CRS Reports

Terrorist Groups in Afghanistan

Feb 12, 2019

Border Security Between Ports of Entry: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress

/ The United States’ southern border with Mexico runs for approximately 2,000 miles over diverse terrain, varied population densities, and discontinuous sections of public, private, and tribal land ownership. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is primarily responsible for border security, including the construction and maintenance of tactical infrastructure, installation and monitoring of surveillance technology, and the deployment of border patrol agents to prevent unlawful entries of people and contraband into the United States (including unauthorized migrants, terrorists, firearms, narcotics, etc.). CBP’s border management and control responsibilities also include facilitating legitimate travel and commerce. Existing statute pertaining to border security confers broad authority to DHS to construct barriers along the U.S. border to deter unlawful crossings, and more specifically directs DHS to deploy fencing along “at least 700 miles” of the southern border with Mexico. The primary statute is the Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility ACT (IIRIRA) as amended by the REAL ID Act of 2005, the Secure Fence Act of 2006, and the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008. On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13767 “Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements,” which addresses, in part, the physical security of the southern border and instructed the DHS Secretary to “take all appropriate steps to immediately plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border, using appropriate materials and technology to most effectively achieve complete operational control.” The order did not identify the expected mileage of barriers to be constructed. The three main dimensions of border security are tactical infrastructure, surveillance technology, and personnel. Tactical Infrastructure. Physical barriers between ports of entry (POE) on the southern border vary in age, purpose, form, and location. GAO reports that at the end of FY2015, about one-third of the southern border, or 654 miles, had a primary layer of fencing: approximately 350 miles designed to keep out pedestrians, and 300 miles to prevent vehicles from entering. Approximately 90% of the 654 miles of primary fencing is located in the five contiguous Border Patrol sectors located in California, Arizona, and New Mexico, while the remaining 10% is in the four eastern sectors (largely in Texas) where the Rio Grande River delineates most of the border. About 82% of primary pedestrian fencing and 75% of primary vehicle fencing are considered “modern” and were constructed between 2006 and 2011. Across 37 discontinuous miles, the primary layer is backed by a secondary layer (pedestrian) as well as an additional 14 miles of tertiary fencing (typically to delineate property lines). No new miles of primary fencing have been constructed since the 654 miles were completed in 2015, but sections of legacy fencing and breached areas have been replaced. Additional tactical infrastructure includes roads, gates, bridges, and lighting designed to support border enforcement, and to disrupt and impede illicit activity. Surveillance Technology. To assist in the detection, identification, and apprehension of individuals illegally entering the United States between POEs, CBP also maintains border surveillance technology. Ground technology includes sensors, cameras, and radar tailored to fit specific terrain and population densities. Aerial and marine surveillance vessels, manned and unmanned, patrol inaccessible regions. Personnel. Approximately 19,500 Border Patrol agents were stationed nationwide, with most (16,600) at the southern border in FY2017. Subject to available appropriations, Executive Order 13767 calls on CBP to take appropriate action to hire an additional 5,000 Border Patrol agents. However, CBP continues to face challenges attaining statutorily established minimum staffing levels for its Border Patrol positions despite increased recruitment and retention efforts. Southern border security may be improved by changes to tactical infrastructure, surveillance technology, and personnel. A challenge facing policymakers is in determining the optimal mix of border security strategies given the difficulty of measuring the effectiveness of current efforts. While the number of apprehensions of illegal entrants has long been used to measure U.S. Border Patrol performance, it does not measure illegal border crossers who evade detection by the Border Patrol. When apprehensions decline, whether it is due to fewer illegal entrants getting caught or fewer attempting to enter illegally is not known. Other difficulties include measuring the contribution of any single border security component in isolation from the others, assessing the extent to which enforcement actions deter illegal crossing attempts, and evaluating ongoing enforcement efforts outside of border-specific actions and their impact on border security. Section 1092 of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to provide annual metrics on border security that are intended to help address some of the challenges of measuring the impact of border security efforts. DHS has produced baseline estimates that go beyond apprehensions statistics to measure progress towards meeting the goals contained in Executive Order 13767. Congress, through CBP appropriations—and appropriations to its predecessor agency, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)—has invested in tactical infrastructure, surveillance technology, and personnel since the 1980s. Given the changing level of detail and structure of appropriations for border infrastructure over time, it is not possible to develop a consistent history of congressional appropriations specifically for border infrastructure. However, CBP has provided the Congressional Research Service (CRS) with some historical information on how it has allocated funding for border barrier planning, construction, and operations and support. Between FY2007 and FY2018, CBP allocated just over $5.0 billion to these activities, including almost $1.4 billion specifically for border barrier construction and improvement through a new “Wall Program” activity in its FY2018 budget. The 116th Congress is considering a mix of tactical infrastructure, including fencing, surveillance technologies, and personnel to enhance border security between U.S. POEs. Some experts have warned that the northern border may need more resources and oversight than it is currently receiving in light of potential national security risks. Other border security priorities that may be considered during the 116th Congress include improvements to existing facilities and screening and detection capacity at U.S. POEs.

Feb 11, 2019

Venezuela Oil Sector Sanctions: Market and Trade Impacts

On January 28, 2019, the Trump Administration imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), adding to existing Venezuela sanctions. The Department of the Treasury determined that persons (e.g., individuals and companies) operating in Venezuela’s oil sector are subject to sanctions in order to apply economic pressure on the government of Nicolas Maduro and facilitate a transition to democracy. Subsequently, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added PdVSA—including all entities in which PdVSA has a 50% or more ownership position—to its Specifically Designated Nationals (SDN) list. This designation blocks PdVSA’s U.S. assets and prohibits the company from dealing with U.S. persons. These sanctions will affect several areas in which U.S. companies have business interests (e.g., debt/financial transactions and oil field services) and will effectively terminate U.S.-Venezuela petroleum (crude oil and petroleum products) trade. Potential economic impacts of these sanctions on Venezuela could be significant, but are beyond the scope of this product. U.S.-Venezuela Petroleum Trade Petroleum trade between the United States and Venezuela has been characterized by imports of heavy Venezuelan crude oil to U.S. refineries (see Figure 1), mostly to the Gulf Coast. In 2017, U.S. refineries imported 618,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Venezuelan crude oil—approximately 8% of total crude imports during the year. U.S. importers also purchased 55,000 bpd of Venezuelan petroleum products. U.S. exports to PdVSA consisted of 64,000 bpd of petroleum products directly to Venezuela and 11,000 bpd of crude oil to Curacao, where PdVSA has operated a refinery and petroleum storage facility. U.S. light oil and petroleum products are typically used as a diluent for blending with Venezuelan heavy crude oil as a means of reducing viscosity and facilitating transportation and marketing. Figure 1. U.S. and Venezuela Petroleum Trade, 2017 / Source: CRS, data from the Energy Information Administration and, where noted, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Notes: EIA export data indicate that U.S. suppliers have not exported crude oil to Curacao since April 2018. The Curacao refinery was temporarily idled in mid-2018 due to a legal dispute between PdVSA and ConocoPhillips. Petroleum Market and Trade Impacts Prohibiting petroleum trade and related financial transactions between the United States and PdVSA will create a constraint within the global oil logistics system that will result in adjustments to global trade flows. The oil sector sanctions do not explicitly prevent non-U.S. entities from purchasing crude oil from or supplying petroleum products to Venezuela. However, OFAC-issued Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs, #657) indicate that petroleum purchases by non-U.S. entities involving “any other U.S. nexus (e.g., transactions involving the U.S. financial system or U.S. commodity brokers)” are prohibited following a 90-day wind-down period. PdVSA will need to secure alternative buyers for crude oil and petroleum product volumes that might otherwise be delivered to U.S. refiners as well as alternative suppliers for diluents previously sourced from the United States. U.S. refiners, on the other hand, will be required to identify alternative crude oil suppliers and U.S. petroleum exporters will have to locate other buyers for petroleum products that might have been destined for Venezuela. Adjusting to these sanctions-related supply constraints may take some time as alternative buyers and suppliers are located. Price levels for the affected petroleum commodities will also likely change as a means to facilitate alternative trade routes (e.g., U.S. refiners may have to incur price premiums to attract substitute crudes and PdVSA may have to accept price discounts in order to attract alternative buyers). Trade flow adjustments could potentially influence the magnitude of price impacts. U.S. Petroleum Exports to Venezuela Petroleum exports (e.g., diluents) from the United States to Venezuela are prohibited as of January 28, 2019. As a result, PdVSA will have to replace volumes purchased from U.S. suppliers. While there are alternative global suppliers, acquiring replacement diluents may result in delayed deliveries due to potentially longer trade routes. Since diluents are necessary to transport and market Venezuela’s heavy crude oil, a temporary diluent shortage could potentially reduce PdVSA’s crude oil production and export volumes until replacement diluents are acquired. U.S. petroleum product suppliers will need to find alternative customers for volumes previously destined for Venezuela. Venezuela Petroleum Exports to the United States Crude oil and petroleum product exports from Venezuela to the United States are also prohibited, although OFAC issued general licenses (7 and 12) allowing two U.S.-based PdVSA subsidiaries, including CITGO, as well as U.S. companies to continue purchasing and importing crude oil and petroleum products from PdVSA until April 28, 2019. Any payment made for petroleum imports from PdVSA during the wind-down period must be deposited into a U.S.-based blocked account, which will likely result in those transactions being stopped immediately. PdVSA will likely seek alternative non-U.S. cash buyers. However, PdVSA petroleum sales to non-U.S. buyers could be complicated due to OFAC’s indication that any such transactions involving the U.S. financial system are prohibited. U.S. crude oil imports from Venezuela—the largest trade element between the two countries—have declined since 2017 and averaged 511,000 barrels per day in November 2018. U.S. refiners will need to secure alternative supply sources to replace crude oil imports from PdVSA. Table 1 shows the companies that purchased Venezuelan crude oil and the states where oil was delivered during November 2018. Table 1. Crude Oil Imports from Venezuela by Company and State, November 2018 Thousand Barrels California Louisiana Mississippi Texas Total Percentage Chevron 220 2,793 3,013 20% CITGO 2,705 1,507 4,212 28% Houston Refining 495 495 3% Marathon 660 660 4% Motiva 458 458 3% Paulsboro 1,392 1,392 9% Valero 329 1,577 3,196 5,102 33% Total 549 6,334 2,793 5,656 15,332 100% Percentage 4% 41% 18% 37% 100% Source: Energy Information Administration, Company Level Imports, with data for November 2018, available at https://www.eia.gov/petroleum/imports/companylevel/, accessed February 6, 2019. Notes: Citgo is majority-owned by PdVSA. Russian oil company Rosneft holds 49.9% of Citgo as loan collateral. Other refiners purchase Venezuelan crude throughout the year, most located in the Gulf Coast.

