CRS Reports

Supreme Court Invalidates Public-Sector Union Agency Fees: Considerations for Congress in the Wake of Janus

Jul 20, 2018

Comparing DHS Component Funding, FY2019: In Brief

Generally, the homeland security appropriations bill includes all annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), providing resources to every departmental component. Table and Figure show DHS’s new discretionary budget authority enacted for FY2018 and requested by the Administration for FY2019, as well as the Senate committee-reported response, broken down by component—from largest to smallest FY2018 appropriation. (TO BE SUPPRESSED) Department of Homeland Security DHS budget Appropriations FY2018, FY2019 funding analysis components

Jul 18, 2018

U.S. Army’s Initial Maneuver, Short-Range Air Defense (IM-SHORAD) System

The Current State of Army SHORAD The Army defines SHORAD as: Dedicated air defense artillery (ADA) and non-dedicated air defense capabilities that enable movement and maneuver by destroying, neutralizing or deterring low altitude air threats to defend critical fixed and semi-fixed assets and maneuver forces. The Army summarizes the recent history and current state of Army SHORAD in the following section: Short-range air defense artillery units were historically embedded in Army divisions, providing them with an organic capability to protect their critical assets against fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. However, in the early 2000s, these ADA units were divested from the Army to meet force demands deemed more critical at that time. Decision-makers accepted the risk that threat aircraft might have on maneuver forces and other critical assets because we believed the Air Force could maintain air superiority. Thus, the short-range ADA force post-2005 was reduced to two battalions of active component Avenger and counter-rocket, artillery and mortar batteries and seven National Guard Avenger battalions; none of which are organic divisional elements. Defense against air threats in maneuver forces is currently limited to that provided by organic weapons and maneuver personnel. Renewed Emphasis on SHORAD Since 2005, there has been a dramatic increase in air and missile platforms that could threaten U.S. ground forces. The use of unmanned aerial systems (UASs) has increased exponentially, and UASs have been used successfully by both sides in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. Furthermore, fixed-wing aircraft, attack helicopters, and cruise missiles continue to pose a significant threat to U.S. ground forces. In its 2015 report to the President and Congress, the National Commission on the Future of the Army noted, among things, there were unacceptable modernization shortfalls in SHORAD and those major shortfalls caused other concerns across a wide range of contingencies, including in Europe and the Korean peninsula. IM-SHORAD While Initial Maneuver, Short-Range Air Defense (IM-SHORAD) is primarily intended to defend maneuver forces against air threats, it also has the capability to engage a range of ground targets. The Army has requested $17 million in FY2019, $72.7 million in FY2020, $152 million in FY2021, $443 million in FY2022, and $291 million in FY2023 for IM-SHORAD procurement. IM-SHORAD is an Army directed requirement to address the urgent need to support Operation Atlantic Resolve to provide air and missile defense protection of Stryker and Armored Brigade Combat Teams. IM-SHORAD is the Army’s “initial” solution, and new weapons systems and weapons carriers might be incorporated into future variants. The Army reportedly plans to procure 144 IM-SHORAD Systems, with the objective to equip the first and second battalions with 36 systems apiece by FY2021 and a third and fourth battalion with 36 systems each by FY2022. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees have recommended fully funding the Army’s FY2019 IM SHORAD budget request. The House Appropriations Committee also recommends fully funding the FY2019 request, and the Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee has yet to markup its version of the FY2019 appropriations bill. The Army reportedly categorizes IM-SHORAD as a rapid acquisition system and is not scheduled to go through a standard defense acquisition development cycle, but is to be developed under the Other Transaction Authority (OTA) contracting process. IM-SHORAD uses the M-1126 Stryker combat vehicle as its chassis. The weapons and radar packages will reportedly be put together by Leonardo DRS and then installed on the Stryker by General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS)—the vehicle’s original manufacturer. The Leonardo DRS–developed multi-purpose unmanned turret reportedly will include two Hellfire missiles capable of hitting ground and air targets; four Stinger missiles for less-well armored aerial targets in a launcher configured by Raytheon; a 30mm automatic cannon; a 7.62mm machine gun; an electronic warfare (EW) package to counter selected enemy systems; and a Rada (Israeli) multi-mission radar capable of tracking both ground and air targets. Potential Issues for Congress The Army describes IM-SHORAD as an “initial” or “short term” capability to address the lack of air defense capability in maneuver forces. If the Army eventually opts to not adopt IM-SHORAD as the long-term solution for maneuver force air defense, what are the Army’s subsequent plans for this potentially $1 billion plus program? Would this capability be realigned to protect other Army assets, inactivated and placed in storage, or would it be made available to other countries under Foreign Military Sales? While IM-SHORAD has the capability to engage ground targets and threats, given the criticality of the potential air threat to maneuver forces and the somewhat limited number of IM-SHORAD systems available, is having a ground attack capability in the Army’s best interest? Will the wheeled IM-SHORAD system have sufficient mobility and survivability to provide air defense protection to Armored Brigade Combat Teams that consist primarily of heavily armored and tracked M-1 Abrams tanks and M-2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles? Do IM-SHORAD’s Stinger missiles have sufficient capability to destroy armored attack helicopters and ground attack fixed-wing aircraft or would some other type of weapon be better suited to address these “heavier” threats? If so, could another weapon be easily integrated into the current IM-SHORAD configuration? While IM-SHORAD has a limited organic onboard capability to detect, track, and engage enemy air threats, it is also expected to be part of the Army’s overall integrated air and missile defense architecture. As such, how will IM-SHORAD integrate with and depend upon the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense Battle Command System (IBCS)—a program that has experienced noteworthy developmental challenges? What are some of the benefits and risks associated with the Army’s decision to procure IM-SHORAD under an Other Transaction Authority (OTA) contracting process?

Jul 18, 2018

The Black Lung Program, the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, and the Excise Tax on Coal: Background and Policy Options

The federal government pays benefits to coal miners affected by coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (CWP, commonly referred to as black lung disease) and other lung diseases linked to coal mining in cases where responsible mine operators are not able to pay. In 2018, the monthly benefit for a miner with no dependents is $660.10. Benefits can be as much as $1,320.10 per month for miners with three or more dependents. Medical benefits are provided separately from disability benefits. Benefit payments and related administrative expenses in cases in which the responsible operators do not pay are paid out of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. The primary source of revenue for the trust fund is an excise tax on coal produced and sold domestically. If excise tax revenue is not sufficient to finance Black Lung Program benefits, the trust fund may borrow from the general fund of the Treasury. Coal Excise Tax Collections / Source: IRS SOI Bulletin Historical Table 20, available at https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-historical-table-20; and Department of the Treasury, Bureau of the Fiscal Service, Treasury Bulletin, March 2018, pp. 90-91, http://www.fiscal.treasury.gov. For 2018, the tax rates on coal are $1.10 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.55 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 4.4% of the sales price. These rates were established in 1986. Starting in 2019, under current law, these tax rates are scheduled to be $0.50 per ton of underground-mined coal or $0.25 per ton of surface-mined coal, limited to 2% of the sales price. These are the rates that were set when the trust fund was established in 1977. The scheduled decline in the excise tax rates will likely put additional financial strain on a trust fund that already borrows from the general fund to meet obligations. The decline in domestic coal production, recent increases in the rate of CWP, and bankruptcies in the coal sector also contribute to the financial strain on the trust fund. The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and associated excise tax on coal were established so that the coal industry, as opposed to taxpayers in general, would bear the burden associated with providing black lung benefits. Throughout its history, the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund has not raised revenues sufficient to meet obligations. As a result, at various points in time, Congress and the President have acted to increase the excise tax on coal, forgive or refinance trust fund debt, and modify black lung benefits eligibility. With the rate of the excise tax on coal scheduled to fall in 2019, the 115th Congress may again evaluate options for improving the fiscal condition of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund, or other issues related to providing federal benefits to miners with black lung disease.

