CRS Reports

DACA Rescission: Legal Issues and Litigation Status

May 23, 2018

United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding to the U.N. System

May 22, 2018

India’s Domestic Political Setting

May 22, 2018

Is There Liability for Cross-Border Shooting?

May 22, 2018

The Federal Budget: Overview and Issues for FY2019 and Beyond

The federal budget is a central component of the congressional “power of the purse.” Each fiscal year, Congress and the President engage in a number of activities that influence short- and long-run revenue and expenditure trends. This report offers context for the current budget debate and tracks legislative events related to the federal budget. After a decline in budget deficits over the past several years, the deficit is projected to increase significantly in FY2019. Enactment of the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97) and the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123) are projected to decrease revenues and increase outlays relative to past years, thus increasing deficits. The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) implemented several measures intended to reduce deficits from FY2012 through FY2021, and deficits declined from FY2012 through FY2015. In its April 2018 forecast, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline projects that the FY2019 deficit will equal $981 billion (4.6% of GDP), its highest value since the economy was recovering from the Great Recession in FY2012. The 2017 tax revision and BCA will continue to affect budget outcomes in FY2019 and beyond. Congress may debate amending the BCA as it has in the past through the American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (ATRA; P.L. 112-240), Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 (BBA 2013; P.L. 113-67), Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA 2015; P.L. 114-74), and BBA 2018. The annual appropriations process, the statutory debt limit, and further tax modifications may also draw congressional attention in FY2019. Additionally, Congress may choose to debate structural changes to the federal budget, including reforms to mandatory and discretionary spending programs proposed by the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Trump Administration. The Trump Administration released its FY2019 budget on February 12, 2018. Proposed policy changes in the budget include increases in discretionary defense spending and relatively large decreases in mandatory spending other than Social Security and Medicare and in nondefense discretionary programs. Following passage of full-year FY2018 appropriations, Congress has turned its attention to the FY2019 budget. The Budget Committees in the House and Senate each develop budget legislation as they receive information and testimony from a number of sources, including the Administration, the Congressional Budget Office, and congressional committees with jurisdiction over spending and revenues. Trends resulting from current federal fiscal policies are generally thought by economists to be unsustainable in the long term. Projections suggest that achieving a sustainable long-term trajectory for the federal budget would require deficit reduction. Reductions in deficits could be accomplished through revenue increases, spending reductions, or some combination of the two.

May 21, 2018

Calculation and Use of the Disaster Relief Allowable Adjustment

May 18, 2018

Indian Health Service (IHS) FY2019 Budget Request and Funding History: A Fact Sheet

The Indian Health Service (IHS) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the lead federal agency charged with improving the health of American Indians and Alaska Natives. IHS provides health care for approximately 2.2 million eligible American Indians/Alaska Natives through a system of programs and facilities located on or near Indian reservations, and through contractors in certain urban areas. IHS provides services to members of 573 federally recognized tribes. It provides services either directly or through facilities and programs operated by Indian tribes or tribal organizations through self-determination contracts and self-governance compacts authorized in the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA). The IHS has three major sources of funding: (1) discretionary appropriations, (2) collections, and (3) mandatory appropriations. Unlike most agencies within HHS, which receive their appropriations through the Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education appropriations act, IHS receives its discretionary appropriations through the Interior/Environment appropriations act. IHS’s discretionary appropriations are divided into three accounts: (1) Indian Health Services, (2) Contract Support Costs, and (3) Indian Health Facilities. IHS collects payments for the health services it provides. IHS, unlike other federal agencies, has the authority to receive payments from other federal programs such as Medicaid, Medicare, and the Department of Veterans Affairs for the health services it provides to IHS beneficiaries who are also enrolled in those programs. IHS also receives payments from state programs (such as workers’ compensation) and from private insurance. In addition to these payments, IHS collects rent from facilities it owns. Since FY1998, IHS has received a mandatory appropriation each fiscal year to support the Special Diabetes Program for Indians. This funding source was most recently extended in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which provided mandatory appropriations for FY2018 and FY2019. The President’s budget requests that these funds be moved to discretionary appropriations in FY2019. This fact sheet focuses on the funding that IHS has received between FY2014 and FY2019 (proposed).

May 18, 2018

Internet Freedom in China: U.S. Government Activity, Private Sector Initiatives, and Issues of Congressional Interest

By the end of 2017, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had the world’s largest number of internet users, estimated at over 750 million people. At the same time, the country has one of the most sophisticated and aggressive internet censorship and control regimes in the world. PRC officials have argued that internet controls are necessary for social stability, and intended to protect and strengthen Chinese culture. However, in its 2017 Annual Report, Reporters Without Borders (Reporters Sans Frontières, RSF) called China the “world’s biggest prison for journalists” and warned that the country “continues to improve its arsenal of measures for persecuting journalists and bloggers.” China ranks 176th out of 180 countries in RSF’s 2017 World Press Freedom Index, surpassed only by Turkmenistan, Eritrea, and North Korea in the lack of press freedom. At the end of 2017, RSF asserted that China was holding 52 journalists and bloggers in prison. The PRC government employs a variety of methods to control online content and expression, including website blocking and keyword filtering; regulating and monitoring internet service providers; censoring social media; and arresting “cyber dissidents” and bloggers who broach sensitive social or political issues. The government also monitors the popular mobile app WeChat. WeChat began as a secure messaging app, similar to WhatsApp, but it is now used for much more than just messaging and calling, such as mobile payments, and all the data shared through the app is also shared with the Chinese government. While WeChat users have recently begun to question how their WeChat data is being shared with the Chinese government, there is little indication that any new protections will be offered in the future. The U.S. government continues to advocate policies to promote internet freedom in China’s increasingly restrictive environment and to mitigate the global impact of Chinese government censorship. The Department of State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), and Congress have taken an active role in fighting global internet censorship: Since 2008, the State Department has created programs that support digital safety, policy advocacy, technology, and research to help global internet users overcome barriers to accessing the internet, including the Freedom Online Coalition. In 2016, the BBG created the Office of Internet Freedom to oversee the efforts of BBG-funded internet freedom projects, including the research, development, deployment, and use of BBG-funded internet freedom technologies. In 2000, Congress created the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) to monitor China’s compliance with international human rights standards, to encourage the development of the rule of law in the PRC, and to establish and maintain a list of victims of human rights abuses in China. Additionally, the U.S. information and communications technology (ICT) industry has taken steps to advance internet freedom. In 2008, a group of U.S. ICT companies, along with nongovernmental organizations, investors, and universities, formed the Global Network Initiative (GNI). The GNI aims to promote best practices related to the conduct of U.S. companies in countries with poor internet freedom records. In the 115th Congress, the CECC held a hearing on April 26, 2018, on “digital authoritarianism and the global threat to free speech.” No legislation has been introduced in the 115th Congress related to global internet freedom in authoritarian regimes.

