CRS Reports

Contract Liability Arising from the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) of 1982

Almost 30 years ago, Congress addressed growing concerns regarding nuclear waste management by calling for the federal collection of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level waste for safe, permanent disposal. To this end, the Department of Energy (DOE) was authorized by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA) to enter into contracts with nuclear power providers to gather and dispose of the provider’s SNF in exchange for payments into the statutorily established Nuclear Waste Fund (NWF). Under the terms of the NWPA, these contracts were to require that the federal government begin disposal of the nation’s nuclear waste no later than January 31, 1998. Over 10 years ago, DOE breached these nuclear waste contracts by failing to begin the acceptance and disposal of SNF by the statutory deadline established in the NWPA. As a result, nuclear utilities have spent billions of dollars on temporary storage for toxic SNF that DOE was contractually and statutorily required to collect for disposal. The breach has triggered a prolonged series of suits by nuclear power providers, many of which continue unresolved to this day. Approximately 78 breach of contract claims have been filed against DOE since 1998, resulting in over $2 billion in damage awards and settlements thus far. In 2010 alone, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims awarded nuclear utilities approximately $507 million in contract damages. DOE predicts that damages stemming from partial breach of contract claims will measure close to $20.8 billion if the government is able to begin accepting SNF by 2020. Approximately $500 million in additional legal damages will continue to build with each year beyond 2020 that DOE is unable to begin accepting SNF. All paid legal damages are drawn from the DOJ Judgment Fund rather than the DOE budget. DOE’s liability for breach of contract was first established in 1996 by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Indiana Michigan Power Co. v. U.S. After DOE hesitated to act on its legal obligations, citing the absence of a completed SNF storage facility (Yucca Mountain), the court issued a writ of mandamus mandating that DOE “proceed with contractual remedies in a manner consistent with NWPA’s command that it undertake an unconditional obligation to begin disposal of SNF by January 31, 1998.” The mandamus, issued in Northern States Power Co. v. U.S., may prohibit DOE from deflecting liability by arguing that the lack of an existing storage facility constitutes an “unavoidable delay.” This report will present a brief overview of the NWPA and its subsequent amendments; provide a survey of key issues that have emerged during the protracted waste storage litigation; and consider the potential for future liability arising from further delays in the storage and disposal of nuclear waste.

Feb 1, 2012

Klamath River Basin: Background and Issues

Feb 1, 2012

Detention of U.S. Persons as Enemy Belligerents

This report provides a background to the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012, the Authorization to use Military Force act, and the President's power to detain "enemy combatants." It then gives a brief introduction to the law of war pertinent to the detention of different categories of individuals and an overview of U.S. practice during wartime to detain persons deemed dangerous to national security. It concludes by discussion Congress's role in prescribing rules for wartime detention as well as legislative proposals in the 112th Congress to address the detention of U.S. persons.

Feb 1, 2012

Terrorist Watch List Screening and Brady Background Checks for Firearms

The November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, TX, renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening and Brady background checks for firearms through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). In the 110th Congress, Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Peter King introduced a bill based on a legislative proposal developed by DOJ that would have authorized the Attorney General to deny the transfer of firearms or the issuance of firearms (and explosives) licenses/permits to "dangerous terrorists." They reintroduced this proposal in the 111th Congress and supporters dubbed it the "Terror Gap" proposal. It was reintroduced once again in the 112th Congress. The Terror Gap proposal raises several potential issues for Congress, which are discussed in this report.

Feb 1, 2012

A Historical Perspective on "Hollow Forces"

This report gives general overview of the history of the origins and uses of "hollow forces" (i.e., "military forces that appear mission-ready but, upon examination, suffer from shortages of personnel and equipment, and from deficiencies in training"). Senior Department of Defense (DOD) leaders have invoked the specter of a "hollow force" to describe what could happen to the U.S. Armed Forces if significant cuts to the defense budget are enacted. As Congress will play a major role in shaping the Armed Forces both in terms of size, capabilities, and how it is equipped and trained, a nuanced understanding of how the military once became "hollow" could provide a useful context for current and anticipated legislative action.

Jan 31, 2012

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) FY2012 Appropriations

Enacted December 23, 2011, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74, H.R. 2055), finalized appropriations for FY2012 for those agencies typically funded under nine of the 12 regular appropriations bills. Not including a 0.16% across-the-board rescission, Title II of Division E under P.L. 112-74 provided $8.46 billion for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for FY2012. The total was an increase above the $7.15 billion proposed by the House Appropriations Committee (H.R. 2584 as reported), but less than the $8.62 billion proposed in a draft released by the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee and the $8.97 billion included in the President’s FY2012 budget request. The EPA FY2012 appropriations were $219.1 million (2.6%) less than the FY2011 enacted appropriations of $8.68 billion. Prior to the enactment of P.L. 112-74, EPA and agencies included in the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill had been funded sequentially under a series of FY2012 continuing resolutions. In addition to FY2012 appropriations for the various EPA programs and activities, P.L. 112-74 included directive provisions regarding certain EPA authorities and program activities, including some that restricted the use of appropriated funds for implementing or proceeding with several recent and pending EPA regulatory actions. Division E, Title IV “General Provisions” P.L. 112-74, included provisions specifying requirements and restrictions for the use of appropriations for certain air Clean Air Act regulatory actions and greenhouse gas emission reporting requirements (see sections 425, 426, 427 and 432), and certain Clean Water Act permitting requirements associated with silvicultural activities (section 429). Additionally, the Conference Report H.Rept. 112-331 included extensive language with regard to specific actions by EPA. For example, under the Science and Technology account in H.Rept. 112-331 (p. 1072), the Conferees required specific refinements and modifications to EPA’s policies and practices for conducting assessments under the agency’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS). EPA regulatory actions received considerable attention during House and Senate oversight committee hearings, appropriations committee hearings, and House floor debate on the FY2012 appropriations during the first session of the 112th Congress. Several of the provisions included in P.L. 112-74 were the same or similar to a subset of more than 25 provisions included in H.R. 2584, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (H.Rept. 112-151), as reported on July 19, 2011, and additional proposed provisions regarding EPA among roughly 150 amendments considered or submitted during floor debate of H.R. 2584, which was suspended on July 28, 2011. These proposed directives cut across many of the various environmental pollution control statutes’ programs and initiatives. An October 14, 2011, draft released by the bipartisan leadership of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies did not include comparable general provisions that would restrict or preclude the use of appropriations for certain EPA actions. This report summarizes funding levels for EPA accounts and certain sub-account program activities as enacted in P.L. 112-74, and as proposed in H.R. 2584 as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, in the Senate subcommittee draft, and in the President’s FY2012 request, compared to the FY2011 enacted appropriations. Selected provisions regarding EPA program activities extracted from P.L. 112-74, the conference report, and the House committee-reported bill are also presented. Only those provisions affecting EPA that are clearly identifiable by specific language or references contained in the bill are included. Amendments that were considered or pending during initial House floor debate at the end of July 2011 are not included.

