CRS Reports

Market Dynamics That May Have Contributed to Solyndra’s Bankruptcy

Solyndra Solar Loan guarantee Section 1705 solar modules polysilicon photovoltaics PV DOE subsidies bankruptcy

Oct 25, 2011

Definition of Income in PPACA for Certain Medicaid Provisions and Premium Credits

Oct 24, 2011

Interior Immigration Enforcement: Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens

This report begins by defining and quantifying the criminal alien population, to the extent possible. The following sections describe current and historical programs designed in whole or in part to target this population, including CAP, Secure Communities, the § 287(g) program, and NFOP. After describing how these programs function and key differences among them, the report reviews their recent appropriations history and enforcement statistics.

Oct 21, 2011

Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the National Preparedness System: Background and Issues for Congress

Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness (PPD-8) was signed and released by President Barack Obama on March 30, 2011. PPD-8 and its component policies intend to guide how the nation, from the federal level to private citizens, can “prevent, protect against, mitigate the effects of, respond to, and recover from those threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation.” These threats include terrorist acts, natural disasters, and other man-made incidents. PPD-8 evolves from, and supersedes, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8, which was released under President George W. Bush. PPD-8 is intended to meet many requirements of Subtitle C of the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-295, 6 U.S.C. §741- 764). In addition to the main Directive, an Implementation Plan for PPD-8 and a National Preparedness Goal were finalized in 2011. Two National Planning Frameworks are also complete, but multiple component PPD-8 policy documents are still being developed. Some elements of PPD-8 may not be finalized until September 2012 or later. However, PPD-8 has already affected national preparedness policy by expanding the scope of the end-state objective for preparedness, modifying the capabilities-based planning methodology, identifying a new set of national capabilities, and directing the creation of more National Planning Frameworks. It is anticipated that the five National Planning Frameworks—one each for prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery—will assign federal roles and responsibilities in each mission area. The National Planning Frameworks are also to guide how nonfederal resources are leveraged, including non-profit and private sectors’ resources. Congress may wish to oversee how the Administration creates and implements the many elements of PPD-8. This report discusses several potential issues and challenges that may arise in the development and implementation of each National Planning Framework. These issues and challenges include evaluating: how PPD-8 policies conform with statute; how federal roles and responsibilities have been assigned to implement and execute PPD-8 policies; how non-federal resources and stakeholders will be impacted by national preparedness guidance; and how the overall federal budget may be reprioritized by a new national preparedness goal. However, it may be difficult to ascertain the full impact of PPD-8 on national preparedness until its provisions are fully operationalized and tested during real world hazards. This report will be updated as required by any significant developments in the implementation of PPD-8.

Oct 21, 2011

The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: Categorical Eligibility

Oct 21, 2011

Fiscal Impacts of the Foreign-Born Population

This report reviews estimates of fiscal impacts to the federal, state, and local governments of the foreign born who reside in the United States. It examines the academic and policy literature on fiscal impacts of two populations: all U.S. foreign born and unauthorized aliens. Computing such fiscal impacts involves numerous methodological and conceptual challenges, and resulting estimates vary considerably according to the assumptions used, including those about the time frame considered, the treatment of U.S.-born children, the unit of analysis used, and which costs and revenues are included. For the total foreign-born population, the findings of a 1996 analysis commissioned by the National Research Council entitled The New Americans remain authoritative and relevant. The report estimated that each new immigrant at that time, with his or her descendents, would generate an average net fiscal surplus. The authors illustrated how their estimate varied according to foreign-born residents’ age composition and educational attainment. Varied assumptions about education generated substantially different impacts. For instance, immigrants with above-average education generated a considerably larger than average net fiscal surplus; those with below-average education levels generated a net fiscal deficit. Reducing the time frame of the analysis to fewer generations changes the average net fiscal surplus into an average net fiscal deficit. This study and others confirm that the foreign born, like the native born, impose their largest costs on U.S. taxpayers as children, through their consumption of public education, and as the elderly, through their consumption of government-funded public health programs. Yet, the majority of the foreign born come to the United States as young adults, where they pay taxes and contribute to programs like Social Security for most of their working lives. Relatively young ages at arrival for most foreign born help explain why many fiscal impact studies found that foreign-born residents generated net fiscal surpluses over the long term. Findings from all of the studies reviewed in this report indicate different impacts at the state and federal levels. Many federal programs, such as Social Security and Medicaid, are oriented toward assisting the elderly, while many state and local level jurisdictions are responsible for services consumed by younger persons, such as public education and criminal justice administration. Foreign-born residents’ relatively young age distribution thus accentuates the degree to which states and localities incur greater fiscal costs from the foreign born than the federal government. Fiscal impact studies of unauthorized aliens reach less consensus than those of the total foreign-born population. Three national estimates evaluated in a 1995 General Accounting Office (GAO) report varied considerably and left the agency unable to definitively quantify such fiscal impacts. Subsequent state-level studies emphasized fiscal impacts of costly public services: public education, health care, and law enforcement. Many estimated tax and other fiscal contributions. Studies estimating fiscal impacts for unauthorized aliens are more likely to yield estimated net fiscal deficits than those estimating fiscal impacts for all foreign born, because unauthorized aliens, on average, tend to be younger and less educated. Consequently, they are more likely to use public education for their children and contribute relatively less in tax revenues compared to all foreign born. Given their unauthorized status, they are also less likely themselves to receive public benefits, although their U.S.-born children may be more likely to qualify for such benefits. However, deriving more specific conclusions or estimates from studies of unauthorized aliens reviewed in this report remains elusive due to variation in study design and methodology.

Oct 19, 2011

Numerical Limits on Employment-Based Immigration: Analysis of the Per-Country Ceilings

The report opens with brief explanations of the employment-based preference categories and the per-country ceilings governing annual admissions of LPRs. The focus is on the major employment-based preference categories. The report continues with a statistical analysis of the pending caseload of approved employment-based LPR petitions.

