CRS Reports

The Department of Defense’s JEDI Cloud Program

In September 2017, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a memorandum calling for the accelerated adoption of a Department of Defense (DOD) enterprise-wide cloud services solution as a fundamental component of ongoing DOD modernization efforts. As a component of this effort, DOD is seeking to acquire a cloud services solution accessible to the entirety of the Department that can support Unclassified, Secret, and Top Secret requirements, focusing on commercially available cloud service solutions, through the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI) Cloud acquisition program. DOD intends to conduct a full and open competition that is expected to result in a single award Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity firm-fixed price contract for commercial items. DOD has indicated that the minimum guaranteed award is $1 million, and that the initial period of performance is two years. The contract is expected to have a maximum ceiling of $10 billion across a potential 10-year period of performance. DOD is in the final stages of evaluating proposals, with Amazon Web Services and Microsoft remaining in contention for the contract. The Department originally expected to award the contract in August 2019. However, Secretary of Defense Dr. Mark T. Esper is reportedly currently reviewing the JEDI Cloud program, which may delay the award. Significant industry and congressional attention has been focused on DOD’s intent to award the JEDI Cloud contract to a single company. Oracle America filed multiple pre-award bid protests with the Government Accountability Office, which were denied. Oracle America then filed a bid protest lawsuit with the U.S. Court of Federal Claims; the court ruled against Oracle in a July 12, 2019, decision. In filings associated with its bid protests, Oracle America alleged in part that the JEDI Cloud acquisition process was unfairly skewed in favor of Amazon Web Services through potential organizational conflicts of interest associated with three former DOD employees, each of whom was involved to greater or lesser degrees in the early development of the program. DOD investigations determined that Amazon Web Services had no conflicts of interest and established that the actions of the individuals identified by Oracle America did not negatively impact the procurement or grant Amazon Web Services an unfair competitive advantage. However, the investigations did identify individual violations of ethical standards established by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Some industry observers contend that an initial single award appears to contradict broader federal cloud computing implementation guidance and industry best practices that stress the importance of multi-cloud solutions. Others point to the implementation approaches identified by DOD’s 2019 Cloud Strategy as evidence that the Department expects the JEDI Cloud to serve certain enterprise-wide functions, performing as one component of a broader multi-cloud, multi-vendor system. Opponents of DOD’s use of a single-award contract for the JEDI Cloud program have suggested that this tactic could restrict future competition for enterprise-wide DOD cloud services. Supporters of DOD’s approach argue that the JEDI Cloud program’s requirement for offerors to develop applications and data schema easily transferable to different platforms suggests that the Department may be equipped to migrate from any service environment developed under the JEDI Cloud contract to another such environment. Several Members of Congress have engaged the Administration to express their views regarding the JEDI Cloud acquisition program and pending contract award. The 116th Congress is considering related authorization and appropriations legislation that could shape future implementation of the program (H.R. 2740, H.R. 2500, and S. 1790).

Aug 2, 2019

Illicit Drug Flows and Seizures in the United States: In Focus

Aug 1, 2019

Why Is the Federal Reserve Reducing Interest Rates?

On July 31, the Federal Reserve (Fed) reduced the federal funds rate by a quarter of a percentage point. The Fed targets this rate to meet its statutory mandate of maximum employment and stable prices (defined as 2% inflation). Lower interest rates would tend to raise employment and inflation, all else equal. Fed Rate Cuts Across the Business Cycle The Fed typically cuts rates during recessions and raises rates during expansions. Since the Fed began using the federal funds rate as its primary instrument to carry out monetary policy (possibly as early as 1982), it has had four periods of sustained rate reductions (see Figure 1). Three out of four of those episodes coincided with the last three recessions. (The fourth was after the 1981-1982 recession, when the Fed had raised rates to their highest level on record, causing inflation to drop rapidly.) Notably, in all three of those cases, the Fed began to reduce rates 2 months to 12 months before the recession began and continued to reduce or maintain low rates into the beginning of the recovery. Rates were also briefly cut three other times during these expansions. The 1987-1988 rate reductions were in response to a large drop in the stock market. The Fed justified the 1995-1996 reductions by stating that “as a result of the monetary tightening initiated in early 1994, inflationary pressures have receded enough to accommodate a modest adjustment in monetary conditions.” The Fed cut rates in 1998 in response to financial turmoil related to the Russian debt crisis and the failure of a large hedge fund. In hindsight, financial turmoil in 1987 and 1998 did not have a long-lasting effect on financial conditions or the broader economy, but there was considerable fear at the time that they would. The Fed resumed rate increases within about a year of all of these reductions. The recent rate cut is starting from a lower federal funds rate than any previous cut since 1982. This is in part because the neutral rate that neither stimulates nor restrains economic activity is thought to have fallen. It is also because the Fed never employed contractionary monetary policy in this expansion, unlike at the peak of previous expansions. Figure 1. Federal Funds Rate Target 1982-2019 / Source: St. Louis Fed, FRED. Notes: The Fed switched from a point target to a target range in 2008. The Current Context Is the Fed cutting rates to fend off an impending recession? Or is it a temporary blip similar to 1987, 1996, and 1998? Current available data may help answer those questions, with the caveat that the Fed has more up-to-date confidential data that may paint a different picture. What many find striking about the Fed’s decision to cut rates is that the unemployment rate has been at its lowest rate this year since 1969, below the Fed’s estimate of the longer-run unemployment rate consistent with maximum employment. Indeed, the unemployment rate is lower today (3.7%) than when the Fed last raised rates in December 2018 (3.9%). Economic growth slowed from 3.1% in the first quarter of 2019 to 2.1% in the second quarter (see Figure 2). However, at full employment, the economy cannot persistently grow faster than its long-run trend, and the second quarter growth rate is slightly higher than the Fed’s projection of longer-run growth and slightly lower than this expansion’s average. Figure 2. Quarterly Economic Growth Rates 2009:3-2019:2 / Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Notes: Growth rates are annualized. Employment growth also shows no sign of a recession, and only a modest cooling off from 2018 (see Figure 3). Although job growth was relatively weak in May (72,000 jobs added), it was relatively strong in June (224,000) and for 2019 to date (a monthly average of 172,000, compared to 223,000 in 2018). Because jobs data are highly volatile, too much cannot be inferred from a one-month change. Figure 3. Monthly Change in Employment 2010-2019 / Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. Economic theory predicts that low unemployment would push inflation higher, but this has not occurred recently. The Fed might be reducing rates because inflation has fallen below its 2% target, although the timing would be a little off—inflation first fell below 2% in October 2018 (or July 2018 if food and energy prices are excluded), and it has ticked back up again slightly since March (see Figure 4). However, the Fed might have wanted to ensure that inflation would remain persistently below 2% before cutting rates. Figure 4. Inflation Rate 2009-2019 / Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis. Notes: 12 month change in Personal Consumption Expenditures Index. A key principle of monetary policy is that it should be forward looking because of lags between policy changes and their effect on the economy. When deciding to cut rates, the Fed should not consider only current economic performance, but also projections of future performance. As noted above, the Fed typically cuts rates before a recession has begun, and there are some recession warning signals, such as the yield curve inversion, which, if accurate, would justify lower rates. The Fed does not project a recession this year or next, however, so that would not seem to motivate its rate decision. Despite its view that a sustained expansion and strong labor markets are the most likely outcomes, the Fed cited global developments and muted inflationary pressures as justification for cutting rates. There are always risks to the outlook, however, especially from abroad. Unlike the 1987 and 1998 episodes, there has been no major disruption in financial markets. (There were large declines in the stock market last December and May, but both subsequently completely reversed.) Some have described this cut as “insurance” in case conditions worsen, but cutting rates also poses a risk of overheating that could threaten the expansion. Fed Independence Given the lack of official evidence that the economy has weakened, some question whether President Trump’s repeated calls for the Fed to reduce rates has been effective. If so, this would raise questions about whether the Fed’s independence has been compromised, which could have implications for the Fed’s credibility going forward. When asked whether the President’s requests have influenced Fed policy, Fed Chairman Jerome Powell recently testified “Not at all.”

Aug 1, 2019

Trends in the U.S. Poverty Rate after Recessions

poverty, poverty rate, recession, expansion, recovery, business cycle

Aug 1, 2019

U.S. EPA FY2020 Appropriations

Jul 31, 2019

FY2019 Disaster Supplemental Appropriations: Overview

This report provides a legislative history of the Additional Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Relief Act, 2019 (P.L. 116-20), and provides an overview of some of the issues that often arise with consideration of supplemental disaster assistance appropriations. In total, 59 major disasters were declared in calendar year 2018, and 27 major disasters were declared in 2019 up to the date the compromise on the disaster supplemental was announced. In addition to these specifically declared incidents, other situations arose that caused disruption to lives, economic resources, and infrastructure. Together, these incidents and ongoing recovery efforts from previous disasters drove a demand for additional federal budgetary resources beyond those provided through regular annual appropriations. This kind of demand is usually reflected in a request by the Administration for supplemental appropriations after the need for funding is recognized. Despite the absence of such a request by the Trump Administration, congressional leadership in both the House and the Senate chose to consider disaster-related supplemental appropriations at the end of the 115th Congress. An initial $7.8 billion proposal that passed the House in the 115th Congress as part of a consolidated appropriations bill did not advance in the Senate. In the 116th Congress, H.R. 268 passed the House. This measure included $14.19 billion in disaster relief appropriations, as well as continuing appropriations intended to resolve an ongoing lapse in annual appropriations that had caused a partial government shutdown. The Senate was unable to get cloture on proposed amendments to the measure, and consideration of the bill stalled. After the lapse in appropriations was resolved, Senate Appropriations Chairman Richard Shelby introduced a $13.45 billion supplemental appropriations measure structured as a substitute to H.R. 268. Again, the Senate could not achieve cloture on the proposal. On April 9, House Appropriations Chairwoman Nita Lowey introduced H.R. 2157, a supplemental appropriations bill, which covered the same disasters addressed in H.R. 268, as well as additional disasters that had occurred since the earlier measure had been passed by the House. CBO estimated the new bill, as introduced, would provide $17.31 billion in discretionary spending, which grew to $19.26 billion through floor action. The bill passed the House May 10, 2019, by a vote of 257-150. A $19.19 billion bipartisan, bicameral agreement on FY2019 disaster funding was negotiated, and offered in the Senate as S.Amdt. 250 to H.R. 2157 on May 23, 2019. The bill, as amended, was passed by the Senate, 85-8. Three attempts to approve the amended bill by unanimous consent were blocked in the House of Representatives while the body was in pro forma session during the Memorial Day recess. The House subsequently considered the amended bill under suspension of the rules on June 3, 2019, and voted 354-58 to approve the measure. The bill was signed into law as P.L. 116-20 on June 6, 2019. This report includes a more detailed legislative history and a tabular comparison that shows how the funding in these different approaches evolved. Congressional clients seeking further insight into specific programs and provisions in P.L. 116-20 may consult the analysts and background reports listed in CRS Report R45714, FY2019 Disaster Supplemental Appropriations: CRS Experts. The report also includes a discussion of issues that commonly arise during debate on supplemental appropriations, including the relative timeliness of supplemental appropriations; adjustments to spending limits that are often applied to them; offsets for disaster relief and recovery appropriations; the appropriate scope of supplemental appropriations; timelines for obligation of funding; and oversight of supplemental spending. This report will not be updated.