Feb 11, 2019

Transportation Security: Issues for the 116th Congress

The nation’s air, land, and marine transportation systems are designed for accessibility and efficiency, two characteristics that make them vulnerable to terrorist attack. While hardening the transportation sector is difficult, measures can be taken to deter terrorists. The enduring challenge facing Congress is how best to implement and finance a system of deterrence, protection, and response that effectively reduces the possibility and consequences of terrorist attacks without unduly interfering with travel, commerce, and civil liberties. Transportation security has been a major policy focus since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. In the aftermath of those attacks, the 107th Congress moved quickly to pass the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA; P.L. 107-71), creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and mandating that security screeners employed by the federal government inspect airline passengers, their baggage, and air cargo. Despite the extensive focus on aviation and transportation security over the past decade, a number of challenges remain, including developing and deploying effective biometric capabilities to verify the identities of transportation workers and travelers; developing effective risk-based approaches to vetting and screening transportation workers accessing secured areas of airports and other sensitive areas of transportation networks; developing cost-effective solutions to screen air cargo and freight without impeding the flow of commerce; and coordination among state, local, and federal homeland security and law enforcement personnel to effectively deter and respond to criminal and terrorist acts targeting public areas of transportation facilities. The FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-190) and the TSA Modernization Act (P.L. 115-254, Division K) included provisions intended to improve screening technologies, streamline the passenger screening process, mandate more rigorous background checks of airport workers, strengthen airport access controls, increase passenger checkpoint efficiency and operational performance, and enhance security in public areas of airports and at foreign airports where flights depart for the United States. Oversight of TSA actions to implement these mandates may be an area of particular interest in the 116th Congress. Particular topics may include the evolution of screening technologies and assessments of emerging screening technology solutions; the expansion of canine teams for transportation security; the expansion of the PreCheck program to expedite screening of known travelers; the use of biometrics and associated data security and privacy concerns; implementing effective approaches, regulations, and international agreements to conduct risk-based screening of air cargo shipments worldwide; protecting public areas of airports; and developing effective countermeasures to protect critical infrastructure, including airports and aircraft, from attacks using drones. Bombings of passenger trains in Europe and Asia in the past few years illustrate the vulnerability of passenger rail systems to terrorist attacks. Passenger rail systems—primarily subway systems—in the United States carry about five times as many passengers each day as do airlines, over many thousands of miles of track, serving stations that are designed primarily for easy access. Transit security issues of recent interest to Congress include the quality of TSA’s surface transportation inspector program. The bulk of U.S. overseas trade is carried by ships, and thus the economic consequences of a maritime terrorist attack could be significant. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Coast Guard have implemented security screening procedures that effectively “push the borders out”—that is, they begin screening vessels and cargo before they reach a U.S. port. Two aspects of maritime security that have drawn attention recently are cybersecurity and the use of drones for coastal surveillance.

Feb 11, 2019

U.S. National Health Security: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress

In its quadrennial National Health Security Strategy, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) states: U.S. National Health Security actions protect the nation’s physical and psychological health, limit economic losses, and preserve confidence in government and the national will to pursue its interests when threatened by incidents that result in serious health consequences whether natural, accidental, or deliberate. The strategy aims to ensure the resilience of the nation’s public health and health care systems against potential threats, including natural disasters and human-caused incidents, emerging and pandemic infectious diseases, acts of terrorism, and potentially catastrophic risks posed by nation-state actors. By law, the HHS Secretary “shall lead all Federal public health and medical response to public health emergencies and incidents covered by the [National Response Framework],” and the HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) shall “[s]erve as the principal advisor to the Secretary on all matters related to Federal public health and medical preparedness and response for public health emergencies.” However, under the nation’s federal system of government, state and local agencies and private entities are principally responsible for ensuring health security and responding to threats. The federal government’s ability to affect national health security, through funding assistance and other policies, is relatively limited. Figure 1. HHS Secretary’s Operations Center (SOC), Activated for the Wannacry Ransomware Attack, May 2017 / Source: Office of the HHS Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response, February 6, 2019. Notes: The health care sector was a significant target of the cyberattack. The image shows a staff briefing on cyber threat information sharing and other efforts to protect health care infrastructure. The nation’s public health emergency management laws have expanded considerably following the terrorist attacks in 2001. Since then, a number of public health emergencies revealed both improvements in the nation’s readiness, and persistent gaps. The National Health Security Preparedness Index (NHSPI, or the Index), a public-private partnership begun in 2013, currently assesses preparedness, using 140 measures, across all 50 states and the District of Columbia. In its latest comprehensive report, for 2017, NHSPI found overall incremental improvements over earlier years. However, the report highlighted differing preparedness levels among states, stating: Large differences in preparedness persisted across states, and those in the Deep South and Mountain West regions lagged significantly behind the rest of the nation. If current trends continue, the average state will require 9 more years to reach health security levels currently found in the best-prepared states. In addition, measures of health care delivery—for example, the number of certain types of health care providers (including mental health providers) per unit of population, access to trauma centers, the extent of preparedness planning in long-term care facilities, and uptake of electronic health record systems—continued to yield the lowest scores. The readiness of individual health care facilities and services to respond to a mass casualty incident or other public health emergency has been a persistent health security challenge. Aiming to address this, the HHS Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) has implemented a rule that requires 17 different types of health care facilities and service providers to meet a suite of preparedness benchmarks in order to participate in (i.e., receive payments from) the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The Emergency Preparedness (EP) Rule became effective in November, 2017. Policymakers may be interested to see, in NHSPI results and through other studies, the extent to which the EP Rule yields meaningful improvements in national health system preparedness in the future. For incidents declared by the President as major disasters or emergencies under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended), public assistance is available to help federal, state, and local agencies with the costs of some public health emergency response activities, such as ensuring food and water safety. However, no federal assistance program is designed specifically to cover the uninsured costs of individual health care services that may be needed as a consequence of a disaster. There is no consensus that this should be a federal responsibility. Nonetheless, during mass casualty incidents, hospitals and health care providers may face expectations to deliver care without a clear payment source of reimbursement. Also, the response to an incident could necessitate activities that begin before Stafford Act reimbursement to HHS has been approved, or that are not eligible for reimbursement under the act. (For example, there is no precedent for a major disaster declaration under the Stafford Act for an outbreak of infectious disease, and only one declaration of emergency, for West Nile virus in 2000.) Although the HHS Secretary has authority for a no-year Public Health Emergency Fund (PHEF), Congress has not appropriated monies to it for many years, and no funds are currently available. On several occasions Congress has provided supplemental appropriations to address uncompensated disaster-related health care costs and otherwise unreimbursed state and local response costs flowing from a public health emergency. These incidents include Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, and the Ebola and Zika virus outbreaks. Supplemental appropriations for hurricane relief were provided for costs (such as uncompensated care) that were not reimbursed under the Stafford Act. The act was not invoked for the three infectious disease incidents, and supplemental appropriations were therefore needed to fund most aspects of the federal response to those outbreaks. Some policymakers, concerned about the inherent uncertainty in supplemental appropriations, have proposed dedicated funding approaches for public health emergency response. Two proposals in the 115th Congress (S. 196, H.R. 3579) would have appropriated funds to the PHEF. These measures did not advance. In appropriations for FY2019 (P.L. 115-245), Congress established and appropriated $50 million (to remain available until expended) to an Infectious Diseases Rapid Response Reserve Fund, to be administered by the Director of the HHS Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) “to prevent, prepare for, or respond to an infectious disease emergency.” The 116th Congress may choose to examine any uses of this new fund by CDC, and to consider appropriations to the PHEF, as well as other options to improve national health security preparedness.