Oct 11, 2011

Social Security Primer

Oct 4, 2011

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2003-2010

This report is prepared annually to provide Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons suppliers to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2003-2010, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 72.9% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 78.9% of all such agreements globally from 2007-2010, and 76.2% of these agreements in 2010. The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2010 was over $30.7 billion. This was a decline from $49.8 billion in 2009. In 2010, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was nearly $21.9 billion, the highest total in these deliveries values since 2006 (in constant 2010 dollars). Recently, from 2007 to 2010, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for each of these four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2007 to 2010, the United States made nearly $72 billion in such agreements, 40.1% all these agreements expressed in constant 2010 dollars. Russia made $37.1 billion, 20.7% of these agreements. During this same period, collectively, the United States and Russia made 60.8% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations, ($109.1 billion [in constant 2010 dollars]) during this four-year period. In 2010, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations with over $14.9 billion or 48.6% of these agreements, a significant increase in market share from 2009, when the United States held a 30.3% market share. In second place was Russia with $7.6 billion or 24.7% of such agreements. In 2010, the United States ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at $8.6 billion, or 39.2% of all such deliveries. Russia ranked second in these deliveries at $4.8 billion or 21.4%. In worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2010—to both developed and developing nations—the United States dominated, ranking first with $21.3 billion in such agreements or 52.7% of all such agreements. Ranking second in worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2010 was Russia with $7.8 billion in such global agreements or 19.3%. The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide in 2010 was $40.4 billion. This was a substantial decrease in arms agreements values over 2009 of 38.1%, and the lowest worldwide arms agreements total since 2003. In 2010, India ranked first in the value of arms transfer agreements among all developing nations weapons purchasers, concluding $5.8 billion in such agreements. Taiwan ranked second with $2.7 billion in such agreements. Saudi Arabia ranked third with $2.2 billion.

Sep 22, 2011

The Role of Public Works Infrastructure in Economic Recovery

During the recent recession, policymakers took a number of monetary and fiscal policy actions to stimulate the economy. Notably, Congress enacted the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) that provided increases in federal spending and reduction in taxes in order to increase demand for goods and services. However, as the economy is only slowly emerging from the recession, interest in using federal government spending to boost U.S. economic recovery has again intensified. There is widespread desire to accelerate job creation and economic recovery, although consensus on how to do so is not apparent. Policymakers at all levels of government are debating a range of options to address these problems. This report is an overview of policy issues associated with one approach that also was included in ARRA: using accelerated investments in the nation’s public infrastructure as a mechanism to benefit economic recovery. When most people think about infrastructure, they probably have in mind systems that are publicly provided and are important to the productive capacity of the nation’s economy. Today, policymakers define the term more broadly to include both publicly and privately owned systems and facilities and categories that vary considerably in the degree of historic federal investment in building or rebuilding physical structures. Academics, economists, and policymakers debate two issues concerning the contribution of infrastructure investment to the economy. One issue is the effects of infrastructure investment on productivity and growth. The second related issue is the role of infrastructure spending, which is typically a long-term activity, as a short-term mechanism to invigorate a sluggish economy. Research conducted over time has resulted in a general consensus that there can be positive returns on productivity of investing in infrastructure. Many experts now argue that infrastructure spending could be an important source of stimulating labor demand and enhancing U.S. productivity through investments in roads, bridges, water systems, etc. Still, some analysts are cautious about the effectiveness of this type of fiscal stimulus because of one key issue: timing. By definition, the goal of stimulus spending is to get money into the economy swiftly, but infrastructure spending is different. The reality is that large infrastructure projects typically are multiyear efforts with slow initial spendout that continues over a period of time. Spending advocates contend that to the extent that recovery from a lengthy recession is slow—as it is now—projects with extended timeframes can still contribute to the economy’s recovery. A key question in debating infrastructure as part of job creation to aid economic recovery is, what will the increased spending buy? Two important considerations are, will it produce short-term or long-term benefit, and will it produce a significant economic boost, relative to its budgetary cost. A commonly asked question is, how many jobs will be created? Setting priorities for infrastructure spending is based on a combination of factors, often including estimates of funding needs. Determining “need” is complicated by differences in purpose, criteria, and timing. In the context of evaluating job creation plans, a further complication is whether funds are targeted to true need, and whether “need” is defined by engineering assessments, by economic measures such as unemployment, or a program’s effectiveness in leveraging private capital.

Sep 21, 2011

International Monetary Fund: Background and Issues for Congress

This report evaluates the purpose, membership, financing, and focus of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) activities. It also discusses the role of Congress in shaping U.S. policy at the IMF and concludes by addressing key issues, both legislative and oversight-related, that Congress may wish to consider, including: the role of the IMF as a lender of last resort; the adequacy of IMF resources; and the effectiveness of IMF surveillance.

Sep 19, 2011

Social Security: Temporary Payroll Tax Reduction in 2011

Sep 13, 2011

Attempt: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law

Sep 13, 2011

Congressional Authority to Limit Military Operations

This report begins by discussing constitutional provisions allocating war powers between Congress and the President, and presenting a historical overview of relevant court cases. It considers Congress's constitutional authority to end a military conflict via legislative action. The report discusses Congress's ability to limit funding for U.S. participation in hostilities, examining relevant court cases and prior measures taken by Congress to restrict military operations, as well as possible alternative avenues to fund these activities in the event that appropriations are cut. The report then provides historical examples of measures that restrict the use of particular personnel, and concludes with a brief analysis of arguments that might be brought to bear on the question of Congress's authority to limit the availability of troops to serve in ongoing military operations.

Sep 8, 2011

Congressional Primer on Major Disasters and Emergencies

This report covers the role of the government in disaster management. While the disaster response and recovery process is fundamentally a relationship between the federal government and the requesting state government, there are roles for congressional offices to play in providing information to the federal/state response and recovery teams in their respective states and districts. Congressional offices also serve as a valuable source of accurate and timely information to their constituents.

Aug 31, 2011

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) FY2012 Appropriations: Overview of Provisions in H.R. 2584

Aug 31, 2011

H.R. 1 Full-Year FY2011 Continuing Resolution: Overview of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Provisions

