CRS Reports

International Trade and Finance: Overview and Issues for the 116th Congress

The U.S. Constitution grants authority to Congress to lay and collect duties and regulate foreign commerce. Congress exercises this authority in numerous ways, including through oversight of trade policy and consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy issues cover areas such as U.S. trade negotiations, U.S. trade and economic relations with specific regions and countries, international institutions focused on trade, tariff and nontariff barriers, worker dislocation due to trade liberalization, enforcement of trade laws and trade agreement commitments, import and export policies, international investment, economic sanctions, and other trade-related functions of the federal government. Congress also has authority over U.S. financial commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and finance-related agencies of the U.S. government. Issues in the 116th Congress During his first two years in office, President Trump has focused on reevaluating many U.S. international trade and economic policies and relationships. The President’s focus on these issues could continue over the next two years. Broad policy debates during the 116th Congress may include the impact of trade and trade agreements on the U.S. economy, including U.S. jobs; the causes and consequences of the U.S. trade deficit; the implications of technological developments for U.S. trade policy; and the intersection of economics and national security. Among many others, the potentially more prominent issues in this area that the 116th Congress may consider are the use and impact of unilateral tariffs imposed by the Trump Administration under various U.S. trade laws, as well as potential legislation that alters the authority granted by Congress to the President to do so; legislation to implement the proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Trade Agreement (USMCA), which would revise and modernize the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the Administration’s launch of bilateral trade negotiations with the European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom, as well as key provisions in trade agreements, including on intellectual property rights, labor, the environment, and dispute settlement; U.S. engagement with the World Trade Organization (WTO), proposals for WTO reform, and the future direction of the multilateral trading system; U.S.-China trade relations, including investment issues, intellectual property rights protection, forced technology transfer, currency issues, and market access liberalization; the future of U.S.-Asia trade and economic relations, given President Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and China’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative; the Administration’s use of quotas to achieve some of its trade objectives, and whether these actions represent a shift in U.S. policy towards “managed trade”; monitoring the implementation of legislation passed by the 115th Congress, including changes to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CIFUS) and export controls, as well as the creation of a new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation; re-authorization of the Export-Import Bank, the U.S. export credit agency that helps finance U.S. exports; oversight of international trade and finance policies to support foreign policy goals, including sanctions on Iran, North Korea, Russia, and other countries; shifts in U.S. leadership of international economic policy coordination at the Group of 7 (G-7) and the Group of 20 (G-20) under the Trump Administration; legislation to fund the Administration’s commitment to increase U.S. contributions to the World Bank, as well as potential U.S.-led reforms to the institution; and major developments in financial markets, including the impact of other countries’ exchange rate polices on the U.S. economy, high levels of debt in emerging markets, potential economic crises, and the role of the U.S. dollar in the global economy.

Jan 28, 2019

The Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure

Jan 28, 2019

Medical Product Regulation: Drugs, Biologics, and Devices

Jan 28, 2019

Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards

Jan 28, 2019

Potential Implications of U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change

Jan 25, 2019

Veterans Health Administration: Gender-Specific Health Care Services for Women Veterans

Jan 25, 2019

Market-Based Greenhouse Gas Emission Reduction Legislation: 108th Through 115th Congresses

Congressional interest in market-based greenhouse gas (GHG) emission control legislation has fluctuated over the past 15 years. During that time, legislation has often involved market-based approaches, such as a cap-and-trade system or a carbon tax or fee program. Both approaches would place a price—directly or indirectly—on GHG emissions or their inputs (e.g., fossil fuels), both would increase the price of fossil fuels, and both would reduce GHG emissions to some degree. Both would allow emission sources to choose the best way to meet their emission requirements or reduce costs, potentially by using market forces to minimize national costs of emission reductions. Preference between the two approaches ultimately depends on which variable policymakers prefer to precisely control—emission levels or emission prices. A primary policy concern with either approach is the economic impacts that may result from the program. Expected energy price increases could have both economy-wide impacts (e.g., on the U.S. gross domestic product) and disproportionate effects on specific industries and particular demographic groups. The degree of these potential effects would depend on a number of factors, including the magnitude, design, and scope of the program and the use of tax or fee revenues or emission allowance values. This report includes a separate table for each Congress, comparing GHG emission reduction legislation by the following characteristics: General framework: the proposed program structure and scope in terms of emissions covered, multiple GHG emissions, or just carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. Covered entities/materials: a list of the industries, sectors, or materials that would be subject to the program. Emissions limit or target: the GHG or CO2 emissions target or cap for a specified year. Distribution of allowance value or tax revenue: how emission allowance value or carbon tax or fee revenue would be distributed. Offset and international allowance treatment: the degree to which offsets and international allowances could be used for compliance purposes and the types of offset activities that would qualify. Mechanism to address carbon-intensive imports: a U.S. GHG reduction program may create a competitive disadvantage for some domestic businesses, particularly carbon-intensive, trade-exposed industries. Additional GHG reduction measures: other mechanisms designed to further reduce GHG emissions that are not covered in the central program. As the figure below illustrates, between the 108th and 111th Congresses, most of the introduced bills would have established cap-and-trade systems. Between the 112th and 115th Congresses, most of the introduced bills would have established carbon tax or emissions fee programs. Figure 1.Number and Type of Introduced GHG Emission Reduction Bills 108th Congress through 115th Congress / Source: Prepared by CRS. Notes: “Other Approaches” include (1) proposals that did not specify the overall framework but would have authorized EPA to establish a GHG emission reduction program, and (2) proposals that combine elements from a cap-and-trade system with price control features in a carbon tax or emissions fee system, sometimes described as hybrid approaches. The carbon tax/fee proposals from the 115th Congress ranged in their scope from CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion to multiple GHG emissions from a broader array of sources. They also varied in their initial carbon price from $24/ton to $50/ton. In addition, the proposals differ by how, to whom, and for what purpose the new tax or fee revenues would be applied. Depending on the level of the tax or fee, some economic analyses indicate that policy choices to distribute the tax or fee revenue would yield greater economic impacts than the direct impacts of the tax or fee.

