Pryor v. Brignole

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for breach of a contractual nondis- paragement clause in connection with anonymous letters detailing criminal charges that had been brought against the plaintiff that the defendant B allegedly sent to various news outlets. The trial court denied the defendants' special motions to dismiss, filed pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52- 196a), and the defendants separately appealed. This court dismissed the appeals for lack of a final judgment. On the granting of certification, the defendants appealed to our Supreme Court, which held that the trial court's denials of the special motions to dismiss constituted appealable final judg- ments, and it reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the case to this court for further proceedings. Held: This court established a bright-line rule that clarified that a moving party, to satisfy its burden under the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3), must demon- strate that the allegations of the complaint, counterclaim or cross claim in question are predicated on conduct that implicates its right to free speech, its right to petition the government, or its right of association in connection with a matter of public concern, and the focus of that inquiry should be on the substance of those allegations as set forth in the pleadings and not on an admission or denial of those allegations by the moving party. The trial court improperly construed the first prong of § 52-196a (e) (3) to require a moving party to admit to engaging in the conduct alleged in the operative complaint and, thus, the court improperly denied the special motions to dismiss filed by the defendants on that basis. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court properly dismissed the defendants' special motions to dismiss on the basis that the conduct alleged in his complaint, which referenced the plaintiff's criminal charges, did not involve a matter of public concern. The plaintiff could not prevail on his