CRS Reports

Bureau of Land Management: FY2020 Appropriations

Aug 26, 2019

A Brief Overview of FEMA’s Individual Assistance Program

Aug 23, 2019

Supreme Court October Term 2018: A Review of Selected Major Rulings

The Supreme Court term that began on October 1, 2018, was a term of transition, with the Court issuing a number of rulings that, at times, suggested but did not fully adopt broader transformations in its jurisprudence. The term followed the retirement of Justice Kennedy, who was a critical vote on the Court for much of his 30-year tenure and who had been widely viewed as the Court’s median or “swing” Justice. As a result, the question looming over the October 2018 Term was how the replacement of Justice Kennedy with Justice Kavanaugh would alter the Court’s jurisprudence going forward. Notwithstanding the alteration in the Court’s makeup, observers have generally agreed that the October 2018 Term largely did not produce broad changes to the Court’s jurisprudence. Although a number of cases presented the Court with the opportunity to rethink various areas of law, the Court largely declined those invitations. In other cases, a majority of the Justices did not resolve potentially far-reaching questions, resulting in the Court either issuing more narrow rulings or simply not issuing an opinion in a given case. Nonetheless, much of the low-key nature of the October 2018 Term was a product of the Court’s decisions to not hear certain matters. And for a number of closely watched cases that it did agree to hear, the Court opted to schedule arguments for the next term. While the Supreme Court’s latest term generally did not result in wholesale changes to the law, its rulings were nonetheless important, in large part, because they provide insight into how the Court may function following Justice Kennedy’s retirement. For the fourth straight year at the Court, the number of opinions decided by a bare majority increased, with 29% of the Court’s decisions being issued by a five-Justice majority. While a number of decisions saw the Court divided along what are perceived to be the typical ideological lines, the bulk of the Court’s closely divided cases involved heterodox lineups in which Justices with divergent judicial philosophies joined to form a majority in a given case. Collectively, the voting patterns of the October 2018 Term have led some commentators to suggest that the Court has transformed from an institution that was largely defined by the vote of Justice Kennedy to one in which multiple Justices are now perceived to be the Court’s swing votes. Beyond the general dynamics of the October 2018 Term, the Court issued a number of opinions of importance for Congress. Of particular note are five opinions from the October Term 2018: (1) Kisor v. Wilkie, which considered the continued viability of the Auer-Seminole Rock doctrine governing judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation; (2) Department of Commerce v. New York, a challenge to the addition of a citizenship question to the 2020 census questionnaire; (3) Rucho v. Common Cause, which considered whether federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of excessive partisanship in drawing electoral districts; (4) American Legion v. American Humanist Association, a challenge to the constitutionality of a state’s display of a Latin cross as a World War I memorial; and (5) Gundy v. United States, which considered the scope of the long-dormant nondelegation doctrine.

Aug 23, 2019

International Food Assistance: Food for Peace Nonemergency Programs

The U.S. government provides international food assistance to promote global food security, alleviate hunger, and address food crises among the world’s most vulnerable populations. Congress authorizes this assistance through regular agriculture and international affairs legislation, and provides funding through annual appropriations legislation. The primary channel for this assistance is the Food for Peace program (FFP), administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Established in 1954, FFP has historically focused primarily on meeting the emergency food needs of the world’s most vulnerable populations; however, it also manages a number of nonemergency programs. These lesser-known programs employ food to foster development aims, such as addressing the root causes of hunger and making communities more resilient to shocks, both natural and human-induced. Nonemergency activities, which in FY2019 are funded at a minimum annual level of $365 million, may include in-kind food distributions, educational nutrition programs, training on agricultural markets and farming best practices, and broader community development initiatives, among others. In building resilience in vulnerable communities, the United States, through FFP, seeks to reduce the need for future emergency assistance. Similar to emergency food assistance, nonemergency programs use U.S. in-kind food aid—commodities purchased in the United States and shipped overseas. In recent years, it has also turned to market-based approaches, such as procuring food in the country or region in which it will ultimately be delivered (also referred to as local and regional procurement, or LRP) or distributing vouchers and cash for local food purchase. The 115th Congress enacted both the 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334) and Global Food Security Reauthorization Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-266), which authorized all Food for Peace programs through FY2023. In the 116th Congress, Members may be interested in several policy and structural issues related to nonemergency food assistance as they consider foreign assistance, agriculture, and foreign affairs policies and programs in the course of finalizing annual appropriations legislation. For example, The Trump Administration has repeatedly proposed eliminating funding for the entire FFP program, including both emergency and nonemergency programs, from Agriculture appropriations and instead fund food assistance entirely through Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs appropriations. The Administration asserts that the proposal is part of an effort to “streamline foreign assistance, prioritize funding, and use funding as effectively and efficiently as possible.” To date, Congress has not accepted the Administration’s proposal and continued to fund the FFP program in Agriculture appropriations, which is currently authorized through FY2023. USAID’s internal reform initiative, referred to as Transformation, calls for the merger of the Office of FFP with the Office U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) into a new entity called the Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance (HA) by the end of 2020. While the agency has indicated that the new HA will administer nonemergency programming, there are few details on how it will do so. FFP programs fall into two distinct committee jurisdictions—Agriculture and Foreign Affairs/Relations—making congressional oversight of programs more challenging. No one committee receives a comprehensive view of all FFP programming, and the committees of jurisdiction sometimes have competing priorities. For additional information, see CRS Report R45422, U.S. International Food Assistance: An Overview.

Aug 21, 2019

Is Mandatory Detention of Unlawful Entrants Seeking Asylum Constitutional?

Aug 20, 2019

Small Business Credit Markets and Selected Policy Issues

Small businesses are owned by and employ a wide variety of entrepreneurs—skilled trade technicians, medical professionals, financial consultants, technology innovators, and restaurateurs, among many others. As do large corporations, small businesses rely on credit to purchase inventory, to cover cash flow shortages that may arise from unexpected expenses or periods of inadequate income, or to expand operations. During the Great Recession of 2007-2009, lending to small businesses declined. A decade after the recession, it appears that while many small businesses enjoy increased access to credit, others might still face credit constraints. Congress has demonstrated an ongoing interest in credit availability for small businesses, viewing them as a medium for stimulating the economy and creating jobs. In general, Congress’s interest in the small business credit market focuses on quantity and price—specifically (1) whether small businesses can reasonably obtain loans from private lenders and (2) whether the prices (lending rates and fees) of such credit are fair and competitive. Congress passed legislation to facilitate lending to small businesses that are likely to face hurdles in obtaining credit: The Small Business Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163) established the Small Business Administration (SBA), which administers several types of programs to support capital access for small businesses that struggle to obtain credit on reasonable terms and conditions from private-sector lenders. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA; P.L. 95-128) encouraged banks to address persistent unmet small business credit demands in low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act; P.L. 111-203) required the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) to collect data from small business lenders concerning credit applications made by women-owned, minority-owned, and small businesses with the goal of better understanding their financing needs. The CFPB has not yet implemented this requirement. Data that capture small business borrowers’ characteristics and lenders’ underwriting processes (i.e., their processes for determining whether borrowers are creditworthy) could help to accurately determine whether small businesses have sufficient and fairly priced access to private credit. Various government agencies and financial institutions define small business using factors that may be based upon annual revenues, number of employees, market scope, market share, and some or all of the above factors. Because no consensus definition of a small business exists, data to analyze the small business credit market’s performance are limited and fragmented. Moreover, certain small businesses face additional challenges that may force them to seek financing outside of traditional business credit markets. Many new start-up firms, for example, do not have the financial track records to qualify for standard business loans and frequently must rely on mortgage and consumer credit. In addition, many small businesses rely on customized lending products, thus limiting their choice of lenders to those with specialized underwriting methodologies or business models. The lack of a consensus definition of small business, along with the wide variety of idiosyncratic business risks, hinders the availability of conclusive evidence on the small business credit market’s overall performance and, therefore, the ability to assess the effectiveness of various policy actions designed to increase small business lending. In 2017, the CFPB issued a request for information on the small business lending market to solicit feedback on how to implement the Dodd-Frank requirement to collect data from financial institutions on small business credit applications. Final rulemaking, however, has been delayed. In addition, various bills regarding the small business credit market have been introduced in the 116th Congress. For example, H.Res. 370 would express “the sense of the House of Representatives that small business owners seeking financing have fundamental rights, including transparent pricing and terms, competitive products, responsible underwriting, fair treatment from financing providers, brokers, and lead generators, inclusive credit access, and fair collection practices.” H.R. 3374 would amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to require the collection of small business loan data related to LGBTQ-owned businesses. H.R. 1937 and S. 212, the Indian Community Economic Enhancement Act of 2019, among other things, would require the Government Accountability Office to conduct a study to assess and quantify the extent to which federal loan guarantees, such as those provided by the SBA, have been used to facilitate credit access in these communities.

Aug 20, 2019

Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies: Overview of FY2020 Appropriations

The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill contains funding for more than 30 agencies and entities. They include most of the Department of the Interior (DOI) as well as agencies within other departments, such as the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. The bill also provides funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), arts and cultural agencies, and other organizations and entities. Issues for Congress include determining the amount, terms, and conditions of funding for agencies and programs. For FY2020, President Trump requested $32.47 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies, including $2.25 billion for DOI and Forest Service wildfire suppression under a discretionary cap adjustment. For the 10 major DOI agencies in Title I of the bill, the request was $11.75 billion, or 36.2% of the $32.47 billion total requested. For EPA, funded in Title II of the bill, the request was $6.22 billion, or 19.2% of the total. For the 23 agencies and other entities currently funded in Title III of the bill, the request was $14.50 billion, or 44.7% of the total. The President’s FY2020 request would be $3.14 billion (8.8%) lower than the FY2019 regular enacted appropriation of $35.61 billion (in P.L. 116-6, Division E), and $4.72 billion (12.7%) lower than the FY2019 total appropriation of $37.19 billion, which included $1.58 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations for disaster relief (in P.L. 116-20, Title VII). On June 25, 2019, the House passed H.R. 3055 with $39.59 billion (in Division C) for agencies in the Interior bill. This total included $2.25 billion for wildfire suppression under the cap adjustment, as requested by the President. The FY2020 House-passed total would be $2.40 billion (6.4%) higher than the FY2019 total of $37.19 billion in regular and emergency appropriations, and $3.98 billion (11.2%) higher than the FY2019 total of $35.61 billion in regular appropriations. It would also be $7.12 billion (21.9%) higher than the President’s FY2020 request of $32.47 billion. For individual agencies and programs in the bill, there are many differences among the funding levels enacted for FY2019 and those requested by the President for FY2020 and approved by the House for FY2020. This report highlights funding for selected agencies and programs that have been among the many of interest to Congress, stakeholders, and the public. They include the Bureau of Land Management, EPA, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Forest Service, Indian Affairs, Indian Health Service, Land and Water Conservation Fund, National Park Service, Payments in Lieu of Taxes Program, Reorganization of DOI, Smithsonian Institution, U.S. Geological Survey, and Wildland Fire Management.