Feb 11, 2019

Military Medical Malpractice and the Feres Doctrine

Feb 11, 2019

Department of Homeland Security Human Resources Management: Homeland Security Issues in the 116th Congress

/ Human resources management (HRM) underlies the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) mission and performance. DHS’s Chief Human Capital Officer (CHCO) “is responsible for the Department’s human capital program,” which is described as including such elements as “human resources policy, systems, and programs for strategic workforce planning, recruitment and hiring, pay and leave, performance management, employee development, executive resources, labor relations, work/life and safety and health.” Under Title 5, Section 1402, of the United States Code, a CHCO’s functions include “setting the workforce development strategy” and aligning HRM with “organization mission, strategic goals, and performance outcomes.” DHS’s Management Directorate web page includes the CHCO position under the Under Secretary for Management (USM). The Organizational Chart and Leadership web pages do not include the position under the USM nor explain that difference. At DHS, the CHCO is a career Senior Executive Service position. The incumbent CHCO assumed the position in January 2016. The 116th Congress may decide to conduct oversight of DHS CHCO operations—including placement, role, and functions within the department—and DHS human resources management. Such reviews could focus on the department’s plans for, and performance of, HRM. These plans are set forth in a Strategic Plan and an Annual Performance Report. The latter report for FY2020 is expected to be published along with the release of the department’s budget request. Congress may also examine DHS activities related to the President’s Management Agenda (PMA), particularly the agenda’s Cross-Agency Priority Goal (CAP) to develop the federal workforce. These topics are briefly discussed below. Hearings, roundtables, and meetings with officials and employees could inform congressional oversight on DHS appropriations, administration, and management as they relate to HRM. Annually, on or about the anniversary of DHS’s official inception, which occurred on March 1, 2003, Congress could consider conducting a review that focuses specifically on the CHCO operations and HRM policies and programs. The DHS FY2020 budget request, anticipated in March 2019, may enable Congress to conduct such a review within the context of the department’s Strategic Plan, Performance Report, and PMA activities. DHS Strategic Plan Section 2 of the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-352) requires agency heads to submit a strategic plan that provides, among other things, “a description of how the goals and objectives are to be achieved,” including a description of the “human, capital ... resources required to achieve those goals and objectives.” Section 230 of the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) Circular No. A-11 (2018), “Preparation, Submission and Execution of the Budget,” stated: An agency’s Strategic Plan should provide the context for decisions about performance goals, priorities, strategic human capital planning and budget planning. It should provide the framework for the detail published in agency Annual Performance Plans, Annual Performance Reports and on Performance.gov. DHS published its most recent publicly available Strategic Plan, covering FY2014-FY2018, in September 2015. The plan briefly mentioned HRM. To “strengthen service delivery and manage DHS resources,” the plan stated that the department would “[r]ecruit, hire, retain, and develop a highly qualified, diverse, effective, mission-focused, and resilient workforce.” Specific objectives identified to accomplish this were “1) building an effective, mission-focused, diverse, and inspiring cadre of leaders; 2) recruiting a highly qualified and diverse workforce; 3) retaining an engaged workforce; and 4) solidifying a DHS culture of mission performance, adaptability, accountability, equity, and results.” To obtain an understanding of progress on the plan’s HRM components to date, Congress could ask the department to document the specific framework for these four objectives and the conditions and factors related to each being fulfilled. Congress could also ask DHS to include a statement about the expected publication of an updated Strategic Plan on the Strategic Planning page of its website. DHS Annual Performance Report A Performance Report, required by Section 3 of P.L. 111-352, is to be published by the first Monday in February each year and cover “each program activity set forth in the budget.” Among the other requirements that are specified at Title 31, Section 1115(b), of the United States Code, the plan must “provide a description of how the performance goals are to be achieved,” including “the operation processes, training, skills and technology, and the human, capital, information, and other resources and strategies required to meet those performance goals.” DHS published its most recent Performance Report, covering FY2017-FY2019, in February 2018. The report noted that the Human Capital Operating Plan (HCOP) identifies “goals, objectives, and performance measures linked to DHS strategy” and “emphasizes management integration, accountability tracking, and the use of human capital data analysis to meet DHS mission needs.” According to the department, the HCOP is used to “identify and address critical skills gaps.” The Performance Report stated that Component Recruitment and Outreach Plans specify “recruitment strategies” as “a key element to sustain progress in skill gap closure.” The HCOP and the Component Recruitment and Outreach Plans do not appear to be publicly available on the department’s website. Congress could suggest that the department include a link to these documents on DHS.gov to facilitate consultation and oversight about measurable results for performance goals. President’s Management Agenda The President Donald Trump Administration describes the PMA as setting forth “a long-term vision for modernizing the Federal Government.” The PMA is to be implemented through CAPs that address “critical government-wide challenges.” One such CAP—led by the Office of Personnel Management, OMB, and the Department of Defense—is “Developing a Workforce for the 21st Century.” It seeks a strategic human capital management framework that enables managers to “hire the best employees, remove the worst employees, and engage employees.” Three CAP subgoals under this objective are “Improve Employee Performance Management and Engagement,” “Reskill and Redeploy Human Capital Resources,” and “Simple and Strategic Hiring.” The DHS CHCO is the leader for the third CAP subgoal, which includes strategies to reduce hiring times; “better differentiate applicants’ qualifications, competencies, and experience;” and “eliminate burdensome policies and procedures.” Congressional oversight of PMA activities at DHS could focus on such matters as key initiatives, measureable results, and anticipated timelines for accomplishing subgoals.

