CRS Reports

Social Security Overview

Jun 13, 2018

The June 12 Trump-Kim Jong-un Summit

On June 12, 2018, President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met in Singapore to discuss North Korea’s nuclear program, building a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, and the future of U.S. relations with North Korea (known officially as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, or DPRK). During their summit, the first-ever meeting between leaders of the two countries, Trump and Kim issued a brief joint statement in which Trump “committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK,” and Kim “reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The Singapore document is shorter on details than previous nuclear agreements with North Korea and acts as a statement of principles in four areas Normalization: The two sides “commit to establish” new bilateral relations. Peace: The United States and DPRK agree to work to build “a lasting and stable peace regime.” Denuclearization: North Korea “commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” as was also promised in an April 2018 summit between Kim and South Korean leader Moon Jae-in. POW/MIA remains: The two sides will work to recover the remains of thousands of U.S. troops unaccounted for during the Korean War. Speaking at a press conference without Kim after the summit, Trump said U.S.-DPRK denuclearization negotiations would continue and resume at an early date; Kim pledged to destroy a “major missile engine testing site”; He will invite Kim to the White House; He raised human rights issues with Kim, though “relatively briefly compared to denuclearization.” Trump appeared to downplay the state of DPRK human rights by saying that human rights conditions are also “rough in a lot of places”; The United States would suspend annual U.S.-South Korea military exercises, which Trump called “war games” and “provocative,” during nuclear negotiations. He said the move, which was not accompanied by any apparent commensurate move by Pyongyang and reportedly surprised South Korea and U.S. military commanders, would save “a tremendous amount of money.” Trump also expressed a hope of eventually withdrawing the approximately 30,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. Postsummit remarks by the Administration created confusion about whether all exercises or only some types will be suspended. Notable items not present in the statement or Trump’s remarks include details about a timeframe or verification protocols for denuclearization, and a commitment by Kim to dismantle the DPRK’s ballistic missile program. Outcomes The summit highlighted the change from 2017, when escalating tensions between North Korea and the United States led to increasingly tight U.S. and international sanctions and fears of a military conflict. In addition to the reduction of tensions, both sides can point to specific gains that have occurred since early 2018. U.S. gains include Kim Jong-un’s public statements committing to begin a process of negotiating complete denuclearization; North Korea’s moratorium on nuclear and missile testing while dialogue continues; North Korea’s apparent destruction in May of its Pyunggye-ri nuclear test site before international journalists; Kim’s statement that he would destroy a missile test site; and North Korea’s release of three U.S. detainees and agreement to restart the POW/MIA recovery program, which the United States suspended in 2005. DPRK gains include Breaking free from its diplomatic isolation. Following Trump’s March 2018 announcement that he would hold a summit, Kim has re-established friendly relations with China and Russia, and held two summits with South Korean President Moon; Boosting Kim’s legitimacy and prestige by using nuclear and missile advancements to obtain a meeting with the U.S. President as an equal; Loosening enforcement of sanctions against the DPRK economy; An expectation of future foreign investment and economic and energy assistance if it denuclearizes; A U.S. promise to provide “security guarantees”; and Trump’s announcement of a unilateral cessation of U.S.-South Korean military exercises and his statement that he hopes to withdraw all U.S. forces from South Korea. Questions The summit meeting raises numerous questions, including Did North Korea promise to abandon its nuclear weapons? What specific steps are needed to realize the DPRK’s commitment “to work toward complete denuclearization?” [emphasis added] Should a timeline be set? Will this be subject to international verification? Some Korea-watchers worry Kim will use a prolonged negotiation, dismantlement, and verification process as a delaying tactic while sanctions pressure eases. What does “denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” mean? Does this mean the same thing to both countries? Does this phrasing have implications for the U.S. alliance with South Korea? How will talks about denuclearization, a possible peace declaration, and U.S.-DPRK normalization be sequenced and/or linked, if at all? Will the Trump Administration link these talks to inter-Korean talks, and vice versa? Will the United States be able to maintain a global pressure coalition while engaging with North Korea? Although Trump Administration officials have said international pressure against North Korea will continue until North Korea either denuclearizes or takes concrete and irreversible steps (as yet undefined) to denuclearize, the incentives for countries to maintain the intensity of the pressure campaign, and scrutiny of countries’ implementation of sanctions, arguably have diminished. What are the implications for U.S. alliances, especially with South Korea? Combined with his apparent lack of prior consultation with Seoul, Trump’s statements on U.S. troops in South Korea are likely to weaken U.S. allies’ confidence in the durability of U.S. security commitments and provide China and Russia with an argument against future U.S. exercises with allies. Should negotiations include North Korea’s other objectionable practices and programs, like the DPRK’s human rights record, cyberattacks, chemical and biological weapons, and sizeable conventional forces? What will Congress’s role be? Congress could play a direct role in several aspects of an evolving U.S.-DPRK relationship. In addition to approving funding to implement various U.S. commitments and new U.S. diplomatic offices in North Korea, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has testified that a U.S.-DPRK nuclear agreement would be submitted to the Senate as a treaty. Congress could also support or oppose moves not to enforce or lift sanctions. Congress may also weigh in on moves that affect U.S. alliances with South Korea and Japan.

Jun 12, 2018

International Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions: An Overview

Jun 12, 2018

Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) Education: An Overview

The term STEM education refers to teaching and learning in the fields of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. It typically includes educational activities across all grade levels—from pre-school to post-doctorate—in both formal (e.g., classrooms) and informal (e.g., afterschool programs) settings. Federal policymakers have an active and enduring interest in STEM education, and the topic is frequently raised in federal science, education, workforce, national security, and immigration policy debates. Various attempts to assess the federal STEM education effort have produced different estimates of its scope and scale. These efforts have identified between 105 and 254 STEM education programs and activities at 13 to 15 federal agencies. Annual federal appropriations for STEM education are typically in the range of $2.8 billion to $3.4 billion. All published inventories identify the Department of Education, National Science Foundation, and the Department of Health and Human Services as key agencies in the federal effort. Over half of federal STEM education funding is intended to serve the needs of postsecondary schools and students; the remainder goes to efforts at the K-12 educational level. Much of the funding for postsecondary students is in the form of financial aid, including fellowships and grants. It is often suggested that the United States performs poorly in STEM education, but the data paint a complex picture. By some measures, U.S. students appear to be doing quite well. For example, overall graduate student enrollments in science and engineering (S&E) grew 15% over the last decade. Further, S&E degree attainment for groups traditionally underrepresented in STEM majors—such as Hispanic/Latino, African American, and female students—grew by 122%, 35%, and 37%, respectively. On the other hand, concerns remain about persistent academic achievement gaps between various demographic groups, STEM teacher quality, the rankings of U.S. students on international STEM assessments, foreign student enrollments and increased educational attainment in other countries, and the ability of the U.S. STEM education system to meet domestic demand for STEM labor. Federal STEM education policy concerns center on broad issues—such as governance of the federal effort and broadening participation of underrepresented populations—as well as those that are specific to STEM education at the elementary, secondary, and postsecondary levels. Governance concerns focus on perceived duplication and lack of coordination in the federal effort; broadening participation concerns tend to highlight achievement and participation gaps between various demographic groups. A variety of policy options have garnered attention in recent years, relating to elementary, secondary, and postsecondary STEM education. At the K-12 level, these include proposals to address educational accountability, standards, and teacher quality. At the postsecondary level, proposals center on efforts to remediate and retain students in STEM majors. This report is intended to serve as a primer on existing STEM education policy issues and programs. It covers the federal STEM education effort and the condition of STEM education in the United States, and examines selected policy issues central to the contemporary federal conversation about STEM education. It also provides a history of major federal legislative efforts impacting STEM education.

Jun 12, 2018

Costa Rica: An Overview

Jun 11, 2018

CIA Ethics Education: Background and Perspectives

Jun 11, 2018

Capital Markets, Securities Offerings, and Related Policy Issues

U.S. capital markets are the largest and considered to be the most efficient in the world. Companies rely heavily on capital access to fund growth and create jobs. As the principal regulator of U.S. capital markets, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires that offers and sales of securities either be registered with the SEC or be undertaken with an exemption from registration. Registered securities offerings, often called public offerings, are available to all types of investors and have more rigorous disclosure requirements. By contrast, securities offerings that are exempt from SEC registration are referred to as private offerings and are mainly available to more sophisticated investors. Some policymakers have concluded that changes in market trends require updated regulations governing capital access. Specifically, the number of publicly listed U.S. companies has declined by half over the last two decades, and small- to medium-sized companies are said to have more difficulty accessing capital relative to larger companies. Additionally, new capital access tools not previously part of the SEC regulatory regime, such as crowdfunding and initial coin offerings, have emerged. These new tools are especially helpful for small businesses and startups. The bipartisan Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (JOBS Act; P.L. 112-106) scaled regulation for smaller companies and reduced regulations in general for certain types of capital formation. It established a number of new options to expand capital access through both public and private offerings, including a new provision for crowdfunding. Following enactment of the JOBS Act, the public and private offering dichotomy has started to blur, and securities regulation has become increasingly tailored to suit companies of different sizes and with different needs. However, concerns over capital formation have persisted, given that the number of IPOs remained at far below long-term average levels post-JOBS Act and smaller businesses continue to face capital access pressure. To address these concerns, Congress has considered numerous legislative proposals to further expand the scaled approach, with some proposals building on existing JOBS Act provisions. The policy debate surrounding these proposals often focuses on expanding capital access and protecting investors, two of the SEC’s core missions. Expanding capital access promotes capital formation and “democratizes” capital markets by allowing for greater access of investment opportunities for more investors. Investor protection is considered to be important for healthy and efficient capital markets because many investors would be more willing to provide capital, and even at a lower cost, if they could expect enforceable contracts for their investments through a transparent process. At times, expanding capital access can come at the expense of investor protection. For example, proposals that reduce the registration and disclosures that a company must make can decrease the company’s compliance costs and increase the speed and efficiency of capital formation. But the reduced disclosures may expose a company’s investors to additional risks if they are not receiving information that is important to making informed investment decisions. This report analyzes legislative proposals that would generally affect the terms and amounts of capital provided to companies by investors. It analyzes a number of current legislative proposals and agency actions to expand both public and private securities offerings through amendments to program design, investor access, and disclosure requirements, among other provisions.

