CRS Reports

Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act of 2015: Changes to Domestic Human Trafficking Policies

The Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA, S. 178/P.L. 114-22), an omnibus bill that primarily includes anti-human trafficking provisions, was signed into law on May 29, 2015. The bill received broad congressional support, passing the Senate unanimously on April 22, 2015, and the House nearly unanimously (420-3) on May 19, 2015. Through amendments in the House and the Senate, the law incorporates the same or similar provisions from 10 of the 12 bills on trafficking that passed the House in the first few weeks of the 114th Congress: H.R. 159, H.R. 181, H.R. 246, H.R. 285, H.R. 350, H.R. 357, H.R. 398, H.R. 460, H.R. 468, and H.R. 469. The JVTA amends the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), the major federal law that addresses human trafficking, as well as multiple other federal statutes. It expands the federal response to trafficking in four broad areas: (1) victims’ services and benefits, (2) criminal justice, (3) domestic sex trafficking of children, and (4) inter-agency coordination and training, and related areas. A major aspect of U.S. anti-trafficking efforts is victim assistance: providing immediate services when victims are identified and helping them recover from the victimization. The JVTA seeks to improve services to victims. For example, it directs the Department of Justice, which administers anti-trafficking programs, to provide a database for trafficking victim stakeholders on counseling and other victim supports. The JVTA also seeks to heighten the federal response to crimes perpetrated by traffickers. A major component of the law is the establishment of new financial penalty assessments for traffickers. These monies are to be deposited into a Domestic Trafficking Victims’ Fund established under the act. Money from the fund may be used to award certain existing grants authorized by the TVPA or enhance programming for victims of child pornography served under the Victims of Child Abuse Act, among other purposes. The law prohibits the use of monies from the fund for medical items or health care or services under certain circumstances, though it allows such services to be funded from other sources. The JVTA responds to domestic sex trafficking of children through changes to a few policy areas, including missing and exploited children, runaway youth, the child welfare system, and juvenile justice. Notably, it requires law enforcement agencies to report additional information to a federal data system on missing children. It also creates a new child human trafficking deterrence program to aid child victims of both sex and labor trafficking while also supporting investigations and prosecutions of trafficking offenses. The JVTA addresses other issues related to trafficking, particularly concerns about possible duplication of efforts and a lack of coordination among the agencies that conduct anti-trafficking activities. It directs the President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking to conduct a review of human trafficking prevention within the United States, including cataloging the U.S. government’s efforts to prevent individuals from committing trafficking offenses and to prevent children from becoming victims. The law also requires a Government Accountability Office report to Congress that would include information on federal and state law enforcement agencies’ efforts to combat human trafficking as well as information on federal anti-trafficking grant programs. This report supplements CRS Report R43917, Domestic Human Trafficking Legislation in the 114th Congress. For further information about trafficking, see CRS Report RL34317, Trafficking in Persons: U.S. Policy and Issues for Congress; and CRS Report R41878, Sex Trafficking of Children in the United States: Overview and Issues for Congress.

Dec 17, 2015

The Air Force Aviation Investment Challenge

The U.S. Air Force is in the midst of an ambitious aviation modernization program, driven primarily by the age of its current aircraft fleets. Four major programs are in procurement, with five more in research and development (R&D). The need to replace several types of aircraft simultaneously poses challenges to future budgets, as the new programs compete with existing program commitments and normal program growth under a restricted service topline. The impending expiration of caps imposed by the Balanced Budget Act coincides with when modernization programs can be expected to experience the most growth, but does not necessarily offer sufficient relief to avoid program cuts or other funding approaches. To meet its modernization requirements, the Air Force may need to revise that topline, defer or delay other programs (including possibly reducing the quantity of aircraft already in procurement), or find other sources of funding to carry all its plans to fruition. Some specific options may include (but are not limited to) raising the Air Force topline (and/or the aviation modernization share); pusharounds or reductions in Air Force programs and activities other than modernization; reducing annual quantities of the F-35A; further retarding the growth of R&D programs; deferring the KC-Y follow-on tanker; funding the long-range strike bomber through a non-Air Force budget. The report examines these options in further detail.

Dec 17, 2015

IMF Quota and Governance Reforms

Dec 17, 2015

The K-1 Fiancé(e) Visa: In Brief

The K nonimmigrant visa category was created in 1970 through P.L. 91-225, which amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Within the K visa category, the K-1 visa is a visa for fiancé(e)s of U.S. citizens and the K-2 visa is a visa for the fiancé(e)’s children. Congress later enacted legislation to provide protections for fiancé(e)s, specifically creating requirements around the use of international marriage brokers, the disclosure of the U.S. petitioner’s criminal background, the provision of information to fiancé(e)s on their rights, and additional protections for minors. A mass shooting on December 2, 2015, in San Bernardino, CA, where one of the suspected shooters entered the United States on a K-1 visa, has drawn increased attention to the visa category. This tragedy has spurred questions surrounding the K-1 visa national security screening process and any possible gaps. Some Members of Congress have suggested including a review of K-1 applicants’ social media accounts into the screening process. In order to qualify for a K-1 visa, a U.S. citizen must file on behalf of his/her fiancé(e) and provide evidence that (1) the parties have met in person within two years of the petition’s filing, (2) the parties have a bona fide intention to marry, and (3) the parties are legally able and willing to be married in the United States within 90 days of the fiancé(e)’s arrival. The petitioner must first file a petition with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). Once the petition is approved, it is sent to a U.S. Embassy or Consulate in the home country of the foreign national, where it is determined if the fiancé(e) is eligible for admission to the United States. Although the K-1 visa is a nonimmigrant visa, the fiancé(e) intends to remain in the United States and is therefore also subject to the admission requirements of immigrant visas. K visa applicants’ national security screening entails the use of biographical, biometric, and photographic data. The data are entered into consular-based databases, such as the Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) and Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), which flag problems that may have an impact on the issuance of a visa or matches to any derogatory information. Consular offices send suspect individuals’ applications for greater review to other agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). In 2013, NCTC began conducting interagency counterterrorism screening of all visa applicants and in 2015, DHS began pilot programs to incorporate social media screening into its vetting of applicants for certain immigration benefits. Once visa applicants have been approved and their security clearances are completed, they can travel to the United States, where they must marry their U.S. citizen petitioners within 90 days of their arrival. Once married, the fiancé(e) adjusts to a conditional residency and after two years can become a lawful permanent resident. In FY2014, the U.S. Department of State issued 35,925 K-1 visas. Asia received the largest portion of K visas at 46%, with the Philippines being the country with the highest number of K visas at 8,525 visas.

Dec 15, 2015

Federal Reserve: Legislation in the 114th Congress

Dec 15, 2015

Women and the Selective Service

Dec 15, 2015

Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014

The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in committee offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 11 staff position titles that are used in House committees, and include the following: Chief Counsel; Communications Director; Counsel; Deputy Staff Director; Minority Professional Staff Member; Minority Staff Director; Professional Staff Member; Senior Professional Staff Member; Staff Assistant; Staff Director; and Subcommittee Staff Director. Tables provide tabular pay data for each House committee staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay, depending on data availability; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 14-year intervals from 2014, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change of pay of that position, to changes in pay of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of 2014 pay, in $10,000 increments. In the past five years (2010 and 2014), the change in median pay, in constant 2015 dollars, ranged from a 2.09% increase for counsels to a -26.93% decrease for senior professional staff members. Of the 11 staff positions, two saw pay increases while nine saw declines. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -7.89%, and General Schedule, DC, -6.97%, over the same period. Pay data for staff working in Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in the personal offices of Senators and Members of the House are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators’ Offices, FY2001-FY2014, and CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014, respectively.

Dec 15, 2015

Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014

The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in committee offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 13 staff position titles used in Senate committees. The positions include the following: Chief Clerk, Chief Counsel, Communications Director, Counsel, Legislative Assistant, Minority Chief Counsel, Minority Staff Director, Press Secretary, Professional Staff Member, Senior Counsel, Staff Assistant, Staff Director, and Systems Administrator. Tables provide tabular pay data for each Senate committee staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay, depending on data availability; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 14-year intervals from FY2014, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change of pay for that position, to the change in pay of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of FY2014 pay, when available, in $10,000 increments. In the past five years (FY2010 and FY2014), the change in median pay, in constant 2015 dollars, ranged from a 2.92% increase for systems administrators to a -24.41% decrease for counsels. Of 11 staff positions for which data were available in FY2010 and FY2014, 2 saw pay increases while 9 saw declines (data are not available in FY2010 or FY2014 for communications directors and press secretaries). This may be compared to changes over approximately the same period (calendar years 2010-2014) to the pay of Members of Congress, -7.89%, and General Schedule, DC, -6.97%. Pay data for staff working in House committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in the personal offices of Senators and Members of the House are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators’ Offices, FY2001-FY2014, and CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014, respectively.

