of, modernize, or acquire, so as to better meet the health care needs of veterans. VA must then create a list of recommendations based on those criteria and submit it to a newly created Asset Infrastructure Review (AIR) Commission. The AIR Commission shall review the VA’s recommendations but may not alter them, unless it determines that one or more recommendations are inconsistent with the criteria. The commission shall submit the list of recommendations to the President, who shall either approve the list in its entirety or send it back to the AIR Commission. The AIR Commission may change the recommendations and resubmit a revised list to the President for reconsideration. The President may approve or disapprove of the revised list. If the President approves of the original or revised list, then VA must begin implementation of the recommendations within three years, unless Congress passes a joint resolution of disapproval, in which case the asset review process terminates. Recruiting and Retaining Health Care Providers in the VHA The VA MISSION Act authorizes or expands several programs, with the intention of recruiting and retaining health care providers in the VHA. Among other things, the act increases the maximum amount of student loan debt that may be reduced under VA’s Education Debt Reduction Program (EDRP); authorizes designated scholarships for physicians and dentists under the VA Health Professional Scholarship Program (HPSP); establishes the VA specialty education loan repayment program to incentivize VHA employees to pursue education and training in medical specialties for which VA determines there is a shortage; establishes a pilot Veterans Healing Veterans Medical Access and Scholarship Program; and extends eligibility for VA’s EDRP to clinical staff working at Vet Centers. The act also requires the VHA to establish a program to deploy mobile health teams to serve in underserved VA medical facilities. Lastly, the VA MISSION Act authorizes and appropriates $5.2 billion in mandatory funding for the VCP until the VCCP is operational.

Nov 1, 2018

U.S. Trade Policy Functions: Who Does What?

Nov 1, 2018

California Dreamin’ of Privacy Regulation: The California Consumer Privacy Act and Congress

Nov 1, 2018

U.S. Ground Forces Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) and Artificial Intelligence (AI): Considerations for Congress

The nexus of robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) and artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to change the nature of warfare. RAS offers the possibility of a wide range of platforms—not just weapon systems—that can perform “dull, dangerous, and dirty” tasks—potentially reducing the risks to soldiers and Marines and possibly resulting in a generation of less expensive ground systems. Other nations, notably peer competitors Russia and China, are aggressively pursuing RAS and AI for a variety of military uses, raising considerations about the U.S. military’s response—to include lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS)—that could be used against U.S. forces. The adoption of RAS and AI by U.S. ground forces carries with it a number of possible implications, including potentially improved performance and reduced risk to soldiers and Marines; potential new force designs; better institutional support to combat forces; potential new operational concepts; and possible new models for recruiting and retaining soldiers and Marines. The Army and Marines have developed and are executing RAS and AI strategies that articulate near-, mid-, and long-term priorities. Both services have a number of RAS and AI efforts underway and are cooperating in a number of areas. A fully manned, capable, and well-trained workforce is a key component of military readiness. The integration of RAS and AI into military units raises a number of personnel-related issues that may be of interest to Congress, including unit manning changes, recruiting and retention of those with advanced technical skills, training, and career paths. RAS and AI are anticipated to be incorporated into a variety of military applications, ranging from logistics and maintenance, personnel management, intelligence, and planning to name but a few. In this regard, most consider it unlikely that appreciable legal and ethical objections to their use by the military will be raised. The most provocative question concerning the military application of RAS and AI being actively debated by academics, legal scholars, policymakers, and military officials is that of “killer robots” (i.e., should autonomous robotic weapon systems be permitted to take human life?). Potential issues for Congress include the following: Would an assessment of foreign military RAS and AI efforts and the potential impact on U.S. ground forces benefit policymakers? Should the United States develop fully autonomous weapon systems for ground forces? How will U.S. ground forces counter foreign RAS and AI capabilities? How should the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services engage with the private sector? What are some of the personnel-related concerns associated with RAS and AI? What role should Congress play in the legal and ethical debate on LAWS? What role should the United States play in potential efforts to regulate LAWS?

