CRS Reports

Capital Access: IPO and “IPO On-Ramp”

Mar 26, 2018

Seed Cotton as a Farm Program Crop: In Brief

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123; BBA), signed into law on February 9, 2018, included a provision—Section 60101(a)—which amended the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79) to add seed cotton as a “covered commodity,” thus making cotton eligible for the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) farm revenue support programs. The 2014 farm bill provides authority for farm programs for the 2014 through 2018 crop years. Under the 2014 farm bill—signed into law in February 2014—neither cotton nor its co-product, cottonseed, were eligible to participate in the newly created ARC and PLC programs. During the first three years of the 2014 farm bill (crop years 2014 through 2016), nearly $20 billion in support payments have been made to eligible program crops under ARC and PLC. Upland cotton had been eligible for U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) farm support programs since their origin in the 1930s. However, in a significant departure from past U.S. farm policy, and in response to a trade dispute with Brazil, the 2014 farm bill permanently removed upland cotton from eligibility for the ARC and PLC programs. Instead, the remaining cotton-specific support programs were supplemented by offering the U.S. cotton sector new transitional payments and, in 2015, a new shallow-loss revenue insurance product: the Stacked Income Protection Program (STAX). Since early 2014, U.S. cotton producers have been largely unsatisfied with their economic situation due to falling cotton prices, and they have expressed additional concern regarding the perceived lack of revenue support offered under STAX. In early 2015, the U.S. cotton sector began advocating to be made eligible for payments under the ARC and PLC programs. Several Members of the House Agriculture Committee (including both its chairman and ranking member) were supportive of this effort and actively sought a legislative opportunity to reintegrate either cottonseed or seed cotton—the harvested but un-ginned cotton boll that includes both lint and cottonseed—back into the revenue support programs in the 2014 farm bill. After several legislative attempts, this effort was successful when Congress passed the BBA with a provision that amended the 2014 farm bill to add seed cotton as a “covered commodity,” thus making it eligible for either ARC or PLC beginning with the 2018 crop. However, to participate, cotton producers must first make three decisions specified in the new statute: what portion of their farm program acres (referred to as base acres) will be designated as cotton-specific base, whether to update historical cotton program yields (needed to determine the per-acre payment rate), and which program to participate in—ARC or PLC. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects the cost of adding seed cotton as a covered commodity at nearly $3 billion over 10 years. However, accompanying budget offsets are projected to lower the net cost to $61 million. Offsets include reallocating farm payments made to other program crops planted on former cotton program acres (known as “generic base”) back to cotton and repealing eligibility for STAX from cotton producers that participate in ARC or PLC. The policy change for cotton has potential implications for both domestic and international commodity markets. However, perhaps the most critical aspect of the new seed cotton policy is that, as part of current law, it becomes part of CBO’s budget baseline used to write the next farm bill. As a result, it avoids the potential policy debate surrounding a search for budgetary offsets that would otherwise be needed to pay for the costs associated with adding a new farm program. This result could facilitate reaching an agreement among congressional negotiators working on the farm support programs in Title I of a new farm bill.

Mar 26, 2018

China’s Communist Party Absorbs More of the State

Mar 23, 2018

UPDATE: Threats to National Security Foiled? A Wrap Up of New Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum

Mar 22, 2018

Bankruptcy Basics: A Primer

U.S. bankruptcy law has two central aims. First, bankruptcy law seeks to relieve debtors of certain obligations they are unable to repay by providing them with a “fresh start” from financial difficulties. At the same time, bankruptcy law attempts to preserve the countervailing interests of creditors and other stakeholders by maximizing total creditor return in an orderly and efficient fashion. Congress and the courts have established a complex system of statutes, procedural rules, and judicial precedents intended to balance these competing interests. Various types of debtors—from individual consumers with modest incomes to the largest multinational corporations—may potentially encounter difficulty repaying their debts. To accommodate the differing needs of such debtors, the Bankruptcy Code—which is the primary source of bankruptcy law in the United States—contains a variety of “Chapters” which create several different forms of bankruptcy proceedings. Although the end goal of each of those proceedings is to balance the conflicting interests of debtors, creditors, and other stakeholders, each Chapter has its own procedures, eligibility requirements, and forms of relief. Whereas some Chapters aim to liquidate the debtor, others attempt to reorganize the debtor so that it may continue to operate as a going concern, while still others adjust the debtor’s debts. This report serves as a primer for Members and their staffs on the basics of U.S. bankruptcy law. The report provides a brief overview of the most essential concepts necessary for an informed understanding of the U.S. bankruptcy system, including the competing policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code; the sources of bankruptcy law; the organization of the Bankruptcy Code; the key players in a bankruptcy proceeding; the initiation of a bankruptcy case; the “automatic stay” of creditor actions against the debtor; the various types of proceedings established by different Chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as the differences between those proceedings; and the “discharge” of debt.

Mar 22, 2018

Unauthorized Childhood Arrivals: Legislative Activity in the 115th Congress

Legislative activity in the 115th Congress on unauthorized childhood arrivals (foreign nationals who as children were brought to live in the United States by their parents or other adults) comes in response to a decision announced by the Trump Administration on September 5, 2017, to terminate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy. The DACA policy was established by the Obama Administration in 2012 to provide eligible individuals with temporary protection against removal from the United States and work authorization. Initial DACA grants were for two years and could be renewed in two-year increments. Under the Trump Administration’s DACA phase-out plan announced in September 2017, a DACA beneficiary whose grant of deferred action was due to expire on or before March 5, 2018, could submit a renewal request. A beneficiary whose DACA grant was due to expire after March 5, 2018, could not request a renewal and, thus, would lose DACA protection on the grant’s expiration date. As of the date of this report, however, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) continues to process requests to renew DACA, in accordance with federal court orders. According to DHS data, as of January 31, 2018, there were approximately 682,750 active DACA recipients. Legislative proposals on unauthorized childhood arrivals in the 115th Congress build on related legislation introduced and considered in earlier Congresses. Past measures receiving action would have established a process for eligible unauthorized childhood arrivals to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs), who can live and work permanently in the United States. None of these measures were enacted. Bills introduced in the 115th Congress include measures to provide pathways to LPR status for certain unauthorized childhood arrivals, like the bills considered in past Congresses, as well as bills to provide more-limited DACA-like temporary protection from removal and employment authorization. In February 2018, the Senate considered three proposals on unauthorized childhood arrivals as floor amendments to an unrelated bill (H.R. 2579). Each proposal would have established a pathway to LPR status for unauthorized childhood arrivals, although there were significant differences among them with respect to the eligible population, the legalization process and timeline, and the implications for the parents of beneficiaries. The Senate rejected motions to invoke cloture on any of the amendments. The House has not considered legislation on unauthorized childhood arrivals in the 115th Congress as of the date of this report.

Mar 22, 2018

Supplemental Security Income (SSI)

Mar 22, 2018

Department of Health and Human Services: FY2019 Budget Request

This report provides information about the FY2019 budget request for the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The report begins by reviewing the department’s mission and structure. Next, the report offers a brief explanation of the conventions used for the FY2018 estimates and FY2019 request levels in the budget documents released by the HHS and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The report also discusses the concept of the HHS budget as a whole, in comparison to how funding is provided to HHS through the annual appropriations process. The report concludes with a breakdown of the HHS request by agency, along with additional HHS resources that provide further information on the request. A table of CRS key policy staff is included at the end of the report. Historically, HHS has been one of the larger federal departments in terms of budgetary resources. Estimates by OMB indicate that HHS has accounted for at least 20% of all federal outlays in each year since FY1995. Most recently, HHS is estimated to have accounted for 28% of all federal outlays in FY2017. Under the FY2019 President’s budget proposal, HHS would spend an estimated $1.2 trillion in FY2019. This is $48 billion more than FY2018 estimated spending levels and about $113 billion (+10%) more than FY2017 actual spending levels. Final FY2018 appropriations were not enacted prior to the release of the FY2019 President’s budget request. As a result, the FY2018 estimates in FY2019 President’s budget materials (and this report) are based on annualized amounts provided in an FY2018 continuing resolution, plus current services estimates for mandatory spending. Mandatory spending typically accounts for the majority of the HHS budget. Two programs—Medicare and Medicaid—are expected to account for 86% of all estimated HHS spending in FY2019, according to the President’s request. Medicare and Medicaid are “entitlement” programs, meaning the federal government is required to make mandatory payments to individuals, states, or other entities based on criteria established in authorizing law. Discretionary spending accounts for about 8% of HHS outlays in the FY2019 President’s request. Although discretionary spending represents a relatively small share of total HHS spending, the department nevertheless receives more discretionary money than most federal departments. According to OMB data, HHS accounted for 7% of all discretionary budget authority in FY2017.