Feb 8, 2019

Electrification May Disrupt the Automotive Supply Chain

Feb 8, 2019

The Fundamentals of Unemployment Compensation

Feb 8, 2019

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA)

Feb 7, 2019

EU-Japan FTA: Implications for U.S. Trade Policy

Feb 7, 2019

EU Data Protection Rules and U.S. Implications

Feb 7, 2019

Congressional Franked Mail: Overview

Feb 7, 2019

Science and Technology Issues in the 116th Congress

Science and technology (S&T) have a pervasive influence over a wide range of issues confronting the nation. Public and private research and development spur scientific and technological advancement. Such advances can drive economic growth, help address national priorities, and improve health and quality of life. The ubiquity and constantly changing nature of science and technology frequently create public policy issues of congressional interest. The federal government supports scientific and technological advancement directly by funding and performing research and development and indirectly by creating and maintaining policies that encourage private sector efforts. Additionally, the federal government regulates many aspects of S&T activities. This report briefly outlines a key set of science and technology policy issues that may come before the 116th Congress. This set is not exhaustive, however. Given the rapid pace of S&T advancement and its importance in many diverse public policy contexts, other S&T-related issues not discussed in this report may come before the 116th Congress. The selected issues are grouped into 10 categories Overarching S&T Policy Issues, Agriculture, Biomedical Research and Development, Climate Change Science and Water, Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Information Technology, Physical and Material Sciences, and Space. Each of these categories includes concise analysis of multiple policy issues. The material presented in this report should be viewed as illustrative rather than comprehensive. Each section identifies CRS reports, when available, and the appropriate CRS experts to contact for further information and analysis.

Feb 6, 2019

Ebola Outbreak: Democratic Republic of Congo

Feb 6, 2019

Defense Primer: Military Retirement

Feb 6, 2019

Title Transfer for Bureau of Reclamation Facilities

Feb 6, 2019

Venezuela: U.S. Recognizes Interim Government

Many in Congress are closely following events in Venezuela, given recent political developments that have led the United States and other governments to recognize an interim government. On January 23, 2019, amid widespread protests against the authoritarian government of President Nicolás Maduro, the president of Venezuela’s democratically elected, opposition-controlled National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, declared himself interim president of Venezuela until new presidential elections are convened. The United States, Canada, and more than 35 other countries have recognized Guaidó as the interim president. The situation remains volatile. Maduro retains control of most of the military, even as domestic protests and international pressure mount against him. The United States has blocked the Maduro government from accessing revenue from the state oil company and agreed to provide humanitarian aid at Guaidó’s request. Background Maduro began a second six-year term as president of Venezuela on January 10, 2019. He won reelection in May 2018 in a contest boycotted by most of the opposition and deemed illegitimate by much of the international community. An escalating economic and humanitarian crisis has further undermined his domestic legitimacy. There had been dissent within the military, but Maduro arrested and reportedly tortured individuals, including military personnel, accused of plotting coups. Maduro faced international isolation, as the United States, key European countries, and 18 other members of the Organization of American States recognized the National Assembly as Venezuela’s only democratic institution. Interim President Juan Guaidó Juan Guaidó, a 35-year-old industrial engineer who hails from the Popular Will (VP) party of Leopoldo López (who remains under house arrest), was elected president of the National Assembly on January 5, 2019. Under Guaidó’s leadership, the National Assembly has enacted resolutions declaring that President Maduro is no longer the legitimate president, establishing a framework for a transition government, and providing amnesty for any public officials (including military members) who support a transition. On January 11, Guaidó declared himself willing to serve as interim president until presidential elections are held. He called for protests to occur on January 23, 2019, the 61st anniversary of the ouster of dictator Marcos Pérez Jiménez. Intelligence police detained and then released Guaidó on January 13, 2019. The Maduro-aligned Supreme Court has ruled that the new National Assembly leadership has been acting outside the law and invalidated its declarations. Nevertheless, Guaidó took the oath of office on January 23, 2019, based on an interpretation of Article 233 of the constitution that regards Maduro as having “usurped” (or abandoned) the presidency after January 10. Rallies for Guaidó have been massive. Guaidó is seeking to form a transition government, but Maduro controls the military and refuses to step down. Thus far, one general has supported Guiadó, but it is unclear whether others will. Some 40 deaths and more than 800 detentions have occurred since January 23. The government has sent police to raid Guaidó’s home, detained foreign journalists, and censored coverage of Guiadó. Further unrest is likely. International Reaction Fourteen Western Hemisphere countries have recognized the Guiadó government, including Canada, most South American countries (including neighboring Colombia and Brazil), four Central American countries, and three Caribbean nations. The EU initially gave Maduro a deadline for scheduling elections; it lapsed on February 3. Although Italy blocked unified EU recognition of Guaidó’s government, 24 European countries recognized Guaidó (including France, Spain, and Germany). The EU and some Latin American countries are forming a contact group on Venezuela. Russia has backed President Maduro and warned against U.S. intervention in Venezuela. Bolivia, Nicaragua, Turkey, Syria, and Iran also have supported Maduro. China has pledged not to intervene in Venezuela’s domestic affairs, and Mexico and Uruguay have supported mediation. U.S. Policy The Trump Administration has sought to increase pressure on the Maduro government and hasten a return to democracy in Venezuela. U.S. pressure has included targeted sanctions on Venezuelan officials and entities and four executive orders establishing broader economic sanctions. On January 10, 2019, the U.S. State Department condemned Maduro’s “illegitimate usurpation of power.” On January 22, Vice President Pence issued a video urging the Venezuelan people to protest the following day in support of Guiadó. President Trump recognized Guaidó as interim president of Venezuela on January 23. In response to U.S. actions, Maduro broke diplomatic ties with the United States and initially ordered U.S. diplomats to depart within 72 hours before eventually allowing them to stay for 30 days. Secretary of State Pompeo has stated that the United States will maintain a mission in Caracas to conduct relations with the Guiadó government, but nonessential staff and dependents have evacuated. The State Department has warned U.S. citizens not to travel to Venezuela. The Trump Administration has continued high-level communications with Guaidó and his representatives. On January 28, the Administration imposed sanctions on Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA), to prevent Maduro and his government from benefitting from Venezuela’s oil revenue. The State Department offered $20 million in humanitarian assistance to interim President Guaidó; that aid reportedly is being positioned in border areas for delivery. President Trump also has repeatedly asserted that “all options are on the table” to address the Venezuela situation, including the use of U.S. military force, although most observers believe that is a remote possibility. Potential Implications The rapidly changing situation in Venezuela poses significant challenges for U.S. policymakers. The United States has pledged full support for the Guaidó government, although it is unclear what that support might involve should the situation devolve into violence. If Guaidó consolidates a transition government, Congress may consider the type and appropriate channels through which it could authorize and appropriate funding for the new government. Support from international financial institutions likely would play a major role in supporting Venezuela’s economic recovery. Some observers, including a former head of the U.S. Southern Command, have argued against policy options that could exacerbate the tense situation on the ground in Venezuela and alienate some U.S. allies. If a political transition does not occur quickly, some observers also caution that the stronger sanctions imposed on PdVSA could exacerbate Venezuela’s humanitarian crisis.

