CRS Reports

Trade Dispute with China and Rare Earth Elements

Jun 28, 2019

The Opioid Epidemic: Supply Control and Criminal Justice Policy—Frequently Asked Questions

Over the last several years, lawmakers in the United States have responded to rising drug overdose deaths, which increased four-fold from 1999 to 2017, with a variety of legislation, hearings, and oversight activities. In 2017, more than 70,000 people died from drug overdoses, and approximately 68% of those deaths involved an opioid. Many federal agencies are involved in domestic and foreign efforts to combat opioid abuse and the continuing increase in opioid related overdose deaths. A subset of those agencies confront the supply side (some may also confront the demand side) of the opioid epidemic. The primary federal agency involved in drug enforcement, including prescription opioids diversion control, is the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Other federal agencies that address the illicit opioid supply include, but are not limited to, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and Office of National Drug Control Policy. This report focuses on efforts from these departments and agencies only. Lawmakers have addressed opioid abuse as both a public health and a criminal justice issue, and Congress enacted several new laws in the 114th and 115th Congresses. These include the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198), the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255), and most recently the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act; P.L. 115-271). Congress also provided funds specifically to address the opioid epidemic in FY2017-FY2019 appropriations. This report answers common supply and criminal justice-related questions that have arisen as drug overdose deaths in the United States continue to increase. It does not provide a comprehensive overview of opioid abuse as a criminal justice issue. The report is divided into the following sections: Overview of the Opioid Epidemic in the United States; Overview of the Opioid Supply; Opioids and Domestic Supply Control Policy; Opioids and Foreign Supply Control Policy; Recent Congressional Action on the Opioid Epidemic; and The Opioid Epidemic and State Criminal Justice Policies.

Jun 28, 2019

House Rules Changes Affecting Floor Proceedings in the 116th Congress (2019-2020)

As agreed to in the House, H.Res. 6, a resolution adopting the rules of the House of Representatives, provided amendments to the rules, as well as separate orders, that affect floor procedure in the 116th Congress (2019-2010). These amendments changed procedures in the full House and in the Committee of the Whole. The rules changes altered when a resolution that would cause a vacancy in the Office of Speaker would qualify as a question of privilege. Under a new provision to clause 2 of Rule IX, resolutions declaring a vacancy of the chair are not privileged unless they are offered by direction of a party caucus or conference. H.Res. 6 established a Consensus Calendar for the consideration of certain broadly supported measures that have not been reported by their committees of primary jurisdiction. One rules change allows the Speaker to schedule consideration of legislation that has been on the Private Calendar for seven days. Another change requires the Speaker to schedule the consideration of a motion to discharge that has garnered the necessary 218 signatures to be placed on the Discharge Calendar (and has been on that calendar for at least seven legislative days). Prior to the rules change, measures on the Private Calendar and motions on the Discharge Calendar were to be considered on specified days of the month. The 116th rules package mandates that certain legislative texts must be available to the public for 72 hours before legislation can be raised on the House floor. The earlier rules provided a three-day layover, not including weekends and holidays, which could provide a review period of fewer or more than 72 hours. Rules changes allow the Speaker to postpone votes on amendment votes that occur in the House proper and no longer require a notice that a voting period on the amendment will be reduced to five minutes. In the Committee of the Whole, the chair is afforded greater flexibility to reduce voting periods to two minutes on record votes. Several rules changes concerned the five Delegates and the Resident Commissioner of Puerto Rico. Most significantly, H.Res. 6 enables these individuals to vote in the Committee of the Whole. The 116th rules reinstated the policy from previous Congresses that allowed for voting in the Committee of the Whole but also mandated a revote in the House proper if the initial vote was decided within the margin of votes cast by the Delegates and the Resident Commissioner. The 116th rules package clarified that the provision in Rule XVII that bans hats in the House chamber allows Members to wear “religious headdress.” In the 116th Congress, Members can wear religious head coverings in the chamber at any time. Finally, H.Res. 6 included a separate order governing action in the 116th Congress that clarified procedures concerning measures introduced pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. The separate order stated that motions to discharge such measures from committee would not be subject to a motion to table.

Jun 27, 2019

SEC Securities Disclosure: Background and Policy Issues

Jun 25, 2019

Variable Renewable Energy: An Introduction

Jun 25, 2019

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

Over the past 30 years, the relationship between the United States and Poland has been close and cooperative. The United States strongly supported Poland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999 and backed its entry into the European Union (EU) in 2004. Poland has made significant contributions to U.S.- and NATO-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Poland and the United States continue to work together closely on a range of foreign policy and international security issues. Domestic Political and Economic Issues The 2015 Polish parliamentary election resulted in a victory for the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS), which won an absolute majority of seats in the lower house of parliament (Sejm). Mateusz Morawiecki (PiS) is Poland’s prime minister and head of government. The center-right Civic Platform (PO) party led the government of Poland from 2007 to 2015. Since winning the election, Law and Justice has made changes to the country’s judicial system and enacted other reforms that have generated concerns about backsliding on democracy and triggered an EU rule-of-law investigation. Poland’s next parliamentary election is due to occur in October or November 2019. European Parliament and regional election results indicate that support for Law and Justice remains strong, and the party is favored to win the 2019 election. Law and Justice candidate Andrzej Duda won Poland’s 2015 presidential election. The president is Poland’s head of state and exercises a number of limited but important functions. The next presidential election is due to occur in May 2020. Poland was one of the few EU economies to come through the 2008-2009 global economic crisis without major damage. As an EU member Poland is obligated to adopt the euro as its currency, but it has not set a target date for adoption and continues to use the zoty as its national currency. Defense Modernization Poland has been implementing an armed forces modernization plan since 2013, and it intends to spend approximately $49 billion on military equipment acquisitions and upgrades over the period 2017-2026. Completed and prospective purchases from U.S. suppliers, including advanced Patriot missiles and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, have a large role in this initiative. Poland is one of seven NATO members to meet the alliance’s benchmark of spending at least 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, and it plans to reach 2.5% of GDP by 2030. Defense Cooperation Under the United States’ European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the U.S. military’s Operation Atlantic Resolve, as well as NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence mission, U.S. forces have expanded their presence in Poland since 2014 and increased joint training and exercises with their Polish counterparts. While U.S. forces participate in these missions on a rotational basis, the Polish government has proposed the establishment of a permanent U.S. base on Polish territory. Visa Waiver Program Although relations between Poland and the United States are largely positive, Poland’s exclusion from the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) has been a point of contention for many years. Some Members of Congress have advocated extending the VWP to include Poland. Relations with Russia Relations between Poland and Russia have long been tense, and Polish leaders have tended to view Russian intentions with wariness and suspicion. Poland remains a leading advocate for forceful EU sanctions against Russia over its 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and fostering of separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine. Energy Security Poland has promoted European energy integration, including projects to expand pipeline and electric grid interconnectivity in order to decrease reliance on Russia. Poland is a leading critic of Nord Stream 2, a Russian-owned pipeline project that would allow Germany to increase the amount of natural gas it imports directly from Russia via the Baltic Sea. Outlook and Issues for Congress Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, Poland and its relations with the United States are of continuing congressional interest. The main areas of interest include defense cooperation, energy security, and concerns about rule-of-law and governance issues.

Jun 25, 2019

FY2020 NDAA Analysis: Elimination of Benefits Offset for Surviving Spouses and Related Legal Issues

Jun 24, 2019

Hemp-Derived Cannabidiol (CBD) and Related Hemp Extracts

Jun 21, 2019

Health Care-Related Expiring Provisions of the 116th Congress, First Session

This report describes selected health care-related provisions that are scheduled to expire during the first session of the116th Congress (i.e., during calendar year [CY] 2019). For purposes of this report, expiring provisions are defined as portions of law that are time-limited and will lapse once a statutory deadline is reached absent further legislative action. The expiring provisions included in this report are those related to Medicare, Medicaid, State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and private health insurance programs and activities. The report also includes health care-related provisions that were enacted in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148) or last extended under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123). In addition, this report describes health care-related provisions within the same scope that expired during the 115th Congress (i.e., during CY2017 or CY2018). Although the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has attempted to be comprehensive, it cannot guarantee that every relevant provision is included here. This report generally focuses on two types of health care-related provisions within the scope discussed above. The first type of provision provides or controls mandatory spending, meaning that it provides temporary funding, temporary increases or decreases in funding (e.g., Medicare provider bonus payments), or temporary special protections that may result in changes in funding levels (e.g., Medicare funding provisions that establish a floor). The second type of provision defines the authority of government agencies or other entities to act, usually by authorizing a policy, project, or activity. Such provisions also may temporarily delay the implementation of a regulation, requirement, or deadline, or establish a moratorium on a particular activity. Expiring health care provisions that are predominantly associated with discretionary spending activities—such as discretionary authorizations of appropriations and authorities for discretionary user fees—are excluded from this report. Certain types of provisions with expiration dates that otherwise would meet the criteria set forth above are excluded from this report. Some of these provisions are excluded because they are transitional or routine in nature or have been superseded by congressional action that otherwise modifies the intent of the expiring provision. For example, statutorily required Medicare payment rate reductions and payment rate re-basings that are implemented over a specified time period are not considered to require legislative attention and are excluded. The report provides tables listing the relevant provisions that are scheduled to expire in 2019 and that expired in 2018 or 2017. The report then describes each listed provision, including a legislative history. An appendix lists relevant demonstration projects and pilot programs that are scheduled to expire in 2019 or that expired in 2018 or 2017.