Aug 19, 2019

DHS Final Rule on Public Charge: Overview and Considerations for Congress

Aug 16, 2019

Asylum Bar for Migrants Who Reach the Southern Border through Third Countries: Issues and Ongoing Litigation

Aug 16, 2019

Hong Kong’s Protests of 2019

Aug 16, 2019

Farm Policy: USDA’s 2019 Trade Aid Package

On May 23, 2019, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced that the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) would undertake a second trade aid package in 2019 valued at up to $16 billion—similar to a trade aid package initiated in 2018 valued at $12 billion—to assist farmers in response to trade damage from continued tariff retaliation and trade disruptions. Under the 2019 trade aid package, USDA will use its authority under the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) Charter Act to fund three separate programs to assist agricultural producers in 2019 while the Administration works to resolve the ongoing trade disputes with certain foreign nations, most notably China. The three programs are similar to the 2018 trade aid package but are funded at different levels: The Market Facilitation Program (MFP) for 2019, administered by USDA’s Farm Service Agency, is to provide up to $14.5 billion in direct payments to producers of affected commodities (compared with up to $10 billion in 2018). A Food Purchase and Distribution Program, administered through USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service, will use $1.4 billion (compared with $1.2 billion in 2018) to purchase surplus commodities affected by trade retaliation such as fruits, vegetables, some processed foods, beef, pork, lamb, poultry, and milk for distribution by USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service to food banks, schools, and other outlets serving low-income individuals. The Agricultural Trade Promotion Program, administered by USDA’s Foreign Agriculture Service, will be provided $100 million ($200 million in 2018) to assist in developing new export markets on behalf of U.S. agricultural producers. The broad discretionary authority granted to the Secretary under the CCC Charter Act to implement the trade aid package also allows the Secretary to determine how the aid is to be calculated and distributed. Some important differences between the 2018 and 2019 trade aid packages include the following. The 2019 package includes an expanded funding commitment of $16 billion versus $12 billion under the 2018 package. The 2019 package focuses on the same three commodity groups—non-specialty crops (grains and oilseeds), specialty crops (nuts and fruit), and animal products (hogs and dairy)—but includes an expanded list of eligible commodities (41 eligible commodities in 2019 compared with nine in 2018). The MFP payment formula for 2019 is modified for non-specialty crops to be a single county payment rate rather than commodity-specific rates that were applied in 2018. This is done to minimize influencing producer crop choices and avoid large payment-rate discrepancies across commodities. MFP payments for non-specialty crops will be based on planted acres in 2019, not harvested production as in 2018. This change will avoid having MFP payments reduced by the lower yields that are expected across major growing regions due to the widespread wet spring and delayed plantings. The 2019 package includes expanded payment limits per individual per commodity group ($250,000 versus $125,000 under the 2018 initiative) and an expanded maximum combined payment limit across commodity groups ($500,000 versus $375,000). It continues the expanded adjusted gross income (AGI) criteria (no restriction if at least 75% of AGI is from farming operations) adopted under the 2019 Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act (P.L. 116-20) and applied to 2018 MFP payments retroactively. Payments may be made in up to three tranches, with the second and third tranches dependent on market developments. The first payment—to go out in mid-to-late August—is to consist of the higher of either 50% of a producer’s calculated payment or $15 per acre. The second and third payments would depend on USDA’s evaluation of market and trade conditions. If deemed necessary, they would occur in November 2019 and January 2020, respectively. USDA’s use of CCC authority to initiate and fund agricultural support programs without congressional involvement is not without precedent, but the scope and scale of its use for the two trade aid packages—at $28 billion—has increased congressional and public interest. Some have questioned whether MFP payments have established a precedent that might persist as long as trade disputes remain unresolved. Others have questioned the equity of their distribution across commodity sectors and regions. Finally, some economists worry that large MFP payments might contribute to a violation of U.S. trade commitments to the World Trade Organization.

Aug 12, 2019

Budget Enforcement Procedures: House Pay-As-You-Go (PAYGO) Rule

The House pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) rule is generally intended to discourage or prevent Congress from taking certain legislative action that would increase the deficit. The rule requires that legislation affecting direct spending or revenues not increase the projected deficit over either a 6-year or an 11-year period. In effect, the rule requires that any legislation projected to increase direct spending or reduce revenues must be offset by equivalent amounts of direct spending cuts, revenue increases, or a combination of the two, over the two specified periods. The House PAYGO rule applies to legislation affecting direct spending and revenues. It does not apply to discretionary spending. This rule exempts provisions designated as an emergency from being counted in determining compliance with the PAYGO rule. First established at the beginning of the 110th Congress, the House PAYGO rule was modified during the 111th Congress: at the beginning of the 111th Congress, as part of the opening-day rules package; and again in the second session of the 111th Congress, as part of a special rule providing for the consideration of an unrelated measure. At the beginning of the 112th Congress, it was replaced with the Cut-As-You-Go (CUTGO) rule, which focused exclusively on the mandatory spending effects of legislation, eliminating any revenue effects from the budgetary evaluation under the rule. Most recently, at the beginning of the 116th Congress, the PAYGO rule was reinstituted, covering both direct spending and revenues, with certain modifications. The House PAYGO rule exists alongside similar PAYGO requirements in statute, but with some significant differences. The House rule (1) applies the PAYGO requirement during the consideration of legislation on the House floor, (2) applies generally to each measure individually, and (3) is enforced by a point of order on the House floor. The Statutory PAYGO Act, in contrast, (1) applies the requirement to legislation after it has been enacted, (2) applies to the net effect of all legislation enacted during a session of Congress, and (3) is enforced by sequestration—the cancellation of budgetary resources provided by laws affecting direct spending—to eliminate an increase in the deficit resulting from the enactment of legislation. This report updates the previous version (dated November 30, 2010) with descriptions of the changes instituted by the CUTGO rule, adopted at the beginning of the 112th Congress, and the current PAYGO rule, adopted at the beginning of the 116th Congress.

Aug 12, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: Support for Indian Tribes

Aug 12, 2019

The Administration’s Designation of China as a Currency Manipulator

On August 4, China’s central bank allowed its currency, the yuan, to depreciate to an 11-year low, breaking the politically sensitive threshold of seven yuan to one U.S. dollar (Figure 1). A depreciation of the yuan against the U.S. dollar makes Chinese exports less expensive in global markets. Some analysts speculate the depreciation is designed to offset and retaliate against U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports, coming four days after President Trump announced his intent to impose an additional 10% tariff on $300 billion of Chinese imports on September 1. There are differing views on the causes of yuan’s movements, however, as discussed below. On August 5, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin, under the auspices of President Trump, determined that China is manipulating its currency. Although some policymakers have called for this designation for years and Donald Trump made it a central issue in his presidential campaign, the Treasury Department had not labeled a country as a currency manipulator in 25 years. Figure 1. Chinese Yuan per U.S. Dollar / Source: International Monetary Fund Notes: A decrease in the graph represents a depreciation of the Chinese yuan relative to the U.S. dollar. Provisions in U.S. Law Addressing Currency Manipulation The Treasury Secretary designated China as a currency manipulator under the provisions laid out in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the 1988 Trade Act, P.L. 100-418, 22 U.S.C. 5301-5306). This law requires the Treasury Department to analyze on an annual basis the exchange rate policies of foreign countries, in consultation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and “consider whether countries manipulate the rate of exchange between their currency and the United States dollar for purposes of preventing effective balance of payments adjustments or gaining unfair competitive advantage in international trade.” If manipulation is occurring with respect to countries that have global currency account surpluses and significant bilateral trade surpluses with the United States, the Secretary of the Treasury is to initiate negotiations, in consultation with the IMF, to ensure adjustment in the exchange rate and eliminate the unfair trade advantage. The Treasury Secretary is not required to start negotiations in cases where they would have a serious detrimental impact on vital U.S. economic and security interests. The Treasury Department had previously designated China, as well as Taiwan and South Korea, as currency manipulators in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The Treasury Secretary has not found China to be manipulating its currency under a second set of provisions in U.S. law, enacted more recently through the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-125; 19 U.S.C. 4421-4422). This act addressed some policymakers’ concerns that successive Administrations had taken insufficient action to address currency manipulation under the 1988 Trade Act. According to the newer provisions, if a country meets three criteria—significant bilateral trade surplus with the United States, material currency account surplus, and engaged in persistent one-sided interventions in foreign exchange markets—the Treasury Secretary is required to engage bilaterally with the country and if the problem persists, take specified putative actions. China does not meet the three specified criteria, according to the May 2019 assessment by the Treasury Department. China has a large trade imbalance with the United States (goods trade surplus of $419 billion in 2018), but a small current account surplus (0.4% of GDP in 2018) and only “modest” interventions in foreign exchange markets. Common Questions about the Designation Does China’s current exchange rate policy constitute currency manipulation? Concerns about currency manipulation typically focus on a country’s efforts to drive down (depreciate) the value of its currency in order to boost exports. For several years in the 2000s, China did intervene actively in foreign markets to depress the value of its currency. More recently, China has intervened in foreign exchange markets to prop up the value of the yuan, in order to prevent capital flight from China and keep inflation in check. In June, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin said that China was intervening in currency markets to prop up the yuan, and warned it could be designated a manipulator if it stopped. The Administration is concerned that China allowed its currency to depreciate in order to negate U.S. tariffs and gain an “unfair” trade advantage described in the 1988 Trade Act. However, many analysts have argued that China’s decision to allow the yuan to depreciate and move closer to its market value is not clearly an effort to gain an “unfair” trade advantage. China also does not meet the three-prong criteria for currency manipulation specified in the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. Chinese officials reportedly argued that the downward movement of the yuan reflected market forces responding to the proposed U.S. tariffs. What are the consequences of labeling China as a currency manipulator? The specified consequences for currency manipulation are less severe under the 1988 Trade Act than under the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. The 1988 Trade Act requires negotiations with the country, in consultation with the IMF. The 1988 Trade Act does not prescribe putative measures if initial negotiations fail to result in policy changes, as required by the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015. According to one analyst, there are “no practical consequences” to the designation; others have called it merely a “political exercise.” The IMF is unlikely to criticize China on currency; in July 2019, the IMF determined that China’s exchange rate is broadly in line with medium-term economic fundamentals and desirable policies. How does the designation affect broader trade negotiations with China? The United States and China have been locked in trade negotiations for more than a year. President Trump has already imposed an additional 25% tariff on $250 billion of U.S. imports from China, and pledged additional tariffs. Many analysts have argued that the currency manipulation designation has complicated negotiations and reduced the likelihood of an agreement in the short-term, and in turn have argued that the escalation could begin having significant economic repercussions. What is Congress’s role? Congress enacted the provisions in U.S. law defining currency manipulation and the resulting consequences. If Congress has concerns about which provisions are being used or how, Congress could revoke or amend the authorities granted to the Executive Branch pertaining to currency manipulation.