Dec 15, 2015

Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014

The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in Member offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 12 staff position titles that are typically used in House Members’ offices. The positions include the following: Caseworker, Chief of Staff, District Director, Executive Assistant, Field Representative, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Correspondent, Legislative Director, Office Manager, Press Secretary, Scheduler, and Staff Assistant. Tables provide tabular pay data for each House Member office staff position. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay, 2001-2014; a comparison, at 5-, 10-, and 14-year intervals from 2014, of the cumulative percentage change in pay of that position to changes in pay of Members of Congress and salaried federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of 2014 pay in $10,000 increments. In the past five years (2010 and 2014), the change in median pay, in constant 2015 dollars, decreased for all 12 staff positions, ranging from a -1.38% decrease for press secretary/communications directors to a -21.81% decrease for executive assistants. This may be compared to changes over the same period to the pay of Members of Congress, -7.89%, and General Schedule, DC, -6.97%. Pay data for staff working in Senators’ offices are available in CRS Report R44324, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators’ Offices, FY2001-FY2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in House and Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014, and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014, respectively.

Dec 15, 2015

Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senators’ Offices, FY2001-FY2014

The level of pay for congressional staff is a source of recurring questions among Members of Congress, congressional staff, and the public. There may be interest in congressional pay data from multiple perspectives, including assessment of the costs of congressional operations; guidance in setting pay levels for staff in Member offices; or comparison of congressional staff pay levels with those of other federal government pay systems. This report provides pay data for 16 staff position titles that are typically used in Senators’ offices. The positions include the following: Administrative Director, Casework Supervisor, Caseworker, Chief of Staff, Communications Director, Counsel, Executive Assistant, Field Representative, Legislative Assistant, Legislative Correspondent, Legislative Director, Press Secretary, Scheduler, “Specials Director” (a combined category that includes the job titles Director of Projects, Director of Special Projects, Director of Federal Projects, Director of Grants, Projects Director, or Grants Director), Staff Assistant, and State Director. Tables provide tabular pay data for each of the selected staff positions in a Senator’s office. Graphic displays are also included, providing representations of pay from three perspectives, including the following: a line graph showing change in pay; a comparison at 5-, 10-, and 14-year intervals from FY2014, depending on data availability, of the cumulative percentage change in pay for that position to changes in pay of Members of Congress and federal civilian workers paid under the General Schedule in Washington, DC, and surrounding areas; and distributions of FY2014 pay in $10,000 increments. In the past five years (FY2010 and FY2014), the change in median pay, in constant 2015 dollars, ranged from a 0.78% increase for state directors to a -20.21% decrease for legislative assistants. All staff positions other than state directors saw declines in pay. This may be compared to changes to the pay of Members of Congress, -7.89%, and General Schedule, DC, -6.97%, over approximately the same period (calendar years 2010-2014). Pay data for staff working in House Member offices are available in CRS Report R44323, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Member Offices, 2001-2014. Data describing the pay of congressional staff working in House and Senate committee offices are available in CRS Report R44322, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in House Committees, 2001-2014, and CRS Report R44325, Staff Pay Levels for Selected Positions in Senate Committees, FY2001-FY2014, respectively.

Dec 15, 2015

The H-2B Visa and the Statutory Cap: In Brief

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, as amended, enumerates categories of aliens, known as nonimmigrants, who are admitted to the United States for a temporary period of time and a specific purpose. One of these nonimmigrant visa categories—known as the H-2B visa—is for temporary nonagricultural workers. The H-2B visa allows for the temporary admission of foreign workers to the United States to perform nonagricultural labor or services of a temporary nature if unemployed U.S. workers are not available. Common H-2B occupations include landscape laborer, amusement park worker, and housekeeper. The H-2B program is administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) Employment and Training Administration. DOL’s Wage and Hour Division also has certain concurrent enforcement responsibilities. The H-2B program currently operates under regulations issued by DHS in 2008 on H-2B requirements, DHS and DOL jointly in 2015 on H-2B employment, and DHS and DOL jointly in 2015 on H-2B wages. Bringing workers into the United States under the H-2B program is a multi-agency process involving DOL, DHS, and the Department of State (DOS). A prospective H-2B employer must apply to DOL for labor certification. Approval of a labor certification application reflects a finding by DOL that there are not sufficient U.S. workers who are qualified and available to perform the work and that the employment of foreign workers will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of U.S. workers who are similarly employed. If granted labor certification, an employer can file a petition with DHS to bring in the approved number of H-2B workers. If the petition is approved, a foreign worker overseas who the employer wants to employ can go to a U.S. embassy or consulate to apply for an H-2B nonimmigrant visa from DOS. If the visa application is approved, the worker is issued a visa that he or she can use to apply for admission to the United States at a port of entry. H-2B workers can be accompanied by eligible spouses and children. By law, the H-2B visa is subject to an annual numerical cap. Under the INA, the total number of aliens who may be issued H-2B visas or otherwise provided with H-2B nonimmigrant status in any fiscal year may not exceed 66,000. USCIS is responsible for implementing the H-2B cap, which it does at the petition receipt stage. Spouses and children accompanying H-2B workers are not counted against the H-2B cap. Certain categories of H-2B workers are exempt from the cap. These categories include, for example, current H-2B workers who are seeking an extension of stay, a change of employer, or a change in the terms of their employment. In addition, a temporary statutory provision that was in effect from FY2005 through FY2007 exempted certain returning H-2B workers from the cap. It applied to returning H-2B workers who had been counted against the cap in any one of the three prior fiscal years. Legislation to reinstate a returning worker exemption has been introduced in the 114th Congress. After several years of cap-exceeding demand for H-2B visas, issuances of H-2B visas fell to under 45,000 in FY2009 and remained below the 66,000 cap level through FY2013. The H-2B cap was reached in FY2014, and demand for the visas continues to exceed supply. For FY2015, USCIS announced that it had received a sufficient number of petitions to reach the H-2B cap as of June 11, 2015, and would not be accepting any more cap-subject H-2B petitions for work beginning prior to October 1, 2015.

Dec 11, 2015

Provisions of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 3762

Dec 9, 2015

Leverage Ratios in Bank Capital Requirements

Dec 9, 2015

Chronic Homelessness: Background, Research, and Outcomes

Chronically homeless individuals are those who spend long periods of time living on the street or other places not meant for human habitation, and who have one or more disabilities, frequently including mental illnesses and substance use disorders. In the 2015 Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) point-in-time count of people experiencing homelessness, more than 83,000 individuals met the definition of chronically homeless, down from nearly 120,000 in 2008. In part the decline is due to the federal government’s plan, announced in 2002, to end chronic homelessness within 10 years. The target date has since been extended to 2017. Among the federal programs focused on ending chronic homelessness are the HUD Homelessness Assistance Grants, the HUD and Veterans Affairs Supported Housing Program (HUD-VASH), and several HUD demonstration programs. One of the reasons that federal programs have devoted resources to ending chronic homelessness is studies finding that individuals who experience it, particularly those with serious mental illness, use many expensive services often paid through public sources, including emergency room visits, inpatient hospitalizations, and law enforcement and jail time. Even emergency shelter resources can be costly. In addition to potential ethical reasons for ending chronic homelessness, doing so could reduce costs in providing assistance to this population. For years, ending chronic homelessness was thought to be a multi-step process, with individuals receiving treatment for addictions and illnesses, perhaps while living in transitional or temporary housing, before being found capable of living on their own. However, the strategy for ending homelessness has changed, largely due to research pioneered by housing providers. Instead of requiring chronically homeless individuals to be “housing ready” by first addressing issues thought to underlie homelessness, the new strategy allows chronically homeless individuals to move into permanent supportive housing without preconditions. Permanent supportive housing (PSH) is not time-limited and makes services available to residents. A particular PSH, called Housing First, focuses on resident choice about where to live and the type and intensity of services and does not require abstinence or medication compliance. Housing First has been embraced by HUD and the Department of Veterans Affairs as a way to end chronic homelessness. Many researchers have examined PSH, including Housing First, as a way to reduce homelessness. Some researchers have also examined related outcomes, including changes in the use of services, and the costs of those services, by formerly homeless individuals after they move into housing; whether drug and alcohol use decreases; if there are improvements in mental health outcomes; and resident satisfaction after moving to housing. Overall, based on a review of the research, PSH helps increase days spent in housing and reduce days spent homeless, showing that PSH can be a successful way to end homelessness. The outcomes in other areas are not as clear, perhaps evidence that reductions in service use and costs, reductions in substance use, and mental health improvements may depend on individual needs and circumstances and require more than a successful move out of homelessness. When reductions in service use result from chronically homeless individuals moving into PSH, any commensurate cost reductions are largely seen in public spending on health care. Medicaid funds can be used to pay for housing-related services, and increasingly housing advocates are encouraging this as a way to help chronically homeless individuals gain and maintain housing. In addition, with limited funding available for new units of housing through HUD programs, some states are using their own shares of Medicaid funds to finance permanent supportive housing for chronically homeless individuals. Another possible funding source is Pay for Success initiatives, where private investments in PSH are paid back if certain outcomes are attained.

