CRS Reports

U.S. Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress

The overall U.S. role in the world since the end of World War II in 1945 (i.e., over the past 70 years) is generally described as one of global leadership and significant engagement in international affairs. A key aim of that role has been to promote and defend the open international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II. In addition to promoting and defending the open international order, the overall U.S. role is generally described as having been one of promoting freedom, democracy, and human rights, while criticizing and resisting authoritarianism where possible, and opposing the emergence of regional hegemons in Eurasia or a spheres-of-influence world. Certain statements and actions from the Trump Administration have led to uncertainty about the Administration’s intentions regarding the future U.S. role in the world. Based on those statements and actions, some observers have speculated that the Trump Administration may want to change the U.S. role in one or more ways. A change in the overall U.S. role could have profound implications for U.S. foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy, for Congress as an institution, and for many federal policies and programs. A major dimension of the debate over the U.S. role is whether the United States should attempt to continue playing the active internationalist role that it has played for the past 70 years, or instead adopt a more restrained role that reduces U.S. involvement in world affairs. A second dimension concerns how to balance or combine the pursuit of narrowly defined U.S. interests with the goal of defending and promoting U.S. values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights. A third dimension relates to the balance between the use of so-called hard power (primarily but not exclusively military combat power) and soft power (including diplomacy, development assistance, support for international organizations, education and cultural exchanges, and the international popularity of elements of U.S. culture such as music, movies, television shows, and literature) in U.S. foreign policy. An initial potential issue for Congress is to determine whether the Trump Administration wants to change the U.S. role, and if so, in what ways. A follow-on potential issue for Congress—arguably the central policy issue for this CRS report—is whether there should be a change in the U.S. role, and if so, what that change should be, including whether a given proposed change would be feasible or practical, and what consequences may result. An initial aspect of this issue concerns Congress: what should be Congress’s role, relative to that of the executive branch, in considering whether the U.S. role in the world should change, and if so, what that change should be? The Constitution vests Congress with several powers that can bear on the U.S. role in the world. Another potential issue for Congress is whether a change in the U.S. role would have any implications for the preservation and use of congressional powers and prerogatives relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy. A related issue is whether a change in the U.S. role would have any implications for congressional organization, capacity, and operations relating to foreign policy, national security, and international economic policy. Policy and program areas that could be affected, perhaps substantially or even profoundly, by a changed U.S. role include the role of allies and alliances in U.S. foreign policy; the organization of, and funding levels and foreign policy priorities for, the Department of State and U.S. foreign assistance; U.S. trade and international economic policy; defense strategy and budgets; and policies and programs related to homeland security, border security, immigration, and refugees.

Jul 12, 2017

Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations

Jul 7, 2017

Department of Labor’s 2016 Fiduciary Rule: Background and Issues

Regulations issued in 1975 (called the 1975 rule in this report) defined investment advice using a five-part test. To be held to ERISA’s fiduciary standard with respect to his or her advice, an individual had to (1) make recommendations on investing in, purchasing, or selling securities or other property, or give advice as to the value (2) on a regular basis (3) pursuant to a mutual understanding that the advice (4) will serve as a primary basis for investment decisions, and (5) will be individualized to the particular needs of the plan regarding such matters as, among other things, investment policies or strategy, overall portfolio composition, or diversification of plan investments. On April 8, 2016, the Department of Labor (DOL) issued a final regulation (called the 2016 final rule in this report) that redefined the term investment advice within pension and retirement plans. Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA; P.L. 93-406), a person who provides investment advice has a fiduciary obligation, which means that the person must provide the advice in the sole interest of plan participants. Thus, redefining the term investment advice could affect who is subject to this fiduciary standard. With the 2016 rule, DOL broadened the term’s definition to capture activities that currently occur within pension and retirement plans, but did not meet the 1975 definition of investment advice. The 2016 final rule replaced the five-part test of the 1975 rule with a more inclusive definition. (Table 1 compares the prior and current definitions.) For example, under the prior regulation, an individual had to provide advice on a regular basis to be a fiduciary, which generally would not have included recommendations on whether to roll over a 401(k) account balance to an Individual Retirement Account (IRA). The expanded definition removed the requirement that advice be given on a regular basis. Under the prior regulation, securities brokers and dealers who provided services to retirement plans and who were not fiduciaries were not required to act in the sole interests of plan participants. Rather, their recommendations had to meet a suitability standard, which requires that recommendations be suitable for the plan participant, given factors such as an individual’s income, risk tolerance, and investment objectives. The suitability standard is a lower standard than a fiduciary standard. Under DOL’s 2016 regulation, brokers and dealers are generally considered to be fiduciaries when they provide recommendations to participants in retirement plans. In addition to broadening the definition of investment advice, the rule provides carve-outs for situations that are not considered to be investment advice. For example, providing generalized investment or retirement education is not considered investment advice under the final rule. The 2016 final rule is accompanied by new prohibited transaction exemptions (PTEs) and amendments to existing PTEs. These allow fiduciaries to continue to engage in certain practices that would otherwise be prohibited (such as charging commissions for products they recommend or having revenue-sharing agreements with third parties). DOL first proposed broadening the definition of investment advice in October 2010. The proposed regulation generated much controversy and was withdrawn in September 2011. The revised proposals issued in April 2015 also generated considerable controversy. Following the release of the proposals, DOL received public comments and held three-and-a-half days of public hearings on the proposals. DOL issued the 2016 final rule on April 8, 2016, with an effective date June 7, 2016, and an applicability date of April 10, 2017. On February 3, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum on the fiduciary rule that directed DOL to (1) review the rule to determine whether it adversely affects access to retirement information and financial advice, and if it finds that it does so then (2) publish a proposed rule to rescind or revise the rule. On March 2, 2017, DOL proposed delaying the rule’s applicability date by 60 days. On March 10, 2017, DOL issued a Temporary Enforcement Policy indicating it will not initiate enforcement actions against financial advisers or financial institutions that fail to satisfy the conditions of the rule or PTEs in the period between the applicability date and when DOL decides to either delay or not delay the applicability date of the 2016 final rule and PTEs. On April 7, 2017, DOL issued a 60-day delay of the 2016 final rule’s applicability date while it reviews the effects of the rule pursuant to the presidential memorandum of February 3, 2017. DOL delayed the applicability date by 60 days from April 10, 2017, to June 9, 2017, of (1) the expanded definition of investment advice and (2) the Impartial Conduct Standard of the Best Interest Contract (BIC) exemption. While these two aspects of the rule are currently in place, other aspects of the exemption, such as requirements to make specific disclosures and warrant policies and procedures and to execute written contracts are to become applicable on January 1, 2018.

Jul 3, 2017

Comparison of the American Health Care Act (AHCA) and the Better Care Reconciliation Act (BCRA)

Per the reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution for FY2017 (S.Con.Res. 3), the House passed its reconciliation bill, H.R. 1628—the American Health Care Act (AHCA)—with amendments on May 4, 2017. The House bill was received in the Senate on June 7, 2017, and the next day the Senate majority leader had it placed on the calendar, making it available for floor consideration. The Senate Budget Committee published on its website a “discussion draft” titled, “The Better Care Reconciliation Act of 2017” (BCRA) on June 22 and subsequently updated the discussion draft on June 26. The Senate’s draft legislation is written in the form of an amendment in the nature of a substitute, meaning that it is intended to be considered by the Senate as an amendment to H.R. 1628, as passed by the House, but that all of the House-passed language would be stricken and the language of the BCRA would be inserted in its place. Both the AHCA and the BCRA would repeal or modify provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended). For example, both would substitute the ACA’s premium tax credit for premium tax credits with different eligibility rules and calculation requirements, and both would effectively eliminate the ACA’s individual and employer mandates. Both the AHCA and the BCRA also would make a number of changes to the Medicaid program. They would repeal some parts of the ACA related to Medicaid, such as the changes the ACA made to presumptive eligibility and the state option to provide Medicaid coverage to non-elderly individuals with income above 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL). They also would amend the enhanced matching rates for the ACA Medicaid expansion and the ACA Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotment reductions. In addition, both the AHCA and the BCRA include new programs and requirements that are not related to the ACA. For example, under each, a new fund would be created to provide funding to states for specified activities intended to improve access to health insurance and health care in the state. The most significant Medicaid-related new provisions in the AHCA and the BCRA would convert Medicaid financing to a per capita cap model (i.e., per enrollee limits on federal payments to states) starting in FY2020 with a block grant option for states. Both also include a provision that would permit states to require nondisabled, non-elderly, non-pregnant adults to satisfy a work requirement to receive Medicaid coverage. The AHCA and the BCRA both contain provisions that could restrict federal funding for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliated clinics for a period of one year, and each would appropriate an additional $422 million for FY2017 to the Community Health Center Fund. Both would repeal all funding for the ACA-established Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF), and both would repeal many of the new taxes and fees established under the ACA. Although the AHCA and the BCRA share many provisions, the BCRA strikes some AHCA provisions and adds some new provisions. For example, the BCRA does not include the AHCA’s provision that would repeal the requirement for private health insurance plans to meet a generosity level based on actuarial value. Furthermore, the BCRA would not allow states to apply for waivers from three federal requirements that apply to private health insurance issuers; instead, the BCRA would modify the current law state innovation waivers. In other examples, the BCRA strikes a Medicaid provision in the AHCA that would let states disenroll high-dollar lottery winners, and the BCRA adds a few new Medicaid provisions, including provisions providing states the option to cover certain inpatient psychiatric services for non-elderly adults and to establish Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) quality performance bonus payments. This report contains three tables that, together, provide an overview of AHCA provisions and BCRA provisions, as baselined against current law. Table 1 includes provisions that apply to the private health insurance market; Table 2 includes provisions that affect the Medicaid program; and Table 3 includes provisions related to public health, taxes, and implementation funding.

Jul 3, 2017

Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies (CJS) FY2018 Appropriations: Trade-Related Agencies

This report tracks and provides an overview of actions taken by the Administration and Congress to provide FY2018 appropriations for the International Trade Administration (ITA), the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), and the office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR). These three trade-related agencies are funded through the annual Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) appropriations act. This report also provides an overview of three trade-related programs administered by ITA, USITC, and USTR. The Trump Administration requests a total of $62.3 billion for CJS for FY2018, a $4.1 billion (6.2%) reduction compared to the FY2017-enacted amount. For the three trade-related agencies for FY2018, the Administration requests a total of $587.7 million (0.9% of total CJS) for the three agencies. The request includes $442.5 million for ITA, $87.6 million for USITC, and $57.6 million for USTR, all of which would be less than the FY2017-enacted appropriations. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) provided a total of $636.5 million for the three agencies (1.0% of total CJS), including $483.0 million for ITA, $62.0 million for USITC, and $91.5 million for USTR.