Nov 1, 2018

Medicaid Financing for the Territories

Oct 29, 2018

The Public Service Loan Forgiveness Program: Selected Issues

The Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program provides Direct Loan borrowers who, on or after October 1, 2007, are employed full-time in certain public service jobs for 10 years while making 120 separate qualifying monthly payments on their Direct Loans with the opportunity to have any remaining balance of principal and interest on their loans forgiven. The program was enacted under the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-84) to encourage individuals to enter into and remain employed in public service and to alleviate the potential financial burdens associated with federal student loans of borrowers in public service occupations who were presumed generally to earn less than their counterparts in other occupations. With the opportunity to apply for program benefits first being made available on October 1, 2017, based on service completed and payments made prior to that date, many issues that span several aspects of the program have been raised and have garnered congressional interest. This report addresses numerous issues, which are highlighted below. Program implementation issues that have surfaced relate to how the PSLF program’s statutory requirements have been operationalized, difficulties experienced by borrowers in participating in the program, and difficulties in administering the program. Some of these issues include: Operationally defining what constitutes a “public service job.” This includes whether the definition in use is sufficiently targeted to meet congressional intent for the program and whether it has created inequities among types of borrowers. There have also been administrative difficulties associated with identifying and certifying qualifying employment. Determining what constitutes a “qualifying payment.” Multiple criteria related to on-time payments, time periods over which payments must be made, and specific payment amounts must be met for a payment to be considered qualifying, which may cause confusion among borrowers and create administrative difficulties. Difficulties borrowers may face when determining which repayment plan to enroll in to maximize PSLF benefits. Payments made according to an income-driven repayment (IDR) plan may decrease the monthly dollar amount of payments made, which may ultimately lead to greater amounts of PSLF forgiveness benefits. Payments made under other plans may also qualify for PSLF but may not be as valuable to borrowers in terms of eventual PSLF forgiveness benefits. The effects of loan consolidation on a borrower’s progress toward receiving PSLF benefits. Of particular importance, PSLF qualifying payments made prior to consolidation do not count toward forgiveness of the resulting Direct Consolidation Loan. The complexities and challenges that administering the program may present for the Department of Education, loan servicers, and borrowers. These include issues of communication among the parties regarding program requirements and processes, lack of coordination among loan servicers, loans servicers making errors or not completing tasks associated with the program in a timely manner, and the lack of automation of some administrative functions. Issues pertaining to PSLF program interactions with other programs and benefits relate to whether borrowers understand the interactions well enough to make rational choices and maximize available benefits and, from the federal government’s perspective, questions have arisen regarding whether the desired targeting of benefits is being achieved and about the potential costs associated with such interactions. Some of these issues include: There is no limit to the amount of loan forgiveness benefits an individual may realize under the PSLF program. While it is possible that many borrowers may receive limited benefits, some Direct Loan borrowers may realize large forgiveness benefits under the program. This outcome may be more likely to occur for borrowers of Direct PLUS Loans for graduate and professional students, which have no aggregate borrowing limits, and which were newly authorized to be made just prior to the enactment of PSLF. Also, the variety of IDR plans has expanded greatly since the PSLF program’s inception, with several of the new IDR plans providing for lower monthly payments than under the Income-Based Repayment plan—the primary IDR plan available when the PSLF program was enacted. This expansion may allow borrowers to lower monthly payments and potentially realize larger forgiveness benefits under the program. The current borrowing limits and variety of IDR plans, coupled with PSLF program benefits, have raised questions about whether certain types of students are not incentivized to limit borrowing and whether they may be less sensitive to the price of postsecondary education. Borrowers may receive benefits under a number of federal student loan repayment programs. Borrowers may also be able to avail themselves of certain income tax provisions to maximize PSLF program benefits. For borrowers, understanding whether the same service that qualifies for PSLF may also qualify for other loan repayment benefits is important, as is their understanding of how other benefits and tax provisions may interact with PSLF. From the perspective of the federal government, a key consideration may relate to what constitutes a “double benefit” for service performed by borrowers and the extent to which overlapping benefits might be provided. Broad program-related issues relate to (1) how the program fits into the overall suite of federal student aid benefits and (2) the difficulty of estimating the potential participation in and costs of the program. The enactment of the PSLF program is reflective of a broadening of the federal approach to student aid, providing more widely available assistance to individuals after a postsecondary education’s costs have been incurred. This approach may place greater emphasis on providing aid on the basis of economic circumstances after enrollment, rather than at the time of enrollment. It also makes some aid available on a targeted basis—providing relief to individuals who pursue certain types of service or occupations, rather than providing aid more broadly to individuals who enroll in postsecondary education. The granting of loan forgiveness benefits results in costs to the federal government, and there has been some speculation that the cost of PSLF could be much higher than anticipated. Limited information is available on the actual and future costs to the government of the PSLF program. It has just recently become possible to claim program benefits; thus, little is known about what the costs associated with the program will be based on the experiences of actual cohorts of borrowers. In addition, estimating potential costs may prove difficult as borrowers are not required to submit information on their intent to participate in the program until they seek forgiveness benefits after 10 years of service and qualifying payments.