Dec 8, 2015

Defense Primer: DOD Domestic School System

Dec 8, 2015

The Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) and ESEA Reauthorization: Summary of Selected Key Issues

Dec 7, 2015

Veterans’ Medical Care: FY2016 Appropriations

Dec 7, 2015

Reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act: Highlights of the Every Student Succeeds Act

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was last comprehensively amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB; P.L. 107-110). Appropriations for most programs authorized by the ESEA were authorized through FY2007. As Congress has not reauthorized the ESEA, appropriations for ESEA programs are currently not explicitly authorized. However, because the programs continue to receive annual appropriations, appropriations are considered implicitly authorized. Congress has actively considered reauthorization of the ESEA during the 114th Congress, passing comprehensive ESEA reauthorization bills in both the House (Student Success Act; H.R. 5) and the Senate (Every Child Achieves Act of 2015; S. 1177). Both chambers agreed to a conference to resolve their differences. On November 19, 2015, the conference committee agreed to file the conference report of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) by a vote of 39-1. On December 2, 2015, the House agreed to the conference report based on a bipartisan vote of 359-64. Table 1 in this report highlights key provisions included in the ESSA and provides some context regarding the treatment of similar provisions in current law, where applicable. The major areas considered in this examination include the following: overall structural and funding issues; Title I-A accountability; Title I-A formulas; teachers, principals, and school leaders; flexibility and choice; and general provisions. Table 2 depicts the proposed structure of the ESEA under the ESSA and includes all authorizations of appropriations for FY2017 through FY2020. Table 3 provides examples of programs authorized under current law that would not be retained by the ESSA. The report does not aim to provide a comprehensive summary of ESSA or of technical changes that would be made by the bill.

Dec 4, 2015

Spain and Its Relations with the United States: In Brief

The United States and Spain have extensive cultural ties and a mutually beneficial economic relationship, and the two countries cooperate closely on numerous diplomatic and security issues. Spain has been a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1982 and a member of the European Union (EU) since 1986. Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, developments in Spain and its relations with the United States are of continuing interest to the U.S. Congress. This report provides an overview and assessment of some of the main dimensions of these topics. Domestic Political and Economic Issues The government of Spain is led by Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy of the center-right Popular Party (PP). The PP won an absolute majority in the general election of November 2011. From 2004 to 2011, the government of Spain was led by José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero of the center-left Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE). The next election is scheduled for December 20, 2015. Economic conditions, austerity policies, and corruption scandals have fueled public backlash against Spain’s political establishment in recent years. Two new parties, Ciudadanos and Podemos, are challenging the PP and PSOE for votes. Polls indicate that the election is likely to result in Spain’s first coalition government since the current constitution was adopted in 1978. The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 ended a decade of strong economic growth and plunged Spain into a prolonged recession. The government budget deficit and debt increased, and unemployment rose dramatically. Intervention in 2012 by Spain’s Eurozone partners and the European Central Bank helped restore confidence in the country’s economy and stabilize the banking sector. Although economic conditions remain difficult and unemployment remains above 20%, there are signs of improvement, including forecasts for sustained economic growth over the next several years. Regional Issues The Spanish government is firmly opposed to a long-standing independence movement in Catalonia, a region of northeast Spain that includes Barcelona. In November 2015, Spain’s constitutional court blocked an attempt by the regional Catalan parliament to begin the process of forming an independent state. Catalonia held a non-binding referendum in November 2014 that returned a large majority for independence, but such a referendum would only be legally binding under the country’s constitution if convened by the central government. Counterterrorism The United States and Spain cooperate closely on counterterrorism issues. An estimated 50 to 100 Spanish citizens and approximately 1,200 Moroccan nationals with Spanish residency cards are thought to have joined jihadist groups fighting in Syria and Iraq. Spanish authorities have dismantled numerous recruiting networks over the past several years, many of them based in Ceuta and Melilla, Spanish enclaves on the coast of Morocco. In March 2015, the Spanish Parliament adopted new legislation to strengthen counterterrorism laws and police powers in response to the foreign fighter threat. U.S.-Spain Defense Relations Spain plays an important role in U.S. defense strategy for Europe and Africa. Four U.S. destroyers equipped with the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense system are stationed at the Rota naval base as part of the European Phased Adaptive Approach for missile defense in Europe. Additionally, Morón air base is the headquarters for a rapid reaction force of 2,200 U.S. Marines that protects U.S. interests and personnel in North Africa. Spanish armed forces participate in numerous international peacekeeping and security operations, including in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Mali, and Somalia. In the context of longstanding U.S. concerns about low European defense spending, Spain’s budget austerity has included considerable cuts to the defense budget in recent years. U.S.-Spain Economic Relations Investment flows between the United States and Spain totaled nearly $80 billion in 2013, and the trade relationship totaled nearly $25 billion in 2014. Approximately 1,200 U.S. firms operate subsidiaries and branches in Spain. Affiliates of Spanish companies account for approximately 73,000 jobs in the United States. Spanish officials have supported the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership under negotiation between the United States and the EU.

Dec 4, 2015

Deeming Resolutions: Budget Enforcement in the Absence of a Budget Resolution

The budget resolution reflects an agreement between the House and Senate on a budgetary plan for the upcoming fiscal year. When the House and Senate do not reach final agreement on this plan, it may be more difficult for Congress to reach agreement on subsequent budgetary legislation, both within each chamber and between the chambers. In the absence of agreement on a budget resolution, Congress may employ alternative legislative tools to serve as a substitute for a budget resolution. These substitutes are typically referred to as “deeming resolutions,” because they are deemed to serve in place of an annual budget resolution for the purposes of establishing enforceable budget levels for the upcoming fiscal year. Since the creation of the budget resolution, there have been nine years in which Congress did not come to agreement on a budget resolution. In each of those years, one or both chambers employed at least one deeming resolution to serve as a substitute for a budget resolution. While referred to as deeming resolutions, such mechanisms are not formally defined and have no specifically prescribed content. Instead, they simply denote the House and Senate, often separately, engaging legislative procedures to deal with enforcement issues on an ad hoc basis. As described below, the mechanisms can vary significantly in content and timing. This report covers the use of deeming resolutions in years when the House and Senate did not agree on a budget resolution.

Dec 3, 2015

Factors Related to the Use of Planned Parenthood Affiliated Health Centers (PPAHCs) and Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs)

Recent debates about federal funding for the Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) and its affiliated health centers (PPAHCs) have raised questions about the services that PPAHCs provide and the availability of alternative facilities to provide similar services to a similar population. This report provides background information and data that may be useful for policymakers evaluating these recent debates. Although a number of other facility types could potentially provide similar services as PPAHCs, this report focuses on federally qualified health centers (FQHCs)—a term used interchangeably with health centers or community health centers—because these facilities have been the focus of recent legislation. This report provides information on three central dimensions of health care. Specifically, for one health facility to begin to provide services to patients that had previously been seen at a different facility, the receiving facility must provide similar services, serve a similar population, and be located in a similar geographic area. This report provides national-level data on these three dimensions. Some selected findings include the following: Services: Both PPAHCs and FQHCs provide family planning services; however, PPAHCs focus on providing family planning and related services, whereas FQHCs focus is on providing more comprehensive primary care, dental, and behavioral health services. There are nearly15 times the number of FQHCs than there are PPAHCs; thus FQHCs provide far more services in a given year than do PPAHCs. However, despite providing more services overall, FQHCs in total provide fewer contraceptive services than do PPAHCs. Specifically, in its 2013-2014 report, PPFA reported that its PPAHCs provided 3.6 million contraceptive services while FQHCs reported providing 1.3 million of these services in 2014. In addition, each individual FQHC provides far fewer contraceptive services than does the typical PPAHC. Populations: Both PPAHCs and FQHCs serve a diverse, but disadvantaged population. PPAHCs focus their services on individuals of reproductive age; whereas, FQHCs provide services to individuals throughout the lifetime. FQHCs served 22.9 million people in 2014, as compared to 2.7 million served by PPAHCs. In 2014, 31% of FQHC patients were children and 8% were age 65 and over. Locations: PPFA affiliates choose the location of their facilities. PPFA reports that the majority of PPAHCs are located in health professional shortage areas (HPSAs), medically underserved areas (MUAs), or rural areas. In contrast, FQHCs are required to be located in MUAs or to serve a medically underserved population. There is some overlap in the location of PPAHCs and FQHCs as 358 counties have both a PPAHC and a FQHC. Facility locations may be particularly important to evaluations of access because health systems and options vary considerably across states and localities. In some areas, one facility may be as accessible as another and may provide (or may be able to begin to provide) the same set of services. In other areas, this may not occur because, for example, only one provider exists, either in general or for a particular service type. Moreover, facilities located in the same geographic area may not be equally accessible for patients, as one facility may be located near public transportation routes while another may not. Although this report presents maps of locations of PPAHCs and FQHCs, these maps are not sufficient to infer meaningful information about the local health care system.

