CRS Reports

Regulation of Power Plant Wastewater Discharges: Summary of the EPA Final Rule

To implement the Clean Water Act (CWA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issues effluent limitation guidelines (ELG), or technology-based standards, for categories of industrial dischargers. These standards are implemented through permits issued by states or EPA to individual facilities. In November 2015, EPA promulgated revised effluent limitations for the steam electric power industry to replace rules that were issued in 1982. The new rule was effective on January 4, 2016. Two factors have altered existing wastestreams or created new wastestreams from many power plants since promulgation of the 1982 ELG. These factors are the development of new technologies for generating electric power, such as coal gasification, and, as a result of federal and state requirements, the widespread implementation of air pollution controls to reduce emissions of hazardous air pollutants and acid gases, such as flue gas desulfurization (scrubber) systems. While scrubbers dramatically reduce emissions of harmful pollutants into the air, some create a significant liquid waste stream. As a result, pollutant discharges from this industry to surface waters have increased in volume, with additional chemical constituents, and EPA believes that many current CWA permits for power plants do not fully address potential water quality impacts of these discharges. Based on studies of the industry and to settle litigation brought by environmental advocates, EPA proposed a rule in April 2013 to revise the steam electric ELG and issued a final rule in November 2015. A total of 1,080 steam electric plants that burn fossil fuels and whose primary purpose is generating electricity are subject to the ELG. Only a subset of these plants is likely to incur compliance costs as a result of the 2015 rule—only 133—because a large portion of the industry has already implemented processes or technologies that are required by the rule. All of the plants that are expected to incur compliance costs are coal- or petroleum coke-fired. EPA estimates that the annualized compliance costs for the rule are $496 million pre-tax and $340 million after-tax, costs that the agency believes are economically achievable and would have minimal effects on the electricity market, both nationally and regionally. The rule also would reduce pollutant discharges by 385 million pounds annually and reduce water use by 57 billion gallons per year. Estimated costs of the rule exceed estimates of monetized benefits; however, the CWA does not require that the benefits of regulation exceed or even equal the costs. An EPA rule under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) on managing coal combustion residuals (CCR) also relates to the CWA ELG rule, because both statutes address coal ash that is generated by power plants and released to the environment. The scope of the CWA and RCRA rules differ. While both address disposal of CCR in surface impoundments at power plants, only the RCRA rule regulates disposal of CCRs in landfills. To coordinate the two rules, in the final CCR rule, EPA extended by one year that rule’s deadline for owners or operators of covered facilities to prepare a closure plan. This would give owners or operators 24 months after publication of the CCR rule, or slightly more than 6 months after the effective date of the revised ELG, to understand the requirements of both regulations and to make the appropriate business decisions and prepare closure and post-closure plans. Many in industry are concerned that the 2015 rule will impose new requirements and compliance timelines at the same time that power plants are implementing other EPA rules. One issue concerns impacts of the proposal on small entities, including small businesses and small governmental jurisdictions. Environmental advocates view the ELG differently from industry and reportedly are generally satisfied with the final rule, but many do have concerns with issues such as compliance deadlines in the rule. Both industry groups and environmental groups have challenged the rule in federal court. EPA rules affecting steam electric power plants have been scrutinized and criticized based on their stringency, feasibility, and projected compliance costs. Congressional interest has been evident in legislation to alter the direction and substance of some of EPA’s regulatory actions and initiatives. To this point, discussion of the power plant ELG has centered on the administrative proceedings at EPA and has not drawn specific attention of lawmakers.

Feb 3, 2016

Highways and Highway Safety on Indian Lands

Cars and trucks are the primary means of transportation on Indian lands, mostly rural areas that cover about 56 million acres. There are about 145,000 miles of roads, owned variously by tribal, federal, state, and local governments, which provide access to and within these areas. Although comprehensive data are not available, roads on Indian lands are typically rudimentary and in poor condition. A large share of federal funding for highways on Indian lands is provided through the Tribal Transportation Program (TTP), which is jointly administered by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the Department of the Interior (DOI). The TTP was authorized at an average of $465 million per year from FY2016 through FY2020 as part of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act (P.L. 114-94). Other programs that provide funding for highways and highway safety on Indian reservations include BIA’s Road Maintenance Program and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s (NHTSA’s) State Highway Safety Program (§402 safety grants). Indian tribes may also receive federal aid for projects from funding apportioned to a state department of transportation. Moreover, tribes have had some success competing for discretionary funding. For example, Indian tribes have received discretionary Transportation Investment Generating Economic Recovery (TIGER) grants from DOT. Tribal advocates, citing the poor and unsafe condition of tribal roads, argue for a much larger tribal transportation program and more funds for highway safety programs. The FAST Act provided modest increases in funding in nominal dollars. The FAST Act also requires two safety-related reports, one on the quality of transportation safety data collected on tribal lands and the other to provide options for improving highway safety on Indian reservations. DOT and BIA have different requirements for projects that involve similar right-of-way circumstances, and a tribe needs to have approval from BIA on BIA-owned or trust land even if the tribe has an agreement with FHWA. In certain situations, BIA will require a more resource-intensive environmental assessment when DOT will process the request as a less resource-intensive categorical exclusion. A legislative option would be to require BIA to apply DOT regulations when implementing the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Others have suggested improving the documentation of rights-of-way on Indian reservations.

Feb 2, 2016

The Good Cause Exception to Notice and Comment Rulemaking: Judicial Review of Agency Action

While the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally requires agencies to follow certain procedures when promulgating rules, the statute’s “good cause” exception permits agencies to forgo Section 553’s notice and comment requirement if “the agency for good cause finds” that compliance would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest” and bypass its 30-day publication requirement if good cause exists. Federal courts reviewing this agency practice have varied in their analysis, resulting in confusion as to precisely what constitutes “good cause.” In addition, some courts have indicated that these are two distinct standards; others do not always distinguish between the two. What precisely constitutes good cause is not explicit from the APA’s text. In order to understand the operation of the good cause exception, it may be helpful to divide good cause cases into several categories: (1) emergencies; (2) contexts where prior notice would subvert the underlying statutory scheme; and (3) situations where Congress intends to waive Section 553’s requirements. Courts differ as to the proper standard of review when agencies invoke the good cause exception. One pitfall is the proper characterization of the agency’s action—is an agency determination that good cause exists to bypass Section 553 a discretionary decision or a legal conclusion? Challenges to agency discretionary decisions are governed by Section 706(2)(A)’s arbitrary and capricious standard, while procedural challenges pursuant to Section 706(2)(D) that an agency failed to comply with the provisions of the APA are often reviewed de novo. Some courts have applied the former standard when reviewing good cause determinations, others the latter. Still other courts appear to not clearly adopt either standard, but focus instead on simply “narrowly construing” the provision. Recent judicial analysis of the Attorney General’s actions pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) illustrates this divergence. The Attorney General issued an interim rule applying SORNA retroactively and relied on the good cause exception to bypass Section 553’s requirements. Federal courts split as to the legality of the Attorney General’s actions as well as to the appropriate standard of review when examining good cause invocations. Agency use of the good cause exception can also be important in the context of presidential transitions. Recent outgoing presidential administrations have engaged in “midnight rulemaking,” whereby federal agencies increase the number of regulations issued during the final months of a presidential administration. A subsequent presidential administration of a different party, however, may have different policy priorities. Nonetheless, once a rule is finalized by an agency, repeal of a rule requires compliance with Section 553’s notice and comment procedures. In order to gain control of the rulemaking process, some Presidents have sought to impose a moratorium on new regulations at the beginning of their administration. Agencies implementing such moratorium directives have often relied on use of the good cause exception to justify their actions.

Jan 29, 2016

Energy Legislation: Comparison of Selected Provisions in H.R. 8 and S. 2012

Congress most recently enacted major energy legislation in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-140). The 114th Congress is currently considering new legislation to address broad energy issues. On September 9, 2015, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources reported S. 2012, the Energy Policy and Modernization Act; the Senate began consideration on the bill January 27, 2016. On December 3, 2015, the House passed an amended version of H.R. 8, the North American Energy Security and Infrastructure Act of 2015. Both bills would address a variety of energy topics, including Energy efficiency in federal buildings, data centers, manufacturing, and schools; Water conservation/efficiency; Electric grid cybersecurity; H.R. 8 also contains provisions on Electric grid physical security; A North American energy security plan; Repeal of the limitation on exports of U.S.-produced crude oil; and A study of wholesale electricity markets. S. 2012 also includes provisions on Energy workforce development (struck from H.R. 8 on the House floor) Review of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (struck from H.R. 8 on the House floor) Energy-efficient appliances; Liquefied natural gas exports; Electric grid energy storage; Renewable energy supply and incentives; Helium and critical minerals; Nuclear energy; and Loan programs. As part of the FY2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 114-113), Congress enacted two key energy provisions, removing them from the debate on H.R. 8 and S. 2012. Repeal of limitation on exports of U.S.-produced crude oil under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act; and Extension of several energy tax incentives, including the production tax credits (PTC) for wind and solar electricity. Other key energy issues not addressed by the bills (but potentially subject to floor amendments): Modifications to the federal renewable fuel standard (RFS); Transport safety (rail, pipeline, etc.) for crude oil and other flammable fuels; and Nuclear waste storage and disposal.

