CRS Reports

Fresh Beef Import Rules for Brazil and Argentina

Mar 2, 2016

Forced Labor Trafficking in the International Fishing Sector

Feb 29, 2016

Is the Chinese “Economic Miracle” Over?

Feb 28, 2016

Senators’ Official Personnel and Office Expense Account (SOPOEA): History and Usage

The Senators’ Official Personnel and Office Expense Account (SOPOEA) is available to assist Senators in their official duties. The allowance is provided on a fiscal year basis (i.e., October 1-September 30). Funding is provided in the annual legislative branch appropriations bills. Senators have a high degree of flexibility to use the SOPOEA to operate their offices in a way that supports their congressional duties and responsibilities, and individual office spending may be as varied as the states from which the Senators are elected. This appropriations account has decreased in recent years, from a high of $422.0 million in FY2010 to $390.0 million in FY2014, a decrease of 7.6%. The appropriation remained at the FY2014 level in the FY2015 and FY2016 appropriations acts. The SOPOEA for each Senator is calculated based on three variables—the administrative and clerical assistance allowance, the legislative assistance allowance, and the official office expense allowance. The formula results in a single, consolidated allowance for each Senator that can be used to pay for any type of approved official expense, subject to any regulations or limitations established by statute, Senate rules, the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, and the Senate Ethics Committee. A preliminary list of SOPOEA levels shows a range in FY2016 of $3,008,288 to $4,760,211, depending on the state. The average allowance is $3,263,940. Pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §4108, Senate expenses are reported online biennially on a fiscal year basis in the Report of the Secretary of the Senate. This report provides a history of the SOPOEA and overview of recent developments, including funding levels. It also analyzes actual SOPOEA spending patterns in selected years (fiscal years 2007, 2008, 2011, and 2012). For a similar analysis of Member office budgets in the House of Representatives, see CRS Report R40962, Members’ Representational Allowance: History and Usage, by Ida A. Brudnick.

Feb 25, 2016

Perspectives on Federal Cybersecurity Spending

The federal government invests significant resources in cybersecurity across every agency through a variety of activities. Although a methodologically rigorous total for these investments has not been calculated and may not be possible, an understanding of how the federal government applies resources to protect U.S. public and private sector data and networks from cyberattacks is necessary for Congress to provide constructive oversight of those efforts. This report considers federal cybersecurity investments in three broad categories: Agency spending to protect its own systems, networks, and data; Agency spending to protect other governmental systems, networks, and data; and Agency spending to protect non-federal IT systems, networks, and data. Each department and agency has some level of participation in cybersecurity activities. However, the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Defense have unique responsibilities established by statute—either for their role in assisting other departments and agencies, or, as in the case with the Department of Defense, for their unique responsibility for their own information technology. Each February the administration releases three sets of documents which describe some facets of the government’s investments in cybersecurity: The President’s Budget; Congressional Budget Justifications from each department or agency; and The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) report to Congress. These reports provide some valuable insights into how or why the government makes certain investments associated with promoting cybersecurity. However, on their own, none of these documents provides a complete and precise representation of how much the federal government is spending on cybersecurity. This is in part because of how they are developed; they are developed from agency submissions based on administration guidance that does not require methodologically consistent reporting on cybersecurity spending—or even provide a common definition for what cybersecurity is. Even if such an authoritative top-line figure for federal cybersecurity investments were available, without detail and context it would not effectively inform the Congressional decision-making process. Understanding the risks an individual agency faces, and what strategies they have for confronting those risks given their size, complexity, and mission is vital to determining the appropriate level of future cybersecurity investments for that agency. Armed with an understanding of those factors, Congress may choose to assess cybersecurity investments of a federal agency independently. Congress may alternatively choose to assess internal cybersecurity investments by an agency relative to similar federal agencies, and external investments relative to, and supporting, the non-“.gov” sector.

Feb 25, 2016

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families and Related Programs: The President’s FY2017 Budget Proposal

Feb 25, 2016

The Death of Justice Scalia: Procedural Issues Arising on an Eight-Member Supreme Court

On February 13, 2016, Justice Antonin Scalia unexpectedly passed away at the age of 79, vacating a seat on the Supreme Court that he had held for nearly 30 years. Supreme Court vacancies that arise in presidential election years rarely occur, and have in the past led to a seat on the Court staying open for extended periods of time. With suggestions that Justice Scalia’s successor may not be confirmed for several months, let alone before the fall election, a possibility exists that Justice Scalia’s seat on the High Court may remain open for an extended period of time, including throughout the remainder of the 2015 Supreme Court term. While the Supreme Court consists of nine Justices, it does not need nine Justices to decide a case. Instead, Congress has established quorum requirements for the Court, providing that any six Justices “shall constitute a quorum.” By tradition, the agreement of a majority of the quorum is necessary to act for the Court. As a consequence, with an eight-member Court, there is the possibility of split votes, where a majority cannot agree on the outcome in a given case. With several high-profile cases pending on the Court’s docket, including cases on public employee unions, abortion, and immigration, it appears that the Court could become equally divided on a number of matters in the near future. In the absence of a full Court, when the quorum of Justices is evenly divided (four to four or three to three), the Supreme Court has empirically adopted one of two approaches. First, if the participating Justices are equally divided on the merits of a case, the Court’s practice has, at times, been not to write an opinion, but to enter a judgment that tersely affirms the lower court judgment without any indication of the Court’s voting alignment. Such an order has no precedential value. Second, in lieu of issuing a summary affirmance of the lower court opinion, the Court could instead order reargument of the case. The Court possesses inherent authority to order reargument of a case sua sponte or on its own volition, and has exercised such authority in the past when there was an open seat on the Court. In addition, an unsuccessful petitioner could petition the Court for a rehearing in anticipation of a Court with a changed composition. Nonetheless, the “more likely” vehicle for rehearing, where the Court is equally divided among its members, is for the Court to order a rehearing sua sponte prior to issuing a decision on the merits. This report provides an overview of the Supreme Court’s procedural rules and requirements when the Court is staffed with less than nine members. Included in this discussion is an overview of the Court’s quorum requirements, rehearing procedures, and vote count practices, with a focus on how the Court has traditionally responded to a change of composition during a term. The report concludes by highlighting over a dozen cases from the current term that could result in an evenly divided Supreme Court.

Feb 25, 2016

Daily Fantasy Sports: Industry Trends, Legal and Regulatory Issues, and Policy Options

Daily fantasy sports (DFS) companies, which operate online gaming platforms that allow players to assemble imaginary sports teams and compete in daily or weekly contests, function in a gray area of the law. The federal government does not license or regulate them. State governments have the main responsibility for regulating gaming activities that offer the prospect of monetary rewards, but a series of federal laws, most recently the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA; P.L. 109-347), may limit states’ ability to oversee DFS. The 2006 law, however, was enacted at a time when only season-long fantasy sports existed. Whether Congress intended it to exempt DFS from state regulation is unclear. Congress, multiple states, and law enforcement agencies have questioned the legality of the fledgling DFS industry, with a central focus on whether DFS contests are indeed games of skill (which would most likely make DFS legal) or chance (which would probably make DFS unlawful gambling). The legal status of DFS under state law directly affects whether DFS operators may be federally prosecuted under the Illegal Gambling Business Act (P.L. 91-452) and whether banks and payment processors could be held liable for violating UIGEA if they process monetary transactions related to daily fantasy sports. It is also possible that courts could determine that the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA; P.L. 102-559) prohibits most state legislatures from authorizing or regulating DFS. In 2015, more than a dozen states considered whether or not to allow DFS operators to offer their gaming activities to individuals located within their borders. Nevada has decided to require DFS operators to obtain a license from its state gaming commission. Other states are considering a similar approach, which could include wagering taxes akin to the ones casinos pay. If state lawmakers decide to treat DFS as gambling, and if the courts determine that status is consistent with federal law, DFS would be subject to regulations, licensing, consumer protection safeguards, and other mandates where states choose to impose and enforce them. In the absence of state regulation, there is no means of assuring customers’ access to funds on deposit with DFS operators and of enforcing prohibitions on participation by underage gamers. Despite the controversy that surrounds it, the DFS sector is relatively small. FanDuel and DraftKings, the two largest operators, and the roughly two dozen smaller DFS companies are estimated to have booked around $86 million in net revenue (receipts minus prizes) from DFS in 2014, a small fraction of the regulated gambling industry’s net revenue. Nonetheless, a variety of sports teams and organizations and media companies have invested in the DFS industry, suggesting a potential for rapid expansion if the industry’s legal status is clarified. There are strong differences of opinion within the traditional gambling industry on DFS. Some land-based casino operators fear losing customers to DFS games, while other casino owners see it as a potential new revenue source allowing them to attract younger players. Some Indian tribes that operate casinos have expressed concern about the prospect that DFS could reduce their revenues, but many tribes have not weighed in. In some states, racinos (gambling venues located at racetracks) may lobby to offer DFS sports to help increase interest in horse racing; in other states, racino operators worry that DFS will divert potential bettors from their facilities. A few state lotteries are considering whether to offer online DFS games.