Jul 18, 2018

Phase 2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles

Jul 18, 2018

The Federal Role in Groundwater Supply: Overview and Legislation in the 115th Congress

Groundwater, the water in aquifers accessible by wells, is a critical component of the U.S. water supply. It is important for both domestic and agricultural water needs, among other uses. Nearly half of the nation’s population uses groundwater to meet daily needs; in 2015, about 149 million people (46% of the nation’s population) relied on groundwater for their domestic indoor and outdoor water supply. The greatest volume of groundwater used every day is for agriculture, specifically for irrigation. In 2015, irrigation accounted for 69% of the total fresh groundwater withdrawals in the United States. For that year, California pumped the most groundwater for irrigation, followed by Arkansas, Nebraska, Idaho, Texas, and Kansas, in that order. Groundwater also is used as a supply for mining, oil and gas development, industrial processes, livestock, and thermoelectric power, among other uses. Congress generally has deferred management of U.S. groundwater resources to the states, and there is little indication that this practice will change. For example, several bills introduced in the 115th Congress contain provisions that would direct that the federal government recognizes that aspects of groundwater, such as the connection between surface water and groundwater, be consistent with state water laws (surface water includes streams, rivers, lakes, ponds, and is not groundwater or atmospheric water, such as rain or snow). Those same bills also would prohibit the federal government from requiring the transfer of water rights to the United States or obtaining a water right in the name of the United States as a condition for receiving, renewing, amending, or extending “any permit, approval, license, lease, allotment, easement, right-of-way, or other land use or occupancy agreement.” In addition, these bills contain language asserting that the legislation would not alter certain reserved rights associated with federal and tribal lands. Congress, various states, and other stakeholders recently have focused on the potential for using surface water to recharge aquifers and the ability to recover stored groundwater when needed. Some see aquifer recharge, storage, and recovery as a replacement or complement to surface water reservoirs, and there is interest in how federal agencies can support these efforts. In the congressional context, there is interest in the potential for federal efforts to facilitate state, local, and private groundwater management efforts (e.g., management of federal reservoir releases to allow for groundwater recharge by local utilities). The two primary federal water resources agencies are the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). No significant federal restrictions apply to Reclamation’s authorities to deliver water for purposes of aquifer recharge, storage, and recovery. USACE authorities also do not contain restrictions on the nonfederal use for groundwater recharge of water stored or released from USACE reservoirs. Both agencies acknowledge that some state restrictions affect the use of the delivered or stored waters for groundwater activities. Some legislative proposals would provide the agencies with additional directives and mechanisms regarding their authority to support nonfederal groundwater recharge. Other federal agencies support activities that inform groundwater management. For example, the U.S. Geological Survey monitors and reports groundwater conditions across the country, develops groundwater models and software tools for characterizing aquifers, and provides long- and short-term forecasts of changing groundwater conditions as part of local and regional groundwater studies. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration also make observations and collect data that are relevant to groundwater monitoring and assessment. The U.S. Department of Agriculture collects groundwater data related to irrigation. Long-term changes to the climate affecting the United States, particularly rising temperatures and changes in the patterns, quantities, and type of precipitation (i.e., rain versus snow), could affect the availability of groundwater in the future. Other factors, such as changes to land use, irrigation practices, and patterns of water consumption, also may influence groundwater supplies.

Jul 18, 2018

Energy and Water Development: FY2019 Appropriations

The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps); the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP); the Department of Energy (DOE); the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC); and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill’s total funding. President Trump submitted his FY2019 budget proposal to Congress on February 12, 2018. The President’s budget requests for agencies included in the Energy and Water Development appropriations bill totaled $36.341 billion (excluding rescissions)—$6.871 billion (15.9%) below the FY2018 appropriation. A $375 million increase (3.5%) was proposed for DOE nuclear weapons activities. In contrast, the two versions of the FY2019 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill passed by the House and Senate (Division A of H.R. 5895, H.Rept. 115-697, S.Rept. 115-258) would boost total appropriations above the FY2018 level. FY2018 Energy and Water Development funding was included in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141), signed by the President on March 23, 2018. Major Energy and Water Development funding issues for FY2019 include Water Agency Funding Reductions. The Trump Administration requested reductions of 29.9% for the Corps and 26.5% for Reclamation for FY2019. Those cuts were largely not followed by the House and Senate. Termination of Energy Efficiency Grants. DOE’s Weatherization Assistance Program and State Energy Program would be terminated under the FY2019 budget request. Congress did not eliminate the grants for FY2018 and the proposed cuts were not included in the FY2019 House and Senate bills. Reductions in Energy Research and Development. Under the FY2019 budget request, DOE research and development appropriations would be reduced for energy efficiency and renewable energy (EERE) by 65.5%, nuclear energy by 37.2%, and fossil energy by 30.9%. The House and Senate bills largely did not include the proposed reductions. Energy R&D funding was increased 12.9% from its FY2017 level by the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Nuclear Waste Repository. The Administration’s budget request would provide new funding for the first time since FY2010 for a proposed nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. DOE would receive $110 million to seek an NRC license for the repository, and NRC would receive $47.7 million to consider DOE’s application. DOE would also receive $10 million to develop interim nuclear waste storage facilities. The House bill would provide an additional $100 million to DOE for Yucca Mountain licensing above the request, while the Senate bill includes no Yucca Mountain funds. An Administration funding request for the Yucca Mountain project in FY2018 was not included in the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Elimination of Advanced Research Projects Agency—Energy (ARPA-E). The Trump Administration proposed to eliminate funds for new research projects by ARPA-E in FY2019, and called for terminating the program after currently funded projects were completed. The House approved an 8.0% cut and the Senate voted for a 6.1% increase. A similar proposal to terminate ARPA-E in FY2018 was not followed by Congress, with the FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act boosting funding for ARPA-E by 15.5%—to $353.3 million. Low-Yield Warhead. DOE’s FY2019 budget documents proposed a low-yield version of the W76 LEP nuclear warhead. DOE’s initial FY2019 budget request did not request any funding specifically allocated to this modification, but the White House included $65 million for it in a budget amendment package submitted to Congress on April 13, 2018. Plutonium Disposition Plant Termination. The Administration proposed in FY2018 and FY2019 to terminate construction of the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which would make fuel for nuclear reactors out of surplus weapons plutonium. The FY2018 Consolidated Appropriations Act conforms to provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-91) that allow DOE to pursue an alternative plutonium disposal program if sufficient cost savings are projected. The FY2019 House bill includes a similar provision, while the Senate bill provides funding for termination. The Administration certified under P.L. 115-91 on May 10, 2018, that the cost-saving requirement for termination of MFFF would be met.

Jul 17, 2018

Mexico’s 2018 Elections: Results and Potential Implications

Jul 17, 2018

Brett M. Kavanaugh: Selected Primary Material

Jul 17, 2018

Supreme Court Directs State Court to Decide Whether Indian Tribe Can Invoke Sovereign Immunity in Property Dispute

Jul 16, 2018

Improper Payments in High-Priority Programs: In Brief

The Improper Payments Information Act (IPIA) of 2002 defines improper payments as payments that should not have been made or that were made in an incorrect amount, including both overpayments and underpayments. This definition includes payments made to ineligible recipients, duplicate payments, payments for a good or service not received, and payments that do not account for applicable discounts. Since FY2004, federal agencies have been required to report on the amount of improper payments they issue each year and take steps to address the root causes of the problem. The data show a significant increase in improper payments from FY2007 ($42 billion) to FY2010 ($121 billion), followed by a slight decrease through FY2013 ($106 billion), another increase through FY2016 ($144 billion), and a slight decrease in FY2017 ($141 billion). The data also show that a small subset of programs has accounted for 85% to 98% of the government’s total improper payments each year. With this in mind, President Barack Obama signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13520 in 2009, which requires agencies to take additional measures to reduce the amount of improper payments associated with these “high-priority” programs. Notably, the executive order requires agencies to identify high-priority programs, develop detailed plans for reducing related improper payments, and establish annual goals against which progress could be measured. Agencies have identified 20 high-priority programs, all but one of which have been reporting data for several years. The data on high-priority programs present mixed results. Nine high-priority programs have showed improvement over time, as indicated by decreasing error rates, while three others have reported no improvement in their error rates. The error rates for the eight remaining high-priority programs have increased since they were first reported. Without further progress in reducing the error rates among high-priority programs the government’s total amount of improper payments may continue to exceed $100 billion per fiscal year, as it has since FY2009. Over the period of FY2004 through FY2017, high-priority improper payments have totaled $1.2 trillion and total improper payments have totaled $1.3 trillion.