Jan 25, 2019

A Summary of Federal Education Laws Administered by the U.S. Department of Education

Jan 23, 2019

The Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and Iran

Jan 23, 2019

Homeland Security Research and Development: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress

/ Overview In the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) has primary responsibility for establishing, administering, and coordinating research and development (R&D) activities. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is responsible for R&D relating to nuclear and radiological threats. Several other DHS components, such as the Coast Guard, also fund R&D and R&D-related activities associated with their missions. The Common Appropriations Structure that DHS introduced in its FY2017 budget includes an account titled Research and Development in seven different DHS components. Issues for DHS R&D in the 116th Congress may include coordination, organization, and impact. Coordination of R&D The Under Secretary for S&T, who leads the S&T Directorate, has statutory responsibility for coordinating homeland security R&D both within DHS and across the federal government (6 U.S.C. §182). The Director of DNDO also has an interagency coordination role with respect to nuclear detection R&D (6 U.S.C. §592). Both internal and external coordination are long-standing congressional interests. Regarding internal coordination, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in a 2012 report that because so many components of the department are involved, it is difficult for DHS to oversee R&D department-wide. In January 2014, the joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76) directed DHS to implement and report on new policies for R&D prioritization. It also directed DHS to review and implement policies and guidance for defining and overseeing R&D department-wide. In July 2014, GAO reported that DHS had updated its guidance to include a definition of R&D and was conducting R&D portfolio reviews across the department, but that it had not yet developed policy guidance for DHS-wide R&D oversight, coordination, and tracking. In December 2015, the joint explanatory statement for the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) stated that DHS “lacks a mechanism for capturing and understanding research and development (R&D) activities conducted across DHS, as well as coordinating R&D to reflect departmental priorities.” A challenge for external coordination is that the majority of homeland security-related R&D is conducted by other agencies, most notably the Department of Defense and the Department of Health and Human Services. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directs the Under Secretary for S&T, “in consultation with other appropriate executive agencies,” to develop a government-wide national policy and strategic plan for homeland security R&D (6 U.S.C. §182), but no such plan has ever been issued. Instead, the S&T Directorate has developed R&D plans with selected individual agencies, and the National Science and Technology Council (a coordinating entity in the Executive Office of the President) has issued government-wide R&D strategies in selected topical areas, such as biosurveillance. Organization for R&D DHS has reorganized its R&D-related activities several times. In December 2017, it established a new Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMDO), consolidating DNDO, most functions of the Office of Health Affairs (OHA), and some other elements. DNDO and OHA were themselves both created, more than a decade ago, largely by reorganizing elements of the S&T Directorate. The Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-387) expressly authorized the establishment and activities of CWMDO. The 116th Congress may examine the implementation of that act. The organization of DHS laboratory facilities may also be a focus of attention in the 116th Congress. At its establishment, the S&T Directorate acquired laboratories from other departments, including the Plum Island Animal Disease Center (from the Department of Agriculture) and the National Urban Security Technology Laboratory, then known as the Environmental Measurements Laboratory (from the Department of Energy). It subsequently absorbed some laboratory facilities from other DHS components (such as the Transportation Security Laboratory from the Transportation Security Administration), but other DHS components retained their own laboratories (such as the U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center). During the 115th Congress, the Federal Bureau of Investigation agreed to assume some of the operational costs of the S&T Directorate’s National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center, and DHS proposed to transfer operational responsibility for the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility—a biocontainment laboratory currently being built by the S&T Directorate in Manhattan, Kansas—to the Department of Agriculture. Impact of R&D Results In testimony at a Senate hearing in 2018, the Administration’s nominee to be Under Secretary for S&T described the S&T Directorate’s mission as “to deliver results” and referred to “timely delivery and solid return on investment.” Members of Congress and other stakeholders have sometimes questioned the impact of DHS R&D programs and whether enough of their results are ultimately implemented in products actually used in the U.S. homeland security enterprise. Part of the debate has been about finding the right balance between near-term and long-term goals. In testimony at House hearing in 2017, a former Under Secretary for S&T stated that the directorate “has worked hard to focus on being highly relevant—shifting from the past focus on long-term basic research to near-term operational impact.” Yet testimony from an industry witness at the same House hearing stated that “there is a perception among some in the industry that S&T programs only infrequently significantly impact the operational or procurement activities of the DHS components.” The 116th Congress may continue to examine the effectiveness and impact of DHS R&D.

Jan 22, 2019

Introduction to U.S. Economy: Personal Saving

Jan 22, 2019

Latin America and the Caribbean: U.S. Policy Overview

Jan 22, 2019

Economics of Federal User Fees

The federal government collects various fees from businesses and households. Choosing to raise public funds via user fees, as opposed to other means such as taxes, has important administrative and economic consequences. Many fees stem from “business-like activities,” in which the government provides a service or benefit in return for payment. For example, many national parks charge entry fees, which then help fund maintenance projects. Such fees and charges that result from voluntary choices, such as entering a national park, are distinguished from taxes—which stem from the government’s sovereign power to compel payments. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines a user fee as a “fee assessed to users for goods or services provided by the federal government. User fees generally apply to federal programs or activities that provide special benefits to identifiable recipients above and beyond what is normally available to the public.” User fees and charges have several advantages as a means of financing public activities. They are voluntary, they connect the burden of financing activities to those who directly benefit from them, and can help decentralize decisionmaking by bypassing centralized allocation of resources. Some have expressed concerns that user fee arrangements may bypass regular congressional scrutiny and dilute Congress’s power of the purse. Collections of fees and charges may also be more sensitive to economic fluctuations, which could complicate financing of programs dependent on those revenue streams. Many user fees or charges are classified as offsetting collections, which are deposited into expenditure accounts. Offsetting collections can be used to offset agency spending and typically require no further congressional approval to use. Other fees and charges are classified as offsetting receipts, which are collected into revenue accounts and typically require congressional authorization to be spent. User fees and charges can be classified as discretionary or mandatory spending, depending on how they are legally authorized. The levels and administration of some fees are specified in detailed statutory text, while other fees are created under broader agency authorities. Certain agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), have increased their reliance on user fees in past decades. Some critics have raised concerns that increased reliance on user fees could shift incentives facing those agencies. Some legislative proposals, such as H.R. 850 introduced in the 115th Congress, would limit or eliminate most exceptions and require most fees and charges to be deposited in the U.S. Treasury General Fund. Congress could fund agencies and activities now funded in whole or in part via user fees directly through the annual appropriations process. Such proposals would mark a departure from past practice. Statutory text governing many fees has evolved over many years and involves substantive policy decisions, often related to the industry or programmatic concerns. A general change in funding from user fees and charges to annual appropriations would likely shift the division of responsibilities between authorizing committees and appropriations committees. Congress may also enhance its oversight of agencies reliant on user fees by requiring more timely and detailed financial reports as well as more precise and systematic explanations of linkages between those fees and associated programs. Congress could also ask for greater transparency in fiscal data. While the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the U.S. Treasury Bureau of the Fiscal Service provide extensive data on user fees and charges, it is difficult to conduct governmentwide analyses using publicly available sources. Congress could mandate more detailed and more easily accessed data on user fees and charges. Additional funding may be needed to develop the capacity to issue those data.