Jan 29, 2016

Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) Negotiations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Congress has broad interest in trade in services, which are a large and growing component of the U.S. economy. It also has a direct interest in establishing trade negotiating objectives and potential consideration of a future Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA). Services account for 78% of U.S. private sector gross domestic product (GDP), 82% of private sector employees in 2013, and an increasing portion of U.S. international trade. “Services” refer to a growing range of economic activities, such as audiovisual, construction, and computer and related services; energy; express delivery; e-commerce; financial, legal, and accounting services; retail and wholesaling; transportation; telecommunications; and travel. Services include end-use products, such as legal services and financial products. Many services, such as distribution or transportation services, also act as the “lifeblood” of the rest of the economy, helping goods move through global supply chains. To open foreign markets to U.S. businesses and address trade barriers to services, which may be in the form of government regulations, the United States has engaged in multiple trade agreement negotiations. The World Trade Organization (WTO) General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) provides the foundation or floor on which rules in other agreements on services are based, including in U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs). Trade in services is addressed in U.S. bilateral and regional FTAs, including the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), concluded in October 2015. However, ongoing negotiation efforts to update GATS are stalled, even as technology and services trade have evolved significantly since GATS went into effect in 1995. To address these issues, 23 parties are engaged in discussions on a potential sector-specific, plurilateral agreement to further liberalize trade in services. Negotiations on a proposed Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) were launched in April 2013, with the United States and Australia initially at the lead. TiSA participants account for about 70% of world trade in services and include the European Union, in addition to the United States and Australia. Some key major emerging markets, including Brazil, China, and India, are not currently parties to the TiSA negotiations, though China has indicated an interest in joining. While TiSA negotiations are occurring outside of the WTO, the agreement is reportedly being structured so that it can be potentially “multi-lateralized” in the future and incorporated into the GATS, making it applicable to all WTO members. The final structure and sectors to be covered in TiSA remain under negotiation, but some key issues have emerged. For the United States, significant interests include expanding market access beyond the current GATS commitments, building disciplines on transparency, setting common rules for cross-border data flows and digital trade, and ensuring fair competition with state-owned enterprises. TiSA participants have conducted 15 negotiating rounds through 2015, and aim to complete negotiations in 2016. The outlook and timeline for the ongoing TiSA negotiations remains uncertain, as participants are tackling difficult and complex issues such as regulatory processes and digital trade frameworks. TiSA is one of several trade agreements that may be considered by Congress in the near future. Congress passed, and the President signed into law, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) legislation in June 2015 which expires on July 1, 2018, with a possible extension to July 1, 2021. As part of TPA, Congress established principal trade negotiating objectives for services. If agreement on TiSA is reached while TPA is in effect, and if certain statutory requirements are met, TPA would provide for expedited legislative consideration of legislation to implement a final TiSA. Congress may opt to exercise oversight on the progress of the TiSA negotiations and consider a number of related factors such as comparisons with other agreements.

Jan 28, 2016

Conflict and History at Malheur National Wildlife Refuge

This report briefly discusses the conflict at the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge (MNWR) in January of 2016.

Jan 28, 2016

Unmanned Aircraft Operations in Domestic Airspace: U.S. Policy Perspectives and the Regulatory Landscape

Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), often referred to as “drones,” have become commonplace over the past few years. As UAS technology develops rapidly, the United States faces significant challenges in balancing safety requirements, privacy concerns, and economic interests. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (FMRA; P.L. 112-95) required the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to develop and implement a comprehensive plan to integrate unmanned aircraft into the national airspace and issue regulations governing the operation of small unmanned aircraft used for commercial purposes. FAA has proposed regulations allowing routine operations of small commercial UAS weighing less than 55 pounds, but is still developing the guidelines and standards for federal, state, and local government agencies required by FMRA. Hundreds of thousands of small UAS are already being operated as recreational model aircraft and hobby drones that are permitted under a special rule for model aircraft established by FMRA. In addition, several hundred public agencies and more than 3,000 businesses have been granted approval to operate UAS on a case-by-case basis. Once regulations and guidelines are put in place, large growth in UAS operations is anticipated. As UAS operations have increased, a number of safety concerns have emerged, particularly with regard to use of model aircraft and hobby drones. UAS flights have interfered with airline crews near busy airports and with aircraft fighting wildfires, and have posed safety and security hazards at outdoor events and in restricted areas. FAA has been addressing these concerns through user education initiatives and in limited cases by using its enforcement authority to sanction unauthorized and unsafe operations. In an effort to better monitor UAS operations and carry out enforcement actions as appropriate, FAA now requires that commercial and recreational UAS operators register all small UAS weighing between 250 grams and 55 pounds. Technology known as “geo-fencing” may play a future role in keeping UAS away from airports and other restricted airspace by overriding operator inputs and keeping UAS out of these areas. UAS could potentially be used by criminals and terrorists for espionage and smuggling, or as a platform to launch a remote attack. To address both safety and security concerns, a number of technology solutions are being examined to detect airborne UAS and pinpoint the location of the operator. Technologies to disable, jam, take control over, or potentially destroy a small UAS are also being developed and tested. Many of the commercial applications envisioned for UAS, such as express package delivery, remote monitoring of utilities and infrastructure, and imagery collection and analysis to support precision agriculture, most likely will not be viable without development of technological capabilities that allow for the complete integration of UAS in the national airspace. These include technologies to enable drones to sense and avoid other air traffic; manage low-altitude airspace and detect and prevent unauthorized use of airspace; mitigate risks to persons and property on the ground; provide secure command and control linkages between drone aircraft and their operators; and enable automated operations. There are also issues related to operator training and operator qualification standards. A number of bills introduced in the 114th Congress address UAS safety, and these topics may be considered in further detail in forthcoming FAA reauthorization debate.

Jan 27, 2016

Final Senate Action on U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations During a President’s Eighth Year in Office

This report, in light of continued Senate interest in the judicial confirmation process during a President’s final year in office, provides statistics related to Senate action on U.S. circuit and district court nominations during the eighth year of the George W. Bush, Clinton, and Reagan presidencies. The eighth year of a presidency is significant, in part, because it is the final opportunity for a President to appoint individuals as U.S. circuit and district court judges. Such judges have what effectively has come to mean life tenure, holding office “during good Behaviour.” For the purposes of this report, final Senate action occurs either when the Senate confirms a nomination during a President’s eighth year or when a nomination is returned to the President during his eighth year (and not resubmitted and ultimately approved by the Senate). Some of the report’s findings include the following: Of the three presidencies, the number of U.S. circuit court nominees confirmed during the eighth year ranged from a low of 4 (during the Bush presidency) to a high of 8 (during the Clinton presidency). The number of circuit court nominations not approved by the Senate and returned at the end of a President’s eighth year in office ranged from a low of 9 (during the Reagan presidency) to a high of 18 during the Clinton presidency. Fewer than half of all circuit court nominations on which the Senate acted during a President’s eighth year in office were confirmed by the Senate—specifically, 23.5%, 30.8%, and 43.7% were confirmed during the eighth year of the Bush, Clinton, and Reagan presidencies, respectively. Each of the three Presidents had at least one circuit court nomination made for the first time during his eighth year in office that was also approved by the Senate during his eighth year. During each President’s eighth year in office, there was at least one month in which the Senate confirmed two or more of a President’s circuit court nominees. For the two most recent Presidents in the comparison group, Bush and Clinton, there were no circuit court nominees approved by the Senate after June or July, respectively, of each President’s eighth year in office. Of the three presidencies, the number of U.S. district court nominees confirmed during the eighth year ranged from a low of 24 (during the Bush presidency) to a high of 33 (during the Reagan presidency). The number of district court nominations not approved by the Senate and returned at the end of a President’s eighth year in office ranged from a low of 12 during the Reagan presidency to a high of 25 (during the Clinton presidency). A majority of district court nominations that received final action during each President’s eighth year in office were confirmed by the Senate—specifically, 54.5%, 55.4%, and 73.3% were confirmed during the eighth year of the Bush, Clinton, and Reagan presidencies, respectively. During each President’s eighth year in office, there were at least two months in which the Senate confirmed more than five district court nominees each month. Senate confirmation of district court nominations extended into the final three or four months of each presidency.

Jan 27, 2016

Helping U.S. Citizens Abroad During a Crisis: Role of the Department of State

Jan 20, 2016

The Glass-Steagall Act: A Legal and Policy Analysis

The phrase “Glass-Steagall” generally refers to the separation of commercial banking from investment banking. Congress effected a separation of commercial and investment banking through four sections of the Banking Act of 1933—Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32. These four statutory provisions are commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act. Key Takeaways of This Report The Glass-Steagall debate is not centered on prohibiting risky financial services; rather, the debate is about whether to permit inherently risky commercial and investment banking activities to be conducted within a single firm—specifically within firms holding federally insured deposits. Over the course of the nearly 70-year-long Glass-Steagall era, the clear-cut separation of traditional commercial banking and securities activities gradually eroded. This erosion was the result of a confluence of matters, including market changes, statutory changes, and regulatory and judicial interpretations. The Glass-Steagall era formally ended in 1999 when the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) repealed the Glass-Steagall Act’s restrictions on affiliations between commercial and investment banks. Less than a decade after GLBA, the United States suffered its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Some have argued that the partial repeal either was a cause of the financial crisis that resulted in the so-called Great Recession or that it fueled and worsened the crisis’s deleterious effect. On the other hand, some policymakers argue that Glass-Steagall issues were not significant causes of the crisis, and that the Glass-Steagall Act would have made responding to the crisis more difficult if it had remained in place. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) was Congress’s primary legislative prescription to prevent a similar financial crisis in the future. The Dodd-Frank Act neither reinstated the sections of the Glass-Steagall Act that were repealed by GLBA nor substantially modified the ability of banking firms to affiliate with securities firms. It did, however, include some arguably Glass-Steagall-like provisions, which were designed to promote financial stability going forward, reduce various speculative activities of commercial banks, and reduce the likelihood that the U.S. government would have to provide taxpayer support to avert or minimize a future financial crisis. Some believe that a more effective way of accomplishing these policy objectives would be to fully reinstate the Glass-Steagall Act. In fact, multiple bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress with that stated purpose. These bills include: S. 1709/H.R. 3054, The 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act of 2015, and H.R. 381, the Return to Prudent Banking Act of 2015. On the other side of the policy discussion, some argue that the Glass-Steagall Act is ill-suited for the current financial system and that the recent financial crisis would have occurred even if GLBA had never partially repealed the Glass-Steagall Act. Even if the Dodd-Frank Act had completely re-enacted the repealed provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act, the financial history of the Glass-Steagall era shows that regulatory walls could be difficult to maintain or enforce.

Jan 19, 2016

Congress and the Budget: 2016 Actions and Events

This report seeks to assist in (1) anticipating what federal budget-related actions might occur within the year 2016, and (2) staying abreast of budget actions that occur this year. It provides a general description of the recurrent types of budgetary actions, and reflects on current events that unfold in each category during 2016. In addition, it includes information on certain events that may affect Congress's work on the budget, such as the President's budget request and the Congressional Budget Office's budget and economic outlook.