Aug 9, 2019

Tax Policy and Disaster Recovery

The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) contains a number of provisions intended to provide disaster relief. Following certain disasters, Congress has passed legislation with temporary and targeted tax relief policies. At other times, Congress has passed legislation providing tax relief to those affected by all federally declared major disasters (disasters with Stafford Act declarations) occurring during a set time period. In addition, several disaster tax relief provisions are permanent features of the IRC. This report discusses the following permanent provisions: disaster casualty loss deductions; deferral of gain from involuntary conversions of property destroyed by a disaster; disaster relief for owners of low-income housing tax credit properties; income exclusion for disaster relief payments to individuals; income exclusion for certain insurance living expense payments; and IRS administrative relief in the form of extended deadlines and waiving of certain penalties. Congress began enacting tax legislation generally intended to assist victims of specific disasters in 2002 in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Laws targeting specific disasters contained provisions that were temporary in nature. Two acts, however—the Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343) and the 2017 tax act (P.L. 115-97)—provided more general, but still temporary, relief for any federally declared disaster occurring during designated time periods. The acts providing temporary relief include the following: The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-147), which provided tax benefits for areas of New York City damaged by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; The Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act of 2005 (KETRA; P.L. 109-73), which provided tax relief to assist the victims of Hurricane Katrina in 2005; The Gulf Opportunity Zone (GO Zone) Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-135), which provided tax relief to those affected by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005; The Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 Farm Bill; P.L. 110-234), which provided tax relief intended to assist those affected by severe storms and tornadoes in Kansas in 2007; The Heartland Disaster Tax Relief Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343), which provided tax relief to assist recovery from both the severe weather that affected the Midwest during summer 2008 and Hurricane Ike (this act also included general disaster tax relief provisions that applied to federally declared disasters occurring before January 1, 2010); The Disaster Tax Relief and Airport and Airway Extension Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-63), which provided tax relief to those affected by Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017; 2017 tax act (P.L. 115-97, commonly referred to using the title of the bill as passed in the House, the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act”) responded to major disasters occurring in 2016; and The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA18; P.L. 115-123), which provided relief to those affected by the 2017 California wildfires. This report provides a basic overview of existing, permanent disaster tax provisions, as well as past, targeted legislative responses to specific disasters. The report also includes a discussion of economic and policy considerations related to providing disaster tax relief to individuals and businesses, and encouraging charitable giving to support disaster relief.

Aug 9, 2019

U.S.-China Trade Relations

Aug 7, 2019

U.S.-China Investment Ties: Overview

Aug 7, 2019

Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education: FY2019 Appropriations

This report offers an overview of actions taken by Congress and the President to provide FY2019 appropriations for accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. This bill includes all accounts funded through the annual appropriations process at the Department of Labor (DOL) and Department of Education (ED). It also provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture bill). Finally, the LHHS bill provides funds for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration (SSA). FY2019 Supplemental Appropriations for the Southern Border: During the 116th Congress, on July 1, 2019, the President signed into law P.L. 116-26, a supplemental appropriations act for FY2019 focusing primarily on the provision of humanitarian assistance and security at the southern border. The bill was passed by the House on June 27 and by the Senate on June 26. (An earlier version of the bill had passed the House on June 25. A related bill, S. 1900, had passed the Senate on June 19; this bill was substantially similar to the final version of P.L. 116-26.) As enacted, the bill contained nearly $2.9 billion in emergency-designated LHHS appropriations for the Refugee and Entrant Assistance account at HHS. The FY2019 enacted levels presented throughout this report are based on amounts provided by the FY2019 LHHS omnibus (P.L. 115-245, see below) and do not include these supplemental funds, which were provided in addition to the annual appropriations. FY2019 Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief: During the 116th Congress, on June 6, 2019, the President signed into law P.L. 116-20, a supplemental appropriations act for FY2019 focusing primarily on certain expenses arising from hurricanes, typhoons, wildfires, earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, and other natural disasters or emergencies. The bill was passed by the House on June 3 and by the Senate on May 23. (An earlier version of the bill had passed the House on May 10.) As enacted, the bill included roughly $611 million in emergency-designated LHHS appropriations for accounts at DOL, HHS, and ED. The FY2019 enacted levels presented throughout this report are based on amounts provided by the FY2019 LHHS omnibus (P.L. 115-245) and do not include these supplemental funds, which were provided in addition to the annual appropriations. FY2019 LHHS Omnibus: During the 115th Congress, on September 28, 2018, the President signed into law the Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (H.R. 6157, P.L. 115-245). This law contained full-year LHHS appropriations in Division B. This is the first occasion since the FY1997 appropriations cycle that full-year LHHS appropriations were enacted on or before the start of the fiscal year (October 1). The FY2019 LHHS omnibus contained discretionary appropriations totaling $189.4 billion. This amount is 1.5% more than FY2018 enacted levels and 8.9% more than the FY2019 President’s budget request. The omnibus also provided $869.8 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined LHHS total of $1.059 trillion. The distribution of discretionary funding was as follows: DOL: $12.1 billion, 0.8% less than FY2018. HHS: $90.5 billion, 2.6% more than FY2018. ED: $71.4 billion, 0.8% more than FY2018. Related Agencies: $15.3 billion, 0.1% more than FY2018. FY2019 LHHS Senate Action: The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2018 LHHS appropriations bill on June 28, 2018, by a vote of 30-1 (S. 3158). Instead of taking up the committee-reported vehicle, the Senate chose to take up a different appropriations vehicle (H.R. 6157) and amend it to contain FY2019 LHHS appropriations as well. (Those LHHS appropriations, which were added as Division B of H.R. 6157, were substantially the same as S. 3158.) During floor consideration of H.R. 6157, the Senate also adopted 31 amendments to the new LHHS division of the bill (see Appendix B for a summary of these amendments). The Senate passed an amended H.R. 6157 by a vote of 85-7 on August 23, 2018. The Senate-passed bill would have provided $189.4 billion in discretionary LHHS funds. This would have been 1.5% more than FY2018, and 8.9% more than the FY2019 President’s request. In addition, the Senate-passed bill would have provided an estimated $869.8 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $1.059 trillion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding would have been as follows: DOL: $12.1 billion, 0.8% less than FY2018. HHS: $90.5 billion, 2.7% more than FY2018. ED: $71.4 billion, 0.8% more than FY2018. Related Agencies: $15.4 billion, 0.5% more than FY2018. FY2019 LHHS House Action: The House Appropriations Committee’s version of the FY2019 LHHS appropriations bill was ordered reported by the full committee on July 11, 2018, by a vote of 30-22, and reported to the House on July 23 (H.R. 6470). This bill would have provided $187.2 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, a 0.3% increase from FY2018 enacted levels. This amount would have been 7.6% more than the FY2019 President’s request. In addition, the House committee bill would have provided an estimated $869.8 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $1.057 trillion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding would have been as follows: DOL: $11.9 billion, 2.4% less than FY2018. HHS: $89.3 billion, 1.3% more than FY2018. ED: $71.0 billion, 0.2% more than FY2018. Related Agencies: $15.0 billion, 2.2% less than FY2018. The House committee-reported version of the LHHS bill did not receive floor consideration. FY2019 President’s Budget Request: On February 12, 2018, the Trump Administration released the FY2019 President’s budget. The President requested $173.9 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the LHHS bill, which would have been a decrease of 6.8% from FY2018 levels. In addition, the President requested $869.8 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of $1.044 trillion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding was as follows: DOL: $10.9 billion, 11.1% less than FY2018. HHS: $86.7 billion, 1.6% less than FY2018. ED: $63.2 billion, 10.8% less than FY2018. Related Agencies: $13.2 billion, 14.0% less than FY2018.

Aug 5, 2019

The Department of Defense’s JEDI Cloud Program

In September 2017, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum calling for the accelerated adoption of a Department of Defense (DOD) enterprise-wide cloud services solution as a fundamental component of ongoing DOD modernization efforts. As a component of this effort, DOD is seeking to acquire a cloud services solution accessible to the entirety of the Department that can support Unclassified, Secret, and Top Secret requirements, focusing on commercially available cloud service solutions, through the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud acquisition program. DOD intends to conduct a full and open competition that is expected to result in a single award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity firm-fixed price contract for commercial items. DOD has indicated that the minimum guaranteed award is $1 million, and that the initial period of performance is two years. The contract is expected to have a maximum ceiling of $10 billion across a potential 10-year period of performance. DOD is in the final stages of evaluating proposals, with Amazon Web Services and Microsoft remaining in contention for the contract. The Department originally expected to award the contract in August 2019. However, Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper is reportedly currently reviewing the JEDI Cloud program, which may delay the award. Significant industry and congressional attention has been focused on DOD’s intent to award the JEDI Cloud contract to a single company. Oracle America filed multiple pre-award bid protests with the Government Accountability Office, which were denied. Oracle America then filed a bid protest lawsuit with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims; the court ruled against Oracle in a July 12, 2019, decision. In filings associated with its bid protests, Oracle America alleged in part that the JEDI Cloud acquisition process was unfairly skewed in favor of Amazon Web Services through potential organizational conflicts of interest associated with three former DOD employees, each of whom was involved to greater or lesser degrees in the early development of the program. DOD investigations determined that Amazon Web Services had no conflicts of interest and established that the actions of the individuals identified by Oracle America did not negatively impact the procurement or grant Amazon Web Services an unfair competitive advantage. However, the investigations did identify individual violations of ethical standards established by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Some industry observers contend that an initial single award appears to contradict broader federal cloud computing implementation guidance and industry best practices that stress the importance of multi-cloud solutions. Others point to the implementation approaches identified by DOD’s 2019 Cloud Strategy as evidence that the Department expects the JEDI Cloud to serve certain enterprise-wide functions, performing as one component of a broader multi-cloud, multi-vendor system. Opponents of DOD’s use of a single-award contract for the JEDI Cloud program have suggested that this tactic could restrict future competition for enterprise-wide DOD cloud services. Supporters of DOD’s approach argue that the JEDI Cloud program’s requirement for offerors to develop applications and data schema easily transferable to different platforms suggests that the Department may be equipped to migrate from any service environment developed under the JEDI Cloud contract to another such environment. Several Members of Congress have engaged the Administration to express their views regarding the JEDI Cloud acquisition program and pending contract award. The 116th Congress is considering related authorization and appropriations legislation that could shape future implementation of the program (H.R. 2740, H.R. 2500, and S. 1790).

Aug 2, 2019

Illicit Drug Flows and Seizures in the United States: In Focus

Aug 1, 2019

Why Is the Federal Reserve Reducing Interest Rates?