Jan 22, 2019

EPA Reconsiders Benefits of Mercury and Air Toxics Limits

Jan 18, 2019

Brexit Deal Rejected: What Now?

Draft Agreement Fails to Gain Support On January 15, 2019, the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) House of Commons rejected a draft agreement on the terms of the country’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) by a vote of 432-202. Prime Minister Theresa May is to return to Parliament by January 21, 2019, to present her “plan B” for how to move forward with exiting the EU (“Brexit”) on March 29, 2019. Brexit supporters, including the 118 members of Parliament (MPs) from May’s Conservative Party who voted against the government’s proposal, objected that the deal’s “backstop” provision, which would keep the UK in the EU customs union until the two sides agreed on their future trade relationship, would leave the UK bound indefinitely to EU rules. The backstop seeks to prevent a “hard” border with customs checks and physical infrastructure between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland to preserve the peace process and cross-border trade. Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), whose backing is critical to May’s government, objected that the backstop would treat Northern Ireland differently from the rest of the UK, as it would preserve deeper regulatory alignment between Northern Ireland and the EU. Skeptics of Brexit, including MPs in the opposition Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, and Scottish National Party, opposed the deal as not only relegating the UK to a “rule taker” without a say in EU decisionmaking but also failing to provide certainty about permanent membership in the EU customs union or single market. Possible Scenarios—No Easy Answers No-Deal Brexit. The default outcome in the absence of further actions would be a “no-deal Brexit,” a scenario in which the UK exits the EU on March 29 without a negotiated withdrawal agreement. Both UK and EU negotiators have consistently rejected a no-deal scenario, although both sides have been developing contingency plans for such an outcome. Assessments of the full impact of a no-deal scenario remain subject to many unknowns. Many observers maintain that a no-deal Brexit could cause considerable disruption and uncertainty, with negative effects on the economy, trade, security issues, Northern Ireland, aviation, and other issues. Others assert that such fears are exaggerated, and some ardent Brexit supporters argue that a no-deal Brexit would be preferable to a “soft Brexit,” which would retain certain ties and obligations to the EU. There are indications that a majority of MPs would seek to prevent a no-deal Brexit. Parliament could introduce legislation making it illegal to exit the EU without a deal, imposing specific withdrawal conditions, or limiting the government’s ability to implement a no-deal Brexit. This Deal or No Deal? The proposal’s unexpectedly large margin of defeat diminishes the notion that the prime minister could bring the draft agreement back to Parliament for a second vote in the hope that further adjustments and the looming prospect of a no-deal Brexit might prompt enough MPs to reconsider. What Does Parliament Want? Prime Minister May has signaled that the government will enter into cross-party talks to find a consensus way forward. Depending on the outcome, Parliament could effectively mandate a renegotiation of the terms of withdrawal or the draft political declaration on the future UK-EU relationship that accompanied the withdrawal agreement. The EU remains unwilling to reopen the withdrawal agreement but may be open to a shift on the part of the UK toward a closer post-Brexit relationship. Timeline Extension. Analysts suggest an increasing likelihood that the UK might request an extension of the two-year timeline for the negotiation and withdrawal process. An extension would require the approval of the 27 other EU member states. Reports indicate that the EU may be open to a limited extension, provided the UK can explain how it would use that time. Second Referendum. Some opponents of Brexit argue that an extension period should be used to organize a second referendum on UK membership in the EU. Prime Minister May has expressed opposition to a second referendum and asserted that her government intends to respect the verdict of the original June 2016 referendum and take the UK out of the EU. Withdraw Article 50. Other Brexit opponents have argued for the UK to formally retract its intention to withdraw from the EU. The UK could unilaterally halt the withdrawal process by doing so. The European Court of Justice has indicated such a maneuver would indicate a cancellation of Brexit and should not be used as a tactic to gain more time. General Election. A snap election in the UK, which could be triggered by two-thirds of MPs (434 out of 650) backing a motion for an early general election, could provide a new mandate for the winner to pursue Brexit plans and likely would necessitate a timeline extension. Prime Minister May survived a vote of no confidence tabled by Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn on January 16. If May had lost, a new general election would have been held only if no new government could be formed within 14 days. Issues for Congress Given that the UK and the EU are important U.S. partners on a range of global political and economic issues, many Members of Congress have a broad interest in Brexit. Brexit-related developments are likely to have implications for the global economy; U.S.-UK and U.S.-EU economic relations; and transatlantic cooperation on foreign policy and security issues, including sanctions, counterterrorism, and defense cooperation. In 2018, the Administration formally notified Congress of its intent to launch U.S.-UK trade negotiations after the UK leaves the EU, and Congress may consider how developments affect the prospects for an agreement. Members of Congress also may have an interest in how Brexit might affect the peace process in Northern Ireland. For additional background information, see CRS Report RL33105, The United Kingdom: Background, Brexit, and Relations with the United States, by Derek E. Mix, CRS Report RS21372, The European Union: Questions and Answers, by Kristin Archick, CRS Report R44817, U.S.-UK Free Trade Agreement: Prospects and Issues for Congress, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, and CRS Report RS21333, Northern Ireland: Current Issues and Ongoing Challenges in the Peace Process, by Kristin Archick.

