CRS Reports

Issues in Autonomous Vehicle Deployment

Autonomous motor vehicles have been a topic of congressional hearings in recent years. Congress is considering legislation that would, for the first time, provide new regulatory tools to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to oversee autonomous vehicles. As the capacity of compact computers has gone up and their cost has dropped, the prospect of converting many driver-controlled functions to technology-control has increased significantly. Consumers are demanding that their vehicles have more telecommunications applications, while ride-sharing has prompted new concepts of mobility for the elderly and disabled, and people who do not own cars. In addition, more autonomous vehicles are seen as a way to reduce U.S. motor vehicle fatalities. There were over 40,000 deaths from traffic accidents in 2016, nearly all caused by driver error. The federal government and the states share motor vehicle regulation, with the federal government responsible for vehicle safety and states for driver-related aspects such as licensing and registration. While NHTSA has the statutory authority to regulate all types of motor vehicles, its traditional standard-setting process would take many years at a time when vehicle innovation is changing rapidly; standards envisioned now could be obsolete by the time they took effect. In the absence of NHTSA regulation of autonomous vehicles, nearly half the states have enacted laws on different aspects of autonomous vehicle deployment, resulting in a patchwork of state regulation. On September 6, 2017, the House of Representatives passed by voice vote H.R. 3388. The legislation, which incorporates some provisions recommended in a 2016 U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) report and also in a later 2017 DOT report, would preempt state regulation of some aspects of autonomous vehicle deployment, while providing new regulatory tools to NHTSA. H.R. 3388 would preempt states from regulating the design of autonomous vehicles, unless those laws are identical to federal law; expand NHTSA’s authority to grant exemptions from its standards to encourage innovation; require each manufacturer to submit a “safety assessment certification” showing how it is addressing autonomous vehicle safety; mandate within one year of enactment a NHTSA report indicating what federal safety standards must be updated and listing its vehicle safety priorities; and require manufacturers to develop and publicize to consumers their cybersecurity and data privacy plans. The legislation would also establish an advisory committee, a new regulation for rear-seat occupant alerts (to reduce infant fatalities), and a review of headlamp standards. H.R. 3388 has been referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; members of that committee have issued principles to guide them in developing similar legislation.

Sep 19, 2017

EPA’s Role in Emergency Planning and Notification at Chemical Facilities

Chemicals and the facilities that manufacture, store, distribute, and use them are essential to the U.S. economy. However, incidents occasioned by natural disasters, unintentional events, or security threats show that the handling and storage of chemicals are not without risk. Federal agencies implement a number of programs to help prevent chemical facility accidents, reduce risks of terrorist attacks on chemical facilities, protect chemical facility workers, collect and share relevant information with the public and decisionmakers, and prepare communities and local, tribal, and state first-responders to respond to potential large-scale accidents. This report reviews the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) authorities regarding risk management, emergency planning, and release notification, among others, at chemical facilities. In doing so, it describes the statutory authorities—and makes note of some of the more prominent, subsequent regulations—as provided by the following: Facility risk management planning requirements under Section 112(r)(7) of the Clean Air Act (CAA). EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP) is aimed at reducing chemical risk at the local level. EPA regulations require owners and operators of a facility that manufactures, uses, stores, or otherwise handles certain listed flammable and toxic substances to develop a risk management program that includes hazard assessment (including an evaluation of worst-case and alternative accidental release scenarios), prevention mechanisms, and emergency response measures. Emergency planning notification requirements under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA). The requirements are designed to promote emergency planning and preparedness at the state, local, and tribal levels. EPCRA helps ensure local communities and first responders have needed information on potential chemical hazards within their communities in order to develop community emergency response plans. Emergency release notification requirements under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). CERCLA obligates a facility to report certain releases of hazardous substances to the National Response Center to inform decisions about federal involvement in responding to the incident to coordinate with state and local officials. The requirements also establish liability for response costs and natural resource damages. Duties of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, known as the Chemical Safety Board (CSB), under Section 112(r)(6) of the CAA. The purpose of the CSB is to investigate accidents to determine the conditions and circumstances that led up to the event and to identify the cause or causes so that similar events might be prevented. Toxic release inventory reporting requirements. EPCRA authorizes EPA to establish and maintain a Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) of facilities that manufacture, import, process, or use certain types of toxic chemicals by providing public disclosure of the locations of such facilities.

Sep 18, 2017

Regulatory Exclusivity Reform in the 115th Congress

Regulatory exclusivities provide incentives for pharmaceutical innovation in the United States. Overseen by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), regulatory exclusivities are alternatively known as marketing exclusivities, data exclusivities, or data protection. Each of the distinct regulatory exclusivities establishes a period of time during which the FDA affords an approved drug protection from competing applications for marketing approval. Between them, the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, P.L. 75-717 (as amended), and the Public Health Service Act, P. L. 78-410 (as amended), require the FDA to enforce 16 different regulatory exclusivities. They include exclusivity terms of 12 years for biologics, 7 years for orphan drugs, 5 years for drugs that qualify as a new chemical entity (NCE), 3 years for certain clinical investigations, and 180 days for generic drug companies that challenge relevant patents under certain conditions. Other, more specialized regulatory exclusivities pertain to antibiotics, enantiomers, and qualifying infectious disease products. Legislation introduced in the 115th Congress would modify the current system of regulatory exclusivities. One bill, the FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, was signed into law on August 18, 2017, as P.L. 115-52. That legislation establishes a wholly new 180-day “competitive generic therapy” exclusivity period in order to address circumstances of “inadequate generic competition.” Other legislation has been introduced but not enacted. The Improving Access to Affordable Prescription Drugs Act, introduced as both H.R. 1776 and S. 771, would modify the NCE exclusivity period to allow FDA to accept a generic drug application for the brand-name product after three years rather than five. However, the agency may not approve the generic application until five years have passed since the brand-name product’s approval date. This legislation would also limit the award of the three-year clinical investigation exclusivity to drugs that show significant clinical benefit over existing therapies manufactured by the applicant in the five-year period prior to the application. H.R. 1776 and S. 771 would also reduce the regulatory exclusivity period for biologics from 12 to 7 years. The two bills would also call for the termination of a regulatory exclusivity if its proprietor engages in one of certain specified activities, including adulteration, misbranding, illegally marketing a drug, or making false statements to the FDA. In addition, the Abuse-Deterrent Opioids Plan for Tomorrow Act of 2017, H.R. 2025, would limit the scope of regulatory exclusivities with respect to so-called “505(b)(2) applications” that relate to abuse-resistant opioids. Finally, the Orphan Products Extension Now Accelerating Cures and Treatments Act (OPEN ACT) of 2017, S. 1509, would require the FDA to extend by six months the exclusivity period for an approved drug or biological product when the product is additionally approved to prevent, diagnose, or treat a new indication that is a rare disease or condition. S. 1509 and another bill, S. 934, the FDA Reauthorization Act, would also clarify that the orphan drug exclusivity does not bar the FDA from approving a new, clinically superior drug with the same active ingredient that will be marketed for treatment of the same disease or condition. As well, the OPEN ACT would extend a “labelling carve out” to section 505(b)(2) applications with respect to pediatric uses.

Sep 15, 2017

Supreme Court October Term 2016: A Review of Select Major Rulings

The Supreme Court term that began on October 3, 2016, was notably different from recent terms at the High Court. It was the first term (1) in thirty years to begin without Justice Antonin Scalia on the Court; (2) since 1987 to commence with a Court made up of fewer than nine active Justices; and (3) since 2010 in which a new member (Justice Neil Gorsuch) joined the High Court. Court observers have suggested that the lack of a fully staffed Supreme Court for the bulk of the last term likely had an impact on the Court’s work both with regard to the volume of cases that the Court heard and the nature of those cases. The Court issued seventy written opinions during the October 2016 term and heard oral arguments in sixty-four cases, numbers that constitute the lightest docket for the Court since at least the Civil War era. Moreover, unlike in recent terms where the Court issued opinions on matters related to abortion and affirmative action, the Court’s docket for the October 2016 term had comparatively very few high-profile issues. Nonetheless, the October 2016 term featured a number of cases on matters of potential significance to Congress’s work, especially with respect to discrete areas of law. In particular, the Court issued several notable opinions in the areas of intellectual property law, criminal law and procedure, and redistricting. While a full discussion of every ruling from the October 2016 term is beyond the scope of this report, Table 1 provides brief summaries of the written opinions issued by the Court during the last term. Instead, this report focuses its discussion on four particularly notable cases the Court ruled on during the October 2016 term: (1) Matal v. Tam; (2) Sessions v. Morales-Santana; (3) Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer; and (4) Ziglar v. Abbasi. In Matal v. Tam, a dispute at the intersection of First Amendment and trademark law, the Court concluded that a federal law prohibiting the registration of trademarks that “may disparage” any “persons, living or dead” violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In a case with potentially significant implications for immigration law, the Supreme Court, in Sessions v. Morales-Santana, ruled that a gender-based distinction in the derivative citizenship rules—under which persons born abroad to a U.S. parent may have U.S. citizenship automatically conferred at birth—violated equal protection requirements. In one of the most closely watched cases of the term, Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the Court invalidated on free exercise grounds a state grant policy that strictly prohibited the distribution of public funds to religious entities on free exercise grounds. Finally, in Ziglar v. Abbasi, the Supreme Court ruled against extending the judicially created Bivens remedy to certain unlawfully present aliens challenging their detention during investigations following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks. The discussion of each of these cases (1) provides background information on the case being discussed; (2) summarizes the arguments that were presented to the Court; (3) explains the Court’s ultimate ruling; and (4) examines the potential implications that the Court’s ruling could have for Congress, including the ramifications for the jurisprudence in a given area of law.

Sep 15, 2017

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI): An Overview

The Social Security Administration (SSA) is responsible for administering two federal entitlement programs established under the Social Security Act that provide income support to individuals with severe, long-term disabilities: Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI). SSDI is a social insurance program established under Title II of the act that provides monthly cash benefits to nonelderly workers with disabilities and to their eligible dependents, provided the worker paid Social Security taxes for a sufficient number of years in jobs covered by Social Security. In contrast, SSI is a public assistance program that provides monthly cash benefits to seniors and individuals with disabilities (adults and children) who have limited assets and little or no Social Security or other income. In 2016, SSDI and SSI combined paid an estimated $199 billion in federally administered benefits to 14.6 million qualified disabled individuals and 1.6 million non-disabled dependents of disabled workers. SSDI is part of the federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program, commonly known as Social Security. OASDI benefits are based on an insured worker’s career-average earnings in jobs covered by Social Security and designed to replace a portion of the income lost to a family due to the worker’s retirement, disability, or death. Workers become insured against these events by acquiring a certain number of earnings credits during their careers in covered employment or self-employment. The SSDI component of the program provides benefits to disabled workers who are under Social Security’s full retirement age and to their eligible spouses and children. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) component also provides disability benefits to eligible disabled dependents of retired workers and to eligible disabled survivors of deceased beneficiaries and insured workers. Although these individuals are not technically disability insurance beneficiaries, they are often included in the term SSDI because they receive Social Security benefits due to a qualifying impairment. SSI is a federal assistance program that provides needy aged, blind, or disabled individuals (including children) with a guaranteed minimum income to meet their basic living expenses. Although there are no work or contribution requirements to qualify for benefits, the program is based on need and therefore is restricted to individuals with limited financial means. SSI is commonly known as a program of “last resort” because claimants must first apply for all other benefits for which they may be eligible; cash assistance is awarded only to those whose assets and other income (if any) are within prescribed limits. The basic federal SSI benefit is the same for all recipients and is reduced by the amount of other income that an individual receives. SSDI and SSI are open-ended entitlement programs, meaning that the federal government is obligated to pay benefits to individuals who meet the eligibility requirements specified in each program’s authorizing statute. SSDI benefits are paid from the Disability Insurance trust fund, which is financed primarily by a portion of the Social Security payroll tax levied on the earnings of covered workers. SSI, in contrast, is financed by appropriations from general revenues. Most claimants are considered disabled for SSDI and SSI eligibility purposes if they are unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity (SGA) by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that is expected to last for at least 12 months or to result in death. In 2017, the SGA earnings limit is $1,170 per month for most individuals. Claimants generally qualify if they have an impairment (or combination of impairments) of such severity that they are unable to perform any kind of substantial work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy, taking into consideration their age, education, and work experience. If a claimant’s application for benefits is denied at any point during the disability determination process, the claimant has the right to appeal the decision.

Sep 14, 2017

Redeploying U.S. Nuclear Weapons to South Korea: Background and Implications in Brief

Recent advances in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have led to discussions, both within South Korea and, reportedly, between the United States and South Korean officials, about the possible redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. The United States deployed nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula between 1958 and 1991. Although it removed the weapons as a part of a post-Cold War change in its nuclear posture, the United States remains committed to defending South Korea under the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty and to employing nuclear weapons, if necessary, in that defense. The only warheads remaining in the U.S. stockpile that could be deployed on the Korean Peninsula are B61 bombs. Before redeploying these to South Korea, where they would remain under U.S. control, the United States would have to recreate the infrastructure needed to house the bombs and would also have to train and certify the personnel responsible for maintaining the weapons and operating the aircraft for the nuclear mission. Some who support the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons argue that their presence on the peninsula would send a powerful deterrent message to the North and demonstrate a strong commitment to the South. Their presence would allow for a more rapid nuclear response to a North Korean attack. Some also argue that weapons could serve as a “bargaining chip” with North Korea and that their presence would allow for a more rapid nuclear response to a North Korean attack. Those who oppose the redeployment argue the weapons would present a tempting target for North Korea and might prompt an attack early in a crisis. They also argue that nuclear weapons based in the United States are sufficient for deterrence, and that the costs of installing the necessary facilities on the peninsula could detract from conventional military capabilities. Finally, some assess that the cost of installing the necessary storage, security, and safety infrastructure could drain funding from other military priorities and time needed to train and certify the crews could undermine readiness for other military missions. Some analysts also assert that, if the United States believed it needed the capability to deliver nuclear weapons to North Korea in a shorter amount of time than allowed by the current force posture, it could pursue sea-based options that would not impose many of the costs or risks associated with the deployment of nuclear weapons on the peninsula. South Korea’s President Moon Jae-in has advocated for more muscular defense options, but does not support the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. The Liberty Korea Party, the main opposition party, has formally called for the move. While some in South Korea believe nuclear weapons are necessary to deter the North, others, including those who maintain hope that North Korea will eliminate its program, argue that their redeployment could make it that much more difficult to pressure the North to take these steps. Further, if North Korea saw the deployment as provocative, it could further undermine stability and increase the risk of conflict on the peninsula. China would also likely view the redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons as provocative; it has objected to U.S. military deployments in the past. Some analysts believe that China might respond by putting more pressure on North Korea to slow its programs, while others believe that China might increase its support for North Korea in the face of a new threat and, possibly, expand its own nuclear arsenal. Japan’s reaction could also be mixed. Japan shares U.S. and South Korean concerns about the threat from North Korea, but given its historical aversion to nuclear weapons, Japan could oppose the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons near its territory. In addition, any adjustment of the U.S. military posture on the peninsula could create additional security concerns for Tokyo.