Jul 30, 2019

Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Retention

Jul 26, 2019

Department of Veterans Affairs (VA): A Primer on Telehealth

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA), of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), is leveraging the use of telehealth with the goal of expanding veterans’ access to VA care. Telehealth generally refers to the use of information and communication technology to deliver a health care service. It is a mode of health care delivery that extends beyond the “brick-and-mortar” health care facilities of the VHA. VA telehealth services are generally provided on an outpatient basis and supplement in-person care. Such services do not replace VA in-person care. The VA copay requirements for telehealth are the same as for VA in-person care, but in some cases may be lower than the copays for VA in-person outpatient health care services delivered through the VHA. President Trump and Congress have recently enacted measures such as the VA Maintaining Internal Systems and Strengthening Integrated Outside Networks of 2018 (VA MISSION Act; P.L. 115-182) that aim to address the access barriers that veterans may experience when accessing VA telehealth services across states lines. The VA MISSION Act, among other things, removes all geographic and licensing barriers to VA telehealth, thereby allowing veterans to access VA telehealth services in their communities from any location in the United States, U.S. territories, District of Columbia, and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. VA Telehealth Modalities In FY2018, more than 9.3 million veterans were enrolled in VA care. In that same fiscal year, the VA provided 2.29 million telehealth episodes of care to 782,000 veteran patients collectively using the following three VA telehealth modalities: (1) home telehealth, (2) store-and-forward telehealth, and (3) clinical video telehealth. The VA has developed VA mobile applications (apps), which refer to software programs that run on certain operating systems of mobile devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets) and computers that transmit data over the internet that veterans can access as telehealth applications. Veterans can access VA mobile apps on cellular and mobile devices that operate using either a web-based platform, an iOS platform, or an Android operating platform. VA Telehealth Partnerships and Access According to the VA, it cannot meet the health care demands of veteran patients in-house and therefore, it has established partnerships with private sector vendors to help address veterans’ demand for VA care. For example, the VA’s partnership with the wireless service provider T-Mobile would allow a veteran who has T-Mobile as a cellular wireless service provider to access the VA Video Connect app without incurring additional charges or reducing plan data allotments. VA Teleconsultations VA providers can use telehealth platforms and applications to consult with one another, which is referred to as a teleconsultation by section 1709A(b) of title 38 of the U.S. Code. The VA has adopted and modified the Project Extension for Community Healthcare Outcomes (Project ECHO) learning model, which the Expanding Capacity for Health Outcomes Act (P.L. 114-270) required the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to examine and report on, to create a Specialty Care Access Network-Extension for Community Healthcare Outcomes (SCAN-ECHO) learning model. The VA’s SCAN-ECHO is a similar approach that aims to connect underproductive providers to assist access-challenged providers, using the hub-and-spoke model, which refers to a structure whereby a central point (referred to as the “hub”) disseminates information to different connecting points (referred to as the “spokes”). Topics Covered in This Report This report provides background information on VA telehealth, including veteran eligibility and enrollment criteria, VA telehealth copayment requirements, and VA providers’ authority to provide telehealth services anywhere. The report also discusses the components of VA telehealth. It also discusses three issues that Congress could choose to consider: (1) access barriers to in-person VA care, (2) lack of access to the internet, and (3) conflicting guidelines for prescribing controlled substances via telehealth across state lines.

Jul 26, 2019

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019: Changes to the BCA and Debt Limit

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2019 (H.R. 3877; BBA 2019), as introduced, would raise the discretionary spending limits (caps) implemented by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) for FY2020 and FY2021; make other BCA-related changes, including an extension of the mandatory sequester through FY2029; and suspend the statutory debt limit until August 1, 2021. Changes to FY2020 and FY2021 Discretionary Spending Caps The BCA created annual statutory discretionary spending caps for defense and nondefense spending that are in effect through FY2021. If appropriations are enacted that exceed a limit for a fiscal year, across-the-board reductions (i.e., sequestration) are triggered to eliminate the excess spending within that spending category. For more information on the BCA, see CRS Report R44874, The Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions. Previously enacted legislation increased these discretionary spending caps for each year from FY2014 through FY2019. For more information, see CRS Insight IN11090, Increasing the BCA Spending Limits: Characteristics of Previously Enacted Legislation. Section 101(a) of BBA 2019 would increase the caps on defense and nondefense budget authority for FY2020 and FY2021, the final two years for which discretionary spending caps are scheduled to be in effect under the BCA. For FY2020, the BBA 2019 would raise the defense discretionary cap to $666.5 billion (a $90 billion increase) and the nondefense cap to $621.5 billion (a $78 billion increase). In FY2021, BBA 2019 would raise the discretionary defense cap to $671.5 billion (an $81 billion increase) and the nondefense cap to $626.5 billion (a $72 billion increase). Table 1 shows the changes that would occur under BBA 2019. Table 1. Discretionary Cap Changes Resulting from the BBA 2019 (in billions of dollars of budget authority) Fiscal Year Category Current Law BBA 2019 Change Post-BBA 2019 FY2020 Defense $576.2 +$90.3 $666.5 Nondefense $543.2 +$78.3 $621.5 FY2021 Defense $590.2 +$81.3 $671.5 Nondefense $554.9 +$71.6 $626.5 Sources: H.R. 3877 and Congressional Budget Office, Updated Budget Projections: 2019 to 2029, May 2019, p. 16. Note: Based on BBA 2019 as introduced on July 23, 2019. The combined increases to the FY2020 and FY2021 discretionary caps proposed by BBA 2019 ($322 billion) would be marginally larger than the combined FY2018 and FY2019 cap increases ($296 billion) and much larger than the two-year cap increases agreed to for FY2016 and FY2017 ($80 billion combined) and FY2014 and FY2015 ($63 billion combined). Figure 1 shows the cap increases enacted for FY2014-FY2019 and the increases that would occur under BBA 2019 compared to the caps established under the BCA. Figure 1. BCA Discretionary Limits, FY2014-FY2021 Budget authority in billions of nominal dollars / Sources: H.R. 3877 and Congressional Budget Office, Updated Budget Projections: 2019 to 2029, May 2019, p. 16. Note: Based on BBA 2019 as introduced on July 23, 2019. BBA 2019 would make the changes in yellow in FY2020 and FY2021. Other Changes Related to the BCA Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) Spending Targets The BCA stipulates that certain discretionary spending—such as appropriations designated as emergency requirements or for overseas contingency operations (OCO)—are effectively exempt from the limits. There is no statutory limit on the amount of spending that may be designated as emergency or for OCO, meaning that Congress and the President can together designate any amount that they agree upon in law. Section 101(b) of BBA 2019 would establish spending targets for OCO levels of $79.5 billion in FY2020 and $77 billion in FY2021. For more information on this spending, see CRS Report R45778, Exceptions to the Budget Control Act’s Discretionary Spending Limits. Exemption for Spending on the 2020 Census As stated above, the BCA stipulates that certain discretionary spending is effectively exempt from the spending caps. The largest categories of this “exempt” spending are OCO and emergency spending but smaller limited exemptions are permitted for other categories such as disaster relief and wildfire suppression. Section 101(c) of BBA 2019 would create a similar exemption of up to $2.5 billion for the 2020 Census. Extension of Automatic Direct Spending Reductions Through FY2029 The BCA also established a sequester of certain mandatory spending programs, including Medicare service payments (also known as the “Joint Committee” sequester), which took effect in FY2013 and was initially scheduled to end in FY2021. Subsequent legislation has extended the mandatory sequester through FY2027. Many large programs, such as Social Security and Medicaid, are exempt from the Joint Committee sequester. For more information on the Joint Committee sequester, see CRS Report R45106, Medicare and Budget Sequestration. Section 402 of BBA 2019 would extend the mandatory sequester for another two years, for FY2028 and FY2029. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that the extension would reduce FY2019-FY2029 budget authority by a combined $61.8 billion. Provisions Related to a Budget Resolution Title II of BBA 2019 includes provisions related to a congressional budget resolution for FY2020 and FY2021. These provisions direct the House and Senate Budget Committee chairs to file statements of budgetary levels, which would have the same effect in the respective chamber as if they had been included in a budget resolution. The BBA 2019 would require that (1) for discretionary spending, the filed levels be consistent with the statutory limits on discretionary spending (as amended by the BBA 2019) and (2) for mandatory spending and revenue levels, the filed levels be consistent with the most recent baseline projections made by the CBO. These provisions, however, would not preclude Congress from acting on a traditional budget resolution for those years. For more information, see CRS Report R44296, Deeming Resolutions: Budget Enforcement in the Absence of a Budget Resolution. Suspension of the Debt Limit Until August 2021 Treasury is currently utilizing “extraordinary measures” to stay under the statutory debt limit since its reinstatement in March 2019. In July 2019, Treasury informed Congress that those extraordinary measures could be exhausted before September 2019. Section 301 of BBA 2019 would suspend the debt limit until August 1, 2021. BBA 2019 would then increase the debt limit upon reinstatement to exactly accommodate any increases in federal borrowing that were undertaken during the suspension period. CBO projects continued growth in federal debt levels through the debt suspension period.

Jul 24, 2019

State and Local Financing of Public Schools

The funding of public elementary and secondary schools in the United States involves a combination of local, state, and federal government revenues, in proportions that vary substantially both across and within states. According to the most recent data, state governments provide 47.0% of these revenues, local governments provide 44.8%, and the federal government provides 8.3%. Over the last several decades, the share of public elementary and secondary education revenues provided by state governments has increased, the share provided by local governments has decreased, and the federal share has varied within a range of 6.0% to 12.7%. The primary source of local revenues for public elementary and secondary education is the property tax, while state revenues are raised from a variety of sources, primarily personal and corporate income and retail sales taxes, a variety of “excise” taxes such as those on tobacco products and alcoholic beverages, and lotteries in several states. All states (but not the District of Columbia) provide a share of the total revenues available for public elementary and secondary education. This state share varies widely, from approximately 25% in Illinois to almost 90% in Hawaii and Vermont. The programs through which state funds are provided to local educational agencies (LEAs) for public elementary and secondary education have traditionally been categorized into five types: (1) Foundation Programs, (2) Full State Funding Programs, (3) Flat Grants, (4) District Power Equalizing, and (5) Categorical Grants. Of these, Foundation Programs are most common, although many states use a combination of program types. A goal of all of the various types of state school finance programs is to provide at least some limited degree of “equalization” of spending and resources, and/or local ability to raise funds, for public elementary and secondary education across all of the LEAs in the state. Such programs often establish target levels of funding “per pupil.” The “pupil” counts involved in these programs may simply be based on total student enrollment as of some point in time, or they may be a “weighted” count of students, taking into account variations in a number of categories—special pupil needs (e.g., disabilities, low family income, limited proficiency in English), grade levels, specific educational programs (e.g., career and technical education), or geographic considerations (e.g., student population sparsity or local variation in costs of providing education). After state funds reach LEAs, they are combined with locally raised funds to provide educational resources to students in individual schools. Under the traditional, and still most common, method of allocating resources within LEAs, there are no specific budgets for individual schools. Available state and local funds are managed centrally, by LEA staff, and various resources—facilities, teachers, support staff, school administrators, instructional equipment, etc.—are assigned to individual schools. In contrast, a number of LEAs have in recent years applied the weighted student funding concept to developing and implementing individual school budgets. The federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) includes one program (Title I-A) and one secretarial authority (Title I-E) that incorporate elements of the equalization and weighted student funding strategies used by states and LEAs. Two of the four ESEA Title I-A allocation formulas employ pupil weighting concepts in the allocation of funds to states and LEAs, and one of those formulas also takes into consideration disparities in expenditures per pupil among each state’s LEAs in calculating grants. The ESEA Title I-E authority allows the Secretary of Education to enter into a demonstration agreement with LEAs that are using or agree to implement weighted student funding systems to establish budgets for, and allocate funds to, individual schools. A separate development relevant to many aspects of public elementary and secondary education finance has been increasing interest in the collection and reporting of school-level finance data for public schools. While historically there have not been comprehensive state or federal efforts to calculate or report on specific budgets or expenditure levels for individual public schools, federal efforts to require and support the reporting of such information have expanded rapidly in recent years.