Jun 8, 2018

UPDATE: Termination of Temporary Protected Status for Sudan, Nicaragua, Haiti, and El Salvador: Key Takeaways and Analysis

Jun 8, 2018

Potential Hydrofluorocarbon Phase Down: Issues for Congress

Jun 7, 2018

Forest Service Assistance Programs

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has numerous programs to support the management of state and private forests. These programs are under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Agriculture Committees and are often examined in the periodic legislation to reauthorize agricultural programs, commonly known as farm bills. For example, the 2014 farm bill repealed, reauthorized, or modified many of these programs. The House version of the 2018 farm bill, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018 (H.R. 2), contains a forestry title (Title VIII) that would reauthorize, modify, and establish new forestry assistance programs. Forestry-specific assistance programs (in contrast to agriculture conservation programs that include forestry activities) are primarily administered by the USDA Forest Service (FS), with permanent authorization of funding as needed. Some programs have been combined through the appropriations process or for administration purposes. These programs generally provide technical and educational assistance such as information, advice, and aid on specific projects. Other programs provide financial assistance, usually through grants (with or without matching contributions from recipients) or cost-sharing (typically through state agencies, with varying levels of contributions from recipients). Many programs provide both technical and financial assistance. Some of the assistance programs provide support for planning and implementing forestry and related land management practices (e.g., Forest Stewardship, Urban and Community Forestry). Other programs provide assistance for forest restoration projects that involve more than one jurisdiction and address regional or national priorities (e.g., Landscape Scale Restoration). Other programs provide support for protecting forestlands from wildfires, insects and diseases, and from converting forestland to nonforest uses (e.g., Community Forest and Open Space Conservation, Forest Legacy). The Forest Health program provides support for protecting both federal and nonfederal forests from continuing threats, although most of the funding goes to federal forests. Programs also exist to enhance state and rural wildfire management capabilities (e.g., State Fire Assistance and Volunteer Fire Assistance) and to promote the use of forest products (e.g., Wood Innovation). International Forestry is often included as a forestry assistance program, because it provides technical forestry help and because it is funded through the FS appropriations account for forestry assistance programs (State and Private Forestry). Most of the programs provide assistance to state partner agencies. The state agencies can use the aid on state forestlands or to assist local governments or private landowners. How the states use the resources is largely at the discretion of the states, within the authorization of each program and consistent with the national priorities for state assistance established by Congress in the 2008 farm bill. Overall funding for the Forest Service’s forestry assistance programs in FY2018 was $355.1 million, an 8% increase over FY2017 funding of $328.9 million. The Trump Administration requested $197.4 million in funding for FY2019. Overall funding has declined over the past 15 years, however, in both real and constant dollars. Over that time, funding for forestry assistance programs has ranged between 5% and 9% of the total annual Forest Service discretionary appropriation.

Jun 7, 2018

Endangered Species Considerations in Pesticide Use Restrictions: Background and Legislation

Jun 7, 2018

Background Information on Health Coverage Options Addressed in Executive Order 13813

On October 12, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order (E.O.) 13813, entitled “Promoting Healthcare Choice and Competition Across the United States.” E.O. 13813 directs specified agencies to consider regulatory or sub-regulatory approaches to expand access to three unrelated, private-sector health coverage options: association health plans (AHPs); short-term, limited-duration insurance (STLDI); and health reimbursement arrangements (HRAs). This report answers frequently asked questions (FAQs) about E.O. 13813 and subsequent rulemaking and provides background information about AHPs, STLDI, and HRAs. Association health plan is an umbrella term that represents a spectrum of arrangements that provide health coverage to a collective body of employers or individuals (e.g., self-employed persons). AHP coverage may be provided through different types of organizations, including but not limited to trade associations, professional societies, and chambers of commerce. Given the absence of a federal definition for either association health plan or association coverage, applicable federal agencies have indicated that a given AHP should be regulated according to the characteristics of the organization offering the AHP coverage and plan enrollees. Generally, association coverage is addressed through sub-regulatory guidance. The vast majority of AHPs provide either individual or small-group coverage, as determined by federal regulatory agencies. On January 5, 2018, the Department of Labor issued a proposed regulation that would amend the federal definition of employer. The proposed amendment potentially could allow certain AHPs that currently are regulated as individual or small-group coverage to be regulated as large-group coverage instead, and it could encourage the formation of new AHPs. Such a change would reduce the overall scope of federal requirements applicable to those AHPs. AHP proponents argue that the proposed changes would expand coverage options and reduce premiums for certain consumers. AHP opponents argue that those changes would raise premiums for consumers with greater health care needs, particularly in the individual market. Short-term, limited-duration insurance is a type of health insurance that generally is designed to fill gaps in health insurance coverage, particularly for individuals transitioning from one type of coverage to another. STLDI is defined in regulations as health insurance coverage with a maximum duration of three months (including any extensions a consumer may request) that is marketed and issued with disclaimer language about the coverage not being considered minimum essential coverage for purposes of avoiding the individual mandate penalty. Beyond this definition, STLDI is not subject to federal requirements applicable to health coverage. On February 21, 2018, the Departments of Health and Human Services (HHS), Labor, and the Treasury jointly issued proposed regulations that would increase the maximum duration of STLDI from 3 months to 12 months, make policy extensions easier, and modify the required disclaimer language. Proponents of expanding access to STLDI argue that these changes would provide more insurance options for consumers; opponents of the proposed changes have emphasized the potential negative impacts on the risk pool for the individual market for comprehensive coverage. Health reimbursement arrangements are employer-established arrangements that pay or reimburse employees for substantiated medical care expenses up to a maximum dollar amount. HRAs are funded solely by employers; employees cannot contribute to HRAs. Payments and reimbursements from an HRA for an employee’s substantiated medical care expenses (and those of the employee’s spouse and dependents) are excluded from the employee’s income and employment taxes. In general, employers may offer to employees only HRAs that are integrated with another group health plan (that is not an HRA). Although HRAs are governed under the federal tax code, they are not explicitly authorized by legislation. Generally, HRAs are addressed through sub-regulatory guidance. As of the publication date of this report, the agencies identified in E.O. 13813 (Treasury, Labor, and HHS) have not published guidance or proposed regulation on HRAs in response to the order.