Mar 22, 2018

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)

Mar 22, 2018

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123): CHIP, Public Health, Home Visiting, and Medicaid Provisions in Division E

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018, P.L. 115-123), which was enacted on February 9, 2018, addresses a number of issues that were before Congress. For example, appropriations for most federal agencies and programs were to expire on February 8, 2018, and BBA 2018 extends continuing appropriations for these agencies and programs through March 23, 2018. In addition, BBA 2018 includes FY2018 supplemental appropriations, an increase to the debt limit, increases to the statutory spending limits for FY2018 and FY2019, tax provisions, and numerous provisions extending or making changes to mandatory spending programs, among other topics. Division E of BBA 2018 is titled the Advancing Chronic Care, Extenders, and Social Services (ACCESS) Act, which includes provisions affecting the following programs: Medicare; Medicaid; the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP); public health programs; the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting (MIECHV) program; foster care and child welfare; social impact partnerships; child support enforcement; and prison data reporting. This report provides information about the provisions from Division E of BBA 2018 related to CHIP, certain public health programs, the MIECHV program, and the Medicaid program. BBA 2018 extends CHIP funding and other CHIP-related provisions (i.e., the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, the qualifying states option, the Express Lane Eligibility option, the maintenance of effort [MOE] for children, the Pediatric Quality Measures Program, and the outreach and enrollment program) for FY2024 through FY2027. BBA 2018 extends funding for a number of public health programs that were funded through direct appropriations. Among the programs that receive additional funding through BBA 2018 for FY2018 and FY2019 are two Special Diabetes Programs, funding for the Health Professions Opportunity Grant Program, and the National Health Service Corps. BBA 2018 also extends funding, and in some cases increased funding, with programmatic changes for the Family-to-Family Health Information Program, an abstinence education program now known as the Sexual Risk Avoidance Education program; the Personal Responsibility Education Program (which relates to teen pregnancy prevention); the health center program; and the teaching health center graduate medical education program. In addition, the law reduces the amounts appropriated to the Public Health and Prevention Fund as a funding offset. BBA 2018 also extends funding of $400 million annually for the MIECHV program from FY2017 through FY2022. It requires states and other jurisdictions to continue to track and report on performance outcomes. It also allows jurisdictions to use some MIECHV funding for a pay-for-outcomes initiative, among other changes. BBA 2018 includes some Medicaid provisions as offsets. These Medicaid offsets are related to (1) Medicaid disproportionate share hospital (DSH) allotments; (2) the third-party liability (TPL) rules; (3) consideration of “qualified lottery winnings” and/or “qualified lump sum income” when determining Medicaid eligibility; (4) the rebate obligation with respect to line-extension drugs; and (5) the Medicaid Improvement Fund. This report provides a table with abbreviated summaries for the provisions in Division E of BBA 2018 related to CHIP, certain public health programs, the MIECHV program, and the Medicaid program. The table is followed by detailed summaries for each of these provisions, including background information and descriptions of the BBA 2018 provision.

Mar 20, 2018

Housing Finance: Recent Policy Developments

Mar 20, 2018

Germaneness of Debate in the Senate: The Pastore Rule

Paragraph 1(b) of Senate Rule XIX—commonly known as the Pastore rule, after its author, former Rhode Island Senator John Pastore—requires Senate floor debate to be germane during specific periods of a Senate work day. The rule has been enforced sporadically since its adoption in 1964. In current practice, the germaneness requirements of the Pastore rule are rarely formally invoked on the Senate floor. Pursuant to the rule, all floor debate must be germane and confined to the specific question then pending before the Senate for the first three hours after (1) the conclusion of the Morning Hour occurring at the beginning of a new legislative day (in the rare event the Senate should hold a Morning Hour) or (2) after the unfinished business or any pending business has been laid before the Senate on any calendar day. The Pastore rule’s germaneness requirement can be waived by unanimous consent or by nondebatable motion. A Senator may be called to order during the three-hour window described in the Pastore rule by the presiding officer or by another Senator if his or her remarks are not germane to the specific question then before the Senate. If a Senator calls another Senator to order under the rule, enforcement first results in a reminder from the presiding officer that debate must be germane to the question then pending before the Senate. The raising of a point of order does not remove speaking privileges from the offending Senator. Depending on the ruling of the presiding officer on such a point of order, a Senator may either continue speaking (if ruled germane), pivot to a germane topic (if ruled not germane), or yield the floor (if ruled not germane).

Mar 20, 2018

Challenges to the United States in Space

Mar 20, 2018

Section 232 Steel and Aluminum Tariffs: Potential Economic Implications

Effective March 23, President Trump will apply 25% and 10% tariffs, respectively, on certain steel and aluminum imports, from all countries, excluding Canada and Mexico at least at this time. These tariffs will affect various stakeholders in the U.S. economy, prompting reactions from several Members of Congress, some in support and others voicing concerns. In general, the tariffs would be expected to benefit the domestic steel and aluminum industries, leading to potential expansion in production in those sectors, while potentially negatively affecting consumers and downstream domestic industries (e.g., manufacturing and construction) through higher costs. For more information on the Section 232 case, see CRS Insight IN10872, The President Acts to Impose Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Imports, by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10097, Threats to National Security Foiled? A Wrap Up of New Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum, by Caitlain Devereaux Lewis. U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports Subject to Section 232 In 2017, U.S. imports of steel and aluminum products covered by the Section 232 tariffs totaled $29.0 billion and $17.4 billion, respectively (Figure 1). Over the past decade steel imports, by value, have fluctuated significantly, while imports of aluminum have increased steadily. The current exclusion of Canada and Mexico from the Section 232 tariffs is economically significant as the two countries respectively accounted for 18% and 5% of relevant U.S. steel imports, and 40% and 2% of relevant U.S. aluminum imports in 2017. Excluding Canada and Mexico, the top three suppliers of steel in 2017 were the European Union (EU), South Korea, and Brazil; the top three suppliers of aluminum were China, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates (Table 1). Figure 1. U.S. Steel and Aluminum Imports subject to Section 232 Tariff (2008-2017, U.S. dollars) / Source: Created by CRS using data from Census Bureau on HTS products included in the Section 232 proclamations. Table 1. Top U.S. Import Suppliers of Products Covered under Section 232 Proclamations (2017) Steel Aluminum Country Import Value (million U.S. $s) Share Country Import Value (million U.S. $s) Share European Union 5,993 20.6% China 1,842 10.6% South Korea 2,787 9.6% Russia 1,576 9.1% Brazil 2,450 8.4% United Arab Emirates 1,388 8.0% Japan 1,659 5.7% European Union 1,249 7.2% Russia 1,431 4.9% Bahrain 585 3.4% Taiwan 1,264 4.4% Argentina 547 3.1% Turkey 1,192 4.1% India 382 2.2% China 1,009 3.5% South Africa 340 2.0% India 761 2.6% Qatar 307 1.8% Vietnam 532 1.8% Japan 251 1.4% Canada 5,187 17.9% Canada 7,043 40.5% Mexico 2,494 8.6% Mexico 262 1.5% U.S. Total (All Countries) 29,038 100.0% U.S. Total (All Countries) 17,403 100.0% Source: Created by CRS using data from the Census Bureau on HTS products included in the Section 232 proclamations. Notes: European Union includes 28 member states. Canada and Mexico are currently excluded from the new tariffs. Economic Dynamics of the Tariff Increase Changes in tariffs affect economic activity directly by influencing the price of imported goods and indirectly through changes in exchange rates and real incomes. The extent of the price change and its impact on trade flows, employment, and production in the United States and abroad depend on resource constraints and how various economic actors (foreign producers of the goods subject to the tariffs, producers of domestic substitutes, producers in downstream industries, and consumers) may respond as the effects of the increased tariffs reverberate throughout the economy. The following outcomes would be expected at the microeconomic (individual firms and consumers) level: The price of the imported steel and aluminum products would likely increase. The magnitude of the price increase will depend on a number of factors including the level of current and potential country and product exceptions, and the ability of foreign producers to lower their own prices and absorb a portion of the tariff increase, which determines the extent the tariffs are “passed through” to downstream industries and consumers. Demand for the imported goods facing the tariffs would likely decrease, while demand for those goods produced domestically or in countries excluded from the tariff would likely increase. Consumers and downstream firms’ sensitivity to the price increase (their price elasticity of demand) will depend in large part on the degree to which the steel and aluminum products produced domestically or in excluded countries are sufficient substitutes for the products facing the tariffs. The price and output of steel and aluminum produced domestically or in countries excluded from the tariffs will likely increase. As consumers of the products facing the tariffs shift their demand to tariff-free substitutes, domestic and excluded-country producers will likely respond by increasing output and raising prices. Resource constraints that may limit this expansion could cause prices to increase more rapidly. Input costs for downstream domestic producers will likely increase. As prices likely rise in the United States for the goods subject to the tariffs, domestic industries that use steel and aluminum in their products (“downstream” industries, such as auto manufacturers and oil producers) will face higher input costs. Higher input costs for downstream domestic producers will likely lead to some combination of lower profits and higher prices, which in turn, could dampen demand for downstream products and result in a reduction of output in these sectors. Aggregating these microeconomic effects, tariffs also have the potential to affect macroeconomic variables, although these impacts may be limited in the case of the Section 232 tariffs, given their focus on two specific commodities with potential exemptions, relative to the size of the U.S. economy. With regard to the value of the U.S. dollar, as demand for foreign goods likely falls in response to the tariff, U.S. demand for foreign currency may also fall, putting upward pressure on the relative exchange value of the dollar. Tariffs may also affect national consumption patterns, depending on the how the shift to higher cost domestic substitutes affects consumers’ discretionary income and therefore aggregate demand. Finally, given the ad-hoc nature, these tariffs, in particular, are also likely to increase uncertainty in the U.S. business environment potentially placing a drag on investment. Assessing the Overall Economic Impact From a global standpoint, tariff increases on steel and aluminum are likely to result in an unambiguous welfare loss due to what most economists consider is a misallocation of resources caused by shifting production from lower-cost to higher-cost producers. Looking solely at the domestic economy, the net welfare effect is unclear, but also likely negative. Generally, economic models would suggest the negative impact of higher prices on consumers and industries using the imported goods is likely to outweigh the benefit of higher profits and expanded production in the import-competing industry and the additional government revenue generated by the tariff. It is theoretically plausible to generate an overall positive welfare effect for the domestic economy if the foreign producers absorb a large enough portion of the tariff increase. Given the current excess capacity and intense price competition in the global steel and aluminum industries, however, this level of tariff absorption by foreign firms seems unlikely. Moreover, any potential retaliation by foreign governments would erode this welfare gain. Major U.S. trading partners, such as the EU, have already expressed their intent to retaliate against the U.S. action by imposing tariffs on various U.S. exports. The direct economic effects of the tariffs may be limited due to the relatively small share of economic activity directly affected. Excluding Canada and Mexico, U.S. imports of covered steel and aluminum were $21.4 billion and $10.1 billion, respectively, accounting for 1.3% of all U.S. imports in 2017. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, steel and aluminum producers employ approximately 200,000 workers in the United States, less than 1% of total U.S. private employment (120 million). Various stakeholder groups have prepared quantitative estimates of the costs and benefits across the economy. Specific estimates from these studies should be interpreted with caution given their sensitivity to modeling assumptions and techniques, but generally they suggest a small negative overall effect on U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) from the tariffs with employment shifts into the domestic steel and aluminum industries and away from other sectors in the economy. Ultimately the economic significance of the tariffs will largely depend on two currently unknown variables, namely The range of product and country exclusions. Canada and Mexico are excluded, which together account for more than 25% of steel and 40% of aluminum imports covered by the tariff. The United States also has important national security relationships, a key factor for potential exemptions according to the U.S. proclamations, with the EU and South Korea. Exempting these partners, together with Canada and Mexico, would exclude more than 50% of relevant U.S. steel imports. Specific products may also be excluded from the tariffs, which would further limit any economic impact. The degree to which other countries retaliate. Retaliation would have an immediate negative economic impact on the industries subject to retaliatory tariffs. Depending on the degree of retaliation it could also set off a tit-for-tat process of increasing global protectionism, leading to a reduction in global trade volumes and a costly and inefficient reallocation of resources.