Jan 31, 2012

Marcellus Shale Gas: Development Potential and Water Management Issues and Laws

Until relatively recently, natural gas-rich shale formations throughout the United States were not considered to have significant resource value because no technologies existed to economically recover the gas. Development and deployment of advanced drilling and reservoir stimulation methods have dramatically increased the gas production from these “unconventional gas shales.” The Marcellus Shale formation potentially represents one of the largest unconventional natural gas resources in the United States, underlying much of West Virginia and Pennsylvania, southern New York, eastern Ohio, western Maryland, and western Virginia. Directional drilling and “hydraulic fracturing” are essential to exploiting these low permeability shale gas resources. Although oil and gas developers have applied these technologies in conventional oil and natural gas fields for some time, recent improvements in both technologies have allowed them to be applied effectively to unconventional gas shales on an industrial scale. While creating significant economic benefits, development of the Marcellus Shale faces infrastructure challenges, such as the need for gathering pipelines. Marcellus development also has generated controversy due to its potential scale and its potential impacts on land and water resources, communities, public infrastructure, and environmental quality. Several water quality issues have arisen, including concerns about the potential for hydraulic fracturing operations to contaminate groundwater and drinking water supplies. The 111th Congress urged the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to study this issue, and the agency expects to publish initial research results in 2012 and a final report in 2014. Notably, EPA does not have the authority to regulate hydraulic fracturing (except where diesel fuel is used). Additionally, managing the large volumes of wastewater produced during natural gas production (including flowback from hydraulic fracturing and water produced from the shale formation) has emerged as a major water quality issue related to Marcellus development. In some areas across the Marcellus Shale region, the geology may limit the use of underground injection wells (the most common produced-water disposal practice in oil and gas fields), and wastewater disposal is posing treatment, quality, and regulatory challenges. Both industry best practices and state regulations continue to evolve. Other concerns associated with shale gas development include the contamination of water from surface spills, migration of methane gas and contaminants into residential water wells from faulty well construction, siltation of streams from drilling and pad construction activities, and potential impacts that large water withdrawals might have on water resources, streams, and aquatic life. The development of the Marcellus Shale on private or state land is subject primarily to state laws and regulations, including requirements for well construction and operation. Provisions of two federal water quality laws—the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and the Clean Water Act (CWA)—can apply to activities related to wastewater disposal through underground injection and discharge to surface waters. Additionally, several of the states include watersheds that are subject to water resource regulations resulting from the adoption of interstate compacts (primarily the Delaware River Basin Compact and the Susquehanna River Basin Compact). This report reviews the Marcellus Shale resource, development processes, and related surface water and groundwater issues. It also discusses related federal and state regulatory authorities and related developments, and pending federal legislation.

Jan 27, 2012

The EPA Draft Report of Groundwater Contamination Near Pavillion, Wyoming: Main Findings and Stakeholder Responses