Jun 21, 2019

Fiscal Policy Considerations for the Next Recession

Although the United States is currently experiencing its longest economic expansion, history has shown that economic expansions inevitably give way to economic slowdowns. If the next slowdown is significant, the economy could enter a recession, which is typically characterized by falling output and rising unemployment. Short-term forecasts are predicting continued economic expansion, but predicting when the economy may transition from expansion to recession is notoriously difficult, as the ebb and flow of the economy is determined by many different factors, including a number that lie outside the country’s borders. This report identifies and summarizes options Congress may consider in response to a possible recession. Recognizing that the economy has the potential to return to full employment without intervention, one policy option is simply to allow the economy to correct on its own with the support of certain “automatic stabilizers” already in place. Automatic stabilizers work without congressional action to lower taxes and increase spending as the economy weakens. Examples include the progressive structure of the income tax system and Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefits, among others. Congress also has a range of other options it could consider when designing a stimulus package should a recession occur and automatic stabilizers are not sufficient to counteract it. The options presented in this report are drawn from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Moody’s Analytics, both of which estimated the impact of specific policies or approaches in response to the Great Recession. While a general approach to stimulating a weakened economy with reduced taxes and increased spending is often advocated, specific policies have different impacts on the economy and differing administrative complexities. CBO’s and Moody’s estimates provide insight into which specific policy options may be most worthwhile to implement during the next downturn. The policy options presented—or variations of them—are ones commonly considered when designing a fiscal stimulus package and are not unique to either CBO or Moody’s. The United States’ recent budget deficits and the country’s long-run budget outlook could influence the size of any stimulus package. Large and persistent budget deficits can hamper economic growth by lowering the rate of capital formation via reduced national saving, and can potentially offset short-term economic stimulus. At the same time, high levels of debt relative to gross domestic product can constrain a country’s borrowing capacity. There are no signs that federal borrowing capacity will be exhausted in the short term. However, the consequences of exhausted fiscal space may be worth considering in designing the next stimulus package since it would increase both deficits and the debt.

Jun 20, 2019

Exceptions to the Budget Control Act’s Discretionary Spending Limits

The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) established statutory limits on discretionary spending for FY2012-FY2021. There are currently separate annual limits for defense discretionary and nondefense discretionary spending. The law specifies that spending for certain activities, such as responding to a national emergency or fighting terrorism, will receive special budgetary treatment. This spending is most easily thought of as being exempt from the spending limits. Formally, however, the BCA states that the enactment of such spending allows for a subsequent upward adjustment of the discretionary limits to accommodate the spending. As a result, these types of spending are referred to as “adjustments.” Two adjustments—for spending designated as emergency or for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)—have made up the vast majority of the spending. (These adjustments are uncapped and can be used for broad purposes.) Five other adjustments are capped and can be used for more specific programs or purposes, and two additional adjustments address potential technical issues that can arise in enforcing the spending limits. According to information provided by the Office of Management and Budget (the agency responsible for evaluating compliance with the discretionary spending limits), in the seven fiscal years that have concluded since the discretionary spending limits were instituted, approximately $891 billion of spending has occurred under these adjustments. Spending for OCO made up 73% of the total, and spending for emergencies made up 20%. In addition to the adjustments specified in the BCA, the 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255) provided that a limited amount of appropriations for specified purposes are to be exempt from the discretionary spending limits. As of the date of this report, the Cures Act is unique in providing an exemption of this kind.

Jun 19, 2019

U.S. Trade Friction with China Intensifies

Commercial relations between the United States and China are experiencing an increasing level of tension and uncertainty. In August 2017, the Trump Administration launched a Section 301 investigation of Chinese policies relating to technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation policies deemed harmful to U.S. economic interests. In March 2018, the Administration announced it would take specified action against China in response to such policies, including increased tariffs. The Administration subsequently raised tariffs on three tranches of import products from China, (with estimated combined worth of $250 billion). China imposed retaliatory tariff increase on three tranches of imported products from the United States (with estimated combined worth of $110 billion). On February 14, 2019, President Trump tweeted that trade negotiations with China were in “advanced stages” and suggested that an agreement could soon be reached. However, on May 5, he tweeted that trade negotiations were going “too slowly” and that China was attempting to “renegotiate” previous trade commitments. As a result, on May 10, he ordered that tariffs on a third tranche of Chinese goods be raised from 10% to 25% (made fully effective on June 15) and that the process for increasing tariffs by 25% on nearly all remaining U.S. imports from China (estimated value at $300 billion) be started. On May 13, China announced it would increase its tariffs on many of the U.S. products listed in its third tranche (effective June 1). China blamed the United States for the breakdown in talks, claiming it had “persisted with exorbitant demands” and demanded concessions touching on “China’s sovereign affairs.” Tariff Increases and Trade Both sides are experiencing trade impacts of the tariff hikes. While U.S. merchandise imports from China in 2018 rose by 6.7% (to $540 billion), over the previous year (data not shown), they fell by 13.9% during the first quarter of 2019 year-over-year, while imports covered by U.S. tariff hikes dropped by 29.9% (see Figure 1). Similarly, while Chinese imports from the United States increased by 2.4% (to $154 billion) in 2018 (data not shown), they fell by 29.3% during the first quarter of 2019. Imports of U.S. products covered under China’s retaliatory tariff measures fell 36.6% (year-over-year). (See Figure 2.) This has raised concerns that China is increasingly turning to non-U.S. suppliers who are not subject to the higher tariffs. Figure 1. U.S. Imports from China of Products Affected by U.S. Section 301 Tariff Hikes (January-March 2019 Year-on-Year (% Change)) / Source: USITC Dataweb. Figure 2. Chinese Imports of U.S. Products Affected by Retaliatory Chinese Tariff Hikes (January-March 2019 Year-on-Year (% Change)) / Source: USITC Dataweb. Additional Economic Measures In addition to tariff increases, the United States and China have implemented other measures (or have threatened to take certain actions) that could lead to additional restrictions on bilateral commercial ties and greater uncertainty in the bilateral economic relationship Information and Communications Technology (ICT). China is the largest foreign supplier of ICT equipment to the United States. In 2018, U.S. ICT imports from China totaled $157 billion, or 60% of total U.S. ICT imports. Citing a “national emergency,” President Trump, on May 15, 2019, issued Executive Order 13873 on Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain. The order stated the Administration’s view that U.S. purchases of ICT goods and services from “foreign adversaries” posed a national security risk to the United States and authorized the Federal government to ban certain ICT transactions deemed to pose an “undue risk.” As of June 18, the President has not yet designated any entities pursuant to this order. Restrictions on Commercial Ties to Huawei. Chinese firm Huawei is the world’s largest telecommunications equipment producer. On May 15, 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce announced that Huawei “is engaged in activities that are contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interest.” As a result, Commerce said it would add Huawei and 68 of its non-U.S. affiliates to the Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List, which would require an export license for the sale or transfer of U.S. technology to such entities. On May 20, the Trump Administration delayed the measure by 90 days. China responded by announcing on May 31 that it would create an “unreliable entity list” of foreign firms and individuals that seriously damage Chinese enterprises by failing to comply with market rules, deviating from contracts, and imposing restrictions on Chinese firms for noncommercial purposes. China implied that punitive measures could be imposed against such entities. Potential Chinese Curtailment of Rare Earths Exports. China is the world’s largest producer and exporter of a number of critical materials, including rare earths, a group of 17 elements (metals) whose unique properties make them critical in a variety of advanced technologies (including some used by the U.S. military). In 2018, nearly three-quarters of U.S. rare earth material imports by value came from China. On May 17, 2019, the USTR published a notice in the Federal Register with a proposed fourth tranche of products imported from China that could be subject to 25% ad valorem tariffs. The notice specified that rare earth materials (and certain other products) would be excluded from the list. On the same day, Chinese President Xi Jinping toured a firm in China’s Jiangxi province that produces rare earth magnets. Some viewed this as a veiled warning to the United States that China could restrict future rare earth exports to the United States if the current trade conflict intensified further. Some economists have raised concerns that the current U.S.-China trade conflict (if not resolved soon) could eventually hit nearly all bilateral trade with increased tariff hikes, lead to additional types and rounds of commercial retaliatory measures, and possibly result in “economic decoupling.”