Jan 19, 2016

Treasury Department Appropriations, FY2016

At its most basic level of organization, the Treasury Department is a collection of departmental offices and operating bureaus. The bureaus as a whole account for 95% of Treasury’s budget and workforce. Most bureaus and offices are funded through annual appropriations. Treasury appropriations were distributed among 10 accounts in FY2015: (1) Departmental Offices (DO), (2) Departmentwide Systems and Capital Investments Program (DSCIP), (3) Office of Inspector General (OIG), (4) Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), (5) Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), (6) Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), (7) Bureau of the Fiscal Service (BFS), (8) Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (ATTB), (9) Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFIF), and (10) the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The President’s budget request for FY2016 included $13.456 billion in appropriations for the Treasury Department, including a rescission of $875 million for the Treasury Forfeiture Fund (TFF). Of the requested amount, $12.931 billion would go to the IRS; $364 million to the BFS; $332 million to DO; $233.5 million to CDFIF; $167 million to TIGTA; $113 million to FinCEN; $101 million to ATTB; $41 million to SIGTARP; $35 million to OIG; and $11 million to DSCIP. In early July 2015, the House Appropriations Committee reported a bill (H.R. 2995) that provided appropriations for the Treasury Department and several other agencies in FY2016. Under the measure, Treasury would have received $10.758 billion in appropriations, including a rescission of $721 million from the TFF; this amount was $764 million less than the amount enacted for FY2015 and $2.698 billion less than the budget request. Later the same month, the Senate Appropriations Committee also reported a bill (S. 1910) to fund Treasury and the same other agencies in FY2016. Under the measure, Treasury would have received $11.139 billion in appropriations, including a rescission of $700 million from the TFF. This amount was $383 million less than the amount enacted for FY2015 and $2.317 billion less than the budget request. The House and Senate agreed in mid-December 2015 on an omnibus appropriations measure (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, P.L. 114-113) for FY2016 that included funding for the Treasury Department. Under the act, Treasury received $11.942 billion in appropriations, or $420 million more than the amount enacted for FY2015 but $1.514 billion less than the budget request. The three FY2016 budget proposals for Treasury raised several issues for Congress. One concerned the status of funding for the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI): H.R. 2995 as reported would have created a separate appropriations account for the TFF, whereas both the Administration’s budget request and S. 1910 as reported proposed combining funding for the Office with overall DO funding. Another issue was the future status of two CDFIF programs: the Healthy Food Initiative and the Bank Enterprise Award Program. The budget request included funding for the former but no funding for the latter, but S. 1910 and H.R. 2995 would have funded the latter without funding the former. Proposed funding for the IRS in FY2016 raised three additional issues: (1) the potential impact of the three proposals on taxpayer service and tax law enforcement, (2) the advantages and disadvantages of using discretionary funding cap adjustments under the Balanced Budget Act of 2011 to increase funding for IRS enforcement activities, and (3) the implications of the current budget scoring convention of disregarding the net revenue effect of agency administrative programs for the size of the IRS budget.

Jan 19, 2016

The Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program: Open Season for the 2016 Plan Year

Jan 19, 2016

Federal-Aid Highway Program (FAHP): In Brief

Federal-aid highways Highway construction Highway finance Alternative finance Highway Trust Fund Highway use tax Gasoline tax User charges Surface transportation reauthorization FAST Act Highway planning Infrastructure Transportation Federal Lands Transportation Program Federal Lands Access Program Tribal Transportation Program Transportation Alternatives Appalachian Development Highway System TIFIA Ferry Freight

Jan 14, 2016

The Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015: In Brief

Prior to December 18, 2015, the Federal Perkins Loan program authorized the allocation of federal funds to institutions of higher education to assist them in capitalizing revolving loan funds for the purpose of making low-interest loans to students with exceptional financial need. The authorization of appropriations for federal capital contributions to institutions’ revolving loan funds and the authority to make Perkins Loans to new students expired on September 30, 2015. For approximately two and one-half months thereafter, the operation of the Perkins Loan program was curtailed and loans could only be made to continuing students. Then, on December 18, 2015, Congress enacted the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015 (the Extension Act; P.L. 114-105), which extended the authorization to make new Perkins Loans to eligible students through September 30, 2017. In addition to extending the authorization to award new Perkins Loans, the Extension Act also amended several key Perkins Loan program provisions relating to student eligibility to receive new Perkins Loans, institutional disclosures required to be made to students borrowing new Perkins Loans, and the distribution of Perkins Loan funds assets upon the program’s end. Additionally, the Extension Act prohibits future appropriations for the program and prohibits an automatic extension of the program under the General Education Provisions Act. This report describes the changes made to the Perkins Loan program by the Federal Perkins Loan Program Extension Act of 2015.

Jan 14, 2016

Efforts to Reauthorize the America COMPETES Act: In Brief

America COMPETES Act. P.L. 110-69. America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act. America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. P.L. 111-358. National Science Foundation. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Department of Energy. Office of Science. NSF. NIST. DOE. Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education. STEM education. STEM workforce. Scientists. Engineers. Innovation. Competitiveness. Commercialization. Technology Transfer. America COMPETES Act. P.L. 110-69. America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act. America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. P.L. 111-358. National Science Foundation. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Department of Energy. Office of Science. NSF. NIST. DOE. Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education. STEM education. STEM workforce. Scientists. Engineers. Innovation. Competitiveness. Commercialization. Technology Transfer. America COMPETES Act. P.L. 110-69. America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act. America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. P.L. 111-358. National Science Foundation. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Department of Energy. Office of Science. NSF. NIST. DOE. Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education. STEM education. STEM workforce. Scientists. Engineers. Innovation. Competitiveness. Commercialization. Technology Transfer. America COMPETES Act. P.L. 110-69. America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act. America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. P.L. 111-358. National Science Foundation. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Department of Energy. Office of Science. NSF. NIST. DOE. Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education. STEM education. STEM workforce. Scientists. Engineers. Innovation. Competitiveness. Commercialization. Technology Transfer. America COMPETES Act. P.L. 110-69. America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act. America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. P.L. 111-358. National Science Foundation. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Department of Energy. Office of Science. NSF. NIST. DOE. Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education. STEM education. STEM workforce. Scientists. Engineers. Innovation. Competitiveness. Commercialization. Technology Transfer. America COMPETES Act. P.L. 110-69. America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act. America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. P.L. 111-358. National Science Foundation. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Department of Energy. Office of Science. NSF. NIST. DOE. Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education. STEM education. STEM workforce. Scientists. Engineers. Innovation. Competitiveness. Commercialization. Technology Transfer. America COMPETES Act. P.L. 110-69. America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science Act. America COMPETES Reauthorization Act of 2010. P.L. 111-358. National Science Foundation. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Department of Energy. Office of Science. NSF. NIST. DOE. Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education. STEM education. STEM workforce. Scientists. Engineers. Innovation. Competitiveness. Commercialization. Technology Transfer.

Jan 14, 2016

FY2016 Appropriations: Selected Federal Food Safety Agencies

The Subcommittees on Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees oversee the budgets of two principal federal food safety agencies at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). FDA, an agency of the Department of Health and Human Services, is responsible for ensuring the safety of the majority of all domestic and imported food products (except for meat and poultry products). FSIS, an agency at the U.S. Department of Agriculture, regulates most meat, poultry, and processed egg products. Combined appropriations and fees collected to cover food safety activities at FDA and USDA totaled an estimated $2.4 billion in FY2015, more or less evenly split between the two agencies. FSIS is responsible for roughly 10%-20% of the U.S. food supply, while FDA is responsible for the remaining 80%-90%. In the past few years, appropriators have increased funding for FDA’s Foods program activities—one of the agency’s primary program areas focused on food safety activities—more than doubling it from $435.5 million in FY2005 to $903.4 million in FY2015. In addition, FDA’s food safety activities receive other program-level funding as part of FDA’s overall budget. (FDA’s Foods program accounts for about one-third of FDA’s total appropriation.) FDA reports that food safety funding at FDA totaled $1.2 billion in FY2015. The FY2016 Agriculture appropriation was enacted in December 2015, as part of an omnibus appropriations act (P.L. 114-113). For FDA’s food safety activities, including Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. 111-353) implementation, the enacted FY2016 appropriation provides for a $104.5 million increase in budget authority, nearly matching that requested in the Administration’s FY2016 budget ($109.5 million). This could raise the budget authority for FDA’s food safety activities to more than $1.3 billion annually. The enacted FY2016 appropriations provide $987.3 million for FDA’s Foods program, which is identical to the amount requested by the Administration. Separately, for FSIS, the enacted FY2016 Agriculture appropriation is $1.015 billion, above the Administration’s requested appropriation ($1.012 billion). These congressional appropriations would be augmented by existing (currently authorized) user fees. The Administration’s FY2016 request for FDA and FSIS proposed a series of new user fees to augment both agencies’ food safety activities. As in previous budget debates, however, appropriators did not include any new user fee proposals as part of either agency’s FY2016 appropriations. The FY2016 appropriation further contains a number of policy riders for a range of FDA and USDA food safety and other food-related programs. Increased funding for food safety activities at FDA is largely in response to additional responsibilities following the enactment of the FDA FSMA in the 111th Congress. FSMA was the largest expansion of FDA’s food safety authorities since the 1930s. FSMA authorized additional appropriations and staff for the agency’s food safety activities, and also provided limited additional funding through industry-paid user fees. However, according to FDA, during the past five years (FY2011-FY2015) it has received increases to its funding base totaling $168 million for enacted changes to its food safety programs. Previously, FDA had reported that an additional $400 million to $450 million per year above the FY2012 base is needed to fully implement FSMA. FDA officials continue to note that without additional funding there will be a significant funding gap for FSMA implementation. FSMA did not directly address meat and poultry products under USDA’s jurisdiction.

Jan 14, 2016

Consumption Taxes: An Overview

Commentary abounds suggesting the current U.S. income tax code is overly complicated, unfair, a drag on the economy, and in need of reform. One option for tax reform would fundamentally change how taxes are collected in the United States, and tax consumption instead of income. Multiple proposals have been introduced in the 114th Congress to shift revenue collection away from income and toward consumption. H.R. 25 and its companion legislation in the Senate, S. 155, would replace the income tax with a national retail sales tax, often referred to as a “fair tax.” H.R. 1040 would offer taxpayers the ability to opt into a consumed-income tax. Within the current income tax structure, an individual’s tax liability is determined as a function of total income. Under a consumption tax, however, an individual’s tax liability would be determined as a function of total expenditures on goods and services. Consumption taxes can take many different forms—which differ in when the tax is collected, how the tax is calculated, and who is responsible for remitting the tax—but they all share the common tax base of consumption. Common consumption tax designs include a value added tax (VAT), a national sales tax (NST), and a consumed-income tax. Taxes are necessary for the government to raise revenue to provide necessary and desired goods and services. However, taxes also tend to introduce distortions into a market economy and can hinder economic efficiency. Proponents of consumption taxes argue that a broad-based consumption tax could replace the federal income tax, raising requisite revenue while improving economic efficiency, and increasing economic output. Broadly, taxes tend to distort individual decisions by altering price signals within the economy. Taxes can affect individual behavior in a number of ways, including labor participation decisions, and saving and investment decisions. As discussed in the report, the effects on labor supply from switching to a consumption tax are expected to be small, if any. However, there is evidence that transitioning to a consumption tax may increase individual saving. Increased individual savings could contribute to increased economic output. Effects on the distribution of the tax burden are also often considered in tax policy debates. When comparing a hypothetical pure consumption tax to a hypothetical pure income tax, consumption taxes place a greater tax burden on lower income individuals. Additionally, in this stylized comparison, consumption taxes place a greater tax burden on younger and older individuals, especially retired individuals drawing down their savings.