Oct 29, 2018

Medicaid Coverage for Former Foster Youth Up to Age 26

Oct 26, 2018

U.S. Global Family Planning and Reproductive Health Programs: Funding Trends and Issues for Congress

Oct 26, 2018

Morocco: Background and U.S. Relations

Morocco is a constitutional monarchy with an elected parliament and local government entities. King Mohammed VI, who inherited the throne in 1999, maintains overarching political authority but has taken some liberalizing steps. In 2011, amid domestic and regional protests, the king introduced a new constitution providing more power to elected officials and expanding individual rights. The monarch nonetheless remains the arbiter of national political decision-making, the head of the military, and—as “Commander of the Faithful”—the country’s highest religious authority. The king’s seizure of the initiative in 2011 and quick response to protests arguably helped the monarchy retain its popular legitimacy and stability. In recent years, officials have struggled to respond to resurgent protests and other forms of activism that apparently reflect ongoing grievances over economic challenges, corruption, and police brutality. Successive U.S. Administrations have viewed Morocco as an important regional security, trade, and development partner. Morocco is a designated Major Non-NATO Ally, and bilateral trade and investment have expanded since a U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement was signed in 2004. The United States allocated $38.6 million in bilateral aid in FY2017; Morocco is also implementing a five-year $450 million U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact, its second such program. Security cooperation has also expanded amid instability in Libya and the Sahel region of West Africa. Morocco is a purchaser of U.S. defense materiel (including F-16 jets), hosts an annual military exercise in which some 1,000 U.S. personnel participate, and is a member of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State. In 2017, the United States and Morocco launched an “Initiative to Address Homegrown Violent Extremists” under the auspices of the multilateral Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). In September 2018, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita pledged to reconvene a high-level U.S.-Morocco Strategic Dialogue, last held in 2015. With regard to the disputed territory of Western Sahara, the United States has recognized neither Morocco’s claim of sovereignty, nor the self-declared Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), led by the independence-seeking Polisario Front from exile in Algeria. The United States has provided funding and diplomatic backing for a U.N. peacekeeping operation, known as MINURSO, which was conceived to organize a referendum on the territory’s final status but currently observes a 1991 ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario. The U.N. Security Council—including the United States, a veto-capable permanent member—has called for Morocco and the Polisario to negotiate a “mutually acceptable political solution.” U.S. officials have praised Morocco’s proposal to grant the territory autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, while maintaining support for the U.N.-led diplomatic process. U.S.-Morocco tensions temporarily erupted in 2013 and 2016 over perceived Obama Administration support for greater pressure on Morocco in the United Nations. (See CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara, for background.) Congressional interest in the Western Sahara issue and the scope of U.S. aid has been reflected in recent appropriations legislation—most recently, §7041(g) of Division K, P.L. 115-141 and the accompanying Explanatory Statement—among other channels. Relevant bills and resolutions pending in the 115th Congress include the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2019 (H.R. 6385 and S. 3108, respectively), as well as H.Res. 1101 (Affirming the historical relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Morocco [...]). Morocco’s foreign policy focuses on its Western partners (including the United States along with France, Spain, and the European Union); the Arab Gulf states; and sub-Saharan Africa. Since the 2011 “Arab Spring,” Morocco has drawn closer to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which have provided aid and investment; it has remained officially neutral in the current rift between Qatar and other GCC countries. In mid-2018, Morocco cut ties with Iran for the second time in the past decade, accusing it of providing military support to the Polisario via Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist network. Tensions between Morocco and neighboring Algeria—a regional rival and the Polisario’s primary backer—have long stymied security and economic cooperation within North Africa. The king has instead launched various economic, trade, and exchange initiatives in sub-Saharan African countries, and in 2016, Morocco joined the African Union (AU), having previously refused to do so due to the organization’s recognition of the SADR as a member state.

Oct 26, 2018

Invasive Species: A Brief Overview

Oct 26, 2018

Pakistan’s Domestic Political Setting

Oct 26, 2018

What Legal Obligations do Internet Companies Have to Prevent and Respond to a Data Breach?