Dec 3, 2015

The Lobbying Disclosure Act at 20: Analysis and Issues for Congress

On December 19, 1995, President William Jefferson Clinton signed the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) into law (2 U.S.C. §1601, et seq.). In his comments when signing the law, President Clinton identified a central question that continues to be an issue for lobbying laws: how can individual citizens’ rights be balanced against the desire to regulate and potentially control the access of special interests to government? As lobbying laws have been developed in the United States, the balance between the right of “ordinary Americans” to petition the government and the access that professional lobbyists can have to Members of Congress and executive branch decisionmakers has been at the forefront. The four major federal lobbying laws—the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) of 1938, the Regulation of Lobbying Act (RLA) of 1946, the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995, and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act (HLOGA) of 2007—were enacted in response to changes in practice or perception surrounding lobbying. In most cases, the enactment, repeal, or amendment of lobbying laws was a response to multiple contextual changes that provided a policy window in which change was possible. This report provides an retrospective and prospective analysis of the LDA on its 20th anniversary, using research conducted and data collected by the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M capstone class over the 2014-2015 academic year. As the LDA turns 20, several issues, each already addressed to some extent in other statutes, have the potential to cause additional shifts in lobbying practices and perception. These include Shadow lobbying—when an individual who is paid to engage public officials on behalf of clients does not register as a lobbyist. Shadow lobbying may raise questions about what practices and activities should trigger lobbyist registration requirements. Grassroots lobbying—attempts to persuade government decisionmakers and influence policy outcomes by shifting public opinion and motivating citizens to take action, often by contacting Representatives and Senators. Grassroots lobbying is generally unregulated, although legislation has been introduced in the past that would require grassroots lobbying activities be registered and disclosed. Revolving door—when federal employees leave the government for employment in the private sector or the government hires former private sector employees for government jobs. There are a number of post-employment restrictions that impose limits on federal employees moving to the private sector, or former lobbyists moving to the public sector. Analysis of whether current restrictions strike a suitable balance, are too restrictive, or too permissive, may be instructive. As these issues evolve, Congress has many options available to potentially amend existing lobbying laws. These include options to change the definition of lobbying; change disclosure thresholds for registered lobbyists; and adjust resources available for implementation and enforcement. Additionally, Congress could choose not to amend existing lobbying laws and maintain current standards.

Dec 1, 2015

Legal Authority for Aliens to Claim Refundable Tax Credits: In Brief

The question is frequently asked whether aliens who enter or remain in the United States in violation of federal immigration law (called unlawfully present aliens for purposes of this report) are permitted to claim refundable tax credits. There is no general provision in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) prohibiting unlawfully present aliens from claiming refundable tax credits. Rather, the restrictions that exist are established on a credit-by-credit basis. For example, one credit—the earned income tax credit (EITC)—requires that taxpayers provide work-authorized Social Security numbers (SSNs) for themselves, a spouse if filing a joint return, and any qualifying children. Because of this requirement, aliens who are not authorized to work in the United States are ineligible for the credit. This treatment can be contrasted with another credit, the additional child tax credit, which does not have an SSN requirement and can be claimed by taxpayers regardless of their immigration or work authorization status. A related issue is whether any refundable tax credits are “Federal public benefits” under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA). Section 401 of that act disallows such benefits to unlawfully present aliens. If any refundable tax credits were federal public benefits, it could be argued the credits should be disallowed to these aliens, even if the IRC does not contain such a restriction. It appears the IRS does not interpret PRWORA to apply to refundable tax credits. No court has examined this issue, and Congress has not taken any action to address it legislatively. Thus, at this time, the only clear restrictions on the ability of unlawfully present aliens to claim refundable tax credits are those found in the IRC.

Dec 1, 2015

Ecuador: In Brief

Ecuador is a small oil-producing country of about 16 million inhabitants located on the west coast of South America between Colombia and Peru. President Rafael Correa was first elected in 2006 and has since stood for and won two elections following the 2008 rewrite of Ecuador’s constitution. Correa took office after a very unstable decade in Ecuadorian politics when no elected president finished his term, and has received sustained high levels of popular support for his administration unparalleled in recent times. In November 2015, he indicated he would not run for reelection in 2017, leading some to speculate if, or how, as a popular former president Correa might continue to influence Ecuadorian politics in the future. President Correa has described his effort to remake the politics of Ecuador as a “Citizens’ Revolution” and placed it in the tradition of “21st century socialism” personified by populist leaders of nearby Andean region countries, Venezuela and Bolivia. Ecuador has effectively fought poverty with ambitious social programs and investments in infrastructure and seen strong growth averaging 4% annually. However, the government has lowered its 2015 gross domestic product (GDP) growth estimate to below 1% because of the recent drop in oil prices, while some analysts forecast that the economy will contract this year. Petroleum is the country’s largest export, comprising more than half of total exports. Ecuador is OPEC’s smallest member, and petroleum is its largest export to the United States, the country’s top trade partner. With the slump in oil prices and budget-tightening measures to compensate, the Correa government has been hit with growing protests from a diverse set of domestic actors: indigenous people, trade unionists, environmentalists, and critics from the right and center-right. The President’s critics also maintain that he has constrained freedom of assembly and association, stifled freedom of the press and expression, and politicized the judiciary while centralizing power in the executive branch. Under left-leaning Correa, relations between Ecuador and the United States have been strained. President Correa has been critical of undue U.S. influence or “imperialism” in the region. Yet, Ecuador has maintained close economic relations with the United States. Following a period of economic turmoil, Ecuador adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency in 2000. Ecuador receives significant remittances from Ecuadorians living in the United States and abroad. Ecuador has also become a popular place for U.S. tourists and retirees. This report will briefly examine the political and economic conditions in Ecuador and U.S.-Ecuadorian relations.

Nov 30, 2015

Federal Real Property Data: Limitations and Implications for Oversight

The federal executive branch owns and leases more than 275,000 buildings, with annual operating costs in excess of $21 billion. Oversight of this portfolio of buildings has been a priority for recent congresses, particularly since real property management has been identified as a “high-risk” area by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), every year since 2003. Key potential weaknesses in real property management include agencies holding empty or only partially occupied buildings; relying on leases for new space even when ownership would be cheaper; and making decisions using real property data of questionable quality. This report examines the challenges to oversight posed by the lack of accurate and reliable real property data, particularly as it relates to the disposal of unneeded building space and the government’s overreliance on costly leasing. The primary source of real property data available to Congress is the Federal Real Property Report (FRPR), which provides aggregate data on executive branch agency portfolios. The data, which are drawn from a database managed by the General Services Administration (GSA), can be unreliable and incomplete, which limits the effectiveness of the FRPR as an oversight tool. After building utilization definitions were revised in FY2013, for example, the number of properties categorized as “unutilized” declined 54% and the number of properties categorized as “underutilized” declined 97%. The FRPR also discontinued reporting the annual operating costs of underutilized and unutilized buildings after FY2010—data that could help Congress understand the full costs of inefficiencies in the building disposal process. GSA does not permit Congress direct access to its real property database, so there is currently no way to obtain that data should GSA opt not to report it in the FRPR. The FRPR is also the primary source of data available to Congress on real property leases. The data on leased space, however, can also be unreliable and incomplete. In FY2014, for example, GSA reported a 45% decline in the amount of leased space held by the executive branch, and it revised data from FY2013, so that the new figures showed the government held 44% less leased space than it had previously reported for that year. Similarly, while long-term operating leases are most likely to expose the government to financial loss, the FRPR does not provide any data specifically on them. Neither does the FRPR provide data on high-value leases—those leases which, although small in number, often account for a disproportionately large percentage of an agency’s operating costs. Key components of agency real property portfolios—notably their long-term and high-value leases—are subject to limited scrutiny from Congress due to the lack of accessible data. Some of the weaknesses in real property data may be mitigated by congressional action. The FRPR could be expanded to include data Congress believes has important oversight value, such as, perhaps, data on the annual operating costs of unutilized and underutilized buildings, and data on long-term and high-value leases. In addition, obtaining access to GSA’s real property database would enable Congress to look at all of the information GSA collects, and to analyze it in a variety of ways—in aggregate, by agency, or by individual building—as policy needs dictate. Agency lease prospectuses—detailed descriptions of the size, cost, and need for high-value leases that must be authorized by Congress—might be required to include the cost of constructing or buying the space which an agency proposed leasing, so that Congress knows if it is being asked to approve the most cost-effective method of space acquisition.