Jun 30, 2017

The Teaching Health Center Graduate Medical Education (THCGME) Program: Policy Considerations for Reauthorization

Teaching health centers (THCs) are outpatient facilities that receive federal funds directly to train medical and dental residents. These facilities are operated by federal health centers, rural health clinics, and tribal health programs, among others. THCs typically provide care to low-income and otherwise underserved populations and are generally located in federally designated health professional shortage areas (HPSAs). The federal government created the teaching health center graduate medical education program (THCGME) in 2010 to pay THCs for the expenses they incur when training residents. However, most residents receive the bulk of their training in teaching hospitals, not THCs. Such training is generally supported in the form of graduate medical education (GME) payments that are made by a number of government programs directly to hospitals based, with some limits, on the number of residents the hospital trains. Medicare is the largest source of GME support; it paid an estimated $11 billion in FY2013. A number of expert groups have criticized the hospital-focused nature of residency training, potentially favoring increased emphasis on THCs. Some have argued that health care is shifting to nonhospital settings and that hospital-focused training may not adequately prepare residents to provide outpatient care. Residencies in THCs may ready physicians for such a shift in health care. In addition, THCs may also train the types of residents that experts identify as most needed. Expert groups have found primary care shortages and particularly recommend increasing primary care training in underserved areas (often home to THCs). Past research has shown that medical residents are more likely to practice in areas near their residency training sites. Thus, some experts suggest that training residents at facilities within HPSAs—including THCs—could be a way to alleviate geographic shortages. Legislative History and Funding THCGME was created by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148), and the first class of residents began their three-year training programs in 2011. The ACA provided a direct appropriation of $230 million for FY2011 through FY2015. It did not specify an annual breakdown. THCGME is administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), an agency within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). From 2011 through 2015, the number of THCGME training programs increased, as did the number of residents trained (see Table 1). The program supports residencies at THCs in 24 states. THCGME’s funding was extended for FY2016 and FY2017 in the Medicare and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA, P.L. 114-10), which provided $60 million for each year. (The FY2017 amount was reduced to $55.9 million by the sequester.) With MACRA funds, HRSA continued its support of existing training programs but did not expand the program to new THCs. Table 1. Teaching Health Center Residents and Program Funding Academic Year Number of Residents (Full-Time Equivalents) Funded Total Number of Residents Trained Number of Residency Programs Funded Funding Source 2011-2012 63 N/A 11 ACAa 2012-2013 143 158 22 ACAa 2013-2014 327 361 44 ACAa 2014-2015 556 600 60 ACAa 2015-2016 660 758 60 MACRAb 2016-2017 N/A N/A 59c MACRAb 2017-2018 (proposed) 800c N/A 59c $60 million new proposed mandatory funding Source: CRS Analysis of Budget Documents from the Health Resources and Services Administration. Notes: Academic years=July 1-June 30; for example, the 2017-2018 academic year begins on July 1, 2017. N/A=not available. ACA provided $230 million for FY2011-FY2015. MACRA provided $60 million for FY2016-FY2017. The FY2017 amount was reduced to $55.9 million. Number anticipated in the FY2018 HRSA Budget Justification. Costs Per Resident When the THCGME began, there was uncertainty about the appropriate per-resident amount under the program. Such costs may differ from hospital-based training programs, because there may be higher training costs in small programs and in outpatient settings. HRSA initially estimated that it would pay $150,000 per resident. For context (within the hospital setting), Medicare estimates it paid $137,000 per resident in FY2013, and the Department of Veterans Affairs estimates it paid $146,000 per resident in FY2015. Recent research found that THCs spend between $145,000 per resident and $169,000 per resident. Some of this variation is because it is more expensive to start a new program than it is to add residents to an existing program. HRSA estimates that the overall per-resident cost for THCs is $157,602. Under MACRA, HRSA reduced its per-resident amount to $95,000 per resident so it could maintain the number of residents the program had supported under the ACA. HRSA was subsequently able to increase this amount for FY2017. No funding is currently expected for FY2018; as such, residents have been accepted to begin training in 2017, but uncertainty remains about recruitment efforts for future residents. Outcomes Associated with Teaching Health Centers Outcomes research associated with training in THCs is preliminary, as the first class completed training in 2014. Initial findings suggest that the program is meeting its stated goals. Specifically, more than 90% of the program’s recent graduates are practicing primary care, and 76% are doing so in a HPSA. Despite these reports, THCs are concerned about sustaining their programs because of the uncertainty of future federal funding. Policy Considerations Congress may face a number of policy questions with regard to THCGME, including the following: Should the program’s funding be extended? If funding is not extended, what, if any payments should be provided to fund current residents who are completing their training at a THC? If program funding is extended, is the program’s current size appropriate? If funding is extended, is the program’s current per-resident funding level appropriate? Is the current funding time frame appropriate? THC training is a minimum of three years and requires a recruitment year prior to training. The most recent extension in MACRA was for two years, the same extension time the Administration proposed in its FY2018 budget. Congress may consider a longer time frame because of the multiyear nature of GME. What is the role of THCGME in the context of the federal government’s full investment in GME? Is this program coordinated with other investments?

Jun 29, 2017

The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions

When there is concern with deficit or debt levels, Congress will sometimes implement budget enforcement mechanisms to mandate specific budgetary policies or fiscal outcomes. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25), which was signed into law on August 2, 2011, includes several such mechanisms. The BCA as amended has three main components that currently affect the annual budget. One component imposes annual statutory discretionary spending limits for defense and nondefense spending. A second component requires annual reductions to the initial discretionary spending limits triggered by the absence of a deficit reduction agreement from a committee formed by the BCA. Third are annual automatic mandatory spending reductions triggered by the same absence of a deficit reduction agreement. Each of those components is described in further detail in this report. The discretionary spending limits (and annual reductions) are currently scheduled to remain in effect through FY2021, while the mandatory spending reductions are scheduled to remain in effect through FY2025. Congress may modify or repeal any aspect of the BCA procedures, but such changes require the enactment of legislation. Several pieces of legislation have changed the spending limits or enforcement procedures included in the BCA with respect to each year from FY2013 through FY2017. These include the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA/P.L. 112-240), the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013/P.L. 113-67, also referred to as the Murray-Ryan agreement), and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015/P.L. 114-74). Those laws included changes to the discretionary limits imposed by the BCA that increased deficits in each year from FY2013-FY2017. No change has been enacted for FY2018 and beyond, so the discretionary spending limits for FY2018 through FY2021 remain at the level prescribed by the BCA. The discretionary caps in FY2018 are scheduled to be approximately $549 billion for defense activities and $516 billion for nondefense activities—slightly lower than the levels of $551 billion and $519 billion, respectively, in FY2017. Combined, the limits for FY2018 are $5 billion lower than the FY2017 level. This report addresses several frequently asked questions related to the BCA and the annual budget.

Jun 22, 2017

NAFTA Renegotiation: Issues for U.S. Agriculture

Jun 22, 2017

FY2017 State Grants Under Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95), is the primary source of federal aid to K-12 education. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and is funded at $15.5 billion for FY2017. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending elementary and secondary schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). The four Title I-A formulas have somewhat distinct allocation patterns, providing varying shares of allocated funds to different types of states. Thus, for some states, certain formulas are more favorable than others. This report provides estimated FY2017 state grant amounts under each of the four formulas used to determine Title I-A grants. Overall, California is estimated to receive the largest FY2017 Title I-A grant amount ($1.8 billion, or 11.98% of total Title I-A grants). Vermont is estimated to receive the smallest FY2017 Title I-A grant amount ($35.3 million, or 0.23% of total Title I-A grants). As final data needed to determine actual Title I-A grants for FY2017 are not yet available, all of the estimates included in this report are subject to change before ED makes final Title I-A grant allocations on October 1, 2017.

Jun 20, 2017

SelectUSA: U.S. Inbound Investment Promotion

Jun 15, 2017

U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA)

Jun 15, 2017

Short-Term, Small-Dollar Lending: Policy Issues and Implications

Short-term, small-dollar loans are consumer loans with relatively low initial principal amounts (often less than $1,000) with relatively short repayment periods (generally for a small number of weeks or months). Short-term, small-dollar loan products are frequently used to cover cash-flow shortages that may occur due to unexpected expenses or periods of inadequate income. Small-dollar loans can be offered in various forms and by various types of lenders. Banks and credit unions (depositories) can make small-dollar loans through financial products such as credit cards, credit card cash advances, and checking account overdraft protection programs. Small-dollar loans can also be provided by nonbank lenders (alternative financial service [AFS] providers), such as payday lenders and automobile title lenders. The extent that borrower financial situations would be made worse from the use of expensive credit or from limited access to credit is widely debated. Consumer groups often raise concerns regarding the affordability of small-dollar loans. Borrowers pay rates and fees for small-dollar loans that may be considered expensive. Borrowers may also fall into debt traps, situations where borrowers repeatedly roll over existing loans into new loans and subsequently incur more charges rather than completely paying off the loans. Although the vulnerabilities associated with debt traps are more frequently discussed in the context of nonbank products such as payday loans, borrowers may still find it difficult to repay outstanding balances and face additional charges on loans such as credit cards that are provided by depositories. Conversely, the lending industry often raises concerns regarding the reduced availability of small-dollar credit. Regulations aimed at reducing costs for borrowers may result in higher costs for lenders, possibly limiting or reducing credit availability for financially distressed individuals. This report provides an overview of the small-dollar consumer lending markets and related policy issues. Descriptions of basic short-term, small-dollar cash advance products are presented. Current federal and state regulatory approaches to consumer protection in small-dollar lending markets are also explained, including a summary of a proposal by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to implement federal requirements that would act as a floor for state regulations. The CFPB estimates that its proposal would result in a material decline in small-dollar loans offered by AFS providers. The CFPB proposal has been subject to debate. H.R. 10, the Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, which was passed by the House of Representatives on June 8, 2017, would prevent the CFPB from exercising any rulemaking, enforcement, or any other authority with respect to payday loans, vehicle title loans, or other similar loans. After discussing the policy implications of the CFPB proposal, this report examines general pricing dynamics in the small-dollar credit market. The degree of market competitiveness, which may be revealed by analyzing market price dynamics, may provide insights concerning affordability and availability options for users of certain small-dollar loan products. The small-dollar lending market exhibits both competitive and noncompetitive market pricing dynamics. Some industry financial data metrics are arguably consistent with competitive market pricing. Factors such as regulatory barriers and differences in product features, however, limit the ability of banks and credit unions to compete with AFS providers in the small-dollar market. Borrowers may prefer some loan product features offered by nonbanks, including how the products are delivered, in comparison to products offered by traditional financial institutions. Given the existence of both competitive and noncompetitive market dynamics, determining whether the prices borrowers pay for small-dollar loan products are “too high” is challenging. The Appendix discusses how to conduct meaningful price comparisons using the annual percentage rate (APR) as well as some general information about loan pricing.

Jun 14, 2017

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)

May 24, 2017

The Growing Gap in Life Expectancy by Income: Recent Evidence and Implications for the Social Security Retirement Age

Life expectancy is a population-level measure that refers to the average number of years an individual will live. Although life expectancy has generally been increasing over time in the United States, researchers have long documented that it is lower for individuals with lower socioeconomic status (SES) compared with individuals with higher SES. Recent studies provide evidence that this gap has widened in recent decades. For example, a 2015 study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) found that for men born in 1930, individuals in the highest income quintile (top 20%) could expect to live 5.1 years longer at age 50 than men in the lowest income quintile. This gap has increased significantly over time. Among men born in 1960, those in the top income quintile could expect to live 12.7 years longer than men in the bottom income quintile. This NAS study finds similar patterns for women: the life expectancy gap between the bottom and top income quintiles of women expanded from 3.9 years for the 1930 birth cohort to 13.6 years for the 1960 birth cohort. Gains in life expectancy are generally heralded as good news by lawmakers and others, signifying improved well-being in the population. Yet widening differentials in life expectancy are more troubling. Congress may be interested in recent research on this topic for many reasons, including the implications for Social Security benefits as well as Social Security reform proposals. Social Security provides monthly benefits to retired and disabled workers and their dependents, and to dependents of deceased workers. A key goal of the Social Security program is redistribution of income from the high earner to the low earner by way of a progressive benefit formula. Widening gaps in life spans by SES pose a challenge to meeting this goal. When Social Security benefits are measured on a lifetime basis, low earners, who show little to no gains in life expectancy over time, are projected to receive increasingly lower benefits than those with high earnings. For instance, in the 2015 NAS study, men in the lowest earnings quintile saw little or no improvement in the value of their lifetime Social Security retirement benefits between the 1930 and 1960 birth cohorts (roughly $125,000 in 2009 dollars in lifetime benefits for both birth cohorts). Due to gains in life expectancy for higher earners, however, men in the highest earnings quintile born in 1930 had lifetime Social Security benefits of $229,000, and men in the highest earnings quintile born in 1960 had estimated lifetime benefits of $295,000. Thus, according to this 2015 NAS analysis, differential gains in life expectancy increased the disparity in the lifetime value of Social Security retirement benefits between the top and bottom earnings quintiles by about $70,000 (in 2009 dollars) for the later birth cohort. In response to rising life expectancy, some commonly discussed Social Security reform proposals involve increasing the retirement age. Yet these proposals would affect low earners disproportionately (i.e., reductions in their lifetime Social Security benefits would be considerably larger than for high earners). Congress may be interested in policy proposals that mitigate the uneven effects of increasing the retirement age and protect the interests of lower-earning, shorter-lived workers. This report provides a brief overview of the concept of life expectancy, how it is measured, and how it has changed over time in the United States. While life expectancy may be studied in a variety of contexts, this report focuses on the link between life expectancy and SES, as measured by lifetime income. In particular, this report synthesizes recent research on (1) the life expectancy gap by income and (2) the relationship between this gap and Social Security benefits. Finally, this report discusses the implications of this research for one type of Social Security reform proposal: increasing the Social Security retirement age.