May 18, 2018

U.S. and Global Trade Agreements: Issues for Congress

Congress plays a prominent role in shaping, debating, and approving legislation to implement trade agreements, and over the past three decades, bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs, or free trade agreements (FTAs) in the U.S. context) have become a primary source of new international trade liberalization commitments. The United States has historically pursued FTAs to open markets for U.S. goods, services, and agriculture, and establish trade rules and disciplines to enhance overall domestic and global economic growth. They are actively debated and can be contentious due to concerns over the potential employment effects of greater import competition, among other reasons. RTAs are reciprocal preferential arrangements among two or more parties. Their content has evolved significantly, partly as a result of change in the international economy where new trade barriers have been erected and/or where RTAs may provide a testing ground for new trade rules for potential future multilateral agreement. The United States historically has aimed for comprehensive coverage in eliminating barriers to trade and addressing all sectors in its FTAs. In addition to the reduction and elimination of tariffs and more traditional nontariff trade barriers, U.S. FTAs also cover services trade, enhance intellectual property rights (IPR), provide investment protections, and include enforceable labor and environmental commitments. Some countries pursue more limited agreements—only half of RTAs worldwide cover services and they rarely include labor and environmental provisions. Congressional interest in U.S. and global RTAs stems from their potential economic and foreign policy implications, implementation issues, and Congress’ role in establishing U.S. trade policy (Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress authority to regulate foreign commerce). In its 2015 grant of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), Congress set specific negotiating objectives for U.S. trade agreements that must be advanced in order for Congress to provide expedited consideration to the implementing legislation needed to bring new agreements into force. TPA is scheduled to be in effect through July 2021, unless Congress, before July 1, 2018, enacts an extension disapproval resolution regarding the Administration’s recently submitted extension request. Since 1990, the number of RTAs in force globally has grown six-fold from fewer than 50 to nearly 300. All 164 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are now party to at least one RTA; as of 2014 each member had on average 11 RTA partners. The United States began negotiating FTAs in the 1980s, and as of 2018, is party to 14 such agreements involving 20 trading partners. The multilateral trading system, meanwhile, has not produced a broad set of new trade liberalization agreements (excluding more limited scope agreements, such as the Trade Facilitation Agreement) since the Uruguay Round, which also established the WTO in 1995. In the current environment of stalled multilateral negotiations, RTAs provide an alternative venue to pursue trade liberalization and establish new rules on emerging issues. RTAs are, however, inherently discriminatory given their limited membership (i.e., they provide preferential treatment to some countries and not others), leading to debate over their global economic effect and whether they serve to facilitate future multilateral agreements or lead to the creation of competing trade blocs. U.S. exporters benefit from the preferential aspects of FTAs when they gain better access to FTA partner markets than their foreign competitors, but may be similarly harmed when third parties negotiate agreements that do not include the United States. To date there are no RTAs in force between the world’s largest economies (China, Japan, European Union (EU), and the United States). This could change in the near future as these and other major U.S. trading partners are involved in several pending RTAs, including an ongoing negotiation between 16 Asian nations that involves both China and Japan, and two recently concluded but not yet ratified and implemented RTAs: the EU-Japan agreement (one of twelve pending EU RTAs) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In some ways, the United States has pulled back from its recent FTA policy. Under the Obama Administration, the United States pursued two major regional FTA negotiations, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) including Japan and 10 other Asia-Pacific nations, and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) with the European Union. These FTAs would have nearly doubled the share of U.S. trade occurring with FTA partners. The Trump Administration, however, has criticized existing FTAs, withdrawn the United States from the concluded but not enacted TPP, placed the T-TIP negotiations on hold, and initiated renegotiation or modification of the largest U.S. FTAs with Canada, Mexico, and South Korea. The Administration has also stated its intent to negotiate future FTAs on a bilateral rather than multi-party basis. As other countries move forward with new RTA negotiations that cover a significant share of world trade, a number of issues arise that may be of interest to Congress, including how these agreements will affect U.S. economic and strategic interests, their impact on U.S. leadership in trade liberalization efforts and establishing new trade rules, and the appropriate U.S. response.

May 17, 2018

Violence Against Journalists in Mexico: In Brief

Over the past decade, at least 74 journalists have been killed in Mexico and many more have been threatened or attacked. Although violence against journalists is occurring within the context of a broader security crisis, the United Nations (U.N.) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression have asserted that such crimes “attack the roots of democratic life in Mexico.” Perhaps partially as a result of international pressure, the Mexican government recently has reported some progress in resolving emblematic cases of journalists who were killed in 2017. Although some observers are skeptical of this reported progress, others remain hopeful that Mexico will take more decisive action to investigate and prosecute unsolved murders and prevent future crimes against journalists. Congress has expressed increasing concern about freedom of the press in Mexico and provided foreign assistance to help the Mexican government better protect journalists and reduce impunity in cases of crimes committed against them. The U.S. government is focused on strengthening Mexican government efforts to protect journalists and on bringing together journalists, media outlet owners, civil society, and the private sector to play a role in monitoring and improving protection and prosecution efforts. Civil society organizations are planning to meet with each of the five presidential candidates competing in Mexico’s upcoming July 1, 2018, election and urge them to prioritize press freedom and journalists’ safety, topics that currently are not addressed in any of their platforms. THIS will be SUPPRESSED.

May 17, 2018

Temporary Assistance for Needy Families: The Decline in the Cash Assistance Caseload

May 17, 2018

Sri Lanka: Background and Issues for Congress

May 17, 2018

The Supreme Court Bets Against Commandeering: Murphy v. NCAA, Sports Gambling, and Federalism

May 16, 2018

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) FY2018 Appropriations: Congressional Action

May 16, 2018

The House Agriculture Committee’s 2018 Farm Bill (H.R. 2): A Side-by-Side Comparison with Current Law

Congress establishes national food and agriculture policy through periodic omnibus farm bills. The 115th Congress has the opportunity to set the direction for farm and food policy because many of the provision in the current farm bill (the Agricultural Act of 2014, (P.L. 113-79) expire in 2018. The 2014 farm bill consists of 12 titles that address commodity price and income support, crop insurance, conservation, domestic food assistance, trade and international food aid, credit, rural development, research, horticulture, forestry, bioenergy, and various other provisions. The House Agriculture Committee approved its version of omnibus farm legislation for FY2019-FY2023—H.R. 2, the Agriculture and Nutrition Act of 2018—on April 18, 2018. In terms of cost, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scored the programs in the bill with mandatory spending, such as nutrition programs, commodity support programs, major conservation programs, and crop insurance, at $867 billion over a 10-year budget window (FY2019-FY2028), which is equivalent to its baseline scenario in which existing farm bill programs would be extended with no changes. H.R. 2 would reauthorize most existing programs for five years through FY2023. Overall, the bill provides continuity with the existing framework of farm and food programs, even as it modifies numerous programs, alters the amount and type of program funding certain programs receive, and exercises the Committee’s discretion not to reauthorize others. For example, H.R. 2 would make changes to the eligibility requirements for individuals participating in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), including expanding the population that is subject to work requirements, while requiring states to offer employment or training opportunities and increasing funding to the states for those purposes. Among changes to commodity programs, an escalator provision could raise the effective reference price for crops enrolled in the Price Loss Coverage program (PLC) under certain market conditions. H.R. 2 also would amend payment limits and the adjusted gross income limit on eligibility for farm program payments to expand the list of producer exemptions from payment and income limits. Payment limits on certain disaster assistance programs also would be raised. The Dairy Margin Protection Program for milk producers is recast as the Dairy Risk Management Program, featuring an expanded range of coverage choices and lower premium rates on the first 5 million pounds of annual milk production. Within the conservation title, H.R. 2 would repeal the Conservation Stewardship Program (CSP) that has an enrollment of 70 million acres, and uses some of the savings to increase funding for the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP). It also raises the acreage enrollment limit under the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP). The bill further increases the loan limits for guaranteed farm ownership and operating loans. Bioenergy programs that comprise a separate title in the 2014 farm bill are included in a title on rural infrastructure and economic development. Also, while many of these bioenergy programs currently are authorized for mandatory funding in addition to being authorized for discretionary funds, H.R. 2 authorizes only discretionary funding. For rural communities, the bill authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to reprioritize certain loan and grant programs to respond to specific health emergencies, and to develop prevention, treatment and recovery services. It also would require the Secretary to promulgate minimum acceptable standards for broadband service from the present day up to 30 years into the future. In sum, the Committee-passed bill launches the debate in Congress over the policy direction and program details for the next five years.

May 16, 2018

The Affordable Care Act (ACA): Notifying an Employer of a Potential Shared Responsibility Payment (ESRP)