Nov 25, 2015

Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE): Authorizations of Appropriations Proposed by the Energy Policy Modernization Act of 2015 (S. 2012)

Search terms: S. 2012, H.R. 8, energy efficiency, renewable energy, Department of Energy, EISA, P.L. 110-140 (Hide summary)

Nov 25, 2015

The Islamic State—Frequently Asked Questions: Threats, Global Implications, and U.S. Policy Responses

In the wake of the deadly November 13, 2015, terrorist attacks in Paris, U.S. policymakers are faced with a wide range of strategy and operational considerations related to the activities of and threats emanating from the Islamic State (IS). A terrorist attack such as this prompts an examination of U.S. domestic security precautions; the role of allies and coalition partners; the appropriate military and diplomatic reactions; the safety and security of infrastructure and that of travelers; and numerous additional discrete issues that require the active involvement of dozens of federal, state, and local government agencies. With the attacks in Beirut, over Egypt, and in Paris, the Islamic State has demonstrated a transnational capability that suggests its strategic objectives and tactics have evolved, gaining strength in some areas and losing capacity in others. The response to these attacks by the United States and other nations continues to evolve as the threat posed by IS changes. This report poses frequently asked questions with answers excerpted from other CRS products. Each section contains references to the full reports in which the material appears. This report will be updated as additional products become available and events warrant.

Nov 25, 2015

President Obama's $1 Billion Foreign Aid Request for Central America

This report discusses the Obama Administration's recent request for over $1 billion in foreign assistance in FY2016 to support a whole-of-government "U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America."

Nov 25, 2015

Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education: FY2016 Appropriations

This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress and the President to provide FY2016 appropriations for accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. This bill provides funding for all accounts funded through the annual appropriations process at the Departments of Labor (DOL) and Education (ED). It provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture bill). The LHHS bill also provides funds for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration (SSA). Continuing Resolution: On September 30, 2015, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2016, was passed by the House and the Senate and signed into law by the President (P.L. 114-53). The FY2016 continuing resolution (CR) provides appropriations for each of the 12 regular appropriations bills (including LHHS) through December 11, or until full-year appropriations are enacted. With limited exceptions, the CR funds discretionary LHHS programs at FY2015 levels, minus a reduction of less than one percent (-0.2108%). The CR generally funds annually appropriated mandatory spending programs at current law levels, though non-exempt mandatory spending programs remain subject to sequestration in FY2016. Senate LHHS Action: On June 25, the Senate Appropriations Committee approved its FY2016 LHHS appropriations bill by a vote of 16-14 (S. 1695; S.Rept. 114-74). This bill would provide $162 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, which is about 1% less than FY2015 enacted levels. In addition, the Senate committee bill would provide an estimated $718 billion in mandatory funding, for a total of $880 billion for LHHS as a whole. DOL: The Senate committee-reported bill would provide roughly $11.4 billion in discretionary funding for DOL, roughly 5% less than FY2015 enacted. HHS: The Senate committee-reported bill would provide roughly $71.0 billion in discretionary funding for HHS, roughly the same as FY2015 enacted. ED: The Senate committee-reported bill would provide roughly $65.8 billion in discretionary funding for ED, roughly 2% less than FY2015 enacted. Related Agencies: The Senate committee-reported bill would provide roughly $13.7 billion in discretionary funding for LHHS related agencies, roughly 3% less than FY2015 enacted. House LHHS Action: On June 24, the House Appropriations Committee approved its FY2016 LHHS bill by a vote of 30-21 (H.R. 3020; H.Rept. 114-195). This bill would provide $161 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, which is about 2% less than FY2015 enacted levels. In addition, the House committee bill would provide an estimated $718 billion in mandatory funding, for a total of roughly $879 billion for LHHS as a whole. DOL: The House committee-reported bill would provide roughly $11.7 billion in discretionary funding for DOL, roughly 2% less than FY2015 enacted. HHS: The House committee-reported bill would provide roughly $71.3 billion in discretionary funding for HHS, roughly the same as FY2015 enacted. ED: The House committee-reported bill would provide roughly $64.4 billion in discretionary funding for ED, roughly 4% less than FY2015 enacted. Related Agencies: The House committee-reported bill would provide roughly $13.8 billion in discretionary funding for LHHS related agencies, roughly 3% less than FY2015 enacted. President’s Budget Submission: On February 2, 2015, the Obama Administration released the FY2016 President’s budget. The President requested $175 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the LHHS bill, which is about 6% more than FY2015 enacted levels. In addition, the President requested roughly $718 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of roughly $893 billion for LHHS as a whole. DOL: The President requested roughly $13.2 billion in discretionary funding for DOL, roughly 10% more than FY2015 enacted. HHS: The President requested roughly $75.8 billion in discretionary funding for HHS, roughly 7% more than FY2015 enacted. ED: The President requested roughly $70.7 billion in discretionary funding for ED, roughly 5% more than FY2015 enacted. Related Agencies: The President requested roughly $15.1 billion in discretionary funding for LHHS related agencies, roughly 6% more than FY2015 enacted.

Nov 24, 2015

Israel and the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) Movement

This report provides information and analysis on a boycott, divestment, and sanctions (“BDS”) movement against Israel, as well as on economic measures that “differentiate” or might be seen as differentiating between (1) Israel in general and (2) entities linked with Israeli-developed areas and settlements (of disputed legality). Such settlements are found in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and Golan Heights—areas that Israel has controlled and administered since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The report also discusses Anti-BDS or anti-differentiation efforts to date, including U.S. legislative action and proposals at both the federal and state level. Legislative considerations drawing from existing antiboycott law and from First Amendment issues. The BDS movement exists within a larger context of Israel’s complex economic and political relations with the world. Since the breakdown of the last round of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in April 2014, challenges that Israel has faced to its international economic and cultural relations have received greater public attention. Many Israeli officials and other observers speculate that Israel could, over time, face greater international isolation. For more information, see CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti. Congress and the Obama Administration currently encounter a number of policy questions related to the BDS movement and other international economic measures affecting Israel. There appear to be some similarities between U.S. and EU laws and guidelines for labeling of certain products imported from the West Bank. Both jurisdictions require the West Bank to be identified as the place of origin, but a November 11, 2015, European Commission notice requires that the labels for certain imports into the EU—Israel’s largest trading partner—provide additional information to its consumers by further differentiating between products from Israeli settlements and from non-settlement areas. This has fueled debate about whether the EU’s guidelines might contravene international trade commitments under the World Trade Organization (WTO) or constitute, encourage, or foreshadow punitive economic measures against Israel. The Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-26), enacted in June 2015, contains a trade negotiating objective for the U.S.-EU Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) that discourages politically motivated economic actions “intended to penalize or otherwise limit commercial relations specifically with Israel or persons doing business in Israel or in Israeli-controlled territories.” Public debate over P.L. 114-26 focused on whether economic actions differentiating between commerce with Israeli settlements and commerce with Israel constitute or promote BDS-related activity. In a statement after the law’s enactment, the State Department reiterated its continued opposition to BDS activity targeting Israel, but asserted that the inclusion of the phrase “Israeli-controlled territories” in P.L. 114-26 “runs counter to longstanding U.S. policy towards the occupied territories, including with regard to settlement activity.” In November 2015, two Senators proposed an amendment to H.R. 22 (Surface Transportation Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2015) that, if enacted, could lead the Export-Import Bank of the United States to deny credit applications in cases where the executive branch discerns a need to advance U.S. policy in opposing politically motivated behavior intended to penalize or otherwise limit commercial relations with Israel-related persons or entities. Observers question whether and to what extent the proposed amendment might affect the “carefully crafted compromise” on H.R. 22 and its proposed reauthorization of the Export-Import Bank’s charter. Participating in the BDS movement would not appear to place a U.S. organization in violation of existing federal antiboycott legislation, which targets organizations’ participation in foreign boycotts. No foreign state has proclaimed that it participates in the BDS movement, and the movement does not have a secondary tier targeting companies that do business in or with Israel. If Members of Congress are inclined to propose legislation regarding BDS, they might consider using, as points of reference, legal and regulatory frameworks Congress and the executive branch have used to designate actors of concern under various rubrics having to do with trade and/or national security. Opponents of the BDS movement have proposed the enactment of legislation that would prohibit the provision of federal funding to United States corporations, academic institutions, groups, or individuals that engage in BDS activity. Some scholars and commentators have argued that such legislation would raise First Amendment concerns, while others have argued that such legislation would be consistent with the First Amendment. The constitutionality of a restriction on the availability of federal funds would depend upon the particulars of the legislation at issue.