Jul 16, 2018

Colombia’s 2018 Elections

Jul 12, 2018

Military Transition Assistance Program (TAP): An Overview

Jul 12, 2018

Justice Anthony Kennedy: His Jurisprudence and the Future of the Court

On June 27, 2018, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy announced that, effective July 31, 2018, he would retire from active service as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court of the United States. His decisive role on the Court, particularly since the Roberts Court era began in 2005, cannot be overstated. The Roberts Court era has witnessed the Court issue a number of landmark rulings, many of which have involved matters where the sitting Justices were closely divided. Justice Kennedy typically voted with the majority of the Court in such cases. Since the October 2005 term that marked the beginning of the Roberts Court, Justice Kennedy voted for the winning side in a case more often than any of his colleagues in 9 out of 12 terms. Unlike several other Justices on the Court, Justice Kennedy did not necessarily subscribe to a particular judicial philosophy, such as originalism or textualism. Instead, Justice Kennedy’s judicial approach seemed informed by a host of related principles. First, Justice Kennedy’s views on the law were often grounded in concerns for personal liberty, particularly freedom from government interference with thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. His emphasis on liberty manifested itself in a range of opinions he wrote or joined during his tenure on the Court, including on issues related to free speech, religious freedom, and government policies concerning same-sex relationships. Second, the structural protections of the Constitution—i.e., restraints imposed on the federal government and its respective branches by the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers—also animated Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence. For Justice Kennedy, separation of powers was a “defense against tyranny,” and he authored or joined a number of Court opinions that invalidated on separation-of-powers grounds intrusions on the executive, legislative, or judicial functions. Likewise, during the Rehnquist Court and Roberts Court eras, Justice Kennedy joined several majority opinions that recognized federalism-based limitations on the enumerated power of the federal government, established external limitations on Congress’s legislative powers over the states, and reaffirmed protections for state sovereignty. Third, Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence was undergirded by his view that the Court often has a robust role to play in resolving issues of national importance. With Justice Kennedy casting critical votes, over the last 30 years the Court has reasserted its role in a number of areas of law in which it was previously deferential to the judgment of the political branches. Given Justice Kennedy’s outsized role on the Roberts Court, whoever succeeds him could have an important influence on any number of areas of law. In particular, Justice Kennedy’s votes were critical to the outcome of numerous Court decisions on matters relating to abortion, business law, civil rights, the death penalty, the regulation of elections, eminent domain, the environment, federalism, the First Amendment, gun rights, immigration, national security, oversight of the administrative state, and separation of powers. Accordingly, Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence in these areas—particularly in cases where he was the deciding vote—may be especially relevant to the Senate as it determines whether to approve the President’s nominee to replace the soon-to-be-retired Justice. On July 9, 2018, President Trump announced the nomination of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to– fill the impending vacancy on the Supreme Court caused by Justice Kennedy’s scheduled retirement. CRS reports analyzing Judge Kavanaugh’s jurisprudence on particular areas of the law, as well as a tabular listing of lower-court decisions in which he authored opinions, are in preparation.

Jul 11, 2018

Mongolia

Jul 10, 2018

President Trump Nominates Judge Brett Kavanaugh: Initial Observations

Jul 10, 2018

Financial Reform: Overview of the Volcker Rule

Jul 9, 2018

State Election Reform Payments: FY2018 Appropriations

Jul 9, 2018

Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862) provides the President with the ability to impose restrictions on certain imports based on an affirmative determination by the Department of Commerce (Commerce) that the product under investigation “is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.” Section 232 actions are of interest to Congress because they are a delegation of Congress’ constitutional authority “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” They also have important potential economic and policy implications for the United States. Global overcapacity in steel and aluminum production, mainly driven by China, has been an ongoing concern of Congress. The George W. Bush, Obama, and Trump Administrations each engaged in multilateral discussions to address global steel capacity reduction through the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). While the United States has extensive antidumping and countervailing duties on Chinese steel imports to counter China’s unfair trade practices, steel industry and other experts argue that the magnitude of Chinese production acts to depress prices globally. Based on concerns about global overcapacity and certain trade practices, in April 2017 the Trump Administration initiated Section 232 investigations on U.S. steel and aluminum imports. Effective March 23, 2018, President Trump applied 25% and 10% tariffs, respectively, on certain steel and aluminum imports. The President temporarily exempted several countries from the tariffs pending negotiations on potential alternative measures. Permanent tariff exemptions in exchange for quantitative limitations on U.S. imports were eventually announced covering steel for Brazil and South Korea, and both steel and aluminum for Argentina. Australia was exempted from both tariffs with no quantitative restrictions. Commerce is also managing a process for potential product exclusions to limit potential negative domestic effects the tariff may have on U.S. businesses and consumers. To date, over 20,000 applications have been received. U.S. trading partners are challenging the tariffs under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and have threatened or enacted retaliation, risking potential escalation of retaliatory tariffs. Some analysts view the U.S. unilateral actions as potentially undermining WTO rules, which generally allow parties to act to protect “national security.” Congress enacted Section 232 during the Cold War when national security issues were at the forefront of national debate. The Trade Expansion Act sets clear steps and timelines for Section 232 investigations and actions, but allows the President to make a final determination over the appropriate action to take following an affirmative finding by Commerce that the relevant imports threaten to impair national security. Prior to the Trump Administration, there have been 26 Section 232 investigations resulting in nine affirmative findings by Commerce. In six of those cases the President imposed a trade action. On May 23, 2018, the Trump Administration initiated an additional Section 232 investigation on U.S. automobile and automobile part imports. This investigation as well as the Administration’s decision to apply the steel and aluminum tariffs on imports from Canada, Mexico, and the EU—all major suppliers of the affected imports—has prompted further questions by some Members of Congress and trade policy analysts on the appropriate use of the trade statute and the proper interpretation of threats to national security on which Section 232 investigations are based. These actions have also intensified debate over potential legislation to constrain the President’s authority with respect to Section 232. The steel and aluminum tariffs are affecting various stakeholders in the U.S. economy, prompting reactions from several Members of Congress, some in support and others voicing concerns. In general, the tariffs are expected to benefit the domestic steel and aluminum industries, leading to potential higher steel and aluminum prices and expansion in production in those sectors, while potentially negatively affecting consumers and downstream domestic industries (e.g., manufacturing and construction) through higher costs. Congress may exercise its authority on this issue by conducting oversight of the Section 232 investigations, examining the potential economic and broader policy effects of the tariffs, or potentially considering legislation to revoke or further limit the authority it previously delegated to the President.

Jul 5, 2018

The Congressional Review Act: Determining Which “Rules” Must Be Submitted to Congress

The Congressional Review Act (CRA) allows Congress to review certain types of federal agency actions that fall under the statutory category of “rules.” The CRA requires that agencies report their rules to Congress and provides special procedures under which Congress can consider legislation to overturn those rules. A joint resolution of disapproval will become effective once both houses of Congress pass a joint resolution and it is signed by the President, or if Congress overrides the President’s veto. The CRA generally adopts a broad definition of the word “rule” from the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), defining a rule as “the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency.” The CRA, however, provides three exceptions to this broad definition: any rule of particular applicability, including a rule that approves or prescribes for the future rates, wages, prices, services, or allowances therefor, corporate or financial structures, reorganizations, mergers, or acquisitions thereof, or accounting practices or disclosures bearing on any of the foregoing; any rule relating to agency management or personnel; or any rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice that does not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties. The class of rules the CRA covers is broader than the category of rules that are subject to the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. As such, some agency actions, such as guidance documents, that are not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures may still be considered rules under the CRA and thus could be overturned using the CRA’s procedures. The effect of Congress disapproving a rule that is not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking may be subject to debate, given that such rules are generally viewed to lack any legal effect in the first place. Nonetheless, the CRA does encompass some such rules, as highlighted by the recent enactment of a CRA resolution overturning a bulletin from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that was not subject to the notice-and-comment procedures. Even if an agency action falls under the CRA’s definition of “rule,” however, the expedited procedures for considering legislation to overturn the rule only become available when the agency submits the rule to Congress. In many cases in which agencies take actions that fall under the scope of a “rule” but have not gone through notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures, agencies fail to submit those rules. Thus, questions have arisen as to how Members can avail themselves of the CRA’s special fast-track procedures if the agency has not submitted the action to Congress. To protect its prerogative to review agency rules under the CRA, Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have developed an ad hoc process in which Members can request that GAO provide a formal legal opinion on whether a particular agency action qualifies as a rule under the CRA. If GAO concludes that the action in question can be considered a rule under the CRA, Congress has treated the publication of the GAO opinion in the Congressional Record as constructive submission of the rule. In other words, an affirmative opinion from GAO can allow Congress to use the CRA procedures to consider legislation overturning an agency action despite the agency not submitting that action to Congress.