Jul 23, 2019

Robocall Regulation and Judicial Review

Jul 22, 2019

Freedom of Information Act Fees for Government Information

Jul 17, 2019

Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons—maneuvering weapons that fly at speeds of at least Mach 5—as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, the United States has focused such efforts on developing hypersonic glide vehicles, which are launched from a rocket before gliding to a target, and hypersonic cruise missiles, which are powered by high-speed, air-breathing engines during flight. As current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command General John Hyten has stated, these weapons could enable “responsive, long-range, strike options against distant, defended, and/or time-critical threats [such as road-mobile missiles] when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not preferred.” Critics, on the other hand, contend that hypersonic weapons lack defined mission requirements, contribute little to U.S. military capability, and are unnecessary for deterrence. Funding for hypersonic weapons has been relatively restrained in the past; however, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to the growing interest in these technologies in Russia and China, both of which have a number of hypersonic weapons programs and are expected to field an operational hypersonic glide vehicle—potentially armed with nuclear warheads—as early as 2020. The United States, in contrast to Russia and China, is not currently considering or developing hypersonic weapons for use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems. The Pentagon’s FY2020 budget request for all hypersonic-related research is $2.6 billion, including $157.4 million for hypersonic defense programs. At present, the Department of Defense (DOD) has not established any programs of record for hypersonic weapons, suggesting that it may not have approved either requirements for the systems or long-term funding plans. Indeed, as Assistant Director for Hypersonics (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) Mike White has stated, DOD has not yet made a decision to acquire hypersonic weapons and is instead developing prototypes to assist in the evaluation of potential weapon system concepts and mission sets. As Congress reviews the Pentagon’s plans for U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, it might consider questions about the rationale for hypersonic weapons, their expected costs, and their implications for strategic stability and arms control. Potential questions include the following: What mission(s) will hypersonic weapons be used for? Are hypersonic weapons the most cost-effective means of executing these potential missions? How will they be incorporated into joint operational doctrine and concepts? Given the lack of defined mission requirements for hypersonic weapons, how should Congress evaluate funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs or the balance of funding requests for hypersonic weapons programs, enabling technologies, and supporting test infrastructure? Is an acceleration of research on hypersonic weapons, enabling technologies, or hypersonic missile defense options both necessary and technologically feasible? How, if at all, will the fielding of hypersonic weapons affect strategic stability? Is there a need for risk-mitigation measures, such as expanding New START, negotiating new multilateral arms control agreements, or undertaking transparency and confidence-building activities?

Jul 11, 2019

Critical Infrastructure: Emerging Trends and Policy Considerations for Congress

Protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure (CI) against asymmetric physical or cyber threats emerged in the late 1990s as a policy concern, which was then further amplified by the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Congress created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in the wake of the attacks, and directed the new Department to identify, prioritize, and protect systems and assets critical to national security, the economy, and public health or safety. Identification of CI assets was, and remains, a complex and resource-intensive task. Many governmental and non-governmental stakeholders increasingly advocate for a fundamentally different approach to critical infrastructure security, maintaining that criticality is not a fixed characteristic of given infrastructure assets. Rather, they argue, criticality should be understood in the context of ensuring system-wide resilience of American government, society, and economic life against the full range of natural and manmade hazards. Congress further elevated resilience as a priority when it passed the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) Act into law in late 2018. As the name indicates, CISA was created to lead the national cybersecurity and infrastructure security effort as an operational component of DHS. In April 2019, leadership of the new agency identified a set of 56 National Critical Functions (NCF) (“Appendix A: National Critical Functions”) which it plans to use as the basis of a resilience-based CI risk management approach. However, implementation will rely to a large degree on repurposed legacy programs. Thus, CI policy is currently at an inflection point that raises several potentially pressing issues for Congress: Scope of federal CI policy: The CI security enterprise has expanded significantly from its early focus on protecting systems and assets “essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government” against deliberate attack. Congress may consider narrowing the scope of CI policy. The legacy policy framework: National CI policy retains many legacy mandates and programs designed to support asset protection despite a long-term policy shift towards an all-hazards resilience framework. Congress may consider revising existing asset identification and reporting requirements statutorily linked to federal homeland security grant award processes. Validity of new risk management methods: Congress may assess the potential advantages and drawbacks of the resilience framework, and NCF as the basis for national-level infrastructure risk assessments and investment prioritization. In the past, Congress has called for external validation of DHS risk management methods and may wish to do so in the present case given its comparative novelty. Roles and responsibilities of federal agencies: The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS and consolidated many of the federal government’s CI security functions in a large-scale reorganization of government and its mission that is still ongoing. Congress may consider transfer of certain infrastructure security related functions to or from DHS as appropriate. Scope of regulation: Congress may consider legislating compulsory compliance with security standards in cases where voluntary private-sector measures are deemed insufficient to protect national security, the economy, and public health or safety. Appropriateness of existing public-private partnership structures: CISA plans to maintain the current sector specific public-private partnership structures as the preferred vehicle for information sharing and policy coordination. Congress may consider whether adjustment or replacement of these structures is needed to better align partnership efforts with the emerging federal emphasis on system-level resilience. Effectiveness of public-private partnerships: CISA and its predecessor organizations have not been able to provide reliable data indicating the reach and effectiveness of public-partnership programs in incentivizing efficient private investments in national level (as opposed to enterprise level) resilience. Congress may consider whether new or revised reporting requirements are necessary.

Jul 8, 2019

The Federal Role in Historic Preservation: An Overview

A variety of federal government, state government, and private programs support historic preservation in the United States. This report provides an overview of the federal role in historic preservation, including background and funding information for some of the major preservation grants, programs, and entities authorized by Congress. Starting in the early 20th century, Congress has passed several laws that have established a framework for federal historic preservation activities. The most comprehensive of these statutes is the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA; P.L. 89-665). NHPA created a grants program for state historic preservation, established the federal National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) and the procedures by which historic properties are placed on the Register, funded the National Trust for Historic Preservation (NTHP), established the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (ACHP), and designated a process for federal agencies to follow when their projects may affect a historic property. Congress has amended and expanded NHPA multiple times since its passage, most recently in 2016. In addition, Congress often considers bills to designate specific properties or areas as historically important, under various designations. These designations include national monuments, national historical parks, national historic landmarks, and properties listed on the NRHP, to name a few. This report addresses questions about what the different land designations signify, who manages the land under each designation, which statutes govern management decisions, and what types of properties are commonly chosen for each designation. Because of these various legislative and oversight commitments, historic preservation is of perennial interest to Congress. For example, some Members of Congress support proposals to eliminate a federal government role in financing historic preservation programs altogether, leaving such programs to be sustained by other levels of government or by private support. Others state that a federal role in supporting historic preservation should be maintained or expanded. In particular, lawmakers and administrations pay significant attention to funding levels for various historic preservation programs that are subject to the annual appropriations process. The most recent (FY2020) budget from the Trump Administration requests a roughly 70% reduction in funding for the Historic Preservation Fund (HPF)—the primary source of funding for federal preservation—compared to FY2019. This request includes no fiscal support for many of the federal grant programs available to states, tribes, local governments, and nonprofit organizations for historic preservation. In June 2019, the House passed H.R. 3055, which consolidated 5 of the 12 regular FY2020 appropriations bills including the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill. This appropriations package would provide $121.7 million in appropriations to the HPF. This figure represents an 18% increase from FY2019 regular appropriations levels and a nearly $90 million increase over the FY2020 Administration request. This report contains a list of many of the federal grant programs funded through the annual appropriations process (see Appendix). It also includes overviews of historic preservation grants for tribal historic preservation, African American Civil Rights, Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs), Japanese American Confinement Sites (JACS), Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) programs, the Save America’s Treasures grant program, and the American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP). The appendix also includes eligibility requirements, matching fund guidelines, and statutory authorization for each program.

Jul 8, 2019

DOD’s Cloud Strategy and the JEDI Cloud Procurement

Jul 8, 2019

USDA’s ReConnect Broadband Pilot Program

Jul 3, 2019

Illicit Drug Flows and Seizures in the United States: What Do We [Not] Know?

Policy discussions around issues such as border security, drug trafficking, and the opioid epidemic include questions about illicit drug flows into the United States. While there are numerous data points involved in understanding the trafficking of illicit drugs into the United States, these data are often estimated, incomplete, imperfect, or lack nuance. For example, debates about drug flows and how best to counter drug trafficking into the country often rely on selected drug seizure data from border officials, which do not reflect all drug flows into the United States. One way of conceptualizing the flow of illicit drugs—both plant-based and synthetic—into the United States is as a funnel. At the top of this funnel is the universe of illicit drugs produced around the world, both foreign and domestic. Factors affecting actual illicit cultivation and/or production are numerous and diverse, as are those affecting analysts’ and officials’ abilities to measure total worldwide production. Of all the illicit drugs that are produced around the world, some portion is destined for the United States. Of the total amount of illicit drugs that reach the U.S. border by land, air, or sea, some portion is known because it was seized by border officials, and an unknown portion is successfully smuggled into the country. While the proportion of illicit drugs coming into the country that are seized is unknowable, the amount of drugs seized is. And, data on drug seizures at the U.S. borders have sometimes served as a reference for policy debates on border security and drug trafficking into the country, in part because it is a knowable portion of drug trafficking problem. The primary agency charged with safeguarding the U.S. borders (including seizing illicit drugs and other contraband) is the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Within CBP, the Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for managing ports of entry and seizes drugs being smuggled into the United States at ports of entry; the Border Patrol is responsible for securing the border between ports of entry and seizes drugs being smuggled into the country between ports of entry. CBP data from OFO and Border Patrol indicate that for cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, and fentanyl, larger quantities by weight are seized at legal ports of entry than are seized between the ports. Conversely, a larger quantity by weight of illicit marijuana is seized between the ports of entry. CRS analysis of OFO drug seizure data from FY2014 to FY2018 indicate that across those five years, about 65% of seized illicit drugs, by weight, were seized at land ports of entry at the border, about 28% of seized drugs were seized at air ports of entry, and about 5% were seized at sea ports of entry. CRS analysis of these data also indicate that nearly 97% of drugs were seized during inbound inspections across those years. CBP is not the only agency that seizes illicit drugs in the United States or even in the border regions. Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies are all involved in enforcement actions that—even if not focused on drug-related crimes—may involve drug seizures. Notably, though, there is no central database housing information on illicit drug seizures from all law enforcement agencies, federal or otherwise. Even though the quantity of total illicit drugs produced around the world that is destined for the United States—and successfully smuggled into the country—is unknown, the likely source of the drugs seized may, in some instances, be knowable. U.S. officials chemically analyze a portion of illicit drugs seized to identify the source and, in conjunction with drug intelligence, assess which countries may be the major suppliers of certain illicit drug types found in the country. In the absence of precise data on illicit drugs moving toward and into the United States, seizure data can provide insight into various elements of drug flows such as smuggling points into the United States and target markets within the country. If policymakers are interested in having a more robust view of drug seizures throughout the country, they could move, through mandates or incentives, to enhance data collection and consolidation of drug seizure data by law enforcement officials. Policymakers may also question how border officials use intelligence about drug flows and data on drug seizures to assess the risks posed by drug trafficking and appropriately allocate resources to counter the threat. They may also evaluate how well available data on drug seizures can help measure progress toward achieving goals outlined in national strategies aimed, at least in part, at reducing drug trafficking into and within the country.