Jun 6, 2018

Increase in Illicit Fentanyl Overdose Deaths

Fentanyl, heroin, and some prescription painkillers (such as morphine and oxycodone) belong to the class of drugs known as opioids, which act on receptors in the brain important in regulating pain and emotion. Opioids have susceptibility for abuse and potential for overdose. In 2016, more than 42,000 of the nearly 64,000 drug overdose deaths in the United States involved opioids. Led by fentanyl, a synthetic opioid 50-100 times more potent than morphine, synthetic opioids emerged as the leading cause of opioid-related overdose deaths in 2016. The steep increase in deaths involving fentanyl is seen as a “new chapter” in the opioid epidemic. What Is Fentanyl? Currently, two types of fentanyl exist: (1) pharmaceutical fentanyl used to treat pain and (2) illicit, nonpharmaceutical fentanyl used illegally as a recreational drug. Pharmaceutical fentanyl is a Schedule II narcotic approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as an analgesic for severe pain. While some pharmaceutical fentanyl is diverted from legitimate use, most fentanyl-related overdoses are associated with illicit, nonpharmaceutical fentanyl. Illicit fentanyl is abused by itself or mixed with heroin or other drugs, sometimes without the consumer’s knowledge. Illicit fentanyl comes in many chemical formulations, known as analogues. The availability of illicit fentanyl over the past several years has increased substantially. There has also been a rise in the amount of illicit fentanyl mixed with other drugs such as heroin and cocaine or pressed into counterfeit painkillers. Rise of Fentanyl Overdoses Until 2001, overdose deaths attributed to fentanyl were relatively uncommon compared to heroin and prescription drugs. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) distinguishes between opioid-involved deaths by the following categories: (1) heroin, (2) natural and semisynthetic opioids (including most prescription painkillers), (3) methadone, and (4) synthetic opioids other than methadone. Deaths involving synthetic opioids other than methadone, like fentanyl, rose gradually from 2001 through 2013. Beginning in 2013, the number of deaths involving synthetic opioids rose precipitously. Dominated by fentanyl, deaths involving synthetic opioids increased 625% between 2013 and 2016, according to the CDC (see Figure 1). By 2016, synthetic opioids accounted for 19,413 deaths, surpassing heroin and prescription drugs as the number one cause of opioid-related deaths. According to a National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) Data Brief, the rate of overdose deaths involving synthetic opioids increased from 1.0 per 100,000 in 2013 to 6.2 per 100,000 in 2016. Figure 1. Opioid-Related Deaths Number of Deaths by Type of Opioid 1999-2016 / Source: CRS presentation of data from the CDC NCHS Data Brief. Notes: Deaths involving more than one opioid category are counted in both categories. According to the CDC, the opioid epidemic is “spreading geographically and increasing across demographic groups.” In 2016, overdose deaths increased in all demographic categories, including all age groups over 15 years old, both sexes, all racial or ethnic groups, and across all levels of urbanization. In the last half of 2016, fentanyl was detected in 56.3% of opioid overdose deaths in 10 states included in the CDC’s Enhanced State Opioid Overdose Surveillance program. Fentanyl is exponentially more potent, and the maximum physical effects of the drug, including respiratory depression, may occur faster than intravenous heroin. The CDC and FDA report that in many cases multiple doses of naloxone—an emergency overdose reversal medication—may be needed to revive a patient during a fentanyl overdose. Figure 2 depicts the physical size of a lethal dose of fentanyl. Figure 2. Size of a Lethal Dose of Fentanyl / Source: Drug Enforcement Administration Multi-Media Library: Fentanyl. Notes: Two milligrams of fentanyl—here compared to a U.S. penny—is a lethal dose for most people. Fentanyl causes respiratory depression, which can cause breathing to stop completely, resulting in death. Availability of Fentanyl According to the CDC, a “substantial portion” of the increase in deaths due to synthetic opioids appears to be related to the availability of illicit fentanyl. Areas reporting large increases in illicit fentanyl seizures have also reported sharp increases in fentanyl-related deaths. Fentanyl is less expensive and easier to manufacture than heroin. It is shipped in small amounts, which reduces risks of detection. Nonpharmaceutical fentanyl is widely available in the United States. It is manufactured in China and likely Mexico, and commonly transported in the mail directly from China (or from China through Canada) and smuggled across the southwest border from Mexico. It is often mixed with or sold as heroin, and is increasingly available in counterfeit pills that resemble prescription opioids. The increased potency of synthetic fentanyl compounds, which when combined with heroin and other synthetic opioids are especially deadly, is extremely dangerous. Law enforcement expects that the fentanyl market will continue to expand in the future as new fentanyl analogues are created. Policy Considerations The rise in deaths due to fentanyl is an area of interest for Congress. Members have introduced over 150 bills related to opioids during the 115th Congress. Since nonmedical use of prescription opioids remains the most common pathway to heroin use, policies curbing inappropriate prescribing may reduce further addictions and illicit opioid use; however, restricting access to prescription opioids may result in those already dependent on opioids pursuing illicit forms, including fentanyl. Preventing further addiction by regulating prescribing practices, while also ensuring that individuals with dependency issues do not seek illicit and more fatal sources elsewhere, has been referred to as “two major and urgent – yet partly conflicting – tasks.” Emphasizing one, without balancing the other, may exacerbate the problem. Some patient advocates also warn that restricting opioid prescribing practices may deny patients helpful medications for pain management. Additional options include improving reporting of drug overdose mortality data, increasing access to naloxone, and improving the ability to test for the presence of fentanyl in other substances. Another possible strategy is to reduce the availability of illicit fentanyl and other opioids by bolstering law enforcement efforts. Among several recommendations it made in a report to Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) proposed that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) assess the volume of illicit fentanyl at each port of entry to efficiently target resources for interdiction efforts. It further recommended that law enforcement agencies, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration, establish performance measures to assess their strategies for dealing with the illicit opioid supply. Such measures, however, may be difficult to develop, partly because the opioid threat continues to evolve and the nature of the threat varies by region.

Jun 6, 2018

Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs Funding for FY2018

Jun 5, 2018

The Opioid Epidemic and the Food and Drug Administration: Legal Authorities and Recent Agency Action

According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the annual number of drug overdose deaths in the United States involving opioids has more than quadrupled since 1999. CDC estimates that in 2016, more than 63,000 people died from a drug overdose, and more than 42,000 of these deaths involved prescription or illicit opioids. A report issued in November 2017 by the President's Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis also observed that “[t]he crisis in opioid overdose deaths has reached epidemic proportions in the United States ... and currently exceeds all other drug-related deaths or traffic fatalities.” In combating the opioid epidemic, one central challenge for state and federal regulators is striking a balance between taking aggressive action to fight opioid misuse and addiction, while simultaneously protecting patients who experience severe pain. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—the executive agency tasked with protecting the public health by ensuring the nation’s drug supply is safe and effective—has a pivotal role in addressing these issues. This report focuses on FDA as a key player in federal efforts to curb the opioid epidemic. The report provides an overview of FDA’s role in approving new prescription drugs, including certain challenges presented by the approval and regulation of opioid products. Next, the report addresses FDA’s multifaceted approach in its response to the opioid epidemic, the agency’s use of its existing legal authorities under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act or Act), and recent agency action taken to target the misuse of opioid medications. The report concludes with a discussion of selected opioid-related legislation in the 115th Congress that would amend the FD&C Act.

Jun 5, 2018

Legislative Branch: FY2019 Appropriations

The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Compliance; Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress (LOC), including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Publishing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); Open World Leadership Center; and the John C. Stennis Center. The FY2019 legislative branch budget request of $4.960 billion was submitted on February 12, 2018. The budget request levels were developed prior to the enactment of full-year appropriations for FY2018. Agency assessments for FY2019 may subsequently have been revised—for example, to account for items funded or not funded in the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Subsequent discussions may vary from the levels or language included in the budget request due to this timing. For purposes of this report, however, FY2019 requested levels refer to the requested levels originally submitted unless otherwise noted. By law, the President includes the legislative branch request in the annual budget submission without change. The House Appropriations Committee’s Legislative Branch Subcommittee held hearings in April to consider the FY2019 legislative branch requests. On May 8, 2018, the House Appropriations Committee held a markup of the bill. Three amendments were considered: one, a manager’s amendment, was adopted; one amendment was not adopted; and one amendment was withdrawn. The bill was ordered reported. The House-proposed total for legislative branch activities, excluding Senate items, is $3.811 billion (H.R. 5894, H.Rept. 115-696). The Senate Appropriations Committee’s Legislative Branch Subcommittee held hearings in April and May to consider FY2019 legislative branch requests. The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 115-141) provided $4.700 billion, an increase of $260.0 million (+5.9%) from FY2017. The FY2017 level of $4.440 billion was an increase of $77.0 million (+1.7%) from FY2016. The FY2016 level of $4.363 billion represented an increase of $63 million (+1.5%) from the FY2015 level of $4.300 billion, and the FY2015 level represented an increase of $41.7 million (+1.0%) from the FY2014 funding level of $4.259 billion. The FY2013 act funded legislative branch accounts at the FY2012 enacted level, with some exceptions (also known as “anomalies”), less across-the-board rescissions that applied to all appropriations in the act, and not including sequestration reductions implemented on March 1. The FY2012 level of $4.307 billion represented a decrease of $236.9 million (-5.2%) from the FY2011 level, which itself represented a decrease of $125.1 million (-2.7%) from FY2010. The smallest of the appropriations bills, the legislative branch comprises approximately 0.4% of total discretionary budget authority.

Jun 4, 2018

National Park Service: FY2019 Appropriations

Jun 4, 2018

What Happens When Five Supreme Court Justices Can’t Agree?