Jul 5, 2018

Rural Highways

Of the nation’s 4.1 million miles of public access roads, 2.9 million, or 71%, are in rural areas. Rural roads account for about 30% of national vehicle miles traveled. However, with many rural areas experiencing population decline, states increasingly are struggling to maintain roads with diminishing traffic while at the same time meeting the needs of growing rural and metropolitan areas. Federal highway programs do not generally specify how much federal funding is used on roads in rural areas. This is determined by the states. Most federal highway money, however, may be used only for a designated network of highways. While Interstate Highways and other high-volume roads in rural areas are eligible for these funds, most smaller rural roads are not. It is these roads, often under the control of county or township governments, that are most likely to have poor pavement and deficient bridges. Rural roads received about 37% of federal highway funds during FY2009-FY2015, although they accounted for about 30% of annual vehicle miles traveled. As a result, federal-aid-eligible rural roads are in comparatively good condition: 49% of rural roads were determined to offer good ride quality in 2016, compared with 27% of urban roads. Although 1 in 10 rural bridges is structurally deficient, the number of deficient rural bridges has declined by 41% since 2000. When it comes to safety, on the other hand, rural roads lag; the fatal accident rate on rural roads is over twice the rate on urban roads. The Federal Highway Administration has generally urged states to select highway projects based on a broad view of transportation benefits; the FHWA has asserted that transportation can shape development but cannot create development where there is no demand. However, an April 2018 statement by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) contended “underinvestment in rural transportation systems has allowed a slow and steady decline in the transportation routes that connect rural American communities.” DOT said that it intends to favor rural areas in awarding discretionary grants for highway projects. If it seeks to focus on the condition of rural roads and bridges, Congress could expand the network of federal-aid highways to include more local roads; could create new programs that would specifically target transportation in rural areas; and/or could fund an expansion of the Interstate System. Without an increase in overall funding levels, however, such measures might cause states to spread their federal highway funds across wider networks of highways, making it more difficult for them to marshal the funds needed to undertake large and costly projects. Alternatively, given the population loss in some rural areas, Congress might provide incentives for states and counties to close or pulverize underused roads back to gravel and close underused and structurally deficient rural bridges, encouraging them to devote more of their resources to more heavily used roads.

Jul 5, 2018

The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program

Jul 5, 2018

Medicare Overview

Jul 5, 2018

Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Program

Jul 5, 2018

Broadband Data and Mapping

Improving the quality of broadband deployment data has become an issue of congressional interest, as policymakers recognize that more accurate broadband availability maps could help ensure that federal broadband programs target unserved areas of the country that are most in need of assistance. Since the initial deployment of broadband in the late 1990s, two federal agencies have implemented broadband availability data collection and mapping initiatives: the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) at the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). NTIA In 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5) appropriated $350 million to NTIA to develop and maintain a comprehensive nationwide inventory map of existing broadband service capability and availability in the United States. Previously, in 2008, the Broadband Data Improvement Act (P.L. 110-385) had directed the Department of Commerce to establish a state broadband data and development grant program, and to use the data gathered by the states to create a broadband inventory map. NTIA launched the State Broadband Initiative (SBI) in 2009 and awarded $293 million to 56 grantees, one each from the 50 states, 5 territories, and the District of Columbia. NTIA worked with each to collect fixed and mobile broadband availability data for over 11 million census blocks. In the SBI program, NTIA used a state-level validation process intended to ensure the accuracy of the broadband availability data submitted by providers. On February 17, 2011, NTIA utilized the state-gathered data to launch the National Broadband Map. The map was updated approximately every six months until April 2015. The final SBI-generated National Broadband Map reflected data as of June 30, 2014. Because the ARRA state grants had expired, NTIA could no longer update the map, and the FCC subsequently assumed responsibility for the National Broadband Map. FCC In 2000, the FCC established the Form 477 Data Program to collect from providers subscription data on broadband services, local telephone service competition, and mobile telephony services. Since 2000, the FCC has revised its Form 477 data process three times. The most recent revision expanded the scope of the data collection program to enable the FCC to, among other things, populate and update the National Broadband Map. The first FCC map was based on June 2016 fixed broadband data collected through the Form 477 process. The second and current map was released in February 2018 and reflects December 2016 fixed broadband data. Unlike NTIA’s SBI program, Form 477 data does not undergo an independent validation and verification process. Twice per year, all facilities-based providers of fixed broadband are required to provide a list of all census blocks where fixed broadband service (at speeds of 200 kilobits per second or higher) is currently available to at least one location, or where the provider could—within a standard service interval—provide service. The collection of accurate and reliable mobile broadband data is particularly challenging, because a user’s mobile wireless experience varies and is affected by signal strength and factors such as terrain, user location, weather, network congestion, and the type of connected device. Mobile broadband service providers are required to submit polygons in shapefiles that digitally represent the geographic areas in which a customer could expect to receive the minimum speed the provider advertises for that area. Additionally, mobile broadband providers report the census tracts in which their service is advertised and available to potential customers. Form 477 mobile broadband data is not reflected in the FCC’s National Broadband Map, which displays fixed broadband deployment only. However, Form 477 mobile broadband data is used by the FCC to determine and map which areas are eligible for the Mobility Fund Phase II program. Moving Forward Two major criticism of the FCC’s Form 477 National Broadband Map are that provider-reported data is not independently verified or validated, and that broadband availability is overstated because the data is not sufficiently granular. A significant factor in over-reporting is that fixed broadband deployment data is collected at the census block level. A census block is considered served if there is broadband service to one or more locations. This is especially problematic in rural areas, which have large census blocks and may be considered served if, for example, a single neighborhood in that large census block has broadband service. On the other hand, broadband providers assert that requiring the collection of certain additional broadband data, including increased granularity (such as address-level data), would be impractical and unduly burdensome, would require significant time and expense, and may not necessarily result in more useful data. On August 3, 2017, the FCC adopted a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to explore ways “to improve the quality, accuracy, and usefulness of the data it collects on fixed and mobile voice and broadband service,” while at the same time examining how it can “reduce burdens on industry by eliminating unnecessary or onerous data filing requirements.” The Administration requested $50 million for broadband mapping in FY2018. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) appropriated $7.5 million to NTIA to update the national broadband availability map in coordination with the FCC and using partnerships previously developed with the states. For FY2019, the House and Senate appropriations committees would provide an additional $7.5 million to NTIA for broadband mapping. On May 30, 2018, NTIA issued a Request for Comments on actions it should take to improve the quality and accuracy of broadband availability data. Meanwhile, broadband data bills in the 115th Congress include H.R. 1546, H.R. 4810, S. 1104, S. 1621, and draft NTIA reauthorization legislation. Issues include how to obtain more granular data while minimizing burdens and costs to providers; whether self-reported provider data should be independently verified, and if so, how; and the appropriate roles and funding of federal agencies in collecting and coordinating broadband data.