P.L. 112-10, the Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (H.R. 1473), enacted April 15, 2011, provided $8.70 billion for EPA for FY2011 prior to a 0.2% across-the-board rescission. None of the 12 regular appropriations bills for FY2011, including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies bill that includes funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), were enacted before the start of the fiscal year on October 1, 2010. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 112-10, a series of temporary continuing resolutions (CRs) were enacted that sequentially extended funding from October 1, 2010, through April 15, 2011 (P.L. 112-8). Passed by the House on February 19, 2011, Division B of H.R. 1 would have funded 11 of the 12 regular FY2011 appropriations bills in the form of a full-year continuing resolution (CR) (Division A separately would have provided FY2011 appropriations for the Department of Defense, the 12th bill). Several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions were the focus of considerable attention during committee hearings and floor debate on EPA FY2011 appropriations, and were reflected in a number of provisions and amendments included in House-passed H.R. 1. These EPA actions cut across the various environmental pollution control statutes’ programs and initiatives, such as those that address greenhouse gas emissions, hazardous air pollutants (including mercury), mountaintop mining regulation, management of coal ash, particulate matter emissions, and water quality management including geographical ecosystems (notably Chesapeake Bay and the Great Lakes). Although Congress did not include the provisions in P.L. 112-10, these environmental regulatory issues remain a prominent topic of debate as Congress deliberates on the FY2012 appropriations and other proposed legislation regarding EPA’s authorities. Title VII of Division B in H.R. 1, as passed by the House, included specified funding levels for certain EPA accounts. Title VII of Division B, as well as Division D of the House-passed bill, combined contained more than 20 provisions that would have restricted or prohibited the use of appropriated funds to implement various regulatory activities under the EPA’s jurisdiction. On March 9, 2011, the Senate did not pass the House version of H.R. 1 and did not agree to a subsequent Senate substitute amendment (S.Amdt. 149) containing different funding levels and generally omitting the EPA provisions included in the House-passed H.R. 1. This report provides a summary of funding levels for EPA accounts and program activities specified in P.L. 112-10, H.R. 1 as passed by the House and as proposed in the Senate amendment, compared to the President’s FY2011 Budget Request and the FY2010 enacted levels in P.L. 111-88. The report also briefly highlights a number of the provisions regarding EPA program activities as presented in H.R. 1, as passed by the House. Only those provisions that are clearly identifiable by specific language or references contained in the bill are included. Nearly all of these EPA provisions were omitted from the Senate amendment (S.Amdt. 149) and P.L. 112-10 as enacted. The information presented throughout this report is primarily an extraction of the bill language for purposes of reference and is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of all provisions in H.R. 1 that may have directly or indirectly affected EPA programs.

Aug 29, 2011

Higher Education Tax Benefits: Brief Overview and Budgetary Effects

Aug 24, 2011

Individual Mandate and Related Information Requirements under PPACA

Aug 22, 2011

The Budget Control Act of 2011

The Budget Control Act (BCA) is the result of negotiations between the President and Congress held in response to the federal government having nearly reached its borrowing capacity. The BCA authorized increases in the debt limit of at least $2.1 trillion dollars (and up to $2.4 trillion under certain conditions), subject to a disapproval process that would likely require securing the support of two-thirds of each chamber to prevent a debt limit increase. It established caps on the amount of money that could be spent through the annual appropriations process for the next 10 years, which the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates will reduce federal spending by $917 billion. The BCA also created a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction that is instructed to develop a bill to reduce the federal deficit by at least another $1.5 trillion over the 10 year period ending in FY2021. The legislation resulting from the joint committee recommendations can be considered under special procedures that prevent amendment and limit debate in both chambers. These procedures could have a significant impact in the Senate because they allow the bill to advance with simple majority support; under regular Senate procedures it can be necessary to obtain agreement among at least three-fifths of the Senate (normally 60 Senators) to advance consideration of legislation. If a joint committee proposal cutting the deficit by at least $1.2 trillion is not enacted by January 15, 2012, then the BCA established an automatic spending reduction process that includes sequestration (the cancellation of budgetary resources). The process presumably is intended to encourage agreement on deficit reduction, either by enacting the joint committee legislation by early 2012, or possibly by enacting other legislation (presumably through existing congressional procedures) by the beginning of 2013, when the automatic process would make reductions. If the enacted bill cuts the deficit by more than $1.2 trillion, an additional increase in the debt limit becomes available in the amount of the excess, up to $0.3 trillion. The Budget Control Act has two additional elements. First, it directs that the House and Senate must each vote on a proposal to amend the Constitution to require that the budget of the federal government be balanced. The BCA does not alter the procedures for taking up such a measure in the Senate, and therefore the Senate might not be able to vote on passage of a constitutional amendment unless the support of 60 Senators can be secured to begin consideration. The only procedural consequence of not voting specified in the BCA is that, if Congress does not approve a constitutional amendment, the second of two conditions under which the act would permit an additional increase of $0.3 trillion in the debt ceiling, will not be available. Second, the BCA also makes changes to the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (DL) program and the Federal Pell Grant program, two federal student aid programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (HEA; P.L. 89-329). Effective July 1, 2012, the BCA eliminates the availability of Subsidized Stafford Loans to graduate and professional students and eliminates all but one type of repayment incentives on future DL program loans. CBO estimates these changes would reduce direct spending by $21.6 billion over the FY2012-FY2021 period. Approximately $17 billion of the $21.6 billion in estimated savings from the changes in the DL program would be directed to the Pell Grant program for future general use in FY2012 and FY2013.

Aug 19, 2011

Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2012 Appropriations

Aug 11, 2011

Energy Tax Incentives: Measuring Value Across Different Types of Energy Resources

Aug 10, 2011

U.S. Policy Towards Burma: Issues for the 112th Congress

A robust discussion has arisen around U.S. policy towards Burma. Some Members of Congress, senior officials in the Obama Administration, noted Burma scholars, and representatives of various interest groups have weighed in on this discussion, offering their views on the merits of current U.S. policy towards Burma and what policy changes ought to be made. Among the commentators, there is general agreement that more than 20 years of political and economic sanctions, and nearly two years of “pragmatic engagement,” have not led to the achievement of the stated goals of U.S. policy towards Burma—the release of all political prisoners from detention and the transfer power to a representative, democratically elected civilian government that will respect the human rights of the people of Burma, including its ethnic minorities. However, there is little agreement as to why U.S. policy has been unsuccessful and what needs to be done to increase the likelihood of achieving the stated goals. Some analysts see the holding of parliamentary elections, the release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest in November 2010, the formal dissolution of Burma’s military regime, and its replacement by a mostly civilian government as evidence of the advent of a new era in Burma. Others view these events as thinly veiled ruses designed to hide the continuation of repressive military rule behind the veneer of seemingly civilian institutions. Both groups of commentators point to various recent events to support for their recommendations for the conduct of U.S. policy towards Burma. Other factors complicate the formulation of U.S. policy towards Burma. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, of which Burma is a member, has called for the end of all sanctions on Burma. The European Union recently lifted its visa ban for several senior officials in the new Burmese government. Neighboring China, India, and Thailand have recently increased their investments in Burma, particularly in its energy sector. Inside Burma, the outbreak of fighting between the Burmese military and several ethnic-based militias has reportedly led to serious human rights abuses and another wave of Burmese refugees in the region. The current discussions have generally focused on three related issues: (1) the effectiveness of the U.S. sanctions regime; (2) the value of high-level meetings with Burmese officials; and (3) the ability to coordinate policies towards Burma with other nations. To some, the basic premise of U.S. policy is fundamentally flawed, and a completely new approach is needed. To others, the main problem with U.S. policy has been in its lack of focus and inadequate implementation. Some question whether or not any U.S. policy can have an appreciable impact on Burma’s military leaders and foster progress towards U.S. objectives in Burma. The installation of a new government in Burma and the appointment of Derek J. Mitchell to serve as the first Special Representative and Policy Coordinator for Burma are viewed as creating a “honeymoon period” in which Congress and the Obama Administration can review and, if desired, adjust U.S. policy towards Burma. The genesis of U.S. policy towards Burma was largely driven by Congress passing legislation after particularly egregious actions by Burma’s ruling military junta. The 112th Congress is currently considering legislation (H.J.Res. 66 and S.J.Res. 17) that would renew certain import restrictions contained in the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003. If the history of the development of U.S. policy towards Burma is indicative, any dramatic new development in Burma—either good or bad—could prompt Congress into action.