Nov 24, 2015

Syrian Refugee Admissions and Resettlement in the United States: In Brief

The November 2015 attacks in Paris have crystallized concerns among some policymakers in the United States about admitting Syrian refugees. From October 1, 2010, through October 31, 2015, the United States admitted a total of 2,070 Syrian refugees. The Obama Administration previously announced that it would admit at least 10,000 Syrian refugees in FY2016. The U.S. overall refugee ceiling for FY2016 is 85,000. The admission of refugees to the United States and their resettlement here are authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980. The INA defines a refugee as a person who is outside his or her country and who is unable or unwilling to return because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. In special circumstances, a refugee also may be a person who is within his or her country and who is persecuted or has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. The maximum annual number of refugee admissions (refugee ceiling) and the allocation of these numbers by region of the world are set by the President after consultation by Cabinet-level representatives with members of the House and the Senate Judiciary Committees. The Department of State’s (DOS’s) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) is responsible for coordinating and managing the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. Prospective refugees can be referred to the U.S. program by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a U.S. embassy, or a designated nongovernmental organization (NGO), or in some cases, they can access the U.S. refugee program directly. PRM generally arranges for an NGO, an international organization, or U.S. embassy contractors to manage a Resettlement Support Center (RSC) that assists in refugee processing. The RSCs assist applicants in completing documentary requirements and schedule refugee eligibility interviews with the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), which adjudicates refugee applications and makes decisions about eligibility for refugee status. The USCIS officer must determine whether the applicant is qualified under one of the refugee processing priorities, meets the INA definition of a refugee, is not firmly resettled in another country, and is admissible to the United States under the INA. Refugee applicants must clear all required security checks before their applications can receive final approval. Refugees who are accepted for U.S. resettlement are placed in communities throughout the United States. Regardless of where refugees are initially resettled, they are free to relocate at any time. Once admitted to the United States, refugees are eligible for initial resettlement assistance through the DOS Reception and Placement Program and longer-term resettlement assistance through the Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS’s) Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).

Nov 19, 2015

TPP: Selected Commodity Impacts for U.S. Agriculture

Nov 19, 2015

Paris Attacks and "Going Dark": Intelligence-Related Issues to Consider

This report discusses intelligence efforts on tracking numerous individuals involved in the deadly assault in Paris on November 13, 2015.

Nov 19, 2015

Global Research and Development Expenditures: Fact Sheet

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Nov 18, 2015

Puerto Rico and Health Care Finance: Frequently Asked Questions

This report provides answers to frequently asked questions (FAQs) about Puerto Rico's health care system, including how federal health care programs (Medicare, Medicaid, and the State Children's Health Insurance Program [CHIP]) and private health insurance requirements apply to Puerto Rico.

Nov 18, 2015

The Family and Medical Leave Act: An Overview of Title I

The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA; P.L. 103-3, as amended) entitles eligible employees to unpaid, job-protected leave for certain family and medical reasons, with continued group health plan coverage. FMLA requires that covered employers grant up to 12 workweeks in a 12-month period to eligible employees for one or more of the following reasons: the birth and care of the employee’s newborn child, provided that leave is taken within 12 months of the child’s birth; the placement of an adopted or fostered child with the employee, provided that leave is taken within 12 months of the child’s placement; to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious health condition; the employee’s own serious health condition that renders the employee unable to perform the essential functions of his or her job; and qualified military exigencies arising from the covered activity duty status of a covered military member who is the employee’s spouse, child, or parent. In addition, the act provides up to 26 workweeks of leave in a single 12-month period to eligible employees to care for a covered military servicemember (including certain veterans) with a serious injury or illness that was sustained or aggravated in the line of duty while on active duty, if the eligible employee is the covered servicemember’s spouse, child, parent, or next of kin. FMLA leave has four fundamental characteristics: It is an entitlement, which means that, unlike other forms of leave (like vacation days), it must be granted to an eligible employee with an FMLA-qualifying need for leave who meet the act’s notification and documentation requirements. FMLA guarantees unpaid leave, but provides that employees may elect to substitute or employers may require the substitution of certain types of accrued paid leave for unpaid FMLA leave, within the constraints of employer policy. FMLA leave is job-protected, which means that—with few exceptions—an employer must return the employee to the same job or to one that is equivalent in terms of pay, benefits, working conditions, and responsibilities to the one held prior to taking leave. Pre-existing group health benefits must be maintained during the employee’s absence under the same conditions that were in place prior to taking leave. FMLA applies to covered employers and eligible employees in both the private and public sectors. Some provisions for federal civil service employees differ from those that apply to private-sector and state and local government employees. Employer coverage and employee eligibility for FMLA leave are not universal. In general, employers engaged in commerce with 50 or more employees are covered. Employee eligibility is defined in terms of an employee’s work history with a specific employer, and the size of the employer’s workforce in or around the employee’s worksite. This report describes the major provisions of Title I of the act—which apply to the private sector, state and local governments, and certain federal agencies—as administered by the Secretary of Labor.

Nov 16, 2015

U.S. Agent Orange/Dioxin Assistance to Vietnam

U.S. assistance to Vietnam for the environmental and health damage attributed to a dioxin contained in Agent Orange and other herbicides sprayed over much of the southern portion of the country during the Vietnam War remains a major issue in bilateral relations. Since 2007, Congress has appropriated over $130 million to address these two issues. Starting in FY2011, Congress has appropriated separate amounts for environmental remediation and for health and disability activities in areas of Vietnam that were targeted with Agent Orange or remain contaminated with dioxin. Most of appropriated funds have been used by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for the environmental clean-up of Danang airport, one of the major airbases used for storing and spraying the herbicides between 1961 and 1971. A lesser amount of the appropriated funds have been used by USAID for assistance to Vietnam’s persons with disabilities, generally, but not always in the vicinity of Danang or other dioxin contaminated areas. Congressional interest in Agent Orange/dioxin in Vietnam has largely been focused on two issues. The first issue is determining the appropriate amount and type of assistance to provide to address the environmental damage and the health effects of dioxin contamination in Vietnam. The second issue is oversight of how such assistance has been utilized by the State Department and USAID. According to USAID projections, the environmental remediation of Danang airport currently underway by a process known as in-pile thermal desorption (IPTD) will be completed in March 2017 at an estimated cost of $88 million. This is $50 million higher than the original projected cost of the project. USAID has fully obligated those funds Congress has appropriated for environmental remediation assistance to Vietnam. The provision of health-related assistance to areas contaminated with Agent Orange/dioxin has raised more issues. By May 2014, USAID had obligated less than two-thirds of the appropriated funds for fiscal years 2010-2013. In addition, the funds have generally been used for disability assistance programs regardless of the cause of the disability, rather than for both health and disability programs targeting populations residing near Agent Orange/dioxin “hot spots.” Field studies have identified a number of areas in Vietnam contaminated with the dioxin associated with Agent Orange, including the airports near Bien Hoa and Phu Cat, as well as sections of the A Luoi Valley. The U.S. and Vietnamese governments are jointly assessing the possibility of undertaking the clean-up of the Bien Hoa airport. One estimate projects the environmental clean-up of Bien Hoa airport could cost over $250 million. While the obligations for environmental remediation activities generally have not been a matter of congressional concern, how USAID has obligated appropriations for health and disability activities has drawn some attention. Two bills—the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2016 (S. 1725); and the Victims of Agent Orange Relief Act of 2015 (H.R. 2114)—would appropriate additional funds for FY2016. The Obama Administration requested $15.0 million under the Economic Support Fund (ESF) to continue the IPTD project at Danang airport and $4.75 million of Development Assistance (DA) funding for “social and economic services and protection for vulnerable populations.”