Mar 19, 2018

The Visa Waiver Program: Balancing Tourism and National Security

Mar 15, 2018

Modes of Constitutional Interpretation

When exercising its power to review the constitutionality of governmental action, the Supreme Court has relied on certain “methods” or “modes” of interpretation—that is, ways of figuring out a particular meaning of a provision within the Constitution. This report broadly describes the most common modes of constitutional interpretation; discusses examples of Supreme Court decisions that demonstrate the application of these methods; and provides a general overview of the various arguments in support of, and in opposition to, the use of such methods of constitutional interpretation. Textualism. Textualism is a mode of interpretation that focuses on the plain meaning of the text of a legal document. Textualism usually emphasizes how the terms in the Constitution would be understood by people at the time they were ratified, as well as the context in which those terms appear. Textualists usually believe there is an objective meaning of the text, and they do not typically inquire into questions regarding the intent of the drafters, adopters, or ratifiers of the Constitution and its amendments when deriving meaning from the text. Original Meaning. Whereas textualist approaches to constitutional interpretation focus solely on the text of the document, originalist approaches consider the meaning of the Constitution as understood by at least some segment of the populace at the time of the Founding. Originalists generally agree that the Constitution’s text had an “objectively identifiable” or public meaning at the time of the Founding that has not changed over time, and the task of judges and Justices (and other responsible interpreters) is to construct this original meaning. Judicial Precedent. The most commonly cited source of constitutional meaning is the Supreme Court’s prior decisions on questions of constitutional law. For most, if not all Justices, judicial precedent provides possible principles, rules, or standards to govern judicial decisions in future cases with arguably similar facts. Pragmatism. Pragmatist approaches often involve the Court weighing or balancing the probable practical consequences of one interpretation of the Constitution against other interpretations. One flavor of pragmatism weighs the future costs and benefits of an interpretation to society or the political branches, selecting the interpretation that may lead to the perceived best outcome. Under another type of pragmatist approach, a court might consider the extent to which the judiciary could play a constructive role in deciding a question of constitutional law. Moral Reasoning. This approach argues that certain moral concepts or ideals underlie some terms in the text of the Constitution (e.g., “equal protection” or “due process of law”), and that these concepts should inform judges’ interpretations of the Constitution. National Identity (or “Ethos”). Judicial reasoning occasionally relies on the concept of a “national ethos,” which draws upon the distinct character and values of the American national identity and the nation’s institutions in order to elaborate on the Constitution’s meaning. Structuralism. Another mode of constitutional interpretation draws inferences from the design of the Constitution: the relationships among the three branches of the federal government (commonly called separation of powers); the relationship between the federal and state governments (known as federalism); and the relationship between the government and the people. Historical Practices. Prior decisions of the political branches, particularly their long-established, historical practices, are an important source of constitutional meaning. Courts have viewed historical practices as a source of the Constitution’s meaning in cases involving questions about the separation of powers, federalism, and individual rights, particularly when the text provides no clear answer.

Mar 15, 2018

DOD’s Troops to Teachers Program (TTT)

Mar 15, 2018

Capital Access: SEC Regulation A+ (“Mini-IPO”)

Mar 15, 2018

Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2018 Appropriations

Mar 14, 2018

The President Acts to Impose Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Imports

On March 8, 2018, President Trump issued proclamations imposing duties on U.S. imports of steel and aluminum, based on the Secretary of Commerce’s finding that these articles are being imported into the United States in such quantities and under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security of the United States. The President acted under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). The proclamations outline the President’s decisions to impose tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum imports effective March 23, 2018. The President temporarily excluded imports from Mexico and Canada and may make further exemptions, stating that other countries with whom the United States has a “security relationship” may discuss “alternative ways” to address the national security threat. In addition, parties located in the United States directly affected by the tariffs will be able request specific product exclusions based on national security considerations or insufficient domestic production. Background In April 2017, two presidential memoranda instructed the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) to prioritize the steel and aluminum investigations. The final reports, submitted to the President on January 11 and January 22, 2018, respectively, concluded imports of steel mill products and of wrought and unwrought aluminum “threaten to impair the national security” of the United States. For more information on the Section 232 process, see CRS analysis in CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10085, Pedal to the Metal: Commerce Recommends Revving Up Trade Measures on Steel and Aluminum. The Commerce investigations analyzed the importance of steel and aluminum products to national security, using a relatively broad definition. Commerce defined national security to include “the general security and welfare of certain industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national defense requirements, which are critical for minimum operations of the economy and government.” The broad scope of the investigations extended to current and future requirements for national defense and 16 specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as electric transmission, transportation systems, food and agriculture, and critical manufacturing. The reports also examined domestic production capacity and utilization, industry requirements, current quantities and circumstances of imports, international markets, and global overcapacity. Past Section 232 investigations generally considered national defense factors, although a 2001 Section 232 report on iron ore and semi-finished steel also looked at broader domestic industry trends but did not lead to an affirmative conclusion. Of the previous 26 Section 232 investigations, a president last acted in 1982 when President Reagan imposed a petroleum embargo on Libya. Commerce Department Recommendations In the recent steel investigation, the Secretary of Commerce concluded that “the present quantities and circumstance of steel imports are weakening our internal economy’ and threaten to impair the national security as defined in Section 232.” He further asserted that “the only effective means of removing the threat of impairment is to reduce imports to a level that should ... enable U.S. steel mills to operate at 80 percent or more of their rated production capacity” (the minimum rate the report found necessary for the long-term viability of the U.S steel industry). This would be well above the 2016 capacity utilization rate of 70.5% reported by the American Iron and Steel Institute, an industry trade group. The Secretary further recommended the President “take immediate action to adjust the level of these imports through quotas or tariffs” and proposed a range of specific tariff and quota options for the President to consider. The President’s final determination imposes a higher tariff rate than the recommended global tariff but, unlike the recommendation, exempts Mexico and Canada and, more recently, Australia. The President followed the Secretary’s guidance that a process be established whereby countries and/or products may be excluded. Tariffs implemented as a result of the Section 232 investigations will be in addition to any tariffs or duties already in place. For more information on the Commerce reports, see CRS Insight IN10865, Commerce Determines Steel and Aluminum Imports Threaten to Impair National Security. Potential Implications and Next Steps Stakeholders on all sides of the issue have been vocal in their views since the investigations commenced. Domestic manufacturers of both steel and aluminum support relief through measures intended to limit imports. U.S. steel manufacturers and the United Steelworkers (USW) support broad new restrictions on steel imports with only limited exceptions. Some Members, including the Congressional Steel Caucus, also support the new tariffs. In contrast, users of steel and aluminum as inputs are concerned that the remedies may increase their production costs and raise prices for consumers, and downstream manufacturing costs, potentially leading to job losses. As a result, U.S industries that use steel in manufacturing downstream products, including companies in the automotive and energy sectors, generally oppose such measures. A new Alliance for Competitive Steel and Aluminum Trade representing a variety of business and agricultural groups was formed in opposition to the tariffs. Some analysts have begun to predict job losses including up to 40,000 in the auto sector and 84,000 in specific industries that handle and transport imported products. In addition, 107 House Republicans signed a letter to the President asking for tailored tariffs that target China’s unfair trade practices and minimize any impact on U.S. businesses and consumers. To limit negative domestic impacts of the tariffs, within 10 days of the presidential proclamation, Commerce is to publish procedures for how U.S. parties may request exclusion for items that are not “produced in the United States in a sufficient and reasonably available amount or of a satisfactory quality.” Exclusion determinations are to be based upon national security considerations. While the Secretary of Defense concurred with Commerce’s overall findings, he expressed concern about the potential effect of the proposed actions on key U.S. allies, endorsing strategic action through targeted and phased implementation of any restrictions. The Secretary's memorandum estimated that the Department of Defense's needs for steel only represent about 3% of U.S. production. The action has raised concern from many U.S. trading partners who deem the new tariffs as protectionist. The European Union (EU) indicated it is planning potential countermeasures and reportedly has identified a list of U.S. exports worth $3.5 billion to target with its own tariffs. Exporting countries may challenge U.S. actions through dispute settlement at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Some analysts have voiced the potential risk of retaliation resulting in a possible trade war. International trade obligations at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels generally include broad exceptions for national security reasons, as in Article XXI of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), limiting the ability of countries to challenge such actions by trade partners. However, more frequent utilization of these exceptions could lessen the effectiveness of existing international trade commitments and could lead to their greater use by other countries and increased trade restrictions against the United States. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) met with his European and Japanese counterparts to discuss potential exemptions. The three agreed to concrete steps to address the underlying issue of global overcapacity, most of which is driven by China. In addition to the Section 232 actions, the U.S. government may continue to focus on global overcapacity of steel and aluminum concerns and unfair trading practices (e.g., dumping and subsidization) in other bilateral and multilateral forums, including through the WTO or Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity.