Aug 8, 2011

Unemployment Insurance: Consequences of Changes in State Unemployment Compensation Laws

Aug 5, 2011

Set-Asides for Small Businesses: Recent Developments in the Law Regarding Precedence Among the Set-Aside Programs and Set-Asides Under Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity Contracts

In government contracting law, a “set-aside” is a procurement in which only certain businesses can compete. Set-asides can be exclusive or partial, depending upon whether the entire procurement, or just part of it, is so restricted. Eligibility for set-asides is typically based on business size, as well as demographic characteristics of the business owners. Currently, federal law provides, in various ways, for set-asides for (1) small businesses generally, (2) small businesses located in Historically Underutilized Business Zones (HUBZones) (HUBZone small businesses), (3) service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs), (4) small businesses owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals that are participating in the Minority Small Business and Capital Ownership Development Program authorized by Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act (8(a) small businesses), and (5) women-owned-and-controlled small businesses. On September 27, 2010, President Obama signed the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-240) which amends several provisions of the Small Business Act pertaining to set-asides. P.L. 111-240 changes certain language in the provisions regarding HUBZone set-asides to make clear that agencies may—but are not required to—use HUBZone set-asides when there is a reasonable expectation that at least two qualified HUBZone small businesses will submit offers and the award can be made at a fair market price. P.L. 111-240 also expressly authorizes agencies to set aside parts of multiple-award contracts for small businesses; place orders under multiple-award contracts with small businesses without complying with certain procedures ensuring that firms holding such contracts generally have a “fair opportunity to be considered” for orders under them; and “reserve” one or more awards for small businesses under “full and open multiple award procurements.” P.L. 111-240 was enacted in response to a series of decisions in 2008-2010 by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) interpreting the provisions of the Small Business Act establishing or implementing the set-aside programs for small businesses. One of these decisions, DGR Associates, Inc. v. United States, issued by the Court of Federal Claims on August 13, 2010, permanently enjoined the government from using an 8(a) set-aside when there is a reasonable expectation that at least two qualified HUBZone small businesses will submit offers and the award can be made at a fair market price. The court did so based, in part, on the interpretation of the Small Business Act set forth in its March 2, 2010, decision in Mission Critical Solutions v. United States. In Mission Critical Solutions, the court held that set-asides for HUBZone small businesses have precedence over those for 8(a) small businesses because HUBZone set-asides are mandatory while 8(a) set-asides are discretionary, and mandatory agency actions take precedence over discretionary ones. Another decision, Delex Systems, Inc., issued by GAO on October 28, 2008, recommended that orders issued under certain multiple-award contracts be subject to set-asides for small businesses because they are “acquisitions,” and any acquisition over $150,000 is subject to set-asides for small businesses. While P.L. 111-240 did not amend the Small Business Act to explicitly provide for “parity” among the set-aside programs, the Federal Acquisition Regulatory Council amended the Federal Acquisition Regulation in April and May 2011 to establish that “there is no order of precedence” among the set-aside programs. Also, in February 2011, a court awarded attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act to a firm that had challenged the government’s argument that there was parity among the set-aside programs prior to the enactment of P.L. 111-240. The court did so because it found that the government’s position in this litigation was not substantially justified.

Aug 4, 2011

Accelerating Highway and Transit Project Delivery: Issues and Options for Congress

Major highway and transit facilities can take somewhere on the order of 10 to 15 years to plan and build. The environmental review process required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other federal environmental laws and regulations is often cited as the main culprit for long delivery times. Available data and research, however, show that environmental review is typically not the greatest source of delay in surface transportation projects. Developing a community consensus on what to do, securing the funding, and dealing with affected residents and businesses, including utilities and railroads, also contribute to the long timelines required to complete certain projects. Project delay can occur during any of the five main phases in delivering major highway and transit projects: planning; preliminary design and environmental review; final design; right-of-way acquisition and utility relocation; and construction. If it wishes to address project delay in the pending reauthorization of surface transportation projects, Congress has several options that might broadly affect all phases of project delivery in both highway and transit projects. Other possible options are targeted to specific issues that affect just one or two phases of a highway or transit project. Broad options that Congress might consider for accelerating project delivery are devolving federal surface transportation funding and the associated federal requirements back to the states; creating an office within the Department of Transportation responsible for expediting project delivery; new initiatives for encouraging and rewarding collaboration between federal, state, and local agencies, such as a requirement in law for partnering plans, funding an awards program for outstanding collaboration, or creation of a special research and technical training center devoted to transportation project delivery. More narrowly tailored options for specific phases or modes include certifying states to use their own procedures to protect dislocated property owners and tenants; reducing the number of steps in the public transit New Starts program and the elimination of the alternatives analysis that is often seen as a duplication of the requirements in NEPA; providing the Federal Transit Administration with the ability to “fast-track” New Starts projects that are low-risk; creation of an Integrated Planning Pilot Project, under the Special Experiment Program authority that currently exists for the Federal Highway Administration; making permanent the Surface Transportation Project Delivery Pilot Program and expanding it to allow delegation of NEPA authority for highway projects to any state.

Aug 3, 2011

The Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Block Grant: An Introduction

Jul 28, 2011

Freedom of Information Act (FOIA): Background and Policy Options for the 112th Congress

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA; 5 U.S.C. §552) enables any person to access—without explanation or justification—certain existing, identifiable, unpublished, executive branch agency records. Pursuant to FOIA, the public has presumptive access to requested agency records unless the material falls within any of FOIA's nine categories of exemption from disclosure. This report discusses FOIA's history, examines its implementation, and provides potential policy approaches for Congress.

Jul 26, 2011

Mail and Wire Fraud: An Abridged Overview of Federal Criminal Law

This report discusses ways in which mail and wire fraud can be federal crimes and penalties for conducting such crimes. It is a federal crime to devise a scheme to defraud another of property, when either mail or wire communications are used in furtherance of the scheme. Misconduct that constitutes mail or wire fraud may also constitute a violation of one or more other federal crimes.