May 12, 2017

Understanding Process Labels and Certification for Foods

May 12, 2017

Administration of the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program

The William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) program, authorized under Title IV, Part D of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA), is the primary federal student loan program. It makes available loans to undergraduate and graduate students and the parents of dependent undergraduate students to help them finance postsecondary education expenses. As of the end of FY2016, there was approximately $949.1 billion in outstanding Direct Loan program loans. Direct Loan program administrative expenses totaled approximately $771 million in FY2016. Under the Direct Loan program, the federal government essentially serves as the banker by providing loans to students and their families using federal capital and assuming the risk of loss against borrower default. In addition, the federal government, via the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Federal Student Aid (FSA), manages the outstanding loan portfolio and is responsible for the program’s administration. FSA is primarily responsible for developing the administrative functions and processes and performing oversight activities for the Direct Loan program to enable its day-to-day operation. Additional parties, including institutions of higher education (IHEs), contracted loan servicers, and contracted private collection agencies (PCAs), perform many of the routine administrative tasks for the program. The first step in administering a Direct Loan is processing a student’s Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). After a student has completed his or her FAFSA, FSA’s automated systems process the application and make an initial determination regarding a student’s eligibility for federal student aid. IHEs then receive the processed information and take a variety of steps to award financial aid, including Direct Loans, to the student. Steps taken by the IHE at this point include packaging available aid for the student, originating and disbursing any Direct Loans the student is eligible for and has accepted, and managing Direct Loan program funds available to the institution. After a borrower’s Direct Loan is disbursed, the loan is then assigned to one of multiple loan servicers with which FSA has contracted. Functions performed by loan servicers vary depending on the loan’s status (e.g., repayment, grace period) and individual borrower circumstances; however, there are several tasks loan servicers typically perform. These include providing information to borrowers on loan terms and conditions, collecting and applying loan payments to outstanding balances, processing requests for loan deferment or forbearance, processing applications to consolidate federal student loans into a Direct Consolidation Loan, and providing delinquency and default prevention activities. If a borrower defaults after entering repayment on a Direct Loan, then a variety of actions may be taken to attempt to reinstate the loan into good standing and recover payment on it. Loan servicers provide initial outreach to defaulted borrowers and attempt to enter into repayment or rehabilitation agreements with them. If the loan servicer is unsuccessful, a borrower’s defaulted loan is transferred to FSA and then may also be transferred to one of multiple PCAs with which FSA has contracted. FSA and PCAs will attempt to enter into voluntary repayment agreements with borrowers; however, a variety of other debt collection tools may also be used if these attempts are unsuccessful. For instance, a borrower may be determined eligible for administrative wage garnishment or income tax offset. If a borrower successfully brings his or her loan into good standing, the account is transferred back to a loan servicer, which will continue to service it.

May 11, 2017

The Financial CHOICE Act in the 115th Congress: Selected Policy Issues

The Financial CHOICE Act (FCA; H.R. 10) was introduced on April 26, 2017, by Representative Jeb Hensarling, chairman of the House Committee on Financial Services. It was ordered to be reported by the House Committee on Financial Services on May 4, 2017. The bill, as amended, is a wide-ranging proposal with 12 titles that would alter many parts of the financial regulatory system. Much of the FCA is in response to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203), a broad package of regulatory reform following the financial crisis that initiated the largest change to the financial regulatory system since at least 1999. Many of the provisions of the FCA would modify or repeal provisions from the Dodd-Frank Act, although others would address long-standing or more recent issues. This report highlights major proposals included in the FCA but is not a comprehensive summary. In general, the bill proposes changes that can be divided into two categories: (1) changes to financial policies and regulations and (2) changes to the regulatory structure and rulemaking process. Major policy-related changes proposed by the FCA include the following: Leverage Ratio—allowing a banking organization to choose to be subject to a higher, 10% leverage ratio in exchange for being exempt from risk-weighted capital ratios, liquidity requirements, and other regulations. Regulatory Relief—providing regulatory relief throughout the financial system to banks, consumers, and capital market participants, including by repealing the Volcker Rule, Durbin Amendment, fiduciary rule, and risk retention requirements for nonmortgage asset-backed securities. Too Big To Fail—repealing the designation of systemically important nonbank financial institutions and emergency assistance and replacing an option for winding down systemic institutions with a new chapter in the Bankruptcy Code that is tailored to financial firms. Structural and procedural changes that affect the balance between regulator independence from and accountability to Congress and the judiciary include the following: Funding—subjecting regulators that currently set their own budgets to the traditional congressional appropriations process. Rulemaking—requiring regulators to perform more detailed cost-benefit analysis when issuing new rules and to use cost-benefit analysis to review existing rules, as well as requiring congressional approval for a major rule to come into effect. Judicial Review—requiring courts to apply a heightened judicial review standard for agency actions taken by financial regulators rather than applying varying levels of deference to the agencies’ interpretations of the law. Enforcement—increasing the maximum civil penalties that could be assessed for violations of certain banking and securities laws and restraining certain agency enforcement powers. CFPB—replacing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau with the Consumer Law Enforcement Agency and modifying its powers, leadership, mandate, and funding.

May 10, 2017

Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy

Venezuela is in the midst of an acute political, economic, and social crisis. Following the March 2013 death of populist President Hugo Chávez, acting President Nicolás Maduro of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) narrowly defeated Henrique Capriles of the opposition Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) to be elected to a six-year term in April 2013. Four years later, President Maduro has less than 20% public approval and fissures have emerged within the PSUV about the means that he has used to maintain power, including a recent aborted attempt to have the Supreme Court dissolve the MUD-dominated legislature. Protests are escalating amid calls for the Maduro government to hold the regional elections that Maduro postponed last year rather than convene a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution, as he has proposed. Venezuela also is grappling with crippling economic and social challenges. It faces an increasingly unstable economic crisis, triggered by mismanagement and the global drop in oil prices. In 2016, the economy contracted by some 18% and inflation averaged 254%. In addition, massive shortages of food and medicine have caused a humanitarian crisis. The Maduro government is struggling to make debt payments and seeking loans from Russia, but economists maintain that Venezuela is at risk of default in 2017. International efforts to facilitate dialogue between President Maduro and the opposition have failed, due to the government’s intransigence. In March 2017, Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) Luis Almagro called on member states to temporarily suspend Venezuela from the organization if the government did not take certain actions, including convening general elections. On April 26, 2017, the OAS Permanent Council approved a resolution to convene a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss Venezuela. In response, the Maduro government initiated the two-year process required to leave the OAS. U.S. Policy U.S. policymakers have had concerns for more than a decade about the deterioration of human rights and democracy in Venezuela and the government’s lack of cooperation on antidrug and counterterrorism efforts. The Obama Administration strongly criticized the Maduro government’s heavy-handed response to protests in 2014 and employed sanctions against Venezuelan officials linked to drug trafficking, terrorism, and human rights abuses. At the same time, it supported efforts at dialogue and OAS activities. The Trump Administration has followed the same general policy approach. In February 2017, the Treasury Department imposed drug-trafficking sanctions against Vice President Tareck el Aissami. President Trump and the State Department have called for the release of imprisoned opposition leader Leopoldo López and all political prisoners. State Department officials have condemned the Venezuelan Supreme Court’s recent rulings, expressed grave concern about a recent ban preventing Capriles from running for office, and called for prompt elections. Congressional Action Congress has taken various actions in response to the situation in Venezuela. It enacted legislation in 2014 to impose sanctions on current and former Venezuelan officials responsible for human rights abuses (P.L. 113-278). In July 2016, Congress enacted legislation (P.L. 114-194) extending the ability to impose sanctions through 2019. In the 115th Congress, the Senate approved S.Res. 35, expressing support for OAS efforts to hasten a return to electoral democracy in the country. The FY2017 Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 244/P.L. 115-31), enacted on May 4, 2017, recommends providing $7 million in democracy and human rights assistance to Venezuela. Congress soon will have the opportunity to reexamine such aid to Venezuela as it considers the FY2018 request. On May 3, 2017, a bipartisan Senate bill was introduced, S. 1018, that would, among other measures, authorize humanitarian assistance for Venezuela and codify existing targeted sanctions on individuals undermining democratic governance and involved in corruption in Venezuela. H.Res. 259, introduced April 6, 2017, expresses concern about the crises that Venezuela is facing and urges the Venezuelan government to hold elections, release political prisoners, and accept humanitarian aid. This report provides an overview of the political and economic challenges Venezuela is facing and efforts to respond to those challenges taken through the OAS. The report also analyzes U.S. policy concerns regarding democracy and human rights, drug trafficking, terrorism, and energy issues in Venezuela. See also CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Overview, and CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Issues for Congress, 2013-2016.

May 10, 2017

Benefits for Service-Disabled Veterans

The Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) administers programs to qualified former U.S. servicemembers (veterans). This report describes programs that provide benefits to veterans with service-connected disabilities (service-disabled veterans). These benefits can compensate a veteran for an injury or provide assistance to enable a veteran to have a higher quality of life. To qualify for the benefits discussed in this report, a veteran must have a physical or mental condition that was “incurred or aggravated” in the line of military duty and that results in a disability. Service-connected disabilities are rated on a scale from 0% to 100% using a VA rating schedule. Disability ratings are used to determine eligibility for various types of benefits and the amount of Veterans Disability Compensation benefits. This report describes major VA benefit programs that are limited to veterans with service-connected disabilities. Veterans Disability Compensation is a monthly cash payment to a veteran with a service-connected disability. Veterans with higher disability ratings are entitled to higher payments. Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment supports services for a veteran with an employment handicap to assist the veteran in obtaining and retaining suitable employment. Housing Grants and Benefits: Specially Adapted Housing Grants support the construction or acquisition of a new home or the remodeling of an existing home to help the veteran live independently in a barrier-free environment. Special Housing Adaptation Grants support modifications to a veteran’s home to accommodate a disability but support less-intensive modifications than Specially Adapted Housing Grants. Home Improvements and Structural Alterations Grants can be used to improve a veteran’s access to his or her home or to facilitate continuation of treatment for the veteran’s disability. Other Grants and Benefits: Automobile and Special Adaptive Equipment Grants can be used to purchase an automobile or to purchase adaptive equipment for an existing automobile to make it safe or legal for the veteran to use that vehicle. Clothing Allowance Grants are for veterans who utilize medical devices or medications that are likely to damage the veteran’s clothing. Service-Disabled Veterans Insurance is life insurance for service-disabled veterans. This report does not discuss health care services provided by the Veterans’ Health Administration and other benefits that are available to veterans who may or may not have service-connected disabilities.

May 8, 2017

Paid Family Leave in the United States

Paid family leave (PFL) refers to partially or fully compensated time away from work for specific and generally significant family caregiving needs, such as the arrival of a new child or serious illness of a close family member. Although the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3) provides eligible workers with a federal entitlement to unpaid leave for a limited set of family caregiving needs, no federal law requires private-sector employers to provide paid leave of any kind. Currently, employees may access paid family leave if offered by an employer. In addition, workers in certain states may be eligible for state family leave insurance benefits that can provide some income support during periods of unpaid leave. As defined in state law and federal proposals, family caregiving activities that are eligible for PFL or family leave insurance generally include caring for and bonding with a newly arrived child and attending to serious medical needs of certain close family members. Some permit leave for other reasons, but in practice, day-to-day needs for leave to attend to family matters (e.g., a school conference or lapse in child care coverage), minor illness, and preventative care are not included among “family leave” categories. Employer provision of PFL in the private sector is voluntary. According to a national survey of employers conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 13% of private industry employees had access to PFL through their employers in March 2016. The availability of PFL was more prevalent among professional and technical occupations and industries, high-paying occupations, full-time workers, and workers in large companies (as measured by number of employees). Recent announcements by several large companies indicate that access may be increasing among certain groups of workers. In addition, some states have enacted legislation to create state paid family leave insurance (FLI) programs, which provide cash benefits to eligible workers who engage in certain caregiving activities. California, Rhode Island, and New Jersey currently operate FLI programs, which offer four to six weeks of benefits to eligible workers. The New York program will begin implementation in 2018. The District of Columbia Council voted to create a FLI program with benefits payable starting in 2020; the bill is currently under congressional review. Implementation of Washington State’s program is delayed until a financing mechanism is identified. Many advanced-economy countries entitle workers to some form of paid family leave. Whereas some provide leave to employees engaged in family caregiving (e.g., of parents, spouses, and other family members), many emphasize leave for new parents, mothers in particular. The United States is the only OECD member to not offer paid leave to new mothers. The 115th Congress is considering proposals to expand national access to paid family leave. Key bills include the Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act (FAMILY Act; S. 337/H.R. 947), which proposes to create a national wage insurance program for persons engaged in family caregiving activities or who take leave for their own serious health condition, and the Strong Families Act (S. 344), which would provide tax incentives to employers to voluntarily offer paid family and medical leave to employees.