Nov 13, 2015

State Management of Federal Lands: Frequently Asked Questions

The federal government owns roughly 640 million acres of land, about 28% of the 2.27 billion acres in the United States. This land is managed by numerous agencies, but four agencies administer about 95% of federal land, with somewhat differing management emphases. These agencies are the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS) in the Department of the Interior (DOI), and the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture. Most federal land is in the West, including Alaska. The total amount of money the federal government spends managing land is not readily available. Federal land ownership began when the original 13 states ceded title to more than 40% of their “western” lands to the central government. Subsequently, the federal government acquired lands from foreign countries through purchases and treaties. The Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, gives Congress authority over the lands, territories, or other property of the United States. This provision provides Congress broad authority over lands owned by the federal government. The U.S. Supreme Court has described this power as “without limitations.” When Congress exercises its authority over federal land, federal law overrides conflicting state laws under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2. States can obtain authority to own and manage federal lands within their borders only by federal, not state, law. Congress’s broad authority over federal lands includes the authority to dispose of lands, and Congress can choose to transfer land to states. When Congress does so, the transferred lands are no longer federally owned. For lands for which the federal government retains ownership, Congress can also give federal agencies authority to delegate or assign responsibility for aspects of federal land management. States have legal authority to manage federal lands within their borders to the extent Congress has given them such authority. For example, Congress has to a large extent left management of wildlife to the states as a traditional area of state concern. Currently, some states are seeking more state and local control over lands and resources. Accordingly, some are considering measures to provide for or express support for the transfer of federal lands to states, to establish task forces or commissions to examine federal land transfer issues, and to assert management authority over federal lands. A collection of efforts from the late 1970s and early 1980s, known as the Sagebrush Rebellion, sought to foster divestiture of federal lands. However, this effort did not succeed. State efforts to claim control of federal lands, without express approval of Congress, are likely to run afoul of the Constitution. Opinions differ about the extent to which the federal government should own and manage land. The extent to which Congress should transfer ownership and management of land to states is a policy choice for Congress. The 114th Congress and recent Congresses have considered, and in some cases enacted, measures related to disposal, acquisition, and management of federal lands. A variety of bills sought to provide for ownership and management of particular parcels by states, individuals, and other entities. At the same time, diverse proposals sought to provide for acquisition of lands for federal ownership and management. Still other proposals focused on establishing or amending agency authorities to dispose of or acquire land.

Nov 12, 2015

Effects of Buy America on Transportation Infrastructure and U.S. Manufacturing: Policy Options

With the aim of protecting American manufacturing and manufacturing jobs, Congress over the years has passed several domestic content laws. Buy America refers to several similar statutes and regulations that apply to federal funds used to support projects involving highways, public transportation, aviation, and intercity passenger rail, including Amtrak. Unless a nationwide or project-specific waiver is granted, Buy America requires the use of U.S.-made iron and steel and the domestic production and assembly of other manufactured goods. One of the main manufacturing industries this applies to is the production of rolling stock (rail cars and buses) used in federally funded public transportation and Amtrak’s intercity passenger rail service. This report examines the effects of Buy America on these two industries, iron and steel manufacturing and rolling stock manufacturing, in the context of industry trends. Buy America dates to passage of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978 (STAA; P.L. 95-599), and is different from the Buy American Act, enacted in 1933, which applies to direct purchases by the federal government. Although the Buy America provisions have been in place in some form for almost 40 years, it is difficult to know how they have affected steel and rolling stock manufacturing in the United States, whether measured by jobs, output, or any other indicator. Empirical evidence on the economic benefits or costs of domestic preference laws is largely lacking, in part because the effects are small compared with macroeconomic forces such as global economic growth and the related growth in demand for steel. Although employment in domestic steel manufacturing has declined sharply, this is largely attributable to higher industry productivity. Buy America has likely promoted the production of rail cars and buses in the United States, but these industries are relatively small, and demand is related strongly to the combined level of federal, state, and local government funding. Buy America could increase the cost of some transportation projects by requiring the purchase of domestic steel, vehicles, and vehicle components when imported products might be cheaper. In some cases, the difficulty of complying with Buy America rules has been blamed for project delays. The cost of imports used in federally supported projects could rise if some agencies within the Department of Transportation (DOT) begin to require that these imports be carried on U.S.-flag vessels in compliance with the FY2009 Defense Act (P.L. 110-417, §3511). Requiring transport by U.S.-flag vessels may also contribute to project delays. Lack of information makes claims about project cost and delay difficult to assess. Much of the congressional activity related to Buy America seeks to strengthen its requirements. The Developing a Reliable and Innovative Vision for the Economy (DRIVE) Act (H.R. 22), a six-year surface transportation bill passed by the Senate in July 2015, would increase from 60% to 70% the share of U.S.-made components and subcomponents required in public transportation vehicles bought with federal support. A version of H.R. 22 passed by the House in November 2015, the Surface Transportation Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2015, would do the same. There are no legislative proposals in the 114th Congress to loosen Buy America requirements substantially. Two proposed provisions in the DRIVE Act would make Buy America somewhat less restrictive. The DRIVE Act would raise the threshold for purchases in public transportation subject to Buy America requirements from $100,000 to $150,000. It would also subject Amtrak to Buy America requirements only for purchases of $5 million or more, as opposed to the current threshold of $1 million.

Nov 10, 2015

The State Department's Final Decision on the Keystone XL Pipeline

This report briefly discusses the State Department's denial of TransCanada's request for a Presidential Permit for proposed pipeline facilities.

Nov 9, 2015

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015: Adjustments to the Budget Control Act of 2011

This report briefly discusses the Bipartisan Budget Agreement of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74), which includes a number of provisions that alter the budget parameters established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25).

Nov 6, 2015

EPA's Clean Power Plan: Implications for the Electric Power Sector

On October 23, 2015, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) released the final version of regulations to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from existing power plants (also referred to as electric generating units or EGUs by EPA). Since carbon dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel combustion is the largest source of U.S. GHG emissions, and fossil fuels are used for the majority of electric power generation, reducing CO2 emissions from power plants plays a key role in the Administration’s climate change policy. Under the provisions of the Clean Power Plan (CPP), states must prepare plans that reduce either total CO2 emissions or emission rates at affected EGUs. When implemented, EPA projects the state plans will reduce CO2 emissions from U.S. power generation approximately 32% by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. EPA prepared state-specific CO2 emissions rates based on newly established national performance standards and the state’s existing power generation portfolio. A state must implement an EPA-approved plan to ensure that power plants individually, in aggregate, or in combination with other measures undertaken by the state, achieve the equivalent of the interim CO2 emissions performance rates (over the “glide path” period of 2022 to 2029), and the final CO2 performance rates, rate-based goals, or mass-based goals by 2030. EPA based the national performance standards in the CPP on the best system of emissions reduction (BSER). In the final rule, BSER includes three (“inside the fence line”) Building Blocks (BBs): BB 1 involves improving the heat rate (i.e., efficiency) of coal-fired steam EGUs. BB 2 substitutes generation from (lower-emitting) existing natural gas combined cycle (NGCC) units for generation from (higher-emitting) steam generating units. BB 3 has generation from new (zero-emitting) renewable energy generating capacity replacing generation from fossil fuel-fired generating units. EPA has modeled potential implications of the CPP in its Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA), and emphasizes demand-side energy efficiency (DSEE) as a potential low-cost option. While DSEE is not a part of the BSER (and is an “outside the fence” activity), EPA’s RIA assumes DSEE can lower electricity demand and reduce electric system costs, thereby offsetting estimated electricity price increases. As a result, EPA projects lower average electricity bills nationally by 2030. EPA’s RIA also estimates reduced electricity demand will lower natural gas consumption, even as more NGCC capacity may be called upon to back up increased intermittent and variable renewable electric generation. Increased dependence on renewable generation may require new transmission lines. Many of today’s transmission projects awaiting regulatory approvals are intended to serve renewable electricity projects. It can take from 3 to 10 years to get the federal, state, and local permits to build a major electric transmission line; planning may need to begin now so that new lines will be in place for when they may be needed in the early 2020s. State decisions on the design and availability of DSEE programs may be crucial to attaining the levels of subscribership necessary to achieve the demand reductions projected in the RIA. For some states, attaining the levels of cost-effective DSEE projects needed to reduce CPP compliance costs may be a challenge, while for the top tier of states currently engaged in DSEE, the challenge may be identifying the next increment of cost-effective projects. Going forward, EPA’s GHG regulations may provide a basis for the evolution of the U.S. electric power sector. EPA has based the CPP on increasing renewables as the technology of choice for new power generation. EPA declares in the CPP that states and affected EGUs can essentially use whatever methods they choose to meet CO2 emissions and emission-rate reductions in timeframes proposed, and in so doing, creates a plan it believes most states and affected EGUs may be able to comply with in the timeframe allowed. The overall costs of CPP compliance will not begin to be known until after state compliance plans are filed and implemented.