Jun 19, 2019

Supreme Court Vacates Another Opinion Applying Antidiscrimination Laws to Religious Objectors

Jun 19, 2019

Transformation at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

Jun 19, 2019

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for Childless Workers

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers. Because the credit is refundable, a worker need not owe federal income taxes to benefit from it. The EITC is the nation’s largest cash anti-poverty program, with a tax year 2016 (returns filed in 2017) total of $66.7 billion claimed on 27.4 million tax returns. Most of the claimed EITC dollars—$64.7 billion, or 97% of total EITC dollars—were for taxpayers with children compared to $2.1 billion in claimed EITC for taxpayers with no qualifying children. EITC Rules for Childless Workers Compared to Those with Children To claim an EITC, tax filers must (1) file a federal tax return, (2) have earned income, (3) meet the residency requirement, (4) have investment income below a certain threshold, (5) not have had a disallowed credit due to fraud or reckless disregard of the rules when previously claiming an EITC, and (6) provide a Social Security number for themselves and their spouses. In addition to these rules, a taxpayer without a qualifying child must also be between the ages of 25 and 64. A childless worker cannot claim an EITC if he or she can also be claimed for EITC purposes as a dependent on another person’s tax return (e.g., a college student). The EITC is a function of a taxpayer’s earnings as well as the credit’s phase-in or phase-out rate (which rate applies depends on the taxpayer’s earnings). The amount of the EITC phases in as earnings increase, with earnings multiplied by the phase-in credit rate. The credit hits a maximum amount, plateaus (meaning the credit amount stays the same even as income rises), and is then phased-out as earnings exceeds certain thresholds. This phase-in, plateau at the maximum, and phase-out is often visually represented as a “trapezoid.” EITC credit amounts are lower for childless workers than for those with children. For 2019, the maximum EITC for a childless worker is $529 (Table 1). This compares with $3,526 for a tax filer with one child and $6,557 for a tax filer with three or more children. The maximum income levels below which taxpayers are eligible for an EITC is also lower for childless workers—in 2019, EITCs is fully phased out (the EITC amount is $0) once income reaches $15,570 for a single childless worker and $21,370 for married childless workers. For a single filer with one child, the EITC is fully phased out once income reaches $41,094. The income at which the EITC is fully phased out is higher for taxpayers filing joint returns or taxpayers with more children. For married taxpayers with three or more children, the EITC is fully phased out once income reaches $55,952. The phase-in amounts for the childless EITC are lower than the phase-in amounts for workers with children. Along the phase-in range, for a childless worker each additional $100 in earnings results in a $7.65 EITC. For a worker with one child, an additional $100 in earnings results in a $34.00 EITC. The phase-in is higher for taxpayers with more children. Table 1. Selected EITC Tax Parameters by Number of Qualifying Children, 2019 0 1 2 3 or more Phase-in Credit Rate 7.65% 34.00% 40.00% 45.00% Maximum EITC $529 $3,526 $5,828 $6,557 Phase-Out Rate 7.65% 15.98% 21.06% 21.06% Income at Which the EITC Begins to Phase Out Single $8,650 $19,030 $19,030 $19,030 Married Filing Jointly $14,450 $24,820 $24,820 $24,820 Income at Which the EITC is Phased-Out Single $15,570 $41,094 $46,703 $50,162 Married Filing Jointly $21,370 $46,884 $52,493 $55,952 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 32, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Revenue Procedure 2018-57. Number of Returns Filed and Average EITC Though childless workers account for 3% of total EITC dollars, they account for 26% of all returns claiming the EITC for 2016. The average EITC for childless workers was $291 (Figure 1). In contrast, the average EITC was $2,400 for taxpayers with one qualifying child and $4,152 for taxpayers with three or more qualifying children. Figure 1. EITC Returns and Average Amount of EITC Claimed / Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on 2016 data from the Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income. Proposal to Expand the Childless EITC The Economic Mobility Act of 2019 (H.R. 3300), ordered to be reported to the full House by the House Ways and Means Committee on June 20, 2019, would expand the EITC for childless workers for two years, 2019 and 2020. It would double the phase-in credit percentage to 15.3%, increase the maximum EITC in 2019 to $1,464, and increase the maximum income at which the credit for these workers phases out (see Figure 2). The bill would also make eligible for the childless EITC individuals aged 19 to 24 (except for full-time college students) and those aged 65. Figure 2. EITC for a Single, Childless Worker Under H.R. 3300 and Under Current Law, 2019 / Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). EITC, Work, and Poverty Research has found that the EITC both increases participation in the labor force and reduces poverty, but its impacts are generally restricted to families with children. An expanded EITC for childless individuals might similarly encourage work and reduce poverty for childless adults. A recent demonstration of an expanded childless EITC did show such impacts—specifically, reducing severe poverty and increasing work among women and very disadvantaged men. This expansion would increase the costs of the EITC. It also would no longer primarily target reducing poverty among children, who are a population group of traditional federal concern and who have the highest poverty rate when compared with nonelderly and elderly adults.

Jun 18, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: Support for Local Food Systems

Jun 18, 2019

Introduction to U.S. Economy: Fiscal Policy

Jun 18, 2019

Supreme Court Stays Injunction That Had Blocked a Portion of the Administration’s Border Wall Funding

Jun 17, 2019

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is an independent federal agency charged with helping improve the administration of federal elections. It was established by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; P.L. 107-252; 116 Stat. 1666; 52 U.S.C. §§20901-21145) and includes a four-member commission, a professional staff, an inspector general, and three advisory bodies. The EAC—and the legislation that created it—marked a shift in the federal approach to election administration. Congress had set requirements for the conduct of elections before HAVA, but HAVA was the first federal election administration legislation also to back its requirements with substantial federal support. In addition to setting new types of requirements, it provided federal funding to help states meet those requirements and facilitate other improvements to election administration and created a dedicated federal agency—the EAC—to manage election administration funding and collect and share election administration information. There was broad support in Congress during the HAVA debate for the idea of providing some assistance along these lines. Both at the time and since, however, opinions have differed about exactly what kind of assistance to provide and for how long. Members have disagreed about whether the EAC should be temporary or permanent, for example, and about what—if any—regulatory authority it should have. Changes in the election administration landscape and in Congress have brought different aspects of the debate to the forefront at various times. The 112th Congress saw the start of legislative efforts in the House to limit or eliminate the EAC, for example, while the agency’s participation in the federal response to attempted foreign interference in the 2016 elections has been cited as new grounds to extend or expand it. These shifts have been reflected in some cases in legislative activity related to the agency. For example, bills have been introduced to grant the EAC additional authority as well as to eliminate it. Other legislative proposals would leave the fundamental role of the EAC largely as it is but add new versions of its existing responsibilities or change the way it performs those responsibilities. Such proposals would direct the EAC to administer new types of grants, for example, or add new members to its advisory bodies.

Jun 14, 2019

Harbor Dredging: Issues and Historical Funding

Congress is debating whether to support increased funding for dredging to better maintain harbor channel depths and widths. A bill approved by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (H.R. 2440) seeks to boost dredging activity by utilizing more of the collections from a port tax levied to fund harbor maintenance. However, it is not clear how the additional funding would change the volume of material dredged from U.S. harbors, as limits on the U.S. dredge fleet and environmental restrictions on when dredging can be performed, among other factors, affect the cost and performance of harbor dredging. Data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the agency responsible for federal harbor maintenance, reveal that an increase in inflation-adjusted spending on routine maintenance dredging from 2001 to 2017 was not matched by an increase in the amount of material dredged (Figure 1). Over the five-year period from 2013 to 2017, spending on routine maintenance dredging was 22% higher (adjusted for inflation) than during the 2001-2005 period, but the actual amount of material dredged was 15% less. These data cover only routine dredging to maintain navigation channel depths and widths, excluding unplanned work such as dredging after hurricanes, which typically costs more. New construction dredging to expand shipping channels beyond existing authorized dimensions, which also is typically more costly than maintenance dredging, is also excluded from the data. Figure 1. “Regular” Harbor Maintenance Dredging (adjusted to 2017 dollars) / Source: CRS, using data from USACE, Dredging Cost Analysis, at https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16021coll2/id/2660. Notes: Excludes emergency work, hurricane response, and ARRA (P.L. 111-5) dredging. 2017 dollars calculated using “nondefense” deflator, Table 10.1 in Federal Budget at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/. Looked at another way (Figure 2), the average annual cost per cubic yard of dredged material for regular harbor maintenance, adjusted for inflation, has risen from $3.46 in 2001 to $5.24 in 2017, an increase of 51% from 2001. Figure 2. Cost Per Cubic Yard for “Regular” Harbor Maintenance Dredging (2017 dollars) / Source: CRS, using data from USACE, Dredging Cost Analysis. When including all maintenance dredging (i.e., unplanned work) and new construction dredging, USACE data show (Figure 3) a declining trend in the amount of material dredged since 1980 despite increases in federal funding. Figure 3. All Maintenance and New Work Dredging / Source: CRS, using data from USACE personal communication, June 8, 2019. Note: 2017 dollars calculated using “nondefense” deflator, Table 10.1 in Federal Budget. Multiple factors are believed to be causing recent cost increases—changes in dredged material disposal, mobilization costs, cost inflation of inputs, environmental factors, and a shortage of dredging firms—but the relative significance of each is unknown. Old disposal sites can be full and newer ones more distant. Unknown is whether enactment of P.L. 104-303 in 1996 led to more federal dollars being used to build and maintain disposal facilities, treat contaminated sediments, or transport dredge spoils further for beneficial uses. Mobilization and demobilization of the several vessels typically required for a dredge project can be more than one-third of project cost in the United States. In addition to changes in the cost of fuel, steel, and labor (accounted for in Figure 1 and Figure 2 above by inflation adjustments), cost of dredged material disposal and compliance with environmental protection requirements may be increasing. For example, to protect endangered species such as sea turtles, dredging firms might have to employ fishing trawlers or restrict dredging and spoils disposal to winter months when bad weather raises costs. Table 1 shows wide variation among USACE districts in the unit cost of dredging. Table 1. Average Unit Cost of Dredging by Selected USACE District Contracts >100,000 cubic yards, 2014 to 2018 USACE District Cubic Yards Dredged Cost per Cubic Yard San Francisco 5,398,939 $ 24.27 New York 11,908,916 $ 23.17 Philadelphia 6,037,757 $ 19.93 Jacksonville 22,447,059 $ 14.86 Los Angeles 1,283,153 $ 13.20 Detroit 3,064,310 $ 9.40 Alaska 5,550,057 $ 8.58 Savannah 37,140,202 $ 6.52 Portland (OR) 30,983,332 $ 5.29 Galveston 76,646,189 $ 3.80 New Orleans 105,894,803 $ 2.62 Source: CRS, using USACE Dredging Information Statistics at https://publibrary.planusace.us/#/series/Dredging%20Information. Congress, per 33 U.S.C. §622, has directed the USACE to contract out dredging work to private firms whenever possible. A handful of firms bid for USACE dredging projects; foreign firms and foreign-built dredges are prohibited in U.S. waters. USACE dredging contract data indicate that of the 701 dredging contracts the agency awarded from 2014 to 2018, 295 (42%) were sole-bid contracts and 178 (25%) attracted two bidders. Hopper dredges are generally preferred for dredging coastal harbors because they can work in rough water and can more efficiently transport dredge spoils to disposal sites. The four U.S. firms that own the 15 hopper dredges in the U.S. fleet accounted for 59% of the USACE’s dredging contracts awarded in dollar value and 32% of the total number of contracts awarded from 2014 to 2018. The USACE owns four hopper dredges employed for emergency work or when private industry submits bids much higher than the USACE’s estimated cost. In 1978 (P.L. 95-269), Congress reduced the USACE-owned fleet in hopes of increasing the private fleet and competition among dredging firms. The USACE is unable at times to schedule as much dredging as desired due to a lack of dredges. Compared to the fleets of the four European dredging firms considered world leaders, the U.S. fleet of hopper vessels is smaller and older. Each of the four European firms has a hopper fleet whose capacity is three to four times that of the entire U.S. fleet. According to an advocate for foreign investors in the United States, European dredging firms “could complete the U.S. projects for half the estimated cost and a third of the time.” One analysis finds dredging costs have trended downward in foreign markets. Foreign firms use heavy-lift ships to transport their dredge fleets. U.S. dredging firms would be required by law to use a U.S.-built heavy-lift ship for transport, but none exist; U.S. firms therefore tow individual vessels to jobsites and stage equipment in various coastal locations.