Sep 14, 2017

Unauthorized Childhood Arrivals: Legislative Options

In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began granting deferred action through the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program to certain individuals without lawful immigration status who had arrived in the United States as children and met other requirements. The requirements included initial entry into the United States before age 16, continuous U.S. residence since June 15, 2007, and being under age 31 as of June 15, 2012. Deferred action provides protection against removal from the United States. Individuals granted deferred action also may receive work authorization. Initial grants of deferred action under DACA were for two years and could be renewed in two-year increments. As of March 31, 2017, DHS had approved 787,580 initial requests for DACA from applicants residing in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and several U.S. territories. On September 5, 2017, the Trump Administration announced plans to terminate the DACA program. In a memorandum issued the same day, DHS explained that DACA would be phased out and that beneficiaries whose grants of deferred action were set to expire after March 5, 2018, would not be able to request a renewal. As a result, under the Administration’s plan, a beneficiary whose period of deferred action expires after March 5, 2018, will lose DACA protection on the expiration date. (For additional information, see CRS Report R44764, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): Frequently Asked Questions, and CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1871, The End of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Program: Some Immediate Takeaways.) Bills Providing Temporary Protection from Removal A number of bills have been introduced in the 115th Congress to provide immigration relief to DACA beneficiaries and certain other unauthorized aliens who arrived in the United States as children (sometimes referred to as unauthorized childhood arrivals). Some of these bills—such as the Securing Active and Fair Enforcement Act (SAFE) Act (S. 127) and the Bar Removal of Individuals who Dream and Grow our Economy Act (BRIDGE) Act (S. 128/H.R. 496)—would establish a new form of temporary protection from removal termed “provisional protected presence” (PPP). The eligibility requirements under S. 127 and S. 128/H.R. 496 for PPP, which are similar to those for DACA, would include that the individual was born after June 15, 1981; initially entered the United States before age 16; was physically and unlawfully present in the United States on June 15, 2012; and had continuously resided in the United States since June 15, 2007. Like the DACA initiative, these bills also would require prospective beneficiaries to satisfy educational requirements (which would include being enrolled in school, or having a high school diploma or general education development certificate) or to have been honorably discharged from the U.S. Armed Forces or the U.S. Coast Guard. Under these bills, DHS would provide successful applicants with employment authorization and would not remove them from the United States during the period of PPP. An individual’s period of PPP and employment authorization would be in effect until three years after the date of the bill’s enactment. Bills Providing Pathways to Lawful Permanent Residence A second set of bills introduced in the 115th Congress would provide certain unauthorized childhood arrivals with pathways to lawful permanent resident (LPR) status. One of these bills, the Encourage New Legalized Immigrants to Start Training (ENLIST) Act (H.R. 60), would enable eligible individuals to become LPRs through military service. The bill would make eligible for enlistment in the U.S. Armed Forces and the U.S. Coast Guard individuals who initially entered the United States before age 15; were unlawfully present in the United States on December 31, 2012; have been continuously present in the United States since December 31, 2012; and are otherwise eligible for original enlistment. The bill would direct DHS to grant LPR status to any such individuals who enlist in a regular component of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard. Other bills introduced in the 115th Congress would provide additional pathways to LPR status for eligible unauthorized childhood arrivals. Among these bills are Recognizing America’s Children Act (H.R. 1468); Dream Act of 2017 (S. 1615/H.R. 3440); and American Hope Act of 2017 (H.R. 3591). Although there are many differences among these proposals, they share certain basic elements. All three would enable unauthorized childhood arrivals who meet a set of requirements to obtain permanent resident status on a conditional basis and then, upon meeting additional requirements, have the condition on their status removed and become full-fledged LPRs. The table below compares selected provisions in these proposals to highlight some of the basic differences among them. Table 1. Selected Features of Bills in the 115th Congress Providing a Pathway to Lawful Permanent Residence for Unauthorized Childhood Arrivals H.R. 1468 S. 1615/H.R. 3440 H.R. 3591 Selected eligibility requirements for conditional permanent resident status Age at entry Below age 16 Below age 18 Below age 18 Period of continuous presence Continuous physical presence since 1/1/2012 Continuous physical presence since date that is four years before bill’s date of enactment Continuous presence since 12/31/2016 Type of required activity Education or employment Education None Number/length of period(s) of conditional status Two periods of five years each One period of eight years One period of eight years Type of required activity for extension of conditional status/removal of condition on status Education, military service, or employment Education, military service, or employment None Source: Compiled by CRS. Notes: Bills are described as introduced in the 115th Congress.

Sep 14, 2017

Due Process Limits on the Jurisdiction of Courts: Issues for Congress

Businesses that are incorporated in foreign countries and conduct a large portion of their operations outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States may nevertheless cause injury to U.S. persons. For example, a foreign company might manufacture in its home country a machine that another company later distributes in the United States, ultimately resulting in an injury to a U.S. consumer. Although foreign companies may engage in actions or omissions that injure U.S. persons, such injured persons may face various procedural challenges in obtaining judicial relief from a foreign company defendant in U.S. courts. One potential obstacle to such civil lawsuits is the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has long interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to limit the power of state courts to render judgments affecting the personal rights of defendants who do not reside within the state’s territory. And the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give federal district courts power to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant to the same extent that a state court in which the federal district court is located may assert that power, meaning the same limits on personal jurisdiction generally apply to federal courts. The Court has offered several justifications for the constitutional constraints on a court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over nonresident persons and corporations, including concerns about state sovereignty and fairness to defendants. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence addressing the doctrine of personal jurisdiction spans a period of American history that has witnessed a significant expansion of interstate and global commerce, as well as major technological advancements in transportation and communication. These changes produced a fundamental shift in the Court’s views concerning the doctrine. Although the Court initially considered the defendant’s physical presence within the forum state to be the touchstone of the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him or her, it later rejected strict adherence to this rule in favor of a more flexible standard that examines a nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state to determine whether those contacts make it reasonable to require him to respond to a lawsuit there. The Supreme Court’s opinions in International Shoe Co. v. Washington and subsequent cases have established a more flexible two-part test for determining when exercise of personal jurisdiction over each nonresident defendant sued by a plaintiff comports with due process: (1) the defendant must establish minimum contacts with the forum state that demonstrate an intent to avail itself of the benefits and protections of state law; and (2) it must be reasonable to require the defendant to defend the lawsuit in the forum. Recent Supreme Court rulings have limited the circumstances in which U.S. courts may exercise personal jurisdiction. This report discusses the evolution of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction as elucidated by the Supreme Court in its opinions. It concludes by examining the implications of recent developments in the doctrine of personal jurisdiction for Congress, as well as options that Congress might have to address these developments.

Sep 14, 2017

Financial Regulation: FY2018 Appropriations and the Financial CHOICE Act (H.R. 10)

Background On September 14, 2017, the House passed the remaining FY2018 appropriations bills as H.R. 3354, which included the Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) Appropriations bill (H.R. 3280) in Division D. An FY2018 FSGG bill has not yet been introduced in the Senate. Although financial services are a focus of the FSGG bill, the bill does not actually include funding for most of the financial service regulators. Instead, this funding comes through a variety of sources, including fees or assessments on regulated institutions. (See CRS Report R43391, Independence of Federal Financial Regulators: Structure, Funding, and Other Issues.) Federal regulation of the banking industry is divided among the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). In addition, credit unions are regulated by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), and the housing government-sponsored enterprises are regulated by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). None of these agencies receive their primary funding through the appropriations process. Federal securities regulation is divided between the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), both of which are funded through appropriations. CFTC appropriations from the general fund are set in FSGG bill in the Senate and the Agriculture bill in the House, whereas the SEC funding is set in the FSGG bill in both, but then offset through fees collected by the SEC. Financial CHOICE Act Provisions Although funding for many financial regulatory agencies may not be provided by the FSGG bill, legislative provisions affecting financial regulation in general and some of these agencies specifically have often been included in FSGG bills. The provisions in Titles IX and X of H.R. 3354 (Division D) are identical, or nearly identical, to some sections in the Financial CHOICE Act (H.R. 10), which passed the House on June 8, 2017. (For more information, see CRS Report R44839, The Financial CHOICE Act in the 115th Congress: Selected Policy Issues.) Many of these provisions would amend the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act. H.R. 10, however, contained a much broader range of provisions than H.R. 3354. Table 1 below contains a listing of the sections from H.R. 3354 and the corresponding sections of H.R. 10. In addition to several provisions providing regulatory relief in banking and securities markets, policy changes in the FSGG bill include the following: SIFI Designation. Dodd-Frank applied enhanced prudential regulation to nonbank financial firms if they are designated as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). H.R. 3354 would repeal FSOC’s ability to designate nonbank financial firms for enhanced regulation. OFR. Dodd-Frank created the Office of Financial Research (OFR) to provide research support to FSOC. H.R. 3354 would eliminate OFR. Appropriations. As mentioned above, aside from the SEC and CFTC, most financial regulators determine their own budgets and assess fees to cover expenditures. H.R. 3354 as amended would bring the remaining financial regulators except for the NCUA—the FDIC, OCC, Fed, CFPB, and FHFA—as well as FSOC into the appropriations process. The Fed’s spending related to monetary policy and the FDIC’s deposit insurance fund would remain outside of the appropriations process. Fees and assessments that agencies currently collect to fund themselves would typically appear as offsetting collections in the federal budget. CFPB. In addition to the funding changes, H.R. 3354 would repeal the CFPB’s supervisory authority and its authority to regulate small dollar credit (e.g., payday loans); unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices (UDAAP); and arbitration agreements in financial products. Risk Retention. H.R. 3354 would amend the provision of the Dodd-Frank Act mandating risk retention rules by applying those requirements only to securities that are wholly composed of residential mortgages. Securities backed by assets that are not residential mortgages—such as commercial real estate mortgages, commercial loans, auto loans, or other types of debt—would not be subject to the risk retention rule. Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule from Dodd-Frank prohibits banks from proprietary trading of “risky” assets and from “certain relationships” with risky investment funds, including acquiring or retaining “any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor[ing] a hedge fund or a private equity fund.” H.R. 3354 would repeal the Volcker Rule. Bankruptcy for Financial Institutions. H.R. 3354 would add a new subchapter to the Bankruptcy Code designed specifically to handle the arguably unique characteristics associated with the failure of certain financial firms. Table 1. Provisions of the Financial CHOICE Act in H.R. 3354 Topic H.R. 3354, Division D H.R. 10 Repeals rules whose authority is eliminated by bill Section 902 Section 2 Repeals various Financial Stability Act provisions Section 903 Section 151 Brings financial regulators under appropriations (except NCUA due to H.Amdt. 443). Sections 904-908; Section 926 Title III, Subtitle E; Section 712 Disclosures Section 909 Section 426 Section 31 fees Section 910 Section 416 Investment fund research Section 911 Section 421 Government-business forum on capital formation Section 912 Section 446 Angel investors Section 913 Sections 451-452 Venture capital funds Section 914 Section 471 Manufactured housing Section 915 Sections 501-502 Deposit account termination Section 916 Section 511 FIRREA amendments Section 917 Section 512 Loans held in portfolio Section 918 Section 516 Small bank holding company policy Section 919 Section 526 Community Institution Mortgage Relief Section 920 Section 531 Regulations appropriate to business models Section 921 Section 546 Jobs for loan originators Section 922 Section 556 Small business loan data Section 923 Section 561 Depository institution records and disclosure Section 924 Section 576 Interest rate after loan transfer Section 925 Section 581 CFBP authority and budget changes Sections 926-930 Sections 712, 727, 733, 735, 737 Nonresidential risk retention Section 931 Section 842 Prohibition in single ballot Section 932 Section 845 Volcker Rule repeal Section 933 Section 901 Financial institution bankruptcy Title X Section 121-123 Source: CRS Other provisions related to financial regulation include Section 114 of Division A, which would repeal the Department of Labor’s 2016 Fiduciary Rule, and H.Amdt. 441, which would prohibit the use of appropriated funds toward enforcing the SEC’s conflict minerals rule.

Sep 14, 2017

Nuclear Talks with North Korea?