Jan 14, 2016

EPA's Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants: Frequently Asked Questions

This report summarizes the issues the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) encountered when developing regulations for "carbon pollution" from existing power plants as part of the Clean Power Plan. The report describes how the EPA resolved these issues. In addition to discussing details of the Clean Power Plan, the report addresses the EPA's authority under Section 111 of the Clean Air Act (CAA), the EPA's previous experience using that authority, and other background questions. The report discusses the ongoing litigation in which a number of states and other entities have challenged the rule, while other states and entities have intervened in support of the rule. It also discusses challenges to the rule under the Congressional Review Act and other options that Congress has to influence the EPA's action.

Jan 13, 2016

Goldwater-Nichols and the Evolution of Officer Joint Professional Military Education (JPME)

In November 2015, the Senate Armed Services Committee initiated a review of the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). This piece of legislation, enacted in 1986 and amended in subsequent years, led to major reforms in defense organization. The year 2016 will mark the 30th anniversary of this landmark legislation, and lawmakers have expressed interest in whether the changes, as implemented, are achieving the goals of the reform, and whether further reforms are needed to achieve current and future national security goals. One of Congress’s main goals of the legislation was to improve joint interoperability among the military services through a series of structural changes and incentives for participation in joint matters. Joint matters, by statute (10 U.S.C. §661), are currently defined as, ...matters related to the achievement of unified action by multiple military forces in operations conducted across domains such as land, sea, or air, in space, or in the information environment... Modifications of the officer management system under the GNA reforms were intended to enhance the quality, experience, and education of joint officers. The law required, for the first time, that officers complete Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) in order to be eligible for certain joint assignments and promotion categories. Some have questioned the extent to which these statutory JPME requirements are achieving the goals of the reform and whether they should be amended or repealed. Others have questioned whether the JPME curriculum, method of delivery and instruction, course structure, and career timing are appropriate in the context of today’s strategic environment and force structure needs. In parallel to congressional efforts, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced in December 2015 that the Department of Defense (DOD) would be launching a review of the department’s structure and efficiency in the context of the GNA reforms. A DOD memorandum dated January 4, 2016, outlined the key questions that would be addressed in this review. With respect to the joint officer management system, DOD plans to consider, Do current law and policy governing joint duty qualifications provide the right human capital development to meet our joint warfighting requirements? Are there adjustments that can be made to balance the often competing demands of joint professional development and other specialized expertise or other career development considerations? A spokesman for DOD indicated that this review might result in internal policy changes and/or legislative proposals. Any reforms to the military personnel management system might also be considered in conjunction with DOD’s “Force of the Future” initiative, the first phase of which was launched by Secretary Carter on November 18, 2015. The purpose of this initiative is to improve the department’s ability to recruit and retain the talent it needs to adapt to future mission requirements.

Jan 13, 2016

Federal Land Management Agencies and Programs: CRS Experts

The following table provides access to names and contact information for CRS experts on policy concerns relating to federal land management agencies. These agencies include the Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and National Park Service in the Department of the Interior, and the U.S. Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture. Experts on specific agencies, and on general policy issues related to federal land management, are listed. Federal Land Management, Forest Service, BLM, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, FWS, Forest Service, National Park Service, National Parks, Energy and Mineral Resources, federal lands, Forest Management, range livestock grazing, wild horses and burros, national wildlife refuge system, recreation, secure rural schools, SRS, wildfire, endangered species, land and water conservation fund, LWCF, national monuments, wilderness, wild and scenic rivers, trails, payment in lieu of taxes, PILT, federal lands, drought monitor, forestry, Federal Land Management, Forest Service, BLM, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, FWS, federal lands, Forest Service, National Park Service, National Parks, Energy and Mineral Resources, Forest Management, range livestock grazing, wild horses and burros, national wildlife refuge system, recreation, secure rural schools, SRS, wildfire, endangered species, federal lands, land and water conservation fund, LWCF, national monuments, wilderness, wild and scenic rivers, trails, payment in lieu of taxes, PILT, drought monitor, forestry, Federal Land Management, Forest Service, BLM, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, FWS, Forest Service, National Park Service, National Parks, Energy and Mineral Resources, Forest Management, federal lands, range livestock grazing, wild horses and burros, national wildlife refuge system, recreation, secure rural schools, SRS, wildfire, endangered species, land and water conservation fund, LWCF, national monuments, wilderness, wild and scenic rivers, trails, payment in lieu of taxes, PILT, drought monitor, forestry, Federal Land Management, Forest Service, BLM, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, FWS, Forest Service, National Park Service, National Parks, Energy and Mineral Resources, Forest Management, range livestock grazing, federal lands, wild horses and burros, national wildlife refuge system, recreation, secure rural schools, SRS, wildfire, endangered species, land and water conservation fund, LWCF, national monuments, wilderness, wild and scenic rivers, trails, payment in lieu of taxes, PILT, drought monitor, forestry, Federal Land Management, Forest Service, BLM, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, FWS, Forest Service, National Park Service, National Parks, Energy and Mineral Resources, federal lands, Forest Management, range livestock grazing, wild horses and burros, national wildlife refuge system, recreation, secure rural schools, SRS, wildfire, endangered species, land and water conservation fund, LWCF, national monuments, wilderness, wild and scenic rivers, trails, payment in lieu of taxes, PILT, drought monitor, forestry, Federal Land Management, Forest Service, BLM, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, federal lands, FWS, Forest Service, National Park Service, National Parks, Energy and Mineral Resources, Forest Management, range livestock grazing, wild horses and burros, national wildlife refuge system, recreation, secure rural schools, SRS, wildfire, endangered species, land and water conservation fund, LWCF, national monuments, wilderness, wild and scenic rivers, trails, payment in lieu of taxes, PILT, federal lands, drought monitor

Jan 12, 2016

The Manufacturing Extension Partnership Program

The Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) program is a national network of centers established by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (P.L. 100-418). MEP centers provide custom services to small and medium-sized manufacturers (SMMs) to improve production processes, upgrade technological capabilities, and facilitate product innovation. Operating under the auspices of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the MEP system includes centers in all 50 states and Puerto Rico. The MEP program received $130.0 million in appropriations for FY2016, equal to its FY2015 level and $11 million less than the President’s request. NIST provides funding to support center operations, with matching funds provided by nonfederal sources (e.g., state governments, fees for services). Initially established with a goal of transferring technology developed in federal laboratories to SMMs, MEP shifted its focus in the early 1990s to responding to needs identified by SMMs, including off-the-shelf technologies and business advice. As MEP evolved, its focus shifted to reducing manufacturing costs through lean production, quality, and other programs targeting plant efficiencies and to increasing profitability through growth. Current MEP efforts focus on innovation strategies, commercialization, lean production, process improvements, workforce training, supply chain optimization, and exporting. In 2014, MEP began a system-wide revamp intended to align center funding levels more closely with the national distribution of manufacturing activity; allow a federal cost-share of up to 50% for the first three years of each center’s new cooperative agreement; and result in a single center in each state and Puerto Rico. Other objectives include aligning center activities to the NIST MEP strategic plan; aligning center activities with state and local strategies; providing opportunities for new partnering arrangements; and restructuring and reinvigorating the boards of local centers. The MEP program has, at times, been included in discussions surrounding termination of federal programs that provide direct support for industry. Proponents assert that SMMs play a central role in the U.S. economy and that the MEP system provides information and assistance not otherwise available to SMMs. Some opponents have asserted that such services are available from other sources and that MEP inappropriately shifts a portion of the costs of these services to taxpayers. Continued federal support for MEP centers remains a point of contention. As conceived, the centers were intended to become self-supporting after six years. The original legislation provided for a 50% federal cost-share for the first three years of operation, followed by declining levels of federal support for the final three years. Federal funding after a center’s sixth year of operation was prohibited. In 1998, Congress eliminated the prohibition on federal funding after year six. Invoking the intent of the original legislation, the George W. Bush Administration proposed in its FY2009 budget to eliminate federal funding for MEP and to provide for “the orderly change of MEP centers to a self-supporting basis.” Congress has continued to appropriate funding for MEP. A related issue is the level of the federal cost-share for the centers. Currently, centers may receive a 50% federal cost-share in their first three years of operation, a 40% cost-share in year four, and a one-third cost-share in their fifth and subsequent years. Some MEP advocates would like the federal government to provide up to 50% of center costs, regardless of how many years a center has been in operation, to allow centers to reach SMMs they might not otherwise be able to serve. The ongoing system-wide competition of the centers will essentially reset the clock, allowing centers to receive a 50% cost-share for the first three years of their new cooperative agreements. As Congress makes appropriation decisions, it may continue to discuss support for MEP in the context of the federal government’s role in facilitating technological advancement and bolstering innovation and competitiveness.