Feb 24, 2016

NASA: FY2017 Budget and Appropriations

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was created in 1958 by the National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-568) to conduct civilian space and aeronautics activities. It has four mission directorates. The Science Mission Directorate manages robotic science missions, such as the Hubble Space Telescope, the Mars rover Curiosity, and satellites for Earth science research. The Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate conducts research and development on aircraft and aviation systems. The Space Technology Mission Directorate develops new technologies for use in future space missions, such as advanced propulsion and laser communications. The Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate is responsible for human spaceflight activities, including the International Space Station and development efforts for future crewed spacecraft. In addition, NASA’s Office of Education manages formal and informal education programs for school children, college and university students, and the general public. While Congress is generally supportive of most NASA programs, government-wide fiscal constraints make funding decisions challenging. The Administration has requested $19.025 billion for NASA in FY2017. This amount is 1.3% less than the FY2016 appropriation of $19.285 billion. Unusually, the FY2017 request includes $763 million in mandatory funds. According to NASA, the reason for requesting mandatory funding is that “the constrained top line for discretionary funding ... has made it difficult to appropriately fund important national priorities, including research and development.” The FY2017 request for the Science Mission Directorate is $5.601 billion, an increase of 0.2% from FY2016. Within this total, funding for Earth Science, Astrophysics, and Heliophysics would increase, while funding for Planetary Science and the James Webb Space Telescope would decrease. The request for Earth Science includes $131 million for Landsat-9. The request for Planetary Science includes $50 million for a mission to Jupiter’s moon Europa. The FY2017 request for the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate is $790 million, an increase of 23.5% from FY2016. The request includes New Aviation Horizons (NAH), a new initiative of experimental aircraft and systems demonstrations. The FY2017 request for the Space Technology Mission Directorate is $827 million, an increase of 20.4% from FY2016. The request includes funding for the Restore-L satellite servicing mission. For the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate, the FY2017 request for Exploration is $3.337 billion, a decrease of 17.2% from FY2016, while the request for Space Operations is $5.076 billion, an increase of 0.9%. The Exploration request includes $1.263 billion, a decrease of 35.2%, for Space Launch System launch vehicle development. Funding for the commercial crew program (formerly requested in Exploration) is combined with funding for operational cargo and crew transport to the International Space Station in a new Space Transportation item within Space Operations. The FY2017 request for the Office of Education is $100 million, a decrease of 13.0% from FY2016. The request includes $24 million for the National Space Grant College and Fellowship Program, $9 million for the Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research, and $30 million for the Minority University Research Education Program. This report will be updated as Congress acts on FY2017 appropriations legislation.

Feb 23, 2016

Court-Ordered Access to Smart Phones: In Brief

The tension between the benefits and challenges of encryption has been an issue for law enforcement and policymakers since the 1990s, and was reinvigorated in 2014 when companies like Apple and Google implemented automatic enhanced encryption on mobile devices and certain communications systems. Companies using such strong encryption do not maintain “back door” keys and, therefore, now cannot easily unlock, or decrypt, the devices—not even when presented with a valid legal order. Law enforcement concerns about the lack of back door keys were highlighted by the November and December 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France, and San Bernardino, CA. Questions arose as to whether the attackers used strong encryption and, more importantly, if they did, whether and how this might have hindered investigations. Following the December 2, 2015, terrorist attack in San Bernardino, CA,, U.S. investigators recovered a cell phone reportedly used by one of the shooters. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director James B. Comey testified before Congress two months later, indicating that the Bureau was still unable to access the information on that device. On February 16, 2016, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California ordered Apple to provide “reasonable technical assistance to assist law enforcement agents in obtaining access to the data” on the cell phone. The order directs Apple’s assistance to feature three components: bypass or disable the iPhone’s auto-erase after 10 incorrect passcode attempts function (even if the function has not been enabled); enable the FBI to electronically input passcodes for testing; and ensure there is no added delay between passcode attempts. The order is not for Apple to decrypt the device itself, something which Apple has publicly stated it cannot do. Instead, this order would enable the FBI to automate the attempts of every possible passcode for the device until the right combination of characters is hit upon by pushing a software update to the iPhone in question’s operating system. Apple is contesting the order, which will require the magistrate judge, and perhaps the district and appeals courts, to assess whether the All Writs Act (28 U.S.C. §1651) can be interpreted broadly to grant the relief the government seeks. The All Writs Act, enacted as part of the first Judiciary Act of 1789, provides a residual source of legal authority to federal judges to enforce the orders of their courts. Whether the All Writs Act can be read to include such an order will largely depend on two inquiries: first, whether a reviewing court would view the FBI’s request as an “unreasonable burden” on Apple under the 1977 Supreme Court case United States v. New York Tel. Co.; and, second, whether such a command is consistent with the intent of Congress. This is a fact-intensive inquiry, the contours of which are uncertain. Policymakers may ask a number of questions with respect to the order from the Central District of California and the larger ongoing encryption debate. Apple has indicated that it is possible to develop an alternate operating system for the iPhone in question that would accomplish the items in the court order. As such, a main question now is whether it should be done. Will doing so effectively create a “back door” to the encryption? What precedent might be set by Apple providing the court-ordered assistance? If Apple develops an alternate operating system to comply with this order, would Apple and other companies have to comply with similar requests in other law enforcement investigations? In addition, as a multinational corporation, would Apple need to comply with requests from other national governments?

Feb 23, 2016

Amending Senate Rules at the Start of a New Congress, 1953-1975: An Analysis with an Afterword to 2015

The filibuster (extended debate) is the Senate’s most well-known procedure. Hollywood even highlighted its use in a famous 1939 movie entitled Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, starring actor Jimmy Stewart in the title role of Senator Jefferson Smith. Lengthy debate has many virtues (informing the public, for example) but the blocking potential of interminable debate has often made the filibuster a target for change by reform-minded Senators. Rule XXII requires 60 votes of Senators duly chosen and sworn to end debate on measures or motions—“except on a measure or motion to amend the Senate rules, in which case the necessary affirmative vote shall be two-thirds of the Senators present and voting.” Real or threatened filibusters, along with cloture motions, have increased in recent Congresses. One consequence has been unsuccessful efforts by change-oriented Senators to amend Rule XXII without having to overcome the two-thirds supermajority hurdle. The contention of the reformers is that at the start of a new Congress, the Senate can amend its rules by majority vote—as the House does on its first day. They cite the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 5) as authority for their claim: “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,” which implicitly means by majority vote, state the reformers. Opponents reject the so-called “constitutional” option. They point out that the Senate has adopted rules and the Constitution says nothing about the vote required to adopt those rules. Moreover, they contend that the Senate is a “continuing body”—a quorum to conduct business is always present given the staggered terms of Senators—with continuing rules. The bottom line: a Senate majority can always amend the chamber’s rules at any time during the two-year life of a Congress so long as the existing rules are observed, such as Rule XXII. Proponents of change refute that argument. They agree that a majority of the Members can change Senate rules at any time. Their concern is Rule XXII’s two-thirds requirement for invoking cloture on proposals to amend Senate rules, which can prevent a majority from altering Senate rules. From 1953 to 1975, initiatives to reform Rule XXII at the start of a new Congress were biennial rituals. They were instigated by Senators in each party frustrated by the chamber’s inability to enact social and civil rights legislation because of opposition from other Members. The bulk of this report examines each Congress where reform actions occurred on “opening day,” which could extend for days, weeks, or months. Most of the reform attempts failed, but two efforts were successful: in 1959 and 1975. An analysis of the successes and failures of this nearly quarter-century era of opening day reform efforts could inform contemporary efforts to revise Senate rules by examining the controversies, conditions, and circumstances that produced the various outcomes. The report discusses, for example, the roles of various Senate Presidents (the Vice President) and party leaders, as well as the procedural strategies used by opponents and proponents of amending Rule XXII by majority vote at the start of a new Congress. The report also includes an “Afterword” that examines several subsequent and successful efforts to change Rule XXII in 1977, 1979, 1986, and 2013. The 2013 case is noteworthy because it created a new Senate precedent that allows majority cloture on most executive and judicial branch nominees. This precedential approach is sometimes called the “nuclear” option because of the likelihood of strong opposition and contentious parliamentary fallout from Senators opposed to its use on consequential measures or matters. In brief, the nuclear option indirectly “amends” Senate rules by majority vote through the creation of a new precedent that alters the application or interpretation of a chamber’s rule, such as Rule XXII, without changing its formal text.

Feb 23, 2016

Crude Oil Exports and Related Provisions in P.L. 114-113: In Brief

On December 18, 2015, Congress passed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (H.R. 2029), which was signed by the President and became P.L. 114-113. Included in P.L. 114-113 is a provision that repeals Section 103 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA; P.L. 94-163), which directs the President to promulgate a rule prohibiting crude oil exports. For nearly four decades, repeal of EPCA was generally not a policy issue since oil production was declining and imports were rising. However, increasing U.S. light oil production starting in the 2010/2011 timeframe, projected production increases, and domestic-to-international oil price differentials that were as large as $30 per barrel, motivated many companies and trade organizations to advocate removing the EPCA crude oil export prohibition. P.L. 114-113 also includes a “savings clause” and a list of exceptions that maintain and provide the President with authority to restrict exports under certain circumstances. Enactment of P.L. 114-113 allows U.S. crude oil to be marketed and sold to international buyers and concludes a nearly two-year debate about the varied and multi-dimensional considerations associated with allowing the export of crude oil produced in the United States. Some oil producers may benefit from this policy change, when market conditions warrant, by potentially selling crude oil for a higher price to global buyers. Perhaps more important for all U.S. oil producers is that allowing crude oil exports may limit the domestic/international price differential in the future. Studies published during the debate estimated that crude oil exports might range between 0 and 2 million barrels per day, reflecting the uncertainty of future market conditions that might motivate exports. Exactly how much crude oil will be exported will depend on oil price differentials, which had narrowed to less than $1 per barrel in January 2016. In addition to repealing EPCA Section 103, P.L. 114-113 also includes provisions that address two considerations discussed during the crude oil export debate. First, owners of U.S. flag ships advocated that crude oil exporters be required to use such ships for overseas transport. While this requirement was not included in P.L. 114-113, the law does include a provision that authorizes increasing the annual subsidy paid to U.S. flag cargo ships participating in the Maritime Security Program (MSP), which provides an operating subsidy in exchange for participating ships being subject to Department of Defense acquisition during times of war. The operating subsidy for each participating ship was increased from $3.1 million to around $5 million per year thru 2021. Second, independent U.S. refiners were generally opposed to allowing unrestricted crude oil exports as many of them were benefiting from price discounts that might either be eliminated or limited as a result of removing export restrictions. Some refiners expressed concern that the cost of waterborne crude shipments from the Gulf coast may result in a competitive disadvantage and that the value of investments made in crude-by-rail infrastructure may be adversely affected should crude oil export restrictions be removed. P.L. 114-113 modified the Section 199 tax deduction for independent refiners by changing how independent refiners account for transportation costs when calculating the deduction, potentially allowing higher oil transportation costs to be associated with greater tax relief. Overall, the enhanced deduction for independent refiners may have fairly modest effects. For most independent refiners that are able to claim the enhanced deduction, the change has the potential to reduce tax liability by up to 1.575% of oil-related transportation costs.