The accelerated pace of North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing, and continued threats against the United States and its allies have raised questions over the usefulness, timing, scope, and goals of any diplomatic talks with Pyongyang. An aggressive negotiation strategy is one of many options available to the United States. The Trump Administration has stated that its approach of “maximum pressure”—through strengthened United Nations sanctions, increased economic pressure, and ramped up military cooperation with allies—is aimed at convincing Pyongyang “to de-escalate and return to the path of dialogue.” South Korean President Moon has said, “[W]e have to add dialogue to the current menu of sanctions and pressure” under the right conditions. Trump Administration officials have made a variety of statements on whether or when talks should occur. On August 30, President Trump tweeted, “Talking is not the answer!” and in another tweet called the South Korean President’s efforts to resume dialogue “appeasement.” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defense James Mattis, however, called the U.S. strategy “peaceful pressure” that was ultimately seeking to convince North Korea to enter negotiations on denuclearization. Pentagon officials have said that their actions to bolster deterrence are in support of diplomacy. Timing Those who advocate for immediately starting talks, including former U.S. officials who faced past nuclear crises with North Korea, view them as a way to de-escalate tensions and lessen the chance of war. However, South Korean President Moon Jae-in said after a September 14 North Korean missile test that “dialogue was now impossible” and could only be pursued once new sanctions have had a greater impact. A similar view, expressed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, among others, is that talks in the near term are counterproductive and possibly embolden or reward Pyongyang for its actions. During the summer of 2017, South Korean President Moon proposed low-level dialogues, but North Korea rejected the overtures. Preconditions Whether and what conditions should be met before diplomatic talks with North Korea could begin is unresolved, and may be a key stumbling block to any resumption of dialogue. The United States and Japan have said that talks would only be possible after North Korea commits to full denuclearization. Secretary of State Tillerson has said that North Korea must take “concrete steps” to reduce the threat posed by its nuclear and missile programs before the United States would consider talks, which would be conditioned upon an understanding that the ultimate goal is moving toward denuclearization. Over the past several years, North Korea generally has rejected dialogue on denuclearization unless other countries drop their preconditions as well as take certain steps, such as the United States withdrawing its protection of South Korea and/or all nuclear weapon states disarming. China and Russia have issued a joint statement proposing a “dual freeze” approach with preconditions for North Korea (a moratorium on missile and nuclear tests) and for the United States and South Korea (a halt in “large-scale” joint military exercises). Once these conditions were met, negotiations would include denuclearization and peace talks. The United States and South Korea have rejected these conditions, and North Korea has accelerated its testing. Precedents The United States and North Korea have conducted negotiations over Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs in the past. Under the Agreed Framework, a U.S.-DPRK agreement reached in 1994, and that collapsed seven years later, North Korea froze plutonium production and opened its facilities to international inspectors in exchange for the United States and other countries providing two nuclear power plants and heavy fuel oil. After the Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002, the countries entered into the Six-Party Talks (2003-2009) among China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. In 2005, the six parties produced a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to abandon its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for energy assistance, a U.S. security guarantee, as well as talks over a peace settlement with South Korea, normalization of relations with the United States, and other matters. A subsequent Six-Party agreement was only partially implemented, however, before disagreements over implementation caused its collapse. On February 29, 2012, the United States and North Korea reached the “Leap Day” agreement in which Pyongyang would halt nuclear and long-range missile tests, and nuclear activities at its Yongbyon facility in return for a U.S. pledge of large-scale food aid and an increase in people-to-people exchanges. The agreement broke down within weeks, after North Korea launched a long-range rocket. Goals The United States says the goal of diplomacy with North Korea is the “peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” and that the goal of talks would be the complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament. U.S. Acting Assistant Secretary of State Susan Thornton said that the United States would “never recognize North Korea as a nuclear state.” Some former U.S. negotiators argue that this goal is achievable with enough diplomatic effort and coordination with China. However, North Korea has said that it will not give up its nuclear weapons under the current regime of Kim Jong-un. Therefore, in order to halt weapon advancements and lower tensions, some analysts argue for a different near term goal: freezing nuclear and missile programs, which would require a testing moratorium, and possibly verification of nuclear facilities. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry, for example, says the focus now should be an agreement that would halt nuclear and ICBM testing, and commit Pyongyang to not export nuclear technology. Others say that since North Korea will not be persuaded to give up its nuclear weapons, talks should focus on convincing North Korea not to use its weapons. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates argues that acceptance of a limited North Korean nuclear force is necessary to avoid war, and could include a testing moratorium, limits on missile range, and verification measures. Others argue that dialogue and confidence-building measures could reduce the chance of military conflict. This could include hotlines or other transparency measures, such as were established between the United States and the Soviet Union and between India and Pakistan.

Sep 14, 2017

Congressional Consideration of Resolutions to “Censure” Executive Branch Officials

Over the history of the federal Congress, Members have proposed resolutions to formally express the House or Senate’s censure, disapproval, loss of confidence, or condemnation of the President or other executive branch official or their actions. This Insight summarizes the parliamentary procedures the House and Senate might use to consider a resolution to censure or condemn an executive branch official and provides links to additional reading material on the subject. Two Types of “Censure” Resolutions An important distinction should be made between two types of “censure” resolutions: (1) resolutions expressing the sense of the House or Senate that the behavior or actions of an executive branch official should be condemned or censured and (2) resolutions that censure a Member of Congress for “disorderly behavior,” including ethical violations. Resolutions that censure officials of the executive branch for abuse of power or inappropriate behavior, including ethical violations, are usually simple resolutions of the House or Senate. Such resolutions, however, are distinct in an important way from the simple resolutions by which either chamber may censure one of its own Members, even though the reasons for censure may be similar. Article I, Section 5, of the Constitution grants each chamber the power to discipline its own members, and resolutions censuring a Senator or Representative are based on this power. Resolutions censuring an official of another branch, on the other hand, are merely expressions of the sense of the House or the Senate about the conduct of an individual over whom Congress has no disciplinary authority (except through impeachment). Consequently, both houses treat these two types of “censure” resolutions very differently in a parliamentary sense. Resolutions of either type, however, have been rare. Resolutions That Censure a Representative or a Senator Simple resolutions that censure a Member of Congress for “disorderly behavior”—that is, resolutions carrying out the constitutional function of disciplining a Member under the Constitution—are privileged for consideration in both the House and Senate. In the House of Representatives, such resolutions generally qualify as questions of the privileges of the House under Rule IX. In this context, the censure of a Representative would occur through a formal vote of the House on a resolution disapproving of the Member’s conduct. Such resolutions include the requirement that the offending Member stand in the well of the House as the resolution of censure is read aloud by the Speaker. (If the resolution reprimands a Member of the House without using the term censure, this step is not taken.) The most recent instance where a Representative was formally censured in this way by the House occurred in 2010. Similarly, in the Senate, the Select Committee on Ethics may recommend disciplinary action against a Senator, including “censure, expulsion, or recommendation to the appropriate party conference regarding such Member’s seniority or positions of responsibility.” The last time a Senator was formally censured by such a privileged resolution was in 1990. Resolutions That Censure an Executive Branch Official While resolutions censuring a Member of Congress are privileged in his or her chamber, resolutions that censure, condemn, disapprove of, or express a loss of confidence in an executive branch official are not privileged and do not enjoy a special parliamentary status. Insomuch as they simply express the formal opinion of the House or Senate, such resolutions are considered under the regular parliamentary mechanisms used to process other “sense of” legislation. Which procedure might be used in the House to consider a resolution censuring an executive branch official would depend on the level of support such a measure enjoyed in the chamber. Should widespread support exist, a resolution to censure an executive branch official could be considered by unanimous consent or under the Suspension of the Rules procedure. (Under long-standing policies announced by the Speaker, such a unanimous consent request would have to be cleared in advance by the bipartisan committee and floor leadership in order to be entertained. The Suspension of the Rules procedure lays aside any parliamentary barriers to considering the measure but requires a two-thirds vote for passage.) Such a resolution could also be brought to the floor under the terms of a special rule reported by the Committee on Rules and adopted by the House. All three of these mechanisms require, at a minimum, the support of the majority party leadership in order to be entertained. If the censure resolution were not supported by the House majority party leadership, obtaining floor consideration would likely be difficult. Members could try to employ the House discharge rule (Rule XV, clause 2) to bring a censure resolution (or a special rule providing for its consideration) to the floor for consideration. In the Senate, resolutions censuring an executive branch official could be called up on the floor by unanimous consent. Should there be an objection to the immediate consideration of such a resolution when it was submitted, the measure would go “over under the rule” and be placed on a special section of the Senate’s Calendar of Business dedicated to such resolutions. In current practice, simple resolutions that go “over under the rule” in this way are effectively moot and cannot be considered except by unanimous consent. Should, on the other hand, a Senate committee report a resolution censuring an executive branch official, the measure could be called up on the floor by debatable motion. In any case, the resolution and any preamble therein would each be separately debatable and amendable, including by non-germane amendment. Should a Senator succeed in getting an amendment that included censure language pending on the floor, that amendment too, would be subject to debate. As a result, one or more cloture processes might be necessary in order to reach a final vote on the language under any of these parliamentary scenarios if unanimous consent could not be obtained. A Senator might try to trigger a vote in relation to censure language by making a motion to Suspend the Rules. When voting on such a motion, the question before the Senate would be whether or not to lay aside any rules blocking floor consideration of censure legislation. For additional reading on censure resolutions aimed at executive branch officials, see CRS Report RL34037, Congressional Censure and “No Confidence” Votes Regarding Public Officials, coordinated by Cynthia Brown; and CRS Insight IN10775, Resolutions Censuring the President: History and Context, 1st-114th Congresses, by Jane A. Hudiburg.

Sep 14, 2017

Resolutions Censuring the President: History and Context, 1st-114th Congresses

Censure is a reprimand adopted by one or both chambers of Congress against a Member of Congress, President, federal judge, or government official. Censure against a sitting Member involves a formal process that is sanctioned by the Constitution (Article 1, Section 5). Non-Member censure, however, is not an enforceable action and has no uniform language. Instead, non-Member censure resolutions may use a variety of terms to highlight conduct deemed by the House or Senate to be inappropriate or unauthorized. Since 1800, the House and Senate have introduced numerous resolutions to censure or condemn the President. Aside from the exceptions noted below, these resolutions have failed in committee or during floor consideration. Nevertheless, presidential censure attempts have become more frequent since the Watergate era. The most recent censure resolution was introduced on August 18, 2017, as H.Res. 496 (115th Congress). It uses the phrase censure and condemn in reference to the current President. Censure Attempts (Resolution Adopted) On four known occasions, the House or Senate adopted resolutions that, in their original form, charged a President with abuse of power. All of these measures were simple resolutions. Thus, they expressed the “sense” of the chamber but did not have the force of law. Andrew Jackson (1834). Between 1832 and 1833, Jackson vetoed the re-charter of the Second Bank of the United States, removed the government’s deposits, and refused to provide Bank-related documents to Congress. In response, Senator Henry Clay introduced a censure measure resolving that the President “has assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both.” The Senate passed the resolution on March 28, 1834, and then refused to recognize Jackson’s “executive protest,” which argued that the Senate’s censure of a non-Senator was “wholly unauthorized by the Constitution.” By early 1837, however, pro-Jackson Democrats gained the Senate majority. On January 16, they voted to “expunge” the censure from the record. James Buchanan (1860). On June 13, 1860, the House adopted five resolutions charging the Buchanan Administration with ethical violations. The fourth resolution alleged that the President and Secretary of the Navy Isaac Toucey awarded contracts based on “party relations.” By doing so, the resolution stated, they deserved the “reproof of this House.” However, the fifth resolution, targeting just Toucey, used the word censured to condemn the Secretary’s actions. Thus, it could be argued that the House chose a weaker reprimand for the President. Abraham Lincoln (1864). In 1864, the Senate considered a resolution reprimanding President Lincoln for re-commissioning two former generals without seeking the chamber’s approval. The original measure stated that the arrangement “was in derogation of the Constitution of the United States, and not within the power of the President” to make. As adopted, however, the amended resolution no longer referred to the President. Instead, it affirmed that an officer must be re-appointed “in the manner provided by the Constitution.” William Howard Taft (1912). In 1912, President Taft was accused of trying to influence a disputed Senate election. The Senate responded with a resolution that “condemned” any presidential attempt to control the seating of Senators, an act that “violates the spirit, if not the letter, of the Constitution.” However, the Senate modified the measure, changing violates to would violate. The resolution thus applied to Presidents in general and not specifically to Taft’s past behavior. Censure Attempts, 1st-91st Congresses (No Resolution Adopted) Between 1800 and 1952, at least three Presidents were the subject of critical resolutions that were not adopted. One President had his actions condemned with an amendment, while another received harsh criticism via a House committee report. John Adams (1800). The House charged the President with interfering in judicial proceedings. According to the third of three censure resolutions, President Adams’s conduct sacrificed the “Constitutional independence of the Judicial power, and expose[d] the administration thereof to suspicion and reproach.” The resolutions were defeated in the Committee of the Whole. John Tyler (1842). A House select committee issued a report condemning the President for repeated and “abusive exercise” of the executive veto. The House adopted the report but did not approve any censure resolutions. Still, the report itself may be considered a presidential censure. Tyler sent an official protest to the House, which was not recognized. James K. Polk (1848). As the House considered a resolution congratulating Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott for their military service during the Mexican-American War, the chamber voted to add the phrase in a war unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President. The amendment passed, but the original resolution was never adopted. The House later adopted another resolution in praise of the generals, and this one included no criticism of Polk or the war. Ulysses S. Grant (1871). Nine months after the Senate defeated a treaty that would have annexed the Dominican Republic, President Grant deployed naval ships along the Dominican coast. Senator Charles Sumner introduced a resolution that called the action “an infraction of the Constitution of the United States and a usurpation of power not conferred upon the president.” The Senate tabled the resolution. Harry S. Truman (1952). The attempt to censure President Truman followed a major steel worker strike. H.Con.Res. 207 (82nd Congress) condemned the President’s seizure of steel-producing facilities “without authority in law.” As a concurrent resolution, it required the agreement of both houses of Congress, but it never received floor consideration. Censure Attempts, 92nd-114th Congresses (No Resolution Adopted) Richard Nixon’s controversial terms in office marked a new period in presidential censures. Since 1972, several Presidents have been subject to multiple censure attempts. Most resolutions have used variations of the phrase censure and condemn or, in reference to Presidents Nixon and Clinton, called for the President’s resignation. In all cases, though, the resolutions have been referred to committee with no further action. Information on resolutions dated since 1973 is available from Congress.gov. Richard M. Nixon (1972/1973/1974) (92nd Congress: H.Con.Res. 500; 93rd Congress: H.Con.Res. 365, H.Con.Res. 371, H.Res. 684, H.Con.Res. 376, H.Res. 734, H.Res. 1288, H.Con.Res. 589). H.Con.Res. 500 cited the President’s failure to withdraw American troops as directed by the “Mansfield Amendment.” All other resolutions related to the Watergate scandal. Nixon resigned on August 9, 1974, one day after the introduction of his last censure resolution, H.Con.Res. 589. Bill Clinton (1998/1999) (105th Congress: H.Res. 531, H.J.Res. 139, H.J.Res 140; 106th Congress: H.J.Res. 12, S.Res. 44). All resolutions charged abuse of office or obstruction of justice. Three were joint resolutions. Had they passed, the President would have had to sign them, veto them, or allow them to become law without his signature. George W. Bush (2005/2006/2007) (109th Congress: H.Res. 636, S.Res. 398; 110th Congress: H.Res. 530, S.Res. 302, S.Res. 303, H.Res. 625, H.Res. 626). S.Res. 398, S.Res. 303, and H.Res. 626 cited “unlawful authorization of wiretaps of Americans.” Four other resolutions referred to the war in Iraq. Barack Obama (2013/2014/2016) (113th Congress: H.Res. 425, H.Res. 652; 114th Congress: H.Res. 582, H.Res. 588, H.Res. 607). The Obama-related resolutions charged failure to implement foreign policy or enforce the laws, as well as “implementing unconstitutional executive actions.” For additional information on censure resolutions targeting executive branch officials, see CRS Insight IN10774, Congressional Consideration of Resolutions to “Censure” Executive Branch Officials, by Christopher M. Davis; and CRS Report RL34037, Congressional Censure and “No Confidence” Votes Regarding Public Officials, coordinated by Cynthia Brown.