Jan 17, 2019

The Child Tax Credit

Jan 17, 2019

The First Amendment: Categories of Speech

Jan 16, 2019

U.S. Immigration Laws for Aliens Arriving at the Border

Jan 16, 2019

Freight Issues in Surface Transportation Reauthorization

Economic growth and expanded global trade have led to substantial increases in goods movement over the past few decades. The growth in freight transportation demand, along with growing passenger demand, has caused congestion in many parts of the transportation system, making freight movements slower and less reliable. Because the condition and performance of freight infrastructure play a considerable role in the efficiency of the freight system, federal support of freight infrastructure investment is likely to be of significant congressional concern in the reauthorization of the surface transportation program. The program is currently authorized by the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), which is scheduled to expire on September 30, 2020. Until recently, the federal surface transportation program did not pay specific attention to freight movement. However, the two most recent surface transportation acts, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21; P.L. 112-141), approved in 2012, and the FAST Act, passed in 2015, encouraged federal and state planning for freight transportation from a multimodal perspective. The FAST Act also directed a portion of federal funds toward highway segments and other projects deemed most critical to freight movement. It did this by creating two new programs: a discretionary grant program administered by the Secretary of Transportation and a formula program for distributing federal funds to states. Trucks continue to move the bulk of freight in the United States. Freight tonnage is projected to increase by an average of 1.4% per year through 2045, according to the Department of Transportation (DOT), and trucks are projected to carry the largest share of the additional freight traffic. Much of the growth in truck traffic has occurred in urban areas, and this trend is expected to continue. Consequently, most truck congestion occurs in urban areas, and comparatively few highway miles are responsible for a disproportionately large share of congestion costs. Highway infrastructure decisions are mainly made by the states, but federal fuel tax revenue is an important source of funds for the projects states pursue. With fuel taxes no longer able to fully cover the cost of existing highway infrastructure programs, Congress has considered strategies to raise new revenue and to make more effective use of federal dollars to facilitate the movement of freight. The trucking industry has favored raising additional revenue by increasing fuel taxes and has generally opposed greater use of highway tolls out of concern that these may disproportionately affect truckers. DOT studies have shown that the structure of motor fuel taxes provides a subsidy to heavily loaded trucks at the expense of passenger vehicles. One significant question is whether additional funding for freight-related infrastructure should be distributed to the states by formula or on a discretionary basis. Federal projections indicate that a relatively small number of Interstate Highway segments and interchanges are likely to face large increases in truck traffic by 2045. However, individual states may have limited incentives to use their federal formula funds to alleviate increasing congestion in those locations, as many of the trucks affected may be passing through rather than serving local businesses. Discretionary grants may be more effective in providing large amounts of federal funding for very costly freight-related projects, particularly those requiring interstate cooperation, but could also lead to fewer projects receiving federal funds. Besides appropriating funds for freight infrastructure, Congress has created programs to support research and development of new transportation technologies. Autonomous and connected vehicle technologies have potential applications in the freight sector, but many federal regulations are written assuming that a single person is in full control of a vehicle at all times. Congress has considered, but not advanced, proposals to update such regulations. Industry is eager to explore the cost-saving potential of new technology, so it will likely remain an issue for Congress.

Jan 16, 2019

The SEC’s Best Interest Proposal for Advice Given by Broker-Dealers

Jan 16, 2019

Federal Grants to State and Local Governments: Issues Raised by the Partial Government Shutdown

At the end of the day on December 21, 2018, the continuing appropriations measure, Making Further Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-298), which encompasses 7 of the 12 regular annual appropriations acts, expired. The resulting lapse in appropriations resulted in the partial shutdown of unfunded agencies beginning on December 22, 2018. Federal agencies that received their FY2019 appropriations under the Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-244), and the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 115-245) are not directly affected by the shutdown. During the lapse in appropriations, the Office of Management and Budget has directed federal agencies to implement contingency plans designed to guide operations during the partial government shutdown. Federal agency operations include administration of over 1,700 congressionally authorized federal grant programs, some of which are administered by agencies currently experiencing a lapse in appropriations. On average, the federal government provides nearly $600 billion annually in outlays to state and local governments through federal grants. A lapse in federal funding for grants to state and local governments raises several potential issues. A federal government shutdown may cause disruption to, or may result in the cessation of, grant administration activities depending on the following factors: the timing and duration of the federal government shutdown; and the choices made by federal, state, and local officials in anticipation of, or during, a shutdown regarding grant program administration. Timing and Duration of the Lapse in Federal Funding Delays in Awarding New Grant Awards and Renewing Existing Awards The timing of a government shutdown may determine the impact on new and existing grant awards. When a shutdown occurs when grant awards have not yet been made, or are in the process of being renewed, uncertainty about final funding can cause delays in awarding the grant. During a shutdown, an agency may also furlough grant personnel and may lack authority to undertake even preliminary grant administration actions in the absence of funding. Preliminary actions may include establishing funding priorities, revising grant program regulations and guidelines, reviewing grant applications, and calculating formula allocations. The lack of personnel and the possible lack of federal agency authority to approve changes in existing grant awards may also prevent grantees from mitigating the impact of the shutdown. Delays in Payments for Existing Grant Awards Though there are variations across states and federal grant programs, the longer the federal government is shut down, generally the greater the impact on federal grant program payments. OMB guidance indicates that grant management activities at the federal agency level for those agencies experiencing a lapse in appropriations would not continue during a shutdown, except in very limited circumstances. These activities include payment processing, routine oversight, inspection, accounting, administration, and other grant management activities. State predictions on how long federally funded/state-administered programs can operate during a shutdown hinge, in part, on how much the state retained in advance payments, how many reimbursement payments they received prior to the shutdown, and whether the other sources of program funding can be used to fund projects during the federal funding gap. Grant recipients that have smaller operating budgets, such as those in rural communities, may face more hardship than larger grant recipients since they have limited resources to cover federal funding gaps that result in delayed payments. For example, some grantees front expenses for the first couple of months of the project and then request federal reimbursement to cover the next months’ expenses. Delays in federal payments may result in no funding availability to cover salaries and other project costs in the months ahead. Consequently, some grantees must stop all grant-funded project activities until federal payments are processed. This could take several weeks after the government reopens due to the likely backlog of reimbursement requests. Additionally, for grant recipients who have a calendar financial year, the delay in receiving reimbursements may also disrupt their year-end financial closeout. Grant Administration Choices at the Federal, State, and Local Levels In anticipation of, or during, a shutdown, federal, state, and local stakeholders make choices in administering grant programs. For some programs, these choices may include whether to cover gaps in federal grant funding using state or local funds with uncertainty of reimbursement after appropriations are provided; furlough grant administration personnel at all levels of government; and involve grant administration personnel in contingency planning. During a funding lapse, certain program activities at the state and local level funded under existing grant awards may continue, but may face limitations based upon state cash flow. Grantees may continue normal activities until advance funding is depleted and then must decide whether to use other funding sources until additional advance or reimbursement payments are received. This decision may be based on the cash flow challenges of the state and the policy priorities of state elected officials. While eventual reimbursement for expenditures made pursuant to existing grant agreements and grant awards is possible, state elected officials have the discretion to decide whether to cover the gap in federal funding or suspend program activities during the lapse in appropriations. At the federal level, delayed grant agreements or expired grant program budget authority may result in federal agencies having limited authority, and limited personnel due to furloughs set forth in contingency plans, to process payments to state and local grantees. In some cases, federal agencies may authorize grant recipients to expend contingency funds to maintain program operations. In other cases, federal agencies may be able to reimburse states under the pre-award activities provisions in federal grant regulations or statutes. In still other cases, it may be an issue for Congress to consider whether to enact specific provisions to reimburse states for covering expenses from before the grant agreement was officially in place if the delay in executing the grant agreement was attributed to a federal government shutdown.