Jul 3, 2019

Defense Primer: Military Installations Management

Jul 3, 2019

PFAS and Drinking Water: Selected EPA and Congressional Actions

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are fluorinated chemicals that have been used in an array of commercial, industrial, and U.S. military applications for decades. Some of the more common applications include nonstick coatings, food wrappers, waterproof materials, and fire suppressants. Detections of some PFAS in drinking water supplies and uncertainty about potential health effects associated with exposure to particular PFAS above certain concentrations have increased calls for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to address these substances in public water supplies. For those few PFAS for which scientific information is available, animal studies suggest that exposure to particular substances above certain levels may be linked to various health effects, including developmental effects; changes in liver, immune, and thyroid function; and increased risk of some cancers. In 2009, EPA listed certain PFAS for formal evaluation under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) to determine whether regulations may be warranted. EPA has not issued drinking water regulations for any PFAS but has taken various actions to address PFAS contamination. In the 116th Congress, Members have introduced more than 35 bills to address PFAS through various means. Multiple bills would direct EPA to take regulatory and other actions to address these emerging contaminants under several environmental statutes, including SDWA. Several SDWA-related bills would direct EPA to establish a drinking water standard for one or more PFAS, require monitoring for PFAS in public water supplies, and authorize grants to communities to treat PFAS in drinking water. In February 2019, EPA released its PFAS Action Plan, which discusses the agency’s current and proposed actions to address these substances under its various statutory authorities. Regarding SDWA, the plan notes that EPA is following the statutory process for evaluating PFAS—particularly perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)—to determine whether national primary drinking water regulations are warranted. EPA is scheduled to propose preliminary regulatory determinations for PFOA and PFOS by the end of 2019 and to make final determinations by the end of 2020. The plan also reviews other SDWA authorities that the agency is using to address PFAS in drinking water. The absence of a national health-based drinking water standard for any PFAS has increased interest in the SDWA process for regulating contaminants. The statute prescribes a risk- and science-based process for evaluating and regulating contaminants in drinking water. The evaluation process includes identifying contaminants of potential concern, assessing health risks, collecting occurrence data (and developing reliable analytical methods necessary to do so), and making determinations as to whether a national drinking water regulation is warranted for a contaminant. PFAS includes thousands of diverse chemicals, and setting scientifically sound drinking water standards for one or multiple PFAS raises technical and scientific challenges. For example, SDWA requires EPA to make determinations and set standards using the best available peer-reviewed science and occurrence data. However, data on the potential health effects and occurrence are available for very few of these substances. Further, EPA may face challenges in developing test methods needed to evaluate PFAS occurrence and technologies to treat PFAS in drinking water. Contamination of drinking water by PFAS can pose challenges for states and communities, and some have called for EPA to establish a health-based standard. State drinking water regulators have noted that many states may face significant obstacles in setting their own standards. For emerging contaminants not regulated under SDWA, EPA is authorized to issue health advisories, which provide information on health effects, testing methods, and treatment techniques for contaminants of concern. In 2016, EPA established health advisory levels for PFOA and PFOS in drinking water at 70 parts per trillion (separately or combined). SDWA also authorizes EPA to take actions it deems necessary to abate an imminent and substantial endangerment to public health from a contaminant present in or likely to enter a public water system or an underground source of drinking water. Actions may include issuing orders requiring persons who caused or contributed to the endangerment to provide alternative water supplies or to treat contamination. Since 2002, EPA has used this authority to require responses to PFOA and/or PFOS contamination of water supplies associated with four sites, including three Department of Defense sites.

Jul 2, 2019

U.S.-Iran Tensions and Implications for U.S. Policy

In the spring of 2019, U.S.-Iran tensions have escalated. The Trump Administration, following its 2018 withdrawal from the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA), has taken several steps in its campaign of applying “maximum pressure” on Iran. Iran or Iran-linked forces have targeted commercial ships and infrastructure in U.S. partner countries. U.S. officials have stated that Iran-linked threats to U.S. forces and interests, and attacks on several commercial ships in May and June 2019, have prompted the Administration to send additional military assets to the region to deter future Iranian actions. President Donald Trump, while warning Iran not to take action against the United States, has said he prefers a diplomatic solution over moving toward military confrontation. The Administration has expanded U.S. sanctions against Iran, including sanctioning its mineral and petrochemical exports during May-June 2019, placing further pressure on Iran’s economy. Iranian leaders have refused to talk directly with the Administration, and they have announced an intent to no longer comply with some aspects of the JCPOA. U.S. allies and other countries such as Russia and China have expressed a preference to reduce tensions. Several countries, including Japan, Germany, Oman, Qatar, and Iraq, have sought to de-escalate U.S.-Iran tensions by sending high-level officials to Tehran for talks. An expanding action-reaction dynamic between the United States and Iran has the potential to escalate into significant conflict. The United States military has the capability to undertake a large range of options against Iran in the event of conflict, both against Iran directly and against its regional allies and proxies. However, Iran’s alliances with and armed support for armed factions throughout the region, and its network of agents in Europe, Latin America, and elsewhere, give Iran the potential to expand any confrontation into areas where U.S. response options might be limited. Members of Congress have received additional information from the Administration about the causes of the uptick in U.S.-Iran tensions and Administration planning for further U.S. responses. They have responded in a number of ways; some Members have sought to pass legislation requiring congressional approval for any decision by the President to take military action against Iran. Additional detail on U.S. policy options on Iran, Iran’s regional and defense policy, and Iran sanctions can be found in: CRS Report RL32048, Iran: Internal Politics and U.S. Policy and Options, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R44017, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43983, 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force: Issues Concerning Its Continued Application, by Matthew C. Weed.

Jul 1, 2019

Poverty Among Americans Aged 65 and Older

The poverty rate among Americans aged 65 and older has declined by almost 70% in the past five decades. In 2017, approximately 9.2% of Americans aged 65 and older had income below the poverty thresholds. However, the number of aged poor has increased since the mid-1970s as the total number of elderly has grown. In 2017, 4.7 million people aged 65 and older lived in poverty. The poverty rate for Americans aged 65 and older historically was higher than the rates for younger groups, but the aged have experienced lower poverty rates than children under age 18 since 1974 and lower rates than adults aged 18 to 64 since the early 1990s. In 2017, the 9.2% poverty rate among Americans aged 65 and older was lower than the 11.2% poverty rate among adults aged 18 to 64 and the 17.5% poverty rate among children under 18 years old. Although the poverty rate has generally declined for older Americans in most demographic groups, certain aged people still live in poverty. For example, People aged 80 and older have a higher poverty rate than other elderly Americans. In 2017, approximately 11.6% of people aged 80 and older lived in poverty, compared with poverty rates of 9.3% among individuals aged 75-79, 8.6% among those aged 70-74, and 7.9% among those aged 65-69. Women aged 80 and older had the highest poverty rate among elderly women and men in all age groups, at 13.5% in 2017 for women aged 80 and older, and 18.6% for those living alone. Americans aged 65 and older who were married and living together with spouses at the time of the survey generally had a lower poverty rate than those who were not married. Among women aged 65 and older, about 4.3% of married women had total incomes below the official poverty threshold in 2017, compared with 13.9% of widows, 15.8% of divorced women, and 21.5% of never-married women. Among individuals aged 65 and older, poverty rates were also high among never-married men, at 22.5% in 2017. Poverty rates vary by race and Hispanic origin. Hispanic origin is distinct from race, and people may identify with one or more races. From 1975 to 2017, the poverty rate for Americans aged 65 and older has decreased for those identifying as non-Hispanic white alone, black alone, and Hispanic. In 2017, the poverty rate was lowest among the non-Hispanic white population (5.8% for men and 8.0% for women) and highest among those identifying as black or African American (16.1% for men and 21.5% for women). The official poverty measure is defined using cash income only, before taxes, and was computed based on food consumption in 1955 and food costs in 1961, indexed to inflation. That definition prevents the official measure from gauging the effects of noncash benefits, taxes, or tax credits on the low-income population, and it does not consider how certain other costs, such as housing or medical expenses, might affect them as well. After decades of research, the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM) was developed to address some of the official poverty measure’s limitations. The SPM poverty rate for the aged population is higher than the official poverty rate (14.1% compared with 9.2% in 2017). This higher poverty rate results largely from higher medical out-of-pocket costs among the aged. Social Security and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) are the main federally funded programs that provide cash benefits to the aged poor; they accounted for almost 90% of total money income received by Americans aged 65 and older whose incomes were below the poverty thresholds in 2017. The federal government also provides certain noncash benefits to help the elderly poor, such as housing subsidies and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). The SPM poverty rate among individuals aged 65 and older would increase by more than 34 percentage points if Social Security benefits were excluded from their income resources, holding other economic behaviors constant. Among the other resources, eliminating SSI, housing subsidies, or SNAP from income would each increase the SPM poverty rate by about one percentage point.

Jul 1, 2019

The Opioid Epidemic: Supply Control and Criminal Justice Policy—Frequently Asked Questions

Over the last several years, lawmakers in the United States have responded to rising drug overdose deaths, which increased four-fold from 1999 to 2017, with a variety of legislation, hearings, and oversight activities. In 2017, more than 70,000 people died from drug overdoses, and approximately 68% of those deaths involved an opioid. Many federal agencies are involved in domestic and foreign efforts to combat opioid abuse and the continuing increase in opioid related overdose deaths. A subset of those agencies confront the supply side (some may also confront the demand side) of the opioid epidemic. The primary federal agency involved in drug enforcement, including prescription opioids diversion control, is the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Other federal agencies that address the illicit opioid supply include, but are not limited to, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Offices of the U.S. Attorneys, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, and Office of National Drug Control Policy. This report focuses on efforts from these departments and agencies only. Lawmakers have addressed opioid abuse as both a public health and a criminal justice issue, and Congress enacted several new laws in the 114th and 115th Congresses. These include the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198), the 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255), and most recently the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act; P.L. 115-271). Congress also provided funds specifically to address the opioid epidemic in FY2017-FY2019 appropriations. This report answers common supply and criminal justice-related questions that have arisen as drug overdose deaths in the United States continue to increase. It does not provide a comprehensive overview of opioid abuse as a criminal justice issue. The report is divided into the following sections: Overview of the Opioid Epidemic in the United States; Overview of the Opioid Supply; Opioids and Domestic Supply Control Policy; Opioids and Foreign Supply Control Policy; Recent Congressional Action on the Opioid Epidemic; and The Opioid Epidemic and State Criminal Justice Policies.

Jun 28, 2019

India’s 2019 National Election and Implications for U.S. Interests

India, a federal republic and the world’s most populous democracy, held elections to seat a new lower house of parliament in April and May of 2019. Estimates suggest that more than two-thirds of the country’s nearly 900 million eligible voters participated. The 545-seat Lok Sabha (People’s House) is seated every five years, and the results saw a return to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who was chief minister of the west Indian state of Gujarat from 2001 to 2014. Modi’s party won decisively—it now holds 56% of Lok Sabha seats and Modi became the first Indian leader to win consecutive majorities since Indira Gandhi in 1971. The United States and India have been pursuing an expansive strategic partnership since 2005. The Trump Administration and many in the U.S. Congress welcomed Modi’s return to power for another five-year term. Successive U.S. Presidents have deemed India’s growing power and influence a boon to U.S. interests in Asia and globally, not least in the context of balancing against China’s increasing assertiveness. India is often called a preeminent actor in the Trump Administration’s strategy for a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” Yet there are potential stumbling blocks to continued development of the partnership. In 2019, differences over trade have become more prominent, and India’s long-standing (and mostly commercial) ties to Russia and Iran may run afoul of U.S. sanctions laws. Additionally, India maintains a wariness of U.S. engagement with Pakistan and intentions in Afghanistan, with Islamabad presently facilitating a U.S.-Taliban dialogue and India counseling against a precipitous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Prime Minister Modi’s return to power promises broad continuity, even with some notable changes to the federal cabinet. By many accounts, Modi’s record as an economic reformer and liberalizer is mixed, and his reputation as a nationalist “watchman” has not always translated into effective foreign policy, according to some analysts. It is unclear if Modi will use his renewed domestic political mandate to pursue more assertiveness internationally, possibly in ways that challenge U.S. preferences. Still, most analysts contend that Modi and the BJP have been and will continue to be more open to aligning with U.S. regional strategy and more energetic in pursuing U.S.-favored economic reforms than would have been any alternative Indian leadership. The BJP is a Hindu nationalist party, born in 1980 of a larger social movement, and Narendra Modi is a self-avowed Hindu nationalist (India is roughly 79% Hindu and 14% Muslim). The 2019 Modi-BJP campaign was widely criticized for divisiveness, and nationalist fervor following a February India-Pakistan crisis may have benefitted the BJP at the polls. India’s minority communities and the country’s civil society are widely reported to be under increasing threats emanating from Hindu majoritarian policies and sentiment. These threats can take violent and repressive forms, at times with the involvement of Indian officials or political figures, as reported by the U.S. State Department and independent human rights watchdogs, and as criticized by some Members of Congress. This report reviews the recent Indian election process and results, the country’s national political stage, and possible implications for U.S. interests in the areas of bilateral economic and trade relations, defense and security ties, India’s other foreign relations, and human rights concerns.