Sep 14, 2017

The Alien Tort Statute (ATS): A Primer

Passed by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been described as a provision “unlike any other in American law” and “unknown to any other legal system in the world.” In its current form, the complete text of the statute provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” While just one sentence, the ATS has been the subject of intense interest in recent decades, as it has evolved from a little-known jurisdictional provision to a prominent vehicle for foreign nationals to seek redress in U.S. courts for injuries caused by human rights offenses and acts of terrorism. The ATS has its historical roots in founding-era efforts to give the federal government supremacy over the nation’s power of foreign affairs and to avoid international conflict arising from disputes about the treatment of aliens in the United States. Although it has been part of U.S. law since 1789, the ATS was rarely used for nearly two centuries. In 1980, that long dormancy came to an end when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a landmark decision, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, which held that the ATS permits claims for violations of modern international human rights law. Filártiga caused an explosion of ATS litigation in the decades that followed, but the Supreme Court has placed outer limits on ATS jurisdiction in two more recent decisions. In a 2004 case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the ATS allows federal courts to hear only a “narrow set” of claims for violations of international law. And in 2013, the Supreme Court held in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. that the statute does not provide jurisdiction for claims between foreign plaintiffs and defendants involving matters arising entirely outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Lower courts’ interpretations of these decisions are still evolving—and, in some cases, conflicting, but many observers agree that Sosa and Kiobel have significantly narrowed the scope of the ATS. In April 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, an ATS case against one the largest financial institutions in the Middle East. The plaintiffs in Jesner allege that Arab Bank maintained accounts for known terrorists; accepted donations that it knew would be used to fund terrorist activity; and distributed millions of dollars to families of suicide bombers in so-called “martyrdom” payments. The Second Circuit dismissed the case on the ground that the “law of nations” that is actionable under the ATS does not impose liability on corporate entities. But every other U.S. court of appeals to consider the issue has reached the opposite conclusion, holding that corporate liability is available under the ATS. The Supreme Court ostensibly granted certiorari in Jesner to resolve this circuit split over the question of corporate liability. Jesner has generated significant attention among observers, including some Members of Congress. Senators Whitehouse and Graham filed an amici brief advocating for reversal of the Second Circuit’s decision. The Senators’ brief argues that the ATS serves as part of a larger legislative scheme to address terrorism, and that a limitation on corporate liability would create gaps in the United States’ legal framework for combating terrorism. The Solicitor General also filed an amicus brief on behalf of the United States arguing that Jesner was wrongly decided. However, the Solicitor General’s brief suggests that the case may be dismissed on other grounds by recommending that it be remanded to the Second Circuit for consideration of whether the claims are sufficiently connected to the United States to satisfy Kiobel’s presumption against extraterritoriality.

Sep 13, 2017

Military Sexual Assault: A Framework for Congressional Oversight

Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to raise and support armies; provide and maintain a navy and make rules for the governance of those forces. Under this authority, Congress determines military criminal law applicable to members of the Armed Forces. Congress has determined that sexual assault is a criminal act under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). As such, Congress has an interest in overseeing the implementation and enforcement of these laws in order to provide for the health, welfare, and good order of the Armed Forces. Prevention and response to sexual violence in the military is not a new concern, nor is sexual violence a problem confined to the military. While prevalence is difficult to estimate, some surveys suggest that up to 19.3% of women and 1.7% of men in the United States have been a victim of sexual assault at some point in their lives. There is a continued national dialogue with regard to sexual violence at universities and other government and private organizations. Sexual assault can have both deleterious physical and psychological effects on the victim and, when an assault occurs in or around the workplace, it can harm the working environment and function of the organization. In the military context, when an assault occurs it impairs the unit’s ability to work effectively; it can have an impact on cohesion, stability, and ultimately, mission success. Thus, concern about sexual assault in the military stems from complementary imperatives: protecting the individual health and welfare of military servicemembers, and ensuring preparedness and effectiveness of military units. Congressional efforts to address military sexual assault, pursuant to its Constitutional authority, have intensified over the past two decades in response to rising public concern about incident rates and perceptions of a lack of adequate response by the military to support the victims and hold perpetrators accountable. Since 2004, Congress has enacted over 100 provisions intended to address some aspect of the problem as part of the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). In addition, DOD has devoted significant resources to the issue in terms of funds, personnel, and training time. Given the scope and complexity of this issue, it is helpful to apply a framework for analysis and oversight. This report provides such a framework to help congressional staff understand the legislative and policy landscape, link proposed policy solutions with potential impact metrics, and identify possible gaps that remain unaddressed. Congressional oversight and action on military sexual assault can be organized into four main categories: (1) Department of Defense (DOD) management and accountability, (2) prevention, (3) victim protection and support, and (4) military justice and investigations. The first category deals with actions to improve management, monitoring, and evaluation of DOD’s efforts in sexual assault prevention and response. The second category includes efforts to reduce the number of sexual assaults through screening, training, and organizational culture. The third category focuses on DOD’s response once an alleged assault has occurred, including actions to protect and support the victim. Finally, the last category addresses bringing perpetrators to justice through military investigative and judicial processes.

Sep 12, 2017

U.S. Air Force Pilot Shortage

In his opening comments to the 2017 U.S. Air Force Posture Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Chairman John McCain stated, “The force is short 1,500 pilots.... This is a full-blown crisis, and if left unresolved, it will call into question the Air Force’s ability to accomplish its mission.” According to current Air Force statistics, the service is 1,947 pilots short of its authorized strength. The shortage is most acute among fighter pilots: the Air Force predicts it will be 1,055 fighter pilots short of 3,781 authorized by the end of FY2017, following a deficiency of 873 in FY2016. Commenting on the shortage, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General David Goldfein, warns, “The Air Force is as busy as we have ever been, but we are also smaller than we have ever been. Consequently, we have less margin for error when it comes to filling our cockpits.” Analysts point to a number of factors driving the Air Force pilot shortage, chief among them an increase in demand for commercial airline pilots. Figure 1 illustrates the historical correlation between airline hiring and Air Force pilot attrition, which creates concern that the shortage will grow given predictions for sustained industry growth. Figure 1. Major Airline Hires vs. Air Force Pilot Attrition / Source: Nolan J. Sweeney, “Predicting Active Duty Air Force Pilot Attrition,” RAND, 2015. Notes: The left vertical axis with corresponding red line depicts pilots hired by the seven major airlines (Alaska, American, Delta, FedEx, Southwest, United, and UPS). The right vertical axis with corresponding blue line shows Air Force pilots leaving the service. Generally, analysts point to three causes for the uptick in airline hires: A large percentage of airline pilots will hit the mandatory retirement age of 65 (14 C.F.R. §121.383) in the next 10 years. One recent study forecasts 36% of the workforce will retire by 2026, while another estimates as high as 42%. The airline industry has grown steadily in the past five years, and studies forecast further increases in response to growing passenger demand, a fleet size that will likely double in 20 years, and a consequent increase in pilot hiring. The Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-216 §217) increased hiring standards for airline pilots. Previously, pilots could assume an entry level position with 250 hours of flight time. Under the new law, all airline pilots must possess an Airline Transport Pilot Certificate, with a prerequisite of 1,500 hours. In effect, the law privileges military pilots, who typically qualify for the license immediately upon separating. A recent GAO report finds wide variances in the impact these circumstances may have on commercial pilot demand: figures range from 1,900 to 4,500 new pilots per year over the next decade. Nevertheless, major carriers have increased pilot salaries by 20% over the past three years, potentially drawing pilots away from the military. Availability of civilian jobs is only one possible factor driving attrition. Preliminary exit survey results indicate that Air Force pilots are motivated to separate primarily by “cultural issues that affect quality of life and service.” Survey respondents cited dissatisfaction with excessive duties unrelated to flying and inability to maintain work-life balance. In response to the shortage, the Air Force created an Aircrew Crisis Task Force (ACTF) to focus on retention, new pilot production, and reducing administrative requirements. Specific initiatives include reducing requirements for fighter pilots to fill 365-day deployments; reducing off-station exercises; cutting administrative duties and ancillary training; hiring contractors to handle administrative requirements; increasing training capacity with new squadrons and incentives for instructor duty; and engaging with industry on cooperative solutions. The Air Force is also asking Congress to modify monetary incentives, which fall into two categories: (1) Aviation Incentive Pay (AvIP), a monthly supplement that scales with years of service, and (2) the Aviation Bonus (AvB), an annual supplement contingent upon pilots extending their active duty service commitment. The FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) (P.L. 114-328 §616) increased maximum AvIP to $1,000 per month and increased the AvB to $35,000 per year (an increase of $10,000). It also mandated a “business case analysis” for future requests to increase the AvB. The resulting study concluded that an AvB between $38,500 and $62,500 would reverse the attrition trend and account for uncertainty in airline growth. The House-passed version of the FY2018 NDAA would raise the AvB to $50,000 per year. In contrast, the committee-reported Senate bill would require further justification before implementing a raise, to include a breakout of the bonus required by aircraft type, a tiered limitation to the bonus depending on anticipated shortfalls, and a description of the nonmonetary means the service is using to address attrition. Critics doubt the extent to which further AvB increases will increase retention. General Goldfein concedes that “it will not be one thing we do that will fix this issue, it will be 100 things.” While the efficacy of the AvB as a stimulus to retention is debatable, the percentage of eligible pilots who take the bonus is a clear indicator of future attrition, as 96% of pilots who reject the AvB choose to separate according to Air Force statistics. Figure 2 shows that in recent years fewer than half of Air Force fighter pilots are accepting the AvB: Figure 2. Air Force Fighter Pilot AvB Take Rate (%) / Source: Headquarters Air Force / A3TC, “ACTF Retention Update.” It may take time for military retention measures being implemented now to produce a demonstrable effect. In the interim, Congress might consider several questions: To what extent will further increases in the Aviation Bonus solve the problem? Would a different type of monetary incentive be a more effective retention tool? To what extent should the issue be viewed as a nationwide shortage of pilots, both military and civilian? How might Congress employ legislative and monetary measures to balance military readiness, health of the airline industry, and aviation safety?

Sep 11, 2017

Congressional Considerations Related to Hurricanes Harvey and Irma

Sep 11, 2017

After the Storm: Highway Reconstruction and Resilience

Sep 8, 2017

TPP: Digital Trade Provisions

Sep 7, 2017

Options to Cease Implementing the Iran Nuclear Agreement

Trump Administration statements indicate that the Administration does not believe that the 2015 multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), addresses the full range of potential threats posed by Iran. Administration officials assert that the Administration is considering ending or altering U.S. implementation of the JCPOA. This report analyzes some of the options the Administration might use to end or alter U.S. implementation of the JCPOA, if there is a decision to do so. These options, which might involve use of procedures in the JCPOA itself or the Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act (P.L. 114-17), are not necessarily mutually exclusive. This report does not analyze the advantages and disadvantages of any specific option, or examine in detail the implications of any particular course of action. Those issues are examined in: CRS Report R43333, Iran Nuclear Agreement, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr; and CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.