Jan 15, 2019

BUILD Act: Frequently Asked Questions About the New U.S. International Development Finance Corporation

Members of Congress and Administrations have periodically considered reorganizing the federal government’s trade and development functions to advance various U.S. policy objectives. The Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 (BUILD Act), which was signed into law on October 5, 2018 (P.L. 115-254), represents a potentially major overhaul of U.S. development finance efforts. It establishes a new agency—the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC)—by consolidating and expanding existing U.S. government development finance functions, which are conducted primarily by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and some components of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). While the IDFC is expected to carry over OPIC’s authorities and many of its policies, there are some key distinctions. For example, in comparison to OPIC, the new IDFC, by statute, is to have the following: More “tools” to provide investment support (e.g., authority to make limited equity investments and provide technical assistance). More capacity (a $60 billion exposure cap compared to OPIC’s $29 billion exposure cap). A longer authorization period (seven years compared to OPIC’s year-to-year authorization through appropriations legislation in recent years). More specific oversight and risk management (including its own Inspector General [IG], compared to OPIC, which is under the USAID IG’s jurisdiction). A key policy rationale for the BUILD Act was to respond to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China’s growing economic influence in developing countries. In this regard, the IDFC aims to advance U.S. influence in developing countries by incentivizing private investment as an alternative to a state-directed investment model. The BUILD Act also aims to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. government development finance functions, as well as to achieve greater cost savings through consolidation. The BUILD Act requires the Administration to submit to Congress a reorganization plan within 120 days of enactment of the act, and the IDFC is not permitted to become operational any sooner than 90 days after the President has transmitted the reorganization plan. The 116th Congress will have responsibility for overseeing the Administration’s implementation of the BUILD Act. As the IDFC is operationalized, Members of Congress may examine whether the current statutory framework allows the IDFC to balance both its mandates to support U.S. businesses in competing for overseas investment opportunities and to support development, as well as whether it enables the IDFC to respond effectively to strategic concerns especially vis-à-vis China. Congress also may consider whether to press the Administration to pursue international rules on development finance comparable to those that govern export credit financing. More broadly, the IDFC’s establishment could renew legislative debate over the economic and policy benefits and costs of U.S. government activity to support private investment, and whether such activity is an effective way to promote broad U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Jan 15, 2019

Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA): Overview and Issues for Congress

Congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA; P.L. 92-583, 16 U.S.C. §§1451-1466) in 1972 and has amended the act 11 times, most recently in 2009. CZMA sets up a national framework for states and territories to consider and manage coastal resources. If a state or territory chooses to develop a coastal zone management program and the program is approved, the state or territory (1) becomes eligible for several federal grants and (2) can perform reviews of federal agency actions in coastal areas (known as federal consistency determination reviews). Each level of government plays a role in coastal management under CZMA. At the federal level, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) Office for Coastal Management (OCM) in the Department of Commerce implements CZMA’s national policies and provisions. OCM administers CZMA under several national programs; the National Coastal Zone Management Program (NCZMP) is the focus of this report. To participate in the NCZMP, states and territories (hereinafter referred to as states) must adhere to guidelines set out in CZMA and related regulations. States determine the details of their coastal management programs (CMPs), including the boundaries of their coastal zones, issues of most interest to the state, and policies to address these issues, among other factors. Local governments then implement the approved CMPs, often through land use regulations. The Secretary of Commerce must approve state CMPs. Once the Secretary approves a state’s CMP, the state is eligible to receive the NCZMP’s benefits and is referred to as a participant in the program (16 U.S.C. §1455). Participation in the NCZMP provides several advantages to participants, including eligibility for federal grant programs and the right to review federal actions for consistency with state coastal policies. Thirty-five states and territories (including states surrounding the Great Lakes, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands) are eligible to participate. Although all 35 eligible states have at some point chosen to participate, 34 are currently part of the NCZMP. Since 1972, NOAA has allocated over $2 billion in coastal zone management-related grants to eligible coastal states. States have received amounts ranging from $13 million to over $106 million in grant funding, depending on factors such as how long the state has been a part of the NCZMP, the state’s size and population, and extent of the state’s applications to grant programs. CZMA consistency provisions (Section 307) require federal actions that have reasonably foreseeable effects on coastal uses or resources to be consistent with the enforceable policies of a participant’s approved CMP. These actions may occur in the state’s approved coastal zone or in federal or out-of-state waters (which may cause interstate coastal effects). Federal agencies or applicants proposing to perform these federal actions must submit a consistency determination to the potentially affected participant, certifying that the actions are consistent with state coastal policies and providing participants the opportunity to review their determinations (16 U.S.C. §1456). The 116th Congress may consider changes to CZMA. These changes may address issues such as growing population and infrastructure needs and changing environmental conditions along the coast, questions about the effectiveness of CZMA implementation, and expired authorization of appropriations for CZMA grant programs. Some of these concerns were addressed in proposed legislation in the 115th Congress, such as legislation to expand grant programs to cover more topics and affected groups, and may be addressed in the 116th Congress.