May 4, 2017

Revitalizing Coastal Shipping for Domestic Commerce

In recent years, domestic shipborne commerce has lost much of its market to other modes. Although potential shipping routes run parallel to congested truck, railroad, and pipeline routes along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in the Great Lakes region, the volume of cargo carried by domestic ships has declined by 61% since 1960, while the volume carried by other modes, including river barges, has more than doubled. Use of domestic ships has retreated to routes where overland modes are not available, such as between Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and Alaska and the U.S. mainland, and where oil pipelines do not exist or are at capacity. One reason for the comparatively lower usage of domestic coastal and Great Lakes shipping is that despite their inherent efficiencies, ships are often not the lowest-cost option for domestic shippers. U.S.-built ships cost six to eight times more to build than the equivalent cargo capacity provided by rail and barge equipment. The comparatively high cost is related to the absence of foreign competition in shipbuilding and the lack of economies of scale at U.S. shipyards. U.S. container ports are widely considered to be much less efficient than ports in Europe and Asia, some of which are fully automated. A 2013 study examining the feasibility of coastal container services on the East Coast found that port handling costs were the largest cost element ship operators would face. Ship crewing costs are inflated by subsidies provided to U.S. crews aboard U.S. international trading ships that have government-impelled cargoes reserved for them. Domestic ship lines compete with the international fleet when hiring maritime officers. U.S. cargo shippers have responded to the comparatively high cost of domestic ship transport by turning to land modes, exporting goods instead of selling them domestically, and utilizing oceangoing barges instead of ships for coastal transport. Oceangoing barges cost less to construct, and can require only a third as many crew as coastal ships. Since 1960, coastwise and Great Lakes tonnage carried by barges has increased 356%, while ship tonnage carried on these waters has decreased by 61%. However, oceangoing barges have significant disadvantages: they are less efficient for longer voyages, and their use does not preserve the shipbuilding and maritime crewing capabilities Congress has sought to protect. Oceangoing barges mainly carry petroleum products, suggesting that commercial shippers do not find them attractive for other types of cargo. Reviving coastal shipping would dramatically increase the capacity of the nation’s freight network. Moreover, some of the necessary infrastructure is largely in place, as many of the harbors the federal government dredges for deep-draft vessels currently have little or no ship traffic. The question is whether a different mix of federal policies would make coastal trade an attractive option for shippers and ship owners. To revive coastal shipping, the cost issues would need to be addressed. Further information on the causes of the high cost of U.S.-built ships, the justification for the crewing disparity between oceangoing barges and coastal ships, and whether automation would lower cargo-handling costs at ports would be useful in evaluating policies that might revitalize coastal shipping.

May 2, 2017

Frequently Asked Questions About Prescription Drug Pricing and Policy

Prescription drugs play an important role in the U.S. health care system. Innovative, breakthrough drugs are providing cures for diseases such as hepatitis C and helping individuals with chronic conditions lead fuller lives. Studies show that prescription drug therapy can produce health care savings by reducing the number of hospitalizations and other costly medical procedures. Congress has attempted to ensure that Americans have access to pharmaceuticals by enacting the Medicare Part D prescription drug benefit as part of the Medicare Modernization and Prescription Drug Act of 2003 (MMA; P.L. 108-173) and expanding drug coverage under the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended). Congress also has enacted laws to encourage manufacturing of lower-cost generic drugs, as well as cutting-edge biologics and biosimilars. Americans are using more prescription drugs, and for longer periods of time, than in past decades. Still, access to prescription drugs remains a real issue for a number of consumers, particularly those without insurance; those prescribed expensive specialty drugs for treating serious or rare diseases; or those enrolled in private insurance or public health plans with high cost-sharing requirements, such as drug deductibles and coinsurance. Prescription drug affordability has gained renewed attention during the past few years as retail drug spending has risen at the fastest pace in more than a decade—growing 12.4% in 2014 and 9% in 2015 before slowing to an estimated 5% increase in 2016. There are several reasons for the increase in drug spending. Manufacturers have been introducing new drugs at a record rate, while raising prices for many existing brand-name products. At the same time, fewer brand-name drugs have lost patent protection than in previous years, paving the way for lower-cost generic substitutes. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) forecasts that retail drug spending could average 6.3% annual growth from 2016 to 2025. Although that growth rate would be a reduction from recent more rapid levels, CMS expects retail drug spending to increase faster than many other areas of medical spending in this 10-year period. This report will address frequently asked questions about government and private-sector policies that affect drug prices and availability. Among the prescription drug topics covered are federally funded research and development, regulation of direct-to-consumer advertising, legal restrictions on reimportation, and federal price negotiation. The report provides a broad overview of the issues as well as references to more in-depth CRS products. The appendixes provide references to relevant congressional hearings and documents (see Appendix A) and a directory of CRS prescription drug experts (see Appendix B).

May 2, 2017

Dispute Settlement in the WTO and U.S. Trade Agreements

May 1, 2017

Advanced Gene Editing: CRISPR-Cas9

Scientists have long sought the ability to control and modify DNA—the code of life. A new gene editing technology known as CRISPR-Cas9 offers the potential for substantial improvement over previous technologies in that it is simple to use and inexpensive and has a relatively high degree of precision and efficiency. These characteristics have led many in the scientific and business communities to assert that CRISPR-Cas9 will lead to groundbreaking advances in many fields, including agriculture, energy, ecosystem conservation, and the investigation, prevention, and treatment of diseases. Over the next 5 to 10 years, the National Academy of Sciences projects a rapid increase in the scale, scope, complexity, and development rate of biotechnology products, many enabled by CRISPR-Cas9. Concomitant with the promise of potential benefits, such advances may pose new risks and raise ethical concerns. For example, recent experiments by Chinese scientists and others that modified human embryos using CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing have sparked ethical debates, raising such concerns as how the genetic change would affect not only the immediate patient, but also future generations who would inherit the change without choice. Additionally, CRISPR-related approaches (i.e., gene drives) are being considered to reduce or eliminate the mosquito that serves as the primary vector for the transmission of Zika or malaria, thereby improving public health. Some scientists have raised ethical questions and expressed concerns about the unintended ecological consequences of eliminating a species or introducing a genetically modified organism into an open environment. Some experts assert that the current system for regulating biotechnology products—the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology—may be inadequate, with the potential to leave gaps in oversight. Regulatory gaps may lead to increased uncertainty that could affect the development of future biotechnology products or a loss of public confidence in the ability of regulators to ensure that such products are safe. In the 115th Congress, policymakers may want to examine the potential benefits and risks associated with the use of CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing, including the ethical, social, and legal implications of CRISPR-related biotechnology products. Congress also may have a role to play with respect to regulation, research and development, and economic competitiveness associated with CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing and future biotechnology products.

Apr 28, 2017

U.S.-UK Free Trade Agreement: Prospects and Issues for Congress

Prospects for a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) between the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) are of increasing interest for both sides. In a national referendum held on June 23, 2016, a majority of British voters supported the UK exiting the European Union (EU), a process known as “Brexit.” The Brexit referendum has prompted calls from some Members of Congress and the Trump Administration to launch U.S.-UK FTA negotiations, though some Members have moderated their support with calls to ensure that such negotiations do not constrain the promotion of broader transatlantic trade relations. On January 27, 2017, President Trump and UK Prime Minister Theresa May discussed how the two sides could launch high-level talks and “lay the groundwork” for a future U.S.-UK FTA. Negotiations on a bilateral FTA between the United States and UK would represent a change in U.S. transatlantic trade policy, which has recently focused on negotiating a U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) FTA. Formal U.S.-UK FTA negotiations cannot start immediately. On March 29, 2017, Prime Minister May sent a letter to the European Council notifying it of the UK’s intention to leave the EU, triggering the two-year Article 50 exit process under the Treaty of the European Union. Until the UK formally exits, it remains a member of the EU, which retains exclusive competence over trade negotiations. During this time, and in the absence of any preferential trade agreement between the United States and the EU, World Trade Organization (WTO) parameters continue to govern U.S.-UK trade—as they do for U.S. trade with all other EU member states. In the meantime, the United States and the UK could pursue preliminary “informal” discussions on a potential bilateral FTA. The prospects for a future U.S.-UK FTA depend on a number of variables, including the terms of the UK’s negotiated withdrawal from, and future trade relationship with, the EU, as well as the UK’s redefined terms of trade within the WTO. A U.S.-UK FTA could include reciprocal provisions to expand access to goods, services, agriculture, and government procurement markets; enhance and develop new bilateral trade-related rules and disciplines in areas such as intellectual property rights (IPR), investment, and digital trade; and cooperate on regulatory issues such as transparency and sector-specific concerns. Congress has important legislative, oversight, and advisory responsibilities with respect to any potential U.S.-UK FTA. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Congress also establishes overall U.S. trade negotiating objectives, which it updated in the 2015 Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation (P.L. 114-26). In addition, Congress would need to approve future implementing legislation for a final U.S.-UK FTA to enter into force. Under TPA, an FTA could be eligible to receive expedited legislative consideration if Congress determines that the FTA advances trade negotiating objectives and satisfies TPA’s various other requirements, including notification to and consultations with Congress on the status of the negotiations.

Apr 14, 2017

NASS and U.S. Crop Production Forecasts: Methods and Issues

The National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates agricultural production (including area and yield) and stocks for more than 120 crops and 45 livestock items. Traditionally NASS estimates have focused on state and national data, but in recent years county-level estimates have gained in importance. NASS crop production estimates are crucial to people in the U.S. agricultural sector involved in making marketing and investment decisions, policymakers who design farm support programs, USDA agents who implement those programs, and producers who benefit from those programs. NASS conducts hundreds of surveys every year and prepares reports covering many aspects of U.S. agriculture. For example, NASS survey data are used to produce forecasts of area, yield, production, value, and stocks for major crop and livestock products, as well as for estimates of the historical number of farms and land in farms, land rental rates and values, farm labor usage, fertilizer and chemical usage, computer usage and ownership on farms, and farm production expenditures. NASS also undertakes a National Census of Agriculture every five years that provides comprehensive information about the nation’s agriculture down to the county level. The census includes data on the number of farms, land use, production expenses, value of land and buildings, farm size and characteristics of farm operators, market value of agricultural production sold, acreage of major crops, inventory of livestock and poultry, and farm irrigation practices. NASS spending is controlled by annual appropriations acts. In FY2016, Congress appropriated $177 million for NASS operations, including $126.2 million (75% of its budget) for annual agricultural estimates and $42.2 million (25%) for the Census of Agriculture. The critical role that NASS data plays in promoting a smooth and efficient marketing process for U.S. agriculture makes NASS’s successful function a concern of Congress. In particular, three issues related to NASS’s survey methodology and crop estimates are of potential concern to Congress. First, a trend has emerged since the early 1990s of declining NASS survey response by farmer participants. For most crops, NASS production estimates are based on data collected from farm operations via grower survey responses. The quality of NASS crop acreage and production estimates depends on a high level of participation by agricultural producers. As the number of respondents falls, the statistical reliability of estimates and forecasts declines and the value of NASS estimates for a host of other purposes declines as well. The second issue derives primarily from the first in that the declining survey response impacts more localized or regional estimates first, particularly county-level estimates and those programs that are based on county-level data. In particular, insufficient response rates in some counties have led to unexpectedly wide discrepancies across counties in farm program payment rates under the county-based revenue support program—Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC-CO)—established under the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79). These discrepancies have generated concern about whether the new revenue program is working as intended or whether this is simply a data problem that needs to be addressed. Barring any near-term fix by USDA, lawmakers may elect to address county-to-county payment disparities in the context of the next farm bill. Third, market participants and policymakers alike are concerned that NASS estimates be unbiased and objective so as not to influence market prices or volatility. Analysis of NASS data suggests that it is both objective and trustworthy; however, variability of data as measured by market price reactions to NASS estimates appears to have increased in recent years.