Mar 13, 2018

Northern Ireland, Brexit, and the Irish Border

As the 20th anniversary of the April 1998 peace accord for Northern Ireland (known as the Good Friday Agreement or the Belfast Agreement) approaches, concerns are increasing about how the expected exit of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU)—or “Brexit”—might affect Northern Ireland. The future of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has become a central issue in the UK’s withdrawal negotiations with the EU. Once the UK ceases to be a member of the EU—likely in March 2019—Northern Ireland will be the only part of the UK to share a land border with an EU member state (Ireland and the UK both joined the EU in 1973). Agreeing upon arrangements for the post-Brexit UK-Irish border is particularly challenging because of Northern Ireland’s history of political violence. Roughly 3,500 people died during “the Troubles,” the 30-year sectarian conflict between unionists (Protestants who largely define themselves as British and support remaining part of the UK) and nationalists (Catholics who consider themselves Irish and may desire a united Ireland). UK, Irish, and EU leaders have pledged repeatedly that they will seek to avoid a “hard” border (with customs and security checks) on the island of Ireland to help preserve the peace process and extensive cross-border economic ties. Many in Ireland and the EU, however, question whether and how this will be possible if the UK continues to pursue a “hard Brexit” outside of the EU’s single market and customs union. (See also CRS Report RS21333, Northern Ireland: Current Issues and Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process, and CRS Report RL33105, The United Kingdom: Background, Brexit, and Relations with the United States.) Peace, the EU, and the Border In 1998, the EU membership of both the UK and the Republic of Ireland was viewed as underpinning the Northern Ireland peace process by providing a common European identity for unionists and nationalists. In the years since, as security checkpoints were removed in accordance with the peace agreement and because both the UK and Ireland belonged to the EU’s single market and customs union, the circuitous 300-mile land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland effectively disappeared. This served as an important symbol on both sides of the sectarian divide and helped to produce a dynamic cross-border economy. Brexit has raised significant political and economic concerns in Northern Ireland (which, unlike the UK overall, voted to remain in the EU). Many experts deem an invisible border as crucial to a still-fragile peace process, in which deep divisions and a lack of trust persist. This situation is evidenced perhaps most clearly by the stalled negotiations between the unionist and nationalist communities’ respective political parties on reestablishing the regional (or devolved) government, more than a year after the last legislative assembly elections. Police officials warn that a hard border post-Brexit could pose considerable security risks. During the Troubles, border regions were often considered “bandit country,” with smugglers and gunrunners, and checkpoints were frequently sites of sectarian violence (such violence and criminality have decreased significantly since 1998). Security assessments suggest that if border posts were reinstated, violent dissident groups opposed to the peace process would view them as targets, endangering the lives of police and customs officers. Establishing checkpoints also would pose logistical difficulties. Estimates suggest there are upward of 275 border crossing points. Many in Northern Ireland and Ireland also are eager to maintain an invisible border to ensure “frictionless” trade and safeguard the North-South economy. Ireland is Northern Ireland’s top external export and import partner. Moreover, the two parts of the island share integrated labor markets and industries that operate on an all-island basis. Figure 1. The United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland / Source: Graphic created by CRS using data from Esri (2017). Brexit Negotiations In December 2017, the UK and the EU reached an agreement in principle covering main aspects of key issues in the withdrawal negotiations. Among other measures related to Northern Ireland, the UK committed to uphold the Good Friday Agreement, avoid a hard border (and any physical infrastructure), and protect North-South cooperation on the island of Ireland. In the absence of other agreed solutions that would be preferable to the UK (such as concluding a UK-EU free-trade agreement or devising technology-based solutions), the UK asserted it would maintain “full alignment” with the rules of the EU single market and customs union that support North-South cooperation and the all-island economy. The UK also maintains there will be “no new regulatory barriers” between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, questions persist about how such a combination of goals can be implemented. Some analysts contend that an invisible border is impossible unless the UK remains in the EU customs union, a “soft Brexit” option that the UK government rejects. UK Prime Minister Theresa May and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP)—the dominant unionist party in Northern Ireland—also have adamantly rejected an EU proposal that envisions a “common regulatory area” after Brexit on the island of Ireland. This proposal essentially would keep Northern Ireland within the EU customs union and thereby create a regulatory border in the Irish Sea between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom. UK and DUP officials contend this arrangement would threaten the UK’s constitutional integrity and thus is unacceptable. Potential Issues for Congress Successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have actively supported the Northern Ireland peace process. The United States was instrumental in forging the Good Friday Agreement and has encouraged its full implementation over the last two decades. Amid the stalemate in Northern Ireland’s devolved government, some Members of Congress have urged the Trump Administration to reappoint a U.S. special envoy for Northern Ireland; the Administration appears inclined to do so. Congress also may consider the possible political, security, and economic implications of Brexit for Northern Ireland, and Brexit’s impact on the Irish border and the Good Friday Agreement.

Mar 12, 2018

Cybersecurity: Selected Issues for the 115th Congress

Cybersecurity has been gaining attention as a national issue for the past decade. During this time, the country has witnessed cyber incidents affecting both public and private sector systems and data. These incidents have included attacks in which data was stolen, altered, or access to it was disrupted or denied. The frequency of these attacks, and their effects on the U.S. economy, national security, and people’s lives have driven cybersecurity issues to the forefront of congressional policy conversations. This report provides an overview of selected cybersecurity concepts and a discussion of cybersecurity issues that are likely to be of interest during the 115th Congress. From a policymaking standpoint, cybersecurity includes the security of the devices, infrastructure, data, and users that make up cyberspace. The elements of ensuring cybersecurity involve policies spanning a range of fields, including education, workforce management, investment, entrepreneurship, and research and development. Software development, law enforcement, intelligence, incident response, and national defense are involved in the response when something goes awry in cyberspace. To help secure and respond to incidents in cyberspace federal departments and agencies carry out their authorized responsibilities, run programs, and work with the private sector. While every federal agency has a role in protecting its own data and systems, certain agencies have significant responsibilities with regard to national cybersecurity. The Department of Defense supports domestic efforts on cybersecurity with its capabilities and capacity, and deploys military assets to protect American critical infrastructure from a cyberattack when directed to do so. The Department of Homeland Security secures federal networks, coordinates critical infrastructure protection efforts, responds to cyber threats, investigates cybercrimes, funds cybersecurity research and development, and promotes cybersecurity education and awareness. The Department of Justice investigates and prosecutes a variety of cyber threats, which range from computer hacking and intellectual property rights violations to fraud, child exploitation, and identity theft. Congress passed five laws related to cybersecurity during the 113th Congress and an additional law during the 114th Congress. Congress also held 119 hearings on cybersecurity-related issues during the 114th Congress. The White House issued presidential actions on cybersecurity related to critical infrastructure cybersecurity, information sharing, and sanctions in retaliation for malicious cyber activities. Cybersecurity policy has continued to hold congressional interest during the 115th Congress. Recent congressional hearings have examined several cybersecurity issues, including data breaches, critical infrastructure protection, education and training, and the security of federal information technology. Other issues discussed during the 114th Congress continue to hold stakeholder interest, including debates concerning government access to encrypted data. This report covers a variety of topics related to cybersecurity in order to provide context and a framework for further discussion on selected policy areas. These topics include cybersecurity incidents, major federal agency roles and responsibilities, recent policy actions by Congress and the White House, and descriptions of policy issues that may be of interest in the 115th Congress.