Jul 21, 2011

Mail and Wire Fraud: A Brief Overview of Federal Criminal Law

This report discusses ways in which mail and wire fraud can be federal crimes and penalties for conducting such crimes. It is a federal crime to devise a scheme to defraud another of property, when either mail or wire communications are used in furtherance of the scheme. Misconduct that constitutes mail or wire fraud may also constitute a violation of one or more other federal crimes.

Jul 21, 2011

The Interplay of Borders, Turf, Cyberspace, and Jurisdiction: Issues Confronting U.S. Law Enforcement

This report looks at issues for Congress, such as how legislative and oversight roles can bolster U.S. law enforcement's abilities to confront modern-day crime, including operations in cyberspace. It also examines whether federal law enforcement is utilizing existing mechanisms to effectively coordinate investigations and share information.

Jul 19, 2011

Cooling Water Intake Structures: Summary of EPA’s Proposed Rule

Jul 19, 2011

Detainee Provisions in the National Defense Authorization Bills

This report offers a brief background of the salient issues raised by H.R. 1540 and S. 1867 regarding detention matters, provides a section-by-section analysis of the relevant subdivision of each bill, and compares the bills' approaches with respect to the major issues they address.

Jul 18, 2011

China’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Mitigation Policies

The 112th Congress continues to debate whether and how the United States should address climate change. Most often, this debate includes concerns about the effects of U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions controls if China and other major countries were not to take comparable actions. China recently surpassed the United States to become the largest emitter of human-related GHG globally, and together, the two nations emit about 40% of the global total (with shares of 21% and 19%, respectively). China’s GHG emissions are growing rapidly and, even with policies adopted by China, are expected to rise until at least 2030. The emissions growth is driven by China’s rapid economic and industrial growth and its reliance on fossil fuels despite measures to raise the shares of non-fossil energy sources. China requires 50% more energy to produce one billion dollars of GDP (its “energy intensity”) compared with the United States. Over the past two decades, strong government directives and investments have dramatically reduced the energy and GHG intensities of China’s economy, though the rates of improvement leveled off in the 2000s, and even reversed in subsequent years. A renewed emphasis on improving energy and GHG intensity emerged in the 11th 5-Year Plan, from 2006-2010, and the government says the nation nearly achieved its aggressive goal to reduce by 20% the energy required to produce GDP. In the context of China’s 12th 5-Year Plan, from 2011-2015, leaders have set targets to further reduce energy intensity by 16% by 2015. Along with measures to reduce pollution and increase the shares of non-fossil fuels in the energy sector, China has set goals to improve its CO2 intensity by 40-45% by 2020, with an interim target in the 12th 5-Year Plan of 17% by 2015. Even if these targets are achieved, China’s GHG emissions are expected to rise in absolute terms. In addition, the frequency, transparency, and data quality of China’s reporting of its GHG emissions and mitigation actions (including underlying energy and other data) have been a challenging diplomatic issue between the United States and China and in the climate change negotiations. China has resisted reporting and reviews comparable to what other industrialized nations or what many developing countries accept. While technical bilateral cooperation on data has been productive and China has moved politically toward better information sharing, the continuing lack of transparency is apparent in uncertain emissions estimates and projections. Chinese negotiators adhere to the principle of “common but differentiated” responsibilities, agreed in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). They argue that emissions per person in China are low, that raising incomes must be their highest priority, and that industrialized countries bear primary responsibility for the historical buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere; therefore the industrialized countries should lead in mitigating emissions domestically. Industrialized countries also, they say, should assist developing countries with financial and technological support to mitigate emissions and adapt to coming change. Debate on potential climate change legislation in the United States has been influenced by China’s surging GHG emissions, and uncertainty over whether, how, and when China might alter that trend. There is concern that strong U.S. domestic action taken without Chinese reciprocity would unfairly advantage China in global trade, and fail to slow significantly the growth of atmospheric concentrations of GHGs. The governments of both China and the United States have indicated some closure of their gap on future actions to address climate change by agreeing on national pledges to GHG targets and mitigation actions rather than binding international obligations. China is also engaged with many other countries in bilateral programs to build its governance and technological capacities to abate its GHG emissions.

Jul 18, 2011

Health Care Providers’ Religious Objections to Medical Treatment: Legal Issues Related to Religious Discrimination in Employment and Conscience Clause Provisions

Federal law provides various legal protections for individuals who object for religious reasons to performing certain tasks required by their employer. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and statutory nondiscrimination laws provide general protection to individuals wishing to exercise their religious beliefs without interference from the government or employers. An individual’s right of refusal may also be protected by specific legislation known as “conscience clauses.” These protections often arise with health care providers, including doctors and pharmacists, who object to assisting with certain reproductive procedures or dispensing birth control. Most often, objections are raised by doctors or hospitals who object to performing abortion procedures because of religious beliefs or affiliations. Medical providers with religious objections to certain treatments highlight the tension between patients’ access to treatment and health providers’ religious freedom. In a recent example of this debate, December 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) issued a final rule to ensure compliance with conscience clauses enacted beginning in the 1970s to protect individuals who object to abortion and other procedures. The rule took effect on January 20, 2009, but was subsequently partially rescinded by the Obama Administration in February of 2011, based on concerns that a broad reading of the 2008 final rule could be interpreted to limit patients’ access to certain health care services. This report will discuss situations in which religious objections may be raised in health care. The report will examine the legal protections for individuals with religious and moral objections to their employment duties offered by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and federal conscience clauses. Finally, the report will analyze the two sets of protections and how they may affect health care providers who have religious objections to medical procedures.

Jul 18, 2011

The U.S. Export Control System and the President's Reform Initiative

This report looks at how the 112th Congress may consider reforms of the U.S. export control system.