Jun 14, 2019

The Impeachment Process in the House of Representatives

Under the U.S. Constitution, the House of Representatives has the power to formally charge a federal officer with wrongdoing, a process known as impeachment. The House impeaches an individual when a majority agrees to a House resolution containing explanations of the charges. The explanations in the resolution are referred to as “articles of impeachment.” After the House agrees to impeach an officer, the role of the Senate is to conduct a trial to determine whether the charged individual should be removed from office. Removal requires a two-thirds vote in the Senate. The House impeachment process generally proceeds in three phases: (1) initiation of the impeachment process; (2) Judiciary Committee investigation, hearings, and markup of articles of impeachment; and (3) full House consideration of the articles of impeachment. Impeachment proceedings are usually initiated in the House when a Member submits a resolution through the hopper (in the same way that all House resolutions are submitted). A resolution calling for the impeachment of an officer will be referred to the Judiciary Committee; a resolution simply authorizing an investigation of an officer will be referred to the Rules Committee. In either case, the committee could then report a privileged resolution authorizing the investigation. In the past, House committees, under their general investigatory authority, have sometimes sought information and researched charges against officers prior to the adoption of a resolution to authorize an impeachment investigation. Impeachment proceedings could also be initiated by a Member on the floor. A Member can offer an impeachment resolution as a “Question of the Privileges of the House.” The House, when it considers a resolution called up this way, might immediately vote to refer it to the Judiciary Committee, leaving the resolution in the same status as if it had been submitted through the hopper. Alternatively, the House might vote to table the impeachment resolution. The House could also vote directly on the resolution, but in modern practice, it has not chosen to approve articles of impeachment called up in this fashion. Instead, the House has relied on the Judiciary Committee to first conduct an investigation, hold hearings, and report recommendations to the full House. Committee consideration is therefore typically the second stage of the impeachment process. In recent decades, it has been more common than not that the Judiciary Committee used information provided from another outside investigation. The committee might create a task force or a subcommittee to review this material and collect any other information through subpoenas, depositions, and public hearings. Impeachment investigations are governed by the standing rules of the House that govern all committee investigations, the terms of the resolution authorizing the investigation, and perhaps additional rules adopted by the committee specifically for the inquiry. If the committee determines that impeachment is warranted, it will mark up articles of impeachment using the same procedures followed for the markup of other legislation. If the Judiciary Committee reports a resolution impeaching a federal officer, that resolution qualifies for privileged consideration on the House floor; its consideration is the third stage of the impeachment process. The resolution can be called up at the direction of the committee and considered immediately under the hour rule in the House. If called up this way, amendments could be precluded if a majority voted to order the previous question. A motion to recommit, with or without instructions, is in order but is not subject to debate. Alternatively, the House might alter these procedures by unanimous consent to, for example, set a longer time for debate or to allow brief debate on a motion to recommit. A resolution reported from the Rules Committee could also be used to structure floor debate. If the House approves the impeachment resolution, it will appoint managers to present and argue its case against the federal officer in front of the Senate.

Jun 14, 2019

FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations: H.R. 3164

The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and in even-numbered fiscal years the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). (In the House, but not the Senate, appropriations jurisdiction for CFTC rests with the Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture.) Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill’s development. The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; rural development; FDA; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance loans and salaries; food safety inspection; animal and plant health programs, and technical assistance for conservation programs. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture marked up its FY2020 bill on May 23, 2019, by voice vote. On June 4, 2019, the full Appropriations Committee passed and reported an amended bill (H.R. 3164, H.Rept. 116-107) by a vote of 29-21, including adopting four amendments. The $24.3 billion discretionary total in the House-reported Agriculture appropriation would be $1 billion more (+4%) than the comparable amount enacted for FY2019 that includes the CFTC (Table 1, Figure 1). Generally speaking, the House-reported bill did not include most of the reductions proposed by the Trump Administration. For FY2020, the Administration requested $19.2 billion for discretionary-funded accounts within the jurisdiction of Agriculture appropriation, which would be a reduction of $4.1 billion from FY2019 (-18%). The primary changes from FY2019 that comprise the $1 billion overall increase in the House-reported bill are the following (Table 1): Increase Rural Development accounts by $382 million (+13%), including a $144 million increase for the Rural Housing Service (+9%) and a $208 million increase for the Rural Utilities Service (+34%) to support rural water and waste disposal and rural broadband. In addition, the General Provisions title includes a $338 million increase for a rural broadband pilot program. Increase foreign agricultural assistance by $377 million (+19%), including increasing Food for Peace humanitarian assistance by $350 million and McGovern-Dole Food for Education by $25 million. In FY2019, Food for Peace had received an increase of $216 million in the General Provisions title. The FY2020 increase is larger and is in the program’s base appropriation. Increase related agencies appropriations by $232 million, including increasing FDA appropriations by $185 million (+6%) and the CFTC by $47 million (+18%). Increase agricultural program appropriations by $228 million, including: Increase departmental administration accounts by $313 million (+80%), including funding the Administration’s requests for a $271 million increase for construction to renovate the USDA headquarters and a $46 million increase for the chief information officer. Increase USDA regulatory programs by $47 million, including increasing the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service by $23 million (+2%) and the Agricultural Marketing Service by $24 million (+15%). Decrease agricultural research by a net $137 million (-4%), mostly through smaller appropriations for construction. Agricultural Research Service (ARS) construction would be reduced by $331 million from FY2019, while salaries and expenses would increase for ARS (+$44 million) and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (+$143 million). Some of these increases are offset by a net reduction of $238 million in budget authority that is accomplished through the General Provisions title. This is mostly a combination of greater rescissions of carryover balances in WIC (-$300 million), the absence of continuing the FY2019 appropriation in the General Provisions for Food for Peace (-$216 million, as mentioned above) and rural water and waste disposal (-$75 million). The General Provisions provide increases in funding for rural broadband (+$338 million, as mentioned above) and other appropriations for miscellaneous programs (+$16 million, net). In addition to discretionary spending, the House-reported bill also carries mandatory spending—largely determined in separate authorizing laws—that totals $131 billion. This is about $2 billion more than in FY2019 often because of automatic changes from economic conditions and expectations about enrollment in entitlement programs. Crop insurance spending would decrease by $6.4 billion, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program spending decreases by about $2.4 billion, and child nutrition programs would increase by $0.9 billion. Reimbursement for the Commodity Credit Corporation would increase by $10 billion, mostly due to the cost of the Administration’s trade aid assistance in 2018. Changes in mandatory spending from the 2018 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2018, P.L. 115-334) are incorporated and were already subject to budgetary enforcement. Amounts in the FY2019 supplemental appropriation for disaster assistance (P.L. 116-20) are not included here. Thus, the overall total of mandatory and discretionary authority in the House-reported bill is about $155 billion, $24.3 billion of which is subject to discretionary spending limits. Table 1. Agriculture and Related Agencies FY2019 and FY2020 Appropriations (budget authority in millions of dollars) FY2019 FY2020 Change from FY2019 to House bill P.L. 116-6 Admin. RequestHouse H.R. 3164 I. Agricultural Programs: Discretionary 6,033.9 5,712.3 6,261.6 +227.7 Mandatory 1,374.0 1,404.0 1,404.0 +30.0 Subtotal 7,407.9 7,116.3 7,665.6 +257.7 II. Farm Production and Conservation Programs 2,748.8 2,430.6 2,798.0 +49.3 Mandatory 30,821.1 34,489.6 34,489.6 +3,668.5 Subtotal 33,569.9 36,920.2 37,287.6 +3,717.7 III. Rural Development 3,011.7 2,938.1 3,393.4 +381.7 IV. Domestic Food Programs: Discretionary 6,620.3 5,958.3 6,584.1 -36.2 Mandatory 96,560.0 93,013.1 95,049.8 -1,510.2 Subtotal 103,180.3 98,971.4 101,633.9 -1,546.4 V. Foreign Assistance 1,938.0 205.0 2,315.2 +377.2 VI. Related Agencies: Food and Drug Administration 3,080.5 3,251.3 3,265.7 +185.3 Commodity Futures Trading Commission [268.0] 250.0 315.0 +47.0 VII. General Provisions (net) 3.5 -1,153.0 -234.0 -237.5 Scorekeeping adjustments -404.0 -403.0 -398.0 +6.0 Discretionary Total: Senate basis w/o CFTC 23,032.7 18,939.6 [23,986.0] +953.3 Discretionary Total: House basis w/ CFTC [23,300.7] 19,189.6 24,301.0 +1,000.3 Mandatory Total 128,755.1 128,906.7 130,943.4 +2,188.3 Total: Senate basis w/o CFTC 151,787.8 147,846.4 154,929.4 +3,141.6 Total: House basis w/ CFTC 152,055.8 148,096.4 155,244.4 +3,188.6 Source: CRS, using appropriations text and reports and unpublished Congressional Budget Office (CBO) tables. Notes: Bracketed amounts are not in the Agriculture appropriations totals due to differing House-Senate jurisdiction for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Scorekeeping adjustments are not necessarily appropriated but are part of the official CBO accounting. Figure 1. Discretionary Agriculture Appropriations, by Title, FY2019-FY2020 / Source: CRS.