Feb 22, 2016

Army Corps of Engineers: FY2017 Appropriations

Feb 22, 2016

Federal Highway Traffic Safety Policies: Impacts and Opportunities

In 2013, 32,000 Americans were killed in crashes involving motor vehicles. Motor vehicle crashes are a leading cause of death for Americans overall, and the number one cause of death for teenagers. Millions of people are injured in crashes annually, and motor vehicle crashes are estimated to have cost some $242 billion in 2010 in lost productivity, medical costs, legal costs, property damage, and time lost in congestion caused by crashes. The number of people killed in crashes has declined significantly over the past decade. The reasons for this sharp decline are not entirely clear. While traffic safety agencies have attributed it, at least in part, to their safety efforts, it is in line with a general trend: as measured by the number of miles people are driving, the rate at which people are killed in traffic crashes has been declining steadily since records began to be kept in 1929. Congress has played a role in improving highway safety. Making road travel safer was one of the responsibilities Congress gave to the federal Department of Transportation (DOT) when it created the department in 1966. Congress has directed DOT to improve the safety of automobile design and of road design, as well as to support programs to improve driver behavior. An oft-cited statistic in traffic safety is that as many as 90% of road deaths are due at least in part to driver error or misbehavior (such as driving too fast for conditions or driving while drunk or distracted). Driver behavior is a state, not federal, matter; in an effort to address it, Congress has enacted programs that encourage states to pass laws to promote safer driving. The role of driver behavior versus road design and traffic management is a subject of debate. Some analysts note that road designs and traffic management arrangements often allow, or even encourage, driver error and misbehavior, and so play a larger role in crashes than is often recognized. One of the core highway capital improvement programs Congress has authorized is intended to fund safety improvements to highway infrastructure. A federal study estimated that half of the improvement in highway fatality rates since 1960 was attributable to improvements in vehicle safety technologies, with social and demographic changes, driver behavior interventions, and improvements in road design playing smaller roles. Most of the vehicle safety technologies analyzed in the study increased the likelihood that vehicle occupants would survive a crash. More recently, technological development has focused on preventing crashes. While some crash-prevention technologies, such as automatic braking and lane departure warnings, are available now, others, such as vehicle-to-vehicle communication and vehicles that can operate without human intervention, are not yet on the market. Given that most vehicles remain in use for many years, it may be a decade or more before the majority of cars on the road incorporate those new technologies. There is opportunity for further improvement: crash and injury rates are no longer declining, and preliminary estimates indicate the fatality rate increased significantly in the first nine months of 2015. Several other nations have significantly improved their highway safety rates in the past few decades, surpassing the U.S. rates. Policy options that might further reduce traffic crashes, injuries, and fatalities include encouraging states to adopt stronger laws regarding use of seat belts and motorcycle helmets, encouraging the use of automated traffic enforcement to reduce speeding and failure to stop at red lights and stop signs, and accelerating the deployment of new vehicle safety technologies. Motorcycle helmet laws and automated traffic enforcement have encountered public opposition.

Feb 19, 2016

FY2017 State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs Budget Request: In Brief

On February 9, 2016, the Obama Administration submitted to Congress its FY2017 budget request for State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) totaling $52.78 billion (-0.1% compared with the FY2016 estimate), $37.89 billion for enduring (ongoing) funds and $14.89 billion for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). Of the total request, $17.05 billion is for State Department Operations and related agencies (a 3.6% increase over FY2016 estimates); $35.74 billion is for Foreign Operations (-1.8% compared with the FY2016 estimates). This report provides an overview of the FY2017 SFOPS request and account-by-account funding comparisons with FY2015 actual and FY2016 estimated appropriations, when available. A more detailed report on the FY2017 SFOPS appropriations will become available when SFOPS legislation is introduced in Congress and will be updated throughout the appropriations process.

Feb 19, 2016

The Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC): In Brief

The Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC) subsidizes most of the cost of qualified health insurance for eligible taxpayers and their family members. Potential eligibility for the HCTC is limited to two groups of taxpayers. One group is comprised of individuals eligible for Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) allowances because they experienced qualifying job losses. The other group consists of individuals whose defined-benefit pension plans were taken over by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) because of financial difficulties. HCTC-eligible individuals are allowed to receive the tax credit only if they either could not enroll in certain other health coverage (e.g., Medicaid) or are not eligible for other specified coverage (e.g., Medicare Part A). To claim the HCTC, eligible taxpayers must have qualified health insurance (specific categories of coverage, as specified in statute). Several of those categories, known as state-qualified health plans, are available only after being established by state action. The HCTC is refundable, so eligible taxpayers may receive the full credit amount even if they had little or no federal income tax liability. The credit is also advanceable, so taxpayers may receive the credit on a monthly basis to coincide with the payment of premiums. The HCTC has a sunset date of January 1, 2020.

Feb 18, 2016

Surface Transportation Funding and Programs Under the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94)

On December 4, 2015, President Barack Obama signed the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94). The act authorized spending on federal highway and public transportation programs, surface transportation safety and research activities, and rail programs for five years, through September 30, 2020. The act’s authorization totaled roughly $305 billion for FY2016 through FY2020. This included $233 billion for highways and highway safety, $61 billion for public transportation, and more than $10 billion for Amtrak. Most of the funding for surface transportation bills has been drawn from the Highway Trust Fund (HTF) since its creation in 1956, but the principal revenue source for the HTF, federal motor fuel taxes, has not generated sufficient revenue to cover HTF outlays since 2008. To fill this shortfall, Congress has relied on Treasury general fund transfers to make up the difference. Although Congress was unable to agree on a long-term solution to the HTF revenue issue, the FAST Act identified roughly $70 billion in budgetary offsets to support general fund transfers sufficient to pay for the five-year bill. The FAST Act builds upon the many programmatic changes made in the previous multiyear reauthorization bill, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141). The act also continues initiatives intended to increase program efficiency through performance-based planning and the streamlining of project development. Among FAST Act’s major attributes are $225 billion authorized from the HTF over five years, an average of $45 billion annually, for Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) programs; $61 billion authorized from the HTF and the general fund, an average of $12.2 billion per year, for Federal Transit Administration (FTA) programs; a major redirection of funding toward highway freight projects via a new formula program and a competitive grant program; direct funding for the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) program of $275 million, down from $1 billion in FY2015; competitive grant component added to the Bus and Bus Facilities Program; provisions on intercity passenger rail transportation included in a surface transportation act for the first time; and no project earmarks. The FAST Act does not increase motor fuels taxes or provide another sustainable source of revenues to be paid into the HTF. Unless new revenue sources are found, Congress will face projections of a large gap between HTF tax receipts and spending plans when it begins debating the reauthorization of the FAST Act in 2020.

Feb 18, 2016

Recovery Act Funding for DOE Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) Projects

Federal policymakers have long been interested in the potential of carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) as a mitigation strategy for lowering global emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2). Congress has appropriated more than $7 billion since FY2008 to CCS activities at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The Obama Administration has promulgated rules on CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-burning power plants and entered into a global agreement to limit CO2 emissions. Congress remains divided over those executive branch decisions. DOE, however, has continued to embrace CCS as part of the Administration’s strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from power plants. Several bills introduced in the 114th Congress address CCS directly or indirectly (e.g., S. 601, S. 1283, H.R. 3392, and others). The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (Recovery Act; P.L. 111-5) provided $3.4 billion for CCS projects and activities at DOE. The large infusion of funding was intended to help develop technologies that would allow for commercial-scale demonstration of CCS in both new and retrofitted power plants and industrial facilities by 2020. Nine individual projects garnered approximately $2.65 billion of the $3.4 billion—about 78%. Each of the nine projects was awarded more than $100 million, and these projects illustrate that DOE prioritized large-scale demonstration projects with Recovery Act funding. The lion’s share of funding went to DOE’s flagship CCS project FutureGen, which was awarded nearly $1 billion from the Recovery Act. Authority to spend Recovery Act funds expired on September 30, 2015. Of $3.4 billion allocated for CCS activities, approximately $1.4 billion went unspent as of the spending deadline. The largest portion of the unspent funds, $795 million, was intended for FutureGen, which DOE suspended in February 2015. FutureGen faced various impediments that led to its cancellation, including delays in receiving required injection well permits from the Environmental Protection Agency, court challenges to its plan to sell electricity, and a lawsuit from an environmental advocacy group. Several other large CCS demonstration projects also were canceled, suspended, or failed to spend all of their Recovery Act funding before the 2015 deadline. Some stakeholders argue that DOE’s CCS programs have been inadequately funded, providing less incentive than they should for deploying CCS. One study concluded that even the financial boost from the Recovery Act was insufficient. To be sure, large-scale CCS projects are complex endeavors, requiring substantial capital investment and multiyear planning and construction schedules. However, the conclusion that more federal funding by itself would be sufficient to support development and commercialization of CCS technology may be overly simplistic. DOE acknowledges that many of the Recovery Act-funded projects were technologically difficult and challenging, but it does not consider the relinquishment of unspent funds to signify project failure. DOE notes that due to its spending on CCS and its partnerships with industry, the costs of capturing CO2 have dropped significantly and its projects have stored more than 10 million metric tons of CO2. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) final rule for reducing CO2 emissions from new fossil fuel power plants, part of the Administration’s Clean Power Plan, found plants incorporating partial CCS to be the Best System of Emission Reduction (BSER). EPA asserts that CCS is technically feasible. Technical feasibility, however, is just one factor of many that determine whether a project successfully reaches its goal of producing electricity and capturing CO2 at commercial scale. EPA states that implementing partial CCS in the rule is likely to boost future research and development in CCS technologies and to make CCS implementation more efficacious and cost-effective. That may be the case; however, other issues also affect CCS implementation. These issues, as well as the outcomes from promulgation of EPA’s final rule, will likely continue to shape the outlook for CCS commercialization and deployment.

