CRS Reports

Universal Service Fund: Background and Options for Reform

Apr 25, 2007

Senate Committee Hearings: The “Minority Witness Rule”

This report discusses the "minority witness rule." When a Senate committee, other than the Appropriations Committee, holds a hearing, the minority party members of the panel have the right to call witnesses of their choosing to testify during at least one day of that hearing.

Apr 24, 2007

Immigration of Foreign Workers: Labor Market Tests and Protections

Apr 24, 2007

Vulnerable Youth: Background and Policies

Apr 24, 2007

Unauthorized Employment in the United States: Issues and Options

As Congress considers immigration reform and ways to address the unauthorized alien population, the issue of unauthorized employment is the focus of much discussion. This report discusses options for addressing unauthorized employment in the United States.

Apr 20, 2007

Nicaragua: The Election of Daniel Ortega and Issues in U.S. Relations

Sandinista leader and former President Daniel Ortega was inaugurated to a five-year term as President on January 10, 2007. Three elements were key to Ortega’s victory in the November 2006 presidential election: a change in Nicaraguan electoral law, an effective political machine, and a divided opposition. Ortega won only 37.9% of the vote, but was able to avoid a run-off vote because he was ahead of the next closest candidate, Eduardo Montealegre of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN), by more than the 5% required by law. Montealegre, who gained 28.3% of the vote, was regarded by many as the U.S.-favored candidate. His second place position garnered him a seat in the legislature. The Liberal Constitutional party (PLC) then came in third place with 26.2% for candidate José Rizo, an ally of the corrupt former President, Arnoldo Alemán. Critics accused both U.S. officials and Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez of trying to influence the election’s outcome. Ortega was a leader of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) when it overthrew the Somoza family dictatorship in 1979. When the pro-Soviet Sandinistas gained control of the government the United States backed opposition “contras” who launched an eight-year war (1982-1990) against the government. Ortega’s government agreed to democratic elections in February 1990, which he lost. Since 1990 Nicaragua has developed democratic institutions and a framework for economic development. Nonetheless, significant challenges remain: Nicaragua is still very poor, the second poorest nation in the western hemisphere. Its institutions are weak and widely viewed as corrupt. In his first three months in office, Ortega has continued to vacillate between anti-U.S. rhetoric and pragmatic reassurances that his second administration will respect private property and pursue free-trade policies, as he did during his campaign. Ortega and U.S. officials have indicated that both sides are seeking a cooperative relationship, however. There is debate among some Members and the Administration over what the appropriate level and focus of U.S. aid to Nicaragua should be. The Administration says its top priority in Nicaragua is consolidating democratic processes, including reforming the judicial system, implementing good governance, and combating corruption. Another issue is promoting development and poverty reduction; the Millennium Challenge Account compact between the two countries focuses on reducing rural poverty through road-building, increased wages, and strengthening property rights. Supporting the U.S.-Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) is the dominant trade issue; President Ortega has said he will honor the agreement. Resolution of property claims by U.S. citizens and immigration are contentious areas in U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. Other issues in U.S.-Nicaraguan relations include improving respect for human rights, improving civilian control over defense policy, the state of Nicaraguan missiles, and increasing Nicaragua’s capacity to combat transnational crimes such as narcotics trafficking. This report will not be updated.

Apr 19, 2007

Economics of Federal Reserve Independence

The Federal Reserve System (Fed) is charged with responsibility for making U.S. monetary policy. Quasi-public in structure, overseen by a Board of Governors whose members are appointed to serve long terms, and reliant on its own source of funding, the Fed possesses a degree of independence that some argue is inimical to the spirit of democracy. Although this argument (and refutations of it) may be political or constitutional in nature, it is also rooted in certain notions about macroeconomic policy. The power that the Fed wields is substantial. Along with fiscal policy, monetary policy is one of two kinds of policy that can be employed to influence aggregate demand. In the short run, both monetary and fiscal policy have the power to raise or lower employment. But they have opposite short-run effects on interest rates (expansionary monetary policy lowers interest rates and expansionary fiscal policy raises them), so that in concert they can achieve results that neither can in isolation. The long-run effects of the two policies are quite different from their short-run effects. Fiscal policy helps determine interest rates in the long run, but not the rate of inflation. Monetary policy largely determines the inflation rate, but cannot be used to fix interest rates in the long run. Policies based on the assumption that monetary policy can fix interest rates ultimately generate accelerating inflation or deflation. Monetary policy affects inflation only after it affects employment. A policy structure that responds quickly to the immediate concerns of the public is thus more likely to generate inflation than one that allows policymakers to more easily weather bad times. A very responsive policy structure not only increases the likelihood of high inflation. It also tends to produce more business cycles if policy directed at reducing inflation is aborted before it is complete, only to be reintroduced again later when the renewed expansion makes inflation worse. On-again, off-again policies erode the credibility of the monetary authorities and make anti-inflation policy all the more costly and lengthy when it is undertaken in earnest. Reducing the independence of the Fed either means reducing the ability to engage in discretionary policy or shifting economic power to the executive branch. This is an important consideration given the difficulty in calibrating policy. Because the legislative branch is not in a position to exercise day-to-day control of monetary policy, if it wishes to reduce the Fed’s discretionary powers, it must choose between establishing policy rules to which the Fed must adhere or allowing the executive to administer policy. Economists who oppose rules fear that they would be too rigid to deliver economic stability in a highly complex economy. Better coordination of monetary and fiscal policy is a double-edged sword. If “good” policy is pursued, it will be all that much better if simultaneously pursued with both tools. But if “bad” policy is pursued, using both tools to pursue it will make the result that much worse. Thus, the choice boils down to whether the policy structure should be one that maximizes the benefits that come from policy when it is well chosen or minimizing the costs that occur when policy is ill-advised. This report does not track legislation and will be update as events warrant.