Jan 12, 2016

Cambodia

Jan 8, 2016

The Federal Cybersecurity Workforce: Background and Congressional Oversight Issues for the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security

The federal cybersecurity workforce is responsible for protecting U.S. government systems and networks against cyber threats and attacks. Federal agencies, however, have reported difficulty in assessing the size and capabilities of their cybersecurity workforces. DOD and DHS, which play prominent roles in the nation’s cybersecurity posture, have also noted certain obstacles affecting the recruitment and retention of qualified cybersecurity professionals to fulfill their departments’ cybersecurity missions. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is constructing a dataset to catalog all federal cybersecurity positions in the executive branch. The dataset had not been released to Congress or the public. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to identify their top five cyber talent gaps by December 31, 2015. Congress has also authorized hiring and pay flexibilities that can be used to fill cybersecurity positions at DOD and DHS. The flexibilities aim to enhance the recruitment and retention of cybersecurity professionals by expediting the federal hiring process and providing such professionals with monetary incentives that are not available to all federal employees. OPM has also established temporary hiring flexibilities for certain DOD and DHS cybersecurity positions. Congress, pursuant to its oversight authority, might seek to increase its awareness and knowledge of these initiatives. OPM is not required to report to Congress on agencies’ progress in coding their federal cybersecurity positions or in completing the agency’s cybersecurity dataset. Further, DOD and DHS are not required to report on the use or effectiveness of certain hiring and pay flexibilities for cybersecurity positions. Congress may find it difficult to identify potential implementation issues, such as (1) conflicting efforts to define and identify the federal cybersecurity workforce, (2) discrepancies between the intended and actual use of hiring and pay flexibilities, and (3) measuring the overall effectiveness of the flexibilities. Congress could consider enhancing its oversight of executive branch initiatives to define and identify federal cybersecurity positions by (1) requiring OPM to notify Congress of its progress on completing the cybersecurity dataset, and (2) directing the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to evaluate the operation and effectiveness of the cybersecurity workforce dataset upon its completion. Congress could also enhance its oversight of the implementation of hiring and pay flexibilities for DOD and DHS by (1) conforming reporting requirements among the three laws governing hiring and pay flexibilities, (2) requiring additional reporting on the use of certain flexibilities, (3) directing DOD and DHS, or GAO, to evaluate the effectiveness of the hiring and pay flexibilities, and (4) requiring DOD and DHS human resources staff to receive training on the structure and operation of the flexibilities.

Jan 8, 2016

American Agriculture and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a regional free trade agreement (FTA), which the United States concluded with 11 other Pacific-facing nations in October 2015: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Approval by Congress (through implementing legislation) is required before TPP can enter into force. If the United States and the other 11 governments ratify the deal, TPP would materially increase the overseas markets to which U.S. agricultural products would have preferential access. Exports account for around one-fifth of U.S. farm production, so foreign sales provide material support to commodity prices and farm income. For U.S. agriculture and food industry interests, much of the potential benefit from TPP lies in improving access to TPP markets by eliminating or lowering tariffs, and also increasing the quantity of products that may be imported on preferential terms under tariff rate quotas (TRQs). TRQs allow imports of a given product to enter duty-free, or at a reduced rate, within the quota amount. Quantities in excess of the quota are subject to higher duties that can be prohibitive. The opportunity to increase sales of farm and food products is expected to be greatest in the five TPP countries with which the United States has not concluded FTAs, particularly Japan and Vietnam. For example, the TPP agreement would substantially lower the tariff that Japan applies to U.S. fresh, chilled and frozen beef cuts—from 38.5% currently to 27.5%—when the agreement enters into force, with further reductions down to 9% over 15 years. Significantly, this would place U.S. beef on par with the tariff treatment for Australian beef, which is the major competitor of U.S. beef in Japan and which currently enjoys a tariff preference under an FTA with Japan. Japan also would create new TRQs specific to U.S. wheat and rice, among other agricultural products, thereby expanding U.S. export opportunities across a number of product categories. The corollary to the potential for greater export opportunities for U.S. farm products under TPP is that the United States would lower and eliminate tariffs on many agricultural product imports—such as tree nuts, peanuts, cotton, various fruits, tobacco, and wine, among others. The United States also would provide limited additional duty-free access to farm imports via new TRQs for dairy products and for sugar and sugar-containing products. U.S. farm products, such as beef, that enjoy preferential access to Canada and Mexico under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would relinquish that advantage as tariffs are lowered over time for TPP partners. While tariff rate reductions and TRQs have long been a staple of trade liberalization efforts, TPP also seeks to address several non-tariff measures that can impede trade in food and agricultural products. Among these are sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS), which concern actions by governments to assure food safety and guard against plant pests and animal diseases. TPP seeks to curb the use of SPS measures as impediments to trade and provides procedures for resolving disputes that arise, including recourse to dispute settlement. TPP also aims to minimize disruptions to trade in products of agricultural biotechnology and to bring greater coordination to the use of geographic indications, which involve exclusive naming rights for distinctive products from specific geographic locations. TPP commits countries to eliminate the use of export subsidies for agricultural products, which the United States does not employ, and seeks to reduce technical barriers to trade in wine and spirits by creating common definitions of these products and by establishing parameters for labeling and certification. As of late-December 2015, numerous major farm and food trade organizations had endorsed the TPP agreement, but support within the farm and food sector has not been universal. The National Farmers Union, the United Food and Commercial Workers Union, and organizations representing tobacco leaf growers have all expressed opposition to the agreement.

Jan 8, 2016

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): In Brief

This report briefly summarizes some of the key provisions listed in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) that are seen as controversial. The TPP is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) among 12 Asia-Pacific countries, which the Obama Administration casts as comprehensive, with economic and strategic significance for the United States. These controversial issues include select market access (such as on dairy and other agricultural products, autos, and textiles and apparel) as well as the level of intellectual property protection, the scope and enforcement of environment and worker rights provisions, the treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), investor-state dispute settlement, access to government procurement, and the potential inclusion of provisions on currency valuation and exchange rates.

Jan 8, 2016

Minding the Data Gap: NOAA’s Polar-Orbiting Weather Satellites and Strategies for Data Continuity

Concerns have been raised in Congress about the possibility of a “data gap” in the polar-orbiting weather satellite coverage. A near-term data gap could occur if the currently operating polar-orbiting weather satellite, the Suomi National Polar-orbiting Partnership (Suomi-NPP), fails before its successor, the first Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS-1), is launched and operational sometime in 2017. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that a polar-orbiting weather satellite data gap would result in less accurate and timely weather forecasts and warnings of extreme weather events, which could endanger lives, property, and critical infrastructure. The likelihood and duration of a data gap are subject to considerable uncertainty. In testimony provided to the Subcommittees on Environment and Oversight of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology on December 10, 2015, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) indicated a high probability (greater than 80%) that the expected lifetime of Suomi-NPP will extend beyond the JPSS-1 launch and commissioning. If Suomi-NPP continues to function until JPSS-1 is fully operational, then no data gap would occur. At the same hearing, the witness for GAO stated that several factors could cause a gap to occur sooner and last longer—potentially up to several years. NOAA released a new strategy called Polar Follow On (PFO) that would fund the third and fourth JPSS satellites and other contingency options to mitigate the consequences of a data gap. The PFO is NOAA’s strategy to transition the current JPSS polar-orbiting weather satellite program from its current “fragile” state to a “robust” state. An independent review team (IRT) for NOAA defined a robust program as one in which two failures must occur before a gap is created and in which an option must be available to quickly return to a two-failure condition if a failure occurs. Conversely, the IRT defines a fragile program as one spacecraft away from catastrophe. NOAA argues that the PFO plan would achieve a resilient and fault-tolerant position by 2023 (implying robustness) and would secure that position through 2038. NOAA requested $380 million as initial funding for PFO in FY2016. House appropriators did not provide any funding for PFO in H.R. 2578, the House FY2016 appropriations bill for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies, and Senate appropriators provided $135 million for PFO in their bill. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), however, provides $370 million for PFO in FY2016. The decision to fund the PFO at $370 million in FY2016 appears to reflect congressional support of the PFO strategy for NOAA’s polar-orbiting weather satellite program. However, Congress likely will continue close scrutiny of the program and oversight of cost and scheduling changes, given the program’s delays and cost growth since the mid-1990s. In addition to efficient and effective management, the PFO program’s success may also hinge on Congress appropriating continued funding to meet program needs without disrupting the cadence of the procurement, construction, launch, and on-orbit checkout schedule. Congressional oversight of the many factors determining robustness versus fragility likely will be a priority for many years. Without robustness, the threat of a polar-orbiting weather satellite data gap would remain.

Jan 7, 2016

Possible U.S. Policy Approaches After North Korea’s January 2016 Nuclear Test

Jan 7, 2016

North Korea's January 6, 2016, Nuclear Test

This report provides a brief background about North Korea's announcement that it successfully tested a "hydrogen bomb" (its fourth nuclear test) on January 6, 2016. The official statement also called the device an experimental or "pilot H-bomb."

Jan 7, 2016

The Motion to Recommit in the House of Representatives

The motion to recommit provides a final opportunity for the House to affect a measure before passage, either by amending the measure or sending it back to committee. The motion to recommit is often referred to as “the minority’s motion,” because preference in recognition for offering a motion to recommit is given to a member of the minority party who is opposed to the bill. The stated purpose of giving the minority party this right was to allow them to “have a vote upon its position upon great public questions.” House rules protect this minority right, as it is not in order for the House Committee on Rules to report a special rule that would preclude offering a motion to recommit a bill or joint resolution prior to its initial passage. Motions to recommit are of two types: “straight” motions and motions that include instructions. A Member offering a “straight” motion to recommit seeks to send the measure to committee with no requirement for further consideration by the House. A Member offering a motion to recommit with instructions seeks to immediately amend the underlying bill on the House floor. A motion to recommit may have various procedural effects, including amending an underlying measure, sending it to one or more committees, providing additional time for its consideration, or potentially disposing of the legislation. Due to its inclusion of policy language, the motion to recommit might also have political effects, such as allowing Members to go on record as supporting or opposing a specific policy and creating a comprehensive public record to emphasize the minority party’s differences from the platform of the majority. This report provides an overview of House rules and precedents governing the motion to recommit and describes procedural and political effects of the motion. This report will be updated to reflect any changes in House rules governing the usage of the motion to recommit.

Jan 6, 2016

What Is the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership?