Jul 3, 2018

Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA)

Some Members of Congress, the Trump Administration, and some U.S. businesses have raised concerns over continued U.S. technological leadership to support national defense and economic security due to growing foreign, primarily Chinese, investments in U.S. high-tech companies. These and other concerns motivated the House and the Senate to adopt measures, both known as the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA). The bills would amend the current process for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) (under P.L. 110-49) to review, on behalf of the President, the national security implications of foreign direct investments in the United States. The Senate version (S. 2098) of FIRRMA was added as Title XVII to the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (S. 2987, and as incorporated into the Senate amendments to H.R. 5515), which passed the Senate on June 18, 2018. The House version (H.R. 5841) of FIRRMA was passed by the House as a stand-alone bill on June 26, 2018. It is expected that the provisions will go to conference to be reconciled in the coming weeks. The House and Senate measures would represent the most comprehensive revision of the foreign investment review process under CFIUS since previous revisions were enacted in 2007. Since its inception in 1975, CFIUS has operated at the nexus of shifting concepts of national security and a changing global economic order that is marked in part by such emerging economies as China and state-led firms that are playing a more active role in the global economy. The CFIUS process grants the President the authority to block or suspend proposed or pending foreign “mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers” of “persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States” that threaten to impair the national security. To exercise his authority, the President must conclude that (1) other U.S. laws are inadequate or inappropriate to protect the national security; and (2) must have “credible evidence” that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair U.S. national security. CFIUS currently does not review joint ventures or new business ventures, the latter often referred to as “greenfield investments.” The U.S. export control system, which addresses certain outbound transactions, operates separately from CFIUS, although the Secretaries of Commerce, Defense, and State, whose departments are involved in administering export controls, are permanent members of CFIUS. Proposed changes to CFIUS could recast the current law’s generally open approach to foreign investment that largely focuses reviews and investigations on the potential impact of individual investments on national security, to a more assertive role that emphasizes both U.S. economic and national security interests, particularly relative to the development of dual-use leading-edge technology. Overall, the changes range from provisions that would codify existing administrative actions to provisions that would expand the scope of transactions that fall under CFIUS’ jurisdiction and distinguish foreign investments by country. Specifically, investment transactions involving “countries of special concern,” would face a higher level of scrutiny, though the criteria for that designation by CFIUS differ between the House and Senate bills. The House and Senate versions of FIRRMA differ in a number of ways, but key provisions would Broaden CFIUS’ role by including for review certain real estate transactions in close proximity to a military installation or U.S. government facility or property of national security sensitivities; joint ventures (House version); any nonpassive investment in U.S. businesses involved in critical technology or critical infrastructure; any change in foreign investor rights regarding a U.S. business; transactions in which a foreign government has a direct or indirect substantial interest; and any transaction or arrangement designed to evade CFIUS regulations. Allow for CFIUS to discriminate among foreign investors by country of origin in reviewing investment transactions by labeling some countries as being a country of special concern—one that poses a “significant threat to the national security interests of the United States” (Senate version), or a country that is subject to export restrictions, is a state-sponsor of terrorism, or is subject to an arms embargo (House version). Shift the filing process for foreign firms from voluntary to mandatory in certain cases and provide for a two-track method for reviewing investment transactions with some transactions requiring a declaration to CFIUS and receiving an expedited process, while transactions involving investors from countries of special concern would require a written notification of a proposed transaction and receive greater scrutiny. Lengthen most time periods for CFIUS reviews and investigations and for a national security analysis by the Director of National Intelligence. Provide for more staff to handle an expected increased work load and provide for additional funding for CFIUS through a filing fee structure for firms involved in a transaction (Senate version) or a combination of a $20 million annual appropriation and a fee structure (House version). Provide for additional factors for consideration that CFIUS and the President can use to determine if a transaction threatens to impair U.S. national security. Formalize CFIUS’ use of risk-based analysis to assess the national security risks of a transaction by assessing the threat, vulnerabilities, and consequences to national security related to the transaction. Modify CFIUS’ annual confidential report to specified Members of Congress and nonconfidential reports to the public to provide for more information on foreign investment transactions. Mandate separate reforms related to export controls, with requirements to establish an interagency process to identify so-called “emerging and foundational technologies”—such items would also fall under CFIUS review of critical technologies—and establish controls on the export or transfer of such technologies. (The House version includes more extensive export control revisions.) President Trump reportedly endorses the enhanced CFIUS process that would result from the adoption of FIRRMA in lieu of proposing new restrictions on foreign investment, including from China as part of the U.S. investigation into Chinese practices related to technology transfer and intellectual property rights.

Jul 3, 2018

FY2019 Funding for CCS and Other DOE Fossil Energy R&D

Jul 2, 2018

Partisan Gerrymandering: Supreme Court Provides Guidance on Standing and Maintains Legal Status Quo

Jul 2, 2018

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962

Jun 29, 2018

Cyber Supply Chain Risk Management: An Introduction

Jun 29, 2018

Hospital Charity Care and Related Reporting Requirements Under Medicare and the Internal Revenue Code

Jun 28, 2018

Trade Deficits and U.S. Trade Policy

The economic effects of the U.S. trade deficit have been a topic of long-standing congressional interest. The U.S. Constitution grants authority to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations and to lay and collect duties, and Congress exercises this authority in numerous ways. These include oversight of trade policy and consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements and to authorize trade programs. In some cases, Congress has delegated certain authorities over trade policy to the Executive Branch: for example, to facilitate trade negotiations. As part of efforts to examine U.S. trade policy and key trading relationships, Congress and previous Administrations have focused on the trade deficit at times, but generally have not implemented specific measures to lower the trade deficit. Nor has reducing bilateral trade deficits been a major objective in evaluating or negotiating U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) and implementing trade laws. Previous Administrations rarely linked trade deficits and import tariffs with U.S. national security. The Trump Administration, however, is using the U.S. trade deficit as a barometer for evaluating the success or failure of the global trading system, U.S. trade policy, and bilateral trade relations with various countries. It also characterizes the trade deficit as harming the performance and national security of the U.S. economy. The Trump Administration’s approach contrasts with the views of most economists, who argue that the overall U.S. trade deficit stems from U.S. macroeconomic policies that create a savings and investment imbalance in which domestic sources of capital are not sufficient to meet domestic capital demands. As such, attempting to alter the trade deficit without addressing the underlying macroeconomic issues will likely be counterproductive and create distortions in the economy. Some analysts argue that trade agreements play an important role in the U.S. trade deficit; they contend the agreements have failed to provide U.S. exporters with reciprocal treatment or have exposed U.S. producers to increased competition. Most economists, however, question both the role that trade agreements play in determining the trade deficit and the position that the trade deficit is substantially the product of unfair treatment. The Trump Administration’s approach does not rule out the possibility that some countries may not be fully abiding by international trade agreements and rules, or may be maintaining certain trade barriers. Such actions may distort market performance and erode public support for the international trade system. As a result, addressing these issues and continuing to negotiate new agreements to remove trade barriers are likely to have benefits by improving efficiency and creating a level playing field in the global trading system. Nevertheless, given the macroeconomic origins of the trade deficit, as is generally accepted, addressing such distortions may alter the composition of U.S. trade among trading partners and commodities, but would be unlikely to affect the overall U.S. trade deficit. Most economists also question the role the trade deficit plays in affecting jobs, wages, and the distribution of income in the U.S. economy. One concern expressed by economists and others is the debt accumulation associated with sustained trade deficits. They argue that the long-term impact on the U.S. economy of borrowing to finance imports depends on whether those funds are used for greater investments in productive capital with high returns that raise future standards of living, or whether they are used for current consumption. These concerns and the various policy approaches that have been used to alter the savings-investment imbalance in the economy are beyond the scope of this report. Most economists generally contend that from the perspective of the economy as a whole, both consumers and producers benefit from liberalized trade and that the gains for the economy as a whole outweigh the costs, irrespective of the bilateral trade deficit or surplus. Most economists argue that the economy as a whole operates more efficiently as a result of competition through international trade and that consumers and producers who may use imported inputs throughout the economy experience a wider variety of goods and services at varying levels of quality and price than would be possible in an economy closed to international trade. They also contend that trade may have a long-term positive dynamic effect on an economy that enhances both production and employment. Standard economic theory also recognizes that some workers and producers in the economy may experience a disproportionate share of the short-term adjustment costs that are associated with shifts in resources stemming from greater international competition. Although the attendant adjustment costs for businesses and labor are difficult to measure, some estimates suggest they may be significant over the short run and can entail dislocations for some segments of the labor force, companies, and communities. Policymakers generally have aimed to address such dislocations through specific training and other readjustment assistance programs, among other trade-related measures.