On July 31, the Federal Reserve (Fed) reduced the federal funds rate by a quarter of a percentage point. The Fed targets this rate to meet its statutory mandate of maximum employment and stable prices (defined as 2% inflation). Lower interest rates would tend to raise employment and inflation, all else equal. Fed Rate Cuts Across the Business Cycle The Fed typically cuts rates during recessions and raises rates during expansions. Since the Fed began using the federal funds rate as its primary instrument to carry out monetary policy (possibly as early as 1982), it has had four periods of sustained rate reductions (see Figure 1). Three out of four of those episodes coincided with the last three recessions. (The fourth was after the 1981-1982 recession, when the Fed had raised rates to their highest level on record, causing inflation to drop rapidly.) Notably, in all three of those cases, the Fed began to reduce rates 2 months to 12 months before the recession began and continued to reduce or maintain low rates into the beginning of the recovery. Rates were also briefly cut three other times during these expansions. The 1987-1988 rate reductions were in response to a large drop in the stock market. The Fed justified the 1995-1996 reductions by stating that “as a result of the monetary tightening initiated in early 1994, inflationary pressures have receded enough to accommodate a modest adjustment in monetary conditions.” The Fed cut rates in 1998 in response to financial turmoil related to the Russian debt crisis and the failure of a large hedge fund. In hindsight, financial turmoil in 1987 and 1998 did not have a long-lasting effect on financial conditions or the broader economy, but there was considerable fear at the time that they would. The Fed resumed rate increases within about a year of all of these reductions. The recent rate cut is starting from a lower federal funds rate than any previous cut since 1982. This is in part because the neutral rate that neither stimulates nor restrains economic activity is thought to have fallen. It is also because the Fed never employed contractionary monetary policy in this expansion, unlike at the peak of previous expansions. Figure 1. Federal Funds Rate Target 1982-2019 / Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED. Notes: The Fed switched from a point target to a target range in 2008. The Current Context Is the Fed cutting rates to fend off an impending recession? Or is it a temporary blip similar to 1987, 1996, and 1998? Current available data may help answer those questions, with the caveat that the Fed has more up-to-date confidential data that may paint a different picture. What many find striking about the Fed’s decision to cut rates is that the unemployment rate has been at its lowest rate this year since 1969, below the Fed’s estimate of the longer-run unemployment rate consistent with maximum employment. Indeed, the unemployment rate is lower today (3.7%) than when the Fed last raised rates in December 2018 (3.9%). Economic growth slowed from 3.1% in the first quarter of 2019 to 2.1% in the second quarter (see Figure 2). However, at full employment, the economy cannot persistently grow faster than its long-run trend, and the second quarter growth rate is slightly higher than the Fed’s projection of longer-run growth and slightly lower than this expansion’s average. Figure 2. Quarterly Economic Growth Rates 2009:3-2019:2 / Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Notes: Growth rates are annualized. Employment growth also shows no sign of a recession, and only a modest cooling off from 2018 (see Figure 3). Although job growth was relatively weak in May (72,000 jobs added), it was relatively strong in June (224,000) and for 2019 to date (a monthly average of 172,000, compared to 223,000 in 2018). Because jobs data are highly volatile, too much cannot be inferred from a one-month change. Figure 3. Monthly Change in Employment 2010-2019 / Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Economic theory predicts that low unemployment would push inflation higher, but this has not occurred recently. The Fed might be reducing rates because inflation has fallen below its 2% target, although the timing would be a little off—inflation first fell below 2% in October 2018 (or July 2018 if food and energy prices are excluded), and it has ticked back up again slightly since March (see Figure 4). However, the Fed might have wanted to ensure that inflation would remain persistently below 2% before cutting rates. Figure 4. Inflation Rate 2009-2019 / Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Notes: 12 month change in Personal Consumption Expenditures Index. A key principle of monetary policy is that it should be forward looking because of lags between policy changes and their effect on the economy. When deciding to cut rates, the Fed should not consider only current economic performance, but also projections of future performance. As noted above, the Fed typically cuts rates before a recession has begun, and there are some recession warning signals, such as the yield curve inversion, which, if accurate, would justify lower rates. The Fed does not project a recession this year or next, however, so that would not seem to motivate its rate decision. Despite its view that a sustained expansion and strong labor markets are the most likely outcomes, the Fed cited global developments and muted inflationary pressures as justification for cutting rates. There are always risks to the outlook, however, especially from abroad. Unlike the 1987 and 1998 episodes, there has been no major disruption in financial markets. (There were large declines in the stock market last December and May, but both subsequently completely reversed.) Some have described this cut as “insurance” in case conditions worsen, but cutting rates also poses a risk of overheating that could threaten the expansion. Fed Independence Given the lack of official evidence that the economy has weakened, some question whether President Trump’s repeated calls for the Fed to reduce rates has been effective. If so, this would raise questions about whether the Fed’s independence has been compromised, which could have implications for the Fed’s credibility going forward. When asked whether the President’s requests have influenced Fed policy, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell recently testified “Not at all.”

Aug 1, 2019

Accredited Investor Definition and Private Securities Markets

Aug 1, 2019

Trends in the U.S. Poverty Rate after Recessions

poverty, poverty rate, recession, expansion, recovery, business cycle

Aug 1, 2019

U.S. EPA FY2020 Appropriations

Jul 31, 2019

FY2019 Disaster Supplemental Appropriations: Overview

This report provides a legislative history of the Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-20), and provides an overview of some of the issues that often arise with consideration of supplemental disaster assistance appropriations. In total, 59 major disasters were declared in calendar year 2018, and 27 major disasters were declared in 2019 up to the date the compromise on the disaster supplemental was announced. In addition to these specifically declared incidents, other situations arose that caused disruption to lives, economic resources, and infrastructure. Together, these incidents and ongoing recovery efforts from previous disasters drove a demand for additional federal budgetary resources beyond those provided through regular annual appropriations. This kind of demand is usually reflected in a request by the Administration for supplemental appropriations after the need for funding is recognized. Despite the absence of such a request by the Trump Administration, congressional leadership in both the House and the Senate chose to consider disaster-related supplemental appropriations at the end of the 115th Congress. An initial $7.8 billion proposal that passed the House in the 115th Congress as part of a consolidated appropriations bill did not advance in the Senate. In the 116th Congress, H.R. 268 passed the House. This measure included $14.19 billion in disaster relief appropriations, as well as continuing appropriations intended to resolve an ongoing lapse in annual appropriations that had caused a partial government shutdown. The Senate was unable to get cloture on proposed amendments to the measure, and consideration of the bill stalled. After the lapse in appropriations was resolved, Senate Appropriations Chairman Richard Shelby introduced a $13.45 billion supplemental appropriations measure structured as a substitute to H.R. 268. Again, the Senate could not achieve cloture on the proposal. On April 9, House Appropriations Chairwoman Nita Lowey introduced H.R. 2157, a supplemental appropriations bill, which covered the same disasters addressed in H.R. 268, as well as additional disasters that had occurred since the earlier measure had been passed by the House. CBO estimated the new bill, as introduced, would provide $17.31 billion in discretionary spending, which grew to $19.26 billion through floor action. The bill passed the House May 10, 2019, by a vote of 257-150. A $19.19 billion bipartisan, bicameral agreement on FY2019 disaster funding was negotiated, and offered in the Senate as S.Amdt. 250 to H.R. 2157 on May 23, 2019. The bill, as amended, was passed by the Senate, 85-8. Three attempts to approve the amended bill by unanimous consent were blocked in the House of Representatives while the body was in pro forma session during the Memorial Day recess. The House subsequently considered the amended bill under suspension of the rules on June 3, 2019, and voted 354-58 to approve the measure. The bill was signed into law as P.L. 116-20 on June 6, 2019. This report includes a more detailed legislative history and a tabular comparison that shows how the funding in these different approaches evolved. Congressional clients seeking further insight into specific programs and provisions in P.L. 116-20 may consult the analysts and background reports listed in CRS Report R45714, FY2019 Disaster Supplemental Appropriations: CRS Experts. The report also includes a discussion of issues that commonly arise during debate on supplemental appropriations, including the relative timeliness of supplemental appropriations; adjustments to spending limits that are often applied to them; offsets for disaster relief and recovery appropriations; the appropriate scope of supplemental appropriations; timelines for obligation of funding; and oversight of supplemental spending. This report will not be updated.

Jul 30, 2019

Examining Regulatory Frameworks for Digital Currencies and Blockchain

Jul 30, 2019

Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Retention

Jul 26, 2019

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA): A Primer on Telehealth

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA), of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), is leveraging the use of telehealth with the goal of expanding veterans’ access to VA care. Telehealth generally refers to the use of information and communication technology to deliver a health care service. It is a mode of health care delivery that extends beyond the “brick-and-mortar” health care facilities of the VHA. VA telehealth services are generally provided on an outpatient basis and supplement in-person care. Such services do not replace VA in-person care. The VA copay requirements for telehealth are the same as for VA in-person care, but in some cases may be lower than the copays for VA in-person outpatient health care services delivered through the VHA. President Trump and Congress have recently enacted measures such as the VA Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks of 2018 (VA MISSION Act; P.L. 115-182) that aim to address the access barriers that veterans may experience when accessing VA telehealth services across states lines. The VA MISSION Act, among other things, removes all geographic and licensing barriers to VA telehealth, thereby allowing veterans to access VA telehealth services in their communities from any location in the United States, U.S. territories, District of Columbia, and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. VA Telehealth Modalities In FY2018, more than 9.3 million veterans were enrolled in VA care. In that same fiscal year, the VA provided 2.29 million telehealth episodes of care to 782,000 veteran patients collectively using the following three VA telehealth modalities: (1) home telehealth, (2) store-and-forward telehealth, and (3) clinical video telehealth. The VA has developed VA mobile applications (apps), which refer to software programs that run on certain operating systems of mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets) and computers that transmit data over the internet that veterans can access as telehealth applications. Veterans can access VA mobile apps on cellular and mobile devices that operate using either a web-based platform, an iOS platform, or an Android operating platform. VA Telehealth Partnerships and Access According to the VA, it cannot meet the health care demands of veteran patients in-house and therefore, it has established partnerships with private sector vendors to help address veterans’ demand for VA care. For example, the VA’s partnership with the wireless service provider T-Mobile would allow a veteran who has T-Mobile as a cellular wireless service provider to access the VA Video Connect app without incurring additional charges or reducing plan data allotments. VA Teleconsultations VA providers can use telehealth platforms and applications to consult with one another, which is referred to as a teleconsultation by section 1709A(b) of title 38 of the U.S. Code. The VA has adopted and modified the Project Extension for Community Healthcare Outcomes (Project ECHO) learning model, which the Expanding Capacity for Health Outcomes Act (P.L. 114-270) required the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to examine and report on, to create a Specialty Care Access Network-Extension for Community Healthcare Outcomes (SCAN-ECHO) learning model. The VA’s SCAN-ECHO is a similar approach that aims to connect underproductive providers to assist access-challenged providers, using the hub-and-spoke model, which refers to a structure whereby a central point (referred to as the “hub”) disseminates information to different connecting points (referred to as the “spokes”). Topics Covered in This Report This report provides background information on VA telehealth, including veteran eligibility and enrollment criteria, VA telehealth copayment requirements, and VA providers’ authority to provide telehealth services anywhere. The report also discusses the components of VA telehealth. It also discusses three issues that Congress could choose to consider: (1) access barriers to in-person VA care, (2) lack of access to the internet, and (3) conflicting guidelines for prescribing controlled substances via telehealth across state lines.