Mar 9, 2018

Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123): Brief Summary of Division E—The Advancing Chronic Care, Extenders, and Social Services (ACCESS) Act

On February 9, 2018, President Donald Trump signed into law the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123). Division E of that law is titled the Advancing Chronic Care, Extenders, and Social Services (ACCESS) Act. This report provides a brief summary of each of the provisions included in the ACCESS Act, along with the contact information for the CRS expert who can answer questions about each provision. Division E consists of 12 titles. Each title is addressed in a separate table, and the provisions are discussed in the order they appear in the law. Topics discussed in this report include Medicare, Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), public health, child and family services, foster care, social impact partnerships, child support enforcement, and prison data reporting. Subsequent CRS reports examining selected subsets of these provisions will be linked to this report as they become available, such as CRS Report R45136, Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123): CHIP, Public Health, Home Visiting, and Medicaid Provisions in Division E.

Mar 9, 2018

The Renewable Fuel Standard: Is Legislative Reform Needed?

Mar 8, 2018

Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Services Block Grant

Mar 7, 2018

How Hard Should It Be To Bring a Class Action?

Mar 7, 2018

The U.S. Individual Income Tax System, 2018

Mar 6, 2018

Information Warfare: Issues for Congress

Information warfare is hardly a new endeavor. In the Battle of Thermopylae in 480 BC, Persian ruler Xerxes used intimidation tactics to break the will of Greek city-states. Alexander the Great used cultural assimilation to subdue dissent and maintain conquered lands. Military scholars trace the modern use of information as a tool in guerilla warfare to fifth-century BC Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu’s book The Art of War and its emphasis on accurate intelligence for decision superiority over a mightier foe. These ancient strategists helped to lay the foundation for information warfare strategy in modern times. Taking place below the level of armed conflict, information warfare (IW) is the range of military and government operations to protect and exploit the information environment. Although information is recognized as an element of national power, IW is a relatively poorly understood concept in the United States, with several other terms being used to describe the same or similar sets of activity. IW is a strategy for using information to pursue a competitive advantage, including offensive and defensive efforts. A form of political warfare, IW is a means through which nations achieve strategic objectives and advance foreign policy goals. Defensive efforts include information assurance/information security, while offensive efforts include information operations. Similar terms sometimes used to characterize information warfare include active measures, hybrid warfare, and gray zone warfare. IW is sometimes referred to as a “disinformation campaign,” yet disinformation is only one of the tactics used in information operations (IO). The types of information used in IO include propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation. As cyberspace presents an easy, cost-effective method to communicate a message to large swaths of populations, much of present day information warfare takes place on the internet, leading some to conflate “cyberwarfare” with information warfare. While IO in the United States tends to be seen as a purely military activity, other countries and terrorist organizations have robust information warfare strategies and use a whole-of-government or whole-of-society approach to information operations. In terms of U.S. government bureaucracy, there are debates in the United States about where the IW center of gravity should be. During the Cold War, the epicenter in the U.S. government was the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency. Since 9/11, much of the current doctrine and capability resides with the military, leading some to posit that the epicenter should be the Pentagon. But others worry that the military should not be involved in the production of propaganda. This report offers Congress a conceptual framework for understanding IW as a strategy, discusses past and present IW-related organizations within the U.S. government, and uses several case studies as examples of IW strategy in practice. Countries discussed include Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. The Islamic State is also discussed.

Mar 5, 2018

Guns, Excise Taxes, Wildlife Restoration, and the National Firearms Act

Federal taxes on firearms and ammunition are collected through different methods and used for different purposes, depending on the nature of the firearms. Some tax receipts are used for wildlife restoration and for hunter education and safety, for example, whereas others are deposited into the General Fund of the U.S. Treasury. The assessment of these taxes and the uses of generated revenues are routinely of interest to many in Congress. In general, taxes on the manufacture of firearms (including pistols and revolvers as well as rifles and other long guns) and ammunition are collected as excise taxes based on the manufacturer’s or importer’s sales price, under the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. §4181). These taxes are imposed on the manufacturer’s sales price at a rate of 10% on pistols and revolvers and 11% on ammunition and other firearms. (Pistols and revolvers, ammunition, and other firearms each account for about a third of these tax revenues.) The tax, which raised $761.6 million in FY2017, is administered by the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB) in the Department of the Treasury. These revenues are allocated to the Federal Aid to Wildlife Restoration Fund, also known as the Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund, and used for wildlife restoration and for hunter safety and education purposes. Established by the Federal Aid in Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937 (16 U.S.C. §§669-669k, commonly known as the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act), the Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund is administered by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service in the Department of the Interior. It also receives revenues from taxes on bows and arrows (26 U.S.C. §4161(b)). Amounts in the fund are allocated to states and selected territories based on formulas, with the largest share for wildlife restoration, apportioned one-half according to the size of the area and one-half according to the area’s share of the overall number of hunting licenses (with a floor and ceiling on these allocations). The federal cost share for most activities receiving support from the fund is capped at 75%. Taxes also are collected for the making and transfer of certain types of firearms and equipment (such as machine guns, short-barreled firearms, and silencers) regulated under the National Firearms Act (NFA; 26 U.S.C. §§5801 et seq.). These taxes originally were set at a level intended to slow the transfer of these weapons, although the tax has not been raised since the NFA was enacted in 1934. In addition, special occupational taxes are collected from federally licensed gun dealers who manufacture, import, or sell NFA firearms. NFA-generated tax receipts are deposited into the General Fund of the Treasury. These tax receipts totaled $68.6 million in FY2016. A variety of proposals have been advanced in recent Congresses that could affect the taxes on firearms and the uses of resulting revenues. In the 115th Congress, some legislative proposals, several of which are known as the Hearing Protection Act, would remove firearm silencers from regulation and taxation under the NFA; firearm silencers would be taxed along with pistols and revolvers at 10%, with revenues deposited into the Wildlife Restoration Trust Fund primarily in support of public target ranges. Other proposals would allow funds to be used to promote hunting and recreational shooting or for Mexican gray wolf management. Still other proposals would increase taxes on guns or ammunition, with proceeds used for gun-violence concerns (e.g., compensation to teachers who are victims of a school shooting, hiring law enforcement personnel, and neighborhood safety).

Mar 5, 2018

Afghanistan: Background and U.S. Policy In Brief

Afghanistan has been a central U.S. foreign policy concern since 2001, when the United States, in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led a military campaign against Al Qaeda and the Taliban government that harbored and supported Al Qaeda. In the intervening 16 years, the United States has suffered more than 2,000 casualties in Afghanistan (including 14 in 2017) and has spent more than $120 billion for reconstruction there. In that time, an elected Afghan government has replaced the Taliban, and nearly every measure of human development has improved, although future prospects of those measures remain mixed. U.S. policymakers routinely describe the war against the insurgency (which controls or contests nearly half of the country’s territory, by Pentagon estimates) as a “stalemate” and the Afghan government faces broad public criticism for its ongoing inability to combat corruption, deliver security, alleviate rising ethnic tensions, and develop the economy. The total number of U.S. troops in the country is reported as around 15,000, with the deployment of another 1,000 troops reportedly under consideration. This report provides an overview of current political and military dynamics, with a focus on the Trump Administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan and South Asia, the U.S.-led coalition and Afghan military operations, and recent political developments, including prospects for peace talks and elections. For more detailed background information and analysis on Afghan history and politics, as well as U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman and Clayton Thomas.