Sep 7, 2017

Disaster Debris Management: Requirements, Challenges, and Federal Agency Roles

Every year, communities in the United States are affected by disasters such as hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, volcanoes, floods, wildfires, and winter storms. After a disaster, when a region turns its attention to rebuilding, one of the greatest challenges often involves properly managing disaster-related debris. Disaster debris typically includes soils and sediments, vegetation (trees, limbs, shrubs), municipal solid waste (common household garbage, personal belongings), construction and demolition debris (in some instances, entire residential structures and all their contents), vehicles, food waste, “white goods” (refrigerators, freezers, air conditioners), and household hazardous waste(cleaning agents, pesticides, pool chemicals). Each type of waste may contain or be contaminated with toxic or hazardous constituents. In the short term, debris removal is necessary to facilitate the recovery of a geographic area. In the long term, the methods by which these wastes are managed requires proper consideration to ensure that their management (e.g., by landfilling) will not pose future threats to human health or the environment. Under a number of different conditions and authorities, several agencies may provide debris removal assistance to communities affected by a disaster. For example, under certain conditions, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provides funding for disaster debris removal and/or approves direct federal assistance to certain entities that do not have the capability to respond to a disaster. Also, under certain conditions, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may assist communities with debris removal activities. For example, the Corps may perform right-of-way clearance, curbside waste pickup, private property debris removal, and property demolition, and EPA may help coordinate the collection and management of contaminated debris and household hazardous wastes. This report focuses on the requirements applicable to disaster debris management and the challenges that communities face when attempting to manage it both quickly and safely. This report also provides an overview of the types of support provided by FEMA, the Corps, and EPA with respect to disaster debris removal. A discussion of the programs or statutory authorities under which that support may be provided is beyond the scope of this report. There are a number of conditions under which federal agencies may support communities with disaster debris removal. With respect to FEMA’s involvement in debris removal assistance, this report focuses on support that may be provided after the President declares the incident to involve a “major disaster” under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act, P.L. 93-288, as amended).

Sep 6, 2017

U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service: FY2018 Appropriations

Sep 6, 2017

Floodplain Management and Flood Resilience: Current Policy and Considerations for Congress

An issue for Congress is how federal floodplain policy shapes implementation of federal projects and programs. Federal floodplain policy has particular relevance for federal disaster recovery assistance and infrastructure support. President Trump and, earlier, Presidents Obama and Carter have provided direction on federal floodplain policy. This Insight describes presidential direction to federal agencies on floodplain management and flood resilience and presents considerations for Congress. Presidential Direction and Current Policy Three executive orders (E.O.s) are relevant to current federal floodplain policy: E.O. 13807 (Trump, 2017) Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects; E.O. 13690 (Obama, 2015) Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard and a Process for Further Soliciting and Considering Stakeholder Input; and E.O. 11988 (Carter, 1977) Floodplain Management. On August 15, 2017, President Trump signed E.O. 13807 in an effort to streamline federal infrastructure approval. Among other actions, E.O. 13807 revoked E.O. 13690. E.O. 13690 modified federal policy by amending E.O. 11988. A principal action of E.O. 13690 was to establish a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard (FFRMS). By revoking E.O. 13690, E.O. 13807 appears to have eliminated the FFRMS and returned federal floodplain policy to the original text of E.O. 11988. E.O. 11988 E.O. 11988 requires that federal actions are to avoid, if alternatives are available, supporting development in the 100-year floodplain (also referred to as the 1% annual-chance floodplain or the floodplain for the Base Flood Elevation [BFE]), and federal agencies responsible for real property and facilities are to design and construct structures and facilities consistent with National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) regulations, which are largely based on the BFE. Under implementation guidance for E.O. 11988, critical actions (e.g., construction of prisons and emergency services) are to avoid the 500-year floodplain if alternatives are available. Revoked E.O. 13690 The stated aim of E.O. 13690 was to improve the flood resilience of communities and federal assets. Federal agencies were to apply the FFRMS as a minimum flood-resilience standard for federally funded projects, which the FFRMS defined as actions where federal funds were used for new construction, substantial improvement, or to address substantial damage to structures and facilities. E.O. 13690 modified the requirements of E.O. 11988 largely by redefining which floodplain was to be the foundation for federal floodplain management policy. Rather than relying on the BFE floodplain, E.O. 13690 provided that the floodplain be determined by 2 feet above BFE (BFE+2); 500-year floodplain; or climate-informed science. Figure 1 illustrates the change in a floodplain’s horizontal and vertical determination by moving from the BFE floodplain to the BFE+2 floodplain. Figure 1. Illustration of E.O. 13690 Floodplain Using 2-Foot Vertical Increase Above Base Flood Elevation / Source: CRS. Note: Topography shapes the difference in the horizontal width of the BFE and the BFE+2 floodplain. E.O. 13690 required that federal actions avoid supporting development in an E.O.13690 floodplain; federally funded projects were to be flood resilient (through elevation or other means) if located within the E.O. 13690 floodplain; and agencies were to use natural systems, ecosystem processes, or nature-based approaches, where possible, when developing project alternatives. Public comments indicated that some stakeholders (e.g., state floodplain managers, environmental advocates) supported E.O. 13690 and the FFRMS, believing that enhanced floodplain management and a resilience standard would reduce impacts from floods and protect floodplains’ natural systems. Other stakeholders (e.g., some county representatives, homebuilders, waterway industry interests) raised concerns. Some questioned the cost implications and implementation challenges and expressed concerns that compliance would hinder economic development in coastal and riverine communities. Others criticized the process for developing the E.O. and FFRMS. For FY2017, Congress allowed for agency-level implementation to proceed, with a few exceptions. Section 748 of Division E of P.L. 115-31 prohibited the implementation and enforcement of E.O. 13690 on non-grant components of the NFIP and any changes in the floodplain considered for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers regulatory activities. In accordance with these provisions, individual agencies were developing or updating their regulations to reflect E.O. 13690 and the FFRMS when President Trump signed E.O. 13807 (e.g., see notices of proposed rulemakings from the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Department of Housing and Urban Development). Considerations for Congress Congress may consider various issues related to federal floodplain management policies and federal programs that fund development in the floodplain. For example, Should floodplain management be predominantly a state and local responsibility, or is there justification for a federal role in shaping resilience of investments in floodplains? Some communities (e.g., communities in Texas) have adopted building standards such as BFE+1, BFE+2, and BFE+3. Estimates are that 13 states require BFE+1 and 4 states (Indiana, Montana, New York, and Wisconsin) have BFE+2 requirements. The Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Task Force chose to require that many Hurricane Sandy-related federally funded projects be built to BFE+1. How can Congress evaluate if there are net benefits of a flood-resiliency standard? The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) found net benefits of elevating at the time of construction some (but not all) structures in coastal areas in a 2016 draft report; for example, the additional costs of elevating new hospitals, police stations, and elementary schools to BFE+3 were exceeded by the benefits of additional flood resilience. Some stakeholders have criticized the draft report. Similar benefit-cost analyses for other infrastructure are not available. Are there changes to how federal programs are implemented that could result in long-term net benefits in terms of avoided federal assistance, lives lost, and economic disruption from disasters? Do federal policies and programs promote or deter state and local efforts to increase flood resilience and prepare for frequent flood events, as well as low-probability, high-consequence events? Congressional debates on these questions may be shaped by local and regional flood events and their impacts, as well as by fiscal and federalism considerations. Congressional discussions also may be informed by stakeholder views and assessments, such as the Government Accountability Office’s identification of the NFIP in its 2017 High Risk Report, the Congressional Budget Office’s analysis of potential hurricane damages, and the National Academy of Sciences report on disaster resilience.

Sep 6, 2017

D.C. Circuit Rejects EPA’s Efforts to Ban Hydrofluorocarbons: Part 1

Sep 5, 2017

D.C. Circuit Rejects EPA’s Efforts to Ban Hydrofluorocarbons: Part 2

Sep 5, 2017

Possible U.S. Policy Approaches to North Korea

Sep 4, 2017

Farm Bill Primer: Program Eligibility and Payment Limits

Sep 1, 2017

Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) FY2018 Appropriations: Overview

The Financial Services and General Government (FSGG) appropriations bill includes funding for the Department of the Treasury, the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the judiciary, the District of Columbia, and more than two dozen independent agencies. The House and Senate FSGG bills fund the same agencies, with one exception. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is funded through the Agriculture appropriations bill in the House and the FSGG bill in the Senate. This structure has existed since the 2007 reorganization of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations. President Trump submitted his FY2018 budget request on May 23, 2017. The request included a total of $45.2 billion for agencies funded through the FSGG appropriations bill, including $250 million for the CFTC. The House Committee on Appropriations reported a Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 3280, H.Rept. 115-234) on July 17, 2017. Total FY2018 funding in the reported bill would be $42.5 billion, with another $248 million for the CFTC included in the Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 3268, H.Rept. 115-232). The combined total of $42.7 billion would be about $2.5 billion below the President’s FY2018 request, with most of this difference in the funding for the General Services Administration (GSA). The House Committee on Rules announced a September 5, 2017, meeting to consider a rule on H.R. 3354, which was reported from the Appropriations Committee as the Interior appropriations bill. Under the Rules Committee announcement, H.R. 3354 would be considered on the House floor including nearly all of the text of H.R. 3280 as Division D of H.R. 3354. The Senate Committee on Appropriations has held FSGG subcommittee hearings, but has yet to release an FSGG bill for FY2018. Although financial services are a major focus of the FSGG appropriations bills, these bills do not include funding for many financial regulatory agencies, which are funded outside of the appropriations process. The FSGG bills do, however, often contain additional legislative provisions relating to such agencies as is the case with H.R. 3280, which contains several provisions in Title IX and Title X that also appear in H.R. 10, a broad financial regulatory bill passed by the House on June 8, 2017.

Sep 1, 2017

New Financial Sanctions on Venezuela: Key Issues

Venezuela continues to be in the throes of a deep political crisis under the authoritarian rule of President Nicolás Maduro. While the United States has employed various sanctions as a policy tool in response to concerns about the activities of the Venezuelan government and Venezuelan individuals for more than a decade, sanctions have been ratcheted up in recent months as the political situation has deteriorated. After a controversial election of a National Constituent Assembly on July 30, 2017, the Trump Administration weighed a range of possible new sanctions to increase pressure on the Maduro government. Options considered included additional targeted economic sanctions on individuals; restrictions on U.S. oil imports from Venezuela, the Venezuelan government’s single largest source of income; and restricting transactions in Venezuelan bonds in U.S. financial markets. Citing the election, human rights abuses, and rampant public corruption, on August 24, 2017, President Trump signed Executive Order 13808 that imposes new sanctions restricting the access of the Venezuelan government and Venezuela’s state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) to U.S. financial markets. Restrictions on Venezuela’s Access to the U.S. Financial System Issuing bonds in U.S. financial markets has been an important source of capital for many governments in emerging markets, including Venezuela. The new U.S. sanctions seek to restrict the Venezuelan government’s access to U.S. debt and equity markets. According to the White House, the measures “are carefully calibrated to deny the Maduro dictatorship a critical source of financing to maintain its illegitimate rule, protect the United States financial system from complicity in Venezuela’s corruption and in the impoverishment of the Venezuelan people, and allow for humanitarian assistance.” The new sanctions on Venezuela seek to cut off new funds flowing from U.S. investors or through the U.S. financial system to the Maduro government. To this end, the sanctions restrict transactions by U.S. investors or within the United States related to new debt issued by the Venezuelan government and PdVSA. U.S. persons are also prohibited from purchasing securities from the Venezuelan government. For example, the new sanctions would prohibit actions like a May 2017, Goldman Sachs Asset Management purchase of PdVSA bonds from Venezuela’s central bank. Goldman Sachs Asset Management bought the bonds at a steep discount—it paid $865 million for bonds with a face value of $2.8 billion—but the transaction resulted in a fresh infusion of cash for the government. (This controversial transaction likely drove development of the new restriction.) Additionally, under the new sanctions, CITGO—whose parent company is PdVSA—is prohibited from distributing profits to the Venezuelan government, though it can continue its commercial operations in the United States. Concurrent with the release of the Executive Order in August, the Treasury Department issued general licenses that seek to minimize the impact of sanctions on U.S. economic interests and on the Venezuelan people. The licenses allow (1) a 30-day window to wind down impacted contracts; (2) U.S. investors to continue trading existing holdings of Venezuelan and PdVSA bonds on secondary markets; (3) transactions involving new debt issued by CITGO; and (4) financing for specific humanitarian goods, including agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices. Transactions involving new short-term debt (less than 30 days for the Venezuelan government and less than 90 days for PdVSA) are also allowed, ensuring continued access to short-term financing that facilitates U.S. trade with Venezuela, including U.S. imports of oil from Venezuela. Sanctions targeting sovereign debt are unusual, but not unprecedented. Congress has passed legislation to prohibit investments and transactions in Iran sovereign debt. The Countering Russia Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (§ 242, P.L. 115-44) calls for a report studying effects of sanctioning Russian sovereign debt and related derivative products. Impact of the New Sanctions The new sanctions come as Venezuela grapples with an acute economic crisis, with devastating humanitarian consequences. Throughout the crisis, the government has prioritized continued payment on its debt obligations, while restricting imports of necessary items, including food and medicine. There has been speculation for months about if and when the government will be pushed into default. The government is running short on funds—it has $3 billion of its foreign exchange reserves in cash and $5 billion in debt falling due between early August and the end of 2017, with continued oil exports an important source of new cash inflows for the government. Now largely shut off from U.S. investors and U.S. financial markets, there are questions about whether the sanctions will accelerate a default by the Venezuelan government. The short-term impact of sanctions has been mixed. In the hours following the announcement of the new sanctions, prices on Venezuelan government and PdVSA bonds went up slightly. Investors reportedly were relieved that secondary market transactions in the bonds would be allowed to continue, a point that was not clear in rumors leading up to the announcement. However, news reports indicate that traders are slowing or stopping trades in Venezuelan government and PdVSA bonds, out of fear that they could be unknowingly trading bonds on behalf of people connected to the Venezuelan government, in violation of sanctions. The credit rating agency, Fitch Ratings, argues that U.S. sanctions have reduced the financing options of the government and makes default “probable.” Longer-term, the sustainability of the government’s finances in light of the new sanctions depends in part on the government’s ability to raise funds outside of U.S. financial markets. There are a number of measures Venezuela could pursue: approaching China and Russia for new oil-for-loan deals, seizing onshore private-sector holdings from Venezuelan banks and insurance companies, taking cash from PdVSA and other state institutions, or trying to issue new bonds in European financial markets. An uptick in oil prices could also alleviate the budgetary pressures facing the government, given Venezuela’s heavy dependence on oil. If the Venezuelan government does default, the new sanctions would complicate any debt restructuring negotiations between private creditors and the government. Many U.S. investors hold Venezuelan bonds, which are included in the popular JP Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI). Venezuela’s dollar-denominated bonds were issued under New York law, and any restructuring would likely result in legal challenges in New York courts. Legal challenges could result in the seizure of Venezuelan assets in the United States, such as CITGO or oil shipments. Related CRS Products CRS In Focus IF10230, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Overview, by Mark P. Sullivan and Clare Ribando Seelke. CRS In Focus IF10715, Venezuela: Overview of U.S. Sanctions, by Mark P. Sullivan. CRS Report R44841, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Policy, by Clare Ribando Seelke. CRS Insight IN10741, U.S. Petroleum Trade with Venezuela: Financial and Economic Considerations Associated with Possible Sanctions, by Phillip Brown and Clare Ribando Seelke.