Apr 13, 2017

Surface Transportation Devolution

Surface transportation “devolution” refers to shifting most current federal responsibility for building and maintaining highways and public transportation systems from the federal government to the states. Devolution legislation has been introduced in each Congress since the mid-1990s, supported by Members who regard the federal government as being overinvolved in highways and public transportation. Under such proposals, the federal taxes that now support surface transportation programs, mostly fuels taxes, would be reduced in line with the shift of responsibility to the states. The states could then raise their own taxes to pay for highway and transit projects as they see fit. A small program, funded by much-reduced motor fuel taxes, would remain in place at the federal level to maintain roads on federal lands, fund highway safety efforts, and support other programs Congress decides not to devolve. Beyond the basic small government argument, advocates of devolution generally assert that it will lower costs and accelerate construction of highway and transit projects by freeing them from a wide variety of federal regulations. They also contend that devolution will be fairer than the present systems for distributing highway and public transportation funding, which give some states more money, relative to their residents’ motor fuel tax payments, than other states. Opponents of devolution question whether it will save money and worry that it could interfere with national goals established by Congress, such as maintaining important interstate freight corridors and adhering to uniform national construction standards. They point out that the last two surface transportation reauthorization acts have greatly reduced the number of programs and given states greater control over highway expenditures while excluding earmarks, addressing some of the complaints that originally led to calls for devolution. There are several significant issues Congress would face if it were to consider devolution. Among them are the following: Devolution would involve substantial upfront costs, possibly as much as $84 billion over a period of several years, to pay for outstanding highway and transit obligations. Even if the federal government hands responsibility for funding new highway and public transportation projects to the states, it would need to retain federal motor fuels taxes or some other revenue source until it has repaid the states for projects in progress as of the date devolution takes effect. Replacing the reduced federal taxes on a cent-for-cent basis would not provide enough revenue to fund the current level of spending on surface transportation. Nearly all states would have to increase their taxes by an amount larger than the reduction in federal taxes, unless they choose to reduce spending. Devolution would likely increase the use of tax-exempt bonds by the states, reducing federal revenue beyond the amount of forgone highway taxes.

Apr 12, 2017

U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: Policy Issues for Congress

Central America has received renewed attention from U.S. policymakers over the past few years as the region has become a major transit corridor for illicit drugs and a significant source of irregular migration to the United States. These narcotics and migrant flows are the latest symptoms of deep-rooted challenges in several countries in the region, including widespread insecurity, fragile political and judicial systems, and high levels of poverty and unemployment. Although the Obama Administration and governments in the region launched new initiatives designed to improve conditions in Central America, the future of those efforts will depend on the decisions of the Trump Administration and the 115th Congress. U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America The Obama Administration determined it was in the national security interests of the United States to work with Central American governments to address conditions in the region. Accordingly, the Obama Administration launched a new, whole-of-government U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. The new strategy takes a broader and more comprehensive approach than previous U.S. initiatives in the region and is based on the premise that efforts to promote prosperity, improve security, and strengthen governance are mutually reinforcing and of equal importance. The new strategy focuses primarily on the “northern triangle” countries of Central America—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—which face the greatest challenges. Nevertheless, it also provides an overarching framework for U.S. engagement with the other countries in the region: Belize, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Panama. The new U.S. strategy and the northern triangle governments’ Alliance for Prosperity initiative have similar objectives and fund complementary efforts; however, they have prioritized different activities. Initial Funding and Conditions Congress has appropriated $1.3 billion to begin implementing the new Central America strategy, dividing the funds relatively equally among efforts to promote prosperity, strengthen governance, and improve security. This figure includes $560 million appropriated in FY2015 and $750 million appropriated in FY2016 (through P.L. 113-235 and P.L. 114-113, respectively). Congress placed strict conditions on the FY2016 aid, requiring the northern triangle governments to address a range of concerns, including border security, corruption, and human rights, to receive assistance. As a result of those legislative requirements and delays in the budget process, most of the FY2016 funding did not begin to be delivered to Central America until early 2017. Future Appropriations and Other Policy Issues Congress is still considering FY2017 appropriations and soon will begin deliberating over President Trump’s FY2018 budget request. The Obama Administration requested $750 million for the Central America strategy in FY2017, but assistance for the region currently is being provided through a continuing resolution (P.L. 114-254) that funds foreign aid programs at the FY2016 level minus an across-the-board reduction of 0.1901%, until April 28, 2017. The Trump Administration’s FY2018 budget blueprint proposes deep cuts to foreign aid globally, but does not specify how those cuts would affect Central America. Congress may examine a number of policy issues as it deliberates on the future of the Central America strategy. These issues include the extent to which Central American governments are demonstrating the political will to undertake domestic reforms; the utility of the conditions placed on assistance to Central America; and the potential implications of changes to U.S. immigration, trade, and drug control policies for U.S. objectives in the region.

Apr 12, 2017

Multinational Species Conservation Fund Semipostal Stamp

The Multinational Species Conservation Fund (MSCF) supports international conservation efforts benefitting several species of animals, often in conjunction with efforts under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). MSCF receives annual appropriations under the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to fund five grant programs for conserving tigers, rhinoceroses, Asian and African elephants, marine turtles, and great apes (gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, orangutans, and various species of gibbons). To provide a convenient way for the public to contribute to these activities and to boost funds for these conservation programs, Congress authorized the Multinational Species Conservation Funds Semipostal Stamp Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-241). With the MSCF semipostal stamp (MSCF stamp) program set to expire in 2017, Congress is considering whether to reauthorize the MSCF stamp through pending legislation (e.g., S. 480 and H.R. 1247). Semipostal stamps are postage stamps that are sold with a surcharge above the normal price for a 1-ounce first-class letter stamp. For example, the current price for a first-class stamp is 49 cents, whereas a first-class semipostal stamp costs 60 cents. The additional charge is recognized by the stamp purchaser as a voluntary contribution to a designated cause. Since 1997, Congress has authorized the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) to sell four different semipostal stamps, including the MSCF stamp. The MSCF stamp, entitled “Save Vanishing Species,” was first issued by USPS on September 22, 2011. A portion of the stamp’s sale proceeds is transferred to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, which administers the MSCF and provides grants to international organizations to help protect the species listed above. As of November 2016, proceeds from MSCF stamp sales had generated more than $3.9 million for the MSCF. Many view semipostal stamps as an easy and inexpensive way to raise funds and awareness for a given organization or cause. Some contend that the MSCF stamp provides a significant amount of funding for MSCF conservation programs and raises awareness about the conservation of certain international threatened and endangered species. Others argue that semipostal stamps detract from the mission of the USPS and divert consumers away from other stamps the USPS has to offer. Additionally, some contend that other causes could benefit more than the MSCF from a semipostal stamp program.

Apr 7, 2017

The ACA Prevention and Public Health Fund: In Brief

SUPPRESS: Section 4002 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended), Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF) a permanent annual appropriation to be administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS). PPHF was intended to support an “expanded and sustained national investment in prevention and public health programs.” (42 U.S.C. 300u-11) PPHF amounts for each fiscal year are available to the Secretary of HHS beginning October 1, the start of the respective fiscal year. Congress may explicitly direct the distribution of PPHF funds, and did so for FY2014 through FY2017. Under the ACA, the PPHF’s annual appropriation would have increased from $500 million for FY2010 to $2 billion for FY2015 and each subsequent fiscal year. Congress has amended the provision two times, using a portion of PPHF funds as an offset for the costs of other activities. 21st Century Cures Act P.L. 114-255. As with ACA in general, the PPHF has sparked some controversy. Since it was enacted in 2010, Congress has considered several proposals to repeal it and rescind any unobligated funds. One of these measures, the Restoring Americans’ Healthcare Freedom Reconciliation Act of 2015 (H.R. 3762 in the 114th Congress) was passed in both chambers. It was vetoed by President Obama, and the House failed to override the veto. The American Health Care Act (115th Congress) also would repeal and rescind. American Health Care Act (H.R. 1628) The PPHF authority directs the HHS Secretary to transfer amounts from the Fund to HHS agencies for prevention, wellness, and public health activities. Since the PPHF is already appropriated, the Administration’s annual budget sets out its intended distribution and use of PPHF funds for that fiscal year, rather than requesting the funds. For FY2010 through FY2013, the Secretary determined the distribution of PPHF funds. For FY2013 the Secretary used almost half of the available PPHF appropriation to implement ACA insurance exchanges, a funding allocation that spurred objections both from opponents of the ACA and the Fund, and supporters of the Fund and the public health programs it has bolstered. Congress has explicitly directed annual PPHF transfers since FY2014, providing most of each annual appropriation to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Although the Secretary used the PPHF to fund a mix of pre-existing activities, as well as activities newly authorized under the ACA, Congress has favored funding pre-existing activities. For some activities the PPHF contribution for FY2016 made up more than half of its total funding. Examples include CDC immunization grants to states (54%) and tobacco prevention activities (60%). The CDC Preventive Health and Health Services Block Grant and the lead poisoning prevention program received 100% of their FY2016 funding from the PPHF. In addition, PPHF transfers accounted for about one-third of the funds for the Garrett Lee Smith suicide prevention grants to states, administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). As part of a continuing resolution for FY2017 Congress directed the distribution of FY2017 PPHF funds. Division A of P.L. 114-254.

Mar 21, 2017

The American Health Care Act (AHCA)

In January 2017, the House and Senate adopted a budget resolution for FY2017 (S.Con.Res. 3), which reflects an agreement between the chambers on the budget for FY2017 and sets forth budgetary levels for FY2018-FY2026. S.Con.Res. 3 also includes reconciliation instructions directing specific committees to develop and report legislation that would change laws within their respective jurisdictions to reduce the deficit. These instructions trigger the budget reconciliation process, which may allow certain legislation to be considered under expedited procedures. The reconciliation instructions included in S.Con.Res. 3 direct two committees in each chamber to report legislation within their jurisdictions that would reduce the deficit by $1 billion over the period of FY2017 through FY2026. In the House, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Energy and Commerce Committee are directed to report. In the Senate, the Committee on Finance and the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions are directed to report. On March 6, 2017, the Committee on Ways and Means and the Energy and Commerce Committee independently held markups. Each committee voted to transmit its budget reconciliation legislative recommendations to the House Committee on the Budget. Combined, these two bills are referred to as the American Health Care Act (AHCA). The House Committee on the Budget is scheduled to mark up the AHCA on March 16, 2017. The AHCA includes a number of provisions that would repeal or modify parts of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) and a number of provisions that do not specifically relate to aspects of the ACA. This report contains three tables that, together, provide an overview of the AHCA provisions. Table 1 includes provisions that apply to the private health insurance market, Table 2 includes provisions that affect the Medicaid program, and Table 3 includes provisions related to public health and taxes. Each table contains a column identifying whether the AHCA provision is related to an ACA provision (e.g., whether it repeals an ACA-related provision). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) estimate that the AHCA would reduce federal deficits by $337 billion over the period FY2017-FY2026. With respect to effects on health insurance coverage, CBO and JCT project that, in FY2018, 14 million more people would be uninsured under the AHCA than under current law and, in FY2026, 24 million more people would be uninsured.