Mar 5, 2018

Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues in the 115th Congress

Geographic proximity has ensured strong linkages between the United States and Latin America and the Caribbean, based on diverse U.S. interests, including economic, political, and security concerns. The United States is a major trading partner and the largest source of foreign investment for many countries in the region, with free-trade agreements enhancing economic linkages with 11 countries. The region is a large source of U.S. immigration, both legal and illegal; geographic proximity and economic and security conditions are major factors driving migration trends. Curbing the flow of illicit drugs has been a key component of U.S. relations with the region for more than three decades and currently involves close security cooperation with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. U.S. support for democracy and human rights in the region has been long-standing and currently focuses on Cuba and Venezuela. Under the Trump Administration, the outlook for U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean has changed. The Administration’s FY2018 and FY2019 foreign aid requests for the region would significantly cut assistance compared with FY2017. On trade, President Trump ordered U.S. withdrawal from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement, an accord that would have increased U.S. economic linkages with Mexico, Chile, and Peru. The Administration is renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Mexico and Canada. At times, President Trump has raised the possibility of withdrawal from NAFTA. The Administration announced it would end the deportation relief program known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), potentially affecting some 550,000 Mexicans and more than 100,000 migrants from other countries in the region. It also announced the termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) designations for El Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua, affecting more than 300,000 nationals from those countries. President Trump unveiled a new policy toward Cuba that partially rolls back U.S. efforts to normalize relations. As the situation in Venezuela has deteriorated, the Trump Administration has imposed additional targeted sanctions on individuals and broader financial sanctions on the government and is considering restrictions on oil trade. Congress traditionally has played an active role in policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of both legislation and oversight. Although Congress has not completed action on FY2018 foreign aid appropriations (H.R. 3362 , included in House-passed H.R. 3354; and S. 1780), it is poised to not include many of the cuts proposed by the Trump Administration for the region and will soon begin consideration of the FY2019 budget request. To date in the 115th Congress, the House has approved bills on Nicaragua and Venezuela: H.R. 1918 would require the United States to vote against any loan to Nicaragua from the international financial institutions unless the government takes steps to hold free and fair elections, and H.R. 2658 would authorize humanitarian assistance for Venezuela. Both houses also have approved several resolutions indicating policy preferences on a range of issues and countries: S.Res. 35 and H.Res. 259 on Venezuela, S.Res. 83 and H.Res. 336 on Mexico, H.Res. 54 on Argentina, and H.Res. 145 on Central America. Looking ahead, congressional attention to the region could focus on numerous issues, including consideration of legislation affecting DACA recipients or TPS beneficiaries; the U.S. response to the crisis in Venezuela, including a planned presidential election in May; the upcoming Summit of the Americas in April 2018 hosted by Peru; the Administration’s efforts to renegotiate NAFTA; Cuba’s expected political transition in April 2018; upcoming presidential elections in Colombia (May), Mexico (July), and Brazil (October); the status of security partnerships with Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean to combat transnational crime; Colombia’s implementation of its peace accord; and the role of external actors in the region, including China and Russia. This report provides an overview of U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean during the 115th Congress. It begins with background on the region’s political and economic environment and then examines U.S. policy toward the region, focusing on the Trump Administration. The report then examines selected regional and country issues, highlighting congressional interest and legislative action. An Appendix lists hearings on the region in the 115th Congress.

Mar 5, 2018

Presidential Funerals and Burials: Selected Resources

This fact sheet is a brief resource guide for congressional staff on funerals and burials for Presidents of the United States. It contains an overview of past practices for presidential funerals and selected online information resources related to official and ceremonial protocols, past presidential funerals, congressional documents, and other documents and books.

Mar 2, 2018

Commerce Determines Steel and Aluminum Imports Threaten to Impair National Security

The U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) recently completed two investigations into the national security threats posed by imports of steel and aluminum in accordance with Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862, as amended). In April 2017, two presidential memoranda instructed Commerce to prioritize the steel and aluminum investigations. The final reports, submitted to the President on January 11 and January 22, 2018, respectively, concluded imports of steel mill products and of wrought and unwrought aluminum “threaten to impair the national security” of the United States as defined by Section 232. For more information on the Section 232 process, see CRS In Focus IF10667, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, by Rachel F. Fefer and Vivian C. Jones, and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10085, Pedal to the Metal: Commerce Recommends Revving Up Trade Measures on Steel and Aluminum, by Caitlain Devereaux Lewis. The Commerce investigations analyzed the importance of steel and aluminum products to national security, using a relatively broad definition. Commerce defined national security to include “the general security and welfare of certain industries, beyond those necessary to satisfy national defense requirements, which are critical for minimum operations of the economy and government.” The broad scope of the investigations extended to current and future requirements for national defense and 16 specific critical infrastructure sectors, such as electric transmission, transportation systems, food and agriculture, and critical manufacturing, including domestic production of machinery and electrical equipment. The reports also examined domestic production capacity and utilization, industry requirements, current quantities and circumstances of imports, international markets, and global overcapacity. Past Section 232 investigations generally only considered national defense needs, although a 2001 Section 232 report on iron ore and semi-finished steel also looked at broader domestic industry trends. Commerce Department Recommendations In the recent steel investigation, the Secretary of Commerce concluded that “the present quantities and circumstance of steel imports are weakening our internal economy’ and threaten to impair the national security as defined in Section 232.” He further asserted that “the only effective means of removing the threat of impairment is to reduce imports to a level that should ... enable U.S. steel mills to operate at 80 percent or more of their rated production capacity” (the minimum rate the report found necessary for the long-term viability of the U.S steel industry). This would be well above the 2016 capacity utilization rate of 70.5% reported by the American Iron and Steel Institute, an industry trade group. The Secretary further recommended the President “take immediate action to adjust the level of these imports through quotas or tariffs” and identified three potential courses of action, including tariffs or quotas on all or some steel imports. Specifically, Commerce proposed a global tariff of at least 24% on all steel imports; or a tariff of at least 53% on all steel imports from 12 named countries (Brazil, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, India, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Vietnam); or a quota on all steel products from all countries, equal to 63% of U.S. imports from each country in 2017. For the U.S. aluminum industry to resume operations at 80% capacity, the Secretary recommended a tariff of at least 7.7% on all U.S. aluminum imports from all countries; or a tariff of 23.6% on all aluminum imports from 5 economies (China, Hong Kong, Russia, Venezuela, and Vietnam). All other countries would be subject to a quota equal to 100% of U.S. imports from that country in 2017; or a quota on all aluminum products equal to 86.7% of U.S. imports from each country in 2017. The reports also recommended that a process be established whereby countries could be exempted, and U.S. interested parties could seek exclusions for individual products through an appeals process. Imports from Canada, for example, could potentially be excluded from any imposed trade measure. Given the high level of integration between the Canadian and U.S. steel and aluminum industries, some have already suggested an exemption for Canada from some or all actions, while others oppose the idea. Others have backed specific product exemptions, such as aluminum rolled can sheet metal used by U.S. beverage producers. On March 1, President Trump announced that he will impose tariffs of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum. Details as to which products would be affected, any exemptions for specific products or exporting products, and timelines are expected to be announced the second week of March. Tariffs and quotas implemented as a result of the Section 232 investigations would be in addition to any tariffs already in place. Potential Impacts and Next Steps Stakeholders on all sides of the issues have been vocal in their views since the investigations commenced 10 months ago. Domestic manufacturers of both steel and aluminum support relief through measures intended to limit imports. U.S. steel manufacturers and the United Steelworkers (USW) support broad new restrictions on steel imports with only limited exceptions. On the other side are users of steel and aluminum as inputs who are concerned any such remedies would increase their production costs and raise prices for consumers, and downstream manufacturing costs, potentially leading to job loss. U.S industries that use steel in manufacturing downstream products, including automakers and parts manufacturers, generally oppose such measures. The Secretary of Defense concurred with Commerce’s overall findings, but expressed concern about the potential effect of the proposed actions on key U.S. allies, endorsing strategic action through targeted and phased implementation of any restrictions. The Secretary’s memorandum estimated that the Department of Defense’s needs for steel only represent about 3% of U.S. production. Steel industry officials have countered that even though national defense products are a small share of the overall steel market, they are made at the same facilities and by the same workers who make other products. Thus, they say, commercial viability of the industry is important to making the specialized products. Potential responses by U.S. trading partners are another concern. Exporting countries may challenge U.S. actions through dispute settlement at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Some analysts have voiced the potential risk of retaliation or initiating a trade war. A representative from Japan’s steel industry called for the President to make a “careful and appropriate decision.” The European Steel Association warned that the deployment of blanket trade restrictions “will almost certainly be contested by other WTO countries.” The Business Roundtable, a business group representing the CEOs of major U.S. corporations, expressed concern that actions on steel and aluminum imports “will result in foreign retaliation against U.S. exporters and harm the U.S. economy,” and that other countries may initiate their own national security investigations into specific industries that could negatively affect U.S. exports. For example, if a country deems food security a national security concern, it may decide to restrict agricultural imports from the United States. International trade obligations at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels generally include broad exemptions for national security reasons, as in Article XXI of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), limiting the ability of countries to challenge such actions by trade partners. More frequent utilization of these exemptions could lessen the effectiveness of existing international trade commitments. In addition to the Section 232 actions, the U.S. government may continue to raise concerns about global overcapacity of steel and aluminum and unfair trading practices (e.g., dumping and subsidization) in other bilateral and multilateral forums, including through the WTO or OECD Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity.