Jun 13, 2019

FDA Regulation of Cannabidiol (CBD) Consumer Products

Jun 12, 2019

National Security Implications of Fifth Generation (5G) Mobile Technologies

Jun 12, 2019

Hong Kong’s Proposed Extradition Law Amendments

Jun 11, 2019

Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2020 Budget and Appropriations

Each year, Congress considers 12 distinct appropriations measures, including one for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS), which includes funding for U.S. diplomatic activities, cultural exchanges, development and security assistance, and U.S. participation in multilateral organizations, among other international activities. On March 11, 2019, the Trump Administration submitted to Congress its SFOPS budget proposal for FY2020, which totaled $42.72 billion in discretionary funds ($42.88 billion when $158.9 million in mandatory retirement funds are included), reflecting adherence to discretionary funding caps, as determined by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25). The FY2020 request would amount to a 2.5% increase in SFOPS when compared to the FY2019 request but a 21% decrease in SFOPS funding when compared to the FY2019 enacted funding levels. Within these totals, Department of State and Related Agency funding would be reduced by 15.7%, with the greatest cuts to the Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (56%), International Organizations (26%), and the U.S. Agency for Global Media (22%) accounts. The Foreign Operations accounts would see a reduction of 23.5%, with the greatest cuts to the nonhealth development assistance (39%), humanitarian assistance (34%), and global health (28%) sectors. On May 16, the House Appropriations Committee agreed to its SFOPS measure (H.R. 2839) that would provide $56.54 billion in total spending ($56.39 in discretionary spending). The bill includes either level or increased funding in nearly all accounts compared to FY2019. It does not include the President’s proposal to consolidate spending into the proposed Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) and International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) accounts, and moves the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account from Title III (Bilateral Economic Assistance) into Title IV (International Security Assistance) to make clear the Committee’s desire to keep ESF distinct from the Development Assistance (DA) account. Finally, the bill would provide funds to make operational the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (pursuant to the BUILD Act of 2018; P.L. 115-254). This report will be updated to reflect congressional activity on FY2020 appropriations.

Jun 11, 2019

Maintaining Electric Reliability with Wind and Solar Sources: Background and Issues for Congress

The share of wind and solar power in the U.S. electricity mix grew from 1% in 2008 to 8% in 2018. Wind and solar are variable renewable energy (VRE) sources. Unlike conventional sources, weather variability creates uncertainty about the availability of VRE sources. This uncertainty could potentially result in a lack of reliability. Some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about the reliability of the electric power system given recent growth in generation from wind and solar sources and projections that growth will continue. According to official metrics, electric reliability was generally stable or improving over the 2013-2017 period. In other words, generation from wind and solar sources does not appear to be causing electric reliability issues at the national level over this period. Questions remain, however, about maintaining reliability if generation from wind and solar should increase above current projections, as some Members of Congress have supported. Entities in the electric power sector and their regulators are evaluating changes to their approaches to reliability to prepare for this possibility. Congress might seek clarification on whether new or modified approaches are required. Under the current regulatory framework, the federal government oversees reliability for the generation and transmission systems of the electric power sector. These components comprise the bulk power system and include large-scale wind and solar sources. The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT05; P.L. 109-58) authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to develop and enforce mandatory reliability standards for the bulk power system. Small-scale wind and solar sources, such as rooftop solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, are connected to the distribution system which is localized and under state jurisdiction. Federal mandatory reliability standards do not apply to the distribution system. The colloquial definition of reliability is “having power when it is needed,” but regulators and operators of power system components require a more precise statement of objectives and metrics. FERC and NERC have developed numerous technical standards to address reliability. These standards apply over the range of timescales over which reliability is measured, from milliseconds to years. FERC has approved approximately 100 reliability standards to date, and new standards are developed as needed to respond to changing conditions, including increasing generation from wind and solar sources. Multiple entities spanning multiple jurisdictions work together to maintain electric reliability. For economic reasons, wind and solar sources tend to be utilized to the maximum extent possible. When their availability changes, which can happen quickly, other sources must quickly respond to maintain reliability. Typically, other sources respond by increasing or decreasing their output, an operation known as balancing. Multiple types of electricity sources are used to balance wind and solar, including some fossil fuel-fired generators, some nuclear generators, other wind and solar sources (provided sufficient transmission availability), energy storage, and demand response. Each of these has benefits and limitations. Some sources and system operations that currently support balancing have received federal financial support in the past, such as tax credits, grants to states or other entities, and Department of Energy research programs. Congress might consider continuing or expanding such support, if lawmakers believed current activities affecting reliability were insufficient. Beyond developing and enforcing reliability standards, other federal government activities affect electric reliability. For example, FERC’s regulation of interstate electricity transmission can be a key determinant of how effectively different electricity sources can meet demand. FERC’s regulation of the wholesale electricity markets that operate in some regions of the country may also affect reliability, because market rules can influence which individual generators are used for system balancing. Market prices directly affect project revenues, influencing the kinds of sources that are developed. Additionally, some projects and programs Congress funds support reliability by enabling technology development and providing financial support for projects that support reliability.

Jun 10, 2019

FY2020 National Security Space Budget Request: An Overview

Jun 7, 2019

FY2019 Supplemental Appropriations for Agriculture

Jun 7, 2019

Defense Primer: DOD Transfer and Reprogramming Authorities

Jun 7, 2019

Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress

Jun 7, 2019

U.S. Military Electronic Warfare Program Funding: Background and Issues for Congress

Congress, in the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, and the Department of Defense (DOD) has identified electronic warfare (EW) as a critical capability supporting military operations to fulfil the current National Defense Strategy. Collectively, DOD considers procurement appropriations and research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) appropriations as part of its investment accounts. Using programs identified by the EW Executive Commission (EW EXCOM), this report traces funding for three of the military services (Air Force, Army, and Navy) along with several defense agencies (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency, the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense Operational Test and Evaluation, and U.S. Special Operations Command). This report compares DOD’s funding requests for FY2019 and FY2020 to assess if DOD seeks to increase the funding of the EW portfolio (by increasing funding), decrease its funding, or keep the portfolio relatively unchanged. Insights into EW Program Funding This report tracks DOD funding requests for approximately 65 research and develop program elements and 30 procurement line items across FY2019 and FY2020. Reviewing these two fiscal years request allows for comparisons across the EW portfolio and provides insights into how EW was prioritized relative to the overall DOD budget. In addition to tracking funding requests in each of the respective fiscal years and identifying what Congress appropriated in FY2019, this report looks at the future years defense program (FYDP) to identify potential trends in the EW portfolio. This report looks at the combination of the procurement and RDT&E budget requests to provide a comprehensive, unclassified overview of the total EW program requests within DOD. DOD requested at least $10.1 billion in FY2019 and $10.2 billion in FY2020 for EW, an amount analogous to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program ($10.7 billion in FY2019) or a Ford-class aircraft carrier ($12.5 billion in total ship-building procurement). Based on statements by several senior defense officials and the conclusions of the National Defense Strategy Commission, it could be expected that DOD is likely to substantially increase funding for EW programs. CRS assesses that DOD increased EW RDT&E funding by 9.7% and EW Procurement funding by 7.1% from the FY2019 request to the FY2020 request. Both portfolios increased more than the 4.9% increase in overall DOD requested funding. From a portfolio perspective, CRS assesses that the Administration seeks to increase funding by $1.48 billion in FY2021 (representing a 16.3% increase), $1.53 billion in FY2022 (a 16.9% increase), and $1.41 billion in FY2023 (a 14.8% increase). Potential Issues for Congress Based on this analysis, this report identifies three potential issues for Congress Is DOD appropriately funding the EW portfolio? How does DOD use appropriated funds for EW programs? Is DOD potentially buying new capabilities with research and development funds, when it should use procurement funding? Does DOD understand what it is developing and procuring within the EW portfolio?