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) requires that large employers either provide health coverage to full-time employees or face a potential assessment of an Employer Shared Responsibility Payment (ESRP). As explained in CRS Report R43981, The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Employer Shared Responsibility Determination and the Potential Employer Penalty, this “employer penalty” may be assessed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) if at least one of employer’s full-time employees obtains a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction through a health insurance exchange. There remains some confusion as to whether the employer penalty was rescinded by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97) and whether the IRS is currently enforcing the mandate. While the ACA’s tax penalty associated with the individual mandate was modified by the 2017 tax revision, the 2017 law did not make any changes to the employer penalty. The requirement that applicable large employers offer affordable health coverage to their workers or pay a penalty is still law and the IRS is actively enforcing the statute. For example, see this May 2018 article in the New York Times (link may require paid subscription). The ACA requirements to hold employers accountable for offering health coverage were to begin in 2014. However, the IRS provided transition relief in 2014 and did not enforce the ESRP in 2014. There was limited implementation in 2015 for employers with over 100 full-time equivalent (FTEs). Thus, in 2016, close to full implementation for applicable large employers (50 or more FTEs) began with very limited transition relief for tax year 2016 for certain specific circumstances. After additional delays, the IRS recently began to notify applicable large employers of potential ESRP assessments based upon their 2015 Tax Year in November 2017. News reports began documenting the frustration of some firms with the IRS enforcement of the employer penalty soon after (link may require paid subscription). On April 17, 2018, the House Committee on Oversight held a hearing on the Continued Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service where, among other matters, it examined ongoing management issues at the IRS, including the capability to implement the ESRP. At that hearing, the IRS testified that it has identified 32,240 employers with potential ESPR totaling over $4.3 billion for 2015. By January 2, 2018, the IRS reported notifying 3,820 (11.8%) of those employers of their potential ESRP liability for tax year 2015. A recent audit by the Treasury’s inspector general for tax administration found that some of the processes the IRS uses to ensure compliance with the ESRP did not work as intended or have been delayed, not initiated, or canceled. As of October 28, 2016, the audit found, due to system errors, the IRS was unable to process paper information returns timely and accurately. How Does an Employer Know if It Has an Employee Receiving a Premium Tax Credit? There are two ways employers are notified that they have a full-time employee receiving a premium tax credit (and thus, are potentially subject to the shared responsibility assessment): (1) by an exchange when the employee is deemed eligible and then (2) by the IRS after the conclusion of the tax year. However, in 2015, some notices were not sent out and others were delayed until late 2017. Employer Notice from an Exchange Under regulation (45 C.F.R. §155.310(h)), exchanges must notify an employer in a “reasonable timeframe” that an employee is eligible for advance payments of the premium tax credit and cost-sharing reductions and enrolls in a qualified health plan through the exchange. Exchanges may be established either by the state itself as a state-based exchange (SBE) or by the Secretary of Health and Human Services as a federally-facilitated exchange (FFE). In states with FFEs, the exchange may be operated solely by the federal government or in conjunction with the state. The FFEs’ employer notification program was not implemented in 2015 and no notifications were sent to employers by the FFEs about employees receiving a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction during 2015. The employer notification program began to be phased-in for 2016 with approximately 470,000 notices being sent in June 2016. Because an employer can have multiple employees, fewer than 470,000 unique employers received a June 2016 notice. Similarly, because an employee can have multiple employers, fewer than 470,000 employees were impacted by these notices. Employers may appeal the verification notice if they disagree with the findings. CRS has not surveyed state exchanges on their notification programs. While many SBEs have stated that they plan on using the federal exchange notification system, it does appear at least some state exchanges had implemented notification in 2015. Employer Notice from the IRS As part of its determination of whether an employer has a ESRP liability, the IRS notifies an employer that one or more employees has enrolled for one or more months during a year in a qualified health plan for which a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid (45 C.F.R. §155.310(i)). An employer receives this notification through IRS Letter 226-J. Given the construction of the ESRP assessment, the employer contact by the IRS for a given calendar year will not occur until after employees’ individual tax returns have been filed. For 2015, the IRS began notifying employers of a potential ESRP and announced this via Question 55 in “Questions and answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the Affordable Care Act” on November 2, 2017. Employers Must Respond The employer must respond to the IRS within 30 days using IRS Form 14764. The employer may agree or disagree with the computation. If an employer disagrees with the computation, the employer will need to provide a full explanation of the disagreement using IRS Form 14765.

May 16, 2018

Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Framework for Congressional Oversight In Brief

Since 9/11, a number of factors have complicated Congress’s efforts to improve oversight of covert and clandestine activities of the intelligence community. Greater integration of military operations and intelligence activities has resulted in a blurring of authorities associated with Title 10 and Title 50 of the United States Code. In addition, Congress has expressed concern that DOD’s overuse of terms that are not defined in statute, such as traditional military activities and operational preparation of the environment (OPE), has allowed DOD to circumvent the more stringent oversight requirements of the congressional intelligence committees for activities that may bear close resemblance to covert action or clandestine intelligence collection. Self-imposed limitations on how Congress conducts intelligence oversight may be inhibiting the oversight’s effectiveness. The congressional intelligence committees’ jurisdiction is limited to intelligence authorizations; the congressional defense sub-committees of the chambers’ appropriations committees exercise sole jurisdiction over intelligence appropriations. There is also no natural public constituency for intelligence. Intelligence programs and analytical products are classified and generally removed from the public domain. In addition to not having to be responsive to a constituency for intelligence matters, term limits for Members of the House Permanent Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), intended to prevent co-optation by the intelligence community (IC), may present an obstacle to the development of deep expertise. In spite of these inhibiting factors, congressional oversight of intelligence is widely viewed as essential to the proper functioning of the government, especially the intelligence community. Highly classified covert action and clandestine intelligence programs do not often have visibility outside of Congress. Congressional oversight, therefore, may provide the only meaningful checks on the President’s execution of intelligence policy and programs that may have significant bearing on U.S. national security. Congressional oversight of covert action can be organized around a framework of five issue areas: (1) the activity’s statutory parameters, (2) U.S. national security interests, (3) U.S. foreign policy objectives, (4) funding and implementation, and (5) risk assessment. These categories enable Congress to analyze and assess the specific elements of each activity from a strategic point of view. By extension, Congressional oversight of anticipated clandestine intelligence activities that might also shape the political, economic or military environment abroad can apply the same framework and, as with covert action oversight, address the risk of compromise, unintended consequences, and loss of life.

May 15, 2018

Farm Bill Primer: Sugar Program

May 15, 2018

Blockchain and International Trade

May 14, 2018

Federal Crop Insurance: Program Overview for the 115th Congress

Since its inception in 1938, the federal crop insurance program has evolved from an ancillary program with low participation to a central pillar of federal support for agriculture. From 2007 to 2016, the federal crop insurance title had the second-largest outlays in the farm bill after nutrition. The total net cost of the program for crop years 2007-2016 was about $72 billion, of which $43 billion (60%) was of direct benefit to producers, $28 billion (39%) went to private insurers, and $754 million (1%) went to the Risk Management Agency (RMA) within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Historically, the agricultural insurance market has been underdeveloped compared to other insurance markets. Agricultural insurance can be challenging to price for several reasons, including lack of crop data, difficulty in calculating actuarially based rates, production and price variations, geographically correlated risks, moral hazard, and adverse selection (i.e., the tendency of higher-risk farmers being more likely to purchase insurance than lower-risk farmers). In 1938, on the heels of the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl, Congress created the federal crop insurance program as a potential alternative to supplemental disaster assistance payments. Initially polices were available for only a few principal crops in a limited number of counties. Few eligible acres were insured. The program underwent significant changes in 1980, when Congress authorized premium subsidies and brought private insurers into the program. Since 1980, federal crop insurance has operated through a shared public-private arrangement funded by taxpayers and producers. Three principal actors operate the program: Private insurance companies, known as Approved Insurance Providers (AIPs), which are the primary insurers selling and servicing the insurance policies; The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which reinsures the policies and subsidizes the delivery expenses of AIPs; and RMA, which determines policy terms, sets premium rates, and regulates AIPs. The terms of the financial arrangement between FCIC and AIPs are set out in a mutually negotiated Standard Reinsurance Agreement (SRA). Each AIP signs an SRA with FCIC annually. In contrast to the program’s limited scope and low participation rate in its early years, by 2011 federal crop insurance was providing more than $100 billion of insurance protection (liability) for over 100 crops (excluding hay, livestock, nursery, pasture, rangeland, and forage) on about 238 million acres. Policy offerings and participation were smaller for the livestock sector—$1.3 billion in liability on less than 3% of total eligible livestock inventory. In 2015, total premium for crops (excluding livestock and other policies) was about $9.8 billion, of which FCIC paid about 62% and producers paid about 38%. From 2000 to 2016, four crops—corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton—accounted for 75% of enrolled acreage. The program is permanently authorized and would continue to operate if Congress does not enact a new farm bill. However, past farm bills have made changes to the underlying authority. Given the program’s significant cost and share of USDA program outlays, it is a frequent target for budgetary savings. Multiple bills introduced in the 115th Congress would modify the main financial components of the program. As with any large program, especially those with private sector involvement, congressional oversight has a significant role in ensuring that the federal crop insurance program meets its intended policy goals and operates efficiently.