Feb 18, 2016

The Role of Local and Regional Food Systems in U.S. Farm Policy

Sales of locally produced foods comprise a small but growing part of U.S. agricultural sales. Estimates vary but indicate that local food sales total between $4 billion and $12 billion annually. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) estimates that local food sales totaled $6.1 billion in 2012, reflecting sales from nearly 164,000 farmers selling locally marketed foods. This represents 8% of U.S. farms and an estimated 1.5% of the value of total U.S. agricultural production. Most (85%) of all local-food farms are smaller in size, with gross revenues under $75,000. A wide range of farm businesses may be considered to be engaged in local foods. These include direct-to-consumer marketing, farmers’ markets, farm-to-school programs, community-supported agriculture, community gardens, school gardens, food hubs and market aggregators, kitchen incubators, and mobile slaughter units. Other types of operations include on-farm sales/stores, Internet marketing, food cooperatives and buying clubs, pick-your-own or “U-Pick” operations, roadside farm stands, community kitchens, small-scale food processing and decentralized root cellars, and some agritourism or other types of on-farm recreational activities. There is no established definition of what constitutes a “local food.” Local and regional food systems generally refer to agricultural production and marketing that occurs within a certain geographic proximity (between farmer and consumer) or that involves certain social or supply chain characteristics in producing food (such as small family farms, urban gardens, or farms using sustainable agriculture practices). Some perceive locally sourced foods as fresher and higher in quality compared to some other readily available foods and also believe that purchasing local foods helps support local farm economies and/or farmers that use certain production practices that are perceived to be more environmentally sustainable. However, no such standards or practices are required under federal programs that support local foods. Many federal programs that support local foods generally define “local” based on the geographic distance between food production and/or sales such that “the total distance that the product is transported is less than 400 miles from the origin of the product”; or “any agricultural food product that is raised, produced, and distributed in ... the State in which the product is produced” (P.L. 110-246, §6015). Authorization for many of the federal programs that support local food farms is contained within periodic farm bills or within the most recent reauthorization of the child nutrition programs. The 2014 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2014, P.L. 113-79) is the most recent omnibus farm bill. Other programs and program funding were authorized in the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-296), which includes programs that sometimes promote local food systems. Congress periodically reviews and reauthorizes expiring authorities under these laws. Many existing federal programs benefiting U.S. agricultural producers may also provide support and assistance for local food systems. With few exceptions, these programs are not limited or targeted to local or regional food systems but are generally available to provide support to all U.S. farmers and ranchers. These include farm support and grant programs administered by USDA, among other federal agencies. In addition, USDA has implemented departmental initiatives intended to support local food systems, such as the “Know Your Farmer, Know Your Food” Initiative, among other activities. These initiatives are not stand-alone programs but are intended to eliminate organizational barriers between existing USDA programs and promote enhanced collaboration among staff, leveraging existing federal activities and programs. In recent years funding to support local food systems has increased. For 2015, USDA awarded nearly $40 million in grants to support local food systems across several programs. In addition, nearly $50 million in loans is available exclusively to support local and regional food enterprises. Other USDA programs often also support local food systems; however, the share of total spending attributable to local foods is not known.

Feb 18, 2016

General and Flag Officers in the U.S. Armed Forces: Background and Considerations for Congress

In the exercise of its constitutional authority over the Armed Forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws which govern important aspects of military officer personnel management, including appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. Some of these laws are directed specifically at the most senior military officers, known as general and flag officers (GFOs). Congress periodically reviews these laws and considers changes as it deems appropriate. Areas of congressional interest have included the number of GFOs authorized, the proportion of GFOs to the total force, compensation levels of GFOs, and duties and grades of certain GFOs. As of December 2015, there were 896 active duty GFOs subject to statutory caps, which is 66 less than the maximum number authorized by law. There were also another 19 exempt from the statutory caps. The current number is about average for the post-Cold War era, though substantially lower than the number of GFOs in the 1960s-1980s, when the Armed Forces were much larger in size than they are today. However, while always very small in comparison to the total force, the general and flag officer corps has increased as a percentage of the total force over the past five decades. GFOs made up about one-twentieth of one percent (0.048%) of the total force in 1965, while they made up about one-fifteenth of one percent (0.069%) of the total force in 2015, indicating that the share of the total force made up of GFOs increased by 43%. Some argue that this increased proportion of GFOs is wasteful and contributes to more bureaucratic decisionmaking processes. Others counter that the increased proportion is linked to the military’s greater emphasis on joint and coalition operations, core organizational requirements, and the increasing use of advanced technologies. Compensation for GFOs varies. One commonly used measure of compensation, known as regular military compensation (RMC), includes basic pay, basic allowance for housing, basic allowance for subsistence, and the federal tax advantage associated with allowances, which are exempt from federal income tax. The lowest-ranking GFOs make about $194,000 per year in RMC, while the highest-ranking GFOs make about $231,000 per year. For the past two years, Congress has included provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act to deny GFOs any increase in basic pay, which is the largest component of RMC. Congress has also used its authority to specify the grade and duties of certain GFO positions. For example, Congress increased the grade of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) from Lieutenant General to General in 2008. Three years later, Congress again changed the law to specify that the CNGB was a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff whose duties included “the specific responsibility of addressing matters involving non-Federalized National Guard forces in support of homeland defense and civil support missions.” This report provides an overview of active duty GFOs in the United States Armed Forces—including authorizations, duties, and compensation—historical trends in the proportion of GFOs relative to the total force, criticisms and justifications of GFO to total force proportions, and statutory controls. National Guard and Reserve GFOs are not addressed in this report, unless they are serving on active duty in a manner that counts against the active duty caps on GFOs.

Feb 18, 2016

Deficits and Debt: Economic Effects and Other Issues

The federal government incurs a budget deficit (also known as a net deficit) when its total outgoing payments (outlays) exceed the total money it collects (revenues). If instead federal revenues are greater than outlays, then the federal government generates a surplus. Deficits are measured over the course of a defined period of time—in the case of the federal government, a fiscal year. Debt measurements may be taken at any point in time and represent the accumulation of all previous government borrowing activity, from private citizens, institutions, foreign governments, and other parts of the federal government. Federal debt increases when there are net budget deficits and outflows made for federal credit programs, which combine to represent debt held by the public. Federal debt also rises through increases in intragovernmental debt, which is generated by trust fund surpluses that are used to finance other government activity. Federal budgeting practices create a system where deficits and debt are interdependent: budget deficits increase federal debt levels, which in turn increase future net deficits. The nature of the relationship between deficits and debt varies depending on the type of debt considered. Budget deficits are the principal contributor to debt held by the public. The contribution of deficits to intragovernmental debt is less certain than their contribution to debt held by the public. All else equal, increases in net trust fund deficits will lead to increases in total budget deficits but decreases in intragovernmental debt. The interest payments made on publicly held debt instruments contribute directly to federal deficits. Holders of federal debt are compensated by receiving interest payments from Treasury. Intragovernmental debt does not contribute to future deficits. The combination of persistent budget deficits and a large and increasing federal debt has generated discussions over the long-term sustainability of current budget projections. Federal budget deficits have declined from 9.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) in FY2009 to 2.5% of GDP in FY2015. However, recent estimates forecast that the government will run deficits in every year through FY2026. Federal debt totaled $18.922 trillion at the end of calendar year 2015, and as a percentage of GDP is at its highest value since the end of World War II; $13.673 trillion of that debt was held by the public. Over time, persistent budget deficits can hamper economic growth. Federal debt, either publicly held or intragovernmental, is funded through private capital. In the absence of federal debt, a portion of such funding would likely have been used on private investment projects that could increase the future productive capabilities of the economy. Large or rapidly increasing debt levels could also make the economy more susceptible to a recession, although that dynamic has not manifested itself in the United States.