Jun 28, 2019

Critical Minerals and U.S. Public Policy

President Trump and various U.S. lawmakers have expressed concerns about U.S. reliance on critical mineral imports and potential disruption of supply chains that use critical minerals for various end uses, including defense and electronics applications. Chinese export quotas on a subset of critical minerals referred to as rare earth elements (REEs) and China’s 2010 curtailment of REE shipments to Japan heightened U.S. vulnerability concern. In December 2017, Presidential Executive Order 13817, “A Federal Strategy to Ensure Secure and Reliable Supplies of Critical Minerals,” tasked the Department of the Interior to coordinate with other executive branch agencies to publish a list of critical minerals. The Department of the Interior published a final list of 35 critical minerals in May 2018. The concern among many in Congress has evolved from REEs and REE supply chains to include other minor minerals and metals that are used in small quantities for a variety of economically significant applications (e.g., laptops, cell phones, electric vehicles, and renewable energy technologies) and national defense applications. Also, as time passed, concerns increased about access to and the reliability of entire supply chains for rare earths and other minerals. Congressional action (e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for FY2014, P.L. 113-66) has led to the acquisition of REEs and other materials for the National Defense Stockpile. In 2017, the United States had no primary production of 22 minerals and was limited to byproduct production of 5 minerals on the critical minerals list. In contrast, the United States is a leading producer of beryllium and helium, and there is some U.S. primary production of 9 other critical minerals. China ranked as the lead global producer of 16 minerals and metals listed as critical. Although there are no single monopoly producers in China, as a nation, China is a dominant or near-monopoly producer of yttrium (99%), gallium (94%), magnesium metal (87%), tungsten (82%), bismuth (80%), and rare earth elements (80%). The United States is 100% import reliant on 14 minerals on the critical minerals list (aside from a small amount of recycling). These minerals are difficult to substitute inputs into the U.S. economy and national security applications; they include graphite, manganese, niobium, rare earths, and tantalum, among others. The United States is more than 75% import reliant on an additional 10 critical minerals: antimony, barite, bauxite, bismuth, potash, rhenium, tellurium, tin, titanium concentrate, and uranium. The current goal of U.S. mineral policy is to promote an adequate, stable, and reliable supply of materials for U.S. national security, economic well-being, and industrial production. U.S. mineral policy emphasizes developing domestic supplies of critical materials and encourages the domestic private sector to produce and process those materials. But some raw materials do not exist in economic quantities in the United States, and processing, manufacturing, and other downstream ventures in the United States may not be globally cost competitive. Congress and other decisionmakers have multiple legislative and administration options to weigh in deliberating on whether, and if so how, to address the U.S. role and vulnerabilities related to critical minerals.

Jun 28, 2019

Trade Dispute with China and Rare Earth Elements

Jun 28, 2019

SEC Securities Disclosure: Background and Policy Issues

Jun 25, 2019

Poland: Background and U.S. Relations

Over the past 30 years, the relationship between the United States and Poland has been close and cooperative. The United States strongly supported Poland’s accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999 and backed its entry into the European Union (EU) in 2004. Poland has made significant contributions to U.S.- and NATO-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Poland and the United States continue to work together closely on a range of foreign policy and international security issues. Domestic Political and Economic Issues The 2015 Polish parliamentary election resulted in a victory for the conservative-nationalist Law and Justice party (PiS), which won an absolute majority of seats in the lower house of parliament (Sejm). Mateusz Morawiecki (PiS) is Poland’s prime minister and head of government. The center-right Civic Platform (PO) party led the government of Poland from 2007 to 2015. Since winning the election, Law and Justice has made changes to the country’s judicial system and enacted other reforms that have generated concerns about backsliding on democracy and triggered an EU rule-of-law investigation. Poland’s next parliamentary election is due to occur in October or November 2019. European Parliament and regional election results indicate that support for Law and Justice remains strong, and the party is favored to win the 2019 election. Law and Justice candidate Andrzej Duda won Poland’s 2015 presidential election. The president is Poland’s head of state and exercises a number of limited but important functions. The next presidential election is due to occur in May 2020. Poland was one of the few EU economies to come through the 2008-2009 global economic crisis without major damage. As an EU member Poland is obligated to adopt the euro as its currency, but it has not set a target date for adoption and continues to use the zoty as its national currency. Defense Modernization Poland has been implementing an armed forces modernization plan since 2013, and it intends to spend approximately $49 billion on military equipment acquisitions and upgrades over the period 2017-2026. Completed and prospective purchases from U.S. suppliers, including advanced Patriot missiles and F-35 Joint Strike Fighters, have a large role in this initiative. Poland is one of seven NATO members to meet the alliance’s benchmark of spending at least 2% of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense, and it plans to reach 2.5% of GDP by 2030. Defense Cooperation Under the United States’ European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) and the U.S. military’s Operation Atlantic Resolve, as well as NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence mission, U.S. forces have expanded their presence in Poland since 2014 and increased joint training and exercises with their Polish counterparts. While U.S. forces participate in these missions on a rotational basis, the Polish government has proposed the establishment of a permanent U.S. base on Polish territory. Visa Waiver Program Although relations between Poland and the United States are largely positive, Poland’s exclusion from the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) has been a point of contention for many years. Some Members of Congress have advocated extending the VWP to include Poland. Relations with Russia Relations between Poland and Russia have long been tense, and Polish leaders have tended to view Russian intentions with wariness and suspicion. Poland remains a leading advocate for forceful EU sanctions against Russia over its 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region and fostering of separatist conflict in eastern Ukraine. Energy Security Poland has promoted European energy integration, including projects to expand pipeline and electric grid interconnectivity in order to decrease reliance on Russia. Poland is a leading critic of Nord Stream 2, a Russian-owned pipeline project that would allow Germany to increase the amount of natural gas it imports directly from Russia via the Baltic Sea. Outlook and Issues for Congress Given its role as a close U.S. ally and partner, Poland and its relations with the United States are of continuing congressional interest. The main areas of interest include defense cooperation, energy security, and concerns about rule-of-law and governance issues.

Jun 25, 2019

FY2020 NDAA Analysis: Elimination of Benefits Offset for Surviving Spouses and Related Legal Issues

Jun 24, 2019

Hemp-Derived Cannabidiol (CBD) and Related Hemp Extracts

Jun 21, 2019

Health Care-Related Expiring Provisions of the 116th Congress, First Session

This report describes selected health care-related provisions that are scheduled to expire during the first session of the116th Congress (i.e., during calendar year [CY] 2019). For purposes of this report, expiring provisions are defined as portions of law that are time-limited and will lapse once a statutory deadline is reached absent further legislative action. The expiring provisions included in this report are those related to Medicare, Medicaid, State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), and private health insurance programs and activities. The report also includes health care-related provisions that were enacted in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148) or last extended under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (BBA 2018; P.L. 115-123). In addition, this report describes health care-related provisions within the same scope that expired during the 115th Congress (i.e., during CY2017 or CY2018). Although the Congressional Research Service (CRS) has attempted to be comprehensive, it cannot guarantee that every relevant provision is included here. This report generally focuses on two types of health care-related provisions within the scope discussed above. The first type of provision provides or controls mandatory spending, meaning that it provides temporary funding, temporary increases or decreases in funding (e.g., Medicare provider bonus payments), or temporary special protections that may result in changes in funding levels (e.g., Medicare funding provisions that establish a floor). The second type of provision defines the authority of government agencies or other entities to act, usually by authorizing a policy, project, or activity. Such provisions also may temporarily delay the implementation of a regulation, requirement, or deadline, or establish a moratorium on a particular activity. Expiring health care provisions that are predominantly associated with discretionary spending activities—such as discretionary authorizations of appropriations and authorities for discretionary user fees—are excluded from this report. Certain types of provisions with expiration dates that otherwise would meet the criteria set forth above are excluded from this report. Some of these provisions are excluded because they are transitional or routine in nature or have been superseded by congressional action that otherwise modifies the intent of the expiring provision. For example, statutorily required Medicare payment rate reductions and payment rate re-basings that are implemented over a specified time period are not considered to require legislative attention and are excluded. The report provides tables listing the relevant provisions that are scheduled to expire in 2019 and that expired in 2018 or 2017. The report then describes each listed provision, including a legislative history. An appendix lists relevant demonstration projects and pilot programs that are scheduled to expire in 2019 or that expired in 2018 or 2017.

Jun 21, 2019

Fiscal Policy Considerations for the Next Recession

Although the United States is currently experiencing its longest economic expansion, history has shown that economic expansions inevitably give way to economic slowdowns. If the next slowdown is significant, the economy could enter a recession, which is typically characterized by falling output and rising unemployment. Short-term forecasts are predicting continued economic expansion, but predicting when the economy may transition from expansion to recession is notoriously difficult, as the ebb and flow of the economy is determined by many different factors, including a number that lie outside the country’s borders. This report identifies and summarizes options Congress may consider in response to a possible recession. Recognizing that the economy has the potential to return to full employment without intervention, one policy option is simply to allow the economy to correct on its own with the support of certain “automatic stabilizers” already in place. Automatic stabilizers work without congressional action to lower taxes and increase spending as the economy weakens. Examples include the progressive structure of the income tax system and Unemployment Compensation (UC) benefits, among others. Congress also has a range of other options it could consider when designing a stimulus package should a recession occur and automatic stabilizers are not sufficient to counteract it. The options presented in this report are drawn from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Moody’s Analytics, both of which estimated the impact of specific policies or approaches in response to the Great Recession. While a general approach to stimulating a weakened economy with reduced taxes and increased spending is often advocated, specific policies have different impacts on the economy and differing administrative complexities. CBO’s and Moody’s estimates provide insight into which specific policy options may be most worthwhile to implement during the next downturn. The policy options presented—or variations of them—are ones commonly considered when designing a fiscal stimulus package and are not unique to either CBO or Moody’s. The United States’ recent budget deficits and the country’s long-run budget outlook could influence the size of any stimulus package. Large and persistent budget deficits can hamper economic growth by lowering the rate of capital formation via reduced national saving, and can potentially offset short-term economic stimulus. At the same time, high levels of debt relative to gross domestic product can constrain a country’s borrowing capacity. There are no signs that federal borrowing capacity will be exhausted in the short term. However, the consequences of exhausted fiscal space may be worth considering in designing the next stimulus package since it would increase both deficits and the debt.