Jun 6, 2019

Legislative Branch: FY2020 Appropriations

The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Congressional Workplace Rights (formerly Office of Compliance); Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress (LOC), including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Publishing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); Open World Leadership Center; and the John C. Stennis Center. The legislative branch budget request was submitted on March 11, 2019. Following hearings in the House and Senate in February, March, and April, the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch held a markup on May 1, 2019. No amendments were considered, and the bill was ordered reported to the full committee by voice vote. On May 9, 2019, the House Appropriations Committee held a markup of the bill. Two manager’s amendments were considered. The first amendment was adopted by voice vote. The second amendment was adopted by voice vote after an amendment to the amendment was not adopted (23-28). The bill was ordered reported (H.Rept. 116-64; H.R. 2779). As amended, the bill would provide $3.972 billion, not including Senate items (+$164.2 million). On June 3, the House Committee on Rules issued a “Dear Colleague” letter announcing the amendment process for floor consideration of the legislative branch and four other appropriations bills (Rules Committee Print 116-17). The committee established a deadline of 10:00 a.m. on June 7, 2019, for the submission of draft amendments. During consideration of the FY2020 funding levels, Congress also considered an additional $10.0 million in FY2019 supplemental appropriations for GAO for audits and investigations related to storms and disasters. This funding has been included in two bills considered in the 116th Congress: H.R. 268, which passed the House on January 16, 2019, but cloture was not invoked in the Senate; and H.R. 2157, which has passed both the House and Senate. Previously, over the last decade The FY2019 level of $4.836 billion represented an increase of $136.0 million (+2.9%) from FY2018. The FY2018 level of $4.700 billion represented an increase of $260.0 million (+5.9%) from FY2017. The FY2017 level of $4.440 billion represented increase of $77.0 million (+1.7%) from FY2016. The FY2016 level of $4.363 billion represented an increase of $63.0 million (+1.5%) from FY2015. The FY2015 level of $4.300 billion represented an increase of $41.7 million (+1.0%) from FY2014. The FY2014 level of $4.259 billion represented an increase of $198 million (+4.9%) from FY2013. The FY2013 level of $4.061 billion represented a decrease of $246 million (-5.6%), including the sequestration and rescission, from FY2012. The FY2012 level of $4.307 billion represented a decrease of $236.9 million (-5.2%) from FY2011. The FY2011 level of $4.543 billion represented a decrease of $125.1 million (-2.7%) from the $4.669 billion provided for FY2010. The smallest of the appropriations bills, the legislative branch bill comprises approximately 0.4% of total discretionary budget authority.

Jun 6, 2019

The Front End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Current Issues

Nuclear power contributes roughly 20% of the electrical generation in the United States. Uranium is the fundamental element in fuel used for nuclear power production. The nuclear fuel cycle is the cradle-to-grave life cycle from extracting uranium ore from the earth through power production in a nuclear reactor to permanent disposal of the resulting spent nuclear fuel. The front end of the nuclear fuel cycle considers the portion of the nuclear fuel cycle leading up to electrical power production in a nuclear reactor. The front end of the nuclear fuel cycle has four stages: mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, and fabrication. Mining and milling is the process of removing uranium ore from the earth and physically and chemically processing the ore to develop “yellowcake” uranium concentrate. Uranium conversion produces uranium hexafluoride, a gaseous form of uranium, from uranium concentrate. Uranium enrichment physically separates and concentrates the fissile isotope U-235. The enriched uranium used in nuclear power reactors is approximately 3%-5% U-235, while weapons-grade enriched uranium is greater than 90% U-235. Nuclear fuel fabrication involves manufacturing enriched uranium fuel rods and assemblies highly specific to a nuclear power reactor. Historically, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), a predecessor federal agency to the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), promoted uranium production through federal procurement contracts between 1947 and 1971. Since the late 1980s, U.S. nuclear utilities and reactor operators have purchased increasingly more foreign-origin uranium for reactor fuel than domestically produced uranium. In 1987, about half of uranium used in domestic nuclear reactors was foreign origin. By 2018, however, 93% of uranium used in U.S. nuclear reactors was foreign origin. No uranium conversion facilities currently operate in the United States. There is one operational U.S. commercial uranium enrichment facility that has the capacity to enrich approximately one-third of the country’s annual reactor requirements. In additional to newly mined uranium, U.S. nuclear power reactors also rely on secondary sources of uranium materials. These sources include federal and commercial stockpiles, re-enrichment of depleted uranium, excess feed from underfeeding during commercial enrichment, and downblending of higher enriched uranium. The global uranium market operates with multiple industries exchanging uranium products and services through separate, nondirect, and interrelated markets. Producers, suppliers, and utilities buy, sell, store, and transfer uranium materials. Nuclear utilities and reactor operators diversify fuel sources among primary and secondary supply and may acquire uranium from multiple domestic and foreign suppliers and servicers. For example, a nuclear power utility in the United States may purchase uranium concentrate that has been mined and milled in Australia, converted in France, enriched in Germany, and fabricated into fuel in the United States. On January 16, 2018, two domestic uranium producers—representatives from the uranium mining/milling industry—petitioned the U.S. Department of Commerce to conduct a Section 232 investigation pursuant to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. §1862) to examine whether U.S. uranium imports pose a threat to national security. The President has until July 13, 2019, to decide if he concurs with the findings and determine what import actions to levy, if any. The Section 232 uranium investigation into uranium imports has started a debate among domestic uranium producers and nuclear utilities and organizations operating nuclear fuel facilities. Uranium producers assert that low production of domestically sourced uranium concentrate poses a national security risk as fuel supplies are dependent on imported material. Nuclear utilities and reactor operators assert that increased fuel costs from trade restrictions would increase their financial burdens, leading to the premature shutdown of economically marginal nuclear power plants. Trade actions may have direct and indirect local, regional, and national economic impacts. Congress may examine the current status of domestic uranium supply and the long-term viability of these industries.

Jun 6, 2019

The Legal Framework of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)

Jun 5, 2019

The Feres Doctrine: Congress, the Courts, and Military Servicemember Lawsuits Against the United States

Jun 5, 2019

China Primer: Human Rights

Jun 4, 2019

Vehicle Electrification: Federal and State Issues Affecting Deployment

Most of the 270 million cars, trucks, and buses on U.S. highways are powered by internal combustion engines using gasoline or diesel fuel. However, improvements in technology have led to the emergence of vehicle electrification as a potentially viable alternative to internal combustion engines. Several bills pending in the 116th Congress address issues and incentives related to electric vehicles and charging infrastructure. Experience with fully electric vehicles is relatively recent: While a few experimental vehicles were marketed in the United States in the 1990s, the first contemporary all-electric passenger vehicles were introduced in 2010. Since then, newer models have increased the range an electric vehicle can travel on a single charge, and charging stations have become more readily available. These developments have been spurred by a range of government incentives, both in the United States and abroad. Transit buses are the fastest-growing segment of vehicle electrification in China, while in the United States and the European Union, the pace of bus electrification is slower. In the United States, federal incentives for electric passenger vehicle purchases have remained largely unchanged for more than a decade and are based primarily on tax credits for electric vehicle purchases and recharging infrastructure investments, and spending on battery chemistry research to develop less-expensive technologies: The plug-in electric tax credit permits a taxpayer to take a credit of up to $7,500 for each vehicle that can be recharged from the electricity grid; it phases out after a manufacturer has sold 200,000 eligible vehicles, a threshold that has been met by Tesla and General Motors. A tax credit for installation of alternative fuel vehicle refueling property expired in 2017; it had allowed a tax credit of $1,000 for equipment installed at a residence and up to $30,000 for business installations. Investment in transportation electrification research and development (R&D), which has led to the gradual reduction in the cost of producing lithium-ion batteries, is administered by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in cooperation with private industry. Although the Trump Administration has recommended large reductions in these programs, Congress has maintained annual funding for sustainable transportation of nearly $700 million in the past two fiscal years. Other programs that directly influence the level of vehicle electrification include the DOE Clean Cities Program, which supports local efforts to reduce fossil fuel-powered transportation, and the Department of Transportation’s Alternative Fuel Corridors, which are designated Interstate Highway corridors with a sufficient number of alternative fueling stations, including electric vehicle chargers, to allow alternative fuel vehicles to travel long distances. The federal government also funds municipal transit bus electrification through Federal Transit Administration grants, which may be used for the purchase of all-electric buses. The pace of electrification also may be affected by proposals for less stringent federal standards for Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) and greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles. Beyond these federal programs, states and electric utilities provide a range of incentives for electrification. The National Conference of State Legislatures reports that 45 states and the District of Columbia offer incentives such as income tax credits for electric vehicle and charger purchases, reduced registration fees, and permitting solo drivers of electric vehicles to use carpool lanes. The California Zero Emission Vehicle program is spurring sales of electric vehicles in 10 states. Utilities can provide incentives to charge during off-peak hours, install public electric charging infrastructure, and utilize vehicle-to-grid (V2G) storage. V2G storage would allow idle vehicle batteries to supply electricity to the grid rather than drawing power from it during peak demand periods.