Jan 15, 2019

The Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) List

Jan 15, 2019

Asylum and Related Protections for Aliens Who Fear Gang and Domestic Violence

Jan 15, 2019

Saudi Arabia

Jan 15, 2019

Animal and Plant Health Import Permits in U.S. Agricultural Trade

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is the U.S. government authority tasked with regulating the import, transit, and release of regulated animals, animal products, veterinary biologics, plants, plant products, pests, organisms, soil, and genetically engineered organisms. APHIS provides scientific authorities in trade partner countries and U.S. importers with animal and plant health import regulations. APHIS requires U.S. importers to obtain animal or plant health import permits, which verify that the items being imported meet U.S. import standards. Animal and plant health import permits certify that imports follow U.S. regulations, World Trade Organization (WTO) guidelines, and/or trading partner specific requirements. These import permits are a part of broader agreements between the United States and its trading partners within the WTO on established sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. These measures aim to protect against diseases, pests, toxins, and other contaminants. The House and Senate Agricultural Appropriations Committees appropriate funds that allow APHIS to carry out a range of activities, including those involved in issuing import permits. From FY2014 to FY2018, discretionary appropriations for APHIS have averaged nearly $900 million. About 85% of the APHIS budget is allocated to the “Safeguarding and Emergency Preparedness/Response” mission area, which includes the administration of health import permits and other efforts to prevent imports of pests and diseases into the United States. APHIS’s authority over agricultural imports is largely provided by the Animal Health Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§8301 et seq.), the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§7701 et seq.), and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (7 U.S.C. §§8401). These laws authorize APHIS to administer animal and plant health import permits and conduct agricultural import inspections. APHIS works with other federal agencies, such as the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection (CBP), to conduct animal and plant health monitoring programs and to determine if new pest or disease management programs are needed. In addition, Congress directs the Food and Drug Administration, the Food Safety and Inspection Service, and state-level Departments of Agriculture to participate in inspecting many products regulated by APHIS. APHIS and CBP personnel inspect shipments of imported agricultural products and certify that the required import health permits and SPS certificates accompany each shipment. One of the major flagship programs that APHIS and CBP administer together is the Agricultural Quarantine Inspection (AQI) program, in which APHIS and CBP technical staff work to ensure that the required animal or plant health permits, sanitary certificates (for animal products), and phytosanitary certificates (for plant products) accompany each shipment. APHIS transfers funds to CBP to conduct AQI activities. The ongoing congressional commitment to preventing plant and animal disease and pests from entering the United States through agricultural imports is evident in annual appropriations Congress provides for APHIS. Congress has directed APHIS to monitor pests and diseases and has assigned APHIS to oversee SPS activities in some free trade agreements. Moreover, legislation introduced in the 115th Congress sought to address invasive species (e.g., Areawide Integrated Pest Management, H.R. 5411) and would have directed CBP to enforce APHIS regulations to deter smuggling of plants and animals into the United States.

Jan 11, 2019

Military Construction Funding in the Event of a National Emergency

The President’s reported consideration of whether to invoke various statutory authorities (including some triggered by a declaration of a national emergency) to direct the Department of Defense (DOD) to construct “a physical barrier” along the U.S.-Mexico border has raised questions about potentially available appropriated funds. This Insight identifies previous military construction projects funded through emergency authorities and unobligated military construction funding balances. Title 10 U.S.C. Section 2808 is entitled Construction authority in the event of a declaration of war or national emergency and depends upon a “declaration of war or the declaration by the President of a national emergency in accordance with the National Emergencies Act [NEA] (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) that requires use of the armed forces.” A declaration by the President under the NEA must detail the statute under which action will proceed. For discussion of the authorities the President may utilize after declaring a national emergency in accordance with the NEA, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB10242, Can the Department of Defense Build the Border Wall?, by Jennifer K. Elsea, Edward C. Liu, and Jay B. Sykes. Previous Instances Presidents have invoked the NEA twice citing the emergency military construction authority set forth in 10 U.S.C. 2808. During Operation Desert Shield, President George H.W. Bush issued EO 12734 of November 14, 1990. In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13235 of November 16, 2001. In the latter, the president was required and able to renew the authority. Previous Military Construction Projects According to DOD information, from 2001 through 2014, the department funded a total of 18 projects under 10 U.S.C. 2808, after the President invoked the NEA, with a combined value of $1.4 billion. With the exception of one project dating from December 2001 related to security measures for weapons of mass destruction at sites in the continental United States, most of the projects took place at overseas locations (see Table 1). Table 1. Department of Defense Use of Authority Per 10 U.S.C. 2808 (2001-2014) Date Component Location Amount (in millions of dollars) Description of Project 11/21/2001 Air Force To support Operation Enduring Freedom 26.7 Expand aircraft parking ramps and build hangars at two forward operating locations 12/4/2001 Army Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon 35.0 Security measures for weapons of mass destruction 11/17/2006 Army Guantanamo 102.0 Secure courthouse and support facilities 9/18/2008 Army Bagram, Afghanistan 38.8 Barracks, power line, and road 5/9/2009 Air Force Afghanistan 41.3 Airfield runway and apron pavement improvements 5/29/2009 Army Afghanistan, Iraq 136.2 Waste management complex, fuel storage, security improvements, ammo storage, medical facility, and logistics support area 6/2/2010 Air Force Afghanistan 59.0 Airfield pavement improvements 8/25/2010 Air Force Qatar, UAE, Kuwait, Afghanistan 129.1 Fuel facilities, passenger and freight terminal, cargo holding area, billeting, network control center, satellite communications facility, maintenance center, electrical substation, special operations forces (SOF) aviation complex, and ramp 8/16/2011 Army Afghanistan 74.0 Detention facility expansion, airfield pavement improvements, and tanker truck facility 1/13/2012 Air Force Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti 6.3 Aircraft parking, taxiway, and aircraft shelter 1/30/2012 Air Force Qatar, Afghanistan, Oman, Kyrgyzstan 141.2 SOF apron, taxiway, communications facility, ammo storage area, and airlift apron 3/5/2012 Army Parwan, Afghanistan 53.3 Detention housing and dining facility 6/1/2012 Army Afghanistan 28.0 Logistics hub, security improvements, and waste water treatment plant 6/15/2012 Air Force Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti 187.0 Combat Aircraft Loading Area (CALA) and billeting 6/30/2012 Army Afghanistan 86.0 Waste management complex and utility projects 8/20/2012 Air Force Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti 24.0 Parallel taxiway extension 8/20/2012 Navy Naval Support Act Bahrain 45.2 Waterfront development 6/14/2013 Navy Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti 228.0 Task Force Compound TOTAL 1,441.1 Source: DOD. Funding Section 2808 does not appear to cite a cost limitation per a project. However, it specifies as a source of funding certain available military construction funds. Subsection (a) states, “Such projects may be undertaken only within the total amount of funds that have been appropriated for military construction, including funds appropriated for family housing, that have not been obligated.” According to DOD information, the department reported unobligated balances in the military construction and family housing accounts totaling $13.3 billion at the end of FY2018 (see Table 2). Table 2. Status of Unobligated Balances for Military Construction (MILCON) and Family Housing Titles (in thousands of dollars, as of September 30, 2018) Account Period of Availability Appropriated Amount Unobligated Balance % Unobligated MILCON 2014/2018 7,969,801 244,377 3% MILCON 2015/2018 119,946 3,887 3% MILCON 2015/2019 4,947,617 654,158 13% MILCON 2016/2020 6,791,551 1,774,080 26% MILCON 2017/2021 6,797,713 2,821,042 41% MILCON 2018/2022 9,896,613 6,755,989 68% Base Realignment and Closure 2,836,102 204,806 7% NATO Security Investment Program 7,874,381 196,231 2% Family Housing 2014/2018 229,247 57,598 25% Family Housing 2015/2019 82,698 11,328 14% Family Housing 2016/2020 345,528 176,791 51% Family Housing 2017/2021 319,535 167,082 52% Family Housing 2018/2022 355,906 323,455 91% Family Housing 2018/2018 1,127,108 52,147 5% Family Housing Improvement Fund 4,301,107 18,812 0% Unaccompanied Housing Improvement Fund 80,332 632 1% Homeowners Assistance Program 2,923,870 40,083 1% MILCON Subtotal 47,233,724 12,458,339 26% Family Housing Subtotal 9,765,331 847,928 9% Grand Total 56,999,055 13,306,267 23% Source: The Report of the Department of Defense on Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 2018 Bid Savings and Unobligated Balances for Military Construction and Family Housing Accounts (Execution as of September 30, 2018). The figures cited above do not account for unobligated balances resulting from FY2019 appropriations. The 2019 Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act (H.R. 5895; P.L. 115-244) appropriated a total of $11.3 billion in military construction budget authority, including $10.3 billion in Title I—Department of Defense (DOD) for the department’s base, or regular, budget, and $921 million in Title IV—Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). These figures can be found in the funding tables in H.Rept. 115-929, the conference report accompanying the bill. These amounts reflect budget authority—not obligations (or unobligated amounts). Because military construction appropriations are generally available for obligation for up to five years, the department likely has a different amount of unobligated military construction funding than the total appropriated amount for any given fiscal year. In general, as part of the President’s annual budget submission to Congress, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer publishes a spreadsheet, entitled “Military Construction, Family Housing, and Base Realignment and Closure Program (C-1),” which details funding amounts, facility title, and installation or location for individual military construction projects. Congressional Notification and Reprogramming The use of Title 10 Section 2808 requires congressional notification. Subsection (b) states, “When a decision is made to undertake military construction projects authorized by this section, the Secretary of Defense shall notify ... the appropriate committees of Congress of the decision and of the estimated cost of the construction projects, including the cost of any real estate action pertaining to those construction projects.” Nevertheless, according to DOD regulations the use of Section 2808 does not require a request to Congress for reprogramming (i.e., a change in the application of funds). The DOD Financial Management Regulation (FMR; DOD 7000.14-R), Paragraph 170303, Subsection (A), “Construction in the Event of a Declaration of War or National Emergency,” highlights additional guidance in DOD Directives (DODD) 3025.18 and 4270.5, the latter of which states reprogramming is not required for construction projects under 10 U.S.C. 2808. Kevin Borden, Nicole Carter, Michelle Christensen, Jennifer Elsea, Michael Garcia, Bruce Lindsay, Edward Liu, and Liana Rosen contributed to this Insight.