May 10, 2018

ENERGY STAR Program

May 10, 2018

Proposed CHIP Rescissions in the Trump Administration’s Rescission Request

On Tuesday, May 8, 2018, the Trump Administration submitted to Congress a proposal for 38 rescissions of budget authority, totaling $15.4 billion. In their transmission, the Office of Management and Budget stated that these rescissions were transmitted pursuant to Section 1012 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 U.S.C. 683). The proposal includes $7.0 billion in rescissions from the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), which is a means-tested program that provides health coverage to targeted low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid-eligibility levels but do not have health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and the states. The federal appropriation for CHIP is provided in statute. From this federal appropriation, states receive CHIP allotments, which are the federal funds allocated to each state, the District of Columbia, and the territories for the federal share of their CHIP expenditures. In addition, if a state has a shortfall in federal CHIP funding, there are a few sources of shortfall funding, such as the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, redistribution funds, and Medicaid funds. Since FY2011, the appropriations laws enacted each fiscal year have consistently included provisions that rescind CHIP funding. From FY2011 through FY2018, a total of $46.4 billion in CHIP funding has been rescinded from the performance bonus payment fund ($30.1 billion), unobligated national allotments ($14.6 billion), and the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund ($1.7 billion). There are two provisions in the Trump proposal that make up the $7.0 billion in CHIP rescissions. The first provision would rescind $5.1 billion from FY2017 federal CHIP funding, and the second provision would rescind $1.9 billion from the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provided an assessment of the proposed CHIP rescissions, and CBO estimates the rescissions would not affect CHIP expenditures or the number of individuals with insurance coverage. Rescission from FY2017 Federal CHIP Funding The provision rescinding funds from FY2017 federal CHIP funding has two parts. Most of the rescission ($3.1 billion) consists of unobligated national allotments, and the remaining $2 billion consists of the recoveries as of May 7, 2018, from states due to a provision from the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10). Unobligated National Allotments The federal appropriation for CHIP is provided in Section 2104(a) of the Social Security Act (SSA). This amount is the overall annual ceiling on federal CHIP spending to the states, the District of Columbia, and the territories. If the federal appropriation is not large enough to cover state allotments in any given year, the state allotments will be reduced proportionally. However, the federal appropriation has been more than sufficient to fund federal CHIP expenditures since FY2009. As a result, in every year since FY2009, there have been unobligated national allotments, which are federal appropriation funds not allocated for state allotments. From FY2009 through FY2013, the unobligated national allotments were transferred into the performance bonus payment fund. However, since then, appropriations laws have rescinded $14.6 billion of the unobligated national allotments. The FY2017 appropriation of $20.4 billion was the combination of two semiannual appropriations of $2.85 billion from SSA Section 2104(a) plus a one-time appropriation of $14.70 billion from MACRA Section 301(b)(3). The Trump proposal would rescind $3.1 billion of unobligated national allotments from the FY2017 one-time appropriation. MACRA Provision State CHIP allotment funds are provided annually, and the funds are available to states for two years. After two years, any unused state CHIP allotment funds are redistributed to states with funding shortfalls. FY2018 began on October 1, 2017, without CHIP funding having been extended. States began FY2018 by funding the federal share of their CHIP programs with unspent funds from their FY2017 allotments, unspent allotments from FY2016, and unspent allotments from prior years redistributed to shortfall states. The amount of the unspent FY2017 allotments available to states was reduced by a provision in MACRA; MACRA Section 301(b)(1)(B)(ii) reduced the amount of states’ unspent funds from their FY2017 allotments available for expenditures in FY2018 by one-third. Earlier in FY2018, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services recovered the funding for the one-third reduction from states. This proposal would rescind $2.0 billion of the recoveries from states due to this MACRA reduction in FY2018 (i.e., the funding recovered from states for the one-third reduction to FY2017 allotment funds available in FY2018). Rescission from Child Enrollment Contingency Fund If a state’s CHIP allotment for the current year, in addition to any allotment funds carried over from the prior year, is insufficient to cover the state’s projected CHIP expenditures for the current year, a few different shortfall funding sources are available. These sources include the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund. A state is eligible for Child Enrollment Contingency Fund payments if it has both a funding shortfall and CHIP enrollment (for children) that exceeds a target level. As a result, not all states with funding shortfalls are eligible for Child Enrollment Contingency Fund payments. The Child Enrollment Contingency Fund was funded with an initial deposit equal to 20% of the appropriated amount for FY2009 (i.e., $2.1 billion). In addition, such sums as were necessary for making Child Enrollment Contingency Fund payments to eligible states are to be deposited into the fund, but these deposits cannot exceed 20% of the federal appropriation for the fiscal year. Iowa, Michigan, and Tennessee are the only states that have received Child Enrollment Contingency Fund payments over the period of FY2009 (when the funds were first available) through FY2017. In FY2016, the appropriations laws rescinded $1.7 billion from the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund. This proposal would rescind $1.9 billion from the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, which would leave roughly $0.5 billion in the fund available for payments in FY2018.

May 10, 2018

Overview of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Water Infrastructure Programs and FY2018 Appropriations

May 9, 2018

The FY2019 Defense Budget Request: An Overview

May 9, 2018

Oil and Gas Activities Within the National Wildlife Refuge System

Oil- and gas-related wells are documented in 110 (approximately 18%) of the 605 units of the National Wildlife Refuge System (NWRS). The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), in the Department of the Interior (DOI), administers the NWRS, which includes primarily national wildlife refuges, along with wetland management districts and waterfowl production areas. The wells in the NWRS most commonly involve nonfederal oil and gas resources but sometimes encompass federal resources. Oil and gas development in the NWRS has the potential to adversely impact wildlife and/or the environment, and some see it as contrary to the mission and purposes for which the NWRS was established. Others think that some levels of oil and gas activity may take place in refuges without harming the system’s central mission of wildlife conservation and that such activity could benefit the U.S. economy and provide greater energy security. FWS, which administers nonfederal mineral activities on refuge lands, and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which administers federal mineral activities on refuge lands, have developed regulations that seek to minimize the adverse impacts of oil and gas development in the NWRS, among other purposes. Nonfederal oil and gas activities in refuges most often occur where FWS has acquired surface rights to refuge lands without acquiring mineral rights. In these cases, the entity (such as an individual, corporation, or tribe) that retains a valid existing right to the mineral estate has the right to develop the oil and gas resources pursuant to regulations established by FWS. According to FWS data, there are 107 NWRS units with nonfederal wells, and 45 of these units have active wells. Nonfederal oil and gas activities in the NWRS outside of Alaska are governed by a final rule promulgated by FWS on November 2016, “Management of Non-Federal Oil and Gas Rights.” In contrast to these nonfederal activities, leasing and development of federal oil and gas resources within the NWRS generally is prohibited. The primary exception is when federal oil and gas leases predate the establishment or expansion of an NWRS unit, in which case the lease can be allowed to continue. According to BLM records, outside of Alaska, there are 11 NWRS units with federal oil and gas wells, all of which have at least 1 producing well. BLM regulations require FWS concurrence as to the time, place, and nature of oil and gas activities in refuges, in order to maximize protection for wildlife populations and habitat. For both federal and nonfederal wells in the NWRS, regulation within Alaska is different from that in the rest of the United States. In addition to general FWS and BLM regulations, these units also are subject to requirements of Alaska-specific laws, including the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA; P.L. 96-487). Within Alaska, Kenai National Wildlife Refuge has both federal and nonfederal oil and gas wells. Three other Alaskan units have nonfederal wells. Congress has debated both the extent of oil and gas activities in the NWRS and the compatibility of these activities with the NWRS’s mission and purposes. One issue that has been debated for many years is whether to allow energy development in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in northeastern Alaska. P.L. 115-97, enacted in December 2017, established a federal oil and gas program for a portion of the refuge. Congress may continue to pursue oversight or legislation related to the implementation of this program, including issues related to limits on the footprint of development, compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. §§4321-4347), or judicial review of legal challenges, among other matters. Congress also has addressed FWS’s 2016 nonfederal oil and gas rule through both oversight and legislation, and it may continue to consider aspects of these regulations as well as the appropriate role for FWS in overseeing nonfederal oil and gas wells in the NWRS.

May 9, 2018

Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Notification Requirements in Brief

Covert action and clandestine activities of the intelligence community and activities of the military may appear similar, but they involve different notification requirements and usually are conducted under different authorities of the U. S. Code. The requirements for notifying Congress of activities of the intelligence community originated from instances in the 1970s when media disclosure of past intelligence abuses underscored reasons for Congress taking a more active role in oversight. Over time, these requirements were written into statute or became custom. Section 3091 of Title 50, U. S. Code requires the President of the United States to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are “kept fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity,” significant intelligence failures, illegal intelligence activities, and financial intelligence activities. Intelligence activities also include covert action as outlined under Section 3093(e) of Title 50, U.S. Code. Section 3092 of Title 50, U. S. Code sets out the congressional notification requirements for non-covert action intelligence activities. Section 3093 of Title 50 sets out the congressional notification requirements for covert actions. Both sections 3092 and 3093 explicitly state such notification is to be provided to the “extent consistent with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods, or other exceptionally sensitive matters.” The President and intelligence committees are responsible for establishing the procedures for notification, which are generally to be done in writing. Partly in deference to this higher standard, such notifications are sometimes limited to specific subgroups of Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in certain circumstances, as defined by law and custom.