Jul 26, 2019

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019: Changes to the BCA and Debt Limit

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (H.R. 3877; BBA 2019), as introduced, would raise the discretionary spending limits (caps) implemented by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) for FY2020 and FY2021; make other BCA-related changes, including an extension of the mandatory sequester through FY2029; and suspend the statutory debt limit until August 1, 2021. Changes to FY2020 and FY2021 Discretionary Spending Caps The BCA created annual statutory discretionary spending caps for defense and nondefense spending that are in effect through FY2021. If appropriations are enacted that exceed a limit for a fiscal year, across-the-board reductions (i.e., sequestration) are triggered to eliminate the excess spending within that spending category. For more information on the BCA, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions. Previously enacted legislation increased these discretionary spending caps for each year from FY2014 through FY2019. For more information, see CRS Insight IN11090, Increasing the BCA Spending Limits: Characteristics of Previously Enacted Legislation. Section 101(a) of BBA 2019 would increase the caps on defense and nondefense budget authority for FY2020 and FY2021, the final two years for which discretionary spending caps are scheduled to be in effect under the BCA. For FY2020, the BBA 2019 would raise the defense discretionary cap to $666.5 billion (a $90 billion increase) and the nondefense cap to $621.5 billion (a $78 billion increase). In FY2021, BBA 2019 would raise the discretionary defense cap to $671.5 billion (an $81 billion increase) and the nondefense cap to $626.5 billion (a $72 billion increase). Table 1 shows the changes that would occur under BBA 2019. Table 1. Discretionary Cap Changes Resulting from the BBA 2019 (in billions of dollars of budget authority) Fiscal Year Category Current Law BBA 2019 Change Post-BBA 2019 FY2020 Defense $576.2 +$90.3 $666.5 Nondefense $543.2 +$78.3 $621.5 FY2021 Defense $590.2 +$81.3 $671.5 Nondefense $554.9 +$71.6 $626.5 Sources: H.R. 3877 and Congressional Budget Office, Updated Budget Projections: 2019 to 2029, May 2019, p. 16. Note: Based on BBA 2019 as introduced on July 23, 2019. The combined increases to the FY2020 and FY2021 discretionary caps proposed by BBA 2019 ($322 billion) would be marginally larger than the combined FY2018 and FY2019 cap increases ($296 billion) and much larger than the two-year cap increases agreed to for FY2016 and FY2017 ($80 billion combined) and FY2014 and FY2015 ($63 billion combined). Figure 1 shows the cap increases enacted for FY2014-FY2019 and the increases that would occur under BBA 2019 compared to the caps established under the BCA. Figure 1. BCA Discretionary Limits, FY2014-FY2021 Budget authority in billions of nominal dollars / Sources: H.R. 3877 and Congressional Budget Office, Updated Budget Projections: 2019 to 2029, May 2019, p. 16. Note: Based on BBA 2019 as introduced on July 23, 2019. BBA 2019 would make the changes in yellow in FY2020 and FY2021. Other Changes Related to the BCA Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Spending Targets The BCA stipulates that certain discretionary spending—such as appropriations designated as emergency requirements or for overseas contingency operations (OCO)—are effectively exempt from the limits. There is no statutory limit on the amount of spending that may be designated as emergency or for OCO, meaning that Congress and the President can together designate any amount that they agree upon in law. Section 101(b) of BBA 2019 would establish spending targets for OCO levels of $79.5 billion in FY2020 and $77 billion in FY2021. For more information on this spending, see CRS Report R45778, Exceptions to the Budget Control Act’s Discretionary Spending Limits. Exemption for Spending on the 2020 Census As stated above, the BCA stipulates that certain discretionary spending is effectively exempt from the spending caps. The largest categories of this “exempt” spending are OCO and emergency spending but smaller limited exemptions are permitted for other categories such as disaster relief and wildfire suppression. Section 101(c) of BBA 2019 would create a similar exemption of up to $2.5 billion for the 2020 Census. Extension of Automatic Direct Spending Reductions Through FY2029 The BCA also established a sequester of certain mandatory spending programs, including Medicare service payments (also known as the “Joint Committee” sequester), which took effect in FY2013 and was initially scheduled to end in FY2021. Subsequent legislation has extended the mandatory sequester through FY2027. Many large programs, such as Social Security and Medicaid, are exempt from the Joint Committee sequester. For more information on the Joint Committee sequester, see CRS Report R45106, Medicare and Budget Sequestration. Section 402 of BBA 2019 would extend the mandatory sequester for another two years, for FY2028 and FY2029. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that the extension would reduce FY2019-FY2029 budget authority by a combined $61.8 billion. Provisions Related to a Budget Resolution Title II of BBA 2019 includes provisions related to a congressional budget resolution for FY2020 and FY2021. These provisions direct the House and Senate Budget Committee chairs to file statements of budgetary levels, which would have the same effect in the respective chamber as if they had been included in a budget resolution. The BBA 2019 would require that (1) for discretionary spending, the filed levels be consistent with the statutory limits on discretionary spending (as amended by the BBA 2019) and (2) for mandatory spending and revenue levels, the filed levels be consistent with the most recent baseline projections made by the CBO. These provisions, however, would not preclude Congress from acting on a traditional budget resolution for those years. For more information, see CRS Report R44296, Deeming Resolutions: Budget Enforcement in the Absence of a Budget Resolution. Suspension of the Debt Limit Until August 2021 Treasury is currently utilizing “extraordinary measures” to stay under the statutory debt limit since its reinstatement in March 2019. In July 2019, Treasury informed Congress that those extraordinary measures could be exhausted before September 2019. Section 301 of BBA 2019 would suspend the debt limit until August 1, 2021. BBA 2019 would then increase the debt limit upon reinstatement to exactly accommodate any increases in federal borrowing that were undertaken during the suspension period. CBO projects continued growth in federal debt levels through the debt suspension period.

Jul 24, 2019

Federal Preemption: A Legal Primer

The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause provides that federal law is “the supreme Law of the Land” notwithstanding any state law to the contrary. This language is the foundation for the doctrine of federal preemption, according to which federal law supersedes conflicting state laws. The Supreme Court has identified two general ways in which federal law can preempt state law. First, federal law can expressly preempt state law when a federal statute or regulation contains explicit preemptive language. Second, federal law can impliedly preempt state law when Congress’s preemptive intent is implicit in the relevant federal law’s structure and purpose. This report begins with an overview of certain general preemption principles. In both express and implied preemption cases, the Supreme Court has made clear that Congress’s purpose is the “ultimate touchstone” of its statutory analysis. The Court’s analysis of Congress’s purpose has at times been informed by a canon of statutory construction known as the “presumption against preemption,” which instructs that federal law should not be read as preempting state law “unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” However, the Court has recently applied the presumption somewhat inconsistently, raising questions about its current scope and effect. Moreover, in 2016, the Court held that the presumption no longer applies in express preemption cases. After reviewing these general themes in the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence, the report turns to the Court’s express preemption case law. In this section, the report analyzes how the Court has interpreted federal statutes that preempt (1) state laws “related to” certain subjects, (2) state laws concerning certain subjects “covered” by federal laws and regulations, (3) state requirements that are “in addition to, or different than” federal requirements, and (4) state “requirements,” “laws,” “regulations,” and “standards.” While preemption decisions depend heavily on the details of particular statutory schemes, the Court has assigned some of these phrases specific meanings even when they have appeared in different statutory contexts. Finally, the report reviews illustrative examples of the Court’s implied preemption decisions. In these cases, the Court has identified two subcategories of implied preemption: “field preemption” and “conflict preemption.” Field preemption occurs when a pervasive scheme of federal regulation implicitly precludes supplementary state regulation, or where states attempt to regulate a field where there is clearly a dominant federal interest. Applying these principles, the Court has held that federal law occupies a number of regulatory fields, including alien registration, nuclear safety regulation, and the regulation of locomotive equipment. In contrast, conflict preemption occurs when simultaneous compliance with both federal and state regulations is impossible (“impossibility preemption”), or when state law poses an obstacle to the accomplishment of federal goals (“obstacle preemption”). The Court has extended the scope of impossibility preemption in two recent decisions, holding that compliance with both federal and state law can be “impossible” even when a regulated party can (1) petition the federal government for permission to comply with state law, or (2) avoid violations of the law by refraining from selling a regulated product altogether. In its obstacle preemption decisions, the Court has concluded that state law can interfere with federal goals by frustrating Congress’s intent to adopt a uniform system of federal regulation, conflicting with Congress’s goal of establishing a regulatory “ceiling” for certain products or activities, or by impeding the vindication of a federal right.

Jul 23, 2019

State and Local Financing of Public Schools

The funding of public elementary and secondary schools in the United States involves a combination of local, state, and federal government revenues, in proportions that vary substantially both across and within states. According to the most recent data, state governments provide 47.0% of these revenues, local governments provide 44.8%, and the federal government provides 8.3%. Over the last several decades, the share of public elementary and secondary education revenues provided by state governments has increased, the share provided by local governments has decreased, and the federal share has varied within a range of 6.0% to 12.7%. The primary source of local revenues for public elementary and secondary education is the property tax, while state revenues are raised from a variety of sources, primarily personal and corporate income and retail sales taxes, a variety of “excise” taxes such as those on tobacco products and alcoholic beverages, and lotteries in several states. All states (but not the District of Columbia) provide a share of the total revenues available for public elementary and secondary education. This state share varies widely, from approximately 25% in Illinois to almost 90% in Hawaii and Vermont. The programs through which state funds are provided to local educational agencies (LEAs) for public elementary and secondary education have traditionally been categorized into five types: (1) Foundation Programs, (2) Full State Funding Programs, (3) Flat Grants, (4) District Power Equalizing, and (5) Categorical Grants. Of these, Foundation Programs are most common, although many states use a combination of program types. A goal of all of the various types of state school finance programs is to provide at least some limited degree of “equalization” of spending and resources, and/or local ability to raise funds, for public elementary and secondary education across all of the LEAs in the state. Such programs often establish target levels of funding “per pupil.” The “pupil” counts involved in these programs may simply be based on total student enrollment as of some point in time, or they may be a “weighted” count of students, taking into account variations in a number of categories—special pupil needs (e.g., disabilities, low family income, limited proficiency in English), grade levels, specific educational programs (e.g., career and technical education), or geographic considerations (e.g., student population sparsity or local variation in costs of providing education). After state funds reach LEAs, they are combined with locally raised funds to provide educational resources to students in individual schools. Under the traditional, and still most common, method of allocating resources within LEAs, there are no specific budgets for individual schools. Available state and local funds are managed centrally, by LEA staff, and various resources—facilities, teachers, support staff, school administrators, instructional equipment, etc.—are assigned to individual schools. In contrast, a number of LEAs have in recent years applied the weighted student funding concept to developing and implementing individual school budgets. The federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) includes one program (Title I-A) and one secretarial authority (Title I-E) that incorporate elements of the equalization and weighted student funding strategies used by states and LEAs. Two of the four ESEA Title I-A allocation formulas employ pupil weighting concepts in the allocation of funds to states and LEAs, and one of those formulas also takes into consideration disparities in expenditures per pupil among each state’s LEAs in calculating grants. The ESEA Title I-E authority allows the Secretary of Education to enter into a demonstration agreement with LEAs that are using or agree to implement weighted student funding systems to establish budgets for, and allocate funds to, individual schools. A separate development relevant to many aspects of public elementary and secondary education finance has been increasing interest in the collection and reporting of school-level finance data for public schools. While historically there have not been comprehensive state or federal efforts to calculate or report on specific budgets or expenditure levels for individual public schools, federal efforts to require and support the reporting of such information have expanded rapidly in recent years.