Mar 14, 2017

The Marijuana Policy Gap and the Path Forward

Under federal law, the cultivation, possession, and distribution of marijuana are illegal, except for the purposes of sanctioned research. States, however, have established a range of laws and policies regarding marijuana’s medical and recreational use. Most states have deviated from an across-the-board prohibition of marijuana, and it is now more so the rule than the exception that states have laws and policies allowing for some cultivation, sale, distribution, and possession of marijuana—all of which are contrary to the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA). As of March 2017, nearly 90% of the states, as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, allow for the medical use of marijuana in some capacity. Also, eight states and the District of Columbia now allow for some recreational use of marijuana. These developments have spurred a number of questions regarding their potential implications for federal law enforcement activities and for the nation’s drug policies as a whole. Thus far, the federal response to state actions to decriminalize or legalize marijuana largely has been to allow states to implement their own laws on marijuana. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has nonetheless reaffirmed that marijuana growth, possession, and trafficking remain crimes under federal law irrespective of states’ positions on marijuana. Rather than targeting individuals for drug use and possession, federal law enforcement has generally focused its counterdrug efforts on criminal networks involved in the drug trade. While the majority of the American public supports marijuana legalization, some have voiced apprehension over possible negative implications. Opponents’ concerns include, but are not limited to, the potential impact of legalization on (1) marijuana use, particularly among youth; (2) road incidents involving marijuana-impaired drivers; (3) marijuana trafficking from states that have legalized it into neighboring states that have not; and (4) U.S. compliance with international treaties. Proponents of legalization have been encouraged by potential outcomes that could result from marijuana legalization, including a new source of tax revenue for states and a decrease in marijuana-related arrests. Many of these potential implications are yet to be fully measured. Given the current marijuana policy gap between the federal government and many of the states, there are a number of issues that Congress may address. These include, but are not limited to, issues surrounding availability of financial services for marijuana businesses, federal tax treatment, oversight of federal law enforcement, allowance of states to implement medical marijuana laws and involvement of federal health care workers, and consideration of marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the CSA. The marijuana policy gap has widened each year for some time. It has only been a few years since states began to legalize recreational marijuana, but over 20 years since they began to legalize medical marijuana. In addressing state-level legalization efforts and considering marijuana’s current placement on Schedule I, Congress could take one of several routes. It could elect to take no action, thereby upholding the federal government’s current marijuana policy. It may also decide that the CSA must be enforced in states and not allow them to implement conflicting laws on marijuana. Alternatively, Congress could choose to reevaluate marijuana’s placement as a Schedule I controlled substance.

Mar 10, 2017

WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement

The Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), finalized in December 2013, is the newest international trade agreement in the World Trade Organization (WTO), having entered into force on February 22, 2017, when two-thirds of WTO members, including the United States, ratified the multilateral agreement. Congress has an interest in the TFA since it may affect U.S. trade flows, the U.S. economy, and international capacity building efforts. Trade facilitation measures aim to simplify and streamline international trade procedures to allow the easier flow of trade across borders and thereby reduce the costs of trade. There is no precise definition of trade facilitation, even in the WTO agreements. Trade facilitation can be defined narrowly as improving administrative procedures at the border or more broadly to also encompass behind-the-border measures and regulations. The TFA aims to address multiple trade barriers confronted by exporters and importers, whether small and medium-sized enterprises engaged in e-commerce or large multinational firms managing complex global supply chains. These barriers include the lack of transparency on process and documentation requirements for exporting to a given country. According to WTO estimates, global export gains from full implementation of the TFA could range from $750 billion to more than $3.6 trillion dollars per year. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) finds that TFA implementation could lower trade costs as much as 12.5%-17.5% globally. Different sets of indicators and indices by various international organizations exist to measure levels of trade facilitation and could be used to monitor TFA effects. The TFA has three sections. The first section is the heart of the agreement, containing the provisions, of which many, but not all, are binding and enforceable. The second section provides for special and differential treatment for developing country members and least-developed country members, allowing them more time and assistance to implement the agreement. The TFA is the first WTO agreement in which members determine their own implementation schedules and in which progress in implementation is explicitly linked to technical and financial capacity. The TFA requires that “donor members,” including the United States, provide the needed capacity building and support to developing and least-developed members. Finally, the third section of the agreement contains the institutional arrangements for administering the TFA. Existing and proposed U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) include trade facilitation commitments. While the WTO TFA and U.S. FTAs share common features, there are also differences. U.S. FTAs generally include more enforceable provisions and specific time frames, and do not include special and differential treatment for developing country participants. U.S. implementation of the TFA does not require changes from current processes, including planned efforts to update U.S. systems. In the United States, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) seeks to balance its overarching objectives of promoting efficient trade flows with enforcing trade laws designed to protect consumers from dangerous and unlawful imports, and collecting customs duties. The CBP uses several instruments to collect information aimed at knowing who is importing and what types of goods are being imported, including the Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism (C-TPAT), the Automated Commercial Environment (ACE), and the International Trade Data System (ITDS). This report provides an overview of the TFA, its provisions, and the United States’ implementation and role in capacity building, and provides options for Congress to consider in relation to the TFA.

Mar 3, 2017

Presentation of Legislation and the Veto Process

Mar 1, 2017

Russia: Background and U.S. Interests

Since 1991, Congress has played a key role in the development of U.S. policy toward the Russian Federation (Russia), the principal successor to the United States’ former superpower rival, the Soviet Union. In that time, U.S.-Russian relations have gone through positive and negative periods. Each new U.S. Administration has sought to improve U.S.-Russian relations at the start of its tenure, and the Donald J. Trump Administration has expressed similar intentions to rebuild constructive relations with Moscow. In doing so, however, the Administration has indicated it intends to adhere to core international commitments and principles, including retention of sanctions against Russia. Moving forward, the 115th Congress is expected to actively engage with the Administration on questions concerning U.S.-Russian relations. Over the last five years, Congress has monitored and, together with the executive branch, taken steps to respond to significant concerns about Russian domestic and foreign policy developments. These developments include a trend toward increasingly authoritarian governance since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidential post in 2012; Russia’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and sponsorship and support of separatists in eastern Ukraine; violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty; Moscow’s ongoing intervention in Syria in support of Bashar al Asad’s government; increased military activity oriented toward Europe; and, according to the U.S. intelligence community, cyber-related influence operations that have extended to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. U.S. responses to these developments have included the imposition of sanctions related to human rights violations, Russia’s actions in Ukraine, and malicious cyber activity. The United States has also led NATO in developing a new military posture in Eastern Europe designed to reassure allies and deter further aggression. The Barack Obama Administration, together with Congress, condemned Russia’s military support to Asad’s government, especially its air strikes on Aleppo. Members of the 115th Congress have proposed to make permanent, until the crisis in Ukraine is resolved, existing Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia (H.R. 830, H.R. 1059, S. 94, S. 341), as well as to expand sanctions related to Russia’s actions in Ukraine (H.R. 830, S. 94), intervention in Syria (S. 138), and cyberattacks against U.S. democratic institutions (S. 94). Members also have proposed to provide congressional oversight over any potential sanctions relief (H.R. 1059, S. 341). In addition, Congress has begun to investigate Russian interference in U.S. elections. In January 2017, the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence announced inquiries into Russian cyber activities and “active measures” surrounding the U.S. election and more broadly. The Senate Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Judiciary Committees launched or announced related investigations. Members also have proposed a variety of other independent or joint commissions, committees, or investigations (H.R. 356, H.Con.Res. 15, H.Con.Res. 24, S. 27). At the same time, U.S. policymakers over the years have identified multiple areas in which U.S. and Russian interests are or could be compatible. The United States and Russia have successfully cooperated on key issues, including nuclear arms control and nonproliferation, support for military operations in Afghanistan, the Iranian nuclear program, the International Space Station, and the removal of chemical weapons from Syria. The United States and Russia also have identified other areas of cooperation, such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, counterpiracy, and global health. Although U.S.-Russian trade and investment were relatively low before sanctions were imposed, economic ties at the firm and sector levels have in some cases been substantial. In 2012, Congress authorized permanent normal trade relations for Russia. In the same year, the U.S. government supported Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization. This report provides background information on Russian politics, economics, and military issues. It also discusses a number of key issues for Congress concerning Russia’s foreign relations and the U.S.-Russian relationship.

Mar 1, 2017

Anti-Money Laundering: An Overview for Congress

Anti-money laundering (AML) refers to efforts to prevent criminal exploitation of financial systems to conceal the location, ownership, source, nature, or control of illicit proceeds. Despite the existence of long-standing domestic regulatory and enforcement mechanisms, as well as international commitments and guidance on best practices, policymakers remain challenged to identify and address policy gaps and new laundering methods that criminals exploit. According to United Nations estimates recognized by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, criminals in the United States generate some $300 billion in illicit proceeds that might involve money laundering. Rough International Monetary Fund estimates also indicate that the global volume of money laundering could amount to as much as 2.7% of the world’s gross domestic product, or $1.6 trillion annually. Money laundering is broadly recognized to have potentially significant economic and political consequences at both national and international levels. Despite robust AML efforts in the United States, the ability to counter money laundering effectively remains challenged by a variety of factors. These include the scale of global money laundering; the diversity of illicit methods to move and store ill-gotten proceeds through the international financial system; the introduction of new and emerging threats (e.g., cyber-related financial crimes); the ongoing use of old methods (e.g., bulk cash smuggling); gaps in legal, regulatory, and enforcement regimes, including uneven availability of international training and technical assistance for AML purposes; and the costs associated with financial institution compliance with global AML guidance and national laws. AML Policy Framework In the United States, the legislative foundation for domestic AML originated in 1970 with the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 1970 and its major component, the Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act. Amendments to the BSA and related provisions in the 1980s and 1990s expanded AML policy tools available to combat crime, particularly drug trafficking, and prevent criminals from laundering their illicitly derived profits. Key elements to the BSA’s AML legal framework, which are codified in Titles 12 (Banks and Banking) and 31 (Money and Finance) of the U.S. Code, include requirements for customer identification, recordkeeping, reporting, and compliance programs intended to identify and prevent money laundering abuses. Substantive criminal statutes in Titles 31 and 18 (Crimes and Criminal Procedures) of the U.S. Code prohibit money laundering and related activities and establish civil penalties and forfeiture provisions. Moreover, federal authorities have applied administrative forfeiture, non-conviction based forfeiture, and criminal forfeiture tools. In response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, Congress expanded the BSA’s AML policy framework to incorporate additional provisions to combat the financing of terrorism (CFT). Although CFT is not the primary focus of this CRS report, post-9/11 legislation provided the executive branch with greater authority and additional tools to counter the convergence of illicit threats, including the financial dimensions of organized crime, corruption, and terrorism. Policy Outlook for the 115th Congress Although CFT will likely remain a pressing national security concern for policymakers and Congress, some see the beginning of the 115th Congress as an opportunity to revisit the existing AML policy framework, assess its effectiveness, and propose regulatory and statutory changes. Such efforts could further address issues raised in hearings and proposed legislation during the 114th Congress, including beneficial ownership, the application of targeted financial sanctions, and barriers to international AML information sharing. Drawing from past legislative activity, the 115th Congress may also revisit proposals to require the executive branch to develop a roadmap for identifying key AML policy challenges and balancing AML priorities in a national strategy. Some observers have gone further to propose broader changes to the BSA/AML regime. The 115th Congress may also seek to address tensions that remain in balancing the policy objectives of improving financial services access and inclusion while also accounting for money laundering risks and vulnerabilities that may result in the exclusion (or “de-risking”) of others from the international financial system.

Mar 1, 2017

Withdrawal from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclear Agreement

The legal procedure through which the United States withdraws from treaties and other international agreements has been the subject of long-standing debate between the legislative and executive branches. Recently, questions concerning the role of Congress in the withdrawal process have arisen in response to statements made by President Donald J. Trump that he may consider withdrawing the United States from certain high-profile international commitments. This report outlines the legal framework for withdrawal from international agreements under domestic and international law, and it examines legal issues related to the potential termination of two agreements that may be of significance to the 115th Congress: the Paris Agreement on climate change and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) related to Iran’s nuclear program. Although the Constitution sets forth a definite procedure whereby the Executive has the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate, it is silent as to how treaties may be terminated. Moreover, not all agreements between the United States and foreign states are made through Senate-approved, ratified treaties. The President also enters into executive agreements, which do not receive the Senate’s advice and consent, and “political commitments,” which are not binding under domestic or international law. The legal procedure for withdrawal often depends on the type of agreement at issue, and the process may be further complicated when Congress has enacted legislation implementing the agreement into domestic law. Historical practice suggests that, because the Obama Administration considered the Paris Agreement to be an executive agreement that did not require the Senate’s advice and consent, a future Executive may unilaterally withdraw from it without seeking approval from the legislative branch. By its terms, however, the Paris Agreement does not allow parties to submit a notice of withdrawal until November 2019. Should a future Executive seek a more expedient method of exit, withdrawal from the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—the parent treaty to the Paris Agreement—would also terminate the United States’ participation in the subsidiary Paris Agreement. Because the UNFCCC received the Senate’s advice and consent in 1992, an effort by the Executive to terminate that treaty unilaterally could invoke the historical and largely unresolved debate over the role of Congress in treaty termination. The Obama Administration treated the JCPOA as a political commitment that is not legally binding. To the extent this understanding is correct, there is no legal prohibition on the President from withdrawing from the plan of action. It is worth noting that the JCPOA was “endorsed” by U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, and there is disagreement among observers as to whether this resolution may have converted at least some of the voluntary commitments in the JCPOA into obligations that are binding under international law. Both the JCPOA and Resolution 2231 contain what has been called a “snapback” mechanism that may allow the United States to cause the Security Council to reinstate its prior sanctions that had been imposed on Iran.