Feb 17, 2016

IAEA Budget and U.S. Contributions: In Brief

The United States, along with European Union and the P5+1 partners and Iran, agreed on July 14, 2015 to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that is intended to end decades of economic sanctions against Iran in exchange for restrictions on its nuclear program. The accord designates the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor and verify Iranian compliance with the JCPOA and report on these activities regularly. With this in mind, the second session of the 114th Congress may be interested in the funding of the IAEA. The IAEA is an autonomous intergovernmental organization related to the United Nations system. Its budget is determined and approved by its member states. Each member is then assessed for contributions to its regular budget. The United States is typically assessed approximately 25% of the agency’s regular budget. U.S.-assessed contributions are provided in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Program Appropriations Contributions to International Organizations account. In addition, the United States provides voluntary contributions primarily for the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) through the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR) account. words: International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, United Nations, UN, U.S. Contributions to International Organizations, U.S. Voluntary Contributions, Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Agencies, NADR,

Feb 17, 2016

Zika Virus: CRS Experts

In late 2015, health officials in Brazil recognized a marked increase in the number of infants born with microcephaly (from Greek, meaning “small head”), a birth defect that may accompany significant, permanent brain damage. Although not conclusive, the increase in microcephaly is suspected to be related to the emergence of Zika virus infections in Brazil early in 2015. Zika virus is related to the viruses that cause yellow fever, dengue, West Nile, and Japanese encephalitis viruses. Historically Zika virus was found in Africa. Since 2007, Zika transmission has also occurred in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. In the Americas, transmission was first identified in Brazil in May 2015. As of January 29, 2016, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) had received reports of local transmission in 25 countries and territories in the Americas, including Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Symptoms of Zika virus infection in adults are usually mild and the illness resolves quickly. However, the possible link to microcephaly has raised the level of public health concern in the Americas and elsewhere, and has spurred wide-ranging efforts to protect pregnant women from infection. Although some aspects of Zika virus infection (such as the behavior of the mosquitoes that carry it) are well understood, many other aspects of this emerging infection in the Americas are unknown. While study of the Zika virus ramps up, health officials will have to base their decisions on the best available evidence, which could have substantial gaps for the time being. On February 1, 2016, the World Health Organization (WHO) determined that the rapid spread of Zika infections in the Americas and the suspected link to a serious birth defect constituted a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” under the International Health Regulations. Under this designation, nations are expected to cooperate, expand monitoring, and share information in order to stem the spread of the disease. This report discusses scientific and technical aspects of Zika virus infection, including modes of transmission, symptoms, diagnosis and treatment, and prevention. Policy concerns and official actions will be discussed in forthcoming CRS products. Unless otherwise cited, information in this report is drawn from the Zika virus information pages of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the World Health Organization (WHO), and PAHO. Health system preparedness and response (domestic and global); Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean; Mosquito control; Medical product development and regulation; Women’s health; U.S. emergency management; Legal issues; FIFRA: Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act.

Feb 17, 2016

Border Security Metrics Between Ports of Entry

Understanding the risks present at the U.S. borders and developing methods to measure border security are key challenges for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Border Patrol, the agency within DHS charged with securing the border between ports of entry. Metrics for border security are used at both the strategic level, by DHS, and at the operational level by Customs and Border Protection (Border Patrol). This report reviews DHS’s and the Border Patrol’s use of metrics in evaluating their objective to secure the border between ports of entry. DHS and the Border Patrol can use metrics to measure their performance and estimate risks at the border. Additionally, metrics provide Congress with an understanding of DHS’s and Border Patrol’s progress in securing the border. At a strategic level, DHS uses performance metrics to understand its ability to meet border security objectives. However, DHS has struggled to create a comprehensive measure of border security. Most recently, DHS has labored to create a new generation of performance metrics, through the estimation of unauthorized entry of migrants into the United States. This measure represents the volume of migration entering the United States and can be influenced by factors outside of DHS’s control, and therefore may not directly speak on border security. Congress may want to consider whether this is an adequate performance metric for border security and whether additional and/or more comprehensive and targeted metrics are required. DHS’s Annual Performance Report for FY2014-FY2016 reported two other performance metrics used to measure its progress in securing the border. First, the percentage of people apprehended multiple times along the Southwest border, or the recidivism rate, is used to capture the ability of the Border Patrol to deter migrants from re-entering the United States. Second, the rate of interdiction effectiveness along the Southwest border between ports of entry, or the effectiveness rate, measures the Border Patrol’s ability to apprehend unauthorized migrants. In the past, DHS has used several different performance metrics. For example, from 2001 to 2004, DHS, and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), used optimum deterrence as a measure for border security, defining it as the level where applying more border security would not significantly increase apprehensions or deterrence. In 2005, DHS began to use operational control as a new measure, describing it as the miles along the border where the Border Patrol had the ability to detect, identify, respond to, and interdict cross-border unauthorized activity. When operational control was retired as a metric, migrant apprehensions became the interim measure for border security from 2011 to 2013. At an operational level, the Border Patrol uses metrics within its risk assessments. The estimation of risk at the sector level assists the Border Patrol in making day-to-day decisions with regard to how to best align its resources against different threats. The agency determines risk through its “State of the Border Risk Methodology.” A secured border is characterized as low risk. The Border Patrol’s methodology estimates the magnitude of risk by gathering and understanding intelligence information, developing a detailed awareness of threats at the border, and applying a standardized measurement of risk. These assessments are not used as metrics themselves. However, the Border Patrol’s methodology monitors certain metrics at the sector level, such as the recidivist rate and effectiveness rate, which may be able to speak to the Border Patrol’s performance. Metrics can provide an understanding of the state of the border. In reviewing border security metrics, Congress may be interested in issues surrounding the oversight of DHS’s measurement practices, the determination of acceptable levels of risk for each metric, and the implementation of strategic and operational metrics and how they relate to one another. Moreover, Congress may consider how metrics can be used to inform decisions on expenditures and whether additional data and methodologies are needed to provide a more holistic view of border issues. Lastly, with migrant demographics shifting and some transit countries conducting their own enforcement of unauthorized migration, Congress may consider how these practices affect data and outcomes and what can be done to account for these changes.

Feb 16, 2016

Intelligence Spending: In Brief

Feb 16, 2016

Lead in Flint, Michigan's Drinking Water: Federal Regulatory Role

This report discusses the federal regulatory role in regards to drinking water, more specifically in the context of the Flint water crisis. Lead exposure is a major public health concern, particularly because low-level exposures can impair the neurodevelopment of children. The main source of lead in drinking water is the corrosion of plumbing materials in the distribution system.

Feb 16, 2016

Disposal of Unneeded Federal Buildings: Legislative Proposals in the 114th Congress

Real property disposal is the process by which federal agencies identify and then transfer, donate, or sell real property they no longer need. Disposition is an important asset management function because the costs of maintaining unneeded properties can be substantial, consuming financial resources that might be applied to long-standing real property needs, such as repairing existing facilities, or other pressing policy issues, such as reducing the national debt. Despite the expense, federal agencies hold thousands of unneeded and underutilized properties. Agencies have argued that they are unable to dispose of these properties for several reasons. First, there are statutorily prescribed steps in the disposal process that can take months to complete. Second, properties may not be appealing to potential buyers or lessees if they require major repairs or environmental remediation—steps for which agencies lack funding to complete before bringing a property to market. Third, key stakeholders in the disposal process—including local governments, non-profit organizations, and businesses—are often at odds over how to dispose of properties. In addition, Congress may be limited in its capacity to conduct oversight of the disposal process because it currently lacks access to reliable, comprehensive real property data. The General Services Administration (GSA) maintains a database with information on most federal buildings, but those data are provided to Congress on a limited basis. Moreover, the quality of the information in the database has been questioned, in part because of inconsistent reporting of key data elements, such as how much space within a given building is unneeded. Three bills have been introduced in the 114th Congress that would enact broad reforms in the real property disposal process—the Civilian Property Realignment Act (CPRA, S. 1750); the Federal Asset Sale and Transfer Act (FAST Act, S. 2375); and the Federal Assets Sale and Transfer Act (H.R. 4465). Under CPRA, agencies would develop a list of disposal recommendations, which could include the sale, transfer, conveyance, consolidation, or outlease of any unneeded space, among other options. These recommendations would be vetted by a newly established Civilian Property Realignment Commission, and then submitted to the President. If the President approved the recommendations, then they would be sent to Congress for review. If Congress passed a joint resolution of disapproval, then the recommendations would not be implemented; if a joint resolution of disapproval was not passed, then implementation would proceed. In many cases, disposal would be expedited by exempting properties on the recommendation list from certain statutory requirements, such as screening for public benefit. Under the FAST Act, agency recommendations would be sent to a newly established real property board for vetting, and then submitted to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget for approval or disapproval. The FAST Act does not provide Congress with an opportunity to vote for or against the list of recommendations.

Feb 12, 2016

Federal Support for Graduate Medical Education: An Overview

Access to health care is, in part, determined by the availability of physicians, a function of the physician supply. Policymakers have demonstrated a long-standing interest in access to care, both in general and for specific populations. Moreover, federal support for medical residency training (a.k.a., graduate medical education [GME]) is the largest source of federal support for the health care workforce. Although the health workforce includes a number of professions, the size of the federal investment in GME—estimated at $15 billion in FY2012—makes it a policy lever often considered to alter the health care workforce and impact health care access. This report describes federal programs that provide GME support. Although these programs may also support training for other health professions, this report focuses on training for physicians. The report examines GME support in Medicare, Medicaid, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Department of Defense, and programs administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration, such as the Children’s Hospital and Teaching Health Center GME payment programs. The report details the mechanisms that various federal programs use to support GME and provides data, when available, on funding and the number of trainees. Although some federal advisory groups have raised concerns about the transparency of federal GME investments, this report does not address such concerns; instead, it discusses some of the data gaps relevant to each of the federal GME programs.