Jun 28, 2018

Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) FY2019 Budget Request and Funding History: Fact Sheet

The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provides health care to individuals who are geographically isolated and/or economically or medically vulnerable. The agency’s programs target specific populations including pregnant women and their children and individuals with HIV/AIDs. HRSA is organized into five bureaus: (1) Primary Care; (2) Health Workforce; (3) Maternal and Child Health; (4) HIV/AIDS; and (5) Healthcare Systems. In addition to these bureaus, HRSA has 11 offices. Some offices focus on specific populations or health care issues (e.g., Office of Women’s Health, Federal Office of Rural Health Policy), while others provide agency-wide support or technical assistance to HRSA’s regional offices (e.g., Office of Planning, Analysis and Evaluation; Office of Regional Operations). This fact sheet focuses on the agency’s funding; a number of specific HRSA programs are described in more detail in other CRS reports.

Jun 28, 2018

U.S. Intelligence Community Establishment Provisions

Jun 27, 2018

Federal Assistance for Wildfire Response and Recovery

Jun 27, 2018

Legislative Actions to Modify the Affordable Care Act in the 111th-115th Congresses

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148) was signed into law on March 23, 2010. The law comprises numerous provisions in 10 titles. The provisions in Titles I-VIII largely relate to how health care in the United States is financed, organized, and delivered. Title IX contains revenue provisions. Title X reauthorizes the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, establishes some new programs and requirements, and amends provisions included in the other nine titles of the ACA. On March 30, 2010, the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (HCERA; P.L. 111-152) was signed into law, which included new provisions and amended several ACA provisions. Since enactment of the ACA and HCERA, lawmakers have repeatedly debated the laws’ implementation and considered bills to repeal, defund, or otherwise amend them. This report summarizes legislative actions taken during the 111th-115th Congresses to modify the health care-related provisions of the ACA and HCERA. The first part of the report provides a brief overview of the laws’ core provisions and their impact on federal spending and health insurance coverage as context for the other material presented in the report. The second part of the report includes Table 2, which summarizes laws enacted during the 111th-115th Congresses that modified ACA or HCERA provisions. The third part of the report lists bills passed in the House or the Senate during the 111th-115th Congresses that would have modified ACA or HCERA provisions, had they been enacted. Identifying legislation that modifies the ACA and HCERA has become increasingly difficult over the years. This is because of the vast number of ACA and HCERA provisions, their complexity, and the fact that these provisions are codified in many different parts of the U.S. Code. As a result, the legislation presented in this report’s tables may not include all enacted legislation that modifies the ACA or HCERA, or all House- or Senate-passed legislation that would have modified the ACA or HCERA, had it been enacted. Due to the increasing complexity of tracking such legislation and concerns about the ability to do so authoritatively, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) does not intend to update this report.

Jun 27, 2018

TRICARE Modernization: Eligibility for the Federal Employee Dental and Vision Insurance Program

In an effort to improve TRICARE dental and vision coverage through “enhanced benefits,” in 2016 Congress expanded (P.L. 114-328) eligibility for the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP) to certain TRICARE beneficiaries. FEDVIP is a dental and vision benefit program for federal employees and annuitants. Uniformed services retirees and their family members are to be eligible to enroll in FEDVIP in November 2018, with coverage beginning on January 1, 2019. Non-active duty TRICARE beneficiaries (i.e., family members of uniformed service members, reserve component members, and survivors) enrolled in a TRICARE health plan are to be eligible to enroll in only a FEDVIP vision plan. What is FEDVIP? FEDVIP is a supplemental dental and vision benefit program managed by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and administered through contracts with various dental and vision insurers. In general, federal employees, U.S. Postal Service employees, federal retirees, and their family members are eligible for FEDVIP. Enrollees pay the entire cost of the premium, as well as associated cost sharing, such as deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance. FEDVIP dental plans typically include the following benefits: 100% coverage of in-network preventive services, no deductibles when using in-network dentists, no waiting periods for major dental procedures (e.g., crowns, bridges, dentures, implants, etc.), and orthodontic coverage without a 12-month waiting period or age limit (select plans). FEDVIP vision plans typically include the following benefits: routine eye exams and vision correction without referral requirements, low vision exams and aids, eyeglass frames, lenses, and contact lenses, lens options (e.g., special coatings, tinting, etc.), and discounts on laser eye surgery. What dental and vision benefits do TRICARE beneficiaries currently receive? Uniformed services retirees and their family members are eligible for the TRICARE Retiree Dental Program (TRDP). TRDP is a premium-based dental plan with 1.6 million enrollees and is managed by the Defense Health Agency (DHA) through a contract with Delta Dental. For active duty service members and their families, dental benefits are provided by military treatment facilities (MTFs) or through separate TRICARE dental contracts managed by the DHA. Reserve component members and their families are also eligible to purchase a premium-based TRICARE dental plan. The Active Duty Dental Program (which is contracted for active duty service members) and the TRICARE Dental Program (which is contracted for active duty family members and reserve component members and their families) are both administered by United Concordia. Vision services for active duty service members are provided at certain MTFs, or through TRICARE. Non-active duty TRICARE beneficiaries may receive vision services at MTFs on a space-available basis. TRICARE vision coverage is a limited benefit with cost shares varying by health plan. Which TRICARE beneficiaries will be eligible for FEDVIP? The TRDP contract for uniformed services retirees and their family members ends on December 31, 2018. Dental insurance coverage beyond 2018 for these individuals is to be available through FEDVIP. Non-active duty TRICARE beneficiaries enrolled in a TRICARE health plan (i.e., TRICARE Prime, TRICARE Select, TRICARE Reserve Select, TRICARE Retired Reserve, or TRICARE for Life) are to be eligible to enroll in FEDVIP vision plans only. How many FEDVIP plans will be available to eligible TRICARE beneficiaries? OPM is scheduled to announce available 2019 FEDVIP plans in October 2018. While FEDVIP benefits are available worldwide, some dental and vision plans may only be available in region-specific locations. For calendar year 2018, FEDVIP offered 10 dental plans: Aetna Dental, Delta Dental, Dominion Dental, EmblemHealth, FEP BlueDental, GEHA, Humana, Metlife, Triple-S Salud, and United Concordia. In 2018, FEDVIP offered four vision plans: Aetna Vision, FEP BlueVision, United Healthcare Vision, and VSP Vision Care. Will interested TRICARE beneficiaries need to enroll in FEDVIP? FEDVIP is a voluntary benefit. Eligible TRICARE beneficiaries (including current TRDP participants) interested in participating must enroll during the annual open enrollment season and pay a premium. Open enrollment is scheduled take place from November 12 to December 10, 2018, for coverage beginning on January 1, 2019. Eligible TRICARE beneficiaries may also enroll in FEDVIP or change their plan within 90 days of a Qualifying Life Event. What is the cost to the federal government for extending FEDVIP eligibility to certain TRICARE beneficiaries? The Congressional Budget Office estimates a cost savings of $14 million (discretionary spending) and $21 million (direct spending) over the FY2018-FY2026 period. Implementation costs to the Department of Defense or OPM have not been calculated; Congress may evaluate the transition of benefits administration from one agency to another. What is the cost to TRICARE beneficiaries participating in FEDVIP? TRICARE beneficiaries enrolling in FEDVIP are to continue to pay full premium costs and associated cost sharing, such as deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance. DHA and OPM are scheduled to announce individual FEDVIP plan details and costs in October 2018. Uniformed services retirees may continue to pay premiums through a post-tax allotment of their base or retirement pay. How are active duty service members impacted by FEDVIP? Active duty service members are not impacted by the expanded eligibility for FEDVIP and are to continue to have priority access to care at MTFs or through TRICARE. How are current TRICARE beneficiaries who are FEDVIP enrollees impacted? TRICARE beneficiaries currently eligible or enrolled in a FEDVIP plan are not to be impacted. Eligible beneficiaries may change their enrollment status or plan during the open enrollment season. Are members of the Reserve Component eligible to participate in FEDVIP? Reserve Component members enrolled in TRICARE Reserve Select are to be eligible to participate in a FEDVIP vision plan. Dental coverage may be purchased through the TRICARE Dental Program.