Jun 4, 2018

Prioritizing Waterway Lock Projects: Barge Traffic Changes

Congress faces decisions about prioritizing new lock construction projects on the inland waterway system. As both houses debate differing versions of water resources and development bills (S. 2800, H.R. 8) and the FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill (S. 2975, H.R. 5895), the decision about which of these projects could be undertaken first will likely be among the most controversial issues. The inland waterway system supports barge transportation of heavy raw materials such as grain, coal, petroleum, and construction aggregates. The new locks are needed, according to the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and barge shippers, where existing locks are in poor condition, requiring frequent closures for repairs, and/or because a lock’s size causes delays for barge tows. The total estimated cost for the 21 planned lock projects is several billion dollars (many of the individual projects have a cost estimate of between $300 million and $800 million). However, available funding for these projects is about $200 million per year. This is because of limited appropriations and cost-sharing capabilities. Under current cost-share arrangements, the barge industry pays half the cost of construction projects. It does this by paying a $0.29 per gallon fuel tax, which annually generates around $100 million. Significant changes in traffic levels through particular locks may affect the benefits that were estimated as expansion projects were advanced. The calculation of benefits is critical to advancing a project: the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will not request funding for a project unless the estimated economic benefit is at least 2.5 times the expected cost. The lock projects are clustered in three regions, each facing different economic conditions that are affecting barge traffic in the agricultural heartland, record corn and soybean harvests have reversed the long-term downward trend of cargo volumes on the Upper Mississippi River; in the Ohio and Tennessee River Valleys, the domestic natural gas boom has reduced the demand for coal by barge to power plants by nearly half; along the Texas and Louisiana intracoastal waterway, tank barge traffic is still in a state of flux as the petrochemical industry makes longer-term investments related to the Texas shale oil boom. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is expecting corn and soybean exports to increase slightly over the next decade, but this projection could be affected by possible Chinese tariff increases on U.S. agricultural goods, including soybeans. The closing of additional coal-fired electric power plants along the Ohio, Monongahela, and Tennessee Rivers would reduce waterway use, as the power plants generate 75% or more of the barge traffic through many of the locks on these rivers. The loss of coal traffic is significant for other commodities as well, as it could lead to more empty repositioning of barges, reducing economies of density for barge transport on the rivers. New pipeline construction and the lifting of the crude oil export ban at the end of 2015 are two factors that could influence barge demand over the long-term on the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway.

Jun 1, 2018

Water Authorization Legislation in Brief: H.R. 8 and S. 2800

The 115th Congress is deliberating two water authorization bills: H.R. 8, the Water Resources Development Act of 2018 (WRDA 2018), and S. 2800, America’s Water Infrastructure Act of 2018 (AIWA 2018). Both bills were introduced and marked up by their respective authorizing committees in May 2018. H.R. 8 is focused on authorizing water resource projects and activities of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). S. 2800 includes provisions related to USACE water resource projects and activities, provisions related to water-related programs of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and a few provisions on water-related activities and authorities of the Department of the Interior (DOI). For the 115th Congress, some of the issues related to these deliberations on the two bills include the scope of water issues to be addressed, how the legislation would affect federal spending, and how the legislation would affect federal and nonfederal investments in water infrastructure. In addition, there is some interest in altering how the USACE is structured and in modifying its operations and delivery of water resource projects. Both H.R. 8 and S. 2800 include numerous provisions that address USACE-related activities. For example, both bills would authorize USACE to conduct new studies and construct new projects, and both would modify and extend existing project and program authorizations. However, despite these similarities, numerous provisions in one bill have no counterpart in the other. In particular, many provisions in S. 2800 have no related provision in H.R. 8. For example, S. 2800 includes numerous provisions related to EPA-administered water quality and infrastructure programs. Most of these provisions occur in Title V, but other titles also include EPA-related provisions. Title V of S. 2800 would amend the Clean Water Act for various purposes (e.g., to reauthorize the appropriation of grants for sewer overflow projects and make stormwater management projects eligible, to authorize integrated planning to help municipalities comply with wastewater discharge mandates, and to require EPA to promote and integrate the use of green infrastructure into various agency activities). It also would amend the Safe Drinking Water Act (SWDA); among other amendments to the SWDA, the Senate bill would (1) make permanent the requirement to use U.S.-produced iron and steel in all projects receiving Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (SRF) assistance and (2) formally authorize EPA’s WaterSense program. S. 2800 would amend the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA; P.L. 113-121, Title V, Subtitle C) to authorize special terms for loan assistance provided to state Clean Water and Drinking Water SRF finance authorities. Further, it would require a study on WIFIA accessibility for certain communities. H.R. 8, in contrast, contains none of these provisions and generally remains focused on USACE activities. This report provides an overview of H.R. 8 and S. 2800, including context related to the bills and the topics shaping deliberation associated with the USACE- and EPA-related provisions. Among the issues shaping deliberations are the extent to which the legislation improves delivery of water infrastructure, including USACE water resource projects, and the effect of the legislation on federal spending and nonfederal investments. As of May 31, 2018, no Congressional Budget Office cost estimates were available for H.R. 8 or S. 2800.

Jun 1, 2018

The Role of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)

ONDCP Mission and Responsibilities The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) is responsible for creating, implementing, and evaluating U.S. drug control policies to reduce the use, manufacturing, and trafficking of illicit drugs as well as drug-related health consequences, crime, and violence. ONDCP is located in the Executive Office of the President. It was created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 and most recently reauthorized by the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006. Authorization of appropriations for ONDCP expired at the end of FY2010, but it continues to receive funding. The ONDCP director must develop a National Drug Control Strategy (Strategy) to direct the nation’s anti-drug efforts—and a companion National Drug Control Budget (Budget)—and evaluate the implementation of the Strategy by agencies contributing to the Federal Drug Control Program and the outcomes (reducing illicit drug use and its consequences). In addition, ONDCP manages the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program and other programs, including Drug Free Communities (DFC). Shifting Priorities ONDCP was created during the “war on drugs”—a term popularized by former President Nixon and commonly used for nearly 40 years to describe U.S. drug policy. In 2009, however, ONDCP distanced itself from the term. While drug use had been considered primarily a criminal justice problem, it has transitioned to being viewed as a combination of criminal justice and public health problems. Mirroring this shift, federal drug control spending has increased the proportion of money allocated for prevention and treatment and decreased that for enforcement and interdiction. Nonetheless, the Budget continues to show a majority of funding is dedicated for supply reduction, as outlined in Table 1. Table 1. Federal Drug Control Budget by Function, FY2013-FY2017 Amounts in billions of dollars Function FY2013 FY2014 FY2015 FY2016 FY2017 Treatment $7.889 $9.482 $9.553 $9.845 $10.580 Prevention 1.275 1.317 1.342 1.486 1.507 Domestic Law Enforcement 8.857 9.349 9.395 9.283 9.299 Interdiction 3.941 3.949 3.961 4.735 4.569 International 1.849 1.637 1.643 1.525 1.521 Total $23.811 $25.734 $25.894 $26.874 $27.476 Demand Reductiona 9.164 10.799 10.895 11.332 12.088 Percentage of Total Drug Control Budget 38.5% 42.0% 42.1% 42.2% 44.0% Supply Reductionb 14.646 14.934 14.998 15.543 15.389 Percentage of Total Drug Control Budget 61.5% 58.0% 57.9% 57.8% 56.0% Source: Amounts taken from ONDCP, National Drug Control Budget: FY2018 Funding Highlights, p. 19. Percentages calculated by CRS. Notes: Amounts may not add to totals due to rounding. ONDCP defines demand reduction as treatment and prevention. ONDCP defines supply reduction as domestic law enforcement, interdiction, and international initiatives. Potential Reauthorization Issues Oversight of ONDCP Over the last several years, ONDCP has not released its Strategy during the relevant fiscal year, and it has not released a 2017 or 2018 Strategy to accompany the FY2018 Budget highlights released in May 2017. It has, however, been directly involved in the President’s Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis. Congress might consider whether ONDCP’s modern role involves more coordinating and advising than implementing and evaluating strategy and policy. Should Congress consider reauthorizing ONDCP, it may question its role. Specifically, if ONDCP continues to delay the release of the Strategy and Budget, and the director’s position remains outside of the President’s Cabinet, Congress may question the role ONDCP plays in U.S. drug policy. Policymakers may also consider the nature of ONDCP altogether. In the FY2019 budget request, the Trump Administration proposes transferring the HIDTA program to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and DFC program to the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). While SAMHSA currently co-administers DFC and other grant programs, DEA does not manage grant programs. Congress may question whether DEA has sufficient resources to properly administer a grant program or whether another Department of Justice (DOJ) entity—such as the Office of Justice Programs—would be better suited to administer the HIDTA program if it were moved out of ONDCP. Policymakers may also question whether the HIDTA program, if administered by DEA, would continue to be seen as a collaborative law enforcement program rather than one directed by a single federal law enforcement agency. Further, if ONDCP no longer administers these grant programs, Congress may consider how this might affect its overall role in federal drug control. Since ONDCP first received funding in FY1989, its operating budget and number of full-time equivalents (FTEs) have fluctuated. However, both the operating budget (not including funding designated for grant programs) and number of FTEs have decreased each fiscal year since FY2010—the longest continual decline in its history. ONDCP’s FY2018 operating budget is $18.4 million, and the number of FTEs is 65—the lowest levels for both over the last two decades. Figure 1. ONDCP FTEs and Operational Budget FY1989-FY2018 / Source: For budget data, see GAO/GGD-93-144, the National Drug Control Budget Summary for FY1994-FY2017, P.L. 115-31, and P.L. 115-141. FTE data provided by ONDCP. Notes: For certain years, the number of FTEs does not appear to match the ONDCP operating budget; the reasons for this are unclear. Funding data are provided in nominal dollars and not adjusted for inflation. Opposition to Legalization of Schedule I Substances In 1970, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) designated marijuana and other drugs as Schedule I controlled substances. This officially prohibited the unauthorized manufacture, distribution, dispensing, and possession of these substances. Current law requires the director of ONDCP to ensure that ONDCP’s funding is not used for any study or contract relating to the legalization of a substance listed in Schedule I of the CSA and oppose any attempt to legalize any substance that the Food and Drug Administration has not approved for medical use. Despite federal restrictions on marijuana, states have deviated by establishing a range of laws and policies allowing its medical and recreational use. As such, Congress may choose to address ONDCP’s ability to support or oppose legalization or remain neutral.