Feb 12, 2016

The Clean Power Plan (CPP): The Treatment of Biomass

Feb 12, 2016

Department of Health and Human Services: FY2017 Budget Request

This report provides information about the FY2017 budget request for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). It begins by reviewing the department’s mission and structure. This is followed by an overview of the total FY2017 request for the department. Next, the report discusses the concept of the HHS budget as a whole, compared to funding provided to HHS through the annual appropriations process. This distinction is important because certain amounts shown in FY2017 HHS budget materials (including amounts for prior years) will not match amounts provided to HHS by annual appropriations acts (and displayed in accompanying congressional documents) because they take into account a broader set of budgetary resources. The report concludes with a breakdown of the HHS request by agency, along with additional HHS resources that provide further information on the request. A table of key policy staff is included at the end of the report.

Feb 12, 2016

FY2017 Defense Budget Request: In Brief

The Administration’s FY2017 budget request includes $619.5 billion for national defense of which $590.6 billion is for the Department of Defense (DOD). Of the DOD total, $523.9 billion covers the base budget, discretionary spending subject to the spending caps established for FY2017 by the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 2015. An additional $58.8 billion of the DOD total is to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). OCO funding supports the continued U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and assistance to Iraqi and Syrian opposition forces. The OCO request also includes $3.4 billion to enhance the U.S. presence in Eastern Europe, referred to as the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). The budget request would reduce active-component end-strength of the armed forces from 1.30 million to 1.28 million. The Army would drop by 15,000 to 460,000 (heading toward a planned level of 450,000). The Navy decline is 4,400, largely to reflect a proposal to disband one of 10 carrier air wings. Military basic pay would increase by 1.6%, costing about $300 million less than if military pay rose at the 2.1% rate that is the average in the private sector (according to the Labor Department’s Employee Compensation Index). The Administration has acknowledged that procurement accounts—and aircraft accounts in particular—bore the brunt of DOD’s belt-tightening. For example, although the Army’s total procurement request for FY2017 was a net of $1.3 billion lower than the amount appropriated in FY2016, the amount requested for procurement of Army aircraft was a net $2.3 billion less than the corresponding FY2016 appropriation. The request funds 63 Joint Strike Fighters (43 for the Air Force, 16 for the Marine Corps, and 4 for the Navy), deferring the planned FY2017 procurement of an additional five F-35As. DOD officials cited this reduction as one instance of a program reduction made in response to budgetary limits. To compensate for the slower-than-planned fielding of the F-35, the budget request includes funds to enlarge and upgrade DOD’s fleet of earlier model fighters. Thus the Administration’s budget includes funds for programs that been funded in recent years as congressional initiatives, for instance: To mitigate a shortfall in the Navy’s fleet of strike fighters, the Administration requests $185 million (in FY2017 OCO funds) to replace two Navy F/A-18s lost in combat; and it plans to continue F/A-18 purchases in future budget years. The budget request would fund two DDG-51 Aegis destroyers for $3.4 billion, two Virginia-class submarines for $5.2 billion, and two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) for $1.3 billion. The budget assumes the Navy would save $200 million by removing seven Aegis cruisers from service for long-term modernization. Congress has rejected similar proposals in previous years. The budget requests $900.0 million in FY2017 to keep in service A-10 ground-attack planes that the Administration has been trying for years to retire, over congressional objections. The current plan is to keep the planes in service—at a cost of $3.4 billion—through FY2022 when they would be replaced by F-35s.

Feb 12, 2016

Federal Grant Financial Reporting Requirements and Databases: Frequently Asked Questions

Congress and federal agencies frequently undertake initiatives to conduct oversight of federal grant programs and expenditures. The ability to oversee is influenced by the existing reporting requirements placed on recipients of federal grant funds. Limitations in accessing information contained in federal databases used to collect grant data also influence the level of transparency into the use of federal grant funds. Congress has also debated the reporting burden placed on federal grant recipients and how to balance grant recipient capacity with the desire for transparency into the use of federal grant funds. This report provides an introduction to reporting requirements placed on federal grant recipients, including requirements that must be met to seek federal grant funds. It also describes the databases containing information about grant awards, the types of information collected on grant recipients, and the availability of that information to the public. Several grant reporting questions are answered, including the following: Why are federal agencies and grant recipients required to report grant data? What information is a federal grant recipient required to report and to whom? How does a federal agency track federal grant data? What is the Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number? What is the System for Award Management (SAM)? What is the Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA)? What are cash management systems? What is USAspending.gov? What is the Federal Assistance Award Data System PLUS (FAADS-PLUS)? What is the Federal Funding Accountability and Transparency Act Subaward Reporting System? What is the Federal Audit Clearinghouse (FAC)? What grant data are accessible by the public? Federal grant reporting requirements fall into two categories: financial reporting and program performance reporting. This report focuses on financial reporting requirements and does not address program performance reporting. This report will be updated should significant legislative activity regarding federal grant recipient reporting occur.

Feb 11, 2016

SAMHSA FY2017 Budget Request and Funding History: A Fact Sheet

The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is the lead federal agency for increasing access to behavioral health services. SAMHSA supports community-based mental health and substance abuse treatment and prevention services through formula grants to the states and U.S. territories and through competitive grant programs to states, territories, tribal organizations, local communities, and private entities. SAMHSA also engages in a range of other activities, such as technical assistance, data collection, and workforce development. SAMHSA and most of its programs and activities are authorized under Public Health Service Act (PHSA) Title V, which organizes SAMHSA in three centers: the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT), the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP), and the Center for Mental Health Services (CMHS). Each center has general statutory authority, called Programs of Regional and National Significance (PRNS), under which it has established grant programs for states and communities to address their important substance abuse and mental health needs. PHSA Title V also authorizes a number of specific grant programs, referred to as categorical grants. SAMHSA’s two largest grant programs are separately authorized under PHSA Title XIX, Part B. The Community Mental Health Services block grant falls within CMHS. The full amount of the Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment block grant falls within CSAT, although no less than 20% of each state’s block grant must be used for prevention. In addition to the three statutorily established centers, SAMHSA’s budget reflects a fourth category, “health surveillance and program support,” for other activities such as collecting data, providing statistical and analytic support, raising public awareness, collaborating with other agencies, developing and supporting the behavioral health workforce, and maintaining the National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP). The last comprehensive reauthorization of SAMHSA and its programs occurred in 2000 as part of the Children’s Health Act, which also added “charitable choice” provisions allowing religious organizations to receive funding for substance abuse prevention and treatment services without altering their religious character. Since 2000, Congress has expanded some of SAMHSA’s programs and activities without taking up comprehensive reauthorization of the agency. Explicit authorizations of appropriations for many of SAMHSA’s grants and activities expired at the end of FY2003; many of these programs have continued to receive funding through the annual appropriations process. The total amount of funding available to SAMHSA (i.e., total program level) traditionally includes discretionary budget authority provided in annual appropriations acts, Public Health Service (PHS) Program Evaluation Set-Aside funds, Prevention and Public Health Fund (PPHF) transfers, and data request and publications user fees. Also, SAMHSA’s FY2017 budget request proposes new mandatory spending that, if enacted, would be in addition to the budgetary resources noted above. Table 1 presents SAMHSA’s FY2017 budget request in the context of SAMHSA’s funding history since FY2014.

Feb 11, 2016

Volkswagen, Defeat Devices, and the Clean Air Act: Frequently Asked Questions

The German automotive manufacturer Volkswagen Automotive Group (VW) has admitted to installing a software algorithm in several of its diesel-fueled vehicle engines that acts as a “defeat device”: the software detects when the vehicle is undergoing compliance testing and activates certain pollution control devices to reduce tailpipe emissions. During normal driving situations, however, the control devices are turned off, resulting in higher emissions of nitrogen oxide (NOx) and other air pollutants than claimed by the company. Federal and California regulators and the European Union (EU) are examining the use of this software, which was reportedly installed in 11 million vehicles worldwide. A summary of federal and state actions includes the following: September 18, 2015: the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a notice of violation (NOV) of the Clean Air Act to VW, contending that 2.0 liter Volkswagen and Audi diesel cars (model years 2009-2015) include software that circumvents EPA standards for NOx, allowing emissions up to 40 times the standard. November 2, 2015: EPA issued a second NOV alleging that VW installed defeat devices in light-duty diesel vehicles equipped with 3.0 liter engines for model years 2014-2016, resulting in NOx emissions increases nine times the EPA standard. January 4, 2016: the U.S Department of Justice filed a civil complaint against VW on behalf of EPA in federal court alleging that nearly 600,000 diesel vehicles had illegal defeat devices installed, thereby impairing emissions controls and causing harmful air pollution in excess of EPA standards. EPA stated that it will not grant a certificate of conformity for VW’s model year 2016 diesel vehicles, thus halting sales of these vehicles in the United States. The California Air Resources Board initiated an investigation into VW’s use of this “defeat device,” and, on January 12, 2016, issued a NOV to VW, alleging that “approximately 75,688 California vehicles do not conform to State law.” This report is organized as a series of frequently asked questions. It focuses on a description of modern diesel technologies, their market and emissions profiles, and some potential reasons that could underlie the use of defeat devices. It summarizes the specific allegations filed against VW under the Clean Air Act, the current status of federal and state investigations, and the potential civil and criminal penalties which may result. Further, the report introduces several outstanding issues currently under debate, including whether EPA has sufficient resources to monitor vehicle emissions, whether the current penalty structure is sufficient, why EPA failed to detect VW’s defeat device when there have been similar cases in the past, and whether VW’s response to the emissions problem and its efforts to provide restitution to U.S. customers has been adequate.