Jan 11, 2019

Introduction to Bank Regulation: Leverage and Capital Ratio Requirements

Jan 11, 2019

Iraq

Jan 10, 2019

Federal Grand Jury Secrecy: Legal Principles and Implications for Congressional Oversight

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.” This provision requires that a federal prosecutor, in order to charge a suspect with a serious federal crime, secure the assent of an independent investigative and deliberative body comprising citizens drawn from the jurisdiction in which the crime would be tried. Federal grand juries serve two primary functions: (1) they aid federal prosecutors in investigating possible crimes by issuing subpoenas for documents, physical evidence, and witness testimony; and (2) they determine whether there is sufficient evidence to charge a criminal suspect with the crime or crimes under investigation. Traditionally, the grand jury has conducted its work in secret. Secrecy prevents those under scrutiny from fleeing or importuning the grand jurors, encourages full disclosure by witnesses, and protects the innocent from unwarranted prosecution, among other things. The long-established rule of grand jury secrecy is enshrined in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which provides that government attorneys and the jurors themselves, among others, “must not disclose a matter occurring before the grand jury.” Accordingly, as a general matter, persons and entities external to the grand jury process are precluded from obtaining transcripts of grand jury testimony or other documents or information that would reveal what took place in the proceedings, even if the grand jury has concluded its work and even if the information is sought pursuant to otherwise-valid legal processes. At times, the rule of grand jury secrecy has come into tension with Congress’s power of inquiry when an arm of the legislative branch has sought protected materials pursuant to its oversight function. For instance, some courts have determined that the information barrier established in Rule 6(e) extends to congressional inquiries, observing that the Rule contains no reservations for congressional access to grand jury materials that would otherwise remain secret. Nevertheless, the rule of grand jury secrecy is subject to a number of exceptions, both codified and judicially crafted, that permit grand jury information to be disclosed in certain circumstances (usually only with prior judicial authorization). Perhaps the most significant of these for congressional purposes are (1) the exception that allows a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters “preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding,” and (2) the exception, recognized by a few courts, that allows a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters in special or exceptional circumstances. In turn, some courts have determined that one or both of these exceptions applies to congressional requests for grand jury materials in the context of impeachment proceedings, though there is authority to the contrary. Additionally, because Rule 6(e) covers only “matters occurring before the grand jury,” courts have recognized that documents and information are not independently insulated from disclosure merely because they happen to have been presented to, or considered by, a grand jury. As such, even if Rule 6(e) generally limits congressional access to grand jury information, Congress has a number of tools at its disposal to seek materials connected to a grand jury investigation. Prior Congresses have considered legislation that would have expressly permitted a court to authorize disclosure of grand jury matters to congressional committees on a showing of substantial need. However, in response to such proposals, the executive branch has voiced concerns that the legislation would raise due-process and separation-of-powers issues and potentially undermine the proper functioning of federal grand juries. These concerns may have resulted in Congress declining to alter Rule 6(e). As a result, to the extent Rule 6(e) constrains Congress’s ability to conduct oversight, legislation seeking to amend the rules governing grand jury secrecy in a way that would give Congress independent access to grand jury materials may raise additional legal and pragmatic issues for the legislative branch to consider.