Mar 2, 2018

The Child Tax Credit: Legislative History

The child tax credit was initially structured in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-34) as a $500-per-child nonrefundable credit to provide tax relief to middle- and upper-middle-income families. Since 1997, various laws have modified key parameters of the credit, expanding the availability of the benefit to more low-income families while also increasing the value of the tax credit. The first significant change to the child tax credit occurred with the enactment of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA; P.L. 107-16). EGTRRA increased the amount of the credit over time to $1,000 per child and made it partially refundable under the earned income formula. The refundable portion of the credit—the amount that exceeds income tax liability—is often referred to as the additional child tax credit or ACTC. Subsequent legislation enacted in 2003 and 2004 accelerated the implementation of the changes made under EGTRRA. In 2008 and 2009, Congress passed legislation—the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA; P.L. 110-343) and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA; P.L. 111-5)—that further expanded the availability and amount of the credit to taxpayers whose income was too low to either qualify for the credit or be eligible for the full credit. ARRA lowered the refundability threshold to its current level of $3,000 for 2009 through 2010. The ARRA provisions were subsequently extended several times and made permanent by the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015 (Division Q of P.L. 114-113). At the end of 2017, Congress enacted P.L. 115-97 which, in addition to making numerous changes to the tax code, temporarily changed the child tax credit. Specifically, the law increased the credit for many (though not all) taxpayers by doubling the maximum amount of the credit (and increasing the maximum amount of the ACTC to $1,400), increasing the income at which the credit begins to phase out, and reducing the refundability threshold. In addition, this law temporarily modified the identification (ID) number requirement of the credit, requiring taxpayers to provide the Social Security number (SSN) for every child for whom they claimed the credit. P.L. 115-97 also created a new temporary “family credit” for non-child credit eligible dependents (children ineligible for the child tax credit or older non-child dependents). Non-child credit eligible dependents excludes otherwise eligible dependents who are citizens of Mexico or Canada. The credit is equal to $500 per non-child credit eligible dependent. The amount is not annually adjusted for inflation. The phaseout parameters of the child credit (i.e., phaseout thresholds of $400,000 married filing jointly, $200,000 other taxpayers, 5% phaseout rate) apply to the family credit. The family credit is not annually adjusted for inflation. All the modifications to the child tax credit and the new family credit are currently scheduled to expire at the end of 2025.

Mar 1, 2018

Blockchain: Background and Policy Issues

The rise of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and the use of Initial Coin Offerings to raise capital has drawn increased attention from both the public and private sector concerning the use of digital ledgers to conduct business (called blockchain technology) and its potential. Yet many remain unclear on what the technology actually is, what it does, and the tradeoffs for its use. A blockchain is a digital ledger that allows parties to transact without the use of a central authority as a trusted intermediary. In this ledger, transactions are grouped together in blocks, which are cryptographically chained together in a way that is tamper-proof and creates a mathematically indisputable history. Blockchain is not a new technology; rather it is an innovative way of using existing technologies. The technologies underpinning blockchain are asymmetric key encryption, hash values, Merkle trees, and peer-to-peer networks. Blockchain allows parties who may not trust each other to agree on the current distribution of assets and who has those assets, so that they may conduct new business. But, while there has been a great deal of hype concerning blockchain’s benefits, it also has certain pitfalls that may inhibit its utility. With blockchain, as transactions are added, the identities of the parties conducting those transactions are verified, and the transactions themselves are verifiable by other users. The strong relationship between identities, transactions, and the ledger enables parties that may not trust each other or an individual computing platform to agree on the state of resources as logged in the ledger. With that agreement, they may conduct a new transaction with a common understanding of who has which resource and their ability to trade that resource. Blockchain is not a panacea technology. A blockchain records events as transactions when they happen, in the order they happen, and in an add-on only manner. Previous data on the blockchain cannot be altered, and users of the blockchain have access to the data on the blockchain in order to validate the distribution of resources. Though there are benefits to blockchain, there are also pitfalls and unsolved conditions which may inhibit blockchain use. Some of those concerns are data portability, ill-defined requirements, key security, user collusion, and user safety. As with adopting any technology, users must examine the business, legal, and technical aspects of that technology. Blockchain is currently being tested by industry, but at this time does not appear to be a complete replacement for existing systems. Although the adoption of blockchain is in its early stages, Congress may have a role to play in several areas, including the oversight of federal agencies seeking to use blockchain for government business, and exploration of whether regulations are necessary to govern blockchain’s use in the private sector. Some federal agencies are seeking to better manage identities, assets, data, and contracts through the adoption of blockchain technology. In addition, some federal agencies are issuing guidance on industry use of blockchain, and whether or not the current legal framework governs blockchain use.

Feb 28, 2018

Funding the State Administration of Unemployment Compensation (UC) Benefits

Feb 28, 2018

EPA’s Proposal to Repeal the Clean Power Plan: Benefits and Costs

In 2015, when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated the Clean Power Plan to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-fueled electric power plants, it concluded that the benefits of reducing emissions would outweigh the costs by a substantial margin under the scenarios analyzed. EPA estimated benefits ranging from $31 billion to $54 billion in 2030 and costs ranging from $5.1 billion to $8.4 billion in 2030, when the rule would be fully implemented. In proposing to repeal the rule in October 2017, EPA revised the estimates of both its benefits and costs, finding in most cases that the benefits of the proposed repeal would outweigh the costs of the proposed repeal. However, EPA found that under other assumptions, the costs of the proposed repeal would outweigh the benefits of the proposed repeal. This report examines the changes in EPA’s methodology that led to the revised conclusions about how benefits compare to costs. Three changes to the benefits estimates of the proposed repeal drive the agency’s new conclusions. First, it considered only domestic benefits of the Clean Power Plan in its main analysis, excluding benefits that occur outside the United States. Second, it used different discount rates, including one higher rate, than the 2015 analysis to state the present value of future climate benefits expected from the Clean Power Plan. Third, the analysis reduced some estimates of the human health “co-benefits”—that is, the benefits resulting from pollutant reductions not directly targeted by the Clean Power Plan. Specifically, several scenarios assumed no health benefits below specified thresholds for some air pollutants. EPA also changed the accounting treatment of demand-side energy efficiency savings. EPA’s 2015 analysis treated savings from energy efficiency measures as a negative cost, whereas the 2017 analysis treated them as a benefit. Using the terminology of the proposed repeal, EPA moved energy savings from the cost savings estimate to the forgone benefits estimate. There was no change in the difference between benefits and costs because the benefits and costs increased by the same amount. This change took on more significance in a separate analysis that EPA conducted to analyze the cost savings of the proposed repeal. EPA based one set of benefit-cost estimates of the proposed repeal on its 2015 power sector modeling, which does not reflect changes that have since occurred in the power sector. EPA based the other set of benefit-cost estimates on more recent power sector projections from the Annual Energy Outlook 2017. The power sector changes subsequent to 2015 are potentially important and include changes in expected electricity demand, expected growth in electricity generation by renewable energy technologies, retirements of older generating units, changes in the prices and availability of different fuels and renewables, and state and federal regulations. While modeling differences render the two sets of estimates incomparable, both sets of estimates show a range of costs exceeding benefits (i.e., net costs), and benefits exceeding costs (i.e., net benefits) of the proposed repeal. EPA stated that it plans to update the power sector modeling and make it available for public comment before it finalizes the proposed repeal. This forthcoming analysis may show the extent to which updated power sector projections may change EPA’s benefit-cost estimates.

Feb 28, 2018

U.S. Farm Income Outlook for 2018

According to USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS), national net farm income—a key indicator of U.S. farm well-being—is forecast at $59.5 billion in 2018, down nearly 7% from last year. The forecast decline in 2018 net farm income is the result of lower cash returns—from both production activities (-0.5%) and government payments (-18.6%)—and higher production expenses (projected up 1%). Net farm income is calculated on an accrual basis. Net cash income (calculated on a cash-flow basis) is also projected lower in 2018 (-5.1%) to $91.9 billion. The 2018 net farm income forecast is substantially below the 10-year average of $85.7 billion. It would be the lowest since 2006 in nominal dollars and lowest since 2002 in inflation-adjusted 2015 dollars. This is primarily the result of the outlook for continued weak prices for most major crops. U.S. farm income experienced a golden period during 2011 through 2014 due to strong commodity prices and robust agricultural exports—in 2014 U.S. agricultural exports achieved a record of $152.3 billion. Most crops and livestock product prices remain significantly below the average for the period of 2011-2014, when prices for many major commodities attained record or near-record highs. Net farm income is projected down 52% since its record high of $123.7 billion in 2013. Net cash income is projected down 32% from its 2013 high of $135.6 billion. Farm-sector production expenses (although up year-to-year) have fallen slightly over that same period (-0.2%) but not nearly as quickly as commodity prices and revenue, thus contributing to lower aggregate income totals. Government payments are projected down 18.6% at $9.3 billion from 2017—due largely to projected lower payments of $5.0 billion in 2018 under the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) revenue support programs for major field crops (down from $6.9 billion in 2017). In 2018 agricultural exports are forecast to be flat, at $140 billion, due largely to abundant supplies in international markets and strong competition from major foreign competitors. Since 2008, U.S. agricultural exports have accounted for a 20% share of U.S. farm and manufactured agricultural sales. In spite of the lower farm income outlook, farm wealth is projected to be up 1.8% from 2017 to $3,087 billion. Farm asset values reflect farm investors’ and lenders’ expectations about long-term profitability of farm sector investments. Farmland values are projected flat in 2018. Because they comprise such a significant portion of the U.S. farm sector’s asset base (81%), change in farmland values is a critical barometer of the farm sector’s financial performance. At the farm household level, average farm household incomes have been well ahead of average U.S. household incomes since the late 1990s. In 2016 (the last year for which comparable data were available), the average farm household income (including off-farm income sources) of $117,918 was about 42% higher than the average U.S. household income of $83,143. The outlook for lower net farm income and relatively weak prices for most major program crops signals the likelihood of continued relatively lean times ahead. Heading into 2018, the financial picture for the agricultural sector as a whole remains dependent on continued growth in domestic and foreign demand to sustain prices at current modest levels. Improvements in agricultural economic well-being will hinge on crop production prospects and prices as well as both domestic and international macroeconomic factors, including economic growth and consumer demand. This report incorporates USDA’s initial February 7, 2018, farm income projections and its November 30, 2017, U.S. agricultural trade outlook update.