May 7, 2018

High Court Strikes Down Provision of Crime of Violence Definition as Unconstitutionally Vague

May 7, 2018

The U.S. Geological Survey: FY2019 Appropriations and Background

May 7, 2018

U.S. LNG Trade Rising, But No Domestic Shipping

May 4, 2018

Compelling Presidential Compliance with a Judicial Subpoena

May 4, 2018

High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program

Drug trafficking is a significant public health and safety threat facing the United States. The federal government has taken a variety of actions aimed at countering this threat. These have ranged from giving law enforcement more tools for combatting traffickers to establishing programs and initiatives to reduce the supply of and demand for illegal drugs. Within the larger framework of the federal government’s efforts to counter drug trafficking is the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) program. The program supports multiagency activities ranging from enforcement initiatives involving investigation, interdiction, and prosecution, to drug use prevention and treatment initiatives. Congress initially created the HIDTA program through the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690) and permanently authorized it in the Office of National Drug Control Policy Reauthorization Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-469). The HIDTA program provides assistance to law enforcement agencies—at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels—operating in areas of the United States that have been deemed as critical drug trafficking regions. The program is designed with the county as its geographic unit of inclusion. There are 29 designated HIDTAs in the United States, cutting across all 50 states, the District Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. The HIDTA program is administered by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). However, each of the HIDTA regions is governed by its own Executive Board, which has the flexibility to design and implement initiatives that confront the specific drug trafficking threats in its region. For FY2018, Congress appropriated $280.0 million for the HIDTA program, a 10.2% increase over the FY2017 appropriation of $254.0 million. Each HIDTA receives a base amount of funding (ranging from approximately $3.1 million to $14.6 million in FY2017) to support initiatives in its region, and the remainder is allocated to support specific initiatives throughout the country. There are several issues that policymakers may consider when they debate the future of the HIDTA program. A prevailing issue will be how much funding to provide for the program. Congress may also choose to exercise oversight and evaluate related issues such as whether the county is still the appropriate unit of inclusion for the HIDTA, whether the criteria for inclusion remain adequate, whether the program is effective in accomplishing its goals, whether its tangential effects can be measured, whether the current bounds on the use of HIDTA funds are still appropriate, and which federal entity may be best suited to administer the program.

May 3, 2018

Farm Bill Primer: Programs Without Baseline Beyond FY2018

May 2, 2018

Issues in International Corporate Taxation: The 2017 Revision (P.L. 115-97)

One of the major motivations for the 2017 tax revision (P.L. 115-97) was concern about the international tax system. Issues associated with these rules involved the allocation of investment between the United States and other countries, the loss of revenue due to the artificial shifting of profit out of the United States by multinational firms (both U.S. and foreign), the penalties for repatriating income earned by foreign subsidiaries that led to the accumulation of deferred earnings abroad, and inversions (U.S. firms shifting their headquarters to other countries for tax reasons). In addition to lowering the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% and providing some other benefits for domestic investment (such as temporary expensing of equipment), the 2017 tax bill also substantially changed the international tax regime. The tax change moved the system from a nominal worldwide tax on all foreign-source income, with a credit against U.S. tax for foreign taxes due, to a nominal territorial system that does not tax foreign-source income. Nevertheless, both systems could be considered a hybrid of a worldwide and territorial system. Prior law reduced the tax on foreign-source income by allowing deferral (taxing income of foreign subsidiaries only if it was repatriated, or paid as a dividend to the U.S. parent) and cross-crediting of foreign taxes (so the credit for high taxes paid in one country could offset U.S. tax on income from a low-tax country). The new system exempts dividends, but also imposes a current worldwide tax on global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI), but at a lower rate. It also introduces a corresponding lower rate on intangible income derived from abroad from assets in the United States (foreign-derived intangible income, or FDII). The new law adds the base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT) to existing anti-abuse measures aimed at artificial profit shifting. BEAT imposes a minimum tax on ordinary income plus certain payments to related foreign companies. Despite the lower corporate tax rate, it is not clear that capital will be shifted into the United States from abroad; although a lower rate reduces the tax rate on equity-financed investments, it decreases the subsidy to debt-financed investments. Whether the capital stock increases or decreases depends on the magnitude of the tax changes (which appear largely offsetting) and the international mobility of debt versus equity. It is also not clear whether the capital stock will be allocated more efficiently or in a way more optimal for U.S. welfare, although economic theory suggests that reducing the tax subsidy for debt is a clear improvement. Although a territorial tax may make profit shifting more attractive, overall, given other elements of the new system, it appears to make profit shifting less important. GILTI and FDII bring the tax treatment of income from intangibles in the United States and abroad closer together, and BEAT and stricter thin capitalization rules (rules limiting interest deductions) also limit profit shifting, including shifting through leveraging. The new system ends the penalties (except for portfolio investment in foreign firms) for repatriating earnings and thus eliminates the prior incentives to retain earnings abroad. A series of measures aimed at inversions appears to make inversions much less attractive. Some of the measures may violate international agreements such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), bilateral tax treaties, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) minimum standards to prevent harmful tax practices. There have been a number of concerns about design features in the new regime, including the dividend deduction, GILTI, FDII, BEAT, and other features. A variety of options might be considered to address these issues.

May 1, 2018

Teen Pregnancy: Federal Prevention Programs

Congress has an interest in preventing pregnancy among teenagers because of the long-term consequences for the families of teen parents and society more generally. Since the 1980s, Congress has authorized—and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has administered—programs with a focus on teen pregnancy prevention. This report intends to assist Congress with tracking developments in four teen pregnancy prevention programs that are currently funded. The report provides detailed information about each program and includes a table that can illustrate the ways in which the programs are both similar and different. The four current programs are the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) program, the Personal Responsibility Education Program (PREP), the Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program, and the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program. Despite their similar names and purposes, the latter two programs have different authorizing laws and funding mechanisms. Generally, the four programs serve vulnerable young people in schools, afterschool programs, community centers, and other settings. Grantees include states, nonprofits, and other entities. The TPP program was established and funded by the FY2010 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 111-117). Subsequent appropriations laws have also provided discretionary funding. As required in appropriations law, the majority of TPP program grants (Tier 1) must use evidence-based education models that have been shown to be effective in reducing teen pregnancy and related risk behaviors. A smaller share of funds is available for research and demonstration grants (Tier 2) that implement innovative strategies to prevent teenage pregnancy. FY2018 funding for the TPP program is $101 million. HHS has taken steps to discontinue the current cohort of grants. PREP was established under Section 513 of the Social Security Act by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA, P.L. 111-148) in 2010. The program receives mandatory funding and is designed to educate adolescents on both abstinence and contraception for preventing pregnancy and sexually transmitted infections, and on selected adult preparation subjects. The PREP authorizing law requires most grantees to replicate evidence-based programs that are proven to change behavior related to teen pregnancy. FY2018 funding for the program is $75 million. The Title V Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program is authorized at Section 510 (Title V) of the Social Security Act. It was formerly known as the Title V Abstinence Education Grant program, which was authorized by the 1996 welfare reform law (P.L. 104-193). The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123) renamed the program and made other changes. The program focuses on implementing sexual risk avoidance, meaning voluntarily refraining from sex before marriage. Grantees may set aside some of their funding to conduct rigorous and evidence-based research on sexual risk avoidance. FY2018 funding for the program is $75 million. The Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program (not to be confused with the Title V program of the same name) was established and funded by the FY2016 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 114-113). Other appropriations laws have since provided discretionary funding. Grantees are to use funding for education on voluntarily refraining from non-marital sexual activity, and they are encouraged to implement evidence-based approaches that teach the benefits associated with resisting risk behaviors. FY2018 funding for the program is $25 million. Multiple HHS offices worked together to establish the Teen Pregnancy Prevention (TPP) Evidence Review process following enactment of the FY2010 omnibus appropriations law (P.L. 111-117). The review is intended to inform the teen pregnancy prevention field about which prevention models have been shown to be effective based on studies from the past 20 years. TPP Tier 1 grantees must use models identified in the review. HHS encourages grantees for the other teen pregnancy prevention programs to use models identified in the review as well.

Apr 30, 2018

Teen Birth Trends: In Brief

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Apr 30, 2018

Army Corps of Engineers: Water Resource Authorization and Project Delivery Processes