Jun 1, 2018

The Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA)

May 31, 2018

Forest Service: FY2018 Appropriations and FY2019 Request

May 31, 2018

The House Journal: Origin, Purpose, and Approval

The Journal of the House of Representatives is the official record of the chamber’s legislative actions. The Journal’s contents include the titles of introduced legislation, the results of votes, presidential veto messages, and any other matters the House deems to be official proceedings. Unlike the Congressional Record, it is not a transcript of debate. Rather, the Journal is a listing of House actions without the debate accompanying those actions. The Constitution mandates that each House keep a journal of its proceedings (Art. 1, §5). The Constitution, House rules and practices, and, to a lesser extent, statutes direct which proceedings must be recorded. The Journal is public, enabling citizens to follow House actions, excepting those that require secrecy, such as matters of national security. Under House rules, the Speaker announces his or her approval of the Journal at the start of each legislative day. In current practice, approval is automatic unless a Member demands a vote. If that occurs, the Speaker then holds or postpones a voice or record vote to agree to the approval of the Journal. Members may call for a vote, or vote against the Journal’s approval, in order to pursue changes to the Journal or for strategic reasons unrelated to the Journal’s contents. For instance, Members may use votes to ascertain the presence of Members, delay proceedings, protest an action, assemble Members prior to a vote or announcement, or establish independence from leadership. If the vote to approve the Journal fails, the Journal may be subject to amendment. In the period examined (1990-2016), no record vote on approval of the Journal has failed. However, in 1990, a voice vote failed, allowing a Member to offer an amendment, which was approved. This report considers the origin and purpose of the Journal as well as the procedures related to its approval. It discusses why a Member might call for a vote and why a Member might vote against the Journal’s approval. The report also examines record approval votes from 1991 to 2016 (102nd-114th Congresses), addressing trends in the frequency of these votes, the percentage of votes initiated by majority party Members, and the procedures used to call for or postpone record votes.

May 31, 2018

Farm Bills: Major Legislative Actions, 1965-2018

The farm bill provides an opportunity for Congress to address agricultural and food issues comprehensively about every five years. Over time, farm bills have tended to become more complicated and politically sensitive. As a result, the timeline for reauthorization has become less certain, and in general recent farm bills have taken longer to enact than in previous decades. Recent farm bills, beginning with the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246), have been subject to various developments that have delayed enactment, such as insufficient votes to pass the House floor, presidential vetoes, and short-term extensions. The 2014 farm bill took more than 21 months from introduction to enactment and spanned the 112th and 113th Congresses. The House rejected a bill in 2013 and then passed separate farm and nutrition assistance components before procedurally recombining them for conference with the Senate. Somewhat similarly, the 2008 farm bill took more than a year to enact and was complicated by revenue provisions from another committee of jurisdiction, temporary extensions, and vetoes. Whether the House or Senate proceeds first in committee or on the floor is also not always predictable. Both the 2008 farm bill and the 2002 farm bill were extended before their successors were enacted. In 2018, a farm bill reauthorization was reported from the House Agriculture Committee on April 18 (H.R. 2). An initial floor vote on passage on May 18 failed in the House 198-213, but floor procedures allow that vote to be reconsidered through the legislative day of June 22, 2018 (H.Res. 905). The Senate has not yet marked up its bill. This report examines the major legislative milestones for the last 11 farm bills covering 53 years and illustrates trends that may provide useful background and context as the current farm bill debate proceeds.

May 31, 2018

Global Oil Markets and U.S. Gasoline Prices 2018

May 30, 2018

Intelligence Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (IPPBE) Process

May 30, 2018

(Robo)Call Me Maybe: Robocalls to Wireless Phones Under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act

May 29, 2018

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Reauthorization Issues and Debate in the 115th Congress

On April 27, 2018, the House of Representatives passed the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (H.R. 4), a six-year Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reauthorization measure that does not include a controversial proposal to privatize air traffic control laid (ATC) out in an earlier bill, H.R. 2997. On May 9, 2018, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation reported a four-year FAA reauthorization bill (S. 1405, S.Rept. 115-243) that does not address ATC privatization. The enactment of either bill would be the first long-term FAA reauthorization act since the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-95) expired at the end of FY2015. Despite many similarities, there are a number of differences in the two bills, including the length of authorization, funding amounts, and other provisions. Key differences include the following: S. 1405 would authorize funding to aviation programs from FY2018 through FY2021, while funding authorization in H.R. 4 would cover two additional years, through FY2023. H.R. 4 would provide higher annual funding. H.R. 4 would establish a pilot program to provide air traffic services on a preferential basis to aircraft equipped with upgraded avionics compatible with FAA’s NextGen ATC system, while S. 1405 would require FAA to identify barriers to complying with the current 2020 equipage deadline. H.R. 4 proposes a number of actions to address noise complaints attributed to NextGen procedures, while S. 1405 addresses noise concerns by clarifying the availability of certain airport grant funds for noise mitigation programs. While both bills would establish a process for certifying drone package delivery operations, S. 1405 addresses the privacy policies of unmanned aircraft operators and would require FAA to establish a public database of unmanned aircraft to aid with compliance and enforcement of airspace restrictions and applicable regulations. Whereas S. 1405 would allow FAA to revise airline pilot qualification standards to allow certain ground instruction to count toward the 1,500 flight-hour minimum, H.R. 4 does not propose any changes to the current requirements. H.R. 4 would create a new supplemental funding authorization for Airport Improvement Program (AIP) discretionary funds from the general fund appropriations, exceeding $1 billion each year. Large hub airports would not be eligible for these funds. H.R. 4 would make involuntary bumping of passengers after boarding an unfair and deceptive practice. It would also allow an air carrier to advertise base airfare rather than the final cost to the passenger, as long as it discloses additional taxes and fees via a link on its website. Such practice is currently deemed “unfair and deceptive” by a Department of Transportation (DOT) consumer protection rule.

May 29, 2018

Vehicle Fuel Economy and Greenhouse Gas Standards: Frequently Asked Questions

The Trump Administration announced on April 2, 2018, its intent to revise through rulemaking the federal standards that regulate fuel economy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new passenger cars and light trucks. These standards include the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards promulgated by the U.S. Department of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Light-Duty Vehicle GHG emissions standards promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). They are known collectively—along with California’s Advanced Clean Car program—as the National Program. NHTSA and EPA promulgated the second (current) phase of CAFE and GHG emissions standards affecting model year (MY) 2017-2025 light-duty vehicles on October 15, 2012. Like the initial phase of standards for MYs 2012-2016, the Phase 2 rulemaking was preceded by a multiparty agreement, brokered by the White House. The agreement included the State of California, 13 auto manufacturers, and the United Auto Workers union. The manufacturers agreed to reduce GHG emissions from most new passenger cars, sport utility vehicles, vans, and pickup trucks by about 50% by 2025, compared to 2010, with fleet-wide fuel economy rising to nearly 50 miles per gallon. As part of the Phase 2 rulemaking, EPA and NHTSA made a commitment to conduct a midterm evaluation for the latter half of the standards (i.e., MYs 2022-2025, for which EPA had finalized requirements and NHTSA, due to statutory limits, had proposed “augural” requirements). On November 30, 2016, the Obama Administration’s EPA released a proposed determination stating that the MY 2022-2025 standards remained appropriate and that a rulemaking to change them was not warranted. On January 12, 2017, EPA finalized the determination, stating “that the standards adopted in 2012 by the EPA remain feasible, practical and appropriate.” After President Trump took office, however, EPA and NHTSA announced their joint intention to reconsider the Obama Administration’s final determination and reopen the midterm evaluation process. EPA released a revised final determination on April 2, 2018. It stated the MY 2022-2025 standards were “not appropriate and, therefore, should be revised,” and that key assumptions in the January 2017 final determination—including gasoline prices, technology costs, and consumer acceptance—“were optimistic or have significantly changed.” With this revision, EPA and NHTSA announced that they would initiate a new rulemaking. Until that rulemaking is complete, the current standards would remain in force. In response to the announcements from the Trump Administration, California has restated its “continued support for the current National Program and California’s standards.” On March 24, 2017, the California Air Resources Board (CARB) passed a resolution to accept its staff’s midterm evaluation of the state’s Advanced Clean Car program—which includes MY 2017-2025 vehicle GHG standards in line with EPA’s 2017 final determination and the 2012 rulemaking. EPA granted CARB a Clean Air Act preemption waiver for its GHG standards on July 8, 2009. A number of issues remain forefront regarding the CAFE and GHG emission standards, their design, purpose, and potential revision. These include (1) whether EPA has adequately justified its decision to revise the MY 2022-2025 standards and (2) whether California can continue to implement state standards that would be more stringent than the revised federal ones. These issues are informed by analyses regarding (1) whether the standards are technically and economically feasible; (2) the impact of the standards on GHG emissions and energy conservation; and (3) whether the standards adequately address consumer choice, safety, and other vehicle policies, both domestic and international.