Feb 9, 2017

State Innovation Waivers: Frequently Asked Questions

Section 1332 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) provides states with the option to waive specified requirements of the ACA. In the absence of these requirements, the state is to implement its own plan to provide health insurance coverage to state residents that meets the ACA’s terms. Under a state innovation waiver, a state can apply to waive ACA requirements related to qualified health plans, health insurance exchanges, premium tax credits, cost-sharing subsidies, the individual mandate, and the employer mandate. The state can apply to waive any or all of these requirements, in part or in their entirety. To obtain approval for a waiver application, a state must show that the plan it will implement in the absence of the waived provision(s) meets certain requirements. The state’s plan must ensure that as many state residents have health insurance coverage under the plan as would have had coverage absent the waiver, and the coverage must be as affordable and comprehensive as it would have been absent the waiver. Additionally, the state’s plan cannot increase the federal deficit. The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Secretary of the Treasury share responsibility for reviewing state innovation waiver applications and deciding whether to approve applications. The earliest a state innovation waiver could go into effect was January 1, 2017. As of the date of this report, Hawaii is the only state with an approved state innovation waiver. Three other states—Alaska, California, and Vermont—have submitted waiver applications. California has since withdrawn its application, and the Secretaries have not yet issued a decision on Alaska’s or Vermont’s application.

Feb 8, 2017

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

In October 2013, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Bali, Indonesia, China proposed creating a new multilateral development bank (MDB), the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). As its name suggests, the Bank's stated purpose is to provide financing for infrastructure needs throughout Asia, as well as in neighboring regions. As of January 2017, the AIIB has approved nine projects, investing a total of $1.7 billion. The AIIB was formally established in late 2015 with 57 founding members. Membership in the AIIB is open to all members of the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The AIIB’s Articles of Agreement create two classes of membership: regional and non-regional members. According to the AIIB articles, regional members hold 75% of the total voting power in the Bank. Fourteen of the G-20 nations are AIIB members. The United States is not an AIIB member. The AIIB was initially conceived as a regional financing mechanism for Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “One Belt, One Road (OBOR)” initiative. This initiative is a central component of President Xi’s regional economic and foreign policy and aims to boost economic connectivity from China to Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe (the Silk Road Economic Belt) and, along a maritime route, from Southeast Asia to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe (the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road). President Xi, more so than previous Chinese leaders, has pursued policies to establish new China-led trade and financial institutions, as well as to further integrate China within the existing international financial institutions. President Xi said that the AIIB would “promote interconnectivity and economic integration in the region” and “cooperate with existing multilateral development banks,” including the World Bank and the ADB. As AIIB membership has expanded to include developed countries in Asia and Europe (and possibly Canada), China has since tried to distance the AIIB from the OBOR initiative through co-financing arrangements for its initial loans. It is uncertain how China will balance its stated goal of establishing an independent and high-standard MDB, while pursuing China’s own economic and national security priorities. The AIIB's initial total capital is $100 billion, with 20% paid-in and 80% callable. China is contributing $50 billion, half of the initial subscribed capital. India is the second-largest shareholder, contributing $8.4 billion. The Bank is based in Beijing, China, and headed by Jin Liqun, a former Chinese vice minister of finance, Chinese sovereign wealth fund chairman, and ADB vice president. China's voting share at the AIIB (28.7%) is substantially larger than that of the second-largest AIIB member nation, India (8.3%). This is the largest gap between the first- and second-largest shareholders at any existing MDB. The AIIB has a governance structure similar to other MDBs, with two key differences: (1) it does not have a resident board of executive directors that represents member countries' interests on a day-to-day basis; and (2) the AIIB gives more decisionmaking authority to regional countries and the largest shareholder, China. The AIIB presents several policy issues for Members of Congress to consider, including the future direction of the AIIB and potential U.S. role, including the question of whether the United States should join and U.S. policy toward the new institution; independence, transparency, and governance of the bank and implications for other MDBs, particularly projects that are co-financed with other MDBs; and commercial implications for U.S. firms, including procurement opportunities.

Feb 3, 2017

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): The Work Participation Standard and Engagement in Welfare-to-Work Activities

The 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193) created the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. TANF’s predecessor program, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), historically assisted non-working single mothers. The debates leading to the 1996 law focused on how to move those single mothers from welfare to work. TANF provides states with flexibility in how they design their programs. It has national goals, one of which is ending dependence of needy parents on government benefits by, in part, promoting job preparation and work. To enforce that goal, TANF requires that 50% of each state’s TANF families with an adult recipient include a member who is either working or engaged in welfare-to-work activities. There are credits that states may receive that lower the 50% goal for states that have reduced caseloads or spend from their own funds more than the amount required under TANF. Thus, there are four different routes for states to meet the work participation standard: (1) caseload reduction (i.e., reducing the number of families receiving TANF assistance); (2) excess state spending; (3) providing assistance to those already working (“unsubsidized employment”); and (4) engaging otherwise non-employed recipients in welfare-to-work activities, such as job search, education and training, community service, work experience, and subsidized employment. The main performance measure for TANF is the work participation rate (WPR), which measures the share of families in the caseload with a member who is either working or engaged in welfare-to-work activities. The WPR is compared annually to the state’s after-credit numerical goal to determine whether it met the work participation standard. The national average WPR fluctuated around 30% from FY2002 through FY2011. Most states met the work participation standard through a combination of caseload reduction, excess spending credits, and a WPR below 50%. Over that period, about half of the national WPR was comprised of recipients in unsubsidized jobs. In recent years, the national TANF average WPR has increased; it approached 50% for the first time in FY2015. This increase is due to states using TANF dollars to implement “earnings supplement” programs, separate from the regular TANF cash assistance programs. Earnings supplement programs provide benefits, usually small ones ($10 to $50 per month), to families with working parents who are not in regular state TANF assistance programs. Some earnings supplement programs provide benefits to those who left regular state TANF cash assistance programs; others provide benefits to families without any necessary connection to regular TANF cash assistance. Despite this, families who receive these TANF-funded benefits are counted toward the WPR. Throughout the history of TANF, participation in welfare-to-work activities has been relatively modest. In FY2015, out of a monthly average of 743,000 non-employed TANF work-eligible individuals, 143,000 (less than 1 in 5) were reported as engaged in welfare-to-work activities. TANF now has a record of 20 years, highlighted by (1) caseload reduction, with particularly large caseload declines in the early years; (2) an increase in the share of families receiving assistance with a parent who is employed; and (3) modest rates of participation in welfare-to-work activities among those who are not otherwise employed. If policymakers wish to increase engagement of non-employed recipients, a number of questions would be raised—including whether TANF’s flexibility with the performance standards structure provides sufficient incentives to increase engagement, or whether other program models, such as a separate program dedicated to work activities for assistance recipients, should be considered.

Feb 1, 2017

The Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF): An Overview

The Airport and Airway Trust Fund (AATF), sometimes referred to as the aviation trust fund, has been the primary funding source for federal aviation programs since 1972. It provides all funding for three major accounts of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): the Airport Improvement Program (AIP), Facilities and Equipment (F&E), and Research, Engineering, and Development (RE&D). It also pays for most spending from FAA’s Operations and Maintenance (O&M) account. The trust fund is funded principally by a variety of taxes paid by users of the national aviation system. Revenue sources for the trust fund include taxes on airline passenger ticket sales, the flight segment tax, air cargo taxes, and aviation fuel taxes paid by both commercial and general aviation aircraft. In FY2016, the trust fund received revenues of over $14.4 billion in aviation taxes and fees. Between FY2012 and FY2016, the trust fund provided between 71% and 93% of FAA’s total appropriations, with the remainder coming from the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. In order to avoid disruptions, both the authority to collect aviation excise taxes and to spend from the trust fund must be reauthorized periodically by Congress. The latest such legislation, P.L. 114-190, reauthorized FAA, other civil aviation programs, and the collection of taxes to fund the AATF through FY2017. However, a full FY2017 appropriation has not been enacted. P.L. 114-254 extended funding of FAA programs and activities at the FY2016 annualized level of $16,281 million through April 28, 2017. The balance in the aviation trust fund is projected to increase over the next few years. However, the AATF’s long-term vitality remains subject to a variety of forces. Poor economic conditions or external events could curb demand for air travel, reducing revenue from the ticket taxes that are the main source of AATF funding. Changing airline business practices, particularly unbundling of ancillary fees for particular amenities from airfares, are adversely affecting AATF revenue, as only base airfares are subject to ticket taxes. The financial future of the trust fund also depends on future spending decisions, including FAA plans for substantial investment in the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen) satellite-based air traffic control system. Proposals to shift air traffic control services from FAA to a government-owned corporation with an independent board of directors, which are expected to reemerge, raise a number of issues regarding AATF revenues and expenditures. A version of such a proposal approved by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee in 2016 would have allowed the corporation to impose user fees on some flights, principally commercial aviation. If user fees were to fund air traffic services, FAA would no longer require aviation tax revenues for this purpose. Congress might then consider options to restructure FAA’s financing mechanisms, such as lowering the aviation taxes that flow into the AATF or eliminating the general fund component of FAA funding.

Jan 31, 2017

Defining “Industrial Hemp”: A Fact Sheet

Botanically, industrial hemp and marijuana are from the same species of plant, Cannabis sativa, but from different varieties or cultivars. However, industrial hemp and marijuana are genetically distinct forms of cannabis that are distinguished by their use and chemical makeup as well as by differing cultivation practices in their production. While marijuana generally refers primarily to the psychotropic drug (whether used for medicinal or recreational purposes), industrial hemp is cultivated for use in the production of a wide range of products, including foods and beverages, personal care products, nutritional supplements, fabrics and textiles, paper, construction materials, and other manufactured goods. Both hemp and marijuana have separate statutory definitions in U.S. law.

Jan 23, 2017

U.S. Farm Program Eligibility and Payment Limits

Current U.S. farm program participants—whether individuals or multi-person legal entities—must meet specific eligibility requirements to receive benefits under certain farm programs. Some requirements are common across most programs while others are specific to individual programs. In addition, program participants are subject to annual payment limits that vary across different combinations of farm programs. Federal farm support programs, along with their current eligibility requirements and payment limits, are listed in Table 1. Since 1970, Congress has used varying policies to address the issue of who should be eligible for farm payments and how much should an individual recipient be permitted to receive in a single year. In recent years, congressional policy has focused on tracking payments through multi-person entities to individual recipients (referred to as direct attribution); ensuring that payments go to persons or entities actively engaged in farming; capping the amount of payments that a qualifying recipient may receive in any one year; and excluding farmers or farming entities with large average incomes from payment eligibility. Current eligibility requirements that affect multiple programs include identification of every participating person or legal entity—both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens; the nature and extent of an individual’s participation (i.e., actively engaged in farming criteria) including ownership interests in multi-person entities and personal time commitments (whether as labor or management); means testing—persons with combined farm and nonfarm adjusted gross income (AGI) in excess of $900,000 are ineligible for most program benefits; and conservation compliance requirements. In general, if a foreign person or legal entity meets a program’s eligibility requirements, then they are eligible to participate. One exception is the four permanent disaster assistance programs created under the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) and the noninsured crop disaster assistance program (NAP) whereby non-resident aliens are excluded. The process of tracking payments to an individual through various levels of ownership in single or multi-person legal entities is critical for assessing an individual’s cumulative payments against their annual payment limit. Current law requires direct attribution through four levels of ownership in multi-person legal entities. Current payment limits include a cumulative limit of $125,000 for all covered commodities under major Title I revenue support programs, with the exception of peanuts, which has its own $125,000 limit. The permanent disaster assistance programs also have a $125,000 per crop year limit, with some exceptions. Supporters of payment limits contend that large payments facilitate consolidation of farms into larger units, raise the price of land, and put smaller, family-sized farming operations and beginning farmers at a disadvantage. In addition, they argue that large payments undermine public support for farm subsidies and are costly. Critics of payment limits counter that all farms need support, especially when market prices decline, and that larger farms should not be penalized for the economies of size and efficiencies they have achieved. Further, critics argue that farm payments help U.S. agriculture compete in global markets, and that income testing is at odds with federal farm policies directed toward improving U.S. agriculture and its competitiveness. As part of the next farm bill debate, Congress may again address these concerns, as well as the following questions: How does policy design of payment limits relate to their distributional impact on crops, regions, and farm size? Is there an optimal aggregation of payment limits across commodities or programs? Do unlimited benefits under the marketing assistance loan program’s forfeiture or commodity certificate exchanges reduce the effectiveness of overall payment limits?