Jun 20, 2019

Exceptions to the Budget Control Act’s Discretionary Spending Limits

The Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25) established statutory limits on discretionary spending for FY2012-FY2021. There are currently separate annual limits for defense discretionary and nondefense discretionary spending. The law specifies that spending for certain activities, such as responding to a national emergency or fighting terrorism, will receive special budgetary treatment. This spending is most easily thought of as being exempt from the spending limits. Formally, however, the BCA states that the enactment of such spending allows for a subsequent upward adjustment of the discretionary limits to accommodate the spending. As a result, these types of spending are referred to as “adjustments.” Two adjustments—for spending designated as emergency or for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)—have made up the vast majority of the spending. (These adjustments are uncapped and can be used for broad purposes.) Five other adjustments are capped and can be used for more specific programs or purposes, and two additional adjustments address potential technical issues that can arise in enforcing the spending limits. According to information provided by the Office of Management and Budget (the agency responsible for evaluating compliance with the discretionary spending limits), in the seven fiscal years that have concluded since the discretionary spending limits were instituted, approximately $891 billion of spending has occurred under these adjustments. Spending for OCO made up 73% of the total, and spending for emergencies made up 20%. In addition to the adjustments specified in the BCA, the 21st Century Cures Act (Division A of P.L. 114-255) provided that a limited amount of appropriations for specified purposes are to be exempt from the discretionary spending limits. As of the date of this report, the Cures Act is unique in providing an exemption of this kind.

Jun 19, 2019

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) for Childless Workers

The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a refundable tax credit available to eligible workers. Because the credit is refundable, a worker need not owe federal income taxes to benefit from it. The EITC is the nation’s largest cash anti-poverty program, with a tax year 2016 (returns filed in 2017) total of $66.7 billion claimed on 27.4 million tax returns. Most of the claimed EITC dollars—$64.7 billion, or 97% of total EITC dollars—were for taxpayers with children compared to $2.1 billion in claimed EITC for taxpayers with no qualifying children. EITC Rules for Childless Workers Compared to Those with Children To claim an EITC, tax filers must (1) file a federal tax return, (2) have earned income, (3) meet the residency requirement, (4) have investment income below a certain threshold, (5) not have had a disallowed credit due to fraud or reckless disregard of the rules when previously claiming an EITC, and (6) provide a Social Security number for themselves and their spouses. In addition to these rules, a taxpayer without a qualifying child must also be between the ages of 25 and 64. A childless worker cannot claim an EITC if he or she can also be claimed for EITC purposes as a dependent on another person’s tax return (e.g., a college student). The EITC is a function of a taxpayer’s earnings as well as the credit’s phase-in or phase-out rate (which rate applies depends on the taxpayer’s earnings). The amount of the EITC phases in as earnings increase, with earnings multiplied by the phase-in credit rate. The credit hits a maximum amount, plateaus (meaning the credit amount stays the same even as income rises), and is then phased-out as earnings exceeds certain thresholds. This phase-in, plateau at the maximum, and phase-out is often visually represented as a “trapezoid.” EITC credit amounts are lower for childless workers than for those with children. For 2019, the maximum EITC for a childless worker is $529 (Table 1). This compares with $3,526 for a tax filer with one child and $6,557 for a tax filer with three or more children. The maximum income levels below which taxpayers are eligible for an EITC is also lower for childless workers—in 2019, EITCs is fully phased out (the EITC amount is $0) once income reaches $15,570 for a single childless worker and $21,370 for married childless workers. For a single filer with one child, the EITC is fully phased out once income reaches $41,094. The income at which the EITC is fully phased out is higher for taxpayers filing joint returns or taxpayers with more children. For married taxpayers with three or more children, the EITC is fully phased out once income reaches $55,952. The phase-in amounts for the childless EITC are lower than the phase-in amounts for workers with children. Along the phase-in range, for a childless worker each additional $100 in earnings results in a $7.65 EITC. For a worker with one child, an additional $100 in earnings results in a $34.00 EITC. The phase-in is higher for taxpayers with more children. Table 1. Selected EITC Tax Parameters by Number of Qualifying Children, 2019 0 1 2 3 or more Phase-in Credit Rate 7.65% 34.00% 40.00% 45.00% Maximum EITC $529 $3,526 $5,828 $6,557 Phase-Out Rate 7.65% 15.98% 21.06% 21.06% Income at Which the EITC Begins to Phase Out Single $8,650 $19,030 $19,030 $19,030 Married Filing Jointly $14,450 $24,820 $24,820 $24,820 Income at Which the EITC is Phased-Out Single $15,570 $41,094 $46,703 $50,162 Married Filing Jointly $21,370 $46,884 $52,493 $55,952 Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 32, and the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Revenue Procedure 2018-57. Number of Returns Filed and Average EITC Though childless workers account for 3% of total EITC dollars, they account for 26% of all returns claiming the EITC for 2016. The average EITC for childless workers was $291 (Figure 1). In contrast, the average EITC was $2,400 for taxpayers with one qualifying child and $4,152 for taxpayers with three or more qualifying children. Figure 1. EITC Returns and Average Amount of EITC Claimed / Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS), based on 2016 data from the Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income. Proposal to Expand the Childless EITC The Economic Mobility Act of 2019 (H.R. 3300), ordered to be reported to the full House by the House Ways and Means Committee on June 20, 2019, would expand the EITC for childless workers for two years, 2019 and 2020. It would double the phase-in credit percentage to 15.3%, increase the maximum EITC in 2019 to $1,464, and increase the maximum income at which the credit for these workers phases out (see Figure 2). The bill would also make eligible for the childless EITC individuals aged 19 to 24 (except for full-time college students) and those aged 65. Figure 2. EITC for a Single, Childless Worker Under H.R. 3300 and Under Current Law, 2019 / Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS). EITC, Work, and Poverty Research has found that the EITC both increases participation in the labor force and reduces poverty, but its impacts are generally restricted to families with children. An expanded EITC for childless individuals might similarly encourage work and reduce poverty for childless adults. A recent demonstration of an expanded childless EITC did show such impacts—specifically, reducing severe poverty and increasing work among women and very disadvantaged men. This expansion would increase the costs of the EITC. It also would no longer primarily target reducing poverty among children, who are a population group of traditional federal concern and who have the highest poverty rate when compared with nonelderly and elderly adults.

Jun 18, 2019

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission: Overview and Selected Issues for Congress

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) is an independent federal agency charged with helping improve the administration of federal elections. It was established by the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA; P.L. 107-252; 116 Stat. 1666; 52 U.S.C. §§20901-21145) and includes a four-member commission, a professional staff, an inspector general, and three advisory bodies. The EAC—and the legislation that created it—marked a shift in the federal approach to election administration. Congress had set requirements for the conduct of elections before HAVA, but HAVA was the first federal election administration legislation also to back its requirements with substantial federal support. In addition to setting new types of requirements, it provided federal funding to help states meet those requirements and facilitate other improvements to election administration and created a dedicated federal agency—the EAC—to manage election administration funding and collect and share election administration information. There was broad support in Congress during the HAVA debate for the idea of providing some assistance along these lines. Both at the time and since, however, opinions have differed about exactly what kind of assistance to provide and for how long. Members have disagreed about whether the EAC should be temporary or permanent, for example, and about what—if any—regulatory authority it should have. Changes in the election administration landscape and in Congress have brought different aspects of the debate to the forefront at various times. The 112th Congress saw the start of legislative efforts in the House to limit or eliminate the EAC, for example, while the agency’s participation in the federal response to attempted foreign interference in the 2016 elections has been cited as new grounds to extend or expand it. These shifts have been reflected in some cases in legislative activity related to the agency. For example, bills have been introduced to grant the EAC additional authority as well as to eliminate it. Other legislative proposals would leave the fundamental role of the EAC largely as it is but add new versions of its existing responsibilities or change the way it performs those responsibilities. Such proposals would direct the EAC to administer new types of grants, for example, or add new members to its advisory bodies.

Jun 14, 2019

Harbor Dredging: Issues and Historical Funding

Congress is debating whether to support increased funding for dredging to better maintain harbor channel depths and widths. A bill approved by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (H.R. 2440) seeks to boost dredging activity by utilizing more of the collections from a port tax levied to fund harbor maintenance. However, it is not clear how the additional funding would change the volume of material dredged from U.S. harbors, as limits on the U.S. dredge fleet and environmental restrictions on when dredging can be performed, among other factors, affect the cost and performance of harbor dredging. Data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the agency responsible for federal harbor maintenance, reveal that an increase in inflation-adjusted spending on routine maintenance dredging from 2001 to 2017 was not matched by an increase in the amount of material dredged (Figure 1). Over the five-year period from 2013 to 2017, spending on routine maintenance dredging was 22% higher (adjusted for inflation) than during the 2001-2005 period, but the actual amount of material dredged was 15% less. These data cover only routine dredging to maintain navigation channel depths and widths, excluding unplanned work such as dredging after hurricanes, which typically costs more. New construction dredging to expand shipping channels beyond existing authorized dimensions, which also is typically more costly than maintenance dredging, is also excluded from the data. Figure 1. “Regular” Harbor Maintenance Dredging (adjusted to 2017 dollars) / Source: CRS, using data from USACE, Dredging Cost Analysis, at https://usace.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/p16021coll2/id/2660. Notes: Excludes emergency work, hurricane response, and ARRA (P.L. 111-5) dredging. 2017 dollars calculated using “nondefense” deflator, Table 10.1 in Federal Budget at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/. Looked at another way (Figure 2), the average annual cost per cubic yard of dredged material for regular harbor maintenance, adjusted for inflation, has risen from $3.46 in 2001 to $5.24 in 2017, an increase of 51% from 2001. Figure 2. Cost Per Cubic Yard for “Regular” Harbor Maintenance Dredging (2017 dollars) / Source: CRS, using data from USACE, Dredging Cost Analysis. When including all maintenance dredging (i.e., unplanned work) and new construction dredging, USACE data show (Figure 3) a declining trend in the amount of material dredged since 1980 despite increases in federal funding. Figure 3. All Maintenance and New Work Dredging / Source: CRS, using data from USACE personal communication, June 8, 2019. Note: 2017 dollars calculated using “nondefense” deflator, Table 10.1 in Federal Budget. Multiple factors are believed to be causing recent cost increases—changes in dredged material disposal, mobilization costs, cost inflation of inputs, environmental factors, and a shortage of dredging firms—but the relative significance of each is unknown. Old disposal sites can be full and newer ones more distant. Unknown is whether enactment of P.L. 104-303 in 1996 led to more federal dollars being used to build and maintain disposal facilities, treat contaminated sediments, or transport dredge spoils further for beneficial uses. Mobilization and demobilization of the several vessels typically required for a dredge project can be more than one-third of project cost in the United States. In addition to changes in the cost of fuel, steel, and labor (accounted for in Figure 1 and Figure 2 above by inflation adjustments), cost of dredged material disposal and compliance with environmental protection requirements may be increasing. For example, to protect endangered species such as sea turtles, dredging firms might have to employ fishing trawlers or restrict dredging and spoils disposal to winter months when bad weather raises costs. Table 1 shows wide variation among USACE districts in the unit cost of dredging. Table 1. Average Unit Cost of Dredging by Selected USACE District Contracts >100,000 cubic yards, 2014 to 2018 USACE District Cubic Yards Dredged Cost per Cubic Yard San Francisco 5,398,939 $ 24.27 New York 11,908,916 $ 23.17 Philadelphia 6,037,757 $ 19.93 Jacksonville 22,447,059 $ 14.86 Los Angeles 1,283,153 $ 13.20 Detroit 3,064,310 $ 9.40 Alaska 5,550,057 $ 8.58 Savannah 37,140,202 $ 6.52 Portland (OR) 30,983,332 $ 5.29 Galveston 76,646,189 $ 3.80 New Orleans 105,894,803 $ 2.62 Source: CRS, using USACE Dredging Information Statistics at https://publibrary.planusace.us/#/series/Dredging%20Information. Congress, per 33 U.S.C. §622, has directed the USACE to contract out dredging work to private firms whenever possible. A handful of firms bid for USACE dredging projects; foreign firms and foreign-built dredges are prohibited in U.S. waters. USACE dredging contract data indicate that of the 701 dredging contracts the agency awarded from 2014 to 2018, 295 (42%) were sole-bid contracts and 178 (25%) attracted two bidders. Hopper dredges are generally preferred for dredging coastal harbors because they can work in rough water and can more efficiently transport dredge spoils to disposal sites. The four U.S. firms that own the 15 hopper dredges in the U.S. fleet accounted for 59% of the USACE’s dredging contracts awarded in dollar value and 32% of the total number of contracts awarded from 2014 to 2018. The USACE owns four hopper dredges employed for emergency work or when private industry submits bids much higher than the USACE’s estimated cost. In 1978 (P.L. 95-269), Congress reduced the USACE-owned fleet in hopes of increasing the private fleet and competition among dredging firms. The USACE is unable at times to schedule as much dredging as desired due to a lack of dredges. Compared to the fleets of the four European dredging firms considered world leaders, the U.S. fleet of hopper vessels is smaller and older. Each of the four European firms has a hopper fleet whose capacity is three to four times that of the entire U.S. fleet. According to an advocate for foreign investors in the United States, European dredging firms “could complete the U.S. projects for half the estimated cost and a third of the time.” One analysis finds dredging costs have trended downward in foreign markets. Foreign firms use heavy-lift ships to transport their dredge fleets. U.S. dredging firms would be required by law to use a U.S.-built heavy-lift ship for transport, but none exist; U.S. firms therefore tow individual vessels to jobsites and stage equipment in various coastal locations.