May 24, 2018

Recent Legislative and Regulatory Developments in States’ Ability to Drug Test Unemployment Compensation Applicants and Beneficiaries

Federal law permits states to restrict an individual’s Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefit eligibility for certain circumstances related to the “fact or cause” of unemployment; this includes situations in which an individual was fired for drug use or refusing to take a drug test. Most states have specific disqualifications for drug-related job loss (see Table 5-8 in the hyperlink), including reporting to work under the influence of drugs/alcohol; violating the employer’s drug policy, including refusing to undergo drug or alcohol testing; or having tested positive for drugs or alcohol under certain circumstances. Proposals to expand drug testing in the UC program have been considered in recent (113th, 114th, and 115th) Congresses. Interest in these proposals has been balanced by concerns that federal or state laws may be subject to a constitutional challenge if UC eligibility determination or ongoing receipt of UC benefits requires passing drug tests without taking into account individualized suspicion of illicit drug use. Recent developments to expand the states’ ability to drug test UC applicants and beneficiaries include the enactment of a law permitting two new types of drug testing, the issuance of guidance and regulations to support the implementation of the law, the overturning of these regulations, and the Trump Administration’s announcement of intent to propose a new drug testing rule. New Permissible Types of Drug Testing: P.L. 112-96 Section 2105 of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96; February 22, 2012) amended federal law to allow states to conduct two types of drug testing. First, it expanded the longstanding state option to disqualify UC applicants who were discharged from employment with their most recent employer (as defined under state law) for unlawful drug use by allowing states to drug test these applicants to determine UC benefit eligibility or disqualification. Second, it allowed states to drug test UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing, to be determined under new regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor. Program Guidance In response to P.L. 112-96, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) released guidance—Unemployment Insurance Program Letter (UIPL), No. 1-15, “Permissible Drug Testing of Certain Unemployment Compensation Applicants Provided for in Title II, Subtitle A of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012—on October 1, 2014. This guidance (which remains in effect at this time) provided states direction on how to conduct drug testing of UC applicants who are discharged from employment with their most recent employer because of illegal use of controlled substances. States are permitted to deny benefits to individuals under these circumstances. According to DOL, three states have enacted such laws: Mississippi, Texas, and Wisconsin (see pp. 5-19 and 5-20 in the hyperlink). New Regulations As called for in P.L. 112-96, on August 1, 2016, DOL promulgated 20 C.F.R. Part 620, a new rule to implement the provisions of the law relating to the drug testing of UC applicants for whom suitable work (as defined under state law) is available only in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing. The rule provided a list of the applicable occupations (20 C.F.R. §620.3) that regularly conduct drug testing. Significantly, the section of the regulations following this list (20 C.F.R. §620.4) limited a state’s ability to conduct a drug test on UC applicants to those individuals who are only available for work in an occupation that regularly conducts drug testing under 20 C.F.R. §620.3. Thus, although an individual’s previous occupation may have been listed in 20 C.F.R. §620.3, as long as the individual was currently able, available, and searching for work in at least one occupation not listed in 20 C.F.R. §620.3, the individual could not be subject to drug testing to determine eligibility for UC (unless the individual had been discharged because of a drug-related discharge). Repeal of Drug Testing Regulation Using Congressional Review Act: H.J.Res. 42/P.L. 115-17 Various stakeholders have voiced concerns about the UC drug testing provisions enacted under P.L. 112-96 and about the DOL rule finalized under 20 C.F.R. Part 620. For example, advocates for UC beneficiaries claimed that drug testing applicants did not address any policy problem, while a state administration stakeholder group, as well as some Members of the House Ways and Means Committee, pushed for a broader interpretation and more flexibility in implementing drug testing than was offered under the DOL rule. On September 7, 2016, a hearing on Unemployment Insurance included statements by Representative Kevin Brady that expanded upon his disagreement with the DOL rule and its narrow interpretation. Policy consideration then turned to using the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to overturn 20 C.F.R. Part 620. On January 1, 2017, Representative Kevin Brady introduced such a CRA resolution: H.J.Res. 42, which was passed by the House on February 15, 2017, and passed by the Senate on March 14, 2017. President Trump signed H.J.Res. 42/P.L. 115-17 on March 31, 2017. Since a list of occupations that requires drug testing no longer exists within the Code of Federal Regulations (on account of P.L. 115-17), the ability to prospectively test UC claimants based upon occupation is no longer available to states. Without this rule, states currently may drug test UC claimants only if they were discharged from employment because of either unlawful drug use or for refusing a drug test. On February 15, 2017, in the Congressional Record, several members provided justification for their support or opposition of the measure. Representative Kevin Brady, among others, supported the measure. He argued the intent of P.L. 112-96 was to provide states the ability to determine how to best implement drug testing programs but the final regulation narrowed the law to circumstances where testing is legally required (rather than the broader definition of generally required by employer) and removed state discretion in conducting drug testing in their UC programs. Representative Richard E. Neal, among others, argued in opposition of the measure, stating there was no evidence that unemployed workers have higher rates of drug abuse than the general population and that it appeared that some states may be trying to limit the number of workers who collect UC benefits. Agenda Notice of Proposed Rulemaking In spring 2018, the President’s Unified Agenda of Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions (Agenda) proposed to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking from DOL that is to identify the occupations that regularly conduct drug testing for purposes of Section 2105 of P.L. 112-96. On April 17, 2018, at the House Committee on Ways and Means Hearing on Jobs and Opportunity: Federal Perspectives on the Jobs Gap, Chairman Brady asked Labor Secretary Acosta about the status of crafting new regulations on drug testing UC applicants (see the hyperlink beginning at 1 hour, 56 minutes). Secretary Acosta replied that DOL was in the process of drafting a new proposed rule, but that it had to take into consideration the reissue requirements of the Congressional Review Act. The CRA prohibits an agency from reissuing the rule in “substantially the same form” or issuing a “new rule that is substantially the same” as the disapproved rule, “unless the reissued or new rule is specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of the joint resolution disapproving the original rule.”

May 23, 2018

DACA Rescission: Legal Issues and Litigation Status

May 23, 2018

United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding to the U.N. System

May 22, 2018

India’s Domestic Political Setting

May 22, 2018

Is There Liability for Cross-Border Shooting?

May 22, 2018

The Federal Budget: Overview and Issues for FY2019 and Beyond

The federal budget is a central component of the congressional “power of the purse.” Each fiscal year, Congress and the President engage in a number of activities that influence short- and long-run revenue and expenditure trends. This report offers context for the current budget debate and tracks legislative events related to the federal budget. After a decline in budget deficits over the past several years, the deficit is projected to increase significantly in FY2019. Enactment of the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97) and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123) are projected to decrease revenues and increase outlays relative to past years, thus increasing deficits. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) implemented several measures intended to reduce deficits from FY2012 through FY2021, and deficits declined from FY2012 through FY2015. In its April 2018 forecast, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline projects that the FY2019 deficit will equal $981 billion (4.6% of GDP), its highest value since the economy was recovering from the Great Recession in FY2012. The 2017 tax revision and BCA will continue to affect budget outcomes in FY2019 and beyond. Congress may debate amending the BCA as it has in the past through the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240), Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P.L. 113-67), Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74), and BBA 2018. The annual appropriations process, the statutory debt limit, and further tax modifications may also draw congressional attention in FY2019. Additionally, Congress may choose to debate structural changes to the federal budget, including reforms to mandatory and discretionary spending programs proposed by the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Trump Administration. The Trump Administration released its FY2019 budget on February 12, 2018. Proposed policy changes in the budget include increases in discretionary defense spending and relatively large decreases in mandatory spending other than Social Security and Medicare and in nondefense discretionary programs. Following passage of full-year FY2018 appropriations, Congress has turned its attention to the FY2019 budget. The Budget Committees in the House and Senate each develop budget legislation as they receive information and testimony from a number of sources, including the Administration, the Congressional Budget Office, and congressional committees with jurisdiction over spending and revenues. Trends resulting from current federal fiscal policies are generally thought by economists to be unsustainable in the long term. Projections suggest that achieving a sustainable long-term trajectory for the federal budget would require deficit reduction. Reductions in deficits could be accomplished through revenue increases, spending reductions, or some combination of the two.

May 21, 2018

Calculation and Use of the Disaster Relief Allowable Adjustment

May 18, 2018

Indian Health Service (IHS) FY2019 Budget Request and Funding History: A Fact Sheet

The Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead federal agency charged with improving the health of American Indians and Alaska Natives. IHS provides health care for approximately 2.2 million eligible American Indians/Alaska Natives through a system of programs and facilities located on or near Indian reservations, and through contractors in certain urban areas. IHS provides services to members of 573 federally recognized tribes. It provides services either directly or through facilities and programs operated by Indian tribes or tribal organizations through self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts authorized in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA). The IHS has three major sources of funding: (1) discretionary appropriations, (2) collections, and (3) mandatory appropriations. Unlike most agencies within HHS, which receive their appropriations through the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education appropriations act, IHS receives its discretionary appropriations through the Interior/Environment appropriations act. IHS’s discretionary appropriations are divided into three accounts: (1) Indian Health Services, (2) Contract Support Costs, and (3) Indian Health Facilities. IHS collects payments for the health services it provides. IHS, unlike other federal agencies, has the authority to receive payments from other federal programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, and the Department of Veterans Affairs for the health services it provides to IHS beneficiaries who are also enrolled in those programs. IHS also receives payments from state programs (such as workers’ compensation) and from private insurance. In addition to these payments, IHS collects rent from facilities it owns. Since FY1998, IHS has received a mandatory appropriation each fiscal year to support the Special Diabetes Program for Indians. This funding source was most recently extended in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which provided mandatory appropriations for FY2018 and FY2019. The President’s budget requests that these funds be moved to discretionary appropriations in FY2019. This fact sheet focuses on the funding that IHS has received between FY2014 and FY2019 (proposed).