Feb 6, 2019

El Salvador’s 2019 Elections

On February 3, 2019, Nayib Bukele, a 37-year-old former mayor of San Salvador and candidate of the Grand Alliance of National Unity (GANA) party, won El Salvador’s presidential election. Bukele garnered 53% of the vote, well ahead of Carlos Calleja, a business executive running for a conservative National Republican Alliance (ARENA)-led coalition, with 31.8%, and Hugo Mártinez, a former foreign minister of the leftist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), with 14.4%. Bukele’s first-round victory occurred amid relatively low voter turnout (44.7%) during a peaceful electoral process observed by the Organization of American States and others. Bukele is set to succeed Salvador Sánchez Cerén (FMLN) as president on June 1, 2019, and serve a single, five-year term. Bukele’s election ends 10 years of FMLN government. Who Is Nayib Bukele? Nayib Bukele served as mayor of Nuevo Cuscatlán (2012-2015) and San Salvador (2015-2018) for the FMLN. Prior to entering politics, Bukele worked in family businesses started by his late father, a prominent Salvadoran of Palestinian descent who backed the FMLN financially beginning in the early 1990s. Throughout his political career, Bukele has used social media to connect directly with voters, a new phenomenon in Salvadoran politics. As mayor, he revitalized the historic center of San Salvador and engaged at-risk youth in violence-prevention programs. In 2017, the FMLN expelled him for criticizing the party’s leadership. Bukele tried to create his own political party, but El Salvador’s electoral court did not approve the new party’s registration in time to appear on the ballot for the 2019 presidential election. Bukele then joined the GANA party and became its presidential candidate. Bukele led the race from start to finish, despite releasing few specific policy proposals until late in the campaign and opting not to attend debates. His personal popularity appeared to overcome GANA’s reputation for corruption (its founder, former president Tony Saca, is in prison). In fact, Bukele ran on an anti-corruption campaign and called for the establishment of an international anti-corruption commission in El Salvador similar to the U.N.-sponsored International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). It is unclear how close Bukele’s ties to GANA will be once he takes office and how he will compose his Cabinet. Why Is Bukele’s Victory Significant? Considered a youthful outsider, Bukele is the first person in 30 years to be elected president of El Salvador without the backing of the FMLN or ARENA. Polarization between the FMLN, a party formed by former guerillas after the signing of peace accords, and ARENA, a party aligned with the military, has been the primary dynamic in Salvadoran politics since the civil conflict (1980-1992). Tension between current FMLN President Sánchez Cerén, once an FMLN high commander, and the ARENA-dominated legislature has hindered efforts to address the country’s significant fiscal and security challenges. (See CRS Report R43616, El Salvador: Background and U.S. Relations.) The scale of Bukele’s victory demonstrated voters’ dissatisfaction with the apparent corruption in both major parties. The attorney general’s office has brought corruption cases against the past three Salvadoran presidents. Francisco Flores (ARENA, 1999-2004) passed away while awaiting trial for allegedly embezzling donations from Taiwan destined for earthquake relief. In 2018, former President Saca (ARENA, 2004-2009) pled guilty to charges of embezzling some $300 million; he is serving a 10-year prison sentence. Former President Mauricio Funes (FMLN, 2009-2014) received political asylum in Nicaragua after prosecutors found evidence he embezzled some $350 million in public funds. Potential Implications for El Salvador and Its Relations with the United States For more than a decade, El Salvador has had the lowest levels of growth and investment and the highest homicide rate in Central America. Bukele’s supporters hope his business experience and relative political independence can help change the country’s trajectory, but his lack of support in the National Assembly (GANA has 10 of 84 seats) could present governing challenges. Critics have questioned how Bukele intends to pay for the many infrastructure projects, including a new airport and railway line, included in his recently announced “Plan Cuscatlán.” As mayor of San Salvador, Bukele demonstrated a willingness to negotiate certain issues with gang leaders. Bukele has vowed not to adopt militarized anti-gang approaches but has not clearly defined his proposals for addressing the country’s gang problem. President-elect Bukele has said he will seek to maintain close relations with the United States and to give Salvadorans hope so they will be able to envision a future in their country rather than migrating to the United States. His willingness to tackle corruption could bolster bilateral cooperation on one of the central objectives of the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America. Bukele also could shift El Salvador’s foreign policy into closer alignment with the United States. He has criticized repression in Venezuela and Nicaragua, a significant departure from the current government’s position. Likewise, he has said he will revisit, but may not reverse, the Sánchez Cerén government’s August 2018 decision to abandon relations with Taiwan in favor of China, a move the Trump Administration sharply criticized. Migration is likely to remain an irritant in bilateral relations, given the difficulty of reducing migrant flows in the short-term and Bukele’s intention to advocate for Salvadoran migrants in the United States, such as the roughly 200,000 nationals whose Temporary Protected Status (TPS) (relief from removal) is scheduled to expire in September 2019. Looking ahead, the 116th Congress may consider the type and level of foreign assistance to provide to El Salvador and the other Northern Triangle countries (Guatemala and Honduras); how to work with the Bukele government to address security, economic, and immigration issues; and how to continue the last attorney general’s recent successes in combating corruption.

Feb 6, 2019

U.S.-Vietnam Relations

Feb 6, 2019

LNG as a Maritime Fuel: Prospects and Policy

The combination of growing liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and new requirements for less polluting fuels in the maritime shipping industry has heightened interest in LNG as a maritime fuel. The use of LNG as an engine (“bunker”) fuel in shipping is also drawing attention from federal agencies and is beginning to emerge as an issue of interest in Congress. In 2008, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced a timeline to reduce the maximum sulfur content in vessel fuels to 0.5% by January 1, 2020. Annex VI of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships requires vessels to either use fuels containing less than 0.5% sulfur or install exhaust-cleaning systems (“scrubbers”) to limit a vessel’s airborne emissions of sulfur oxides to an equivalent level. An option for vessel operators to meet the IMO 2020 standards is to install LNG-fueled engines, which emit only trace amounts of sulfur. Adopting LNG engines requires more investment than installing scrubbers, but LNG-fueled engines may offset their capital costs with operating cost advantages over conventional fuels. Savings would depend on the price spread between LNG and fuel oil. Recent trends suggest that LNG may be cheaper in the long run than conventional fuels. LNG bunkering requires specialized infrastructure for supply, storage, and delivery to vessels. To date, the number of ports worldwide that have developed such infrastructure is limited, although growth in this area has accelerated. Early adoption of LNG bunkering is occurring in Europe where the European Union requires a core network of ports to provide LNG bunkering by 2030. LNG bunkering is also advancing in Asia, led by Singapore, the world’s largest bunkering port. Asian countries, together with Australia and the United Arab Emirates, have about 10 coastal ports offering LNG bunkering, with another 15 projects in development. LNG bunkering in the United States currently takes place in Jacksonville, FL, and Port Fourchon, LA—with a third facility under development in Tacoma, WA. Bunkering of LNG-fueled cruise ships using barges also is planned for Port Canaveral, FL. The relative locations of other U.S. ports and operating LNG terminals suggest that LNG bunkering could be within reach of every port along the Eastern Seaboard and in the Gulf of Mexico. On the West Coast, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, CA, are near the Costa Azul LNG terminal in Ensenada, MX. Seattle and Tacoma are adjacent to the proposed Tacoma LNG project. Since 2015, Jones Act coastal ship operators have taken steps to transition their fleets to use cleaner burning fuels, including LNG. Shippers of dry goods to Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico have taken delivery or have ordered LNG-fueled and LNG-capable vessels from U.S. shipyards in Philadelphia, PA, and Brownsville, TX. Another company operates five LNG-powered offshore supply vessels built in Gulfport, MS. Depending upon LNG conversions, the global LNG bunker fuel market could grow to several billion dollars by 2030. If U.S. LNG producers were to supply a significant share of this market—on the strength of comparatively low LNG production costs—LNG bunkering could increase demand for U.S. natural gas production, transportation, and liquefaction. Opportunities in LNG-related shipbuilding might be more limited, as most shipbuilding occurs overseas, although domestically-constructed LNG bunkering barges could be one area of economic growth. Finally, engineering and construction firms could benefit from new opportunities to develop port infrastructure for LNG storage and transfer. However, while vessel conversion to LNG fuel may increase demand for U.S.-produced natural gas, it partially could be offset by reduced demand for U.S.-produced crude oil or refined products. Furthermore, while LNG can reduce direct emissions from vessels, fugitive emissions and environmental impacts from natural gas production and transportation could reduce overall emissions benefits. While the LNG industry has experienced few accidents, the Coast Guard has been developing new standards to address unique safety and security risks associated with LNG in vessel operations. The overarching consideration about LNG bunkering in the United States is uncertainty about how the global shipping fleet will adapt to the IMO sulfur standards over time. This uncertainty complicates decisions related to both private investment and public policy. Although Congress has limited ability to influence global shipping, it could influence the growth of LNG bunkering through the tax code and regulation, or through policies affecting the LNG industry or domestic shipping industry as a whole. Evaluating the potential implications of LNG bunkering within the context of broader energy and environmental policies may become an additional consideration for Congress. If LNG bunkering expands significantly, Congress also may examine the adequacy of existing measures to ensure the safety and security of LNG vessels, storage, and related facilities.

