Simpson v. State

Citations

• 81 Fla. 292
• 87 So. 920

Syllabus

<p>1. A presumption of a criminal intention may arise from proof of the commission of an unlawful act, hut the general rule, that if it is proved that the accused committed the unlawful act charged, it will be presumed that the act was done with a criminal intention, does not apply in the case of crimes like burglary, assault with intent to kill, or rape, for which a specific intent is necessary. Here the burden is on the State to prove affirmatively either by direct or circumstantial evidence that 'the act was done with the requisite specific intent.</p> <p>2. Where a specific intent is required to make an act an offense, the doing of the act does not raise a presumption that it was done with that specific intent.</p> <p>3. Where a statute makes an offense to consist of an act combined with a particular intent, that intent is just as necessary to be proven as the act itself, and must be found by the jury as a matter of fact before a conviction can be had; and especially when the offense created by the statute, consisting of the act and the intent, constitutes substantially an attempt to commit some higher offense than that which the defendant has succeeded in accomplishing by it.</p> <p>4. Where a defendant is indicted for the commission of an offense with intent to commit another, as for instance rape, it devolves upon the prosecution to prove some act or deed evidencing such intent in order to warrant conviction of the defendant.</p> <p>5. The allegation of the intent in this case was an essential and material allegation, and it was necessary for the prosecution to prove facts in order to show beyond a reasonable doubt what that intent was.</p>