Feb 27, 2018

U.S. Sanctions on Russia Related to the Ukraine Conflict

Feb 26, 2018

Unemployment Compensation (UC) and Family Leave

Feb 26, 2018

Budgetary Effects of the BCA as Amended: The “Parity Principle”

Feb 23, 2018

Financial Reform: Small Bank Holding Company Threshold

Feb 23, 2018

NAFTA Motor Vehicle Talks Reopen Old Trade Debate

Feb 23, 2018

Dairy Provisions in the Bipartisan Budget Act (P.L. 115-123)

Feb 22, 2018

H.R. 4508, the PROSPER Act: Proposed Reauthorization of the Higher Education Act

During the 115th Congress, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce marked up and ordered reported with amendments the Promoting Real Opportunity, Success, and Prosperity through Education Reform Act (PROSPER Act; H.R. 4508), which would provide for the comprehensive reauthorization of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA). H.R. 4508 would make numerous amendments to the HEA, many of which address six themes: (1) redesigning the federal approach to providing student aid; (2) modifying federal student aid rules; (3) eliminating or winding down programs; (4) revising the educational quality and financial accountability requirements applicable to institutions of higher education (IHEs); (5) amending public accountability, transparency, and consumer information requirements; and (6) establishing limits on the Secretary of Education’s authority. H.R. 4508 would extend the authorization of many currently operating HEA programs through FY2024, repeal or wind down many HEA programs and activities, and make amendments to myriad HEA programs and activities. The amendments proposed in H.R. 4508 signal an attempt to redesign the federal approach to providing student aid by transitioning toward the delivery of student aid through fewer programs. The bill would terminate or phase-out several programs (e.g., TEACH Grants, Federal Supplemental Educational Opportunity Grants, Direct Loans), establish a new Federal ONE Loan program, and eliminate programs that have not been funded in recent years or that have never been funded. By 2024, the Title IV federal student aid programs would include two grant programs (Pell Grants and Iraq and Afghanistan Service Grants), the Federal ONE Loan program, and the Federal Work-Study (FWS) program. Regarding changes to student aid benefit levels and award rules, under H.R. 4508 a new Pell Grant bonus would be available to students who enroll for at least 30 credit hours per award year. In the Federal ONE Loan program, annual loan limits would be increased by $2,000 above what undergraduate students may borrow through the Direct Loan program, while firm loan limits would be established for graduate students and parent borrowers. Federal ONE Loans would be repaid according to a limited set of repayment plans, and fewer loan forgiveness benefits would be available compared with what is offered under the Direct Loan program. FWS funds would be awarded to institutions according to a restructured allocation formula. Need-based aid would be made available only to undergraduate students through the Pell Grant and FWS programs. All other federal student aid would be made available without regard to financial need. Aside from changes to the types of aid available and to student aid benefit levels and award rules, other amendments proposed in H.R. 4508 include the following: changes to rules for disbursing Title IV aid to recipients, which would include annual aid counseling for recipients and more-frequent, smaller disbursements; the elimination or wind down of numerous programs supporting IHEs and programs they operate, which are authorized under the HEA and other higher education laws, including the Strengthening Institutions Program, programs to enhance teacher education and preparation (HEA Title II), and all of the programs in HEA Title VIII; changes to HEA provisions designed to hold IHEs accountable for the educational programs they offer, including the repeal of the gainful employment regulations, the establishment of a programmatic loan repayment rate metric, and amendments to Department of Education recognition criteria for accrediting agencies that would require accreditors to examine student learning and other student outcomes relative to what should be expected from institutions or educational programs; adjustments to the fiscal accountability standards institutions must meet to participate in the HEA Title IV programs, including the repeal of the 90/10 Rule, which requires that at least 10% of institutional revenues come from sources other than HEA Title IV aid at proprietary schools; amendments to institutional information gathering and reporting requirements, which are designed to generate information that can assist students in making college-going decisions; changes to ED’s administrative functions and the establishment of specified limitations on the Secretary’s authority to promulgate regulations; amendments to address campus safety and sexual violence issues at IHEs that would add specificity to procedures for institutional disciplinary actions that must be used by IHEs in alleged incidents of sexual violence and would require most domestic IHEs to administer campus climate surveys of attitudes on campus toward sexual assault; and creation of a new competitive grant program to expand earn-and-learn programs developed by partnerships of employers and IHEs that would provide students with on-the-job training and accompanying for-credit classroom instruction.

Feb 22, 2018

Bankruptcy and Student Loans

As overall student loan indebtedness in the United States has increased over the years, many borrowers have found themselves unable to repay their student loans. Ordinarily, declaring bankruptcy is a means by which a debtor may “discharge”—that is, obtain relief from—debts he is unable to repay. However, Congress, based upon its determination that allowing debtors to freely discharge student loans in bankruptcy could threaten the student loan program, has limited the circumstances in which a debtor may discharge a student loan. Under current law, a debtor may not discharge a student loan unless repaying the student loan would impose an “undue hardship” upon the debtor and his dependents. The Bankruptcy Code does not define “undue hardship,” and the legislative history of Section 523 does not precisely specify how courts should determine whether a debtor qualifies for an undue hardship discharge. The task of interpreting this statutory term has consequently fallen to the federal judiciary. Courts, however, have disagreed regarding exactly what a debtor must prove in order to discharge a student loan on undue hardship grounds. The vast majority of courts have interpreted “undue hardship” to require the debtor to prove three things: (1) the debtor cannot maintain, based on current income and expenses, a “minimal” standard of living for himself and his dependents if forced to repay the loans; (2) additional circumstances exist indicating that the debtor’s inability to pay is likely to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) the debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans. The debtor must prove each of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. This standard is commonly called the “Brunner” test, after the case in which the standard originated. The Brunner test is highly fact-intensive, and not all courts apply the Brunner standard the same way. Indeed, each factor has resulted in various subsidiary splits in the courts with respect to a host of issues. Whereas the vast majority of courts apply the Brunner test to determine whether excepting a student loan from discharge would impose an undue hardship upon the debtor, two courts have explicitly declined to adopt the Brunner standard. Instead, these courts apply an alternative standard known as “the totality-of-the-circumstances test,” weighing numerous, nonexclusive factors when considering whether student loan debt should be discharged. In response to this split of authority, some Members of Congress and commentators have advanced numerous proposals to alter the way that student loans are treated in bankruptcy. This report therefore provides a comprehensive overview of the various legal issues related to whether, and under what circumstances, a debtor may discharge a student loan in bankruptcy. The report begins by providing general background on bankruptcy law and the principles governing the discharge of outstanding debt. In so doing, the report explains how and why the Bankruptcy Code generally makes student loans nondischargeable absent an “undue hardship.” The report then describes the various legal standards that courts have applied when determining whether a particular debtor is entitled to an undue hardship discharge. The report closes by describing various potential considerations for Congress, including ways in which Congress could alter the Bankruptcy Code’s current treatment of student loans.

Feb 22, 2018

Eurasian Economic Union

Feb 22, 2018

Federal and Indian Lands on the U.S.-Mexico Border

Feb 21, 2018

The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), signed into law on February 9, 2018, creates a new joint select committee of the House and Senate. The Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform, made up of 16 Members from the House and Senate—four chosen by each of the chambers’ party leaders—is intended to formulate recommendations and legislative language that will “significantly reform the budget and appropriations process.” The law directs the committee to make a report no later than November 30, 2018, which will be submitted along with legislative language to the President, the Speaker of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the House and Senate. The act includes procedures that are intended to allow the Senate to reach a timely vote on the question of whether or not to consider legislation embodying the recommendations of the joint select committee. Under the terms of the act, the Senate is directed to vote on a motion to proceed to consider any reported joint committee bill before the conclusion of the 115th Congress (2017-2018). The support of at least three-fifths of the Senate (60 votes if there is no more than one vacancy) would be necessary to take up and approve the motion. The act does not specify any procedures governing consideration of the bill once the Senate has agreed to take it up. There are also no provisions in the act concerning the consideration of the recommendations of the joint select committee in the House, nor are there any provisions concerning resolving any differences between the House and Senate. Such actions would occur under the regular procedures of each chamber. This report discusses the structure, powers, and funding of the Joint Select Committee on Budget and Appropriations Process Reform and provides an overview of the parliamentary procedures the chambers may use to consider its recommendations.

Feb 21, 2018

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) Oil and Gas Program: Provisions in P.L. 115-97, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

Feb 21, 2018