Nov 5, 2015

Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE): Appropriations and the FY2016 Budget Request

Nov 4, 2015

The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act (NAHASDA): Issues and Reauthorization Legislation in the 114th Congress

The Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act of 1996 (NAHASDA; P.L. 104-330) replaced several existing sources of housing funding for Native Americans with a single block grant, the Native American Housing Block Grant (NAHBG). Through the NAHBG, tribes and Alaska Native villages receive formula funding from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to use for a variety of affordable housing activities that benefit low-income Native American households living in tribal areas. NAHASDA also authorizes a loan guarantee program for tribes (the Title VI loan guarantee) and funding for training and technical assistance. In addition, NAHASDA (as amended) authorizes the Native Hawaiian Housing Block Grant (NHHBG), which provides funds for affordable housing activities for low-income Native Hawaiians eligible to reside on the Hawaiian Home Lands. While tribes are generally supportive of NAHASDA, some have advocated for changes to program requirements. For example, tribes have argued for streamlining certain cross-cutting federal requirements when multiple sources of funds are used in a single project, for more flexibility in setting certain program requirements, and for HUD to respond to requests for approvals or waivers of NAHASDA requirements in a more timely fashion. Furthermore, Congress has expressed concern over certain NAHASDA-related issues. For several years, there has been some opposition in Congress to reauthorizing housing programs for Native Hawaiians out of concern that such programs could be construed to be based on race. Congress has also debated whether, and how, to respond to ongoing litigation between the Cherokee Nation and the Cherokee Freedmen. More recently, Congress has expressed concern about a few tribes that have accumulated large balances of unexpended NAHASDA funds. The authorization for most NAHASDA programs expired at the end of FY2013 (the authorization for the NHHBG expired at the end of FY2005), although Congress has continued to provide funding for these programs. The reauthorization process has presented an opportunity for Congress to consider potential program changes advocated by tribes as well as other issues related to NAHASDA that are of interest to Congress. In the 114th Congress, the House has passed a NAHASDA reauthorization bill (H.R. 360), while in the Senate a different bill has been favorably reported out of committee (S. 710). Both H.R. 360 and S. 710 would reauthorize a number of Native American and Native Hawaiian housing programs, authorize certain new program demonstrations and set-asides for Native American housing, and provide for a reduction in NAHBG formula funding for certain tribes with large amounts of unspent funds (although in slightly different ways). Both bills also include a number of changes to NAHASDA requirements, including provisions related to streamlining environmental review and lease termination requirements when NAHASDA funds are combined with other sources of funding, and allowing tribes to set their own maximum rents for NAHASDA-assisted housing. Although the House and the Senate reauthorization bills address many of the same issues, they do not always do so in the same way. Each bill also includes provisions related to certain issues that are not included in the other bill.

Nov 3, 2015

TANF Reauthorization: House Ways and Means Committee Discussion Draft of July 10, 2015

Nov 3, 2015

Cargo Preferences for U.S.-Flag Shipping

Long-standing U.S. policy has treated the U.S.-flag international fleet as a naval auxiliary to be available in times of war or national emergency. When the United States is involved in an extended military conflict overseas, 90% or more of military cargoes are typically carried by ship. To support the U.S. merchant marine, Congress has required that “government-impelled” cargo sent overseas be carried on U.S.-flag ships. Government-impelled cargo (a.k.a. “preference cargo”) is government-owned cargo, such as military supplies and food aid, and any cargo that is somehow financed by the federal government, such as by the Export-Import Bank. While export shipments account for the vast bulk of government-impelled cargo, in 2008 Congress extended the law to require that state and local governments and private entities importing goods with federal financial assistance ship at least 50% of such cargo in U.S.-flag vessels. Regulations to implement that requirement have not been issued. Historically, cargo preference law has been used to assure that a large proportion of government-impelled cargoes is shipped in privately owned U.S.-flag ships rather than in government-owned vessels such as those now controlled by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Military cargo then, and more so now, accounts for the overwhelming bulk of preference cargoes. Since 1954, an agreement between U.S. government cabinet departments has restricted the size of the military-owned fleet and has required the military to turn first to the private fleet before using its own ships. The cost of employing U.S. citizens aboard U.S.-flag commercial vessels appears to be higher than the costs of employing the federal civilian mariners that crew government-owned ships. It appears preference cargo now accounts for almost all of the revenues of the U.S.-flag international fleet. U.S.-flag ships do not appear competitive with foreign-flag ships in carrying the overwhelming bulk of exports and imports transacted in the private sector. However, Congress has directed that the U.S. government pay the additional cost of U.S.-flag shipping in order to maintain the U.S.-flag international fleet as a naval auxiliary to be available in times of war or national emergency. This cost may be influenced by the level of competition among U.S.-flag carriers bidding for preference cargoes and the procedures for determining “fair and reasonable rates.” The needs of the commercial market increasingly have diverged from those of the military, as the trend toward highly specialized and larger ships in the commercial sector appears inconsistent with the military’s shipping requirements. However, the knowledge and skills of the mariners aboard U.S.-flag commercial ships are transferrable to manning a military reserve fleet of ships. In the 114th Congress, several disparate bills would have the effect of either increasing or decreasing the volume of preference cargo significantly. The bills involve the future of food-aid policy, the existence of the Export-Import Bank, and the level of operating subsidy provided to U.S.-flag carriers. The boom in domestic oil and gas production also has led to discussions in Congress about whether U.S.-flag tankers should be guaranteed a portion of the cargo if these products are exported. These issues are arising at a time when U.S.-flag operators face a potential decline in the amount of preference cargo due to overseas troop withdrawals and changes in food-aid policy.

Oct 29, 2015

Impeachment and Removal

The impeachment process provides a mechanism for removal of the President, Vice President, and other “civil Officers of the United States” found to have engaged in “treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.” The Constitution places the responsibility and authority to determine whether to impeach an individual in the hands of the House of Representatives. Should a simple majority of the House approve articles of impeachment specifying the grounds upon which the impeachment is based, the matter is then presented to the Senate, to which the Constitution provides the sole power to try an impeachment. A conviction on any one of the articles of impeachment requires the support of a two-thirds majority of the Senators present. Should a conviction occur, the Senate retains limited authority to determine the appropriate punishment. Under the Constitution, the penalty for conviction on an impeachable offense is limited to either removal from office, or removal and prohibition against holding any future offices of “honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.” Although removal from office would appear to flow automatically from conviction on an article of impeachment, a separate vote is necessary should the Senate deem it appropriate to disqualify the individual convicted from holding future federal offices of public trust. Approval of such a measure requires only the support of a simple majority. Key Takeaways of This Report The Constitution gives Congress the authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and other federal “civil officers” upon a determination that such officers have engaged in treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. A simple majority of the House is necessary to approve articles of impeachment. If the Senate, by vote of a two-thirds majority, convicts the official on any article of impeachment, the result is removal from office and, at the Senate’s discretion, disqualification from holding future office. The Constitution does not articulate who qualifies as a “civil officer.” Most impeachments have applied to federal judges. With regard to the executive branch, lesser functionaries—such as federal employees who belong to the civil service, do not exercise “significant authority,” and are not appointed by the President or an agency head—do not appear to be subject to impeachment. At the opposite end of the spectrum, it would appear that any official who qualifies as a principal officer, including a head of an agency such as a Secretary, Administrator, or Commissioner, is likely subject to impeachment. Impeachable conduct does not appear to be limited to criminal behavior. Congress has identified three general types of conduct that constitute grounds for impeachment, although these categories should not be understood as exhaustive: (1) improperly exceeding or abusing the powers of the office; (2) behavior incompatible with the function and purpose of the office; and (3) misusing the office for an improper purpose or for personal gain. The House has impeached 19 individuals: 15 federal judges, one Senator, one Cabinet member, and two Presidents. The Senate has conducted 16 full impeachment trials. Of these, eight individuals—all federal judges—were convicted by the Senate.

Oct 29, 2015

The EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement on Personal Data Privacy: In Brief

This report discusses a recent judgement by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that invalidates the Safe Harbor Agreement between the United States and the 28-member European Union (EU). Safe Harbor is a 15-year-old accord, under which personal data could legally be transferred between EU member countries and the United States.

Oct 29, 2015

Designation of Global 'Too Big To Fail' Firms

This report provides background on the the Financial Stability Board's (FSB) designation process for systemically significant financial institutions, but takes no position on any potential benefits or shortcomings of that process.

Oct 29, 2015

House Transportation Bill Would Hold Spending Below Senate Bill

This report discusses the Surface Transportation Reauthorization and Reform Act of 2015 (STRRA), which provides only those spending increases the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has determined are needed to cover projected inflation in the cost of the existing surface transportation program.

Oct 29, 2015