Jan 25, 2012

The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act: Innovation Issues

Jan 24, 2012

Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz

Some officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran have recently renewed threats to close or exercise control over the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s threats appear to have been prompted by the likely imposition of new multilateral sanctions targeting Iran’s economic lifeline—the export of oil and other energy products. In the past, Iranian leaders have made similar threats and comments when the country’s oil exports have been threatened. However, as in the past, the prospect of a major disruption of maritime traffic in the Strait risks damaging Iranian interests. U.S. and allied military capabilities in the region remain formidable. This makes a prolonged outright closure of the Strait appear unlikely. Nevertheless, such threats can and do raise tensions in global energy markets and leave the United States and other global oil consumers to consider the risks of another potential conflict in the Middle East. This report explains Iranian threats to the Strait of Hormuz, and analyzes the implications of some scenarios for potential U.S. or international conflict with Iran. These scenarios include Outright Closure. An outright closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a major artery of the global oil market, would be an unprecedented disruption of global oil supply and contribute to higher global oil prices. However, at present, this appears to be a low probability event. Were this to occur, it is not likely to be prolonged. It would likely trigger a military response from the United States and others, which could reach beyond simply reestablishing Strait transit. Iran would also alienate countries that currently oppose broader oil sanctions. Iran could become more likely to actually pursue this if few or no countries were willing to import its oil. Harassment and/or Infrastructure Damage. Iran could harass tanker traffic through the Strait through a range of measures without necessarily shutting down all traffic. This took place during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Also, critical energy production and export infrastructure could be damaged as a result of military action by Iran, the United States, or other actors. Harassment or infrastructure damage could contribute to lower exports of oil from the Persian Gulf, greater uncertainty around oil supply, higher shipping costs, and consequently higher oil prices. However, harassment also runs the risk of triggering a military response and alienating Iran’s remaining oil customers. Continued Threats. Iranian officials could continue to make threatening statements without taking action. This could still raise energy market tensions and contribute to higher oil prices, though only to the degree that oil market participants take such threats seriously. If an oil disruption does occur, the United States has the option of temporarily offsetting its effects through the release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Such action could be coordinated with other countries that hold strategic reserves, as was done with other members of the International Energy Agency after the disruption of Libyan crude supplies in 2011. Iran’s threats suggest to many experts that international and multilateral sanctions—and the prospect of additional sanctions—have begun to affect its political and strategic calculations. The threats have been coupled with a publicly announced agreement by Iran to resume talks with six countries on measures that would assure the international community that Iran’s nuclear program is used for purely peaceful purposes. Some experts believe that the pressure on Iran’s economy, and its agreement to renewed talks, provide the best opportunity in at least two years to reach agreement with Iran on curbing its nuclear program.

Jan 23, 2012

"Who is a Veteran?"-Basic Eligibility for Veterans' Benefits

This report examines the basic eligibility criteria for VA administered veterans' benefits, including the issue of eligibility of members of the National Guard and reserve components.

Jan 23, 2012

President Obama’s January 4, 2012, Recess Appointments: Legal Issues

The U.S. Constitution establishes two methods by which Presidents may appoint officers of the United States: either with the advice and consent of the Senate, or unilaterally “during the Recess of the Senate.” These two constitutional provisions have long served as sources of political tension between Presidents and Congresses, and the same has held true since President Obama took office. At the end of the first session of the 112th Congress, the Senate had not acted upon the nominations of the Director to the recently established Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB or Bureau) or of members to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). On December 17, 2011, the Senate adopted a unanimous consent agreement that established a series of “pro forma” sessions to occur from December 20, 2011, until January 23, 2012, with brief recesses in between. The unanimous consent agreement established that “no business” would be conducted during the pro forma sessions and that the second session would begin at 12:00 p.m., January 3, 2012. On January 4, 2012, despite the periodic pro forma sessions of the Senate, the President, asserting his Recess Appointments Clause powers, announced his intent to appoint Richard Cordray to be Director of the CFPB and Terrence F. Flynn, Sharon Block, and Richard F. Griffin Jr. to be Members of the NLRB. The unique facts underlying the President’s January 4, 2012, recess appointments raise a number of unresolved constitutional questions regarding the scope of the Recess Appointments Clause. However, the Clause itself contains ambiguities, and with a lack of judicial precedent that may otherwise elucidate the provision, it is difficult to predict how a reviewing court would define the contours of the President’s recess appointment authority. If the President’s recess appointments are challenged, it appears the most likely plaintiffs to satisfy the court’s standing requirements would be a private individual or association who, following the appointments, has suffered an injury as a result of some discrete action taken by the CFPB or NLRB. Were the court to proceed to the merits of the challenge, the primary question presented would likely be whether the President made the January 4 recess appointments “during a recess of the Senate.” This issue, however, appears to involve questions of separation of powers and the internal proceedings of the Senate, and may potentially be deemed to involve political questions inappropriate for judicial review and better resolved by the President and Congress. Finally, even if the recess appointments are considered constitutionally valid, it appears likely that other questions may be raised as to Director Cordray’s authority. This report analyzes the legal issues associated with the President’s asserted exercise of his Recess Appointments Clause power on January 4, 2012. The report begins with a general legal overview of the Recess Appointments Clause. This is followed by an analysis of two legal principles, standing and the political question doctrine, which may impede a reviewing court from reaching the merits of a potential legal challenge to the appointments. The examination of these justiciability issues is followed by an analysis of the constitutional validity of the appointments; potential statutory restrictions on a recess appointee’s authority to exercise the powers of the CFPB; and how actions taken by the recess appointees could be impacted by a court ruling that the appointments are unlawful.

Jan 23, 2012

The Role of Local Food Systems in U.S. Farm Policy

Jan 20, 2012

U.S. Trade and Investment in the Middle East and North Africa: Overview and Issues for Congress

This report provides background and analysis for policymakers considering re-evaluating U.S. trade and investment in the MENA region in light of recent political developments. In particular, the report examines the economic challenges facing many countries in the region and the area's limited integration in the world economy, including relatively weak economic ties with the United States. It also analyzes various policy options for increasing trade and investment with MENA countries. The report concludes by discussing: 1) the premise of the policy agenda, specifically whether increased trade and investment can support or lead to successful democratic transitions and political stability; and 2) if such a policy agenda is pursued, possible implementation questions that policymakers in Congress and the Administration may face.

Jan 20, 2012

Constitutional Analysis of Suspicionless Drug Testing Requirements for the Receipt of Governmental Benefits

This report gives an overview of the issues related to federal or state laws that condition the initial or ongoing receipt of governmental benefits on passing drug tests. These regulations are vulnerable to constitutional challenge, most often due to issues of personal privacy and Fourth Amendment protections against "unreasonable searches."