May 18, 2018

Internet Freedom in China: U.S. Government Activity, Private Sector Initiatives, and Issues of Congressional Interest

By the end of 2017, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had the world’s largest number of internet users, estimated at over 750 million people. At the same time, the country has one of the most sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and control regimes in the world. PRC officials have argued that internet controls are necessary for social stability, and intended to protect and strengthen Chinese culture. However, in its 2017 Annual Report, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, RSF) called China the “world’s biggest prison for journalists” and warned that the country “continues to improve its arsenal of measures for persecuting journalists and bloggers.” China ranks 176th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index, surpassed only by Turkmenistan, Eritrea, and North Korea in the lack of press freedom. At the end of 2017, RSF asserted that China was holding 52 journalists and bloggers in prison. The PRC government employs a variety of methods to control online content and expression, including website blocking and keyword filtering; regulating and monitoring internet service providers; censoring social media; and arresting “cyber dissidents” and bloggers who broach sensitive social or political issues. The government also monitors the popular mobile app WeChat. WeChat began as a secure messaging app, similar to WhatsApp, but it is now used for much more than just messaging and calling, such as mobile payments, and all the data shared through the app is also shared with the Chinese government. While WeChat users have recently begun to question how their WeChat data is being shared with the Chinese government, there is little indication that any new protections will be offered in the future. The U.S. government continues to advocate policies to promote internet freedom in China’s increasingly restrictive environment and to mitigate the global impact of Chinese government censorship. The Department of State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and Congress have taken an active role in fighting global internet censorship: Since 2008, the State Department has created programs that support digital safety, policy advocacy, technology, and research to help global internet users overcome barriers to accessing the internet, including the Freedom Online Coalition. In 2016, the BBG created the Office of Internet Freedom to oversee the efforts of BBG-funded internet freedom projects, including the research, development, deployment, and use of BBG-funded internet freedom technologies. In 2000, Congress created the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) to monitor China’s compliance with international human rights standards, to encourage the development of the rule of law in the PRC, and to establish and maintain a list of victims of human rights abuses in China. Additionally, the U.S. information and communications technology (ICT) industry has taken steps to advance internet freedom. In 2008, a group of U.S. ICT companies, along with nongovernmental organizations, investors, and universities, formed the Global Network Initiative (GNI). The GNI aims to promote best practices related to the conduct of U.S. companies in countries with poor internet freedom records. In the 115th Congress, the CECC held a hearing on April 26, 2018, on “digital authoritarianism and the global threat to free speech.” No legislation has been introduced in the 115th Congress related to global internet freedom in authoritarian regimes.

May 18, 2018

U.S. and Global Trade Agreements: Issues for Congress

Congress plays a prominent role in shaping, debating, and approving legislation to implement trade agreements, and over the past three decades, bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs, or free trade agreements (FTAs) in the U.S. context) have become a primary source of new international trade liberalization commitments. The United States has historically pursued FTAs to open markets for U.S. goods, services, and agriculture, and establish trade rules and disciplines to enhance overall domestic and global economic growth. They are actively debated and can be contentious due to concerns over the potential employment effects of greater import competition, among other reasons. RTAs are reciprocal preferential arrangements among two or more parties. Their content has evolved significantly, partly as a result of change in the international economy where new trade barriers have been erected and/or where RTAs may provide a testing ground for new trade rules for potential future multilateral agreement. The United States historically has aimed for comprehensive coverage in eliminating barriers to trade and addressing all sectors in its FTAs. In addition to the reduction and elimination of tariffs and more traditional nontariff trade barriers, U.S. FTAs also cover services trade, enhance intellectual property rights (IPR), provide investment protections, and include enforceable labor and environmental commitments. Some countries pursue more limited agreements—only half of RTAs worldwide cover services and they rarely include labor and environmental provisions. Congressional interest in U.S. and global RTAs stems from their potential economic and foreign policy implications, implementation issues, and Congress’ role in establishing U.S. trade policy (Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress authority to regulate foreign commerce). In its 2015 grant of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), Congress set specific negotiating objectives for U.S. trade agreements that must be advanced in order for Congress to provide expedited consideration to the implementing legislation needed to bring new agreements into force. TPA is scheduled to be in effect through July 2021, unless Congress, before July 1, 2018, enacts an extension disapproval resolution regarding the Administration’s recently submitted extension request. Since 1990, the number of RTAs in force globally has grown six-fold from fewer than 50 to nearly 300. All 164 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are now party to at least one RTA; as of 2014 each member had on average 11 RTA partners. The United States began negotiating FTAs in the 1980s, and as of 2018, is party to 14 such agreements involving 20 trading partners. The multilateral trading system, meanwhile, has not produced a broad set of new trade liberalization agreements (excluding more limited scope agreements, such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement) since the Uruguay Round, which also established the WTO in 1995. In the current environment of stalled multilateral negotiations, RTAs provide an alternative venue to pursue trade liberalization and establish new rules on emerging issues. RTAs are, however, inherently discriminatory given their limited membership (i.e., they provide preferential treatment to some countries and not others), leading to debate over their global economic effect and whether they serve to facilitate future multilateral agreements or lead to the creation of competing trade blocs. U.S. exporters benefit from the preferential aspects of FTAs when they gain better access to FTA partner markets than their foreign competitors, but may be similarly harmed when third parties negotiate agreements that do not include the United States. To date there are no RTAs in force between the world’s largest economies (China, Japan, European Union (EU), and the United States). This could change in the near future as these and other major U.S. trading partners are involved in several pending RTAs, including an ongoing negotiation between 16 Asian nations that involves both China and Japan, and two recently concluded but not yet ratified and implemented RTAs: the EU-Japan agreement (one of twelve pending EU RTAs) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In some ways, the United States has pulled back from its recent FTA policy. Under the Obama Administration, the United States pursued two major regional FTA negotiations, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) including Japan and 10 other Asia-Pacific nations, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) with the European Union. These FTAs would have nearly doubled the share of U.S. trade occurring with FTA partners. The Trump Administration, however, has criticized existing FTAs, withdrawn the United States from the concluded but not enacted TPP, placed the T-TIP negotiations on hold, and initiated renegotiation or modification of the largest U.S. FTAs with Canada, Mexico, and South Korea. The Administration has also stated its intent to negotiate future FTAs on a bilateral rather than multi-party basis. As other countries move forward with new RTA negotiations that cover a significant share of world trade, a number of issues arise that may be of interest to Congress, including how these agreements will affect U.S. economic and strategic interests, their impact on U.S. leadership in trade liberalization efforts and establishing new trade rules, and the appropriate U.S. response.

May 17, 2018

Violence Against Journalists in Mexico: In Brief

Over the past decade, at least 74 journalists have been killed in Mexico and many more have been threatened or attacked. Although violence against journalists is occurring within the context of a broader security crisis, the United Nations (U.N.) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression have asserted that such crimes “attack the roots of democratic life in Mexico.” Perhaps partially as a result of international pressure, the Mexican government recently has reported some progress in resolving emblematic cases of journalists who were killed in 2017. Although some observers are skeptical of this reported progress, others remain hopeful that Mexico will take more decisive action to investigate and prosecute unsolved murders and prevent future crimes against journalists. Congress has expressed increasing concern about freedom of the press in Mexico and provided foreign assistance to help the Mexican government better protect journalists and reduce impunity in cases of crimes committed against them. The U.S. government is focused on strengthening Mexican government efforts to protect journalists and on bringing together journalists, media outlet owners, civil society, and the private sector to play a role in monitoring and improving protection and prosecution efforts. Civil society organizations are planning to meet with each of the five presidential candidates competing in Mexico’s upcoming July 1, 2018, election and urge them to prioritize press freedom and journalists’ safety, topics that currently are not addressed in any of their platforms. THIS will be SUPPRESSED.