Jun 27, 2018

Tip Credit and Tip Pooling Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act

Jun 27, 2018

Private Flood Insurance and the National Flood Insurance Program

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the main source of primary flood insurance coverage in the United States, collecting $3.5 billion in premiums for over five million flood insurance policies. This is in contrast to the majority of other property and casualty risks, such as damage from fire or accidents, which are covered by a broad array of private insurance companies. One of the primary reasons behind the creation of the NFIP in 1968 was the withdrawal by private insurers from providing flood insurance coverage, leaving flood victims largely reliant on federal disaster assistance to recover after a flood. While private insurers have taken on relatively little flood risk, they have been involved in the administration of the NFIP through sales and servicing of policies and claims. In recent years, private insurers have expressed increased interest in providing flood coverage. Advances in the analytics and data used to quantify flood risk along with increases in capital market capacities may allow private insurers to take on flood risks that they shunned in the past. Private flood insurance may offer some advantages over the NFIP, including more flexible flood polices, integrated coverage with homeowners insurance, or lower cost coverage for some consumers. Private marketing might also increase the overall amount of flood coverage purchased, reducing the amount of extraordinary disaster assistance necessary to be provided by the federal government. Increased private coverage could reduce the overall financial risk to the NFIP, reducing the amount of NFIP borrowing necessary after major disasters. Increasing private insurance, however, may have some downsides compared to the NFIP. Private coverage would not be guaranteed to be available to all floodplain residents, unlike the NFIP, and consumer protections could vary in different states. The role of the NFIP has historically been broader than just providing insurance. As currently authorized, the NFIP also encompasses social goals to provide flood insurance in flood-prone areas to property owners who otherwise would not be able to obtain it, and to reduce government’s cost after floods. Through flood mapping and mitigation efforts, the NFIP has tried to reduce the future impact of floods, and it is unclear how effectively the NFIP could play this broader role if private insurance became a large part of the flood marketplace. Increased private insurance could also have an impact on the subsidies that are provided for some consumers through the NFIP. The 2012 reauthorization of the NFIP (Title II of P.L. 112-141) included provisions encouraging private flood insurance; however, various barriers have remained. Legislation passed the House in the 114th Congress (H.R. 2901) which was intended to loosen requirements on private flood insurance, but it was not taken up by the Senate before the end of the 114th Congress. The NFIP is currently operating under a short-term reauthorization until July 31, 2018. A bill for longer term reauthorization (H.R. 2874) passed the House in November 2017. Three bills (S. 1313, S. 1368, and S. 1571) have been introduced in the Senate, but none have been acted on by the full Senate. H.R. 2874 includes several provisions intended to promote private flood insurance. S. 1313 mirrors some of these provisions, while the other Senate bills have fewer provisions promoting private flood insurance. This report describes the current role of private insurers in U.S. flood insurance, and discusses barriers to expanding private sector involvement. The report considers potential effects of increased private sector involvement in the U.S. flood market, both for the NFIP and for consumers. Finally, the report outlines the provisions relevant to private flood insurance in the House and Senate NFIP reauthorization bills.

Jun 26, 2018

The Special Registration for Telemedicine: In Brief

Suppress: In response to the concerns about the opioid epidemic, the Trump Administration proposed expanding access to telemedicine services such as for the prescribing of medicine used for substance abuse or mental health treatment. Telemedicine is the electronic delivery of a clinical health care service via a technological method. Section 311(h)(1) of the Controlled Substance Act (CSA), which was added by Section 3 of the Ryan Haight Online Pharmacy Consumer Protection Act of 2008 (Ryan Haight Act; P.L. 110-425), authorized the special registration for telemedicine with the goal of increasing patients’ access to practitioners that can prescribe controlled substances via telemedicine in limited circumstances. Section 802(21) of Title 21, U.S.C. defines a practitioner as a physician, dentist, veterinarian, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices or does research, to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical analysis, a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research. The registration would enable a practitioner to deliver, distribute, dispense, or prescribe via telemedicine a controlled substance to a patient who has not been medically examined in-person by the prescribing practitioner. For example in the event of an opioid overdose, a patient might need a prescription for an opioid antagonist such as naloxone from a practitioner who has never examined the patient in-person prior to the telemedicine encounter. While the CSA authorized the special registration for telemedicine, practitioners have not been able to apply for this special registration. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has yet to finalize a rule on the registration’s application process and procedures and the limited circumstances that warrant it. As a result, Congress is considering the Special Registration for Telemedicine Clarification Act of 2018 (H.R. 5483). H.R. 5483 would require the DEA, in a joint effort with the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to issue a rule on the special registration for telemedicine within one year of the enactment of the bill (as amended). On June 12, 2018, the House passed H.R. 5483 under suspension of the rules. On June 13, 2018, the Senate referred the bill to the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee.

Jun 26, 2018

Trinidad and Tobago

Jun 26, 2018

Lebanese Hezbollah

Jun 22, 2018

FEMA and SBA Disaster Assistance for Individuals and Households: Application Process, Determinations, and Appeals

The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Individual Assistance (IA) program and the Small Business Administration’s (SBA’s) Disaster Loan Program are the federal government’s two primary sources of financial assistance to help individuals and households recover and rebuild from a major disaster. In many cases, disaster survivors find that they need assistance from both of these programs in addition to other sources of assistance including private insurance, state and local government assistance, and assistance from private voluntary organizations. Though FEMA IA and the SBA Disaster Loan Program are separate programs administered by different agencies, in many ways they are interconnected. SBA and FEMA share real-time data on disaster grant and loan approvals to identify potential duplication of benefits while providing individuals and households with federal assistance that can be used in conjunction with each other to meet recovery needs. The two programs are also interconnected in the way they are administered to determine loan and grant eligibility. Furthermore, eligibility and assistance from one source can affect eligibility and assistance from the other source. It could be argued the overlap between the two programs provides an effective means to identify duplication and provide federal assistance; however, the overlap also causes some confusion. Some in Congress are concerned that elements of the application process are not entirely known. For instance, it is unclear to some what criteria are used to determine assistance eligibility as well as how decisions are made with respect to whether an applicant should be provided a grant or a loan (or both). It is also unclear whether FEMA and SBA determine eligibility on a case-by-case basis, or if eligibility criteria are applied uniformly. This report provides an overview of the two programs including discussions about: how declarations put the programs into effect; the application process for both programs; the criteria used by FEMA and the SBA to determine assistance; and the FEMA and SBA appeal processes. The report concludes with policy observations and considerations for Congress.

Jun 22, 2018

Jamaica

Jun 21, 2018

Overview of FY2019 Appropriations for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS)

This report describes actions taken by the Trump Administration and Congress to provide FY2019 funding for Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) accounts. It also provides an overview of enacted FY2018 funding for agencies and bureaus funded as part of annual CJS appropriations acts. For FY2018, Congress and the President provided a total of $72.119 billion in funding for CJS. This included $70.921 billion in regular funding provided in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) and $1.198 billion in emergency-designated funding provided in the Further Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Requirements Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-123). The Administration requests $66.555 billion for CJS for FY2019, which is 7.7% less than total FY2018 funding and 6.2% less than regular FY2018 funding (which excludes emergency-designated funding). The Administration requests $9.797 billion for the Department of Commerce, $28.835 billion for the Department of Justice, $27.372 billion for the science agencies, and $551 million for the related agencies. The Administration’s budget proposes eliminating funding for several CJS agencies and accounts, including the Economic Development Administration and the Legal Services Corporation. The Administration’s budget proposes moving funding for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas program from the Office of National Drug Control Policy to the Drug Enforcement Administration, closing the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Office and moving its responsibilities to the Office of Justice Programs (OJP), and a new account structure for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The bill reported by the House Committee on Appropriations (H.R. 5952) would provide a total of $73.923 billion for CJS for FY2019, an amount that is 4.2% greater than regular FY2018 funding (which excludes emergency-designated funding) and 11.1% greater than the Administration’s request. The bill would provide $12.106 billion for the Department of Commerce, $31.113 billion for the Department of Justice, $29.728 billion for the science agencies, and $976 million for the related agencies. The committee largely declined to adopt many of the Administration’s proposals to eliminate funding for several CJS agencies and accounts, though the committee-reported bill would move funding for the COPS program to OJP and it includes the Administration’s proposed account structure for NASA. The bill reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations (S. 3072) would provide a total of $72.648 billion for CJS for FY2019, an amount that is 2.4% more than regular FY2018 funding (which excludes emergency-designated funding) and 9.2% more than the Administration’s request. The bill would provide $11.572 billion for the Department of Commerce, $30.699 billion for the Department of Justice, $29.400 billion for the science agencies, and $977 million for the related agencies. The Senate Committee on Appropriations largely declined to adopt many of the proposals put forth by the Administration in its FY2019 budget. Unlike the House committee-reported bill, S. 3072 would fund the COPS program through its own account and the committee did not include the Administration’s new account structure for NASA.