Feb 10, 2016

Need-Tested Benefit Receipt by Families and Individuals

Feb 9, 2016

The National Network for Manufacturing Innovation

Congress maintains a strong interest in the health of U.S. manufacturing due to its central role in the U.S. economy and national defense. In 2012, in his FY2013 budget, President Obama proposed the creation of a National Network for Manufacturing Innovation (NNMI) to help accelerate innovation by investing in industrially relevant manufacturing technologies with broad applications, and to support manufacturing technology commercialization by bridging the gap between the laboratory and the market. The proposal included a request for $1 billion in mandatory funding for the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for the establishment of up to 15 NNMI Institutes for Manufacturing Innovation (IMIs). No legislation to enact the President’s proposal was introduced in the 112th Congress. In 2013, the President renewed his call for an NNMI in his FY2014 budget request, again seeking $1 billion in mandatory funding. In August 2013, bills entitled the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act were introduced in the House (H.R. 2996) and the Senate (S. 1468) to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation. H.R. 2996 passed the House in September 2014. S. 1468 was reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation in August 2014. No further legislative action was taken. In 2014, the President’s FY2015 budget again sought authority and funding to establish the NNMI, including $2.4 billion in discretionary funding to establish up to 45 IMIs. In December 2014, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation Act of 2014 (RAMI Act), as Title VII of Division B of the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235). The RAMI Act directs the Secretary of Commerce to establish a Network for Manufacturing Innovation program at NIST. The RAMI Act includes provisions authorizing NIST, the Department of Energy, and other agencies to support the establishment of IMIs and establishing and providing for the operation of a Network for Manufacturing Innovation. NIST is authorized to use up to $5.0 million per year of appropriated funds for FY2015-FY2024 to carry out its responsibilities under the act. The Department of Energy is authorized, but not required, to transfer to NIST up to $250.0 million of appropriated funds over the same FY2015-FY2024 period. The Secretary of Commerce is also authorized to accept funds, services, equipment, personnel, and facilities to carry out the program. The act also establishes a National Office of the Network for Manufacturing Innovation Program at NIST to oversee and carry out the program. Prior to enactment of the RAMI Act, President Obama used existing authorities and regular appropriations of the Department of Defense and Department of Energy to establish several NNMI-like institutes. Under the RAMI Act, these and other institutes may be designated as part of the Network for Manufacturing Innovation. Enactment of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) provides new impetus for congressional oversight as appropriations were made explicitly for the first time for the NNMI. P.L. 114-113 provides NIST with $25 million for the purpose of establishing IMIs and coordinating their activities. Among the issues of interest are the selection of focus areas for the new centers and the integration of these centers with existing ones. Another area of possible congressional attention is to the network of IMIs. While the RAMI Act specifies which new and existing institutes are eligible to be a part of the network and designates the National Program Office as “a convener of the Network,” it does not further specify the purpose, federal role, and activities of the network.

Feb 9, 2016

DOE's Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE): A Primer, with Appropriations for FY2016

This report discusses the Department of Energy's (DOE's) Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE), which is tasked with the lead role to address electric infrastructure needs and issues, such as: increased use of distributed (mostly renewable energy) resources, Internet-enabled demand response technologies, growing loads from electric vehicle use, continued expansion of natural gas use, and integration of energy storage devices.

Feb 9, 2016

Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD): FY2017 Budget Request Overview and Resources

Click here and type your Summary

Feb 9, 2016

Renewed Crypto Wars?

This report briefly examines renewed tensions between tech companies and the government regarding encryption "back doors" and how quickly-advancing technologies could impact law enforcement investigations.

Feb 9, 2016

Smithsonian Institution: Background and Issues for Congress

The Smithsonian Institution (SI) is a complex of museum, education, research, and revenue-generating entities primarily located in the Washington, DC, region, with additional facilities and activities across the United States and world, that reportedly employs 6,500 staff, supplemented by 6,300 volunteers. In fiscal year (FY) 2015, SI’s museums and zoo, which are open to the public largely without admission fee, were visited 28.2 million times, while its websites were accessed 116.6 million times. Congress created SI in 1846, after it agreed to accept the bequest of James Smithson, an English scientist who left the bulk of his estate to the United States of America to found at Washington an establishment bearing his name. Governmental but organizationally separate and distinct from the legislative, executive, or judicial branches of the U.S. government, SI is overseen by a Board of Regents (Regents), composed of the Chief Justice, Vice President, Members of the House and Senate, and private citizens. The Regents are authorized by Congress to carry out a number of activities, and oversee certain SI entities established or authorized by Congress. Congress provides to SI an annual appropriation—in FY2016, this was approximately $696 million—and provides oversight of SI activities. In addition to carrying out authorities granted by Congress, it appears that SI acts pursuant to its role as trustee of the Smithson and other bequests and gifts to create additional entities to further SI missions. This report provides an overview of SI organization and leadership roles, and entities created by Congress as well as those created by SI. It also provides background information on consideration of an SI museum in London, and Smithsonian related legislation introduced in the 114th Congress, including the following: H.R. 3169, which would change the composition and appointment process of the Regents; S. 2057 and H.R. 3702, companion measures that would authorize funds for SI to plan, design and build additional collections storage, hangars and laboratory space; H.R. 3387, which would make SI subject to the Freedom of Information Act, Privacy Act, Federal Advisory Committees Act, and require SI to hold open meetings; and H.R. 4307, which would establish a new National Museum of Asian Pacific American History and Culture within SI.

Feb 8, 2016

Senate Committee Rules in the 114th Congress: Key Provisions

Senate Rule XXVI establishes specific requirements for certain Senate committee procedures. In addition, each Senate committee is required to adopt rules to govern its own proceedings. These rules may “not be inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate.” Senate committees may also operate according to additional established practices that are not necessarily reflected in their adopted rules but are not specifically addressed by Senate rules. In sum, Senate committees are allowed some latitude to establish tailored procedures to govern certain activities, which can result in significant variation in the way different committees operate. This report first provides a brief overview of Senate rules as they pertain to committee actions. The report then provides tables that summarize selected, key features of each committee’s rules in regard to meeting day, hearing and meeting notice requirements, scheduling of witnesses, hearing quorum, business quorum, amendment filing requirements, proxy voting, polling, nominations, investigations, and subpoenas. In addition, the report looks at selected unique provisions some committees have included in their rules in the miscellaneous category. The tables, however, represent only a portion of each committee’s rules, and provisions of the rules that are substantially similar to or essentially restatements of the Senate’s Standing Rules are not included. This report will be not be updated further during the 114th Congress.

Feb 8, 2016

Zika Virus: Global Health Considerations

This report gives a brief overview of the Zika virus, which typically causes mild symptoms, including fever, rash, and conjunctivitis. Health experts are uncertain whether Zika causes microcephaly, a potentially-severe birth defect involving brain damage.

Feb 6, 2016

Federal Freight Policy: In Brief

freight, cargo, truck, rail, maritime, barge, shipping, port, congestion, infrastructure, RRIF, train, locks, inland waterways, army corps, dredging, harbor, surface transportation board, STB, jones act, cabotage, railroad, highway, longshore, marine highways, Title XI, shipyard, shipbuilding, ship construction, intermodal, FAST Act, P.L. 114-94

Feb 5, 2016

National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA): Background and Issues for Congress

Title XVII of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291) established the National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) to conduct a comprehensive study of the structure of the Army. The NCFA reported its findings to Congress and the Administration on January 28, 2016, and made a number of recommendations that may or may not be acted upon. Some have suggested the historical post-war practice of reducing defense budgets contributed to the perceived need for a commission to address proposed changes to the Army. The perceived success of two previous commissions—the 2014 National Commission on the Structure of the Air Force and the 2015 Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission—also likely played a role in the establishment of the commission. Some say controversy surrounding the Army’s 2013 Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) significantly influenced the decision to establish the NCFA. As part of its final report, the NCFA produced a classified appendix, which is available to those with the appropriate clearance and a “need to know.” The 208-page report contained 63 recommendations for the Nation, the President, Congress, the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, the Army, and Army Service Component Commands. Some of the report’s major recommendations include forward stationing an Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Europe; retaining an 11th Regular Army Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) and forward stationing it in Korea; and recommending the Army maintain 24 manned AH-64 Apache battalions—20 in the Regular Army and 4 in the National Guard. Major themes of the NCFA’s report include developing “One Army” and the prioritization of training and readiness. Some general observations of the commission’s recommendations include the importance of the NCFA classified appendix; the impact of the commission’s recommendations on the “Corporate” Army; the history and challenges of past and current Army initiatives; and force structure issues outside the Title XVII mandate. Potential issues for Congress include to what extent will Congress and the Administration implement NCFA’s recommendations; how much would it cost to implement the recommendations; potential difficulties in implementing the NCFA’s recommendations; and how Congress would oversee the implementation of the NCFA’s recommendations. The author of this report served on the staff of the National Commission on the Future of the Army from June 1, 2015, until September 30, 2015. The information and analysis contained in this report are derived from open source data. Participation on this commission informed but did not influence the content of this report.

Feb 5, 2016

What Does the Gig Economy Mean for Workers?