Jun 14, 2019

FY2020 Agriculture Appropriations: H.R. 3164

The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and in even-numbered fiscal years the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). (In the House, but not the Senate, appropriations jurisdiction for CFTC rests with the Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture.) Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill’s development. The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; rural development; FDA; foreign food aid and trade; farm assistance loans and salaries; food safety inspection; animal and plant health programs, and technical assistance for conservation programs. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture marked up its FY2020 bill on May 23, 2019, by voice vote. On June 4, 2019, the full Appropriations Committee passed and reported an amended bill (H.R. 3164, H.Rept. 116-107) by a vote of 29-21, including adopting four amendments. The $24.3 billion discretionary total in the House-reported Agriculture appropriation would be $1 billion more (+4%) than the comparable amount enacted for FY2019 that includes the CFTC (Table 1, Figure 1). Generally speaking, the House-reported bill did not include most of the reductions proposed by the Trump Administration. For FY2020, the Administration requested $19.2 billion for discretionary-funded accounts within the jurisdiction of Agriculture appropriation, which would be a reduction of $4.1 billion from FY2019 (-18%). The primary changes from FY2019 that comprise the $1 billion overall increase in the House-reported bill are the following (Table 1): Increase Rural Development accounts by $382 million (+13%), including a $144 million increase for the Rural Housing Service (+9%) and a $208 million increase for the Rural Utilities Service (+34%) to support rural water and waste disposal and rural broadband. In addition, the General Provisions title includes a $338 million increase for a rural broadband pilot program. Increase foreign agricultural assistance by $377 million (+19%), including increasing Food for Peace humanitarian assistance by $350 million and McGovern-Dole Food for Education by $25 million. In FY2019, Food for Peace had received an increase of $216 million in the General Provisions title. The FY2020 increase is larger and is in the program’s base appropriation. Increase related agencies appropriations by $232 million, including increasing FDA appropriations by $185 million (+6%) and the CFTC by $47 million (+18%). Increase agricultural program appropriations by $228 million, including: Increase departmental administration accounts by $313 million (+80%), including funding the Administration’s requests for a $271 million increase for construction to renovate the USDA headquarters and a $46 million increase for the chief information officer. Increase USDA regulatory programs by $47 million, including increasing the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service by $23 million (+2%) and the Agricultural Marketing Service by $24 million (+15%). Decrease agricultural research by a net $137 million (-4%), mostly through smaller appropriations for construction. Agricultural Research Service (ARS) construction would be reduced by $331 million from FY2019, while salaries and expenses would increase for ARS (+$44 million) and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (+$143 million). Some of these increases are offset by a net reduction of $238 million in budget authority that is accomplished through the General Provisions title. This is mostly a combination of greater rescissions of carryover balances in WIC (-$300 million), the absence of continuing the FY2019 appropriation in the General Provisions for Food for Peace (-$216 million, as mentioned above) and rural water and waste disposal (-$75 million). The General Provisions provide increases in funding for rural broadband (+$338 million, as mentioned above) and other appropriations for miscellaneous programs (+$16 million, net). In addition to discretionary spending, the House-reported bill also carries mandatory spending—largely determined in separate authorizing laws—that totals $131 billion. This is about $2 billion more than in FY2019 often because of automatic changes from economic conditions and expectations about enrollment in entitlement programs. Crop insurance spending would decrease by $6.4 billion, Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program spending decreases by about $2.4 billion, and child nutrition programs would increase by $0.9 billion. Reimbursement for the Commodity Credit Corporation would increase by $10 billion, mostly due to the cost of the Administration’s trade aid assistance in 2018. Changes in mandatory spending from the 2018 farm bill (Agricultural Act of 2018, P.L. 115-334) are incorporated and were already subject to budgetary enforcement. Amounts in the FY2019 supplemental appropriation for disaster assistance (P.L. 116-20) are not included here. Thus, the overall total of mandatory and discretionary authority in the House-reported bill is about $155 billion, $24.3 billion of which is subject to discretionary spending limits. Table 1. Agriculture and Related Agencies FY2019 and FY2020 Appropriations (budget authority in millions of dollars) FY2019 FY2020 Change from FY2019 to House bill P.L. 116-6 Admin. RequestHouse H.R. 3164 I. Agricultural Programs: Discretionary 6,033.9 5,712.3 6,261.6 +227.7 Mandatory 1,374.0 1,404.0 1,404.0 +30.0 Subtotal 7,407.9 7,116.3 7,665.6 +257.7 II. Farm Production and Conservation Programs 2,748.8 2,430.6 2,798.0 +49.3 Mandatory 30,821.1 34,489.6 34,489.6 +3,668.5 Subtotal 33,569.9 36,920.2 37,287.6 +3,717.7 III. Rural Development 3,011.7 2,938.1 3,393.4 +381.7 IV. Domestic Food Programs: Discretionary 6,620.3 5,958.3 6,584.1 -36.2 Mandatory 96,560.0 93,013.1 95,049.8 -1,510.2 Subtotal 103,180.3 98,971.4 101,633.9 -1,546.4 V. Foreign Assistance 1,938.0 205.0 2,315.2 +377.2 VI. Related Agencies: Food and Drug Administration 3,080.5 3,251.3 3,265.7 +185.3 Commodity Futures Trading Commission [268.0] 250.0 315.0 +47.0 VII. General Provisions (net) 3.5 -1,153.0 -234.0 -237.5 Scorekeeping adjustments -404.0 -403.0 -398.0 +6.0 Discretionary Total: Senate basis w/o CFTC 23,032.7 18,939.6 [23,986.0] +953.3 Discretionary Total: House basis w/ CFTC [23,300.7] 19,189.6 24,301.0 +1,000.3 Mandatory Total 128,755.1 128,906.7 130,943.4 +2,188.3 Total: Senate basis w/o CFTC 151,787.8 147,846.4 154,929.4 +3,141.6 Total: House basis w/ CFTC 152,055.8 148,096.4 155,244.4 +3,188.6 Source: CRS, using appropriations text and reports and unpublished Congressional Budget Office (CBO) tables. Notes: Bracketed amounts are not in the Agriculture appropriations totals due to differing House-Senate jurisdiction for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Scorekeeping adjustments are not necessarily appropriated but are part of the official CBO accounting. Figure 1. Discretionary Agriculture Appropriations, by Title, FY2019-FY2020 / Source: CRS.

Jun 13, 2019

FDA Regulation of Cannabidiol (CBD) Consumer Products

Jun 12, 2019

Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs: FY2020 Budget and Appropriations

Each year, Congress considers 12 distinct appropriations measures, including one for the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS), which includes funding for U.S. diplomatic activities, cultural exchanges, development and security assistance, and U.S. participation in multilateral organizations, among other international activities. On March 11, 2019, the Trump Administration submitted to Congress its SFOPS budget proposal for FY2020, which totaled $42.72 billion in discretionary funds ($42.88 billion when $158.9 million in mandatory retirement funds are included), reflecting adherence to discretionary funding caps, as determined by the Budget Control Act of 2011 (BCA; P.L. 112-25). The FY2020 request would amount to a 2.5% increase in SFOPS when compared to the FY2019 request but a 21% decrease in SFOPS funding when compared to the FY2019 enacted funding levels. Within these totals, Department of State and Related Agency funding would be reduced by 15.7%, with the greatest cuts to the Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (56%), International Organizations (26%), and the U.S. Agency for Global Media (22%) accounts. The Foreign Operations accounts would see a reduction of 23.5%, with the greatest cuts to the nonhealth development assistance (39%), humanitarian assistance (34%), and global health (28%) sectors. On May 16, the House Appropriations Committee agreed to its SFOPS measure (H.R. 2839) that would provide $56.54 billion in total spending ($56.39 in discretionary spending). The bill includes either level or increased funding in nearly all accounts compared to FY2019. It does not include the President’s proposal to consolidate spending into the proposed Economic Support and Development Fund (ESDF) and International Humanitarian Assistance (IHA) accounts, and moves the Economic Support Fund (ESF) account from Title III (Bilateral Economic Assistance) into Title IV (International Security Assistance) to make clear the Committee’s desire to keep ESF distinct from the Development Assistance (DA) account. Finally, the bill would provide funds to make operational the new U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (pursuant to the BUILD Act of 2018; P.L. 115-254). This report will be updated to reflect congressional activity on FY2020 appropriations.