Jan 6, 2016

Big Data in U.S. Agriculture

Recent media and industry reports have employed the term big data as a key to the future of increased food production and sustainable agriculture. A recent hearing on the private elements of big data in agriculture suggests that Congress too is interested in potential opportunities and challenges big data may hold. While there appears to be great interest, the subject of big data is complex and often misunderstood, especially within the context of agriculture. There is no commonly accepted definition of the term big data. It is often used to describe a modern trend in which the combination of technology and advanced analytics creates a new way of processing information that is more useful and timely. In other words, big data is just as much about new methods for processing data as about the data themselves. It is dynamic, and when analyzed can provide a useful tool in a decisionmaking process. Most see big data in agriculture at the end use point, where farmers use precision tools to potentially create positive results like increased yields, reduced inputs, or greater sustainability. While this is certainly the more intriguing part of the discussion, it is but one aspect and does not necessarily represent a complete picture. Both private and public big data play a key role in the use of technology and analytics that drive a producer’s evidence-based decisions. Public-level big data represent records collected, maintained, and analyzed through publicly funded sources, specifically by federal agencies (e.g., farm program participant records and weather data). Private big data represent records generated at the production level and originate with the farmer or rancher (e.g., yield, soil analysis, irrigation levels, livestock movement, and grazing rates). While discussed separately in this report, public and private big data are typically combined to create a more complete picture of an agricultural operation and therefore better decisionmaking tools. Big data may significantly affect many aspects of the agricultural industry, although the full extent and nature of its eventual impacts remain uncertain. Many observers predict that the growth of big data will bring positive benefits through enhanced production, resource efficiency, and improved adaptation to climate change. While lauded for its potentially revolutionary applications, big data is not without issues. From a policy perspective, issues related to big data involve nearly every stage of its existence, including its collection (how it is captured), management (how it is stored and managed), and use (how it is analyzed and used). It is still unclear how big data will progress within agriculture due to technical and policy challenges, such as privacy and security, for producers and policymakers. As Congress follows the issue a number of questions may arise, including a principal one—what is the federal role?

Jan 6, 2016

Electric Grid Physical Security: Recent Legislation

This report briefly discusses legislative initiatives to address the physical safety of electrical transformers and 0other parts of the U.S. electric grid which are vulnerable to damage from theft, vandalism, or terrorist attacks.

Jan 6, 2016

Using Data to Improve Defense Acquisitions: Background, Analysis, and Questions for Congress

Many analysts believe that data analysis is a critical element in making smart, informed, policy decisions and in managing government programs. Without data, there may not be an appropriate basis for making policy decisions, measuring or assessing the effectiveness of government programs, or providing transparency into government operations. Despite the importance of data, most observers believe that the Department of Defense (DOD), and other government agencies lag behind the private sector in effectively incorporating data analyses into decisionmaking. These analysts argue that by using data more effectively to support acquisition decisionmaking, DOD could save billions of dollars, more efficiently and effectively allocate resources, and improve the effectiveness of military operations. In FY2014, DOD obligated more than $280 billion for federal contracts, more than all other federal agencies combined. Given the size of the defense budget, Congress has pursued a variety of approaches to improving the efficiency of DOD, such as requiring the department to be auditable, including provisions on acquisition reform in National Defense Authorization Acts, and holding numerous hearings on agency operations and acquisition reform. To the extent that improved data analysis could enable more effective decisionmaking, Congress may opt to conduct oversight in this area and explore ways to enable DOD to conduct more effective data analysis. A number of analysts and government officials have argued that some of the critical elements required for DOD to use data more effectively include: having the information systems to gather and manage data; ensuring that data is sufficiently comprehensive and accurate; and using data to inform decisionmaking. Senior DOD officials acknowledge that the department does not sufficiently use data to inform decisionmaking and have emphasized the need to transition to a more data-driven decisionmaking process. Efforts are underway to improve IT systems, data quality, and the use of data to inform policy decisions—but success is not guaranteed. Many past efforts to use data to drive efficiency and management within DOD have not succeeded, and those that have met with success still sometimes fell short of initial expectations. To succeed in these efforts, many analysts argue that there must be a culture within DOD that not only values using data to drive decisions, but also integrates data gathering and analysis into the very fabric of the organization, making it part of standard routines and operating procedures. Under the best of circumstances, it will take years for DOD to implement and improve data systems and to foster a culture that routinely uses data to support its decisions. DOD’s efforts to use data analyses to improve business operations and decisionmaking raise a number of questions for Congress, including: To what extent does DOD have the systems and qualified people in place to conduct robust data analysis? To what extent does DOD have the right culture and processes in place to foster better decisionmaking? How can DOD balance the benefits of sharing data with the need to safeguard information security concerns? The answer to these and other questions could help inform congressional efforts to improve defense acquisitions.

Jan 5, 2016

Public Charge Grounds of Inadmissibility and Deportability: Legal Overview

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) has long provided for aliens’ exclusion and deportation from the United States on “public charge” grounds. Under current law, aliens outside the United States who seek to obtain visas at U.S. consulates overseas, or admission at U.S. ports of entry, are generally denied entry if they are deemed “likely at any time to become a public charge.” Aliens within the United States who seek to adjust their status to that of lawful permanent resident (LPR), or who entered the United States without inspection, are also generally subject to this ground of inadmissibility. Similarly, LPRs and other aliens who have been admitted to the United States are removable if they become a public charge within five years after the date of their entry due to causes that pre-existed their entry. These public charge grounds are of recurring interest to Members of Congress and the public because of questions about whether aliens who receive various forms of public assistance are inadmissible or deportable on public charge grounds. The INA does not expressly define what it means for an alien to be a public charge, and, prior to 1996, there was no statutory guidance on what was to be considered in determining whether an alien is inadmissible or deportable on public charge grounds. Then, in 1996, the INA was amended to require that certain factors be taken into account when determining whether aliens are inadmissible on public charge grounds, including the alien’s age, health, family status, financial resources, education, and skills. There still is no similar guidance on the public charge ground of deportability. Given this general lack of statutory guidance, the executive and judicial branches initially construed the meaning of public charge in adjudicating cases involving individual aliens. In so doing, administrative authorities interpreted public charge differently for purposes of the grounds of inadmissibility than for the grounds of deportability. Specifically, public charge was construed broadly in the context of admissibility, with determinations based on a “totality of the circumstances” test that considered factors like those codified in the INA in 1996. In contrast, in the context of deportability, “public charge” was construed more narrowly. Aliens could only be found to be deportable on public charge grounds if (1) they received government assistance that they were legally obligated to repay, (2) the government entity providing the assistance demanded repayment, and (3) the alien or the alien’s sponsor was unable to pay. Following the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, executive agencies issued guidance regarding the public charge grounds. While PRWORA generally restricts noncitizens’ eligibility for “public benefits,” it permits them to receive specified benefits, and its enactment raised questions about whether aliens who receive benefits for which they are eligible under PRWORA could potentially be removable on public charge grounds. Immigration officials addressed these questions in a 1999 policy letter that defined public charge, and identified which benefits are considered in public charge determinations. This policy letter underlies current regulations and other guidance on the public charge grounds of inadmissibility and deportability. Collectively, the various sources addressing the meaning of public charge suggest that an alien’s receipt of public benefits, per se, is unlikely to result in the alien being deemed removable on public charge grounds. Neither the INA nor implementing regulations address the role that receipt of public benefits plays in public charge determinations. Other agency guidance and court decisions indicate that, while receipt of certain public benefits could be considered in public charge determinations, other factors are also considered (e.g., age, obligation to repay).

Jan 5, 2016

The WTO Nairobi Ministerial

This report briefly discusses a limited set of deliverables agreed upon by trade ministers and their senior representatives in Nairobi at the 10th Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Jan 4, 2016

Gun Control: CRS Experts

The following table provides names and contact information for CRS experts on policy and legal issues related to gun control. In the wake of mass shootings and other firearms-related violence, several gun control issues are often raised. They include improving and expanding background checks, further regulating certain semiautomatic firearms (“assault weapons” or “military-style” firearms) that accept detachable ammunition feeding devices (“magazines”), combating illegal gun trafficking, interstate concealed carry of handguns, and enacting or repealing appropriations limitations related to gun control. For a complete list of CRS products on gun control, see the CRS Issues Before Congress webpage “Regulation of Firearms.”

Jan 4, 2016

Need-Tested Benefits: Estimated Eligibility and Benefit Receipt by Families and Individuals

Need-tested benefits have received increased attention from policymakers in recent years, as spending levels for these programs remain elevated well into the economic expansion that followed the 2007-2009 recession. While information is available on the number of people who receive benefits from individual programs, it is more challenging to examine how these programs interact and the cumulative benefits families receive from them. Case studies based on hypothetical families often show how much in benefits a family may potentially receive from multiple programs under federal and state policies. However, these case studies assume families receive all the benefits they are eligible for and receive them all year. This is often not true. This report examines estimated benefit receipt by families from nine major need-tested benefit programs in 2012. The nine programs are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP); the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC); Supplemental Security Income (SSI); subsidized housing assistance; the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC); the special supplemental nutrition program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) cash assistance; the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF); and the Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP). The estimates are derived from a combination of information from a Census Bureau household survey and a model that estimates program eligibility and participation based on information from that survey. An estimated 135 million persons, 4 in 10 persons in the noninstitutionalized population, were eligible for benefits from at least one of these programs in 2012. However, not all persons eligible for need-tested benefits actually received them. Among the programs examined in this report, an estimated 70% of eligible families actually received SNAP and 65% of eligible families received WIC in 2012. However, the estimated rate of benefit receipt among eligible persons was 28% for TANF cash assistance, 22% for LIHEAP, 18% for subsidized housing, and 17% for CCDF (based on eligible children). An estimated 106 million persons (1 in 3 persons in the population) actually received benefits from one of these programs in 2012. Benefits were concentrated among people in families with children and families with an individual with disabilities with those two groups accounting for an estimated 78% of total benefit dollars from the selected programs. Many families that received need-tested benefits had characteristics not typically associated with economic disadvantage; a substantial portion of families that received aid had pre-welfare incomes above the poverty line in 2012. Among families with children in 2012, an estimated 45% of those who had a worker and 38% with at least one adult working full-time all year received at least one need-tested benefit. The estimated median annual benefit amount from the nine programs in 2012 was $3,300 (i.e., half the families that received benefits received less than $3,300 and half received more). About 40% of families that received need-tested aid did so from only one of the nine selected programs. Some families received relatively large amounts of need-tested aid. In 2012, an estimated 25% of families that received benefits from one or more of the selected programs received a total of $9,027 or more. These families accounted for two-thirds of all spending for these programs in 2012. Families with children who received $9,027 or more had characteristics indicative of a more disadvantaged population: working less than full-time all year, lacking a high school diploma, being in a family headed by a single woman, being of a racial/ethnic minority (other than Asian-American), and being in a large family.