Jan 19, 2012

Agricultural Conservation and the Next Farm Bill

Jan 17, 2012

Loan Guarantees for Clean Energy Technologies: Goals, Concerns, and Policy Options

Government guaranteed debt is a financial tool that has been used to support a number of federal policy objectives: home ownership, higher education, and small business development, among others. Loan guarantees for new energy technologies date back to the mid-1970s, when rapidly rising energy prices motivated the development of alternative, and renewable, sources of energy. Recently, the Energy Policy Act of 2005 created a loan guarantee program for innovative clean energy technologies (nuclear, clean coal, renewables) commonly known as Section 1703. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 created Section 1705, a temporary loan guarantee program focused on deployment of renewable energy technologies and projects. Loan guarantee authority for the Department of Energy Loan Programs Office (LPO) Section 1705 program ended on September 30, 2011, prior to which approximately $16.15 billion of loans were guaranteed for a variety of clean energy projects. In August 2011, the high-profile bankruptcy of Solyndra, the first company to receive a Section 1705 loan guarantee, resulted in a congressional investigation and increased scrutiny of the DOE Loan Guarantee Program. As a result, Congress may decide to evaluate the use of loan guarantees as a mechanism for supporting the development and deployment of clean energy technologies. This report analyzes goals and concerns associated with innovative clean energy loan guarantees. Fundamentally, loan guarantees can provide access to low-cost capital for projects that might be considered high risk by the commercial banking and investment community. There are many goals for using loan guarantees to support innovative energy technology commercialization and deployment. Commercializing new technologies that may increase the performance and reduce the cost of clean energy generation is one objective. Also, the potential global market for clean energy technologies and systems is substantial (trillions of dollars over the next 25 years by some estimates) and loan guarantees could help position U.S. manufacturers to supply product for this growing market. Loan guarantees may also result in near- and long-term job creation as well as contribute toward reducing emissions of various pollutants. The high-risk nature of clean energy projects, however, raises some concerns about the use of loan guarantees as a mechanism to encourage the deployment of new technologies. First, loan repayment demands cash flow from development stage companies at a time when they may already have high cash flow requirements, so loan repayment obligations could actually increase the risk of default for certain projects. Second, at a project level, the government’s potential return is not commensurate with the risk being assumed. Third, loan guarantees for clean energy technologies are essentially long-term commitments in a dynamic and evolving marketplace. As a result, technologies supported today could be obsolete in less than a decade, thereby increasing the risk of loan default. Finally, federally managed loan guarantee programs may be subject to certain pressures that could result in less-than-optimal decision making. Should Congress decide to continue the use of government financial tools as a clean energy technology deployment support mechanism, it may wish to consider various policy options for future initiatives. Some policy options could include (1) using grants or tax expenditures instead of loan guarantees; (2) taking equity positions in new technologies and projects through a new government-backed venture-capital-like organization; (3) authorizing the use of flexible management tools such as stock warrants, portfolio management, and convertible equity; and (4) creating a dedicated clean energy financial support authority to manage federal clean energy deployment investments. Each of these policy options is explored and discussed in this report.

Jan 17, 2012

In Brief: Assessing DOD's New Strategic Guidance

On January 5, 2012, President Obama announced new defense strategic guidance entitled "Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense." This report highlights and analyzes key strategic-level issues raised by the new guidance.

Jan 12, 2012

DOE Weatherization Program: A Review of Funding, Performance, and Cost-Effectiveness Studies

This report analyzes the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) Weatherization Assistance Program. (WAP, the “program”). It provides background—a brief history of funding, program evolution, and program activity—and a review of program assessments and benefit-cost evaluations. Budget debate over the program is focused on a $5 billion appropriation in the Recovery Act of 2009, a report that state and local governments have yet to commit about $1.5 billion of that total, and concerns about the quality of weatherization projects implemented with Recovery Act funding. During the debate over FY2011 funding, the House Republican Study Committee called for program funding to be eliminated. In April 2011, Congress approved $171 million for the program in the final continuing resolution for FY2011 (P.L. 112-10). For FY2012, DOE requested $320 million, the House approved $30 million, the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended $171 million, and the Conference Committee approved $68 million. The budget debate provides the context for this report, but details of the current debate are beyond the scope of this report, which is focused on evaluations of program cost-effectiveness. WAP is a formula grant program: funding flows from DOE to state governments and then to local governments and weatherization agencies. Over the 32 years from the program’s start-up in FY1977 through FY2008, Congress appropriated about $8.7 billion (in constant FY2010 dollars). The $5 billion provided by the Recovery Act added more than 50% to the previous spending total. Over the program’s history, DOE’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and the Office of Management and Budget have used process and impact evaluation research methods to assess WAP operations and estimate cost-effectiveness. Virtually all the studies conducted through 2005 showed that the program was moderately cost effective. The studies included measures of operational effectiveness, energy savings, and non-energy benefits. The timing of past studies was a bit sporadic, driven mainly by new statutory requirements and program audits. Performance assessments have alternately identified improvements in program operations or identified operational problems that subsequently stimulated program improvements. Only the intensive evaluation study of program year 1989 (published in 1993) was designed to directly draw a national sample to produce empirical data on program cost-effectiveness. Such in-depth evaluations are costly and time-consuming. Most other “metaevaluations” were much less costly, using available state-level evaluation studies as the basis to infer national-level program impacts. The large infusion of Recovery Act funding—and attendant changes in program structure—heightened interest in conducting a fresh assessment of operations and new scientifically based evaluations of program impacts. Unforeseen recession-driven events delayed use of Recovery Act funding. For example, the DOE Inspector General (DOE IG) found that recession-driven budget shortfalls, state hiring freezes, and state-wide planned furloughs delayed program implementation—and created barriers to meeting spending and home weatherization targets. In December 2011, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a performance audit which found that the Recovery Act phase of the program was successfully addressing most goals and the challenges identified by the DOE IG. Recently-launched evaluation studies by DOE aim to determine whether Recovery Act funding was used cost-effectively and whether it fulfilled goals for job creation. The report concludes by reviewing the debate over the use of “outside” contractors to improve the objectivity and independence of weatherization program evaluations.