Jul 23, 2019

Robocall Regulation and Judicial Review

Jul 22, 2019

FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 5515)

For FY2019, the Trump Administration requested $708.1 billion to fund programs falling under the jurisdiction of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and subject to authorization by the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorizes appropriations for the Department of Defense (DOD) and defense-related atomic energy programs of the Department of Energy. In addition to authorizing appropriations, the NDAA establishes defense policies and restrictions, and addresses organizational administrative matters related to DOD. Unlike an appropriations bill, the NDAA does not provide budget authority for government activities. The President’s FY2019 budget request for DOD reflected in part the department’s efforts to align its priorities with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and conform to discretionary spending limits set by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) as amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-23). Of the $708.1 billion, the Trump Administration’s request included $639.1 billion in discretionary funding for the so-called base budget—that is, funds intended to pay for defense-related activities that DOD and other agencies would pursue even if U.S. armed forces were not engaged in contingency operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. The remaining $69 billion of the request, designated as funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), would fund the incremental costs of those ongoing contingency operations, as well as any other costs that Congress and the President agreed to so designate. The request was consistent with discretionary spending limits (or caps) on defense activities originally established by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) and amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123). The FY2019 defense spending cap is $647 billion and applies to discretionary defense programs (excluding OCO). The cap includes programs outside the scope of the NDAA and for which the Administration requested approximately $8 billion. Thus, the portion of the cap applicable to spending authorized by the NDAA is approximately $639 billion. On May 24, 2018, the House voted 351-66 to pass H.R. 5515, an amended version of the FY2019 NDAA reported by the House Armed Services Committee. On June 18, 2018, the Senate voted 85-10 to pass its version of H.R. 5515, after replacing the House-passed text of H.R. 5515 with an amended version of the FY2019 proposal reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S. 2987). On July 25, 2018, a conference committee reported a revised version of the bill (H.Rept. 115-874). On July 26, 2018, the House voted 359-54 to approve the conference report. On August 1, the Senate voted 87-10 to approve the conference report. The conference version authorized approximately the same amount as the President’s request, though with several billions of dollars of adjustments to amounts within the appropriation titles. On August 13, 2018, President Donald J. Trump signed the bill into law (P.L. 115-232). Congressional authorization of FY2019 defense authorizations reflected a running debate about the size of the defense budget given the strategic and budgetary issues facing the United States.

Jul 18, 2019

Freedom of Information Act Fees for Government Information

Jul 17, 2019

An Overview of Consumer Finance and Policy Issues

Consumer finance refers to the saving, borrowing, and investment choices that households make over time. These financial decisions can be complex and can affect households’ financial well-being both now and in the future. Safe and affordable financial services are an important tool for most American households to avoid financial hardship, build assets, and achieve financial security over the course of their lives. Understanding why and how consumers make financial decisions is important when considering policy issues in consumer financial markets. Households borrow money for the following common reasons: investments—such as a home or education—to build future wealth, consumption smoothing (i.e., paying later to consume things now), and emergency expenses. Most households rely on credit to finance some of these expenses, because they do not have enough money saved to pay for them. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, mortgage debt is by far the largest type of debt for households, accounting for approximately 67% of household debt. Student debt is the second-largest household debt, followed by auto loans and credit cards. Consumer financial markets generally share similar market dynamics. In all of these markets, consumers often act in similar ways when making financial decisions and firms tend to act in comparable ways to attract consumers. Therefore, the government tends to consider similar policy interventions when regulating in these markets. Competitive free markets generally lead to efficient distributions of goods and services to maximize value for society. Yet sometimes, free markets are inefficient when particular issues arise. Common issues in consumer financial markets include (1) information asymmetries between financial firms and consumers and (2) behavioral biases that predictably bias consumers when making financial decisions. In these cases, government policy can potentially correct market failures to bring the market to a more efficient outcome, maximizing social welfare. In consumer finance, three types of policy interventions are common: (1) standardized consumer disclosures; (2) regulation to prevent deceptive, unfair, or abusive financial institution practices; and (3) regulation to prevent discrimination in consumer-lending markets. Yet, policymakers need to be aware of unintended consequences of proposed policies, and often find it challenging to determine whether a policy intervention will help or harm a particular market’s efficiency. In response to the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank; P.L. 111-203) established the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) to implement and enforce federal consumer financial law while ensuring consumers can access financial products and services. The CFPB’s authorities fall into three broad categories: rulemaking, writing regulations to implement laws under its jurisdiction; supervision, the power to examine and impose reporting requirements on financial institutions; and enforcement of various consumer protection laws and regulations. The CFPB generally has regulatory authority over providers of an array of consumer financial products and services. The major consumer financial markets include mortgage lending, student loans, automobile loans, credit cards and payments, payday loans and other credit alternative financial products, and checking accounts and substitutes. In addition, two important market structures allow these consumer financial products to be offered: (1) the consumer credit reporting system and (2) the debt collection market. These aspects of the consumer credit system facilitate the pricing of credit offers and the resolution of delinquent consumer credit products for most consumer credit markets.

Jul 12, 2019

Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence. Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to the growing interest in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs and are expected to field an operational hypersonic glide vehicle—potentially armed with nuclear warheads—as early as 2020. The United States, in contrast to Russia and China, is not currently considering or developing hypersonic weapons for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. The Pentagon’s FY2020 budget request for all hypersonic-related research is $2.6 billion, including $157.4 million for hypersonic defense programs. At present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have approved either requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Assistant Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets. As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control. Potential questions include the following: What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine and concepts? Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and technologically feasible? How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?

Jul 11, 2019

Immigration: Alternatives to Detention (ATD) Programs

Since FY2004, Congress has appropriated funding to the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) for an Alternatives to Detention (ATD) program to provide supervised release and enhanced monitoring for a subset of foreign nationals subject to removal whom ICE has released into the United States. These aliens are not statutorily mandated to be in DHS custody, are not considered threats to public safety or national security, and have been released either on bond, their own recognizance, or parole pending a decision on whether they should be removed from the United States. Congressional interest in ATD has increased in recent years due to a number of factors. One factor is that ICE does not have the capacity to detain all foreign nationals who are apprehended and subject to removal, a total that reached nearly 400,000 in FY2018. (ICE reported an average daily population of 48,006 aliens in detention for FY2019, through June 22, 2019.) Other factors include recent shifts in the countries of origin of apprehended foreign nationals, increased numbers of migrants who are traveling with family members, the large number of aliens requesting asylum, and the growing backlog of cases in the immigration court system. Currently, ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) runs an ATD program called the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program III (ISAP III). On June 22, 2019, program enrollment included more than 100,000 foreign nationals, who are a subgroup of ICE’s broader “non-detained docket” of approximately 3 million aliens. Those in the non-detained docket include individuals the government has exercised discretion to release—for example, they are not considered a flight risk or there is a humanitarian reason for their release (as well as other reasons). (Others who are not detained include aliens in state or federal law enforcement custody and absconders with a final order of removal.) Individuals in the non-detained docket, and not enrolled in the ISAP III program, receive less-intensive supervision by ICE. Those in ISAP III are provided varying levels of case management through a combination of face-to-face and telephonic meetings, unannounced home visits, scheduled office visits, and court and meeting alerts. Participants may be enrolled in various technology-based monitoring services including telephonic reporting (TR), GPS monitoring (location tracking via ankle bracelets), or a recently introduced smart phone application (SmartLINK) that uses facial recognition to confirm identity as well as location monitoring via GPS. From January 2016 to June 2017, ICE also ran a community-based supervision pilot program for families with vulnerabilities not compatible with detention. The Family Case Management Program (FCMP) prioritized enrolling families with young children, pregnant or nursing women, individuals with medical or mental health considerations (including trauma), and victims of domestic violence. The program was designed to increase compliance with immigration obligations through a comprehensive case management strategy run by established community-based organizations. FCMP offered case management that included access to stabilization services (food, clothing, and medical services), obligatory legal orientation programing, and interactive and ongoing compliance monitoring. An ICE review of FCMP in March 2017 showed that the rates of compliance for the program were consistent with other ICE monitoring options. The program was discontinued due to its higher costs as compared to ISAP III. Even with the higher costs, there is considerable congressional interest in the effectiveness of FCMP as a way to maintain supervision for families waiting to proceed through the backlogged immigration court system. While DHS upholds that ISAP III is neither a removal program nor an effective substitute for detention, it notes that the program allows ICE to monitor some aliens released into communities more closely while their cases are being resolved. Supporters of ATD programs point to their lower costs compared to detention on a per day rate, and argue that they encourage compliance with court hearings and ICE check-ins. Proponents also mention the impracticalities of detaining the entire non-detained population of roughly 3 million aliens. The primary argument against ATD programs is that they create opportunities for participants to abscond (e.g., evade removal proceedings and/or orders). Other concerns include whether the existence of the programs provides incentives for foreign nationals to migrate to the United States with children to request asylum, in the hope that they will be allowed to reside in the country for several years while their cases proceed through the immigration court system, or that it provides incentives—such as community release—for adults without bona fide family relationships to travel with children and file fraudulent asylum claims or do children harm.

Jul 8, 2019

Critical Infrastructure: Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress

Protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure (CI) against asymmetric physical or cyber threats emerged in the late 1990s as a policy concern, which was then further amplified by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the wake of the attacks, and directed the new Department to identify, prioritize, and protect systems and assets critical to national security, the economy, and public health or safety. Identification of CI assets was, and remains, a complex and resource-intensive task. Many governmental and non-governmental stakeholders increasingly advocate for a fundamentally different approach to critical infrastructure security, maintaining that criticality is not a fixed characteristic of given infrastructure assets. Rather, they argue, criticality should be understood in the context of ensuring system-wide resilience of American government, society, and economic life against the full range of natural and manmade hazards. Congress further elevated resilience as a priority when it passed the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Act into law in late 2018. As the name indicates, CISA was created to lead the national cybersecurity and infrastructure security effort as an operational component of DHS. In April 2019, leadership of the new agency identified a set of 56 National Critical Functions (NCF) (“Appendix A: National Critical Functions”) which it plans to use as the basis of a resilience-based CI risk management approach. However, implementation will rely to a large degree on repurposed legacy programs. Thus, CI policy is currently at an inflection point that raises several potentially pressing issues for Congress: Scope of federal CI policy: The CI security enterprise has expanded significantly from its early focus on protecting systems and assets “essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government” against deliberate attack. Congress may consider narrowing the scope of CI policy. The legacy policy framework: National CI policy retains many legacy mandates and programs designed to support asset protection despite a long-term policy shift towards an all-hazards resilience framework. Congress may consider revising existing asset identification and reporting requirements statutorily linked to federal homeland security grant award processes. Validity of new risk management methods: Congress may assess the potential advantages and drawbacks of the resilience framework, and NCF as the basis for national-level infrastructure risk assessments and investment prioritization. In the past, Congress has called for external validation of DHS risk management methods and may wish to do so in the present case given its comparative novelty. Roles and responsibilities of federal agencies: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS and consolidated many of the federal government’s CI security functions in a large-scale reorganization of government and its mission that is still ongoing. Congress may consider transfer of certain infrastructure security related functions to or from DHS as appropriate. Scope of regulation: Congress may consider legislating compulsory compliance with security standards in cases where voluntary private-sector measures are deemed insufficient to protect national security, the economy, and public health or safety. Appropriateness of existing public-private partnership structures: CISA plans to maintain the current sector specific public-private partnership structures as the preferred vehicle for information sharing and policy coordination. Congress may consider whether adjustment or replacement of these structures is needed to better align partnership efforts with the emerging federal emphasis on system-level resilience. Effectiveness of public-private partnerships: CISA and its predecessor organizations have not been able to provide reliable data indicating the reach and effectiveness of public-partnership programs in incentivizing efficient private investments in national level (as opposed to enterprise level) resilience. Congress may consider whether new or revised reporting requirements are necessary.