Jun 3, 2019

New Round of Farm Trade Aid Proposed by Administration for 2019

On May 23, 2019, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) announced that it will take several actions in 2019 to assist farmers in response to continued economic damage from trade retaliation and trade disruption in international agricultural markets. These actions are to include a new trade aid package for the U.S. farm sector valued at up to $16 billion. Building on the 2018 Trade Aid Package USDA implemented a similar trade aid package in 2018, also in response to trade retaliation against U.S. agricultural products. Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue used authority under the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act (15 U.S.C. §714c) to authorize up to $12 billion in financial assistance for certain agricultural commodities. In September 2018 Secretary Perdue stated that 2018 trade aid was a one-time program and that nothing similar would be implemented in 2019 unless Congress took the initiative to authorize such a package. Instead of future trade aid, the Administration stated that it would negotiate a trade agreement with China with expanded access to China’s market for U.S. agricultural products. However, the Administration and China have been unable to resolve differences in their ongoing trade dispute, leading to the announcement of a second U.S. farm trade aid package for 2019. 2018 Trade Disputes Spill into 2019 The ongoing trade dispute originated in early 2018 with U.S. tariffs imposed on steel and aluminum imports from certain countries and a reaction from those countries. By May 2018, the largest dispute focused on a disagreement between the United States and China following the imposition of U.S. tariffs on $50 billion of Chinese goods imported by the United States. China retaliated with higher tariffs on several U.S. agricultural products, and the dispute has since escalated. Trade retaliation—in this case, in the form of higher tariffs—can raise costs along the producer-to-consumer supply chain and disrupt normal marketing patterns by forcing commodities to find new markets. This trade retaliation has impacted several U.S. commodities. USDA Announces 2019 Trade Aid, Yet Many Details to Be Determined According to a May 23 USDA press release, the 2019 trade aid package appears to be similar to the 2018 package but with different funding levels and, in the case of the Market Facilitation Program, a different payment rate determination. USDA again plans to use CCC Charter Act authority to fund and implement three separate components. (Amounts cited below are in addition to the $12 billion announced in 2018.) The Market Facilitation Program (MFP) for 2019, administered by the Farm Service Agency, is intended to provide $14.5 billion in direct payments to producers of several commodities (listed below). A Food Purchase and Distribution Program, valued at $1.4 billion and administered through the Agricultural Marketing Service, is expected to be used to purchase surplus commodities affected by trade retaliation such as fruits, vegetables, some processed foods, beef, pork, lamb, poultry, and milk. These are for distribution by USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service to food banks, schools, and other outlets serving low-income individuals. The Agricultural Trade Promotion Program, valued at $100 million, is to be administered by the Foreign Agriculture Service to assist in developing new export markets for U.S. producers. USDA has released preliminary information about the 2019 MFP. Not public are what the payment rates will be and how they will be determined. However, unlike the 2018 MFP, which limited payments to producers of seven commodities, the 2019 MFP proposes to make payments to producers of an expanded list of field crops (alfalfa hay, barley, canola, corn, crambe, dry peas, extra-long-staple cotton, flaxseed, lentils, long- and medium-grain rice, mustard seed, dried beans, oats, peanuts, rapeseed, safflower, sesame seed, small and large chickpeas, sorghum, soybeans, sunflower seed, temperate japonica rice, upland cotton, and wheat), as well as milk, hogs, and certain specialty crops (tree nuts, fresh sweet cherries, cranberries, and fresh grapes). For field crop producers, a single county payment rate per acre is to be calculated on a county-by-county basis using an as-yet-unannounced formula that is to consider historical production activity. Payments are to be based on each farm’s 2019 planted acres. In contrast, 2018 MFP payments were based on harvested production. As a result, any acres prevented from being planted this year may not be eligible for MFP payments. However, they may qualify for pending disaster aid (H.R. 2157) and for prevented planting benefits under crop insurance. A farm’s total acres eligible for MFP in 2019 cannot exceed its 2018 plantings. Hog producer payments are to be based on hog inventories, while dairy producer payments are to be per-hundred pounds of historical milk production. The reference periods for these have yet to be determined. MFP payments may be made in tranches. The first of these is to begin in late July or early August. The second and third tranches are to be evaluated relative to market conditions and trade opportunities—for example, a successful conclusion to the U.S.-China trade negotiations could temper the need for further MFP payments. Otherwise, if conditions warrant, the second and third tranches may be made in November 2019 and early January 2020. The share of payments to be issued in each tranche has not been announced. USDA has not indicated whether payment caps for individual producers will be imposed on MFP payments and whether an adjusted gross income (AGI) threshold may be enforced. USDA did apply payment limits and an AGI threshold to 2018 MFP payments. Another uncertainty is how USDA will notify MFP outlays at the World Trade Organization, where the United States has committed to limit outlays on programs that alter production incentives to less than $19.1 billion annually.

May 31, 2019

Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues

For the past 70 years, the United States has been instrumental in leading and promoting a strong U.S.-European partnership. Often termed the transatlantic relationship, this partnership has been grounded in the U.S.-led post-World War II order based on alliances with like-minded democratic countries and a shared U.S.-European commitment to free markets and an open international trading system. Transatlantic relations encompass the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), close U.S. bilateral ties with most countries in Western and Central Europe, and a massive, interdependent trade and investment partnership. Despite periodic U.S.-European tensions, successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported the broad transatlantic relationship, viewing it as enhancing U.S. security and stability and magnifying U.S. global influence and financial clout. Transatlantic Relations and the Trump Administration The transatlantic relationship currently faces significant challenges. President Trump and some members of his Administration have questioned the strategic value and utility of NATO to the United States, and they have expressed considerable skepticism about the fundamental worth of the EU and the multilateral trading system. President Trump repeatedly has voiced concern that the United States bears an undue share of the transatlantic security burden and that EU trade policies are unfair to U.S. workers and businesses. U.S.-European policy divisions have emerged on a wide range of regional and global issues, from certain aspects of relations with Russia and China, to policies on Iran, Syria, arms control, and climate change, among others. The United Kingdom’s pending departure from the EU (“Brexit”) also could have implications for U.S. security and economic interests in Europe. The Trump Administration asserts that its policies toward Europe seek to bolster the transatlantic relationship by ensuring that European allies and friends are equipped to work with the United States in confronting the challenges posed by an increasingly competitive world. Administration officials maintain that the U.S. commitment to NATO and European security remains steadfast; President Trump has backed new NATO initiatives to deter Russian aggression and increased U.S. troop deployments in Europe. The Administration also contends that it is committed to working with the EU to resolve trade and tariff disputes, as signaled by its intention to launch new U.S.-EU trade negotiations. Supporters credit President Trump’s approach toward Europe with strengthening NATO and compelling the EU to address U.S. trade concerns. Critics argue that the Administration’s policies are endangering decades of U.S.-European cooperation that have advanced key U.S. geostrategic and economic interests. Some analysts suggest that current U.S.-European divisions are detrimental to transatlantic cohesion and represent a win for potential adversaries such as Russia and China. Many European leaders worry about potential U.S. global disengagement, and some argue that Europe must be better prepared to address both regional and international challenges on its own. Congressional Interests The implications of Trump Administration policies toward Europe and the extent to which the transatlantic relationship contributes to promoting U.S. security and prosperity may be of interest to the 116th Congress. Broad bipartisan support exists in Congress for NATO, and many Members of Congress view the EU as an important U.S. partner, especially given extensive U.S.-EU trade and investment ties. At the same time, some Members have long advocated for greater European burdensharing in NATO, or may oppose European or EU policies on certain foreign policy or trade issues. Areas for potential congressional oversight include the future U.S. role in NATO, as well as prospects for U.S.-European cooperation on common challenges such as managing a resurgent Russia and an increasingly competitive China. Based on its constitutional role over tariffs and foreign commerce, Congress has a direct interest in monitoring proposed new U.S.-EU trade agreement negotiations. In addition, Congress may consider how the Administration’s trade and tariff policies could affect the U.S.-EU economic relationship. Also see CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO’s Value, by Paul Belkin; CRS Report R44249, The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects, by Kristin Archick; and CRS In Focus IF11209, Proposed U.S.-EU Trade Agreement Negotiations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Andres B. Schwarzenberg, and Renée Johnson.