Jan 11, 2012

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012: Detainee Matters

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012 (2012 NDAA, P.L. 112-81) contains a subtitle addressing issues related to detainees at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and more broadly, the disposition of persons captured in the course of hostilities against Al Qaeda and associated forces. This report offers a brief background of the salient issues and provides a section-by-section analysis of the detainee provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012.

Jan 11, 2012

EPA’s Utility MACT: Will the Lights Go Out?

On December 21, 2011, EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson announced final standards aimed at reducing mercury and other air toxics emissions from electric generating units (EGUs) by about 90%. The rule, commonly referred to as the “Utility MACT” or the “Mercury and Air Toxics Standards” (MATS), has been more than a decade in the making (Congress authorized the standards in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments), and it is among the most expensive rules that EPA has ever promulgated. EPA estimates the annualized cost at $9.6 billion in 2015. Industry estimates have been higher. The benefits are also large, according to EPA, ranging from $37 billion to $90 billion annually. The benefits mostly reflect the monetized value of avoiding up to 11,000 premature deaths annually. The rule’s costs will fall primarily on older coal-fired units that do not have state-of-the art pollution controls. EPA says that this is a minority of coal-fired plants and an even smaller share of all electric generation: the agency estimates that 56% of coal-fired units have already installed equipment that can be used to meet the standards. In addition, about 55% of the nation’s electricity supply comes from natural gas, nuclear, and renewable sources that are not subject to the rule’s requirements. This report describes the rule and its potential impact. The report discusses previous EPA efforts to regulate utility mercury emissions, the court decision overturning those regulations, the specifics of the new rule, its estimated costs and benefits, the impact of the rule on electric reliability, and legislation related to it that has been or may be considered in the 112th Congress. Industry and environmental groups have been keenly interested in both the substance of the rule and the schedule for its implementation, and the House has already passed legislation (H.R. 2401) that would change both. A particular issue has been whether the standards will lead to retirement of a significant number of electric generating units, with negative effects on the reliability of the power supply. EPA and many other analysts maintain that this will not be the case. To address this question, this report reviews industry data on planning reserve margins and potential retirement of units that do not currently meet the standards. Based on these data, it appears that, although the rule may lead to the retirement or derating of some facilities, almost all of the capacity reductions will occur in areas that have substantial reserve margins. Two areas that may have difficulty meeting reserve margins, Texas and New England, will experience few plant retirements and deratings, according to industry data. Furthermore, to address the reliability concerns expressed by industry, the final rule includes provisions aimed at providing additional time for compliance if it is needed to install pollution controls or add new capacity to ensure reliability in specific areas. As a result, it is unlikely that electric reliability will be harmed by the rule. Another potential concern, given the rule’s cost, is what impact it may have on the price of electricity. EPA estimates that the average price of electricity nationally will increase by 3.1% by 2015, as a result of the rule. Electricity prices have declined more than 20% in real terms since 1980. The impact of price changes would be relatively small compared to this downward trend, and well within the normal range of historical price fluctuations.

Jan 9, 2012

Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry

This report concludes by raising additional questions about future investments at the border, how to weigh such investments against other enforcement strategies, and the relationship between border enforcement and the broader debate about U.S. immigration policy.

Jan 6, 2012

Ticket to Work and Self-Sufficiency Program: Overview and Current Issues

Jan 6, 2012

U.S. Manufacturing in International Perspective

Jan 5, 2012

Medicare Advantage Risk Adjustment and Risk Adjustment Data Validation Audits

Jan 4, 2012

Fact Sheet: The Social Security Retirement Age

Jan 3, 2012

Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Aid Conditions, Restrictions, and Reporting Requirements

This report provides a comprehensive list of existing laws and pending legislation containing conditions, limitations, and reporting requirements for U.S. foreign assistance to Pakistan. It will track the debate on this topic and resulting changes.

Dec 15, 2011

National Infrastructure Bank: Overview and Current Legislation

Several bills to establish a national infrastructure bank have been introduced in the 112th Congress. This report examines three such bills, the Building and Upgrading Infrastructure for Long-Term Development Act (S. 652), the American Infrastructure Investment Fund Act of 2011 (S. 936), and the National Infrastructure Development Bank Act of 2011 (H.R. 402). These proposals share three main goals: increasing total investment in infrastructure by encouraging new investment from nonfederal sources; improving project selection by insulating decisions from political influence; and encouraging new investment with relatively little effect on the federal budget through a mostly self-sustaining entity. The federal government already uses a wide range of direct expenditures, grants, loans, loan guarantees, and tax preferences to expand infrastructure investment. A national infrastructure bank would be another way to provide federal credit assistance, such as direct loans and loan guarantees, to sponsors of infrastructure projects. To a certain extent, a new institution may be duplicative with existing federal programs in this area, and Congress may wish to consider the extent to which an infrastructure bank should supplant or complement existing federal infrastructure efforts. It is unclear how much new nonfederal investment would be encouraged by a national infrastructure bank, beyond the additional budgetary resources Congress might choose to devote to it. The bank may be able to improve resource allocation through a rigorous project selection process, but this could have consequences that Congress might find undesirable, such as an emphasis on projects that have the potential to generate revenue through user fees and a corresponding de-emphasis on projects that generate broad public benefits that cannot easily be captured through fees or taxes. As with other federal credit assistance programs, the loan capacity of an infrastructure bank would be large relative to the size of the appropriation. The bank is unlikely to be self-sustaining, however, if it is intended to provide financing at below-market interest rates. The extent to which the bank is placed under direct congressional and presidential oversight may also affect its ability to control project selection and achieve financial self-sufficiency. More generally, Congress may wish to consider the extent to which greater infrastructure investment is economically beneficial. Advocates of increased investment in infrastructure typically assert that high-quality, well maintained infrastructure increases private-sector productivity and improves public health and welfare. Congress may want to weigh the benefit of the increased spending on physical infrastructure against the benefit generated by alternative types of spending.