Jul 8, 2019

The Federal Role in Historic Preservation: An Overview

A variety of federal government, state government, and private programs support historic preservation in the United States. This report provides an overview of the federal role in historic preservation, including background and funding information for some of the major preservation grants, programs, and entities authorized by Congress. Starting in the early 20th century, Congress has passed several laws that have established a framework for federal historic preservation activities. The most comprehensive of these statutes is the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA; P.L. 89-665). NHPA created a grants program for state historic preservation, established the federal National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) and the procedures by which historic properties are placed on the Register, funded the National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP), established the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), and designated a process for federal agencies to follow when their projects may affect a historic property. Congress has amended and expanded NHPA multiple times since its passage, most recently in 2016. In addition, Congress often considers bills to designate specific properties or areas as historically important, under various designations. These designations include national monuments, national historical parks, national historic landmarks, and properties listed on the NRHP, to name a few. This report addresses questions about what the different land designations signify, who manages the land under each designation, which statutes govern management decisions, and what types of properties are commonly chosen for each designation. Because of these various legislative and oversight commitments, historic preservation is of perennial interest to Congress. For example, some Members of Congress support proposals to eliminate a federal government role in financing historic preservation programs altogether, leaving such programs to be sustained by other levels of government or by private support. Others state that a federal role in supporting historic preservation should be maintained or expanded. In particular, lawmakers and administrations pay significant attention to funding levels for various historic preservation programs that are subject to the annual appropriations process. The most recent (FY2020) budget from the Trump Administration requests a roughly 70% reduction in funding for the Historic Preservation Fund (HPF)—the primary source of funding for federal preservation—compared to FY2019. This request includes no fiscal support for many of the federal grant programs available to states, tribes, local governments, and nonprofit organizations for historic preservation. In June 2019, the House passed H.R. 3055, which consolidated 5 of the 12 regular FY2020 appropriations bills including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill. This appropriations package would provide $121.7 million in appropriations to the HPF. This figure represents an 18% increase from FY2019 regular appropriations levels and a nearly $90 million increase over the FY2020 Administration request. This report contains a list of many of the federal grant programs funded through the annual appropriations process (see Appendix). It also includes overviews of historic preservation grants for tribal historic preservation, African American Civil Rights, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Japanese American Confinement Sites (JACS), Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) programs, the Save America’s Treasures grant program, and the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP). The appendix also includes eligibility requirements, matching fund guidelines, and statutory authorization for each program.

Jul 8, 2019

DOD’s Cloud Strategy and the JEDI Cloud Procurement

Jul 8, 2019

The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA): A Summary of Selected Statutory Provisions

The Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA, Division D of P.L. 115-254) was enacted on October 5, 2018. DRRA is the most comprehensive reform of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) disaster assistance programs since the passage of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013 (SRIA, Division B of P.L. 113-2) and the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA, P.L. 109-295). DRRA focuses on improving pre-disaster planning and mitigation, response, and recovery, and increasing FEMA accountability. As such, it amends many sections of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended; 42 U.S.C. §§5121 et seq.) and also includes new standalone authorities. In addition, DRRA requires reports to Congress, rulemaking, and other actions. This report provides an overview of selected sections of DRRA that significantly change the provision of services or authorities under the Stafford Act, and includes: an overview of programs as they existed prior to DRRA’s enactment, and how they were modified following DRRA; the context or rationale for program modifications or changes to disaster assistance policies following DRRA’s enactment; potential considerations and issues for Congress; a table of amendments to the Stafford Act following DRRA’s enactment; and tables of deadlines associated with DRRA’s reporting, rulemaking and regulations, and other implementation actions and requirements. This report does not specifically address every section included in DRRA, nor does it address every subsection or paragraph of those DRRA sections which are addressed herein.

Jul 8, 2019

USDA’s ReConnect Broadband Pilot Program

Jul 3, 2019

Illicit Drug Flows and Seizures in the United States: What Do We [Not] Know?

Policy discussions around issues such as border security, drug trafficking, and the opioid epidemic include questions about illicit drug flows into the United States. While there are numerous data points involved in understanding the trafficking of illicit drugs into the United States, these data are often estimated, incomplete, imperfect, or lack nuance. For example, debates about drug flows and how best to counter drug trafficking into the country often rely on selected drug seizure data from border officials, which do not reflect all drug flows into the United States. One way of conceptualizing the flow of illicit drugs—both plant-based and synthetic—into the United States is as a funnel. At the top of this funnel is the universe of illicit drugs produced around the world, both foreign and domestic. Factors affecting actual illicit cultivation and/or production are numerous and diverse, as are those affecting analysts’ and officials’ abilities to measure total worldwide production. Of all the illicit drugs that are produced around the world, some portion is destined for the United States. Of the total amount of illicit drugs that reach the U.S. border by land, air, or sea, some portion is known because it was seized by border officials, and an unknown portion is successfully smuggled into the country. While the proportion of illicit drugs coming into the country that are seized is unknowable, the amount of drugs seized is. And, data on drug seizures at the U.S. borders have sometimes served as a reference for policy debates on border security and drug trafficking into the country, in part because it is a knowable portion of drug trafficking problem. The primary agency charged with safeguarding the U.S. borders (including seizing illicit drugs and other contraband) is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Within CBP, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for managing ports of entry and seizes drugs being smuggled into the United States at ports of entry; the Border Patrol is responsible for securing the border between ports of entry and seizes drugs being smuggled into the country between ports of entry. CBP data from OFO and Border Patrol indicate that for cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl, larger quantities by weight are seized at legal ports of entry than are seized between the ports. Conversely, a larger quantity by weight of illicit marijuana is seized between the ports of entry. CRS analysis of OFO drug seizure data from FY2014 to FY2018 indicate that across those five years, about 65% of seized illicit drugs, by weight, were seized at land ports of entry at the border, about 28% of seized drugs were seized at air ports of entry, and about 5% were seized at sea ports of entry. CRS analysis of these data also indicate that nearly 97% of drugs were seized during inbound inspections across those years. CBP is not the only agency that seizes illicit drugs in the United States or even in the border regions. Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies are all involved in enforcement actions that—even if not focused on drug-related crimes—may involve drug seizures. Notably, though, there is no central database housing information on illicit drug seizures from all law enforcement agencies, federal or otherwise. Even though the quantity of total illicit drugs produced around the world that is destined for the United States—and successfully smuggled into the country—is unknown, the likely source of the drugs seized may, in some instances, be knowable. U.S. officials chemically analyze a portion of illicit drugs seized to identify the source and, in conjunction with drug intelligence, assess which countries may be the major suppliers of certain illicit drug types found in the country. In the absence of precise data on illicit drugs moving toward and into the United States, seizure data can provide insight into various elements of drug flows such as smuggling points into the United States and target markets within the country. If policymakers are interested in having a more robust view of drug seizures throughout the country, they could move, through mandates or incentives, to enhance data collection and consolidation of drug seizure data by law enforcement officials. Policymakers may also question how border officials use intelligence about drug flows and data on drug seizures to assess the risks posed by drug trafficking and appropriately allocate resources to counter the threat. They may also evaluate how well available data on drug seizures can help measure progress toward achieving goals outlined in national strategies aimed, at least in part, at reducing drug trafficking into and within the country.

Jul 3, 2019

Defense Primer: Military Installations Management

Jul 3, 2019

PFAS and Drinking Water: Selected EPA and Congressional Actions

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are fluorinated chemicals that have been used in an array of commercial, industrial, and U.S. military applications for decades. Some of the more common applications include nonstick coatings, food wrappers, waterproof materials, and fire suppressants. Detections of some PFAS in drinking water supplies and uncertainty about potential health effects associated with exposure to particular PFAS above certain concentrations have increased calls for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to address these substances in public water supplies. For those few PFAS for which scientific information is available, animal studies suggest that exposure to particular substances above certain levels may be linked to various health effects, including developmental effects; changes in liver, immune, and thyroid function; and increased risk of some cancers. In 2009, EPA listed certain PFAS for formal evaluation under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to determine whether regulations may be warranted. EPA has not issued drinking water regulations for any PFAS but has taken various actions to address PFAS contamination. In the 116th Congress, Members have introduced more than 35 bills to address PFAS through various means. Multiple bills would direct EPA to take regulatory and other actions to address these emerging contaminants under several environmental statutes, including SDWA. Several SDWA-related bills would direct EPA to establish a drinking water standard for one or more PFAS, require monitoring for PFAS in public water supplies, and authorize grants to communities to treat PFAS in drinking water. In February 2019, EPA released its PFAS Action Plan, which discusses the agency’s current and proposed actions to address these substances under its various statutory authorities. Regarding SDWA, the plan notes that EPA is following the statutory process for evaluating PFAS—particularly perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)—to determine whether national primary drinking water regulations are warranted. EPA is scheduled to propose preliminary regulatory determinations for PFOA and PFOS by the end of 2019 and to make final determinations by the end of 2020. The plan also reviews other SDWA authorities that the agency is using to address PFAS in drinking water. The absence of a national health-based drinking water standard for any PFAS has increased interest in the SDWA process for regulating contaminants. The statute prescribes a risk- and science-based process for evaluating and regulating contaminants in drinking water. The evaluation process includes identifying contaminants of potential concern, assessing health risks, collecting occurrence data (and developing reliable analytical methods necessary to do so), and making determinations as to whether a national drinking water regulation is warranted for a contaminant. PFAS includes thousands of diverse chemicals, and setting scientifically sound drinking water standards for one or multiple PFAS raises technical and scientific challenges. For example, SDWA requires EPA to make determinations and set standards using the best available peer-reviewed science and occurrence data. However, data on the potential health effects and occurrence are available for very few of these substances. Further, EPA may face challenges in developing test methods needed to evaluate PFAS occurrence and technologies to treat PFAS in drinking water. Contamination of drinking water by PFAS can pose challenges for states and communities, and some have called for EPA to establish a health-based standard. State drinking water regulators have noted that many states may face significant obstacles in setting their own standards. For emerging contaminants not regulated under SDWA, EPA is authorized to issue health advisories, which provide information on health effects, testing methods, and treatment techniques for contaminants of concern. In 2016, EPA established health advisory levels for PFOA and PFOS in drinking water at 70 parts per trillion (separately or combined). SDWA also authorizes EPA to take actions it deems necessary to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health from a contaminant present in or likely to enter a public water system or an underground source of drinking water. Actions may include issuing orders requiring persons who caused or contributed to the endangerment to provide alternative water supplies or to treat contamination. Since 2002, EPA has used this authority to require responses to PFOA and/or PFOS contamination of water supplies associated with four sites, including three Department of Defense sites.

Jul 2, 2019

U.S.-Iran Tensions and Implications for U.S. Policy

In the spring of 2019, U.S.-Iran tensions have escalated. The Trump Administration, following its 2018 withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), has taken several steps in its campaign of applying “maximum pressure” on Iran. Iran or Iran-linked forces have targeted commercial ships and infrastructure in U.S. partner countries. U.S. officials have stated that Iran-linked threats to U.S. forces and interests, and attacks on several commercial ships in May and June 2019, have prompted the Administration to send additional military assets to the region to deter future Iranian actions. President Donald Trump, while warning Iran not to take action against the United States, has said he prefers a diplomatic solution over moving toward military confrontation. The Administration has expanded U.S. sanctions against Iran, including sanctioning its mineral and petrochemical exports during May-June 2019, placing further pressure on Iran’s economy. Iranian leaders have refused to talk directly with the Administration, and they have announced an intent to no longer comply with some aspects of the JCPOA. U.S. allies and other countries such as Russia and China have expressed a preference to reduce tensions. Several countries, including Japan, Germany, Oman, Qatar, and Iraq, have sought to de-escalate U.S.-Iran tensions by sending high-level officials to Tehran for talks. An expanding action-reaction dynamic between the United States and Iran has the potential to escalate into significant conflict. The United States military has the capability to undertake a large range of options against Iran in the event of conflict, both against Iran directly and against its regional allies and proxies. However, Iran’s alliances with and armed support for armed factions throughout the region, and its network of agents in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere, give Iran the potential to expand any confrontation into areas where U.S. response options might be limited. Members of Congress have received additional information from the Administration about the causes of the uptick in U.S.-Iran tensions and Administration planning for further U.S. responses. They have responded in a number of ways; some Members have sought to pass legislation requiring congressional approval for any decision by the President to take military action against Iran. Additional detail on U.S. policy options on Iran, Iran’s regional and defense policy, and Iran sanctions can be found in: CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its Continued Application, by Matthew C. Weed.