Feb 5, 2019

Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS)

Feb 5, 2019

The Congressional Review Act: Defining a “Rule” and Overturning a Rule an Agency Did Not Submit to Congress

Feb 5, 2019

H.R. 1 and S. 1: Overview and Related CRS Products

Feb 5, 2019

The Debt Limit

Feb 5, 2019

The World Oil Market and U.S. Policy: Background and Select Issues for Congress

The United States, as the largest consumer and producer of oil, plays a major role in the world market. Policy decisions can affect the price of oil and petroleum products (e.g., gasoline) for U.S. consumers and companies operating in U.S. oil production, transportation, and refining sectors. Congress considers policies that can affect the world oil market, including trade, sanctions, protection of trade routes, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), and alternative fuel standards. Technological advancements, supportive policies, and other aspects of the U.S. oil industry have reversed a multidecade downward trend in U.S. oil production. In 2018, U.S. oil production nearly doubled compared to 2008. The United States is also the number one consumer of crude oil and refined petroleum products in the world. The pricing of crude oil contributes to the price consumers pay for petroleum products in the United States. Congress has maintained an interest in oil policy. Following the 1973 Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil embargo, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (EPCA; P.L. 94-163). In response to rapid price escalation and perceived scarcity, the EPCA, among many other things, restricted U.S. produced crude oil exports. As the oil sector evolved, Congress has amended the EPCA. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113) repealed Section 103 of the EPCA removing any restrictions to crude oil exports. Supply, demand, price, and other factors all combine and interact with one another to create the world oil market. Saudi Arabia, historically, has been the world’s leading oil producer and along with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Counties (OPEC) has held enough spare capacity to influence global oil supply and prices. World oil demand typically follows world economic conditions. Oil prices are set in the world market and are primarily a function of supply and demand fundamentals, but also a number of other factors, such as quality, location, and transport infrastructure availability (e.g., pipelines). While the world oil market historically follows the world economy, supply generally does not follow demand smoothly and this results in price volatility. As economies grow, so too does the demand for crude oil and petroleum products, including fuels, paints, lubricants, and plastics. China and India are forecasted by the International Energy Agency (IEA) to contribute a large portion of oil demand growth, representing around 20% of total world demand by 2023. Asia, by IEA’s forecast, will remain a net importer of crude oil through 2023. Oil policy can be influential as a response to or in anticipation of undesirable international behavior or as a means to bring balance and stability to an otherwise volatile market. OPEC, especially in conjunction with other major producers (e.g., Russia), can exert influence on the oil market. Several bills introduced in the 115th Congress addressed the U.S. relationship with OPEC, such as the No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels (NOPEC) Act of 2018 (H.R. 5904 and S. 3214). The United States has utilized the oil market as a political tool. National oil companies (NOCs) operate under government ownership or are companies under influence by national governments. The United States, by placing sanctions on crude oil and crude oil-related industries, can send a message to those governments. Physical threats to oil supply still exist, particularly along certain trade routes. For instance, roughly 24% of the world oil market transited the Strait of Hormuz in the first half of 2018. A disruption to world supply along trade routes could permeate into geopolitical relationships, secondary industries (e.g., petrochemicals, agriculture), and the economy at large. The United States plays a multifaceted role in the world oil market, which may affect policy decisions for Congress. Congress has in the past enacted legislation to promote a stable, reliable supply of oil. For example, the EPCA created the SPR and established the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard for vehicles, in part, as strategies to reduce U.S. exposure to future supply disruptions. Additionally, Congress has enacted legislation to diversify transportation fuels, including tax credits for electric vehicles and the Renewable Fuel Standard. As the oil market continues to evolve, Congress may want to consider these and other major policy options that could include international trade policies, infrastructure, diversification of transportation fuels, and funding in research and development.

Feb 4, 2019

U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: What’s Next?

Feb 4, 2019

U.S.-European Relations in the 117th Congress

Feb 4, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: Veteran Farmers and Ranchers

Feb 4, 2019

Is the Trump Administration Rethinking Title VI?

Feb 4, 2019

Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies (THUD) Appropriations for FY2019: In Brief

Feb 4, 2019

2019 Tax Filing Season (2018 Tax Year): Itemized Deductions

Feb 4, 2019

“Migrant Protection Protocols”: Legal Issues Related to DHS’s Plan to Require Arriving Asylum Seekers to Wait in Mexico

Feb 1, 2019

The Disaster Relief Fund: Overview and Issues

The Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) is one of the most-tracked single accounts funded by Congress each year. Managed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), it is the primary source of funding for the federal government’s domestic general disaster relief programs. These programs, authorized under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.), outline the federal role in supporting state, local, tribal, and territorial governments as they respond to and recover from a variety of incidents. They take effect in the event that nonfederal levels of government find their own capacity to deal with an incident is overwhelmed. The appropriation which feeds the DRF predates current disaster relief programs and FEMA itself. It dates back to a half-million dollar deficiency appropriation to the President in 1948 that was drafted to allow him to use these resources to provide temporary emergency assistance to communities in the wake of unspecified potential natural disasters. Although the appropriation was provided with one particular Upper Midwest flooding incident in mind, the legislative language allowed the funding to be used more broadly, if the President wished to do so. This policy of providing general disaster relief was a shift from previous policy, which largely left emergency management, disaster relief, and disaster recovery in the hands of other levels of government and private relief organizations. Prior to the development of the general relief program, when the federal government got involved in disaster response and recovery, it was on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. By comparison, the annual appropriation for the DRF in FY2018—70 years after the initial appropriation for general disaster relief—was $7.9 billion. The evolving federal role in disaster relief is partially illuminated in the funding stream provided for it through the DRF. What is a fixture of federal policy today was not a given a century ago. Examining the history of the program and its funding through the DRF may help Congress consider future approaches to disaster relief. This report introduces the DRF and provides a brief history of federal disaster relief programs. It goes on to discuss the appropriations that fund the DRF, and provides a funding history from FY1964 to the present day, discussing factors that contributed to those changing appropriations levels. It concludes with discussion of how the budget request for the DRF has been developed and structured, given the unpredictability of the annual budgetary impact of disasters, and raises some potential issues for congressional consideration. This report is updated on an annual basis.

Feb 1, 2019

Immigration: “Recalcitrant” Countries and the Use of Visa Sanctions to Encourage Cooperation with Alien Removals

Feb 1, 2019

U.S. Department of the Interior: An Overview

The U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) is a federal executive department responsible for the conservation and administration of the public lands and mineral estate of the United States. DOI describes its mission as protecting and managing the nation’s natural resources and cultural heritage for the benefit of the American people; providing scientific and scholarly information about those resources and natural hazards; and exercising the nation’s trust responsibilities and special commitments to American Indians, Alaska Natives, and island territories under U.S. administration. As part of its responsibilities, DOI oversees and fosters the use of more than 480 million acres of public lands, 700 million acres of subsurface minerals, and 1.7 billion acres of the outer continental shelf. Each year, Congress deliberates legislation that could affect DOI’s management of this vast federal estate. As a result, understanding the roles and responsibilities of DOI’s various components and offices is valuable when crafting legislation that affects the department’s operations and ability to fulfill its mission. DOI primarily implements its responsibilities and mission through nine technical bureaus that make up more than 80% of the agency’s workforce. These technical bureaus are the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation), Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), National Park Service (NPS), Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSMRE), U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Each of these bureaus has a unique mission and set of responsibilities, as well as a distinct organizational structure that serves to meet its functional duties. In addition to these technical bureaus, DOI has multiple departmental offices, which provide leadership, coordination, and services to DOI’s various bureaus and programs. As of June 2018, DOI employed a staff of 69,563 nationwide across its bureaus and offices. However, total DOI employment figures fluctuate throughout the year, as some bureaus rely on seasonal and part-time staff, increasing staff totals during the summer months. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) reports the average total DOI employment as 65,350 for the four reporting periods from September 2017 to June 2018. The largest bureau within DOI based on number of staff is NPS, which averaged close to 20,000 staff over the same time period—more than twice the size of the second-largest bureau, BLM. The smallest technical bureau by employment is OSMRE, which averaged just over 400 employees. Approximately 10% of all DOI staff are within the District of Columbia core-based statistical area (CBSA), which includes the District of Columbia and selected counties in Maryland, Virginia, and West Virginia. Congress provides discretionary appropriations for DOI through two annual appropriations bills: the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies bill and the Energy and Water appropriations bill. Enacted discretionary appropriations for FY2018 totaled $14.6 billion. DOI also received $566 million in supplemental emergency appropriations in FY2018, for a total of $15.2 billion in discretionary appropriations for FY2018. The organizational structure of DOI is subject to continual congressional oversight and executive branch examination. In 2017 and 2018, President Trump and then-Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke submitted reorganization plans for the department and its bureaus. These plans put forth several recommendations, including the consolidation and transfer of most functions of the Army Corps of Engineers Civil Works Division to DOI, the merger of the Department of Commerce’s National Marine Fisheries Service with FWS, and the creation of 12 “Unified Regional Boundaries” across DOI’s various bureaus.