Jan 10, 2019

China’s Status as a Nonmarket Economy (NME)

Jan 10, 2019

The 2019-2020 Iran Crisis and U.S. Military Deployments

Jan 9, 2019

The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions (ESRP)

The employer shared responsibility provisions (ESRP), which often are referred to as the employer mandate, generally incentivize large employers to offer adequate and affordable health insurance coverage to their full-time employees and full-time employees’ dependents. If an applicable large employer fails to offer health insurance or offers substandard coverage to its employees, the employer may be subject to a penalty (i.e., assessment payment). All common-law employers, including government entities (such as federal, state, local, or Indian tribal government entities), are responsible for annually determining whether they are considered an applicable large employer (ALE), which is generally an employer that has at least 50 full-time employees (including full-time equivalent employees, which are a representation of non-full-time employees as full-time employees). If an employer qualifies as an ALE in a given year, then it will be subject to the ESRP in the subsequent year, meaning it will have to offer adequate, affordable health insurance coverage to generally all of its full-time employees (and their dependents) or it will risk being subject to one of two penalties. Regardless of penalty type, a penalty will be triggered only if at least one full-time employee receives financial assistance through an exchange. These types of financial assistance generally are not available to employees who were offered affordable and adequate coverage by their employer. If an employer does not qualify as an ALE, then it will not be subject to the ESRP and will not face a penalty for failing to offer health insurance coverage to its full-time employees. Which potential ESRP penalty an ALE may be subject to is contingent upon whether an ALE offered appropriate health insurance to enough of its full-time employees (and their dependents). If an ALE offered appropriate health insurance to 95% or more of its full-time employees (and their dependents) and at least one employee received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy through a health insurance exchange, then the employer may be subject a penalty that is the lesser of (1) an amount based on the number of people who received financial assistance through an exchange or (2) an amount based on the number of the firm’s full-time employees. If an ALE did not offer appropriate health insurance coverage to its full-time employees (or offered appropriate coverage to less than 95% of its full-time employees and their dependents) and at least one employee received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy through a health insurance exchange, then the employer may be subject to a penalty based on the number of the firm’s full-time employees.

Jan 9, 2019

Introduction to U.S. Economy: GDP and Economic Growth

Jan 8, 2019

U.S. Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Other Illicit Financial Threats

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to Financial Services: The Federal Reserve

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to U.S. Economy: The Business Cycle and Growth

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to Financial Services: Systemic Risk

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to Financial Services: Capital Markets

Jan 8, 2019

2019 Tax Filing Season (2018 Tax Year): The Mortgage Interest Deduction

Jan 8, 2019

Human Trafficking and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Introduction

Jan 7, 2019

U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America: An Overview

Jan 3, 2019

Funding U.S.-Mexico Border Barrier Construction: Current Issues

Jan 3, 2019

Targeting Illicit Finance: The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s “Financial Institution Advisory Program”

Jan 2, 2019

The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (P.L.115-271): Medicare Provisions

On October 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention That Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act; P.L. 115-271). The conference report on the bill was approved by the House 393-8 on September 28, 2018, and it cleared the Senate 98-1 on October 3, 2018. The law was enacted in response to growing concerns among the U.S. public and lawmakers about increasing numbers of drug overdose deaths. Opioid overdose deaths, in particular, have increased significantly since 2002. In 2015, an estimated 33,091 Americans died of opioid-related overdoses, almost three times as many as in 2002, around the beginning of the opioid epidemic in the United States. In 2016, that number had increased to 42,249. In October 2017, President Trump declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency. The SUPPORT Act is a sweeping measure designed to address widespread overprescribing and abuse of opioids in the United States. The act includes provisions to bolster law enforcement, public health, and health care financing and coverage, including under Medicare and Medicaid. It imposes tighter oversight of opioid production and distribution; requires additional reporting and safeguards to address fraud; alters programs related to the provision of support to children in the child welfare system because of their parent’s or caregiver’s opioid use; and limits coverage of prescription opioids. It also expands coverage of and access to opioid addiction treatment services. In addition, the act authorizes programs to expand consumer education on opioid use and train additional providers to treat individuals with opioid use disorders (OUDs). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecast that the SUPPORT Act would increase the on-budget deficit by $1,001 million over 5 years (FY2019-2023) but reduce the on-budget deficit by $52 million over 10 years (FY2019-FY2028). The SUPPORT Act is one of several recent laws aimed at addressing the opioid epidemic. The 114th Congress enacted the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198). CARA addressed substance use issues broadly, targeting the opioid crisis predominantly through public health and law enforcement strategies. The 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255), also enacted in 2016, authorized new funding for medical research, amended the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval process, and authorized additional funding to combat opioid addiction, among other provisions. The SUPPORT Act consists of eight titles. The Congressional Research Service is publishing a series of reports on this law, organized by title. This report provides a section-by-section description of Medicare provisions in Titles II and VI, as well as one Medicare budget offset in Title IV. Among significant Medicare changes, the law creates a Medicare bundled payment for an incident of medication-assisted treatment (MAT), which combines medications with counseling and behavioral therapies to provide a holistic approach to treating OUD and makes federally registered opioid treatment programs (OTPs) approved Medicare providers. It also requires private insurers that offer Medicare Part D prescription drug plans to implement “lock-in” programs, starting in CY2022, that limit the number of pharmacies and prescribers used by enrollees identified as at risk of opioid abuse. This report is intended to reflect the SUPPORT Act at enactment (i.e., October 24, 2018); it does not track the act’s implementation or funding. This report will not be updated.

Jan 2, 2019

U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview

Jan 2, 2019

Executive Branch Ethics and Financial Conflicts of Interest: Disclosure

Jan 2, 2019

Selected Issues for National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) Reauthorization and Reform

Jan 2, 2019

Broadband Deployment: Status and Federal Programs

Jan 2, 2019