The gig economy is the collection of markets that match providers to consumers on a gig (or job) basis in support of on-demand commerce. In the basic model, gig workers enter into formal agreements with on-demand companies (e.g., Uber, TaskRabbit) to provide services to the company’s clients. Prospective clients request services through an Internet-based technological platform or smartphone application that allows them to search for providers or to specify jobs. Providers (i.e., gig workers) engaged by the on-demand company provide the requested service and are compensated for the jobs. Recent trends in on-demand commerce suggest that gig workers may represent a growing segment of the U.S. labor market. In response, some Members of Congress have raised questions, for example, about the size of the gig workforce, how workers are using gig work, and the implications of the gig economy for labor standards and livelihoods more generally. With some exceptions, on-demand companies view providers as independent contractors (i.e., not employees) using the companies’ platforms to obtain referrals and transact with clients. This designation is frequently made explicit in the formal agreement that establishes the terms of the provider-company relationship. In some ways, the gig economy can be viewed as an expansion of traditional freelance work (i.e., self-employed workers who generate income through a series of jobs and projects). However, gig jobs may differ from traditional freelance jobs in a few ways. For example, coordination of jobs through an on-demand company reduces entry and operating costs for providers and allows workers’ participation to be more transitory in gig markets (i.e., they have greater flexibility around work hours). The terms placed around providers’ use of some tech platforms may further set gig work apart. For example, some on-demand companies discourage providers from accepting work outside the platform from certain clients. This is a potentially important difference between gig work and traditional freelance work because it may limit the provider’s ability to build a client base and operate outside the platform. Characterizing the gig economy workforce (i.e., those providing services brokered through tech-based platforms) is challenging along several fronts. To date, no large-scale official data have been collected; and there remains considerable uncertainty about how to best measure this segment of the labor force. Existing large-scale labor force survey data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the U.S. Census Bureau may provide some insights, but are imperfect proxy measures of contemporary gig economy participants. A sparse literature examines data collected by individual companies operating in the gig economy or from pockets of gig-economy workers. As such, these analyses can be viewed as snapshots of certain gig workers, but they are not necessarily representative of the full market. The apparent availability of gig jobs and the flexibility they seem to provide workers are frequently touted features of the gig economy. However, to the extent that gig-economy workers are viewed as independent contractors, gig jobs differ from traditional employment in notable ways. First, whether a worker in the gig economy may be considered an employee rather than an independent contractor is significant for purposes of various federal labor and employment laws. In general, employees enjoy the protections and benefits provided by such laws, whereas independent contractors are not covered. Two laws, in particular, the Fair Labor Standards Act and the National Labor Relations Act, have drawn recent attention. In addition, certain other benefits (e.g., paid sick leave, health insurance, retirement benefits) that are often associated with traditional employment relationships may not be available in the same form to workers in the gig economy. Should Congress choose to consider ways of increasing access to such benefits for non-traditional employees, new mechanisms, such as portable benefits or risk-pooling, could serve to provide benefits to workers in the gig economy.

Feb 5, 2016

Agency Final Rules Submitted After May 16, 2016, May Be Subject to Disapproval in 2017 Under the Congressional Review Act

This report briefly discusses The Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. §§801-808), enacted as part of the 104th Congress's (1995-1996) "Contract with America," which established a special parliamentary mechanism whereby Congress can disapprove a final rule promulgated by a federal agency. With a change in the occupancy of the White House taking place in 2017, some in Congress are paying renewed attention to a parliamentary mechanism that might enable a new Congress and new President to overturn agency final rules of the Obama Administration issued after mid-May 2016.

Feb 4, 2016

Zika Virus: Basics About the Disease

In late 2015, health officials in Brazil recognized a marked increase in the number of infants born with microcephaly (from Greek, meaning “small head”), a birth defect that may accompany significant, permanent brain damage. Although not conclusive, the increase in microcephaly is suspected to be related to the emergence of Zika virus infections in Brazil early in 2015. Zika virus is related to the viruses that cause yellow fever, dengue, West Nile, and Japanese encephalitis viruses. Historically Zika virus was found in Africa. Since 2007, Zika transmission has also occurred in Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. In the Americas, transmission was first identified in Brazil in May 2015. As of January 29, 2016, the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) had received reports of local transmission in 25 countries and territories in the Americas, including Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Symptoms of Zika virus infection in adults are usually mild and the illness resolves quickly. However, the possible link to microcephaly has raised the level of public health concern in the Americas and elsewhere, and has spurred wide-ranging efforts to protect pregnant women from infection. Although some aspects of Zika virus infection (such as the behavior of the mosquitoes that carry it) are well understood, many other aspects of this emerging infection in the Americas are unknown. While study of the Zika virus ramps up, health officials will have to base their decisions on the best available evidence, which could have substantial gaps for the time being. On February 1, 2016, the World Health Organization (WHO) determined that the rapid spread of Zika infections in the Americas and the suspected link to a serious birth defect constituted a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” under the International Health Regulations. Under this designation, nations are expected to cooperate, expand monitoring, and share information in order to stem the spread of the disease. This report discusses scientific and technical aspects of Zika virus infection, including modes of transmission, symptoms, diagnosis and treatment, and prevention. Policy concerns and official actions will be discussed in forthcoming CRS products. Unless otherwise cited, information in this report is drawn from the Zika virus information pages of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the World Health Organization (WHO), and PAHO.

Feb 4, 2016

The Trans-Pacific Partnership: Strategic Implications

This report discusses selected strategic arguments related to the proposed 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations. The potential impacts of the agreement may be an active area of debate during the second session of the 114th Congress.

Feb 3, 2016

Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 114th Congress

The House and the Senate have considered immigration measures on a variety of issues in the 114th Congress. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) extends four immigration programs through September 30, 2016: the EB-5 immigrant investor Regional Center Pilot Program, the E-Verify employment eligibility verification system, the Conrad State program for foreign medical graduates, and the special immigrant religious worker program. P.L. 114-113 also contains provisions on the Visa Waiver Program and certain nonimmigrant visa categories. Other enacted immigration-related measures include the Border Jobs for Veterans Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-68) on border security personnel, the Adoptive Family Relief Act (P.L. 114-70) on intercountry adoption, and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (P.L. 114-92) on the Afghan special immigrant visa program. The House has passed several other immigration-related bills. Among them are the Northern Border Security Review Act (H.R. 455), the Preclearance Authorization Act of 2015 (H.R. 998), the Border Security Technology Accountability Act of 2015 (H.R. 1634), the Enforce the Law for Sanctuary Cities Act (H.R. 3009), and the American SAFE Act of 2015 (H.R. 4038). H.R. 998 has also been reported by the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. In addition, various bills on border security, interior enforcement, visa security, and asylum, among other issues, have been considered by a House or Senate committee. Border security-related measures have been reported or ordered to be reported by the House Homeland Security Committee (H.R. 399, H.R. 3583, H.R. 3586), or the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (S. 750, S. 1808, S. 1864, S. 1873). Interior enforcement provisions are included in bills ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee (H.R. 1147, H.R. 1148, H.R. 1153) or reported by the House Appropriations Committee (H.R. 3128). S. 1635, as reported by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also contains interior enforcement-related provisions. Several of these interior enforcement bills also contain key provisions on other immigration issues. Among the other issues addressed in these bills are employment eligibility verification (H.R. 1147); visa security and naturalization (H.R. 1148); and expedited removal, asylum, parole, and unaccompanied alien children (H.R. 1153). H.R. 1149, as ordered to be reported by the House Judiciary Committee, also addresses unaccompanied alien children. This report discusses these and other immigration-related issues that have received legislative action or are of significant congressional interest in the 114th Congress. Department of Homeland Security appropriations are addressed in CRS Report R44053, Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2016, and, for the most part, are not covered here.

Feb 3, 2016

Post-Committee Adjustment in the Modern House: The Use of Rules Committee Prints

Floor proceedings in the U.S. House of Representatives often begin on the basis of legislation reported from committee. In some instances, adjustments to committee recommendations are made and a new legislative text is presented for chamber consideration. These “post-committee adjustments” are not new to the House, but the frequency of their use and the mechanics of executing them have changed in recent years. It is now common for legislative adjustments to be reflected in a “Rules Committee print” that is established as the base text at the outset of floor consideration (in lieu of a committee-reported version) by way of a “special rule” reported by the Rules Committee and adopted by the House. Many Rules prints contain the same language found in committee-reported bills, while others may include slight or significant revisions to the reported text. This report examines the use of Rules prints as a way of executing post-committee adjustments to measures reported from committee. It begins with a discussion of how legislation gets considered on the House floor, the important role of the Rules Committee in organizing the chamber’s business, and the mechanics of how special rules can modify legislation following the committee stage of proceedings. The report then explains the language the Rules Committee uses to communicate to Members and staff the magnitude and policy significance of textual changes contained in a Rules print, and it assesses the degree to which post-committee adjustments have been made in this context. House leadership and the Rules Committee have made increasing use of Rules prints in recent years as the textual basis for floor debate and amendment. The first identified use of a Rules print for the purpose of post-committee adjustment occurred in July 1999, but this practice did not become routine until the 112th Congress (2011-2012). Early Rules prints appear to have modified bills to about the same degree as in recent Congresses, but a noticeable drop in post-committee adjustment during the 113th Congress (2013-2014) suggests a continued evolution in the use of Rules prints for this purpose. Overall, of the 82 Rules prints examined here, 44 of them contained some kind of modification to a committee-reported bill. To be sure, Rules prints can accomplish any number of purposes that may or may not require textual adjustments to committee-reported bills. For instance, when policy or jurisdictional disputes arise between or among committees, a Rules print may include language that reflects the outcome of negotiations involving committee chairs and the majority leadership. Rules prints can also expand the scope of subject matter Members consider on the floor by combining two or more committee-reported bills in a single print. Prints can expedite House business by presenting legislative text for debate and amendment at an earlier stage in the legislative process than would otherwise be possible, and they can lend certainty to floor proceedings by reducing the time it takes after a committee reports a measure for its text to become available to Members and the general public. A Rules print may also modify reported text in order to broaden support for the proposal among Members. Making in order a Rules print as the legislative baseline for House floor consideration can be understood as a procedural tool to manage uncertainty on the House floor and enhance majority leadership control over the substance of policy the House considers. The use of Rules prints is a logical extension of past procedural innovations and should not be viewed as constituting a significant departure in the way the House conducts its business. Differences in how this current practice has evolved from previous methods of setting a base text for House floor consideration are highlighted throughout the report.

Feb 3, 2016