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) in the Department of Defense undertakes water resources development activities. Its projects primarily are to maintain navigable channels, reduce flood and storm damage, and restore aquatic ecosystems. Congress directs USACE through authorizations and appropriations legislation. This report summarizes congressional authorization legislation, the standard project delivery process, authorities for alternative water resource project delivery, and other USACE authorities. Authorization Legislation. Congress generally authorizes USACE water resource activities in authorization legislation prior to funding them through appropriations legislation. USACE’s ability to act on an authorization often is determined by funding. Congress typically authorizes numerous new USACE site-specific activities and provides policy direction in an omnibus USACE authorization bill, typically titled a Water Resources Development Act (WRDA). Most project-specific authorizations in WRDAs fall into three general categories: project studies, construction projects, and modifications to existing projects. A few provisions in WRDA bills have time-limited authorizations; therefore, some WRDA provisions may be reauthorizing expired or expiring authorities. In 2018, USACE identified a $96 billion backlog of authorized construction projects. As USACE starts only a few construction projects in a fiscal year (e.g., five in FY2018), numerous projects authorized for construction in previous WRDAs remain unfunded. From 1986 through 2000, Congress often enacted a WRDA on a roughly biennial schedule. The pattern shifted after 2000; no WRDA bills were enacted in the 107th, 108th, and 109th Congresses. Several factors contributed to the lack of WRDAs in these Congresses, including disagreements over whether to change how USACE plans and constructs projects and over the effect of additional project authorizations and policy changes on both spending and the backlog of USACE authorized construction projects. The 110th Congress enacted the Water Resources Development Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-114) in November 2007, overriding a presidential veto. The next omnibus USACE authorization bill, the Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA 2014; P.L. 113-121), was enacted in June 2014. In WRRDA 2014, Congress developed and used new processes for identifying site-specific studies and projects for authorization to overcome concerns related to congressionally directed spending (known as earmarks). The 114th Congress enacted the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN; P.L. 114-322); Title I of the bill had the short title of Water Resources Development Act of 2016 (WRDA 2016). Standard and Alternative Project Delivery. The standard process for a USACE project requires two separate congressional authorizations—one for studying feasibility and a subsequent one for construction—as well as appropriations for both. Congressional authorization for project construction in recent years has been based on a favorable report by the Chief of Engineers (known as a Chief’s Report) and an accompanying feasibility study. For most activities, Congress requires a nonfederal sponsor to share some portion of study and construction costs. Cost-sharing requirements vary by type of project. For some project types (e.g., levees), nonfederal sponsors own the completed works after construction and are responsible for operation and maintenance. As nonfederal entities have become more involved in USACE projects and their funding, they have expressed frustration with the time it takes USACE to complete projects. WRRDA 2014 and WRDA 2016 expanded the opportunities for interested nonfederal entities, including private entities, to have greater roles in project development, construction, and financing. WRRDA 2014 also authorized, through the Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (WIFIA), a program to provide direct loans and loan guarantees for water projects, including those for navigation, flood risk reduction, and ecosystem restoration, among others. Although the portion of the WIFIA program administered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency is operational, the USACE WIFIA program, which was focused more on water resource projects, has not been funded. Other USACE Activities and Authorities. Although most USACE projects are developed under the standard project development process, exceptions exist. Congress has granted USACE general authorities to undertake some studies, small projects, technical assistance, and emergency actions (e.g., flood fighting, repair of damaged levees, and limited drought assistance). Additionally, under the National Response Framework, USACE may be tasked with performing activities in response to an emergency or disaster, such as emergency power restoration.

Apr 30, 2018

Unemployment and Employment Programs Available to Workers Affected by Disasters

The federal government supports several programs that can provide assistance to workers who lose their jobs as a result of a natural or other disaster. In many cases, disaster-affected workers will be served by permanent programs and systems that generally provide assistance to workers who involuntarily lose their jobs. In some cases, disaster-triggered federal supports may be made available to provide additional assistance or aid to workers who do not qualify for assistance under the permanent programs. This report discusses two income support programs and two workforce service programs. In each benefit category, there is a broader permanent program and a more-targeted program for disaster-affected workers. All of these programs are administered through state agencies and some programmatic details may be state-specific. Unemployment Compensation (UC) provides a weekly cash payment to workers who are involuntarily unemployed and meet other criteria. States administer UC benefits with U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) oversight. UC benefits are considered entitlements for eligible workers and funded via payroll taxes paid by employers. Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) provides a weekly cash payment to individuals who become unemployed as a direct result of a major disaster and are not eligible for UC benefits. DUA is funded by the federal government and benefits are paid through each state’s UC agency. Dislocated Worker Activities under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA-DW) are federal formula grants to states to provide training and career services to workers who involuntarily lose their jobs and meet other criteria. WIOA-DW grants are funded via DOL appropriations and administered by state workforce agencies and local partners with DOL oversight. Disaster Dislocated Worker Grants (DDWGs) are competitive federal grants that support temporary disaster response jobs for workers who are unemployed as a direct result of a disaster. DDWGs are awarded by DOL to the state and local partners that receive WIOA-DW funds. Since UC and DUA outlays increase as the need grows, these funds can be responsive to the scale of a disaster. Conversely, WIOA-DW and DDWG funds are limited by appropriations levels and therefore may be less immediately scalable than UC and DUA, which are entitlements for individuals. In some instances, Congress has enacted legislation to temporarily expand these programs that serve disaster-affected workers or otherwise extend supplemental support to the states administering them. These prior efforts may serve as a model when Congress considers legislation to support workers affected by disasters.

Apr 30, 2018

Family Planning Program Under Title X of the Public Health Service Act

The federal government provides grants for family planning services through the Family Planning Program, Title X of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. §§300 to 300a-6). Title X, enacted in 1970, is the only domestic federal program devoted solely to family planning and related preventive health services. In 2016, Title X-funded clinics served 4 million clients. Title X is administered through the Office of Population Affairs (OPA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Although the authorization of appropriations for Title X ended in FY1985, funding for the program has continued through appropriations bills for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS-Education). Title X grantees can provide family planning services directly or subaward Title X monies to other public or nonprofit entities to provide services. In December 2016, OPA released a final rule to limit the criteria Title X grantees could use to restrict subawards: “No recipient making subawards for the provision of services as part of its Title X project may prohibit an entity from participating for reasons other than its ability to provide Title X services.” On April 13, 2017, the President signed P.L. 115-23, which nullified the rule under the Congressional Review Act. On March 23, 2018, the President signed the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), which provides $286.5 million for Title X, the same as the FY2017 level. The FY2018 act continues previous years’ requirements that Title X funds not be spent on abortions, that all pregnancy counseling be nondirective, and that funds not be spent on promoting or opposing any legislative proposal or candidate for public office. Grantees continue to be required to certify that they encourage “family participation” when minors seek family planning services and to certify that they counsel minors on how to resist attempted coercion into sexual activity. The appropriations law also clarifies that family planning providers are not exempt from state notification and reporting laws on child abuse, child molestation, sexual abuse, rape, or incest. The President’s FY2019 budget request, submitted February 12, 2018, proposes $286.5 million for Title X, the same as the FY2018 enacted level. Under the Title X Family Planning Services FY2017 funding opportunity announcement (FOA), final award selections were made by the applicable Public Health Service Region’s regional health administrator, in consultation with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs (DASPA) and the Assistant Secretary for Health or their designees. In contrast, under the FY2018 FOA, final award selections will be made by the DASPAa political appointee or the DASPA’s designee. This is a change from program practices in place since the 1980s. Federal law (42 U.S.C. §300a-6) prohibits the use of Title X funds in programs in which abortion is a method of family planning. According to OPA, family planning projects that receive Title X funds are closely monitored to ensure that federal funds are used appropriately and that funds are not used for prohibited activities. The abortion prohibition does not apply to all Title X grantees’ activities, but applies only to Title X projects’ activities. A grantee’s abortion activities must be “separate and distinct” from the Title X project activities.

Apr 27, 2018

Medicare Coverage of Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT) for Opioid Addiction

Apr 27, 2018

The First Responder Network (FirstNet) and Next-Generation Communications for Public Safety: Issues for Congress

During the events of September 11, 2001 (9/11), first responders could not communicate with each other. Some radios did not work in the high-rise World Trade Center; radio channels were overloaded by the large number of responders trying to communicate; and public safety radio systems operated on various frequencies and were not interoperable. There were also non-technical issues. Officials struggled to coordinate the multi-agency response, and to maintain command and control of the numerous agencies and responders. The 9/11 Commission called for the “expedited and increased assignment of radio spectrum for public safety purposes.” Increased spectrum would allow public safety agencies to accommodate an increasing number of users; support interoperability solutions (e.g., shared channels); and leverage new technologies (e.g., live video streams) to enhance response. In 2012, Congress acted on the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. In Title VI of the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 (P.L. 112-96), Congress authorized the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to allocate additional spectrum for public safety use; established the First Responder Network Authority (FirstNet) and authorized it to enter into a public-private partnership to build a nationwide public safety broadband network; and, provided $7 billion out of revenues from spectrum auctions to build the network. February 22, 2017, marked five years since the act was signed into law. FirstNet has made progress in implementing the provisions in the act. In March 2017, FirstNet awarded a 25-year, $6.5 billion contract to AT&T to build and maintain the nationwide network for public safety. FirstNet provided AT&T with 20 megahertz (MHz) of broadband spectrum, which AT&T can monetize for public safety and non-public safety use. AT&T is providing FirstNet access to its infrastructure, valued at $180 billion, and $40 billion to maintain and improve the network. In September 2017, FirstNet/AT&T presented states with plans detailing how the network would be deployed in each state. Governors could opt to have AT&T deploy the network (i.e., opt in), or have the state assume responsibility for the deployment (i.e., opt out). By January 2018, all 50 states and 6 territories opted in. This was viewed as a victory for FirstNet, AT&T, and public safety stakeholders who had long advocated for a nationwide network for public safety. However, challenges remain. While governors allowed FirstNet/AT&T to deploy the network in their states, there is no requirement for state and local public safety agencies to use the network. FirstNet/AT&T must attract users to the network to ensure the network is self-sustaining, as required under the act. FirstNet set adoption targets and steep penalties that AT&T must pay if targets are not met. AT&T has offered specialized features and services (e.g., priority access to the network, support during disasters) to attract users to the network. However, Verizon has offered similar services to entice users to its network which may affect FirstNet/AT&T’s enrollment efforts. There are other factors affecting enrollment. Some public safety agencies have expressed reluctance to join the FirstNet network, citing uncertainties with the resiliency, reliability, and security of the network, coverage, and cost. Other agencies have expressed an unwillingness to join until FirstNet can provide mission critical voice features—essential features that responders have on their radios and use during emergencies—that will not be available from FirstNet until 2019. Attracting users to the network will be challenging for FirstNet/AT&T, but necessary to meet the requirements in the law and achieve the intent of the act. Congress may continue its oversight of FirstNet to ensure the FirstNet network is meeting public safety needs (e.g., security, reliability, and resiliency), requirements in the law are met, and the network is deployed as intended. Congress may monitor subscribership to ensure the network will be self-sustaining, as required in the act, and that the intent of the law is achieved.