Jan 31, 2019

Defense Primer: Military Commissaries and Exchanges

Jan 31, 2019

Child Nutrition Programs: Current Issues

The term child nutrition programs refers to several U.S. Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) programs that provide food for children in institutional settings. These include the school meals programs—the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program—as well as the Child and Adult Care Food Program, Summer Food Service Program, Special Milk Program, and Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program. The most recent child nutrition reauthorization, the Healthy, Hunger-Free Kids Act of 2010 (HHFKA; P.L. 111-296), made a number of changes to the child nutrition programs. In some cases, these changes spurred debate during the law’s implementation, particularly in regard to updated nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. On September 30, 2015, some of the authorities created by the HHFKA expired. Efforts to reauthorize the child nutrition programs in the 114th Congress, while not completed, considered several related issues and prompted further discussion about the programs. There were no substantial reauthorization attempts in the 115th Congress. Current issues discussed in this report include the following: Nutrition standards for school meals and snacks. The HHFKA required USDA to update the nutrition standards for school meals and other foods sold in schools. USDA issued final rules on these standards in 2012 and 2016, respectively. Some schools had difficulty implementing the nutrition standards, and USDA and Congress have taken actions to change certain parts of the standards related to whole grains, sodium, and milk. Offerings in the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program (FFVP). There have been debates recently over whether the FFVP should include processed and preserved fruits and vegetables, including canned, dried, and frozen items. Currently, statute permits only fresh offerings. “Buy American” requirements for school meals. The school meals programs’ authorizing laws require schools to source foods domestically, with some exceptions, under Buy American requirements. Efforts both to tighten and loosen these requirements have been made in recent years. The enacted 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334) instructed USDA to “enforce full compliance” with the Buy American requirements and report to Congress within 180 days of enactment. Congregate feeding in summer meals. Under current law, children must consume summer meals on-site. This is known as the “congregate feeding” requirement. Starting in 2010, Congress funded demonstration projects, including the Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) demonstration, to test alternatives to congregate feeding in summer meals. Congress has increased funding for Summer EBT in recent appropriations cycles and there have been discussions about whether to continue or expand the program. Implementation of the Community Eligibility Provision (CEP). The HHFKA created CEP, an option for qualifying schools, groups of schools, and school districts to offer free meals to all students. Because income-based applications for school meals are no longer required in schools adopting CEP, its implementation has created data issues for federal and state programs relying on free and reduced-price lunch eligibility data. Unpaid meal costs and “lunch shaming.” The issue of students not paying for meals and schools’ handling of these situations has received increasing attention. Some schools have adopted what some term as “lunch shaming” practices, including throwing away a student’s selected hot meal and providing a cold meal alternative when a student does not pay. Congress and USDA have taken actions recently to reduce instances of student nonpayment and stigmatization. Paid lunch pricing. One result of new requirements in the HHFKA was price increases for paid (full price) lunches in many schools. Attempts have been made—some successfully—to loosen these “paid lunch equity” requirements in recent years.

Jan 31, 2019

Executive Branch Ethics and Financial Conflicts of Interest: Disqualification

Jan 31, 2019

“Affirmative Action” and Equal Protection in Higher Education

When federal courts have analyzed and addressed “affirmative action” in higher education, they have done so in two distinct but related senses, both under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of “equal protection.” The first has its roots in the original sense of “affirmative action:” the mandatory use of race by public education systems to eliminate the remnants of state-imposed racial segregation. Because state-sanctioned race segregation in public education violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, in certain cases involving a state’s formerly de jure segregated public university system, a state’s consideration of race in its higher education policies and practices may be an affirmative obligation. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in its consequential 1992 decision United States v. Fordice, equal protection may require states that formerly maintained de jure segregated university systems to consider race for the purpose of eliminating all vestiges of their prior “dual” systems. Drawing upon its precedent addressing racially segregated public schools in the K-12 context, the Court established a three-part legal standard in Fordice for evaluating the sufficiency and effectiveness of a state’s efforts in “dismantl[ing]” its formerly de jure segregated public university system. To that remedial end, mandatory race-conscious measures—in this de jure context—are not limited to admissions. Instead, remedies may also address policies and practices relating to academic programs, institutional missions, funding, and other aspects of public university operations. Outside this de jure context, “affirmative action” has come to refer to a different category of race-conscious policies. These involve what the Court at one time called the “benign” use of racial classifications—voluntary measures designed not to remedy past de jure discrimination, but to help racial minorities overcome the effects of their earlier exclusion. And for institutions of higher education, the Court has addressed one type of affirmative action policy in particular: the use of race as a factor in admissions decisions, a practice now widely observed by both public and private colleges and universities. The federal courts have come to subject these voluntary race-conscious policies—“affirmative action” in its perhaps more familiar sense—to a particularly searching form of review known as strict scrutiny. And even though this heightened judicial scrutiny has long been regarded as strict in theory but fatal in fact, the Court’s review of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education has proved a notable exception, with the Court having twice upheld universities’ use of race as one of many factors considered when assembling their incoming classes. The Court has long grappled with this seeming tension—between the strictness of its scrutiny and its approval of race-conscious admissions policies—beginning with its landmark 1978 decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke through its 2016 decision in Fisher v. University of Texas. Though the Equal Protection Clause generally concerns public universities and their constitutional obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment, federal statutory law also plays a role in ensuring equal protection in higher education. To that end, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits recipients of federal funding—including private colleges and universities—from, at a minimum, discriminating against students and applicants in a manner that would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Federal agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Education, investigate and administratively enforce institutions’ compliance with Title VI.

Jan 31, 2019

Bureau of Land Management: FY2019 Appropriations

Jan 30, 2019

The Emoluments Clauses of the U.S. Constitution

Jan 30, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: SNAP and Nutrition Title Programs