Dec 14, 2011

Reasons for the Decline in Corporate Tax Revenues

Corporate tax revenues have declined over the last six decades. In the post-World War II era, corporate tax revenue as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) peaked in 1952 at 6.1%. Today, the corporate tax generates revenue equal to approximately 1.3% of GDP. The corporate tax has also decreased in importance relative to other revenue sources. At its post-WWII peak in 1952, the corporate tax generated 32.1% of all federal tax revenue. In that same year the individual tax accounted for 42.2% of federal revenue, and the payroll tax accounted for 9.7% of revenue. Today, the corporate tax accounts for 8.9% of federal tax revenue, whereas the individual and payroll taxes generate 41.5% and 40.0%, respectively, of federal revenue. This report discusses the three main factors for the decline in corporate tax revenue. First, the average effective corporate tax rate has decreased over time, mostly as a result of reductions in the statutory rate and changes affecting the tax treatment of investment and capital recovery (depreciation). Second, an increasing fraction of business activity is being carried out by partnerships and S corporations, which are not subject to the corporate income tax. This has led to an erosion of the corporate tax base. And third, corporate sector profitability has fallen over time, leading to a further erosion of the corporate tax base. Understanding the decline in corporate tax revenue could be helpful in preserving any tax reforms enacted, or structuring a reform to obtain a desired revenue effect, such as revenue neutrality or enhancement. The House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance have held hearings on tax reform throughout the first session of the 112th Congress. The President, in his 2011 State of the Union address, called for corporate tax reform that did not add to the deficit. Generally, the corporate tax reform discussion has focused on reducing statutory rates and achieving revenue neutrality through broadening the tax base by eliminating various deductions, exemptions, and credits, among other things.

Dec 8, 2011

Federal Laws Relating to Cybersecurity: Discussion of Proposed Revisions

For more than a decade, various experts have expressed concerns about information-system security-often referred to as cybersecurity-in the United States and abroad. This report discusses that framework and proposals to amend more than 30 acts of Congress that are part of or relevant to it.

Dec 7, 2011

Tax Rates and Economic Growth

Dec 5, 2011

“Super PACs” in Federal Elections: Overview and Issues for Congress

Dec 2, 2011

Boosting U.S. Exports: Selected Issues for Congress

For many years, the U.S. government has played an active role in promoting U.S. commercial exports of goods and services by administering various forms of export assistance through federal government agencies. Congress has had a long-standing interest in the effectiveness and efficiency of federal export promotion activities and may exercise export promotion authority in a number of ways, including through oversight, authorization, and funding roles. The recent global economic downturn has renewed congressional interest in U.S. government efforts to expand U.S. exports levels. In addition, in 2010, President Obama introduced a National Export Initiative (NEI), a strategy for doubling U.S. exports by 2015 to generate U.S. jobs. The NEI’s key components are to (1) improve advocacy and trade promotion efforts on behalf of U.S. exporters; (2) increase access to export financing; (3) reinforce efforts to remove barriers to trade, such as through free trade agreements (FTAs); (4) enforce trade rules; and (5) pursue policies to promote strong, sustainable, and balanced global economic growth. The NEI also contains a focus on expanding specific U.S. exports, such as exports from small businesses. The growing interest in federal export promotion raises a number of issues for the 112th Congress. One debate involves export promotion definitions. Based on varying views, activities that constitute export promotion can range from direct forms of export assistance (such as commercial advocacy or export financing) to broader forms (such as negotiating FTAs). Although the main goal of export promotion policy generally is to boost U.S. exports, policymakers may use export promotion to advance other goals, such as macroeconomic, economic sector-specific, or international trade policy goals, and may differ on how to prioritize such goals. From an economic perspective, much of the debate over export promotion involves whether some market failure actually has occurred, and whether government intervention can produce net benefits for the economy as a whole. Opponents of export promotion programs dispute that significant market failures have occurred, and warn that government intervention may interfere with efficient operation of the market. Although export promotion might increase the ability of certain U.S. firms to export, a combination of macroeconomic and other factors may determine the overall level of U.S. exports. Another aspect to the economic debate is the existence of foreign countries’ export promotion programs. Supporters of export promotion often argue that such policies are needed to offset the effects of similar programs used by foreign governments. Congressional debate on the effectiveness of U.S. export promotion has grown with the introduction of the NEI. Many argue that providing export assistance to U.S. firms would be of limited help if such firms faced significant tariff and non-tariff trade barriers and poor protection of intellectual property rights overseas. Thus, it is argued that efforts to ensure foreign compliance with existing trade agreements and the negotiation of new FTAs should be part of a strategy to boost U.S. exports. Others argue that more can be done to address U.S. barriers to exports, such as U.S. export controls on dual-use products, which some contend may be too restrictive and may put U.S. exporters at a disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign competitors. Finally, many argue that greater efforts should be made to induce countries with high savings and relatively low consumption and that are heavily dependent on exporting for their economic growth to implement policies that would make private consumption the engine of future economic growth, which would enhance their demand for U.S. goods and services. The NEI also has drawn greater attention to whether the trade policy structure and organization of the federal government is suited to boosting U.S. exports and supporting U.S. jobs effectively and efficiently.