Sep 1, 2017

Congressional Action on the FY2013 Disaster Supplemental

On January 29, 2013, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013, a $50.5 billion package of disaster assistance largely focused on responding to Hurricane Sandy, was enacted as P.L. 113-2. In late October 2012, Hurricane Sandy impacted a wide swath of the East Coast of the United States, resulting in more than 120 deaths and major disaster declarations for 12 states plus the District of Columbia. The Obama Administration submitted a request to Congress on December 7, 2012, for $60.4 billion in supplemental funding and legislative provisions to address both the immediate losses and damages from Hurricane Sandy, as well as to mitigate the damage from future disasters in the impacted region. On January 15, 2013, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 152, the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, 2013. This bill included $50.5 billion in disaster assistance. This was the third piece of disaster legislation considered by the House during the first month of the 113th Congress. H.R. 41, which passed the House and Senate on January 4, 2013 and was signed into law two days later as P.L. 113-1, provided $9.7 billion in additional borrowing authority for the National Flood Insurance Program. On January 14, the House passed H.R. 219, legislation making changes to disaster assistance programs. The rule for consideration of H.R. 152 combined the text of H.R. 219 with H.R. 152 upon its engrossment, to send them to the Senate as a single package. The Senate passed H.R. 152 unchanged on January 28, 2013 by a vote of 62-36, and it was signed into law as P.L. 113-2 the next day. H.R. 152 was not the initial legislative response to the storm. In the 112th Congress, the Senate passed a separate package of disaster assistance totaling $60.4 billion, as well as several legislative provisions reforming federal disaster programs. While appropriations legislation generally originates in the House of Representatives, the Senate chose to act on the Obama Administration’s request first by amending an existing piece of House-passed appropriations legislation—H.R. 1. This passed the Senate December 28, 2012, by a vote of 62-32. The House did not act on the legislation before the end of the 112th Congress. This summary report analyzes the Obama Administration’s request, the initial Senate position from the 112th Congress, and H.R. 152, the legislative package developed in the House that was ultimately enacted as P.L. 113-2. This report is primarily for reference purposes. The material in it is intended to provide context to help the reader better understand how the disaster relief bill that passed in the wake of Hurricane Sandy moved through Congress at what funding it ultimately contained. The report does not track obligation of funds or discuss ongoing recovery efforts. Enacted funding levels in the report represent funding prior to the sequestration of March 2013, as how sequestration would be implemented was not clear at the time P.L. 113-2 was enacted. For details concerning the legislative provisions requested by the Obama Administration, as well as those included in Senate-amended H.R. 1, see CRS Report R42869, FY2013 Supplemental Funding for Disaster Relief. Division B of P.L. 113-2, which amended several disaster assistance programs managed by FEMA, is discussed separately in CRS Report R42991, Analysis of the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act of 2013.

Aug 31, 2017

FY2018 Appropriations for the Department of Justice

The Department of Justice (DOJ) was established in 1870 with the Attorney General as its leader. Since its creation, DOJ has added additional agencies, offices, boards, and divisions to its organizational structure. DOJ, along with the judicial branch, operates the federal criminal justice system. The department enforces federal criminal and civil laws, including antitrust, civil rights, environmental, and tax laws. Through agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), it investigates terrorism, organized and violent crime, illegal drugs, and gun and explosives violations, among others. Through the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), it protects the federal judiciary, apprehends fugitives, and oversees the detention of alleged offenders who are not granted pretrial release. DOJ prosecutes individuals accused of violating federal laws, and it represents the U.S. government in court. DOJ’s Bureau of Prisons (BOP) houses individuals accused or convicted of federal crimes. In addition to its role in administering the federal criminal justice system, the department also provides grants and training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies and judicial and correctional systems. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31) appropriated $28.962 billion for DOJ. The act provided $2.713 billion for the U.S. Marshals, $9.006 billion for the FBI, $2.103 billion for the DEA, $1.259 billion for the ATF, and $7.142 billion for the BOP. The remaining funding (approximately $6.739 billion) was for DOJ’s other offices, such as the U.S. Attorneys offices, the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the Attorney General’s office. The Trump Administration requests $28.205 billion for DOJ for FY2018. This amount is 2.6% less than the FY2017-enacted appropriation. The Administration proposes reductions for several DOJ accounts, including a $232 million (-2.6%) reduction for the FBI, a $340 million (-26.6%) reduction for State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance, and a $21 million (-8.3%) reduction for Juvenile Justice Programs. While the Administration’s FY2018 budget request includes several reductions for DOJ accounts, it also includes several increases, including an additional $22 million (1.1%) for the Office of the United States Attorneys, an $82 million (5.6%) increase for the USMS’s Federal Prisoner Detention account, a $76 million (1.1%) increase for BOP’s Salaries and Expenses account, and a $61 million (2.9%) increase for the DEA. The House committee-reported bill (H.R. 3267) includes $29.315 billion for DOJ, which is 1.2% greater than the FY2017-enacted appropriation and 3.5% greater than the Administration’s request. The committee would provide increases for the USMS (+3.2%), DEA (+2.9%), ATF (+2.8%), BOP (+0.4%), and the Office of the U.S. Attorneys (+1.1%). The committee-reported bill would reduce funding for the FBI (-1.6%), but this is due to a proposed cut in funding for the FBI’s Construction account. The Senate committee-reported bill (S. 1662) includes $29.068 billion for DOJ, which is 0.4% greater than the FY2017-enacted appropriation and 2.6% greater than the Administration’s request. The committee-reported bill includes increases for the USMS (+4.0%), DEA (+0.6%), ATF (+1.2%), and the Office of the U.S. Attorneys (+1.1%). The committee recommends reduced funding for the FBI (-0.2%), but this is due to a proposed reduction in the FBI’s Construction account. The committee would essentially flat-fund BOP (the recommended increase is less than 0.1%).

Aug 30, 2017

Forecasting Tropical Cyclones: NOAA’s Role

Aug 29, 2017

Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies: Overview of FY2018 Appropriations

The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for approximately 30 agencies and entities. They include most of the Department of the Interior (DOI) as well as agencies within other departments, such as the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. The bill also provides funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), arts and cultural agencies, and other entities. At issue for Congress is determining the amount, terms, and conditions of funding for FY2018 for agencies and programs within the bill. For FY2018, President Trump requested $27.26 billion for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. For the DOI agencies in Title I of the bill, the request was $10.62 billion, or 38.9% of the total requested. For EPA, funded in Title II of the bill, the request was $5.66 billion, or 20.7% of the total. For the roughly 20 agencies and other entities funded in Title III of the bill, the request was $10.99 billion, or 40.3% of the total. The President’s request would be an overall decrease of $5.37 billion (-16.5%) from the total FY2017 enacted appropriations of $32.63 billion. This FY2017 total includes $407.0 million in emergency funding for wildfire suppression by the Forest Service and DOI. Under the President’s proposal, funding for each of the bill’s three titles would decrease by a different amount relative to the FY2017 enacted levels. DOI agencies (Title I) would receive $1.64 billion (-13.4%) less than in FY2017. EPA funding (Title II) would decrease by $2.40 billion (-29.8%), the largest dollar amount and percentage of the three titles. The total for all Related Agencies (Title III) would decline by $1.33 billion (-10.8%). On July 21, 2017, the House Appropriations Committee reported H.R. 3354, the Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018, containing $31.52 billion in appropriations for FY2018 for Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies. The bill would provide $1.12 billion (-3.4%) less than the FY2017 appropriation of $32.63 billion. For each of the bill’s three titles, H.R. 3354 would decrease funds by a different amount relative to the FY2017 enacted levels. Funding for DOI agencies would decrease by $302.7 million (-2.5%). Funding for EPA would decline by $534.4 million (-6.6%), the largest dollar amount and percentage of the three titles. The total for all Related Agencies in Title III would decline by $284.9 million (-2.3%). The $31.52 billion for FY2018 in H.R. 3354, as reported, was $4.26 billion (15.6%) higher than the President’s FY2018 requested appropriation of $27.26 billion. The bill contained more funding than the President sought for each of the three titles. Under the House committee-reported bill, as compared with the President’s request, funding for DOI agencies would be $1.33 billion (12.6%) greater, funding for EPA would be $1.87 billion (33.1%) greater, and funding for Title III agencies would be $1.05 billion (9.5%) greater. This report first presents a brief overview of the major agencies in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. It then describes the appropriations requested by President Trump for FY2018. Next, it compares the President’s request for FY2018 with appropriations enacted for FY2017. It then compares the amounts in H.R. 3354, as reported by the House Appropriations Committee, with FY2017 enacted appropriations and with FY2018 appropriations requested by the President.

Aug 29, 2017

Maternal and Child Health Services Block Grant: Background and Funding

The Maternal and Child Health (MCH) Services Block Grant is a federal-state partnership program that aims to improve the health of low-income pregnant women, mothers, and children. In addition, the program aims to connect low-income families with other services and programs, such as Medicaid and the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). This federal-state partnership is composed of three programs. First, formula-based block grants are provided to states and territories (collectively referred to as states in this report). Second, competitive grants are available through the Special Projects of Regional and National Significance (SPRANS) program. Third, competitive grants are available through the Community Integrated Service Systems (CISS) program. As a whole, these programs are administered by the Maternal and Child Health Bureau (MCHB) of the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). This block grant was authorized under Title V of the Social Security Act (SSA). Appropriations The MCH Services Block Grant received an appropriation of $638.2 million in FY2016. Of that amount, approximately $550.8 million (86.31%) was for block grants to states, $77.1 million (12.08%) was for SPRANS, and $10.3 million (1.61%) was for CISS. Congress provided $20 million in supplemental funding to the SPRANS program to help territories respond to the Zika virus. Eligible Population Although the MCH Services Block Grant program primarily serves low-income pregnant women, mothers, and children, individuals who are not from low-income families are also eligible to receive services. Such recipients may include nonpregnant women who are over 21 years of age. Program Services MCH Services Block Grant funds are distributed for the purpose of funding core public health services provided by maternal and child health agencies. These core services are often divided into four categories: (1) direct health care, (2) enabling services, (3) population-based services, and (4) infrastructure building. Within these categories, the MCH Services Block Grant supports a wide array of programs, including newborn screening, health services for children with special health care needs (CSHCNs), and immunization programs. Topics Covered in This Report This report provides background and funding information on the MCH Services Block Grant. It also includes select program and health expenditure data to provide context on issues that Congress and HRSA have sought to address through this block grant program.

Aug 28, 2017

Business Tax Provisions that Expired in 2016 (“Tax Extenders”)

Temporary tax provisions were last extended in the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes (PATH) Act of 2015, signed into law as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). Under this law, all tax provisions that had expired at the end of 2014 were retroactively extended. Among the business-related tax provisions, some were extended through 2016, some were extended through 2019, while others were made permanent. This report briefly summarizes and discusses the economic impact of selected business-related tax provisions that expired at the end of 2016, including the following. Special business investment (cost recovery) provisions: Special Expensing Rules for Certain Film, Television, and Live Theatrical Productions Seven-Year Recovery Period for Motorsports Entertainment Complexes Three-Year Depreciation for Race Horses Two Years or Younger Accelerated Depreciation for Business Property on an Indian Reservation Election to Expense Advanced Mine Safety Equipment Economic development provisions: Empowerment Zone Tax Incentives Qualified Zone Academy Bonds—Allocation of Bond Limitation American Samoa Economic Development Credit Other business-related provisions: Credit for Certain Expenditures for Maintaining Railroad Tracks Temporary Increase in Limit on Cover Over of Rum Excise Tax Revenues to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands Deduction Allowable with Respect to Income Attributable to Domestic Production Activities in Puerto Rico Indian Employment Tax Credit Mine Rescue Team Training Credit Special Rate for Qualified Timber Gains This report does not include provisions that in the past have been classified as individual or energy-related. For a general overview of tax provisions that expired in 2016, see CRS Report R44677, Tax Provisions that Expired in 2016 (“Tax Extenders”), by Molly F. Sherlock.