Apr 27, 2018

OPIC, USAID, and Proposed Development Finance Reorganization

Members of Congress and Administrations have periodically considered reorganizing the federal government’s trade and development functions to advance various policy objectives. In its 2019 budget request, the Trump Administration included a proposal to consolidate the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and other agency development finance functions, specifically noting the Development Credit Authority (DCA) of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), into a new U.S. development finance agency. The policy objectives that the new agency would aim to support include enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of government functions and advancing U.S. national security interests. In February 2018, two proposed versions of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act, H.R. 5105 in the House and S. 2463 in the Senate, were introduced on a bipartisan, bicameral basis to create a new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC). The nearly identical bills would consolidate all of OPIC’s functions and the DCA, enterprise funds, and development finance technical support functions of USAID. Stakeholders differ in their views of particular aspects of the proposal and certain issues remain open questions. Congress would play a major role in any reorganization of federal development finance functions. The proposal to create a new U.S. government agency involves legislative, oversight, and appropriations functions. Key questions for Congress may include the following: What are the rationales for and against modifying and expanding OPIC’s functions? Should development finance functions be reorganized or should alternative approaches be considered? If reorganization is pursued, how should a new development finance institution (DFI) be structured? How should a proposed new DFI be funded? What implications would a proposed new DFI have for USAID and U.S. development objectives? How can adequate coordination be ensured between the new DFI and other U.S. government agencies involved in development? What are the competitiveness and other strategic implications of the proposed DFI?

Apr 27, 2018

Artificial Intelligence and National Security

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a rapidly growing field of technological development with potentially significant implications for national security. As such, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) is developing AI applications for a range of military functions. AI research is underway in the fields of intelligence collection and analysis, logistics, cyberspace operations, command and control, and a variety of military autonomous vehicles. AI applications are already playing a role in operations in Iraq and Syria, with algorithms designed to speed up the target identification process. Congressional action has the potential to shape the technology’s trajectory, with fiscal and regulatory decisions potentially influencing growth of national security applications and the standing of military AI development versus international competitors. AI technology presents unique challenges for military acquisitions, especially since the bulk of AI development is happening in the commercial sector. Although AI is not unique in this regard, the Defense Acquisition Process (DAP) may potentially need to be adapted for acquiring systems like AI. In addition, many commercial AI applications must undergo significant modification prior to being functional for the military. A number of cultural issues challenge AI acquisition, leading to discord with AI companies and potential military aversion to adapting weapons systems and processes to this disruptive technology. International rivals in the AI market are creating pressure for the United States to compete for innovative military AI applications. China is a leading competitor in this regard, releasing a plan in 2017 to capture the global lead in AI development by 2030. Currently, China is primarily focused on using AI to make faster and more well-informed decisions, as well as developing multiple types of autonomous military vehicles. Russia is also active in military AI development, with a primary focus on robotics. Although AI has the potential to impart a number of advantages in the military context, it may also introduce distinct challenges. AI technology can facilitate autonomous operations, lead to more informed military decision-making, and will likely increase the speed and scale of military action. However, it is also unpredictable, vulnerable to unique forms of manipulation, and presents challenges to human-machine interaction. Analysts hold a broad range of opinions on how influential AI will be in future combat operations. While a small number of analysts believe that the technology will have minimal impact, a larger number of experts believe that AI will have at least an evolutionary if not revolutionary effect. Military AI development presents a number of potential issues for Congress What is the right balance of commercial and government funding for AI development? How might Congress influence Defense Acquisition reform initiatives that ease military AI adaptation? What changes, if any, are necessary in Congress and DOD to implement effective oversight of AI development? What regulatory changes are necessary for military AI applications? What measures can be taken to protect AI from exploitation by international competitors and preserve a U.S. advantage in the field?

Apr 26, 2018

Farm Bill Primer: Budget Issues

Apr 26, 2018

District Court Enjoins DACA Phase-Out: Explanation and Takeaways

Apr 26, 2018

Farm Bill Primer: What Is the Farm Bill?

Apr 26, 2018

The Islamic State: Background, Current Status, and U.S. Policy

Apr 26, 2018

Covert Action and Clandestine Activities of the Intelligence Community: Selected Definitions in Brief

While not defined by statute, DOD doctrine describes clandestine activities as “operations sponsored or conducted by governmental departments in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment” that may include relatively passive intelligence collection information gathering operations. Unlike covert action, clandestine activities do not require a presidential finding but may require notification of Congress. This definition differentiates clandestine from covert, using clandestine to signify the tactical concealment of the activity. By comparison, covert operations are “planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor.” Since the 1970s, Congress has established and continued to refine oversight procedures in reaction to instances where it had not been given prior notice of intelligence activities—particularly covert action—that had significant bearing on United States national security. Congress, for example, had no foreknowledge of the CIA’s orchestration of the 1953 coup that overthrew Iran’s only democratically elected government, or of the U-2 surveillance flights over the Soviet Union that ended with the Soviet shoot-down of Francis Gary Powers in 1960. Eventually, media disclosures of the CIA’s domestic surveillance of the anti-Vietnam War movement and awareness of the agency’s covert war in Laos resulted in Congress taking action. In 1974, Congress began its investigation into the scope of past intelligence community activities that provided the basis for statutory provisions for intelligence oversight going forward. The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (§32 of P.L. 93-559) provided the earliest provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. In the late 1970s, Congress established a permanent oversight framework, standing up the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI). These committees were given exclusive oversight jurisdiction of the intelligence community. Recent events in North Korea, Yemen, and elsewhere have underscored the important function Congress can have in influencing the scope and direction of intelligence policy that supports United States national security. However, despite Congress’s work during the past decades to establish statutory provisions for conducting intelligence oversight, those efforts have not always achieved Congress’s desired result. For example, there has been occasional confusion over whether the congressional intelligence or defense committees have jurisdiction for oversight purposes. This confusion is due in part to overlapping or mutually supporting missions of the military and intelligence agencies, particularly in the post-9/11 counterterrorism environment. Intelligence and military activities fall under different statutory authorities, but they may have similar characteristics that warrant congressional notification (e.g., a need to conceal United States sponsorship and serious risk of exposure, compromise, and loss of life).