Nov 29, 2011

Proposals to Eliminate Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns

Nov 28, 2011

The Lord's Resistance Army: The U.S. Response

This report discusses the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and United States policy, strategic and humanitarian response. LRA is an armed group that originated in northern Uganda 24 years ago but has operated since 2006 in the remote border areas between the Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and South Sudan. Led by Joseph Kony, its numbers are tiny, but its actions, which include massacres, mass abductions, sexual assault, and looting, have caused significant human suffering and instability.

Nov 21, 2011

Financial Stability Oversight Council: A Framework to Mitigate Systemic Risk

This report describes the mission, membership, and scope of the FSOC. It provides an analysis of several major policy issues related to the FSOC that may come before the 112th Congress. This report is intended to be used as a reference by congressional staff working on financial issues. The macroeconomic policy rationales for various financial crisis-related issues are summarized, and a glossary is provided to assist in understanding technical terms. This report is not intended to be read from cover to cover, but instead may be more useful as issues related to the FSOC arise.

Nov 15, 2011

Qualifications for President and the "Natural Born" Citizenship Eligibility Requirement

This report discusses the history of the qualifications clause in the Federal Convention of 1787, the Common Law meaning of the term "Natural Born" citizen or subject, and common understanding in 18th Century of the term "Natural Born" citizen.

Nov 14, 2011

Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis and Issues for Congress

Government contracting in Afghanistan and other wartime environments is different than contracting in peacetime. In peacetime, the goal of contracting is generally to obtain the good or service that is required. The measurements of success are generally getting the right good or service, on schedule, and at a fair price. In wartime, however—and particularly in a counterinsurgency environment—cost, schedule, and performance are often secondary to larger strategic goals of promoting security and denying popular support for the insurgency. From FY2005 through 2011, the U.S. government obligated more than $50 billion for contracts performed primarily in Afghanistan. Because a primary goal of defense contracting in Afghanistan is to support the overall mission, it is deemed essential that contracting is not only thought of as a response to immediate needs but also as part of the larger strategy. As General Allen, Commander, International Security Assistance Force, recently wrote, “We must improve our contracting practices to ensure they fully support our mission.” Many of the weaknesses of the current government acquisition process can be exacerbated and exploited in a wartime environment, making it more difficult to adhere to best practices. These weaknesses include inadequate acquisition planning, poorly written requirements, and an insufficient number of capable acquisition and contract oversight personnel. For example, in a wartime environment, it is more difficult to research and evaluate companies bidding on a contract and more difficult to conduct oversight of projects built in dangerous locations. In Afghanistan, an effort is currently underway to improve contracting. This effort, led by senior military officers, seeks to take a strategic approach to contracting by (1) articulating the role of contracting in current operations; (2) identifying specific acquisition weaknesses and creating the infrastructure to address them; and (3) using reliable data to make better acquisitions decisions. Two of the major initiatives to improve contracting in Afghanistan that are well underway are Task Force 2010 and the Vendor Vetting Cell. Task Force 2010 was established in 2010 to help DOD commanders and acquisition personnel better understand with whom they are doing business, to conduct investigations to gain visibility into the flow of money at the subcontractor level, and to promote best contracting practices. The task force also supports efforts to track and recover goods stolen while in the possession of contractors providing logistics support. As of October 2, 2011, Task Force 2010 assisted in recovering over 180,000 pieces of equipment worth over $170 million and successfully suspended or debarred over 120 companies or individuals. The Afghanistan Vendor Vetting Cell was established to ensure that government contracts are not awarded to companies with ties to insurgents, warlords, or criminal networks. The cell was set up in the fall of 2010 and is based in CENTCOM headquarters in Tampa, FL. In June 2011, the vendor vetting cell consisted of 14 analysts capable of vetting approximately 15 companies a week. The cell is expected to have 63 analysts by December 2011. The billions of contracting dollars spent to support military operations and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan raise a number of potential questions for Congress that may have significant policy implications for current and future overseas operations. These questions include (1) to what extent are U.S. government development and CERP contracts contributing to the overall mission in Afghanistan; (2) how will contract oversight be impacted by a troop drawdown; and (3) to what extent is DOD preparing for the role of contractors in future military operations?