Aug 28, 2017

Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems: DOE Programs

While physical threats to the U.S. power grid and pipelines have long worried policymakers, cyber threats to the computer systems that operate this critical infrastructure are an increasing concern. Cybersecurity risks against the power and pipeline sectors are similar, as both use similar control systems, and there appears to be a broad consensus that cyber threats to this infrastructure are on the rise. Furthermore, with ever-greater physical interdependency between electricity generators and the natural gas pipelines that supply their fuel, many in Congress recognize that grid and pipeline cybersecurity are intertwined. In 2015, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (the FAST Act) provided the Secretary of Energy with new authority to protect or restore the power grid during a grid security emergency, including a cyber incident. Congress is considering additional legislation to fund and expand the Department of Energy’s cybersecurity programs. The Department of Energy (DOE) is the lead agency for the protection of electric power, oil, and natural gas infrastructure—cooperating with the Department of Homeland Security, the lead agency for pipelines. DOE’s cybersecurity activities are led by its Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE) and structured around three areas: (1) cybersecurity preparedness, (2) cyber incident response and recovery, and (3) research, development, and demonstration. Although nominally applicable to energy delivery systems across the electric power, oil and natural gas, and pipeline sectors, OE’s cybersecurity activities to date appear to have been focused primarily on the grid. Publicly available examples of DOE-supported activities specifically focused on pipeline cybersecurity are limited. Rather, pipeline cybersecurity efforts appear to be included as part of broader national cybersecurity efforts. Several bills potentially affecting DOE’s cybersecurity activities for power grid and pipeline infrastructure have been introduced in the 115th Congress. These include the Defense, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Legislative Branch, and Energy and Water Development National Security Appropriations Act, 2018 (H.R. 3219) and the Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2018 (S. 1609), both of which would modestly increase funding for OE in FY2018. The Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017 (S. 1460) would establish and fund a DOE program for energy sector cybersecurity research, development, and demonstration (RD&D) to be carried out for advanced applications to identify and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities. The Enhancing State Energy Security Planning and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2017 (H.R. 3050) would authorize DOE to provide financial and technical assistance to states for assessing cybersecurity threats to energy infrastructure. As federal cybersecurity oversight and legislative debate continue, Congress may focus on several key issues. Given the ever-changing cybersecurity environment in the energy sector, Congress may continue to examine OE’s cybersecurity resources to ensure that they are adequate and being deployed appropriately to address the most important energy delivery risks. Congress may also seek a more-informed basis for considering whether to adjust the provisions of the FAST Act or clarify the authorizations it contains. How OE’s programs and expertise could best be used to inform analysis of electric power and natural gas infrastructure interdependency from a cybersecurity perspective may also be of interest to Congress. Finally, Congress may examine how OE’s cybersecurity activities fit in, and coordinate with, the other various roles in energy cybersecurity for electricity, oil and natural gas pipelines. In particular, Congress may examine how OE’s RD&D programs and work with the National Labs in electric power sector cybersecurity supports federal and private sector efforts in pipeline cybersecurity.

Aug 28, 2017

Farm Bill Primer: Title I Commodity Programs

Aug 28, 2017

HUD FY2018 Appropriations: In Brief

Most of the funding for the activities of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) comes from discretionary appropriations provided each year in the annual appropriations acts, typically as a part of the Transportation, HUD, and Related Agencies appropriations bill (THUD). HUD’s programs are designed primarily to address housing problems faced by households with very low incomes or other special housing needs. Three rental assistance programs—Public Housing, Section 8 tenant-based rental assistance (which funds Section 8 Housing Choice Vouchers), and Section 8 project-based rental assistance—account for the majority of the department’s funding (nearly 80% of total HUD appropriations in FY2017). Two flexible block grant programs—HOME and the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program—help communities finance a variety of housing and community development activities designed to serve low- and moderate-income families. Other more specialized grant programs help communities meet the needs of homeless persons, including those living with HIV/AIDS. HUD’s Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insures mortgages made by lenders to homebuyers with low down payments and to developers of multifamily rental buildings containing relatively affordable units. FHA collects fees from insured borrowers, which are used to sustain the insurance fund. Surplus FHA funds have been used to offset the cost of the HUD budget. This In Brief report tracks progress on FY2018 HUD appropriations and provides detailed account-level, and in some cases sub-account-level, funding information and footnotes with additional detail or context. Relevant legislation includes P.L. 115-31, H.R. 3353, S. 1655, and H.R. 3354 (the Make America Secure and Prosperous Appropriations Act, 2018).

Aug 28, 2017

Allowances and Office Staff for Former Presidents, FY2016-FY2018 Appropriations

Introduction The Former Presidents Act (FPA), enacted on August 25, 1958 (3 U.S.C. §102 note), “was designed to maintain the dignity’ of the office of the President by providing former Presidents—and their spouses—a pension and other benefits to help them respond to post-presidency mail and speaking requests, among other informal public duties often required.” (See CRS Report RL34631, Former Presidents: Pensions, Office Allowances, and Other Federal Benefits.) The General Services Administration (GSA) administers the law. Five former Presidents receive pensions and benefits under the FPA: Jimmy Carter, George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama. According to GSA, “In January 2017, the program began funding the pension for President Obama, and after July 21, 2017 ... [began funding] payroll and benefits of his staff, office space, office furnishings, and other related expenses.” Allowances and Office Staff for Former Presidents GSA appropriations are included in annual financial services and general government (FSGG) appropriations acts. Within the GSA appropriations, the Allowances and Office Staff for Former Presidents account covers expenditures for personnel compensation, personnel benefits, pension, travel, office space, communications, printing, other services, supplies and materials, and equipment. Tables 1 through 3, below, show FY2016 enacted, FY2017 enacted, and FY2018 requested appropriations for allowances and office staff for former Presidents, respectively, disaggregated by expenditure categories. Enacted appropriations totaled $3,277,000 (FY2016) and $3,865,000 (FY2017). FY2018 appropriations totaling $4,754,000 were requested. H.R. 3280, FY2018 FSGG Appropriations Act, as reported on July 18, 2017, would provide this amount. In the tables below, the Pension category includes the pension and federal health benefits. According to a GSA legal opinion, President Carter did not have the five years of qualifying federal service needed to receive federal health benefits. President G.H.W. Bush qualifies for, but has chosen not to receive, federal health benefits. Presidents Clinton, G.W. Bush, and Obama receive federal health benefits. Communications include telephone and United Parcel Service/Federal Express charges. Other Services includes security payments to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for lease location, license and support hours for the indefinite quantity (IQ) contract, postage for franked mail, furniture moves, cable installation, and disposal costs. Supplies and Materials includes office supplies and subscriptions. Equipment includes furniture or information technology hardware or software and related installation costs. Personnel Compensation and Benefits for former President Carter are provided by contract support under Other Services. The location and square footage for Office Space are as follows: Jimmy Carter – Atlanta, GA, 7,070; G.H.W. Bush – Houston, TX, 5,379; William J. Clinton – New York, NY, 8,300; G.W. Bush – Dallas, TX, 8,237; and Barack H. Obama – Washington, DC, 8,198. Table 1. Allowances and Office Staff for Former Presidents FY2016 Enacted Appropriation, Dollars in Thousands Allowance Type Jimmy Carter George H. W. Bush William J. Clinton George W. Bush Totals Personnel Compensation $0 $96 $96 $96 $288 Personnel Benefits $0 $65 $119 $90 $274 Pension $207 $207 $221 $217 $852 Travel $0 $72 $0 $8 $80 Office Space $112 $205 $444 $440 $1,201 Communications $15 $57 $13 $64 $155a Printing $7 $8 $17 $14 $46 Other Services $94 $73 $26 $43 $236 Supplies and Materials $2 $13 $7 $35 $57 Equipment $0 $22 $26 $40 $88 Totals $437 $818 $969 $1,047 $3,277 Source: Data provided to CRS by GSA Office of Budget staff by in-person meeting on August 17, 2017. Notes: FY2016 covers October 1, 2015, through September 30, 2016. Mrs. Nancy Reagan died on March 6, 2016. She waived the widow’s pension, but received $6,000 for communications and that amount is included in the overall total for FY2016 communications. Table 2. Allowances and Office Staff for Former Presidents FY2017 Enacted Appropriation, Dollars in Thousands Allowance Type Jimmy Carter George H. W. Bush William J. Clinton George W. Bush Barack H. Obamaa Totals Personnel Compensation $0 $96 $96 $96 $29 $317 Personnel Benefits $0 $82 $98 $98 $38 $316 Pension $210 $210 $226 $220 $161 $1,027 Travel $0 $78 $0 $18 $3 $99 Office Space $113 $254 $511 $472 $84 $1,434 Communications $21 $50 $1 $140 $11 $223 Printing $7 $9 $22 $40 $6 $84 Other Services $91 $67 $44 $14 $20 $236 Supplies and Materials $3 $4 $12 $20 $3 $42 Equipment $0 $18 $35 $20 $15 $88 Totals $444 $868 $1,045 $1,138 $370 $3,865 Source: Data provided to CRS by GSA Office of Budget staff by electronic mail on June 27, 2017, and telephone consultation on June 28, 2017. Notes: FY2017 covers October 1, 2016, through September 30, 2017. According to GSA: “In January 2017, the program began funding the pension for President Obama, and after July 21, 2017, the program [began funding] payroll and benefits of his staff, office space, office furnishings, and other related expenses. FY 2018 will therefore be the first fiscal year that the budget will need to cover a full year of operations for five ... former Presidents.” (U.S. General Services Administration, FY2018 Congressional Justification, May 23, 2017, p. FP-3) From January 21 through July 21, 2017, office, office staff, and related support for President Obama were funded through appropriations for the Presidential Transition Act (see CRS Report RS22979, Presidential Transition Act: Provisions and Funding, by Henry B. Hogue). Table 3. Allowances and Office Staff for Former Presidents FY2018 Budget Request, Dollars in Thousands Allowance Type Jimmy Carter George H. W. Bush William J. Clinton George W. Bush Barack H. Obama Totals Personnel Compensation $0 $96 $96 $96 $150 $438 Personnel Benefits $0 $74 $119 $108 $122 $423 Pension $214 $214 $231 $225 $236 $1,120 Travel $0 $68 $0 $7 $10 $85 Office Space $115 $286 $518 $497 $536 $1,952 Communications $17 $57 $14 $69 $11 $168 Printing $7 $11 $17 $21 $20 $76 Other Services $102 $83 $35 $54 $36 $310 Supplies and Materials $1 $15 $7 $30 $7 $60 Equipment $0 $38 $26 $33 $25 $122 Totals $456 $942 $1,063 $1,140 $1,153 $4,754 Sources: Data provided to CRS by GSA Office of Budget staff by electronic mail on June 27, 2017. U.S. General Services Administration, FY2018 Congressional Justification, May 23, 2017, p. FP-6. Note: FY2018 covers October 1, 2017, through September 30, 2018.

Aug 28, 2017

Orderly Liquidation Authority

Aug 25, 2017

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): FY2018 President’s Budget Request

Aug 25, 2017

Farm Bill Primer: The Marketing Assistance Loan Program

Aug 24, 2017

Small Modular Nuclear Reactors: Status and Issues

Small modular reactors (SMRs) are nuclear reactors that are sized to be suitable for modular construction. SMRs are generally defined as having electric generating capacity of 300 megawatts (MWe) or less, in contrast to existing nuclear power reactors, which typically exceed 1,000 MWe. A wide variety of nuclear technologies could be used in SMRs, in addition to the conventional light water reactor (LWR) technology in existing U.S. commercial nuclear plants. Many SMR designs are still in development stages, and the projected timelines for initial deployment of SMRs generally range from the present to 2030. SMRs could offer several benefits relative to large-scale reactors. SMRs require less initial capital investment and allow for greater flexibility in siting and total power output. According to SMR supporters, deploying multiple SMRs sequentially at a single plant site could create the same generating capacity as a full-scale nuclear plant with less financial risk, because each module could begin producing electricity and revenue as soon as it is completed, rather than having to wait for completion of a single large reactor. Most SMR designs employ passive safety concepts for accident mitigation (relying on gravity, natural convection, and other non-mechanical phenomena), reducing reliance on active safety systems. However, SMRs may also have significant drawbacks. Since SMRs do not have the same economies of scale as larger reactors, they may produce electricity at a higher cost per kilowatt-hour than other energy sources, including existing commercial reactors. The Union of Concerned Scientists raises this point in a 2013 publication critiquing SMRs, which also contends that the inherent safety features of SMR concepts are untested. The lower capital investment required for SMR construction has also been called into question by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, which contends that construction of a modular nuclear plant would require costly early construction of shared facilities, such as a containment structure, intended for use with all planned reactor modules. The potential impact of SMR technologies on weapons proliferation is unclear. Proliferation concerns for reactors center on nuclear fuel—specifically, the requisite level of enrichment of uranium fuel and reprocessing of spent fuel. SMR technologies requiring higher-enriched uranium fuel would pose a greater proliferation risk relative to typical nuclear power reactors, which use uranium enriched to about 5% of the fissile isotope U-235. In contrast, some advanced SMR concepts use 15-20% enriched uranium (see Table 1). The planned treatment of spent fuel for proposed SMR concepts varies, with some developers suggesting that sealed SMR cores could be manufactured, shipped to the site of the power plant, and shipped back to the manufacturer at the end of the core lifetime, still sealed. However, such systems could face technical barriers to safe transportation, and experts disagree on whether sealed cores would decrease the proliferation risk, since they would require relatively high enrichment levels. To date, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) identifies 40 small and medium-sized reactor designs under development. SMR concepts using coolants other than light (ordinary) water are less technically understood than water-cooled concepts, and will require further research before commercialization. Table 1 summarizes SMR development status. Table 1. SMR Technologies Water-Cooled High Temperature Gas-Cooled Liquid-Metal Cooled Fast Neutron Molten-Salt Cooled Coolant Light water Helium Sodium, lead-bismuth, or lead Fluoride salt coolant Moderator Light water or heavy water Graphite No moderator Graphite Fuel Less than 5% enriched uranium Up to 20% enriched uranium, in fuel pebbles 15-20% enriched uranium Thorium or low-enriched uranium fuel salt, potentially dissolved into coolant Sample projects CNP-300, China PHWR-220, India KLT-40S, Russia HTR-PM, China SVBR-100, Russia IMSR, Canada Deployment status (nearest-term projects) Operational (China, Pakistan, India) Under construction (China) Under construction (Russia) In design certification, projected deployment in early 2020s (Canada) Source: International Atomic Energy Agency, World Nuclear Association, Ux Consulting. Notes: In reactors, a moderator is a substance that slows down neutrons, which increases the chance that a given neutron will cause fission in a fuel atom. In recent years, U.S. interest in SMR development has increased. The Department of Energy (DOE) began the SMR Licensing Technical Support (LTS) program in 2012 to accelerate deployment of near-term SMR projects. DOE also has provided some funding for non-LWR SMR concepts through the Office of Advanced Reactor Technologies. The LTS program is scheduled to conclude in 2017. The first grant awarded under DOE’s LTS program was a 50-50 cost-share to Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) in November 2012, to support the development of the 180 MWe mPower design. However, B&W shelved the project in April 2014 due to lack of investors, and DOE stopped sending funds in November 2014. The mPower project was terminated in March 2017. In March 2013, DOE granted another award through its LTS program to NuScale Power to support development of its 45 MWe design. DOE allocated up to $217 million over five years in a 50-50 cost-share. NuScale projects that a demonstration of its SMR will be operational at Idaho National Laboratory by 2024. In March 2012, DOE signed agreements with three companies to allow construction of demonstration small reactors at the Savannah River Site (SRS) facility using private-sector funding. However, interest in the proposed SRS demonstrations reportedly has waned in recent years. In 2016, a group of U.S. SMR developers and potential customers formed the SMR Start consortium to advocate for increased government support for commercialization of SMR designs. SMR Start calls for the DOE’s LTS program to be extended to 2025 with increased funding. Continued SMR development would be supported by several bills currently pending in the 115th Congress. The Advanced Nuclear Energy Technologies Act (S. 1457, Sec. 640) specifically names reactors “of modular size” as a type of advanced nuclear reactor requiring further research and development. Additionally, Section 106 of the Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act (S. 512) would require the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to report on emergency planning zones for SMRs. The nuclear provisions in the Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017 (S. 1460) are similar to those of S. 1457. This CRS Insight was originally prepared by research associate Luisa Kenausis.