Apr 25, 2018

U.S. Funding to the United Nations System: Overview and Selected Policy Issues

Members of Congress are responsible for authorizing and appropriating U.S. funding to the United Nations (U.N.) system. Over the years, congressional interest in U.N. funding has largely focused on three key questions: What are appropriate levels of U.S. funding to U.N. entities? Are U.S. contributions used as efficiently and effectively as possible? How, if at all, should the United States leverage U.S. contributions to achieve its policy priorities in U.N. bodies? U.N. System Funding The U.N. system is made up of interconnected entities including specialized agencies, funds and programs, peacekeeping operations, and the U.N. organization itself. The U.N. Charter requires each U.N. member to contribute to the expenses of the organization. U.N. bodies are funded by a combination of assessed and voluntary contributions. Assessed contributions are required dues shared among U.N. member states to pay for the expenses of the organization. The U.N. regular budget, peacekeeping operations, and specialized agencies are funded mainly by assessed contributions. Voluntary contributions fund U.N. funds, programs, and offices. The budgets for many of these bodies may fluctuate annually depending on contribution levels. Organizations such as the U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and U.N. Development Program (UNDP) are financed mainly by voluntary contributions. U.S. Contributions The United States is the largest financial contributor to the U.N. system, providing 22% of the U.N. regular budget and 28.43% of U.N. peacekeeping budgets. In FY2017, it contributed more than $8.5 billion to U.N. entities through the State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations act. Congress usually authorizes the majority of U.S. contributions to the U.N. system as part of Foreign Relations Authorization Acts, with appropriations provided to the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to meet obligations. When authorization bills are not enacted, Congress has waived the authorization requirements and appropriated funds through annual SFOPS appropriations acts. The Trump Administration’s FY2018 and FY2019 budgets proposed significant reductions in U.N. funding. Selected Policy Issues Since the United Nations was established in 1945, Members of Congress have considered a number of ongoing issues related to U.N. funding: U.S. assessment levels. Some policymakers are concerned that current assessment levels result in the United States providing the bulk of funding to U.N. entities, particularly the U.N. regular budget, while having minimal influence on the organization’s budget processes. Some are concerned that the U.S. peacekeeping assessment of 28.43%, which Congress capped at 25%, is too high. Others argue that the U.S. assessment reflects its commitment to the United Nations, affirms U.S. global leadership, and encourages other countries to fund the organization. U.S. withholdings. Over the years, Congress has withheld full or partial funding from selected U.N. bodies and activities. Some Members of Congress have debated the effectiveness of such withholdings in furthering U.S. interests in U.N. bodies, as well as the potential impact on U.N. operations. U.S. arrears. For the past several decades, the United States has accumulated arrears for some U.N. entities and activities, including U.N. peacekeeping. Some Members continue to discuss the impact of these arrears and whether they should be paid. U.S. funding and U.N. reform. Congress has enacted legislation linking U.S. funding to specific U.N. reform benchmarks. Some policymakers oppose such actions due to concerns that they may interfere with U.S. influence and ability to conduct diplomacy in U.N. bodies. Others suggest that the United States should use its position as the largest financial contributor to push for certain U.N. reforms. Tracking U.S. contributions. The manner in which the United States provides funding to the U.N. system is complex and often difficult to track in a timely and accurate manner. Congress has enacted several U.N. funding reporting requirements over the years. While some of these efforts have provided useful snapshots of U.S. funding during particular time periods or to select U.N. bodies, for a number of reasons few have comprehensively captured the full scope of U.S. funding to the U.N. system. This report will be updated as events warrant. For a brief overview of U.N. funding, see CRS In Focus IF10354, United Nations Issues: U.S. Funding to the U.N. System.

Apr 25, 2018

Closing the Flood Insurance Gap

There is a large flood insurance gap in the United States, where many people that are exposed to flood risk are not covered by flood insurance. The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the primary source of residential flood insurance in the United States. Over 22,000 communities participate in the NFIP, with over 5 million policies providing $1.28 trillion in coverage. The NFIP identifies areas at high risk of flooding as Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs). Property owners are required to purchase flood insurance only if (1) their properties are in SFHAs, (2) their communities participate in the NFIP, and (3) they have federally backed mortgages. Because the SFHA boundary is central to NFIP mapping, it may create a false belief that flood risk changes abruptly at the boundary and that properties outside the SFHA are safe and do not need flood insurance. However, about 20% of NFIP claims are for properties outside SFHAs, and all 50 states have experienced floods in the last five years. Recent floods highlight the issue of high uninsured losses. For example, in the October 2015 South Carolina floods, the average NFIP penetration rate in counties with a federal disaster declaration was 5% (Table 1). Nearly 90% of policies in South Carolina were concentrated at the coast, but the flood damage was primarily inland, where few residents were insured (Figure 1). Figure 1. Residential Penetration Rates of NFIP Flood Insurance in South Carolina Counties with FEMA Individual Assistance Declarations for 2015 South Carolina Floods (DR-4241) / Source: Data for all figures provided by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, November 6, 2017. Notes for all figures: Left: county-wide penetration rate; right: penetration rate for structures in SFHA. Table 1. Average Residential Penetration Rates for Recent Flood Events Counties with FEMA Individual Assistance Declarations Flood Event Location Average County Penetration Rate Average SFHA Penetration Rate Counties with Highest SFHA Penetration Rate County-wide Penetration Rate Percentage of County in SFHA October 2015 (DR-4241) South Carolina 5% 30% Berkeley 93% Charleston 83% Berkeley 10% Charleston 44% Berkeley 64% Charleston 73% August 2016 (DR-4277) Louisiana 17% 31% St. Tammany 73% Livingstone 54% St. Tammany 53% Livingstone 38% St. Tammany 27% Livingstone 62% Hurricane Harvey (DR-4332) Texas 10% 21% Aransas 72% Galveston 64% Aransas 43% Galveston 47% Aransas 32% Galveston 35% Hurricane Irma (DR-4337) Florida 12% 31% St. Johns 73% Monroe 54% St. Johns 35% Monroe 51% St. Johns 52% Monroe 88% Hurricane Irma (DR-4335), Hurricane Maria (DR-4340) U.S. Virgin Islands 2.5% n/a n/a n/a n/a Hurricane Irma (DR-4336), Hurricane Maria (DR-4339) Puerto Rico 0.2% 1.9% Carolina 3.1% Cataño 0.6% n/a n/a Carolina 14% Cataño 40% Source: Data provided by FEMA Congressional Affairs staff, November 6, 2017. Notes: Penetration rates are given in all cases for the two counties with the highest penetration rates in the SFHA. For comparison, the penetration rate for the whole county is also given. FEMA describes NFIP penetration rates as the proportion of all properties with NFIP flood insurance. See, for example, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Flood Insurance, GAO-14-297R, April 9, 2014, p. 6. In the 2016 Louisiana floods, about 17% of the flooded properties were insured. The 2016 floods were due to intense rainfall rather than coastal flooding, but NFIP policies were concentrated in a band relatively close to the coast (Figure 2). Figure 2. Residential Penetration Rates of NFIP Flood Insurance in Louisiana Counties with FEMA Individual Assistance Declarations for 2016 Louisiana floods (DR-4277) / The flooding caused by the 2017 hurricanes further highlighted the issue of low numbers of insured flood victims, with particularly low penetration rates in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. On average, 10% of flooded structures had NFIP insurance in the 41 counties in Texas with FEMA Individual Assistance (IA) declarations for Hurricane Harvey. In the 48 Florida counties with IA declarations for Hurricane Irma, 12% of the flooded buildings had flood insurance. In both Texas and Florida, penetration rates were highest at the coast (see Figure 3 and Figure 4, respectively). In contrast, many inland counties with a significant proportion of their area within the SFHA had low penetration rates despite the known flood risk. Figure 3. Residential Penetration Rates of NFIP Flood Insurance in Texas Counties with FEMA Individual Assistance Declarations for Hurricane Harvey (DR-4332) / In the floods shown here, less than a third of the structures in SFHAs were insured. Although these structures may not have been covered by the mandatory purchase requirement, the extent of recent flooding suggests that residents in SFHAs might benefit from purchasing flood insurance voluntarily. Figure 4. Residential Penetration Rates of NFIP Flood Insurance in Florida Counties with FEMA Individual Assistance Declarations for Hurricane Irma (DR-4337) / An insured flood victim is likely to recover more quickly and will generally receive more from NFIP insurance than from IA. Homeowners can get up to $350,000 for buildings and contents together, and renters are able to get up to $100,000 from an NFIP policy, compared to a maximum of $34,000 per household from IA. In addition, most disaster victims do not receive the maximum amount available under FEMA disaster assistance. For example, after the 2015 South Carolina floods, the average IA payment was about $3,200, and the average NFIP claim was $34,934. After the 2016 Louisiana floods, the average NFIP claim was $90,674, whereas the average IA payment was about $9,000. The NFIP could achieve greater financial stability with a wider policy base and, in particular, through finding ways to increase coverage outside the SFHA. FEMA has identified the need to increase flood insurance coverage across the nation as a major priority for NFIP reauthorization, and this also forms a key element of FEMA’s 2018-2022 strategic plan. FEMA’s “moonshot” has set a goal of doubling flood insurance coverage by 2023 through the increased sale of both NFIP and private policies. FEMA’s view is that both the NFIP and an expanded private market will be needed in order to increase flood insurance coverage for the nation and reduce uninsured losses after the next flood.

Apr 24, 2018

Work Authorization for H-4 Spouses of H-1B Temporary Workers: Frequently Asked Questions

H-4 nonimmigrant visas allow spouses and unmarried children (under 21 years of age) of H-1B temporary workers to join them in the United States. Eligibility for employment authorization for H-4 nonimmigrants was instituted by regulation in 2015 and is limited to those whose spouses are H-1B nonimmigrants who are in the process of obtaining employment-based lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. The Trump Administration is proposing to rescind this regulation, thus removing eligibility for work authorization for H-4 nonimmigrants. Congress has expressed interest in the background and impact of this proposed change, as well as legislative approaches to addressing work authorization for this group. This report provides answers to frequently asked questions about work authorization for H-4 visa holders.

Apr 24, 2018