Jun 20, 2018

Cambodian Elections

Cambodian National Assembly elections, scheduled for July 29, 2018, are expected to be a setback for the country’s prospects for democratization. The ruling political party, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), banned the largest opposition party in 2017 and will run virtually unopposed. Steps taken by the Trump Administration and Congress to respond to the Cambodian government’s “anti-democratic” actions have been met with defiance by the Cambodian leader, Hun Sen. Political History Between 1975 and 1991, Cambodia endured the four-year reign of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, also known as the Khmer Rouge, during which an estimated two million Cambodians died, as well as Vietnamese invasion and occupation, and civil war. The Paris Peace Agreement, signed by Cambodia and 18 other nations pledging to support the country’s sovereignty and reconstruction on October 23, 1991, ended the conflict. It also established a “liberal democracy” with “periodic and genuine elections.” Since the United Nations administered the first post-war national elections in 1993, the Kingdom of Cambodia has made fitful progress in its political and social development, including the conduct of elections and growth of civil society. Official Development Assistance (ODA), which totaled more than $10 billion between 1995 and 2016 (according to OECD data), helped restore and develop Cambodian political, social, and economic institutions, most of which were destroyed under the Khmer Rouge (1975-1979). In recent years, assistance from China has roughly matched total annual ODA flows from OECD member countries, and it appears that Prime Minister Hun Sen has embraced Chinese assistance as an alternative to Western aid, which often comes with conditions for democratic governance. Recent Political Developments The Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP), a union of two opposition parties led by Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha, made significant gains in the 2013 parliamentary elections and 2017 local elections. The CNRP’s strength reflected a younger and more globalized electorate that is less focused on Cambodia’s past turbulence, more concerned about corruption and inequality, and more demanding about government accountability and performance. Cambodia also has been under pressure to improve the quality of its elections, with many Western governments, including the United States, providing assistance to increase participation, improve transparency, and ensure polls are free and fair. The threat of a CNRP victory in 2018 appears to have compelled Hun Sen, who often has employed undemocratic means to stay in power, to crack down on the opposition. In November 2017, the Supreme Court of Cambodia made a ruling that dissolved the CNRP for “conspiring with the United States to overthrow the government.” U.S. Ambassador to Cambodia William Heidt said Hun Sen’s accusations that the U.S. government is attempting to overthrow his government are “inaccurate, misleading, and baseless.” Since 2008, former CNRP president Sam Rainsy has faced several defamation charges regarded by many observers as politically motivated, and has spent most of his time in exile. In December 2017, Sam was charged with treason for posting a video on social media urging security personnel not to “obey orders from any dictators if they order you to shoot and kill innocent people.” He has called upon Cambodians to boycott the 2018 elections. Former CNRP vice-president Kem Sokha has been detained since September 2017 awaiting trial for treason, or conspiracy with a foreign power, allegedly for collaborating with the United States to foment a popular overthrow of the CPP. The Cambodian government has placed increasing restrictions on political and social activism, civil society, free speech, and foreign-funded democracy programs. Since late 2015, more than 25 opposition Members and government critics have been arrested. In 2017, the government ordered the Cambodia Daily, known as an opposition newspaper, to shut down, ostensibly for failing to pay taxes. In 2017, the Cambodian Foreign Ministry expelled the National Democratic Institute (NDI), which receives U.S. funding and was engaged in democracy programs in Cambodia, on the grounds that the U.S.-based organization was not registered with the government. In 2017, the government closed more than one dozen Cambodian radio stations that sold air time to Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Asia (RFA). RFA, facing political and economic pressure from the government, closed its Phnom Penh office. In May 2018, the government made its first arrest under a lèse-majesté law, passed by the National Assembly in February 2018, which makes insulting the monarch a crime. U.S. Policy Responses U.S. relations with Cambodia have become strained in recent years in light of Hun Sen’s suppression of political opponents and growing embrace of China. The Trump Administration announced in December 2017 that the U.S. government would “restrict entry into the United States of those individuals involved in undermining democracy in Cambodia.” Pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which implemented the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Section 1261 of P.L. 114-328), in June 2018 the U.S. Department of the Treasury sanctioned Cambodian General Hing Bun Hieng, commander of Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit, “for being the leader of an entity involved in serious human rights abuses.” Sanctioned individuals are denied entry into the United States, and any assets that they hold in the United States are blocked. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (P.L. 115-141) imposes democracy-related and other conditions upon U.S. assistance to the government of Cambodia, as would S. 2412, the Cambodia Accountability and Return on Investment Act of 2018, which is pending in the Senate. H.R. 5754, the Cambodia Democracy Act of 2018, which is pending in the House, would impose visa restrictions and block assets of senior government officials who have undermined democracy or committed serious human rights violations. S.Res. 279, passed by the Senate on November 16, 2017, urges the Department of the Treasury to consider placing all senior Cambodian government officials implicated in the suppression of democracy and human rights abuses on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list; calls on the Cambodian government to release opposition leader Kem Sokha; and supports free and fair elections in 2018 monitored by international observers. A similar resolution, H.Res. 661, is pending in the House.

Jun 20, 2018

Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2019 Appropriations

The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and—in even-numbered fiscal years—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill’s development, since mandatory amounts are generally set by authorizing laws such as the farm bill. The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; FDA; rural development; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance programs; food safety inspection; conservation; and animal and plant health programs. The main mandatory spending items are the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), child nutrition, crop insurance, and the farm commodity and conservation programs paid by the Commodity Credit Corporation. For FY2019, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees reported Agriculture appropriations bills (H.R. 5961, S. 2976) in May 2018. Neither bill has gone to the floor. The Trump Administration requested $17 billion for discretionary-funded accounts within the jurisdiction of Agriculture appropriations, which would be a reduction of $6.2 billion from FY2018 (-27%). In general, both the House-reported and Senate-reported bills reject most of the Administration’s proposed reductions. The discretionary total of the House-reported bill is $23.23 billion, which would be $14 million less than enacted in FY2018 (-0.1%). The discretionary total of the Senate-reported bill is also $23.23 billion. However, the Senate bill’s total would be $229 million more than enacted in FY2018 (+1%) on a comparable basis that excludes the CFTC. The Senate-reported bill would provide about $250 million more than the House-passed bill on a comparable basis. The primary changes at the agency level that comprise the differences between the bills and from FY2018 include the following: Both the House and Senate bills would increase FDA appropriations (+$308 million in the House bill; +$159 million in the Senate bill), though neither continues extra funding for the opioid crisis that was in the FY2018 appropriation. Both bills increase appropriations for animal and plant health programs (+$16 million to +$19 million). The House bill would provide more base funding for rural water and waste disposal (+$81 million), but none of the extra money that was provided separately in FY2018. The Senate bill would not change the base funding for rural water but continues $400 million of the extra funding from last year. For rural broadband, both the House and Senate bills would continue extra funding from a FY2018 pilot ($550 million in the House bill; $425 million in the Senate bill). The House bill would increase appropriations for agricultural research (+$79 million), and the Senate bill would increase Agricultural Research Service programming (+98 million) but would not provide any money for construction (-$141 million). Both bills provide less for WIC (-$175 million in the House bill, and -$25 million in the Senate bill), though the Senate bill has a larger rescission from prior-year WIC funds than does the House bill. The House bill would reduce base funding for the international Food for Peace program (-$100 million) and does not renew extra funding provided last year (-$116 million), while the Senate bill would keep it constant overall. The appropriations also carries mandatory spending—largely determined in separate authorizing laws—that would total $122 billion. Thus, the overall total of the both bills is about $145 billion. Both bills contain policy provisions affecting disaster programs, rural definitions, industrial hemp, animal products, nutrition programs, dietary guidelines, CFTC, and tobacco products.

Jun 18, 2018

Railroad Retirement Board: Retirement, Survivor, Disability, Unemployment, and Sickness Benefits

Jun 18, 2018

Human Rights and Anti-Corruption Sanctions: The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act

Jun 15, 2018

FY2020 Foreign Operations Appropriations: Targeting Foreign Corruption and Human Rights Violations

Jun 14, 2018