Aug 24, 2017

The Electoral College: Reform Proposals in the 114th and 115th Congress

American voters elect the President and Vice President of the United States indirectly, through presidential electors chosen by voters in the states—the electoral college. For further information see CRS Report RL32611, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections. Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, as revised by the 12th Amendment in 1804, requires winning candidates for President and Vice President to gain a majority of electoral votes. Since 1804, Presidents who won a majority of electoral votes and at least a plurality of popular votes were elected in 49 of 54 presidential elections. In four elections, however—1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016—candidates were elected with a majority of electoral votes, but fewer popular votes than their principal opponents. In the presidential election of 1824, none of the four major candidates won a majority of electoral votes (or popular votes); the President, therefore, was chosen by contingent election in the House of Representatives. For information on contingent election, see CRS Report R40504, Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis. The election of Presidents who won a majority of electoral votes but fewer popular votes than their opponents is sometimes referred to, particularly by reform advocates, as an “electoral college misfire.” This is possible because the Constitution requires a majority of electoral votes to elect the President, but it does not require a majority or plurality of popular votes to be elected. Critics of the electoral college have called for its reform or abolition since the earliest days of government under the Constitution. Proponents of reform, especially of direct popular election, claim the built-in potential for so-called misfires is undemocratic and cite it as a principal argument for change. For additional information on electoral college reform, see CRS Report R43824, Electoral College Reform: Contemporary Issues for Congress. Although reform of the electoral college by constitutional amendment was proposed in Congress through the 1960s, the focus later turned to amendments that would replace it with direct popular election, which proponents claim would ensure that future Presidents received a popular vote majority or plurality. Reform or replacement proposals were once familiar items on the congressional agenda; for instance, 26 amendments were introduced to abolish or reform the electoral college in the 96th Congress (1979-1980). In recent years, however, the number of related constitutional amendments introduced in the House or Senate dropped from an average of eight per Congress for the 101st through 110th Congresses, to none in the 113th Congress (2013-2014). Moreover, none of the measures introduced received consideration beyond committee referral. Following the 2016 election, however, four constitutional amendments introduced late in the 114th Congress proposed eliminating the electoral college and replacing it with direct election. To date in the 115th Congress, two amendments to establish direct popular election have been introduced: H.J.Res. 19, offered on January 5, 2017, by Representative Steve Cohen, would replace the electoral college with direct popular election of the President and Vice President by plurality vote. It would also authorize Congress to set voter qualifications, times, places, and manner of holding presidential elections, and other election-related policies. H.J.Res. 65, the “Every Vote Counts Amendment,” introduced by Representative Gene Green on February 7, 2017, provides for direct popular election by plurality, and also provides Congress with additional authority over related activities. Both resolutions have been referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary and to its Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice. This report provides an analysis of these measures in the 115th Congress.

Aug 24, 2017

The National Park Service’s Maintenance Backlog: Frequently Asked Questions

This report addresses frequently asked questions about the National Park Service’s (NPS’s) backlog of deferred maintenance—maintenance that was not performed as scheduled or as needed and was put off to a future time. NPS’s deferred maintenance, also known as the maintenance backlog, was estimated for FY2016 at $11.332 billion. More than half of the NPS backlog is in transportation-related assets. Other federal land management agencies also have maintenance backlogs, but NPS’s is the largest and has drawn the most congressional attention. During the past decade (FY2007-FY2016), NPS’s maintenance backlog grew steadily before decreasing in FY2016. Overall, the deferred maintenance estimate grew by an estimated $1.718 billion in nominal dollars and $0.021 billion in inflation-adjusted dollars over the decade. Many factors might contribute to growth or reduction in deferred maintenance, including the aging of NPS assets, the availability of funding for NPS maintenance activities, acquisitions of new assets, agency management of the backlog, completion of individual projects, changes in construction and related costs, and changes in measurement and reporting methodologies. The backlog is distributed unevenly among states and territories, with California, the District of Columbia, and New York having the largest amounts of deferred maintenance. The amounts also vary among individual park units. Sources of funding to address NPS deferred maintenance include discretionary appropriations, allocations from the Department of Transportation, park entrance and concessions fees, donations, and others. It is not possible to determine the total amount of funding from these sources that NPS has allocated each year to address deferred maintenance, because NPS does not aggregate these amounts in its budget reporting. NPS prioritizes its deferred maintenance projects based on the condition of assets and their importance to the parks’ mission, as well as other criteria related to financial sustainability, resource protection, visitor use, and health and safety. NPS has taken a number of steps over the decade to improve its asset management systems and strategies. Some observers, including the Government Accountability Office (GAO), have recommended further improvements. Some Members of Congress and other stakeholders have proposed new sources of funding to address NPS’s deferred maintenance needs. Bills in the 115th Congress to increase NPS funding for deferred maintenance—including H.R. 2584, H.R. 2863, S. 751, and S. 1460—would draw from mineral revenues currently going to the Treasury. Other proposed funding sources have included monies from the Land and Water Conservation Fund, income tax overpayments and contributions, new motorfuel taxes, and coin and postage stamp sales. Other stakeholders have suggested that NPS deferred maintenance could be reduced without additional funding—for example, by improving the agency’s capital investment strategies or increasing the role of nonfederal partners in park management. H.R. 1577 would require the Secretary of the Interior to evaluate NPS’s Capital Investment Strategy and report on any recommended changes.

Aug 23, 2017

Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions (“Tax Extenders”): In Brief

Thirty-four temporary tax provisions expired at the end of 2016. Four of these provisions are individual income tax provisions. In the past, Congress has regularly acted to extend expired or expiring temporary tax provisions. Collectively, these temporary tax provisions are often referred to as “tax extenders.” Most recently, in December 2015, Congress addressed tax extenders in the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). Three of the four individual income tax provisions that expired at the end of 2016 were extended in the PATH Act. The provisions that were extended in the PATH Act were extended for two years, retroactive for 2015 and through 2016. These include the: Tax Exclusion for Canceled Mortgage Debt; Mortgage Insurance Premium Deductibility; and Above-the-Line Deduction for Qualified Tuition and Related Expenses. Brief background information on these provisions is provided in this report. The other individual income tax provision that expired at the end of 2016, expired for the first time in that year, and thus has not been a part of previous tax extender legislation. This is the: Medical Expense Deduction Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) Floor of 7.5% for Individuals Age 65 and Over. Options related to expired tax provisions in the 115th Congress include (1) extending all or some of the provisions that expired at the end of 2016 or (2) allowing expired provisions to remain expired. If temporary tax provisions that expired at the end of 2016 are extended, retroactive extensions may be considered so that tax incentives and provisions are available in 2017. In the past, retroactive extensions have been common for expired temporary tax provisions. This report provides background information on individual income tax provisions that expired in 2016. For information on other tax provisions that expired at the end of 2016, see CRS Report R44677, Tax Provisions that Expired in 2016 (“Tax Extenders”), by Molly F. Sherlock.

Aug 23, 2017

Justice Department’s Role in Cyber Incident Response

Criminals and other malicious actors increasingly rely on the Internet and rapidly evolving technology to further their operations. In cyberspace, criminals can compromise financial assets, hacktivists can flood websites with traffic—effectively shutting them down, and spies can steal intellectual property and government secrets. When such cyber incidents occur, a number of questions arise, including how the federal government will react and which agencies will respond. The Obama Administration, through Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-41, outlined how the government responds to significant cyber incidents. Responding to cyber incidents involves (1) threat response, (2) asset response, and (3) intelligence support. The Department of Justice (DOJ), through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, or the bureau) and National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF), is the designated lead on threat response, which involves investigating and attributing specific cyber activities to particular individuals or entities as well as facilitating intelligence and information sharing. In investigating cyber incidents, the FBI’s Cyber Division focuses on “high-level intrusions by state-sponsored hackers and global cyber syndicates, and the most prolific botnets.” In addition to conducting its own cyber investigations, the FBI leads the NCIJTF, a multiagency hub for coordinating, integrating, and sharing information on cyber threat investigations; heads up other task forces and law enforcement partnerships focused on cyber threat response, including cyber task forces with subject matter experts at each field office, cyber action teams that can rapidly deploy in response to specific incidents, and cyber assistant legal attachés positioned in certain foreign countries to work with U.S. counterparts; has established several initiatives to interface with the private sector regarding cyber incidents; these resources (such as the Internet Crime Complaint Center, IfraGard program, and National Cyber-Forensics and Training Alliance) collect and share information, build partnerships, and enhance cyber threat awareness; has been working to recruit and retain an appropriate cyber workforce and has developed a multilayered cyber training program for its agents; and has been discussing with the technology community and policymakers how evolving technology, such as encrypted communications and devices, affects investigations, particularly in cyber-related cases, and how law enforcement can develop tools to investigate these cases most effectively. Relating to the FBI’s work in combating and responding to cyber threats, one question policymakers may have is how the bureau prioritizes cyber threats. DOJ’s Inspector General, while noting strides in this arena, has recommended that (1) the FBI should use a more data-driven, objective methodology to identify and prioritize cyber threats, and (2) the FBI should develop a means to track agent time spent on specific cyber threats. Policymakers may elect to conduct oversight of the FBI’s efforts in these areas, examine whether any changes to cyber threat prioritization affect where cyber threats rank within the broader universe of threats confronting the nation, and debate whether or how to direct the FBI’s use of funds allocated to combating cyber threats.

Aug 23, 2017

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations: FY2018

This report provides an overview and analysis of FY2018 appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The primary focus of this report is on Congressional direction and funding provided to DHS through the appropriations process, though note is also made of funding made available to DHS outside this process (e.g., user fees and trust funds). It includes an Appendix with definitions of key budget terms used throughout the suite of Congressional Research Service reports on homeland security appropriations. It also directs the reader to other reports providing context for and additional details regarding specific component appropriations and issues engaged through the FY2018 appropriations process. The Trump Administration requested $44.00 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for DHS for FY2018, as part of an overall budget that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimated to be $70.7 billion (including fees, trust funds, and other funding that is not annually appropriated or does not score against discretionary budget limits set by the Budget Control Act (BCA; P.L. 112-25)). The request amounted to a $1.59 billion (3.8%) increase from the $42.41 billion in annual and supplemental appropriations enacted for FY2017 through the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 115-31, Division F). The Administration also requested discretionary funding for DHS components that does not count against discretionary spending limits and is not reflected in the above totals. The Administration requested an additional $6.79 billion for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in disaster relief funding, as defined by the BCA, and in the budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), a transfer of $162 million in Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terror designated funding (OCO). On July 21, 2017, the House Committee on Appropriations reported out H.R. 3355, the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2018, accompanied by H.Rept. 115-239. Committee-reported H.R. 3355 included $44.33 billion in adjusted net discretionary budget authority for FY2018. This was $327 million (0.7%) above the level requested by the Administration, and $1.92 billion (4.5%) above the enacted level for FY2017. The House committee-reported bill included the Administration-requested levels for disaster relief funding—and the House Appropriations Committee chose to provide the Coast Guard OCO funding as a transfer as requested, through H.R. 3219, the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2018. This report will be updated throughout the FY2018 appropriations process.

Aug 22, 2017

FY2018 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues

Military personnel issues typically generate significant interest from many Members of Congress and their staffs. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) has selected a number of the military personnel issues considered in deliberations on H.R. 2810 as passed by the House, on July 14, 2017, and S. 1519 as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee. This report provides a brief synopsis of sections in each bill that pertain to selected personnel policies. These include issues such as military end-strengths, pay and benefits, and other major policy issues. This report focuses exclusively on the annual national defense authorization act (NDAA) legislative process. It does not include language concerning appropriations, or tax implications of policy choices, topics that are addressed in other CRS products. Issues that have been discussed in the previous year’s defense personnel reports are designated with an asterisk in the relevant section titles of this report.

Aug 22, 2017

Comparing DHS Component Funding, FY2018: In Brief

Generally, the homeland security appropriations bill includes all annual appropriations for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), providing resources to every departmental component. Table 1 and Figure 1 show DHS’s new discretionary budget authority enacted for FY2017 and requested by the Administration for FY2018, as well as the House committee-reported response, broken down by component—from largest to smallest appropriations request. (TO BE SUPPRESSED) Department of Homeland Security DHS budget Appropriations FY2017, FY2018 funding analysis H.R. 3355 H.Rept. 115-239 components

Aug 21, 2017

Reinsurance in Health Insurance

Aug 18, 2017