Dec 30, 2015

Oil, Natural Gas, and Coal: CRS Experts

Fossil fuels play a dominant role in U.S. energy. The United States is a major producer and consumer of oil (and petroleum products), natural gas, and coal. U.S. fossil fuel reserves, production, processing and refining, distribution, markets, and use are of perennial interest among policymakers and the public. Ongoing concerns include retail gasoline prices, oil and other commodity markets, potential for expanded domestic supply, environmental effects of continued fossil combustion, and the benefits and drawbacks of trade in these commodities. The following tables provide access to names and contact information for CRS experts on policy concerns relating to fossil fuels in the United States. The three tables are divided by primary energy (i.e., oil, natural gas, or coal), and then organized by sub-topic. Coal natural gas oil petroleum gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources hydraulic fracturing fracing Marcellus Bakken mountaintop mining Keystone XL oil spill Deepwater Horizon exports imports gasoline prices oil prices natural gas prices tar sands oil sands oil shale onshore production offshore production federal lands leases refining electricity production tax credits profits geology carbon capture and storage clean coal Middle East Europe OPEC Gas Exporting Countries Forum GECF Russia Saudi Arabia Iraq Sanctions Iran China Venezuela Qatar Australia fracking liquefied natural gas LNG NGL Arctic CO2 greenhouse gas IEA EIA strategic petroleum reserve speculation resource shale oil shale gas tight oil coalbed methane CBM tight gas hydrates tax taxation Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources Coal oil natural gas prices production gasoline diesel fuel heating oil drilling mining extraction resources

Dec 30, 2015

Data Security and Breach Notification Legislation: Selected Legal Issues

Recent data breaches at major U.S. retailers have placed a spotlight on concerns about the security of personal information stored in electronic form by corporations and other private entities. A data breach occurs when data containing sensitive personal information is lost, stolen, or accessed in an unauthorized manner, thereby causing a potential compromise of the confidentiality of the data. Existing federal laws, such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH Act), and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, impose security and breach notification requirements on specific industries or types of data. Additionally, 47 states, the District of Columbia (D.C.), and three territories have enacted laws requiring breach notification, while at least 12 states have enacted data security laws, designed to reduce the likelihood of a data breach. Alabama, New Mexico, and South Dakota have not enacted breach notification laws. Several data security and breach notification bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress, which broadly would impose security and notification requirements on businesses regardless of industry sector, with limited exceptions. This report begins by describing the common elements of these federal proposals and then discusses state laws that may apply in the event of a data breach. The report then addresses two legal issues that may arise in consideration of new legislation about data security and breach notification. First, how would new federal legislation alter the application of existing state law or the availability of state law remedies for victims of data breaches? The report will discuss various forms of federal preemption (including express preemption, implied impossibility preemption, and implied obstacle preemption) and evaluate how a reviewing court might apply these preemption principles to federal proposals to determine which state laws would be superseded. Second, the report examines the existing jurisdiction and enforcement authority of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with regard to data security and breach notification requirements. This section analyzes the FTC’s unfair or deceptive acts and practices authority under the Federal Trade Commission Act and the FCC’s authority to regulate data security and breach notification for common carriers and cable and satellite providers under the Communications Act. Finally, it evaluates how the current federal proposals would change the enforcement responsibilities of each agency, potentially increasing the jurisdiction of the FTC and limiting the FCC’s ability to enforce its existing data security rules.

Dec 28, 2015

Alcohol Excise Taxes: Current Law and Economic Analysis

The federal excise tax on alcoholic beverages is imposed at the manufacturer and importer level, based on the per unit production or importation of alcoholic beverages (e.g., distilled spirits, wine, and beer) for sale in the U.S. market. When converted to standard drink measures liquor drinks are generally subjected to a federal excise tax of approximately 13 cents per 1.5 ounce shot, wine is taxed at 4 cents per 5 ounce glass, and beer is taxed at 5 cents per 12 ounce can or bottle. Alcohol excise tax collections totaled $10.4 billion in FY2015, with collections from distilled spirits comprising 55.1% of that amount. Congressional interest in alcohol excise taxes is broad, given a variety of policy motivations and the industry’s wide geographic distribution. Since their inception in 1791, federal excise taxes on alcohol have been imposed or increased throughout history primarily to fund emergency spending during wartime or in response to concerns over the growth of budget deficits. Today, three main approaches drive interest in alcohol taxes: (1) tax rates could be decreased to benefit firms in the industry, (2) excise tax rates could be increased for deficit reduction, or (3) excise tax rates could be increased to discourage the negative spillover effects of alcohol consumption (e.g., drunk driving fatalities, property damage, domestic violence). This report provides a brief historical overview of alcohol excise tax policy and a description of current law. Next, the report analyzes alcohol excise tax rates based on some of the standard criteria for tax evaluation: revenue, economic efficiency, and equity. Lastly, this report discusses bills introduced in the 114th Congress that would reduce current excise tax rates as well as possible approaches to raising alcohol excise tax rates. Despite three tax rate increases since 1951 (with the last increase in 1991), alcohol excise taxes have declined in inflation-adjusted value over time. Excise tax reductions would reduce excise tax collections, reduce some of the regressivity in the federal tax code, and provide owners of the affected alcohol producers with a temporary increase in their profits (due to lower tax rates). Economists typically justify imposing excise taxes on alcohol consumption to better reflect the costs of an individual’s consumption of alcohol to society. While there is much debate surrounding the technical measurement of these linkages, most researchers argue that alcohol excise tax rates are set below the economically efficient level to compensate for social costs. One estimate finds the combined federal, state, and local taxes between 25 cents and 29 cents (in 2013 dollars) per ounce of pure alcohol compared with the external cost of $1.02 per ounce. Analysis suggests that excise tax increases are usually passed forward to consumers through higher prices and are not borne by the owners of alcoholic beverage manufacturers or importers. Excise taxes are generally regressive, alcohol included. Lower income households tend to spend a higher share of their pre-tax income on alcoholic beverages, but this distribution is not as uneven as spending on non-alcoholic beverages or food. Consumers also pay different amounts of federal excise tax on the same amount of alcohol content, based on the type of alcoholic beverages they purchase. At current rates, the federal tax per ounce of pure alcoholic content for spirits, wine, and beer is 21 cents, 10 cents, and 8 cents, respectively.

Dec 23, 2015

Western Water and Drought: Legislative Analysis of H.R. 2898 and S. 1894

Several western states are experiencing extreme or exceptional drought conditions. The persistence and intensity of the drought, which began in 2011 in some areas, has received considerable attention from Congress. To date, federal legislative proposals have focused primarily on the management of federal water projects, support for drought-related programs, and needs of fish and wildlife for water. A broad policy question is how Congress might address western drought, drought in any part of the United States, and gaps in water supply and demand. Several bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress that would address issues associated with drought. They include S. 176, S. 1837, S. 1894, H.R. 2898, H.R. 2983, and H.R. 3045, among others. Of the bills considered to date, H.R. 2898, the Western Water and American Food Security Act, and S. 1894, the California Emergency Drought Relief Act of 2015, have received the most congressional and public attention. On July 17, 2015, H.R. 2898 passed the House, and on October 8, 2015, both H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 were the focus of a Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee hearing. There are reports that a draft bill addressing differences between H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 is being negotiated; however no new bills have been introduced. Although H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 address some common issue areas and include some similar provisions, the bills’ approaches often differ in important ways. Both bills focus on water projects and management during drought, and do not attempt to address the broad suite of drought impacts and policies (e.g., effects on wildfire and agricultural assistance programs). To date, the focus on both bills has centered primarily on provisions related to the management and operations of the federal Central Valley Project (CVP) and the State Water Project (SWP) in California; however, S. 1894 would authorize several programs and activities that would aim to benefit water users and increase water supplies, including water recycling and desalination. H.R. 2898’s supporters contend that the bill would, among other things, improve the flexibility and responsiveness of CVP and SWP operations during the current drought in California and beyond. Supporters also contend that activities authorized under H.R. 2898 could increase water supplies to users facing curtailed allocations and improve the science and data collection activities for identifying the effects of operations on listed species. Broadly speaking, supporters of both H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 contend that the legislation would allow for maximum available water supplies in a manner that is consistent with existing laws and regulations; however, S. 1894 would provide fewer directives for project operations. Others believe the bills could harm listed species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA; P.L. 93-205). H.R. 2898 and S. 1894 have generated both support and opposition from stakeholders and have raised questions about their potential implementation. The bills also raise a number of questions for Congress to consider when addressing drought, including how to reconcile environmental protections with demand for more water and increased pumping from the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers Delta to support CVP and SWP water contractors. Related questions include whether the Administration is already maximizing water supplies at federally operated water projects and whether water project management and operations pursuant to the ESA and other laws should be adjusted to better account for water resources challenges. The bills also raise other issues, including what principles and approaches should guide federal involvement in water resources management and how much (if any) support the federal government should provide for drought preparedness and relief efforts. Related topics may include the preferred mix of federal and state leadership in addressing drought; the proper balance of federal investment in surface water storage and in new “alternative” water supplies (e.g., water recycling and reuse, desalination); and the geographic scope of drought-related assistance, authorities, and programs.

Dec 23, 2015

Wildlife Poaching in Africa: An Overview

Dec 23, 2015

Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Opportunity in the Armed Services: Background and Issues for Congress