Jun 11, 2019

FY2020 National Security Space Budget Request: An Overview

Jun 7, 2019

FY2019 Supplemental Appropriations for Agriculture

Jun 7, 2019

Defense Primer: DOD Transfer and Reprogramming Authorities

Jun 7, 2019

Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles: Background and Issues for Congress

Jun 7, 2019

Legislative Branch: FY2020 Appropriations

The legislative branch appropriations bill provides funding for the Senate; House of Representatives; Joint Items; Capitol Police; Office of Congressional Workplace Rights (formerly Office of Compliance); Congressional Budget Office (CBO); Architect of the Capitol (AOC); Library of Congress (LOC), including the Congressional Research Service (CRS); Government Publishing Office (GPO); Government Accountability Office (GAO); Open World Leadership Center; and the John C. Stennis Center. The legislative branch budget request was submitted on March 11, 2019. Following hearings in the House and Senate in February, March, and April, the House Appropriations Committee Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch held a markup on May 1, 2019. No amendments were considered, and the bill was ordered reported to the full committee by voice vote. On May 9, 2019, the House Appropriations Committee held a markup of the bill. Two manager’s amendments were considered. The first amendment was adopted by voice vote. The second amendment was adopted by voice vote after an amendment to the amendment was not adopted (23-28). The bill was ordered reported (H.Rept. 116-64; H.R. 2779). As amended, the bill would provide $3.972 billion, not including Senate items (+$164.2 million). On June 3, the House Committee on Rules issued a “Dear Colleague” letter announcing the amendment process for floor consideration of the legislative branch and four other appropriations bills (Rules Committee Print 116-17). The committee established a deadline of 10:00 a.m. on June 7, 2019, for the submission of draft amendments. During consideration of the FY2020 funding levels, Congress also considered an additional $10.0 million in FY2019 supplemental appropriations for GAO for audits and investigations related to storms and disasters. This funding has been included in two bills considered in the 116th Congress: H.R. 268, which passed the House on January 16, 2019, but cloture was not invoked in the Senate; and H.R. 2157, which has passed both the House and Senate. Previously, over the last decade The FY2019 level of $4.836 billion represented an increase of $136.0 million (+2.9%) from FY2018. The FY2018 level of $4.700 billion represented an increase of $260.0 million (+5.9%) from FY2017. The FY2017 level of $4.440 billion represented increase of $77.0 million (+1.7%) from FY2016. The FY2016 level of $4.363 billion represented an increase of $63.0 million (+1.5%) from FY2015. The FY2015 level of $4.300 billion represented an increase of $41.7 million (+1.0%) from FY2014. The FY2014 level of $4.259 billion represented an increase of $198 million (+4.9%) from FY2013. The FY2013 level of $4.061 billion represented a decrease of $246 million (-5.6%), including the sequestration and rescission, from FY2012. The FY2012 level of $4.307 billion represented a decrease of $236.9 million (-5.2%) from FY2011. The FY2011 level of $4.543 billion represented a decrease of $125.1 million (-2.7%) from the $4.669 billion provided for FY2010. The smallest of the appropriations bills, the legislative branch bill comprises approximately 0.4% of total discretionary budget authority.

Jun 6, 2019

The Feres Doctrine: Congress, the Courts, and Military Servicemember Lawsuits Against the United States

Jun 5, 2019

Vehicle Electrification: Federal and State Issues Affecting Deployment

Most of the 270 million cars, trucks, and buses on U.S. highways are powered by internal combustion engines using gasoline or diesel fuel. However, improvements in technology have led to the emergence of vehicle electrification as a potentially viable alternative to internal combustion engines. Several bills pending in the 116th Congress address issues and incentives related to electric vehicles and charging infrastructure. Experience with fully electric vehicles is relatively recent: While a few experimental vehicles were marketed in the United States in the 1990s, the first contemporary all-electric passenger vehicles were introduced in 2010. Since then, newer models have increased the range an electric vehicle can travel on a single charge, and charging stations have become more readily available. These developments have been spurred by a range of government incentives, both in the United States and abroad. Transit buses are the fastest-growing segment of vehicle electrification in China, while in the United States and the European Union, the pace of bus electrification is slower. In the United States, federal incentives for electric passenger vehicle purchases have remained largely unchanged for more than a decade and are based primarily on tax credits for electric vehicle purchases and recharging infrastructure investments, and spending on battery chemistry research to develop less-expensive technologies: The plug-in electric tax credit permits a taxpayer to take a credit of up to $7,500 for each vehicle that can be recharged from the electricity grid; it phases out after a manufacturer has sold 200,000 eligible vehicles, a threshold that has been met by Tesla and General Motors. A tax credit for installation of alternative fuel vehicle refueling property expired in 2017; it had allowed a tax credit of $1,000 for equipment installed at a residence and up to $30,000 for business installations. Investment in transportation electrification research and development (R&D), which has led to the gradual reduction in the cost of producing lithium-ion batteries, is administered by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in cooperation with private industry. Although the Trump Administration has recommended large reductions in these programs, Congress has maintained annual funding for sustainable transportation of nearly $700 million in the past two fiscal years. Other programs that directly influence the level of vehicle electrification include the DOE Clean Cities Program, which supports local efforts to reduce fossil fuel-powered transportation, and the Department of Transportation’s Alternative Fuel Corridors, which are designated Interstate Highway corridors with a sufficient number of alternative fueling stations, including electric vehicle chargers, to allow alternative fuel vehicles to travel long distances. The federal government also funds municipal transit bus electrification through Federal Transit Administration grants, which may be used for the purchase of all-electric buses. The pace of electrification also may be affected by proposals for less stringent federal standards for Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) and greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles. Beyond these federal programs, states and electric utilities provide a range of incentives for electrification. The National Conference of State Legislatures reports that 45 states and the District of Columbia offer incentives such as income tax credits for electric vehicle and charger purchases, reduced registration fees, and permitting solo drivers of electric vehicles to use carpool lanes. The California Zero Emission Vehicle program is spurring sales of electric vehicles in 10 states. Utilities can provide incentives to charge during off-peak hours, install public electric charging infrastructure, and utilize vehicle-to-grid (V2G) storage. V2G storage would allow idle vehicle batteries to supply electricity to the grid rather than drawing power from it during peak demand periods.

Jun 3, 2019

Transatlantic Relations: U.S. Interests and Key Issues

For the past 70 years, the United States has been instrumental in leading and promoting a strong U.S.-European partnership. Often termed the transatlantic relationship, this partnership has been grounded in the U.S.-led post-World War II order based on alliances with like-minded democratic countries and a shared U.S.-European commitment to free markets and an open international trading system. Transatlantic relations encompass the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), close U.S. bilateral ties with most countries in Western and Central Europe, and a massive, interdependent trade and investment partnership. Despite periodic U.S.-European tensions, successive U.S. Administrations and many Members of Congress have supported the broad transatlantic relationship, viewing it as enhancing U.S. security and stability and magnifying U.S. global influence and financial clout. Transatlantic Relations and the Trump Administration The transatlantic relationship currently faces significant challenges. President Trump and some members of his Administration have questioned the strategic value and utility of NATO to the United States, and they have expressed considerable skepticism about the fundamental worth of the EU and the multilateral trading system. President Trump repeatedly has voiced concern that the United States bears an undue share of the transatlantic security burden and that EU trade policies are unfair to U.S. workers and businesses. U.S.-European policy divisions have emerged on a wide range of regional and global issues, from certain aspects of relations with Russia and China, to policies on Iran, Syria, arms control, and climate change, among others. The United Kingdom’s pending departure from the EU (“Brexit”) also could have implications for U.S. security and economic interests in Europe. The Trump Administration asserts that its policies toward Europe seek to bolster the transatlantic relationship by ensuring that European allies and friends are equipped to work with the United States in confronting the challenges posed by an increasingly competitive world. Administration officials maintain that the U.S. commitment to NATO and European security remains steadfast; President Trump has backed new NATO initiatives to deter Russian aggression and increased U.S. troop deployments in Europe. The Administration also contends that it is committed to working with the EU to resolve trade and tariff disputes, as signaled by its intention to launch new U.S.-EU trade negotiations. Supporters credit President Trump’s approach toward Europe with strengthening NATO and compelling the EU to address U.S. trade concerns. Critics argue that the Administration’s policies are endangering decades of U.S.-European cooperation that have advanced key U.S. geostrategic and economic interests. Some analysts suggest that current U.S.-European divisions are detrimental to transatlantic cohesion and represent a win for potential adversaries such as Russia and China. Many European leaders worry about potential U.S. global disengagement, and some argue that Europe must be better prepared to address both regional and international challenges on its own. Congressional Interests The implications of Trump Administration policies toward Europe and the extent to which the transatlantic relationship contributes to promoting U.S. security and prosperity may be of interest to the 116th Congress. Broad bipartisan support exists in Congress for NATO, and many Members of Congress view the EU as an important U.S. partner, especially given extensive U.S.-EU trade and investment ties. At the same time, some Members have long advocated for greater European burdensharing in NATO, or may oppose European or EU policies on certain foreign policy or trade issues. Areas for potential congressional oversight include the future U.S. role in NATO, as well as prospects for U.S.-European cooperation on common challenges such as managing a resurgent Russia and an increasingly competitive China. Based on its constitutional role over tariffs and foreign commerce, Congress has a direct interest in monitoring proposed new U.S.-EU trade agreement negotiations. In addition, Congress may consider how the Administration’s trade and tariff policies could affect the U.S.-EU economic relationship. Also see CRS Report R45652, Assessing NATO’s Value, by Paul Belkin; CRS Report R44249, The European Union: Ongoing Challenges and Future Prospects, by Kristin Archick; and CRS In Focus IF11209, Proposed U.S.-EU Trade Agreement Negotiations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar, Andres B. Schwarzenberg, and Renée Johnson.

May 31, 2019

Defense Primer: Senior Reserve Officers’ Training Corps

May 30, 2019

Technological Convergence: Regulatory, Digital Privacy, and Data Security Issues

Technological convergence, in general, refers to the trend or phenomenon where two or more independent technologies integrate and form a new outcome. One example is the smartphone. A smartphone integrated several independent technologies—such as telephone, computer, camera, music player, television (TV), and geolocating and navigation tool—into a single device. The smartphone has become its own, identifiable category of technology, establishing a $350 billion industry. Of the three closely associated convergences—technological convergence, media convergence, and network convergence—consumers most often directly engage with technological convergence. Technological convergent devices share three key characteristics. First, converged devices can execute multiple functions to serve blended purpose. Second, converged devices can collect and use data in various formats and employ machine learning techniques to deliver enhanced user experience. Third, converged devices are connected to a network directly and/or are interconnected with other devices to offer ubiquitous access to users. Technological convergence may present a range of issues where Congress may take legislative and/or oversight actions. Three selected issue areas associated with technological convergence are regulatory jurisdiction, digital privacy, and data security. First, merging and integrating multiple technologies from distinct functional categories into one converged technology may pose challenges to defining regulatory policies and responsibilities. Determining oversight jurisdictions and regulatory authorities for converged technologies can become unclear as the boundaries that once separated single-function technologies blend together. A challenge for Congress may be in delineating which government agency has jurisdiction over various converged technologies. Defining policies that regulate technological convergence industry may not be simple or straightforward. This may further complicate how Congress oversees government agencies and converged industries due to blending boundaries of existing categories. Second, converged technologies collect and use personal and machine data which may raise digital privacy concerns for consumers. Data collection and usage are tied to digital privacy issues because a piece or aggregation of information could identify an individual or reveal patterns in one’s activities. Converged or smart technologies leverage large volumes of data to try to improve the user experience by generating more tailored and anticipatory results. However, such data can potentially identify, locate, track, and monitor an individual without the person’s knowledge. Such data can also potentially be sold to third-party entities without an individual’s awareness. As the use of converged technologies continues to propagate, digital privacy issues will likely remain central. Third, data security concerns are often associated with smart devices’ convenient ubiquitous features that may double as vulnerabilities exploited by malicious actors. Data security, a component of cybersecurity, protects data from unauthorized access and use. Along with digital privacy, data security is a pertinent issue to technological convergence. As converged devices generate and consume large volumes of data, multiple data security concerns have emerged: potentially increased number of access points susceptible to cyberattacks, linkage to physical security, and theft of data. Relatively few policies are in place for specifically overseeing technological convergence, and current federal data protection laws have varied privacy and data security provisions for different types of personal data. To address regulatory, digital privacy, and data security issues, Congress may consider the role of the federal government in an environment where technological evolution changes quickly and continues to disrupt existing regulatory frameworks. Regulating technological convergence may entail policies for jurisdictional deconfliction, harmonization, and expansion to address blended or new categories of technology. One approach could be for Congress to define the role of federal government oversight of digital privacy and data security by introducing new legislation that comprehensively addresses digital privacy and data security issues or by expanding the current authorities of federal agencies. When considering new legislation or expanding the authorities of federal agencies, three potential policy decisions are (1) whether data privacy and data security should be addressed together or separately, (2) whether various types of personal data should be treated equally or differently, and (3) which agencies should be responsible for implementing any new laws.

May 30, 2019

Defense Primer: Defense Working Capital Funds

May 29, 2019