May 31, 2019

Defense Primer: Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

May 30, 2019

Technological Convergence: Regulatory, Digital Privacy, and Data Security Issues

Technological convergence, in general, refers to the trend or phenomenon where two or more independent technologies integrate and form a new outcome. One example is the smartphone. A smartphone integrated several independent technologies—such as telephone, computer, camera, music player, television (TV), and geolocating and navigation tool—into a single device. The smartphone has become its own, identifiable category of technology, establishing a $350 billion industry. Of the three closely associated convergences—technological convergence, media convergence, and network convergence—consumers most often directly engage with technological convergence. Technological convergent devices share three key characteristics. First, converged devices can execute multiple functions to serve blended purpose. Second, converged devices can collect and use data in various formats and employ machine learning techniques to deliver enhanced user experience. Third, converged devices are connected to a network directly and/or are interconnected with other devices to offer ubiquitous access to users. Technological convergence may present a range of issues where Congress may take legislative and/or oversight actions. Three selected issue areas associated with technological convergence are regulatory jurisdiction, digital privacy, and data security. First, merging and integrating multiple technologies from distinct functional categories into one converged technology may pose challenges to defining regulatory policies and responsibilities. Determining oversight jurisdictions and regulatory authorities for converged technologies can become unclear as the boundaries that once separated single-function technologies blend together. A challenge for Congress may be in delineating which government agency has jurisdiction over various converged technologies. Defining policies that regulate technological convergence industry may not be simple or straightforward. This may further complicate how Congress oversees government agencies and converged industries due to blending boundaries of existing categories. Second, converged technologies collect and use personal and machine data which may raise digital privacy concerns for consumers. Data collection and usage are tied to digital privacy issues because a piece or aggregation of information could identify an individual or reveal patterns in one’s activities. Converged or smart technologies leverage large volumes of data to try to improve the user experience by generating more tailored and anticipatory results. However, such data can potentially identify, locate, track, and monitor an individual without the person’s knowledge. Such data can also potentially be sold to third-party entities without an individual’s awareness. As the use of converged technologies continues to propagate, digital privacy issues will likely remain central. Third, data security concerns are often associated with smart devices’ convenient ubiquitous features that may double as vulnerabilities exploited by malicious actors. Data security, a component of cybersecurity, protects data from unauthorized access and use. Along with digital privacy, data security is a pertinent issue to technological convergence. As converged devices generate and consume large volumes of data, multiple data security concerns have emerged: potentially increased number of access points susceptible to cyberattacks, linkage to physical security, and theft of data. Relatively few policies are in place for specifically overseeing technological convergence, and current federal data protection laws have varied privacy and data security provisions for different types of personal data. To address regulatory, digital privacy, and data security issues, Congress may consider the role of the federal government in an environment where technological evolution changes quickly and continues to disrupt existing regulatory frameworks. Regulating technological convergence may entail policies for jurisdictional deconfliction, harmonization, and expansion to address blended or new categories of technology. One approach could be for Congress to define the role of federal government oversight of digital privacy and data security by introducing new legislation that comprehensively addresses digital privacy and data security issues or by expanding the current authorities of federal agencies. When considering new legislation or expanding the authorities of federal agencies, three potential policy decisions are (1) whether data privacy and data security should be addressed together or separately, (2) whether various types of personal data should be treated equally or differently, and (3) which agencies should be responsible for implementing any new laws.

May 30, 2019

Defense Primer: Defense Working Capital Funds

May 29, 2019

Antitrust Law: An Introduction

May 29, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: Beginning Farmers and Ranchers

May 28, 2019

USDA Domestic Food Assistance Programs: FY2019 Appropriations

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-6) was enacted on February 15, 2019. This omnibus bill included appropriations for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), of which USDA’s domestic food assistance programs are a part. Prior to its enactment, the federal government had continued to operate for the first six months of the fiscal year under continuing resolutions (CRs). This report focuses on the enacted appropriations for USDA’s domestic food assistance programs and, in some instances, policy changes provided by the omnibus law. CRS Report R45230, Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2019 Appropriations provides an overview of the entire FY2019 Agriculture and Related Agencies portion of the law as well as a review of the reported bills and CRs preceding it. USDA experienced a 35-day lapse in FY2019 funding and partial government shutdown prior to the enactment of P.L. 116-6. Domestic food assistance funding is primarily mandatory but also includes discretionary funding. Most of the programs’ funding is for open-ended, appropriated mandatory spending—that is, terms of the authorizing law require full funding and funding may vary with program participation (and in some cases inflation). The largest mandatory programs include the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly the Food Stamp Program) and the child nutrition programs (including the National School Lunch Program and School Breakfast Program). Though their funding levels are dictated by the authorizing law, in most cases, appropriations are needed to make funds available for obligation and expenditure. The three largest discretionary budget items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP); and federal nutrition program administration. The domestic food assistance funding is, for the most part, administered by USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service (FNS). The enacted FY2019 appropriation provides over $103 billion for domestic food assistance (Table 1). This is a decrease of approximately $1.7 billion from FY2018. Declining participation in SNAP is responsible for most of the difference. Approximately 94% of the FY2018 appropriations for domestic food assistance are for mandatory spending. Highlights of the associated appropriations accounts are summarized below. For SNAP and other programs authorized by the Food and Nutrition Act, such as The Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP) commodities, the FY2019 appropriations law provides approximately $73.5 billion. Certain provisions of the law affect SNAP policies. For example, it continues a policy in the FY2017 and FY2018 appropriations laws that limited USDA’s implementation of December 2016 regulations regarding SNAP retailers’ inventory requirements. USDA must amend its final rule to define “variety” more expansively and must “apply the requirements regarding acceptable varieties and breadth of stock.” For the child nutrition programs (the National School Lunch Program and others), the enacted law provides approximately $23.1 billion. This includes discretionary funding for school meals equipment grants ($30 million) and Summer Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) demonstration projects ($28 million), and a general provision that provides an additional $5 million for farm-to-school grants. The law includes policy provisions related to processed poultry from China, requirements for schools’ paid lunch pricing, vegetables in school breakfasts, and the use of commodities in child nutrition programs. For the WIC program, the law provides nearly $6.1 billion while also rescinding $500 million in prior-year carryover funding. The law includes new funding for telehealth grants. For the Commodity Assistance Program account, which includes funding for the Commodity Supplemental Food Program (CSFP), TEFAP administrative and distribution costs, and other programs, the law provides over $322 million. The law increases discretionary funding for TEFAP administrative and distribution costs through the annual appropriation and through a $30 million transfer of prior-year CSFP funds. For Nutrition Programs Administration, the law provides nearly $165 million.

May 24, 2019

Legislative Purpose and Adviser Immunity in Congressional Investigations

May 24, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: Rural Development Programs

May 23, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: Agricultural Trade and Food Assistance

May 22, 2019

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview

A plaintiff injured by a defendant’s wrongful act may file a tort lawsuit to recover money from that defendant. To name a particularly familiar example, a person who negligently causes a vehicular collision may be liable to the victim of that crash. By forcing people who wrongfully injure others to pay money to their victims, the tort system serves at least two functions: (1) deterring people from injuring others and (2) compensating those who are injured. Employees and officers of the federal government occasionally commit torts just like other members of the general public. For a substantial portion of this nation’s history, however, plaintiffs injured by the tortious acts of a federal officer or employee were barred from filing lawsuits against the United States by “sovereign immunity”—a legal doctrine that ordinarily prohibits private citizens from haling a sovereign state into court without its consent. Until the mid-20th century, a tort victim could obtain compensation from the United States only by persuading Congress to pass a private bill compensating him for his loss. Congress, deeming this state of affairs unacceptable, enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which authorizes plaintiffs to obtain compensation from the United States for the torts of its employees. However, subjecting the federal government to tort liability not only creates a financial cost to the United States, it also creates a risk that government officials may inappropriately base their decisions not on socially desirable policy objectives, but rather on the desire to reduce the government’s exposure to monetary damages. In an attempt to mitigate these potential negative effects of abrogating the government’s immunity from liability and litigation, the FTCA limits the circumstances in which a plaintiff may pursue a tort lawsuit against the United States. For example, the FTCA contains several exceptions that categorically bar plaintiffs from recovering tort damages in certain categories of cases. Federal law also restricts the types and amount of damages a victorious plaintiff may recover in an FTCA suit. Additionally, a plaintiff may not initiate an FTCA lawsuit unless he has timely complied with a series of procedural requirements, such as providing the government an initial opportunity to evaluate the plaintiff’s claim and decide whether to settle it before the case proceeds to federal court. Since Congress first enacted the FTCA, the federal courts have developed a robust body of judicial precedent interpreting the statute’s contours. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has expressed reluctance to reconsider its long-standing FTCA precedents, thereby leaving the task of further developing the FTCA to Congress. Some Members of Congress have accordingly proposed legislation to modify the FTCA in various respects, such as by broadening the circumstances in which a plaintiff may hold the United States liable for torts committed by government employees.

May 21, 2019