Jan 30, 2019

Fifth-Generation (5G) Telecommunications Technologies: Issues for Congress

Since the first mobile phones were made available in the 1980s, telecommunication providers have been investing in mobile networks to expand coverage, improve services, and attract more users. First-generation networks supported mobile voice calls but were limited in coverage and capacity. To address those limitations, providers developed and deployed second-generation (2G) mobile networks, then third-generation (3G), and fourth-generation (4G) networks. Each generation offered improved speeds, greater capacity, and new features and services. In 2018, telecommunication providers began deploying fifth-generation (5G) networks to meet growing demands for data from consumer and industrial users. 5G networks are expected to enable providers to expand consumer services (e.g., video streaming, virtual reality applications), support the growing number of connected devices (e.g., medical devices, smart homes, Internet of Things), support new industrial uses (e.g., industrial sensors, industrial monitoring systems), perform advanced data analytics, and enable the use of advanced technologies (e.g., smart city applications, autonomous vehicles). 5G is expected to yield significant economic benefits. Market analysts estimate that in the United States, 5G could create up to 3 million new jobs and add $500 billion to the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). Globally, analysts estimate that 5G technologies could generate $12.3 trillion in sales activity across multiple industries and support 22 million jobs by 2035. Experience has shown that companies first to market with new products can capture the bulk of the revenues, yielding long-term benefits for those companies and significant economic gains for the countries where those companies are located. Hence, technology companies around the world are racing to develop 5G products, and some countries (i.e., central governments) are acting in support of 5G deployment. This competition to develop 5G products and capture the global 5G market is often called the “race to 5G.” In the race to 5G, the United States is one of the leaders, along with China and South Korea. Each country has adopted a different strategy to lead in 5G technology development and deployment. China’s central government is supporting the deployment of 5G infrastructure in China. China has a national plan to deploy 5G domestically, capture the revenues from its domestic market, improve its industrial systems, and become a leading supplier of telecommunications equipment to the world. In South Korea, the central government is working with telecommunications providers to deploy 5G. South Korea plans to be the first country to deploy 5G nationwide, and to use the technology to improve its industrial systems. In the United States, private industry is leading 5G deployment. U.S. providers, competing against each other, have conducted 5G trials in several cities and were the first in the world to offer 5G services commercially. The U.S. government has supported 5G deployment, making spectrum available for 5G use and streamlining processes related to the siting of 5G equipment (e.g., small cells). While each country has taken a different approach to capturing the 5G market, there are factors that drive the timeline for all deployments, including international decisions on standards and spectrum. In the United States, 5G deployment may also be affected by the lengthy spectrum allocation process, resistance from local governments to federal small cell siting rules, and limitations on trade that may affect availability of equipment. The 116th Congress may monitor the progress of 5G deployment in the United States and the U.S. position in the race to 5G. Congress may consider policies that may affect 5G deployment, including policies related to spectrum allocation, trade restrictions, and local concerns with 5G deployment. Policies that support 5G deployment while also protecting national and local interests could provide significant consumer benefits, help to modernize industries, give U.S. companies an advantage in the global economy, and yield long-term economic gains for the United States. In developing policies, Members may consider the economic and consumer benefits of 5G technologies, as well as other interests, such as the need to preserve spectrum for other users and uses, the protection of national security and intellectual property when trading, the privacy and security of 5G devices and systems, and the respect of local authorities and concerns during 5G deployment.

Jan 30, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: Hemp Cultivation and Processing

Jan 30, 2019

Bribery, Kickbacks, and Self-Dealing: An Overview of Honest Services Fraud and Issues for Congress

As the trials of Sheldon Silver and Dean Skelos illustrate, corruption among high-profile public officials continues to be a concern in the United States. Likewise, recent examples abound of powerful executives in the private sector abusing positions of trust for personal gain. Faced with this reality, Congress has shown consistent interest in policing public- and private-sector corruption, enacting a number of criminal provisions aimed at holding corrupt officials accountable for their actions under federal law. However, one of federal prosecutors’ most potent existing tools for combating such corruption—18 U.S.C. § 1346, which defines the crimes of mail and wire fraud as including so-called “honest services” fraud—has been a source of contention between the courts and Congress for years. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 defines the term “scheme or artifice to defraud,” as used in the general statutes prohibiting use of the mails or wires to commit fraud, to include a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services. Congress enacted this provision in the late 1980s in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in McNally v. United States that the mail fraud statute was limited in scope to only the protection of tangible property rights. The McNally decision was grounded in concerns that a broader construction of the statute could leave its outer boundaries ambiguous and unjustifiably involve the federal government in setting standards for good government at the local level. Nevertheless, Section 1346 abrogates McNally’s holding, codifying the understanding of some of the lower federal courts that the mail and wire fraud statutes extend to conduct that deprives a person or group of the right to have another act in accordance with some externally imposed duty or obligation, regardless of whether the victim so deprived has suffered or would suffer a pecuniary harm. Recognizing that this lower court understanding in fact evinced considerable disarray as to the kinds of schemes that would qualify as honest services fraud, however, the Supreme Court subsequently read a limiting principle into Section 1346 in Skilling v. United States in order to avoid invalidating the statute as unconstitutionally vague. After Skilling, mail and wire fraud prosecutions under an honest services theory may extend only to those who, in violation of a fiduciary duty, participate in bribery or kickback schemes. Notably, the Skilling decision withdrew from the reach of Section 1346 a significant category of cases that had been prosecuted as honest services fraud up to that point: cases involving more general financial self-dealing or conflicts of interest, where no bribes or kickbacks are given. Congress has considered legislation on more than one occasion that would reinstate the self-dealing category of honest services fraud rejected in Skilling, though the law remains unchanged as of this writing. The conversation between the Court and Congress regarding the scope of honest services fraud and its culmination in Skilling have presented more questions that lower courts have been tasked with answering, including the source of the requisite fiduciary duty and the conduct that qualifies as bribery or kickbacks. Courts have looked to a variety of sources to give content to the fiduciary duty requirement, including federal, state, and common law. Likewise, in fleshing out the contours of the bribery or kickbacks called for in Skilling, lower courts have relied on anti-bribery and anti-kickback provisions found in federal statutes. In the recent case of McDonnell v. United States, the Supreme Court limited the reach of one of those statutes—18 U.S.C. § 201, which makes it a crime to offer or solicit anything of value to influence an “official act”—by construing the term “official act” narrowly. Nevertheless, alternate routes appear to be available to prosecute bribery schemes involving conduct that may be beyond the scope of McDonnell. Should Congress seek to alter the scope of honest services fraud, it will likely need to be attuned to the concerns that federal courts interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1346 have voiced over the years. Chief among these have been the concerns that—as written—the statute has the potential to sweep too broadly and regulate ethically dubious conduct of state and local officials in a way that conflicts with the Constitution.

Jan 30, 2019

Unemployment Insurance: Legislative Issues in the 116th Congress

Jan 29, 2019

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons and Missile Programs

Jan 29, 2019

Recent Migration to the United States from Central America: Frequently Asked Questions

Over the last decade, migration to the United States from Central America—in particular from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (known collectively as the Northern Triangle)—has increased considerably. Families migrating from this region, many seeking asylum, have made up an increasing share of the migrants seeking admission to the United States at the U.S.-Mexico border. In the past year, news reports of migrant “caravans” from the Northern Triangle traveling toward the United States have sparked intense interest and questions from Congress. Many factors, both in their countries of origin and elsewhere, contribute to people’s decisions to emigrate from the Northern Triangle. Weak institutions and corrupt government officials, chronic poverty, rising levels of crime, and demand for illicit drugs result in insecurity and citizens’ low levels of confidence in government institutions. These “push” factors intersect with “pull” factors attracting migrants to the United States, including economic and educational opportunities and a desire to reunify with family members. Addressing these factors is complex. Under the U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America, the United States is working with Central American governments to promote economic prosperity, improve security, and strengthen governance in the region. Since 2014, Mexico has helped the United States manage flows of Central American migrants, including a recent decision to allow certain U.S.-bound asylum seekers to remain in Mexico while awaiting U.S. immigration proceedings. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)—in collaboration with local and federal governments and civil society—is providing immediate and longer-term support for Mexico’s refugee agency and migrants in transit. Central Americans who wish to request asylum in the United States may do so at a U.S. port of entry before a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer or upon apprehension by a CBP officer between U.S. ports of entry. Those requesting asylum at the border undergo screening to determine whether they can pursue an asylum claim. To receive asylum, a foreign national must establish, among other requirements, that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution based on one of five protected grounds (race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). In 2018, President Trump, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) took various actions to tighten the U.S. asylum system. These actions have been met with legal challenges. For example, on November 9, 2018, the President issued a presidential proclamation to suspend immediately the entry into the United States of aliens who cross the Southwest border between ports of entry. This proclamation and a related DHS-DOJ rule are being challenged in federal court. Chapter 15, Title 10 of the U.S. Code provides general legislative authority for the Armed Forces to provide certain types of support to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. In October 2018, active-duty personnel were deployed to the Southwest border to provide assistance in air and ground transportation, logistics support, engineering capabilities and equipment, medical support, housing, and planning support. The Posse Comitatus Act constrains the manner in which military personnel may be used in a law enforcement capacity at the border. President Trump has contemplated proclaiming a national emergency pursuant to the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in order to fund a physical barrier at the southern border with Mexico using DOD funds. Congress provided the President with significant discretion to reduce foreign assistance to Central America in FY2018, dependent on the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras addressing a variety of congressional concerns, including improving border security, combating corruption, and protecting human rights. The President’s ability to modify assistance to the Northern Triangle for the remainder of FY2019 will depend on provisions Congress may include in future appropriations legislation.

Jan 29, 2019

China’s Retaliatory Tariffs on U.S. Agricultural Products

Jan 29, 2019