Nov 14, 2011

Finance and the Economy: Occupy Wall Street in Historical Perspective

Wall Street and Main Street—the financial system and the real economy of goods and services—are bound together. If businesses large and small had to fund investment projects out of their own pockets, society would be significantly poorer. The financial system aggregates the savings of millions of households and allocates them to the most productive uses. The importance and value of this function are almost universally acknowledged and are axiomatic in market economics. Nevertheless, the benefits of certain forms of financial intermediation to the real economy are not always apparent. American politics has a demonstrated history of attacks on Wall Street and financiers whose great personal fortunes appear disproportionate to their contribution to national prosperity. This tradition, which goes back at least to Thomas Jefferson, accuses high finance of siphoning off resources that could be better used elsewhere. A recurrent critique is that “swapping pieces of paper” is not only less useful than, but morally inferior to, actual production of goods and services, and that great concentrations of wealth represent a threat to democratic values. For all their lack of a unified, coherent program, the Occupy Wall Street protestors can be seen as the latest in a long series of anti-financial sector critiques. This report presents examples of political statements about the fundamental costs and benefits of finance and recent economic research that points to aspects of financial activity that may not be advantageous to the real economy. The report does not attempt a comprehensive survey of either literature, but provides a reminder of the breadth of the historical debates that have shaped congressional oversight of financial institutions and markets. Some of the political remarks excerpted here strike the theme of conflict between the real economy and the paper profits derived from financial speculation, and include claims that the temptations of the latter draw resources away from the former, or that speculators misappropriate the rewards that would otherwise accrue to hardworking businessmen, farmers, and wage earners. Apart from the normative judgments of political and populist outcry, economists have expanded on prior research that focused on finance’s contribution to economic development to study whether an excessively large and complex financial system could be a drag on a country’s economic growth. Among the questions raised are the following: When the volume of financial activity passes a certain threshold, does it have the potential to lower the rate or destabilize the pattern of growth? Do incentives to ignore long-term risks in search of short-term profits produce financial instability, leading to crises that may trigger deep recessions? Do the complex products of financial innovation yield any significant benefits to the real economy, or simply new opportunities for speculation? and Does growing income inequality, driven in part by financial sector compensation, have negative implications for the economy? The research summarized in this report may represent the beginning of a revaluation of the role of finance in the economy, but much difficult work remains to be done before general statements can be formulated. This report, which will not be updated, attempts to show that the basic questions raised by Occupy Wall Street about the value of certain forms of financial activity are not new.

Nov 14, 2011

Women in Combat: Issues for Congress

Nov 8, 2011

Financial Services and General Government: FY2012 Appropriations

This report discusses government financial appropriations for the 2012 fiscal year.

Nov 8, 2011

The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress

This report provides information on the history, mission, and operational considerations for each of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and associated Combatant Commands (COCOMs) organizations as well as a brief discussion of current issues associated with the UCP and these commands.

Nov 7, 2011

Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) for Workers

Nov 7, 2011

U.S. Natural Gas Exports: New Opportunities, Uncertain Outcomes

Nov 4, 2011

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): FY2012 Appropriations

Nov 2, 2011

Private Health Insurance Market Reforms in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)

Nov 1, 2011

The Education of Students with Disabilities: Alignment Between the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

Oct 31, 2011

Synthetic Drugs: Overview and Issues for Congress

This report discusses the federal scheduling of controlled substances, including the temporary scheduling of substances. It also provides an overview of current trends in selected synthetic cannabinoids and stimulants. It concludes with a review of selected relevant legislation in the 112th Congress as well as issues for policymakers to consider.

Oct 28, 2011

Regulatory Incentives for Electricity Transmission—Issues and Cost Concerns

Following the August 14, 2003, electric grid blackout which affected large portions of the Northeast United States and Ontario, Canada, Congress acted to promote investment in the nation’s electrical grid to increase the system’s capacity and efficiency. Inadequacies of an antiquated transmission system were blamed for the 2003 blackout. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58) (EPACT) directed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to hold a rulemaking on incentive rates for construction of critical electric transmission infrastructure “for the purpose of benefitting consumers by ensuring reliability and reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission congestion.” The Final Rule was issued in July 2006 with FERC Order No. 679, “Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform.” EPACT Section 219 stipulates that “all rates, charges, terms, and conditions be just and reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.” FERC reviews the requested incentives under Section 219 to ensure that these are matched to risks and challenges of the proposed investment. On May 19, 2011, FERC released a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) on the “scope and implementation of its transmission incentives regulations and policies” in Order No. 679. In the NOI, FERC notes that there have been “significant changes in the electric industry,” and it now seeks comments regarding the scope and implementation of its incentives program. FERC states in the NOI that more than 75 FERC applications have been received since the Final Rule was issued, with over $50 billion in proposed investments. As comments by some FERC Commissioners note, increases in transmission rates are “sometimes perceived” to be caused by return-on-equity (ROE) incentive adders. However, FERC’s codification of Section 219(a) changes EPACT’s language to “either ensure reliability or reduce the cost” which can potentially lead to cost increases (especially for reliability-specific projects). FERC is not required to track or report to Congress on the status of transmission incentives, nor is FERC required to make any determination of the “effectiveness” of these incentives to cause the construction of new transmission facilities. Such a determination is thus beyond the scope of the NOI. In comments submitted to the NOI, the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) stated its opinion that Order No. 679 transmission incentives will provide “regulatory certainty,” and are “supporting the development of transmission.” EEI further notes that while not conclusive, industry data suggest that Order No. 679 incentives have had a “positive impact” on transmission investment in many regions. However, EEI’s own analysis arguably shows a decade-long trend of increasing transmission investment by the industry may have occurred without Order No.679’s transmission incentives. Going forward, FERC appears to have regulatory discretion with regard to establishing criteria for project approvals, but has declined to do so on the grounds “that to do so now would limit the flexibility of the Rule.” FERC may or may not revisit this decision as a result of its consideration of comments submitted to the NOI. Expectations have been raised as to the large dollar investment possible over the next two decades in transmission systems alone, with one estimate from the electricity industry suggesting $298 billion will be required to meet future electricity demand. However, with the concerns raised over the effects of transmission incentives on consumer rates (especially incentives granting higher ROE incentives to applicants), implications of related federal policies on the electric power sector, additional FERC regulatory policies for transmission, and the aging of electricity infrastructure among key issues, the need for continuing transmission incentives may be a matter for Congress to consider.

Oct 28, 2011

The Intelligence Appropriations Process: Issues for Congress

The intelligence appropriations process remains complicated and not well understood, but intelligence is an important and sizable part of the federal budget and will undoubtedly be addressed as Congress considers various alternatives for spending. This report reviews the intelligence appropriations process, describes various changes that have been proposed, and analyzes the issues associated with the proposals.

Oct 27, 2011