Jan 17, 2017

National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF): History, Function, and Funding

The National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF) was chartered by Congress in 1984 to aid in the conservation of plants, animals, and ecosystems; many of its projects involve work with federal agencies. By statute, NFWF is a “charitable and nonprofit corporation and is not an agency or establishment of the United States.” Registered under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 501(c)(3), NFWF is not a part of the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS, Department of the Interior), though it does have certain links to that agency, as well as to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NFWF offers opportunities to individuals and corporations to make tax-deductible contributions to promote plant, animal, and ecosystem conservation in peer-reviewed projects. It also allows federal agencies to seek partners who wish to aid in such projects, and it sometimes serves as a conduit for the management of fines or funds resulting from court settlements to mitigate damage to fish and wildlife. NFWF projects may benefit conservation on federal lands, but other ownerships also may receive benefits. NFWF differs from such other federal foundations as the National Park Foundation and the National Forest Foundation in having much more tenuous links to federal agencies; many NFWF projects have no link to any federal agency. If Congress considers legislation to create additional foundations associated with the missions of other federal land agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)—or for other purposes, such as Indian education—NFWF and the two foundations noted above offer three different models for such an effort.

Jan 17, 2017

The Closure of Institutions of Higher Education: Student Options, Borrower Relief, and Implications

The recent closures of multiple large, private for-profit institutions of higher education (IHEs), such as those owned by Corinthian Colleges, Inc. (e.g., Heald College) and ITT Educational Services (e.g., ITT Technical Institutes) have brought into focus the extent to which a student’s postsecondary education may be disrupted by a school closure. The closures of these IHEs also highlighted the numerous issues students may face when their institutions close and the difficult decisions they may be required to make in the wake of a closure. Two key issues students may face when their IHE closes relate to their academic plans and their personal finances. The academic issues faced by students when their schools close include whether they will continue to pursue their postsecondary education, and if so, where and how they might do so. Students deciding to continue their postsecondary education have several options. They may participate in a teach-out offered by the closing institution or by another institution. A teach-out is a plan that provides students with the opportunity to complete their program of study after a school has closed. In conjunction with or in lieu of participating in a teach-out, students may also be able to transfer the credits they previously earned at the closed IHE to another IHE. If a student is able to transfer some or all of their previously earned credits, he or she would not be required to repeat the classes those credits represent at the new institution; if a student is unable to transfer all or some of his or her previously earned credits, the student may be required to repeat the classes those credits represent at the new IHE. Decisions regarding the acceptance of credit transfers are within the discretion of the accepting IHE. The financial issues faced by students when their schools close include whether they are responsible for repaying any loans borrowed to attend a closed school and how they might finance any additional postsecondary education they pursue. In general, a closed school loan discharge is available to a borrower of federal student loans made under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA) if the student was enrolled at the IHE when it closed or if the student withdrew from the IHE within 120 days prior to its closure. In addition, the student must have been unable to complete his or her program of study at the closed school or a comparable program at another IHE, either through a teach-out agreement or by transferring any credits to another IHE. Borrowers ineligible for a closed school discharge may be eligible to have their Federal Direct Loan and Federal Family Education Loan program loans discharged by successfully asserting as a defense to repayment (DTR) certain acts or omissions of an IHE, if the cause of action directly relates to the loan or educational services for which the loan was provided. Whether a borrower may have all or part of any private education loans borrowed to attend the closed IHE discharged depends on the loan’s terms and conditions. Some students may also face issues regarding how they might finance future postsecondary educational pursuits. If a borrower receives a closed school discharge or has a successful DTR claim, his or her eligibility for future Direct Subsidized Loans and Pell Grants is unlikely to be affected. Moreover, a borrower’s statutory annual and aggregate borrowing limits on Direct Subsidized and Unsubsidized Loans are unlikely to be affected. However, if the borrower used GI Bill educational benefits for attendance at a closed school, those benefits cannot be restored for purposes of attending another institution. Students may be reimbursed for payments on charges levied by closed IHEs that are not covered by other sources from a State Tuition Recovery Fund (STRF). The availability of and student eligibility for such funds vary by state, and not all states operate STRFs. Finally, the receipt of any of the above-mentioned benefits may have federal and state income tax implications, including the potential creation of a federal income tax liability for borrowers who have certain loans discharged.

Jan 12, 2017

How Legislation Is Brought to the House Floor: A Snapshot of Parliamentary Practice in the 114th Congress (2015-2016)

The House of Representatives has several different parliamentary procedures through which it can bring legislation to the chamber floor. Which of these will be used in a given situation depends on many factors, including the type of measure being considered, its cost, the amount of political or policy controversy surrounding it, and the degree to which Members want to debate it and propose amendments. This report provides a snapshot of the forms and origins of measures that, according to the Legislative Information System of the U.S. Congress, received action on the House floor in the 114th Congress (2015-2016) and the parliamentary procedures used to bring them up for initial House consideration. In the 114th Congress, 1,200 pieces of legislation received floor action in the House of Representatives. Of these, 907 (76%) were bills or joint resolutions, and 293 (24%) were simple or concurrent resolutions. Of these 1,200 measures, 1,068 originated in the House, and 132 originated in the Senate. During the same period, 62% of all measures receiving initial House floor action came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, 16% came to the floor as business “privileged” under House rules and precedents, 14% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, and 7% came up by the unanimous consent of Members. One measure was processed under the procedures associated with clause 2 of Rule XV, the House Discharge Rule. When only lawmaking forms of legislation (bills and joint resolutions) are counted, 78% of measures receiving initial House floor action in the 114th Congresses came before the chamber under the Suspension of the Rules procedure, 18% were raised by a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House, and 5% came up by unanimous consent. No lawmaking forms of legislation received House floor action via the Discharge Rule or by virtue of being “privileged” under House rules. The party sponsorship of legislation receiving initial floor action in the 114th Congress varied based on the procedure used to raise the legislation on the chamber floor. Sixty-nine percent of the measures considered under the Suspension of the Rules procedure were sponsored by majority party Members. All but one of the 172 measures brought before the House under the terms of a special rule reported by the House Committee on Rules and adopted by the House were sponsored by majority party Members.

Jan 11, 2017

Haiti Declares Winner of Presidential Election After Delays

Jan 6, 2017

Global Human Rights: Security Forces Vetting (“Leahy Laws”)

Jan 3, 2017

The Role of State Approving Agencies in the Administration of GI Bill Benefits

State Approving Agencies (SAAs) play an important role in the administration of GI Bill® benefits. GI Bill benefits provide educational assistance payments to eligible veterans and servicemembers and their families enrolled in approved programs of education. The SAA role is intended to ensure that veterans and other GI Bill participants have access to a range of high-quality education and training programs at which to use their GI Bill benefits. In FY2017, the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) is estimated to distribute over $14 billion in GI Bill benefits to over 1 million eligible participants. Statutory provisions provide for the establishment of SAAs and describe their role in administering GI Bill benefits. Each state is “requested” to create or designate a state department or agency as its SAA. The VA contracts (or enters into agreement) with each SAA annually to provide approval, oversight, training, and outreach activities by qualified personnel as specified in the contract to ensure the quality of programs of education and proper administration of GI Bill benefits. The VA oversees the processes for approving and reviewing approved programs of education, educating the entities and individuals involved in GI Bill claims processing, and increasing awareness among potential GI Bill participants. The VA and any other federal entity or individual is prohibited from exercising any supervision or control over SAAs except as specifically provided in statutory provisions. For example, 38 U.S.C. §3674 requires the VA take into consideration an annual evaluation of each SAA’s performance on its contractual standards when negotiating a new contract. One of the key SAA roles is to initially approve programs of education for GI Bill purposes. Each sponsoring facility (e.g., educational institutions and training establishments) must submit an application to its SAA. Approval is intended to ensure that each program of education and sponsoring facility meets all applicable statutory and regulatory requirements, including proper benefit administration and program of education quality. The approval process and requirements vary depending on the program’s educational objective (e.g., non-college degree or flight training) and existing government oversight. For example, some programs that are approved by other government programs or processes are “deemed approved” and require a less in-depth review. The remaining programs undergo more comprehensive approval processes that may include the SAA reviewing institutional policies, staff qualifications, and academic curriculum. The SAA may conduct a site visit. Once the SAA completes the initial approval review in accordance with the approval standards, the SAA issues an approval or disapproval letter to the facility. The VA maintains the compiled list of all approved programs of education. Another key SAA role is to conduct compliance surveys. Compliance surveys are designed to ensure that the facility and approved programs are in compliance with all applicable statutory, regulatory, and policy provisions and the facility understands the provisions. Statutory provisions establish the number of institutions requiring annual compliance surveys. The VA conducts compliance surveys but also assigns some of the required compliance surveys to SAAs. During the onsite compliance survey visit, the SAA reviews student files to verify that GI Bill payments have been made properly, conducts student interviews, verifies institutional operations, and reviews additional documents and areas as outlined on the compliance survey checklist. Discrepancies uncovered during the compliance survey may be resolved immediately, may result in the creation of a GI Bill debt or payment, or may result in the suspension or disapproval of a program of education. The SAA may suspend a program of education from new enrollments for up to 60 days while the SAA provides assistance to help the facility resolve the issue. The SAA may disapprove the program of education such that no GI Bill payments may be made based on an individual’s pursuit of the program of education.

Dec 29, 2016

The 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255)

The 21st Century Cures Act (P.L. 114-255) was signed into law on December 13, 2016, by President Barack Obama. On November 30, 2016, the House passed the House amendment to the Senate amendment to H.R. 34, the 21st Century Cures Act, on a vote of 392 to 26. The bill was then sent to the Senate where it was considered and passed, with only minor technical modification, on December 7, 2016, on a vote of 94 to 5. The law consists of three divisions: Division A—21st Century Cures Act; Division B—Helping Families in Mental Health Crisis; and Division C—Increasing Choice, Access, and Quality in Health Care for Americans. CRS has published a series of reports on this law, one on each Division. This is the report for Division A of the law. This report provides a brief summary of each provision of the 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255), by title, subtitle, and section. The Division includes five titles, as follows: (1) Innovation projects and state responses to opioid abuse; (2) Discovery; (3) Development; (4) Delivery; and (5) Savings. Title I provides funding for biomedical research, including the Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI) and the Cancer Moonshot Initiative, for the opioid crisis response, and for the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to support certain new activities authorized by the law. Title II, consisting of seven subtitles, requires or authorizes a number of activities to support biomedical research, including the reauthorization of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the reform of that agency through numerous administrative, reporting, and data access provisions. The Title includes provisions that support young investigators funded by NIH; pediatric research; collaborative research such as research on neurological disease; and precision medicine efforts, and specifically the PMI. Title III, consisting of ten subtitles, focuses on modifying the drug and device approval pathways at the FDA to support innovation, and specifically includes provisions that support patient-focused drug development and streamlined and clarified pathways to approval for drugs, combination products, antimicrobials, Orphan drugs, drugs for rare disease, and regenerative therapies. This Title also contains provisions making modifications to the medical device approval pathway and reforms to the FDA’s hiring process. Finally, it addresses FDA’s regulation of medical countermeasure and vaccine development. Title IV focuses on health care delivery, and includes provisions that together address the federal policies to promote the adoption and use of electronic health record (EHR) technology, as well as a handful of Medicare delivery provisions addressing telehealth services in Medicare, site-of-service price transparency for certain Medicare services, Local Coverage Determinations (LCDs) under Medicare, and a technology and pharmaceutical ombudsman for Medicare. Title V provides savings for the Division, and includes Medicare and Medicaid savings; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) savings, including Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF) and territory funding; and savings from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) drawdown.

Dec 23, 2016