Jul 14, 2011

Regulation of Debit Interchange Fees

Although the United States has seen continued growth of noncash or electronic payments, debit card transactions outpaced credit card transactions and other forms of payments in 2009. When a consumer uses a debit card in a transaction, the merchant pays a “swipe” fee, which is also known as the interchange fee. The interchange fee is paid to the card-issuing bank (the consumer’s bank that issued the debit card), and the fee covers the bank’s costs to facilitate the transaction. Section 920 of the Dodd Frank Act, also known as the Durbin Amendment, authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe regulations to ensure that the amount of any interchange transaction fee received by a debit card issuer is reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the issuer. The Federal Reserve may consider the authorization, clearance, and settlement costs of each transaction when it sets the interchange fee. The Durbin Amendment allows the interchange fee to be adjusted for costs incurred by debit card issuers to prevent fraud, but the Federal Reserve is prohibited from considering other costs associated with the transaction. Debit card issuers with less than $10 billion in assets would be exempt from the regulation, which means that smaller financial institutions may receive a larger interchange fee than larger issuers. The legislation also prohibits network providers (e.g., Visa and MasterCard) and debit card issuers from imposing restrictions that would override a merchant’s choice of the network provider through which to route transactions. On June 29, 2011, the Federal Reserve issued a final rule to implement the Durbin Amendment, which includes a cap on the interchange fee for large issuers. The rule is scheduled to go into effect on October 1, 2011. Merchants that currently pay fees above the regulated interchange fee would likely benefit from the Durbin Amendment; large debit card issuers that would lose revenue under the regulated cap would be opposed. Many small debit card issuers that are exempt from the rule, however, are also opposed to the Durbin Amendment given concerns that a two-tiered interchange pricing system may not be sustainable over time. Legislation proposed in the 112th Congress, S. 575, the Debit Interchange Fee Study Act of 2011 (Senator Jon Tester), and H.R. 1081, the Consumers Payment System Protection Act (Representative Shelley Moore Capito), would delay implementation of the Durbin Amendment and require a study of the impact of this legislation on small issuers. On June 8, 2011, S.Amdt. 392 (Senator Jon Tester) to S. 782 was considered, but not agreed to, in the Senate by a 54-45 vote. This amendment would also have delayed implementation of the Durbin Amendment and required a study. This report begins with a description of the debit payments process and network pricing. Possible effects of the Durbin Amendment on the banking system are then discussed in light of comments by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke. Given that banks have increasingly relied upon non-interest or fee income during the past two decades, the decline in overall bank operating income may be material; smaller banks may be disproportionately affected because a large share of their fee income is generated through checking and savings deposits-related services. Technological developments by network providers, however, could reduce the revenues generated from this line of business for large and small banks even in the absence of the Durbin Amendment.

Jul 12, 2011

EPA’s Regulation of Coal-Fired Power: Is a “Train Wreck” Coming?

Jul 11, 2011

Multiyear Procurement (MYP) and Block Buy Contracting in Defense Acquisition: Background and Issues for Congress

This report provides background information and issues for Congress on multiyear procurement (MYP) and block buy contracting (BBC), which are special contracting mechanisms that Congress permits the Department of Defense (DOD) to use for a limited number of defense acquisition programs. Potential issues for Congress concerning MYP and BBC include whether to use MYP and BBC in the future more frequently, less frequently, or about as frequently as they are currently used, and whether to create a permanent statute to govern the use of BBC, analogous to the permanent statute (10 U.S.C. 2306b) that governs the use of MYP.

Jul 11, 2011

Presidential Appointments, the Senate's Confirmation Process, and Proposals for Change, 112th Congress

The responsibility for populating top positions in the executive and judicial branches of government is shared, with the President having the power of appointment and the Senate having the power of advice and consent. This report provides a brief background on advice and consent issues, an overview of the appointment process in both the executive and legislative branches, and a brief discussion of recent concerns about the system. Next, the report explores the events in the 112th Congress leading up to the introduction and Senate action on S. 679 and S.Res. 116, and concludes with an analysis of the two measures.

Jul 8, 2011

Statutory Budget Controls in Effect Between 1985 and 2002

Between 1985 and 2002, several statutory budget controls were enacted to reduce the budget deficit. Chief among these were the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. The mechanisms included in these acts sought to supplement and modify the existing budget process, and also added statutory budget controls, in some cases seeking to require future deficit reduction legislation, and in some cases seeking to preserve deficit reduction achieved in accompanying legislation. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, was passed during a period of growing deficits, as part of legislation to increase the debt limit. The act did not include legislation that reduced the deficit, but instead established a statutory requirement for the gradual reduction and elimination of budget deficits over a six-year period. The act specified annual deficit limits and set forth a specific process for the cancellation of spending by executive order, known as a sequester order, to enforce the annual deficit limit in the event that compliance was not achieved through legislation. The deficit targets and timetable were modified and extended in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 was enacted as part of a budget reconciliation bill that reduced the deficit. The act replaced the focus on deficit targets under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings with a two-pronged procedural approach to budgetary enforcement: (1) the implementation of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) procedures to control new direct spending and revenue legislation and (2) discretionary spending limits to control the level of discretionary spending. In contrast to Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, these budget control mechanisms sought to preserve the deficit reduction achieved in the accompanying legislation rather than force subsequent legislation. As originally enacted, these mechanisms were to be in force for a period of five years, but they were modified and extended twice. In 1993, they were extended through 1998 in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, and in 1997, they were extended through 2002 in the Budget Enforcement Act of 1997. This report provides information on the basic operation of the budgetary controls and will be updated as warranted.

Jul 1, 2011

Job Creation in the Manufacturing Revival

Jul 1, 2011

Master Limited Partnerships: A Policy Option for the Renewable Energy Industry

Expanded investment in clean and renewable energy resources continues to be a policy priority of the Obama Administration and an area of interest to the 112th Congress. In recent years, the primary policy vehicle for promoting investment in renewable energy has been tax credits, particularly the renewable energy investment and production tax credits. A lack of tax liability, however, has limited the renewable energy sector’s ability to fully take advantage of these and other tax benefits. The result has been an increased interest in exploring other options for promoting investment in renewable energy. One option might be to allow renewable energy entities access to the master limited partnership (MLP) business organizational form. An MLP is a type of business structure that is taxed as a partnership, but whose ownership interests are traded on financial markets like corporate stock. Being treated as a partnership for tax purposes implies that MLP income is generally subject to only one layer of taxation in contrast to publically traded C corporations, which are subject to two layers of taxation. The ability to access equity markets in a manner similar to corporations allows MLP to obtain greater amounts of capital. Access to a greater pool of capital, when combined with the favorable partnership tax treatment, may allow MLPs to secure capital at a lower cost than similar businesses operating under a different organizational structure. The lower cost of capital, in turn, could increase investment in the renewable energy sector. Congress first established rules relating to MLPs in the 1980s. At that time, the MLP structure was limited to businesses deriving 90% of their income from primary sources, which included dividends, interest, rents, capital gains, and mining and natural resources income. Effectively, this definition allowed oil and gas extraction and transportation activities access to the MLP structure, while renewable energy resources were generally excluded. The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343) expanded the definition of income from qualifying sources to include transportation of certain renewable and alternative fuels, such as ethanol and biodiesel. Provisions enacted under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5) enhanced the value of certain renewable energy tax credits for many renewable energy projects. By transforming existing tax credits into cash grants, the Section 1603 grants in lieu of tax credits program enhanced access to capital for many in the renewable energy sector. The Section 1603 grant program is scheduled to expire at the end of 2011. As Congress evaluates other policies to attract additional capital to the renewable energy sector, allowing renewable energy entities to structure as MLPs might be one option. Extending the MLP structure to renewables could possibly attract additional capital to and stimulate investment in the renewable energy sector. There are, however, a number of potential policy concerns to consider. First, expanding access to the MLP structure could narrow the corporate tax base, which is one of the reasons access to this structure was limited in the first place. Second, if changes to the tax code allowing renewable entities to access the MLP structure are enacted alongside changes to current passive activity loss rules, there may be concerns about the possibility of renewable energy investments being used as a tax shelter. Finally, if the concern is that renewable entities are disadvantaged relative to fossil fuels currently able to use the MLP structure, one option would be to prevent other energy entities from structuring as MLPs.