Jul 1, 2019

Poverty Among Americans Aged 65 and Older

The poverty rate among Americans aged 65 and older has declined by almost 70% in the past five decades. In 2017, approximately 9.2% of Americans aged 65 and older had income below the poverty thresholds. However, the number of aged poor has increased since the mid-1970s as the total number of elderly has grown. In 2017, 4.7 million people aged 65 and older lived in poverty. The poverty rate for Americans aged 65 and older historically was higher than the rates for younger groups, but the aged have experienced lower poverty rates than children under age 18 since 1974 and lower rates than adults aged 18 to 64 since the early 1990s. In 2017, the 9.2% poverty rate among Americans aged 65 and older was lower than the 11.2% poverty rate among adults aged 18 to 64 and the 17.5% poverty rate among children under 18 years old. Although the poverty rate has generally declined for older Americans in most demographic groups, certain aged people still live in poverty. For example, People aged 80 and older have a higher poverty rate than other elderly Americans. In 2017, approximately 11.6% of people aged 80 and older lived in poverty, compared with poverty rates of 9.3% among individuals aged 75-79, 8.6% among those aged 70-74, and 7.9% among those aged 65-69. Women aged 80 and older had the highest poverty rate among elderly women and men in all age groups, at 13.5% in 2017 for women aged 80 and older, and 18.6% for those living alone. Americans aged 65 and older who were married and living together with spouses at the time of the survey generally had a lower poverty rate than those who were not married. Among women aged 65 and older, about 4.3% of married women had total incomes below the official poverty threshold in 2017, compared with 13.9% of widows, 15.8% of divorced women, and 21.5% of never-married women. Among individuals aged 65 and older, poverty rates were also high among never-married men, at 22.5% in 2017. Poverty rates vary by race and Hispanic origin. Hispanic origin is distinct from race, and people may identify with one or more races. From 1975 to 2017, the poverty rate for Americans aged 65 and older has decreased for those identifying as non-Hispanic white alone, black alone, and Hispanic. In 2017, the poverty rate was lowest among the non-Hispanic white population (5.8% for men and 8.0% for women) and highest among those identifying as black or African American (16.1% for men and 21.5% for women). The official poverty measure is defined using cash income only, before taxes, and was computed based on food consumption in 1955 and food costs in 1961, indexed to inflation. That definition prevents the official measure from gauging the effects of noncash benefits, taxes, or tax credits on the low-income population, and it does not consider how certain other costs, such as housing or medical expenses, might affect them as well. After decades of research, the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) was developed to address some of the official poverty measure’s limitations. The SPM poverty rate for the aged population is higher than the official poverty rate (14.1% compared with 9.2% in 2017). This higher poverty rate results largely from higher medical out-of-pocket costs among the aged. Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are the main federally funded programs that provide cash benefits to the aged poor; they accounted for almost 90% of total money income received by Americans aged 65 and older whose incomes were below the poverty thresholds in 2017. The federal government also provides certain noncash benefits to help the elderly poor, such as housing subsidies and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). The SPM poverty rate among individuals aged 65 and older would increase by more than 34 percentage points if Social Security benefits were excluded from their income resources, holding other economic behaviors constant. Among the other resources, eliminating SSI, housing subsidies, or SNAP from income would each increase the SPM poverty rate by about one percentage point.

Jul 1, 2019

Sudan’s Uncertain Transition

Sudan faces an inflection point as elements of deposed President Omar al Bashir’s regime struggle to maintain power in the face of a popular uprising and international pressure. Sudan has a long history of rebellion and resistance; mass protests in 1964 and 1985 against military regimes spurred coups that led to brief periods of civilian rule. The current social movement, however, is unprecedented for Sudan in its scope, bringing together professional and labor unions, community groups, civic activists and business leaders, opposition parties, and insurgents in a common call for change. Bashir’s security chiefs, who seized power in April, appear divided on how to proceed: they allowed an initial opening of political space, pledging a transition to civilian government and negotiating with the opposition. But in early June, the Transitional Military Council (TMC) launched a violent crackdown on the pro-democracy movement, killing and arresting protesters, raiding hospitals, blocking the internet, and deploying paramilitary forces across Khartoum and other key cities. The rise within the TMC of a former Darfur militia leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemeti,” whom human rights groups have accused of war crimes, has drawn particular concern. Former U.S. envoy to Sudan Andrew Natsios has described the current moment as Sudan’s greatest political crisis since independence in 1956. Developments in Sudan, a country described as a crossroads between Africa and the Arab world, can have implications beyond its borders. Some observers have asked whether Sudan’s uprising represents a new phase of the Arab Spring, with the potential to revive pro-democracy movements elsewhere. Protests in Algeria, sparked by an effort to extend the tenure of its aging leader, have occurred in tandem with Sudan’s, and by many accounts the protesters have learned lessons from previous uprisings, and from each other. A transition that would bring an end to Sudan’s internal conflicts and allow for economic recovery could have positive impacts in neighboring countries, including South Sudan. A failed transition, however, could spur civil war or state collapse. Such a scenario could have devastating humanitarian consequences, spurring refugee flows and putting existing relief efforts at risk. (Sudan is already a top source of African migrant flows to Europe.) Further instability in Sudan could have spillover effects in surrounding states that rank high on fragility indexes. State collapse could also provide a haven for violent extremists. As a result, the stakes are high, not only for Sudanese, but for the region and the international community.

Jun 28, 2019

India’s 2019 National Election and Implications for U.S. Interests

India, a federal republic and the world’s most populous democracy, held elections to seat a new lower house of parliament in April and May of 2019. Estimates suggest that more than two-thirds of the country’s nearly 900 million eligible voters participated. The 545-seat Lok Sabha (People’s House) is seated every five years, and the results saw a return to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who was chief minister of the west Indian state of Gujarat from 2001 to 2014. Modi’s party won decisively—it now holds 56% of Lok Sabha seats and Modi became the first Indian leader to win consecutive majorities since Indira Gandhi in 1971. The United States and India have been pursuing an expansive strategic partnership since 2005. The Trump Administration and many in the U.S. Congress welcomed Modi’s return to power for another five-year term. Successive U.S. Presidents have deemed India’s growing power and influence a boon to U.S. interests in Asia and globally, not least in the context of balancing against China’s increasing assertiveness. India is often called a preeminent actor in the Trump Administration’s strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Yet there are potential stumbling blocks to continued development of the partnership. In 2019, differences over trade have become more prominent, and India’s long-standing (and mostly commercial) ties to Russia and Iran may run afoul of U.S. sanctions laws. Additionally, India maintains a wariness of U.S. engagement with Pakistan and intentions in Afghanistan, with Islamabad presently facilitating a U.S.-Taliban dialogue and India counseling against a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Prime Minister Modi’s return to power promises broad continuity, even with some notable changes to the federal cabinet. By many accounts, Modi’s record as an economic reformer and liberalizer is mixed, and his reputation as a nationalist “watchman” has not always translated into effective foreign policy, according to some analysts. It is unclear if Modi will use his renewed domestic political mandate to pursue more assertiveness internationally, possibly in ways that challenge U.S. preferences. Still, most analysts contend that Modi and the BJP have been and will continue to be more open to aligning with U.S. regional strategy and more energetic in pursuing U.S.-favored economic reforms than would have been any alternative Indian leadership. The BJP is a Hindu nationalist party, born in 1980 of a larger social movement, and Narendra Modi is a self-avowed Hindu nationalist (India is roughly 79% Hindu and 14% Muslim). The 2019 Modi-BJP campaign was widely criticized for divisiveness, and nationalist fervor following a February India-Pakistan crisis may have benefitted the BJP at the polls. India’s minority communities and the country’s civil society are widely reported to be under increasing threats emanating from Hindu majoritarian policies and sentiment. These threats can take violent and repressive forms, at times with the involvement of Indian officials or political figures, as reported by the U.S. State Department and independent human rights watchdogs, and as criticized by some Members of Congress. This report reviews the recent Indian election process and results, the country’s national political stage, and possible implications for U.S. interests in the areas of bilateral economic and trade relations, defense and security ties, India’s other foreign relations, and human rights concerns.

Jun 28, 2019

Critical Minerals and U.S. Public Policy

President Trump and various U.S. lawmakers have expressed concerns about U.S. reliance on critical mineral imports and potential disruption of supply chains that use critical minerals for various end uses, including defense and electronics applications. Chinese export quotas on a subset of critical minerals referred to as rare earth elements (REEs) and China’s 2010 curtailment of REE shipments to Japan heightened U.S. vulnerability concern. In December 2017, Presidential Executive Order 13817, “A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,” tasked the Department of the Interior to coordinate with other executive branch agencies to publish a list of critical minerals. The Department of the Interior published a final list of 35 critical minerals in May 2018. The concern among many in Congress has evolved from REEs and REE supply chains to include other minor minerals and metals that are used in small quantities for a variety of economically significant applications (e.g., laptops, cell phones, electric vehicles, and renewable energy technologies) and national defense applications. Also, as time passed, concerns increased about access to and the reliability of entire supply chains for rare earths and other minerals. Congressional action (e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014, P.L. 113-66) has led to the acquisition of REEs and other materials for the National Defense Stockpile. In 2017, the United States had no primary production of 22 minerals and was limited to byproduct production of 5 minerals on the critical minerals list. In contrast, the United States is a leading producer of beryllium and helium, and there is some U.S. primary production of 9 other critical minerals. China ranked as the lead global producer of 16 minerals and metals listed as critical. Although there are no single monopoly producers in China, as a nation, China is a dominant or near-monopoly producer of yttrium (99%), gallium (94%), magnesium metal (87%), tungsten (82%), bismuth (80%), and rare earth elements (80%). The United States is 100% import reliant on 14 minerals on the critical minerals list (aside from a small amount of recycling). These minerals are difficult to substitute inputs into the U.S. economy and national security applications; they include graphite, manganese, niobium, rare earths, and tantalum, among others. The United States is more than 75% import reliant on an additional 10 critical minerals: antimony, barite, bauxite, bismuth, potash, rhenium, tellurium, tin, titanium concentrate, and uranium. The current goal of U.S. mineral policy is to promote an adequate, stable, and reliable supply of materials for U.S. national security, economic well-being, and industrial production. U.S. mineral policy emphasizes developing domestic supplies of critical materials and encourages the domestic private sector to produce and process those materials. But some raw materials do not exist in economic quantities in the United States, and processing, manufacturing, and other downstream ventures in the United States may not be globally cost competitive. Congress and other decisionmakers have multiple legislative and administration options to weigh in deliberating on whether, and if so how, to address the U.S. role and vulnerabilities related to critical minerals.

Jun 28, 2019