Diversity, inclusion, and equal opportunity are three terms that are often used interchangeably; however, there are some differences in how they are interpreted and applied between the Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian organizations. DOD’s definitions of diversity and equal opportunity have changed over time, as have its policies toward inclusion of various demographic groups. These changes have often paralleled social and legal change in the civilian sector. The gradual integration of previously excluded groups into the military has been ongoing since the 19th century. However, in the past few decades there have been rapid changes to certain laws and policies regarding diversity, inclusion, and equal opportunity in the Armed Forces. Since 2009, DOD policy changes and congressional actions have allowed individuals who are gay to serve openly and recognized their same-sex spouses as dependents for the purpose of military benefits, opened all combat assignments to women, and initiated a review of existing policies prohibiting transgender servicemembers. Under Article 1, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress has the authority to raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy; and provide for organizing, disciplining, and regulating them. Congress has used this authority to establish criteria and standards that must be met for individuals to be recruited into the military, to advance through promotion, and to be separated or retired from military service. Throughout the history of the armed services, Congress has established some of these criteria based on demographic characteristics such as race, sex, and sexual orientation. In recent years, Congress and the Administration have taken actions to build a more diverse and representative military workforce in parallel with efforts to diversify the federal civilian workforce. Military manpower requirements derive from National Military Strategy and are determined by the military services based on the workload required to deliver essential capabilities. Some argue that to effectively deliver these capabilities a workforce with a range of backgrounds, skills and knowledge is required. In this regard, DOD’s pursuit of diversity is one means to acquire those necessary capabilities by broadening the potential pool of high-quality recruits and ensuring equal opportunities for advancement and promotion for qualified individuals throughout a military career. DOD has used diversity and equal opportunity programs and policies to encourage the recruitment, retention, and promotion of a diverse force that is representative of the nation. Those who support broader diversity and equal-opportunity initiatives in the military contend that a more diverse force is a better performing and more efficient force. They point out that the nature of modern warfare has been shifting, requiring a range of new skills and competencies, and that these skills may be found in a more diverse cross-section of American youth. Many believe that it has always been in the best interest of the military to recruit and retain a military force that is representative of the Nation as a “broadly representative military force is more likely to uphold national values and to be loyal to the government—and country—that raised it.” They contend that in order to reflect the nation it serves the military should strive for diversity that mirrors the shifting demographic composition of civil society. Some argue that historically underrepresented demographic groups continue to be at a disadvantage within the military and that efforts should be intensified to ensure equal opportunity for individuals in those groups. Some also contend that if the military is to remain competitive with private-sector employers in recruiting a skilled workforce, DOD should offer the same equal-opportunity rights and protections that civilian employees have. Some who oppose the expansion of diversity and equal-opportunity initiatives have concerns about how these initiatives might be implemented and how they might impact military readiness. Some believe that diversity initiatives could harm the military’s merit-based system, leading to accessions and promotions based on demographic quotas instead of performance criteria. Some contend that a military that is representative of the nation should also reflect the social and cultural norms of the nation. In this regard, they argue that the popular will for social change should be the driving factor for DOD policies. Others express concern that that the inclusion of some demographic groups is antithetical to military culture and could affect unit cohesion, morale, and readiness—particularly in elite combat units. In terms of equal opportunity and inclusion, some argue that the military has a unique mission that requires the exclusion of some individuals based on, for example, physical fitness level, education attainment, or social characteristics.

Dec 23, 2015

The Federal Election Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress

More than 40 years ago, Congress created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and related amendments. Today, the FEC is responsible for administering disclosure of millions of campaign finance transactions; interpretation and civil enforcement of FECA and agency regulations; and administering the presidential public financing program. Six presidentially appointed commissioners, who are subject to Senate advice and consent, head the FEC. No more than three members may be affiliated with the same political party. Congress arrived at this bipartisan, even-numbered structure amid debate over how to properly insulate the campaign finance agency from political pressures. Although this structure ensures that commissioners must reach bipartisan agreement to make most decisions, it has not saved the agency from bipartisan criticism. Throughout its history, critics have alleged that the FEC fails to adequately regulate campaign finance activity or does so too stringently. Discussion of what the commission does, why it does so, and how is less common. This report provides selected information about the FEC’s history and ongoing issues that are likely to be of interest to Congress for appropriations, legislative, or oversight activities. The discussion is organized around those factors that most actively shape the FEC: its structure and commission appointments; organizational issues; and debate over campaign finance policy. These selected topics represent both ongoing and recent areas of congressional activity. CRS Report R44319, The Federal Election Commission: Enforcement Process and Selected Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett provides additional information about the FEC’s enforcement process—a topic that is related to some of the issues discussed in this report but also distinct from the organizational and administrative themes considered here. As the FEC heads toward a half-century of regulating campaigns, perhaps the most fundamental question facing Congress and the commission is what the agency’s mission should be today and in the future. As Congress monitors the FEC, it perhaps faces a choice similar to that facing the agency itself: whether to focus on major change—if any—or to emphasize managing routine business. Recent Congresses have engaged in oversight activities surrounding the FEC’s enforcement practices and agency transparency. For more than 20 years, Congress occasionally has considered legislation to restructure the agency, particularly to change the number of commissioners, thereby reducing possibilities for deadlocked votes. H.R. 2931 in the 114th Congress is the latest such proposal. This report will be updated occasionally as events warrant.

Dec 22, 2015

The Federal Election Commission: Enforcement Process and Selected Issues for Congress

The Federal Election Commission (FEC) is responsible for civil enforcement of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) and other campaign finance statutes. Enforcement, one of the FEC’s principal functions, is perhaps the most controversial thing the agency does. Enforcement matters not only for encouraging compliance with law and regulation, but also for what it represents about the state of campaign finance policy overall. Some agency critics argue that modest fines, protracted processes, and deadlocked commission votes demonstrate that the FEC cannot effectively enforce campaign finance law. Others contend that Congress designed the FEC, which includes six commissioners who typically represent the two major political parties, to be deliberate and driven by consensus so that enforcement would not be politicized. Enforcement has drawn attention inside and outside the agency. In recent years, commissioners have sparred at open meetings and in the media about whether the agency’s enforcement activities are inadequate or overzealous. The commission has struggled to staff some senior enforcement positions. Through oversight hearings, recent Congresses have monitored the FEC’s enforcement activities and, in some cases, criticized the transparency surrounding those processes. Congress occasionally has considered legislation to restructure the agency, particularly to change the number of commissioners, thereby reducing possibilities for deadlocked votes. H.R. 2931 in the 114th Congress is the latest such proposal. This report provides Congress with a resource for understanding the FEC’s enforcement process and context for why enforcement is consequential. Enforcement represents broader debates about what the FEC does and what it should do, and what federal campaign finance policy is and should be. The FEC can determine how to prioritize enforcement activities and can manage its response to ongoing campaign finance policy disagreements. The agency has less or no control over other aspects of its environment, such as the enforcement process mandated in FECA. CRS Report R44318, The Federal Election Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress, by R. Sam Garrett provides an overview of the FEC generally, including attention to organizational and administrative matters that are related to but distinct from the enforcement topics discussed here. This report will be updated occasionally as events warrant.

Dec 22, 2015

The Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program: Overview and Impact of the Affordable Care Act

This report discusses the impact of the Affordable Care Act on the Ryan White HIV/AIDS Program, which makes federal funds available to metropolitan areas and states to that provide a number of health care services for HIV/AIDS patients.

Dec 21, 2015

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2007-2014

This report provides Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all government suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons supplying governments to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2007-2010, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 74.4% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 75.5% of all such agreements globally from 2011-2014, and 86.0% of these agreements in 2014. The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2014 was $61.8 billion. In 2014, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was $20.6 billion. Recently, from 2011 to 2014, the United States and Russia have dominated the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second for each of these four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2011 to 2014, the United States made nearly $115 billion in such agreements, 46.3% of all these agreements (expressed in current dollars). Russia made $41.7 billion, 16.8% of these agreements. During this same period, collectively, the United States and Russia made 63.1% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations, ($156.4 billion in current dollars). In 2014, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations with $29.8 billion or 48.2% of these agreements. In second place was Russia with $10.1 billion or 16.3% of such agreements. In 2014, Russia ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at $8.4 billion, or 40.8% of all such deliveries. The United States ranked second in these deliveries at over $7.6 billion or 27.2%. In worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2014—to both developed and developing nations—the United States dominated, ranking first with $36.2 billion in such agreements or 50.4% of all such agreements. Russia ranked second in worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2014 with $10.2 billion in such global agreements or 14.2%. The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide in 2014 was $71.8 billion. In 2014, South Korea ranked first concluding $7.8 billion in agreements. Brazil ranked third in the value of arms transfer agreements among all developing nations weapons purchasers, concluding $6.5 billion in such agreements. Iraq ranked second with $7.3 billion in such agreements.

Dec 21, 2015

What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress

Since 2001, successive U.S. administrations have increasingly prioritized efforts to build foreign security forces—particularly in weak and failing states—arguing that doing so advances U.S. national security objectives. In turn, the Department of Defense (DOD) has invested billions of dollars in “Building Partner Capacity,” a term that refers to a broad set of missions, programs, activities, and authorities intended to improve the ability of other nations to achieve those security-oriented goals they share with the United States. As a consequence, these efforts and programs have been a growing focus of Congressional attention. Many partner capacity building programs and activities have their roots in the post-World War II period, if not well before, yet today they are implemented more widely, and often with greater resourcing, than efforts prior to September 11, 2001. Indeed, building partner capacity was a central feature of the 2003-2010 Iraq campaign, and is a core component of the ongoing current campaigns both in Afghanistan to counter Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and in Iraq/Syria to counter the Islamic State. Recent events, particularly the battle between the Afghan government and the Taliban over Konduz, the inability of DOD-led efforts to produce more than a “handful” of anti-Assad, anti-Islamic State (IS) forces in Syria, and the collapse of U.S.-trained forces in Iraq in the face of the Islamic State, have called into question—including in Congress—whether these BPC programs can ever achieve their desired effects. CRS surveyed the publicly available literature on the subject, and found the debate on the strategic effectiveness of BPC and related programs nascent, at best. While a variety of studies explore programmatic effectiveness, very few explore what the United States sought to achieve when engaging in a BPC effort, and whether or not doing so led to desirable outcomes. The increasing emphasis that the U.S. government is placing on BPC as a means to achieve strategic goals, combined with the paucity of the literature on this subject, prompted CRS to explore the historical track record of BPC efforts to help determine whether they produced outcomes consistent with U.S. strategic objectives. Twenty case studies since World War II were explored; each was grouped according to one of seven strategic goals that U.S. sought to accomplish. These goals included victory in war/war termination, managing regional security challenges, indirectly supporting a party to a conflict, conflict mitigation, enhancing coalition participation, building institutional and interpersonal linkages, and alliance building. Given that U.S. leaders often argue that a BPC effort could help accomplish more than one of the above goals, determining what constitutes the “primary” strategic objective for a given BPC effort required analytic judgment. CRS organized the cases according to public statements at the time, with particular attention paid to how leaders described the purpose of the BPC effort. Effectiveness was judged based on two criteria: whether the strategic goal was achieved, and whether the effort produced unintended consequences that were obviously and meaningfully damaging to U.S. national interests. Within the case studies explored, BPC was least effective as a tool for allowing the United States to extract itself from conflict (victory in war/war termination). However, it was most effective as a tool for building interpersonal and institutional linkages, and for alliance building.

Dec 18, 2015

Employer Wellness Programs and Genetic Information: Frequently Asked Questions

Since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended), which encouraged use of wellness programs, employers have increasingly established employer wellness programs in an effort to support better health among their employees and reduce their own health care costs. Employer wellness programs often focus on improving wellness overall, but they may target a specific disease (e.g., diabetes) or behavior (e.g., smoking), and they may include the provision of health or other services. These programs often include incentives for participation, ranging from additional paid time off to reduced insurance premium contributions.

Dec 17, 2015