Jun 28, 2011

”Dirty Bombs”: Background in Brief

Congress has long sought, through legislation and oversight, to protect the United States against terrorist threats, especially from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) are one type of CBRN weapon. Explosive-driven “dirty bombs” are an often-discussed type of RDD, though radioactive material can also be dispersed in other ways. This report provides background for understanding the RDD threat and responses, and presents issues for Congress. Radioactive material is the necessary ingredient for an RDD. This material is composed of atoms that decay, emitting radiation. Some types and amounts of radiation are harmful to human health. Terrorists have shown some interest in RDDs. They could use these weapons in an attempt to cause panic, area denial, and economic dislocation. While RDDs would be far less harmful than nuclear weapons, they are much simpler to build and the needed materials are used worldwide. Accordingly, some believe terrorists would be more likely to use RDDs than nuclear weapons. Key points include: RDDs could contaminate areas with radioactive material, increasing long-term cancer risks, but would probably kill few people promptly. Nuclear weapons could destroy much of a city, kill tens of thousands of people, and contaminate much larger areas with fallout. Cleanup cost after an RDD attack could range from less than a billion dollars to tens of billions of dollars, depending on area contaminated, decontamination technologies used, and level of cleanup required. Terrorists would face obstacles to using RDDs, such as obtaining materials, designing an effective weapon, and avoiding detection. Governments and organizations have taken steps to prevent an RDD attack. Domestically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued regulations to secure radioactive sources. The Department of Homeland Security develops and operates equipment to detect radioactive material. The National Nuclear Security Administration has recovered thousands of disused or abandoned sources. Some state and local governments have taken steps to prepare for an RDD attack. Internationally, the International Atomic Energy Agency has led efforts to secure radioactive sources. Its Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources offers guidance for protecting sources. The G8 Global Partnership has secured sources in Russia and elsewhere. Other nations have taken steps to secure sources as well. Key points include: Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions have done much to instill a security culture for U.S. licensees of radioactive sources post-9/11. Many programs have sought to improve the security of radioactive sources overseas, but some incidents raise questions about security. Should prevention fail, federal, state, and local governments have taken many measures to respond to and recover from an RDD attack. The National Response Framework “establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response.” The federal government has expertise and equipment to use for recovery. Key points include: Government agencies have done much to prepare for and recover from an RDD attack. This work would help cope with other disasters. Conversely, planning for other disasters would help in the event of an RDD attack. Response planning fell short in the wake of Katrina and the Gulf oil spill, raising questions about the effectiveness of planning to respond to an RDD attack. Issues for Congress include: The priority for countering RDDs vs. other types of CBRN weapons. The proper balance of effort for securing domestic vs. overseas radioactive sources. Whether to establish a radiation detection system in cities; how to dispose of potentially large volumes of radioactive waste that could result from an RDD attack. Whether to modify the pace of a program for implementing certain security enhancements for U.S. radioactive sources. How to improve radiological forensics capability. This report is an abridged version of CRS Report R41890, “Dirty Bombs”: Technical Background, Attack Prevention and Response, Issues for Congress, by Jonathan Medalia.

Jun 24, 2011

Brief History of the Gold Standard in the United States

The U.S. monetary system is based on paper money backed by the full faith and credit of the federal government. The currency is neither valued in, backed by, nor officially convertible into gold or silver. Through much of its history, however, the United States was on a metallic standard of one sort or another. On occasion, there are calls for Congress to return to such a system. Such calls are usually accompanied by claims that gold or silver backing has provided considerable economic benefits in the past. This report briefly reviews the history of the gold standard in the United States. It is intended to clarify the dates during which the standard was used, the type of gold standard in operation at the various times, and the statutory changes used to alter the standard and eventually end it. It is not a discussion of the merits of such a system. The United States began with a bimetallic standard in which the dollar was defined in terms of both gold or silver at weights and fineness such that gold and silver were set in value to each other at a ratio of 15 to 1. Because world markets valued them at a 15½ to 1 ratio, much of the gold left the country and silver was the de facto standard. In 1834, the gold content of the dollar was reduced to make the ratio 16 to 1. As a result, silver left the country and gold became the de facto standard. In addition, gold discoveries drove down the value of gold even more, so that even small silver coins disappeared from circulation. In 1853, the silver content of small coins was reduced below their official face value so that the public could have the coins needed to make change. During the Civil War, the government issued legal tender paper money that was not redeemable in gold or silver, effectively placing the country on a fiat paper system. In 1879, the country was returned to a metallic standard; this time a single one: gold. Throughout the late 19th century, there were efforts to remonetize silver. A quantity of silver money was issued; however, its intrinsic value did not equal the face value of the money, nor was silver freely convertible into money. In 1900, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to the gold standard and relegated silver to small denomination money. Throughout the period under which the United States had a metallic standard, paper money was extensively used. A variety of bank notes circulated, even without being legal tender. Various notes issued by the Treasury also circulated without being legal tender. This use of paper money is entirely consistent with a gold standard. Much of the money used under a gold standard is not gold, but promises to pay gold. To help ensure that the paper notes theretofore issued by banks were honored, the government created the national bank system in 1863. In 1913, it created the Federal Reserve System to help ensure that checks were similarly honored. The creation of the Federal Reserve did not end the gold standard. The gold standard ended in 1933 when the federal government halted convertibility of notes into gold and nationalized the private gold stock. The dollar was devalued in terms of its gold content, and made convertible into gold for official international transactions only. Even this quasi-gold standard became difficult to maintain in the 1960s. Over the period 1967-1973, the United States abandoned its commitment to covert dollars into gold in official transactions and stopped trying to maintain its value relative to foreign exchange. Despite several attempts to retain some link to gold, all official links of the dollar to gold were severed in 1976.

Jun 23, 2011

International Climate Change Financing: The Green Climate Fund (GCF)

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC, Treaty Number: 102-38, 1992), the Copenhagen Accord (2009), and the UNFCCC Cancun Agreements (2010), wherein the higher-income countries pledged jointly up to $30 billion of "fast start" climate financing for lower-income countries for the period 2010-2012, and a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion annually by 2020. The Cancun Agreements also proposed that the pledged funds are to be new, additional to previous flows, adequate, predictable, and sustained, and are to come from a wide variety of sources, both public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.