May 17, 2018

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: The Decline in the Cash Assistance Caseload

May 17, 2018

Sri Lanka: Background and Issues for Congress

May 17, 2018

The Supreme Court Bets Against Commandeering: Murphy v. NCAA, Sports Gambling, and Federalism

May 16, 2018

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) FY2018 Appropriations: Congressional Action

May 16, 2018

The House Agriculture Committee’s 2018 Farm Bill (H.R. 2): A Side-by-Side Comparison with Current Law

Congress establishes national food and agriculture policy through periodic omnibus farm bills. The 115th Congress has the opportunity to set the direction for farm and food policy because many of the provision in the current farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014, (P.L. 113-79) expire in 2018. The 2014 farm bill consists of 12 titles that address commodity price and income support, crop insurance, conservation, domestic food assistance, trade and international food aid, credit, rural development, research, horticulture, forestry, bioenergy, and various other provisions. The House Agriculture Committee approved its version of omnibus farm legislation for FY2019-FY2023—H.R. 2, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018—on April 18, 2018. In terms of cost, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scored the programs in the bill with mandatory spending, such as nutrition programs, commodity support programs, major conservation programs, and crop insurance, at $867 billion over a 10-year budget window (FY2019-FY2028), which is equivalent to its baseline scenario in which existing farm bill programs would be extended with no changes. H.R. 2 would reauthorize most existing programs for five years through FY2023. Overall, the bill provides continuity with the existing framework of farm and food programs, even as it modifies numerous programs, alters the amount and type of program funding certain programs receive, and exercises the Committee’s discretion not to reauthorize others. For example, H.R. 2 would make changes to the eligibility requirements for individuals participating in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), including expanding the population that is subject to work requirements, while requiring states to offer employment or training opportunities and increasing funding to the states for those purposes. Among changes to commodity programs, an escalator provision could raise the effective reference price for crops enrolled in the Price Loss Coverage program (PLC) under certain market conditions. H.R. 2 also would amend payment limits and the adjusted gross income limit on eligibility for farm program payments to expand the list of producer exemptions from payment and income limits. Payment limits on certain disaster assistance programs also would be raised. The Dairy Margin Protection Program for milk producers is recast as the Dairy Risk Management Program, featuring an expanded range of coverage choices and lower premium rates on the first 5 million pounds of annual milk production. Within the conservation title, H.R. 2 would repeal the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) that has an enrollment of 70 million acres, and uses some of the savings to increase funding for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). It also raises the acreage enrollment limit under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The bill further increases the loan limits for guaranteed farm ownership and operating loans. Bioenergy programs that comprise a separate title in the 2014 farm bill are included in a title on rural infrastructure and economic development. Also, while many of these bioenergy programs currently are authorized for mandatory funding in addition to being authorized for discretionary funds, H.R. 2 authorizes only discretionary funding. For rural communities, the bill authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to reprioritize certain loan and grant programs to respond to specific health emergencies, and to develop prevention, treatment and recovery services. It also would require the Secretary to promulgate minimum acceptable standards for broadband service from the present day up to 30 years into the future. In sum, the Committee-passed bill launches the debate in Congress over the policy direction and program details for the next five years.

May 16, 2018

The Affordable Care Act (ACA): Notifying an Employer of a Potential Shared Responsibility Payment (ESRP)

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) requires that large employers either provide health coverage to full-time employees or face a potential assessment of an Employer Shared Responsibility Payment (ESRP). As explained in CRS Report R43981, The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Employer Shared Responsibility Determination and the Potential Employer Penalty, this “employer penalty” may be assessed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) if at least one of employer’s full-time employees obtains a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction through a health insurance exchange. There remains some confusion as to whether the employer penalty was rescinded by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97) and whether the IRS is currently enforcing the mandate. While the ACA’s tax penalty associated with the individual mandate was modified by the 2017 tax revision, the 2017 law did not make any changes to the employer penalty. The requirement that applicable large employers offer affordable health coverage to their workers or pay a penalty is still law and the IRS is actively enforcing the statute. For example, see this May 2018 article in the New York Times (link may require paid subscription). The ACA requirements to hold employers accountable for offering health coverage were to begin in 2014. However, the IRS provided transition relief in 2014 and did not enforce the ESRP in 2014. There was limited implementation in 2015 for employers with over 100 full-time equivalent (FTEs). Thus, in 2016, close to full implementation for applicable large employers (50 or more FTEs) began with very limited transition relief for tax year 2016 for certain specific circumstances. After additional delays, the IRS recently began to notify applicable large employers of potential ESRP assessments based upon their 2015 Tax Year in November 2017. News reports began documenting the frustration of some firms with the IRS enforcement of the employer penalty soon after (link may require paid subscription). On April 17, 2018, the House Committee on Oversight held a hearing on the Continued Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service where, among other matters, it examined ongoing management issues at the IRS, including the capability to implement the ESRP. At that hearing, the IRS testified that it has identified 32,240 employers with potential ESPR totaling over $4.3 billion for 2015. By January 2, 2018, the IRS reported notifying 3,820 (11.8%) of those employers of their potential ESRP liability for tax year 2015. A recent audit by the Treasury’s inspector general for tax administration found that some of the processes the IRS uses to ensure compliance with the ESRP did not work as intended or have been delayed, not initiated, or canceled. As of October 28, 2016, the audit found, due to system errors, the IRS was unable to process paper information returns timely and accurately. How Does an Employer Know if It Has an Employee Receiving a Premium Tax Credit? There are two ways employers are notified that they have a full-time employee receiving a premium tax credit (and thus, are potentially subject to the shared responsibility assessment): (1) by an exchange when the employee is deemed eligible and then (2) by the IRS after the conclusion of the tax year. However, in 2015, some notices were not sent out and others were delayed until late 2017. Employer Notice from an Exchange Under regulation (45 C.F.R. §155.310(h)), exchanges must notify an employer in a “reasonable timeframe” that an employee is eligible for advance payments of the premium tax credit and cost-sharing reductions and enrolls in a qualified health plan through the exchange. Exchanges may be established either by the state itself as a state-based exchange (SBE) or by the Secretary of Health and Human Services as a federally-facilitated exchange (FFE). In states with FFEs, the exchange may be operated solely by the federal government or in conjunction with the state. The FFEs’ employer notification program was not implemented in 2015 and no notifications were sent to employers by the FFEs about employees receiving a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction during 2015. The employer notification program began to be phased-in for 2016 with approximately 470,000 notices being sent in June 2016. Because an employer can have multiple employees, fewer than 470,000 unique employers received a June 2016 notice. Similarly, because an employee can have multiple employers, fewer than 470,000 employees were impacted by these notices. Employers may appeal the verification notice if they disagree with the findings. CRS has not surveyed state exchanges on their notification programs. While many SBEs have stated that they plan on using the federal exchange notification system, it does appear at least some state exchanges had implemented notification in 2015. Employer Notice from the IRS As part of its determination of whether an employer has a ESRP liability, the IRS notifies an employer that one or more employees has enrolled for one or more months during a year in a qualified health plan for which a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid (45 C.F.R. §155.310(i)). An employer receives this notification through IRS Letter 226-J. Given the construction of the ESRP assessment, the employer contact by the IRS for a given calendar year will not occur until after employees’ individual tax returns have been filed. For 2015, the IRS began notifying employers of a potential ESRP and announced this via Question 55 in “Questions and answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the Affordable Care Act” on November 2, 2017. Employers Must Respond The employer must respond to the IRS within 30 days using IRS Form 14764. The employer may agree or disagree with the computation. If an employer disagrees with the computation, the employer will need to provide a full explanation of the disagreement using IRS Form 14765.

May 16, 2018

Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Framework for Congressional Oversight In Brief

Since 9/11, a number of factors have complicated Congress’s efforts to improve oversight of covert and clandestine activities of the intelligence community. Greater integration of military operations and intelligence activities has resulted in a blurring of authorities associated with Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code. In addition, Congress has expressed concern that DOD’s overuse of terms that are not defined in statute, such as traditional military activities and operational preparation of the environment (OPE), has allowed DOD to circumvent the more stringent oversight requirements of the congressional intelligence committees for activities that may bear close resemblance to covert action or clandestine intelligence collection. Self-imposed limitations on how Congress conducts intelligence oversight may be inhibiting the oversight’s effectiveness. The congressional intelligence committees’ jurisdiction is limited to intelligence authorizations; the congressional defense sub-committees of the chambers’ appropriations committees exercise sole jurisdiction over intelligence appropriations. There is also no natural public constituency for intelligence. Intelligence programs and analytical products are classified and generally removed from the public domain. In addition to not having to be responsive to a constituency for intelligence matters, term limits for Members of the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), intended to prevent co-optation by the intelligence community (IC), may present an obstacle to the development of deep expertise. In spite of these inhibiting factors, congressional oversight of intelligence is widely viewed as essential to the proper functioning of the government, especially the intelligence community. Highly classified covert action and clandestine intelligence programs do not often have visibility outside of Congress. Congressional oversight, therefore, may provide the only meaningful checks on the President’s execution of intelligence policy and programs that may have significant bearing on U.S. national security. Congressional oversight of covert action can be organized around a framework of five issue areas: (1) the activity’s statutory parameters, (2) U.S. national security interests, (3) U.S. foreign policy objectives, (4) funding and implementation, and (5) risk assessment. These categories enable Congress to analyze and assess the specific elements of each activity from a strategic point of view. By extension, Congressional oversight of anticipated clandestine intelligence activities that might also shape the political, economic or military environment abroad can apply the same framework and, as with covert action oversight, address the risk of compromise, unintended consequences, and loss of life.

May 15, 2018

Farm Bill Primer: Sugar Program

May 15, 2018

Blockchain and International Trade

May 14, 2018