Oct 25, 2018

Regulation of Cell-Cultured Meat

Oct 25, 2018

Section 232 Auto Investigation

Oct 24, 2018

U.S.-India Trade Relations

Oct 24, 2018

Funding and Financing Highways and Public Transportation

For many years, federal surface transportation programs were funded almost entirely from taxes on motor fuels deposited in the Highway Trust Fund. The tax rates, which are fixed in terms of cents per gallon, have not been increased at the federal level since 1993. Meanwhile, motor fuel consumption is projected to decline due to improved fuel efficiency, increased use of electric vehicles, and slow growth in vehicle miles traveled. In consequence, revenue flowing into the Highway Trust Fund has been insufficient to support the surface transportation program authorized by Congress since 2008. Congress has yet to address the surface transportation program’s fundamental revenue issues, and has given limited consideration to raising fuel taxes in recent years. Instead, since 2008 Congress has supported the federal surface transportation program by supplementing fuel tax revenues with transfers from the U.S. Treasury general fund. The most recent reauthorization act, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), authorized spending on federal highway and public transportation programs through September 30, 2020. The act provided $70 billion in general fund transfers to the Highway Trust Fund from FY2016 through FY2020. This use of general fund transfers to supplement the Highway Trust Fund will have been the de facto funding policy for 12 years when the FAST Act expires. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections indicate that the Highway Trust Fund insufficiency relative to spending will reemerge following expiration of the FAST Act. The projections indicate a shortfall of $85 billion over the first five years following the FAST Act, and $109 billion over the first six years. As the September 2020 expiration of the FAST Act approaches, Congress may again examine adjustments to the funding and financing of the federal role in surface transportation. Raising motor fuel taxes could provide the Highway Trust Fund with sufficient revenue to fully fund the program in the near term, but may not be a viable long-term solution due to expected declines in fuel consumption. It would also not address the equity issue arising from the increasing number of personal and commercial vehicles that are powered electrically and therefore do not pay motor fuel taxes. Replacing motor fuel taxes with a mileage-based road user charge would need to overcome a variety of financial, administrative, and privacy barriers, but could be a solution in the longer term. Treasury general fund transfers could continue to be used to make up for the Highway Trust Fund’s projected shortfalls but could require budget offsets of an equal amount. The political difficulty of adequately funding the Highway Trust Fund could lead Congress to consider altering the trust fund system or eliminating it altogether. This might involve a reallocation of responsibilities and obligations among federal, state, and local governments. Some surface transportation needs can be met by private investment, including public-private partnerships, and federal loans from the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program. If it desires to promote private investment in transportation infrastructure, Congress could consider asset recycling incentive grants to state and local governments for the sale or lease of government-owned infrastructure if the proceeds are committed to new infrastructure. Tolling may be an effective way to finance specific roads, bridges, or tunnels that are likely to have heavy use and are located such that the tolls are difficult to evade. All revenue from tolls flows to the state or local agencies or private entities that operate tolled facilities; the federal government does not collect any revenue from tolls. However, a major expansion of tolling might reduce the need for federal expenditures on roads. Tolls and private investment are unlikely to provide broad financial support for surface transportation needs, and many projects are not well suited to alternative financing.

Oct 24, 2018

Head Start: Overview and Current Issues

Oct 23, 2018

Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 (“Tax Extenders”)

Twenty-eight temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2017. Collectively, temporary tax provisions that are regularly extended as a group by Congress, rather than being allowed to expire as scheduled, are often referred to as “tax extenders.” Temporary tax provisions were most recently extended in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123). BBA18 extended nearly all of the provisions that had expired at the end of 2016, with most provisions extended through the end of 2017. For most provisions, this extension was purely retroactive. Since the BBA18 was enacted in February 2018, the extensions generally were not made available for the tax year in which the legislation was enacted. The extension of expired provisions enacted in BBA18 was estimated to reduce federal revenue by $15.1 billion between FY2018 and FY2027. All of the temporary tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 have been included in previous “tax extender” legislation. There are several options for Congress to consider regarding temporary tax provisions. Provisions that expired at the end of 2017 could be extended. The extension could be retroactive. The extension could be short term, long term, or permanent. Another option would be to allow expired provisions to remain expired. Making permanent the temporary tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 would reduce federal revenue by an estimated $92.5 billion between FY2018 and FY2027. This is equal to about 0.2% of current-law projected federal revenue over this period. The number of “tax extender” provisions has fallen in recent years, as has the cost associated with extending “tax extenders.” The Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), made permanent a number of provisions that had been long-standing “tax extenders,” and extended several other provisions through 2019. The 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97) also made changes that resulted in the elimination of certain “tax extender” provisions. If Congress chooses to consider extending tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 late in 2018, the option of extending tax provisions that are scheduled to expire at the end of 2018 might be evaluated simultaneously. The two tax provisions scheduled to expire at the end of 2018 are (1) increased excise tax rates on coal used to finance the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund; and (2) a reduction in the medical expense deduction threshold from 10% of adjusted gross income (AGI) to 7.5% of AGI. Certain disaster-related tax provisions were available for 2017 disasters. Extending or expanding these provisions to be available for 2018 disasters is a policy option that could be considered. This report provides a broad overview of “tax extenders.” More information on specific tax provisions that expired at the end of 2017 can be found in CRS Report R44925, Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions (“Tax Extenders”): In Brief, coordinated by Molly F. Sherlock; CRS Report R44930, Business Tax Provisions that Expired in 2017 (“Tax Extenders”), coordinated by Molly F. Sherlock; and CRS Report R44990, Energy Tax Provisions That Expired in 2017 (“Tax Extenders”), by Molly F. Sherlock, Donald J. Marples, and Margot L. Crandall-Hollick.

Oct 22, 2018