Jun 23, 2011

Considerations for a Catastrophic Declaration: Issues and Analysis

Jun 21, 2011

The U.S.-Canada Energy Relationship: Joined at the Well

The United States and Canada, while independent countries, effectively comprise a single integrated market for petroleum and natural gas. Canada is the single largest foreign supplier of petroleum products and natural gas to the United States—and the United States is the dominant consumer of Canada’s energy exports. The value of the petroleum and natural gas trade between the two countries totaled nearly $100 billion in 2010, helping to promote general economic growth and directly support thousands of energy industry and related jobs on both sides of the border. Increased energy trade between the United States and Canada—a stable, friendly neighbor—is viewed by many as a major contributor to U.S. energy security. The U.S.-Canada energy relationship is increasingly complex, however, and is undergoing fundamental change, particularly in the petroleum and natural gas sectors. Congress has been facing important policy questions in the U.S.-Canada energy context on several fronts, including the siting of major cross-border pipelines, increasing petroleum supplies from Canadian oil sands, increasing natural gas production from North American shales, and the construction of new facilities for liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports. Legislative proposals in the 112th Congress could directly influence these developments. These proposals include H.R. 1938, which would expedite consideration of the Keystone XL pipeline proposal; H.R. 909, which would encourage petroleum and natural gas production on the outer continental shelf and in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge; and S. 304, which would support a program to train workers involved with oil and gas infrastructure in Alaska. Other proposals in Congress affecting hydraulic fracturing operations for natural gas production, offshore drilling, or U.S. oil shale development could also affect the U.S.-Canada energy relationship. Traditionally, the energy trade between the United States and Canada, while intertwined, has been uncomplicated—taking the form of a steadily growing southward flow of crude oil and natural gas to markets in the U.S. Midwest and Northeast. But recent developments have greatly complicated that energy relationship, creating new competition and interconnections. Consequently, while energy policies in one country have always inevitably affected the other, their cross-cutting effects in the future may not be widely understood and, in some cases, may be largely unanticipated. For example, policies affecting U.S. shale gas production could affect North American natural gas prices overall, and thus, the costs of producing petroleum from oil sands (which requires large volumes of natural gas for heating). Changing oil sands costs could, in turn, affect Canadian petroleum supplies to the United States, affecting north-south pipeline use and changing U.S. petroleum import requirements from overseas. Changing natural gas prices would also change the economics of Arctic natural gas, however, and influence the development of the Arctic natural gas pipelines, which could provide an alternative source of economic natural gas for oil sands production in Alberta. How such scenarios could play out in reality is open to debate, but they illustrate the tangled web policymakers in both countries must navigate as they consider future energy, environmental, and transportation decisions. As Congress debates legislative proposals affecting the petroleum and natural gas industries, it may be helpful to consider these proposals in the broadest possible North American context, recognizing that the energy sector in Canada may be moved in one direction or another based on policies in Washington, DC. To date, the judgment of Congress has favored a growing U.S.-Canada energy partnership—but ensuring that this relationship continues to be as mutually beneficial as possible will likely remain a key oversight challenge for the next decades.

Jun 17, 2011

Legislative History Research: A Basic Guide

This report provides an overview of federal legislative history research, the legislative process, and where to find congressional documents. The report also summarizes some of the reasons researchers are interested in legislative history, briefly describes the actions a piece of legislation might undergo during the legislative process, and provides a list of easily accessible print and electronic resources.

Jun 15, 2011

The Smart Grid and Cybersecurity—Regulatory Policy and Issues

Electricity is vital to the commerce and daily functioning of United States. The modernization of the grid to accommodate today’s uses is leading to the incorporation of information processing capabilities for power system controls and operations monitoring. The “Smart Grid” is the name given to the evolving electric power network as new information technology systems and capabilities are incorporated. While these new components may add to the ability to control power flows and enhance the efficiency of grid operations, they also potentially increase the susceptibility of the grid to cyber (i.e., computer-related) attack since they are built around microprocessor devices whose basic functions are controlled by software programming. The potential for a major disruption or widespread damage to the nation’s power system from a large scale cyberattack has increased focus on the cybersecurity of the Smart Grid. Federal efforts to enhance the cybersecurity of the electrical grid were emphasized with the recognition of cybersecurity as a critical issue for electric utilities in developing the Smart Grid. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) received primary responsibility for the reliability of the bulk power system from the Energy Policy Act of 2005. FERC subsequently designated the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) as the “Electric Reliability Organization” (ERO) with the responsibility of establishing and enforcing reliability standards. Compliance with reliability standards for electric utilities thus changed from a voluntary, peer-driven undertaking to a mandatory function. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) later added requirements for “a reliable and secure electricity infrastructure” with regard to Smart Grid development. NERC is also responsible for standards for critical infrastructure protection (CIP) which focus on planning and procedures for the physical security of the grid. Self-determination is a key part of the CIP reliability process. Utilities are allowed to self-identify what they see as “critical assets” under NERC regulations. Only “critical cyber assets” (i.e., as essential to the reliable operation of critical assets) are subject to CIP standards. FERC has directed NERC to revise the standards so that some oversight of the identification process for critical cyber assets was provided, but any revision is again subject to stakeholder approval. While reliability standards are mandatory, the ERO process for developing regulations is somewhat unusual in that the regulations are essentially being established by the entities who are being regulated. This may potentially be a conflict of interest, especially when cost of compliance is a concern, and acceptable standards may conceivably result from the option with the lowest costs. Since utility systems are interconnected in many ways, the system with the least protected network potentially provides the weakest point of access. Cybersecurity threats represent a constantly moving and increasing target for mitigation activities and mitigation efforts could likewise spiral upward in costs. Recovery of costs may present a major challenge especially to distribution utilities and state commissions charged with overseeing utility costs. EISA only requires states to consider recovery of costs related to Smart Grid systems. FERC has jurisdiction over the bulk power grid, and cannot compel entities involved in distribution to comply with its regulations. Recoverability from a cyber attack on the scale of something which could take down a significant portion of the grid will likely be very difficult, but maintaining a ready inventory of critical spare parts in close proximity to key installations could quicken recovery efforts from some types of attack. The electricity grid is connected to (and largely dependent on) the natural gas pipeline, water supply, and telecommunications systems. Technologies being developed for use by the Smart Grid could also be used by these industries. Consideration could be given to applying similar control system device and system safeguards to these other critical utility systems.

Jun 15, 2011