Apr 17, 2007

Nigeria: Current Issues

Apr 12, 2007

Arab League Boycott of Israel

This report briefly discusses the Arab League's boycott of Israeli companies and Israeli-made goods since Israel's founding in 1948, as well as U.S. efforts to end the boycott and prevent U.S. firms in participating in the boycott.

Apr 12, 2007

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as Amended by the No Child Left Behind Act: A Primer

Apr 12, 2007

What’s the Difference? — Comparing U.S. and Chinese Trade Data

Apr 10, 2007

Statutes of Limitation in Federal Criminal Cases: A Sketch

Apr 9, 2007

Statutes of Limitation in Federal Criminal Cases: An Overview

Apr 9, 2007

Congressional Commissions, Committees, Boards, and Groups: Appointment Authority and Membership

Apr 4, 2007

House Committee Hearings: The ”Minority Witness Rule”

Apr 4, 2007

State and Local Economic Sanctions: Constitutional Issues

Apr 2, 2007

Juvenile Justice: Legislative History and Current Legislative Issues

Apr 2, 2007

Trade Primer: Qs and As on Trade Concepts, Performance, and Policy

Mar 27, 2007

Polar Bears: Proposed Listing Under the Endangered Species Act

Mar 27, 2007

The Rise of Senate Unanimous Consent Agreements

Mar 26, 2007

Field Hearings: Fact Sheet on Purposes, Rules, Regulations, and Guidelines

Mar 23, 2007

Medicaid Citizenship Documentation

Mar 22, 2007

The Corporation for National and Community Service: Overview of Programs and FY2008 Funding

Mar 19, 2007

The Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA): Background and Issues for PDUFA IV Reauthorization

Mar 13, 2007

Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United States: Estimates Since 1986

Feb 28, 2007

Tracking Current Federal Legislation and Regulations: A Guide to Resources

Feb 28, 2007

Common Questions About Postage and Stamps

Feb 23, 2007

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Exemptions to the Prohibition on Circumvention

Feb 21, 2007

Statutory Qualifications for Executive Branch Positions

Feb 20, 2007

North Korean Crime-for-Profit Activities

Feb 16, 2007

Older Americans Act: FY2006 Funding, FY2007 Proposals, and FY2008 Budget Request

Feb 15, 2007

Title X Family Planning Program

Feb 9, 2007

Office of Legislative Counsel: Senate

Feb 8, 2007

Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR): New Directions in the 110th Congress

Feb 8, 2007

Mootness: An Explanation of the Justiciability Doctrine

A case pending before a federal court may at some point in the litigation process lose an element of justiciability and become “moot.” Mootness may occur when a controversy initially existing at the time the lawsuit was filed is no longer “live” due to a change in the law or in the status of the parties involved, or due to an act of one of the parties that dissolves the dispute. When a federal court deems a case to be moot, the court no longer has the power to entertain the legal claims and must dismiss the complaint. However, the U.S. Supreme Court over time has developed several exceptions to the mootness doctrine. This report provides a general overview of the doctrine of “mootness,” as the principle is understood and used by federal courts to decide whether to dismiss certain actions for lack of jurisdiction.

Feb 7, 2007

The Federal Food Safety System: A Primer

Numerous federal, state, and local agencies share responsibilities for regulating the safety of the U.S. food supply, which many experts say is among the safest in the world. Nevertheless, critics view this system as lacking the organization and resources to adequately combat foodborne illness, which sickens an estimated 76 million people and kills an estimated 5,000 each year in this country. The 110th Congress may face calls for a review of federal food safety agencies and authorities, and proposals for reorganizing them. Among the issues likely to arise are whether reform can improve oversight, and the cost to industry, consumers, and taxpayers. This report provides a brief introduction to the system and the debate on whether reorganization is needed.

Feb 7, 2007

Tariff Modifications: Miscellaneous Duty Suspension Bills

Feb 5, 2007

Earthquakes: Risk, Monitoring, Notification, and Research

Feb 2, 2007

The Department of Homeland Security’s Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress

As early as his Senate confirmation hearing, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Michael Chertoff advocated a risk-based approach to homeland security. Secretary Chertoff has stated “DHS must base its work on priorities driven by risk” and, increasingly, risk assessment and subsequent risk mitigation have influenced all of the department’s efforts intended to enhance our nation’s ability to prevent, respond to, and recover from future terrorist attacks and natural disasters. While the practice of risk analysis may be advanced in the insurance and financial industries, it is relatively less developed in the homeland security field. Although there are numerous reasons that account for this dynamic, two primary reasons include (1) the dynamic nature of terrorism and ability of terrorists to adapt to successful countermeasures, and (2) the lack of a rich historical database of terrorist attacks, which necessitates a reliance on intelligence and terrorist experts for probabilistic assessments of types of terrorist attacks against critical assets and/or regions. This report begins with an overview of the evolution of risk assessment methodologies from the Department of Justice in FY2002 to DHS in FY2007, and then discusses the discipline of risk management and risk assessment as applied to Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP). Terrorism risk analysis and assessment do not exist in a vacuum. Risk is analyzed and assessed as a means to mitigate or “buy down” risk over time by developing certain capabilities across the country. At DHS, the State Homeland Security Grant Program is the primary tool the agency has to influence the behavior of State and local partners to take actions that reduce what both parties agree are the risks of a terrorist attack and to respond effectively to such an attack, or other catastrophe. Regardless of the complexity of the risk assessment methodology, due to the inherent uncertainties associated with assessing risk in a dynamic counterterrorism context, some level of flexibility in managing risk may be necessary. Empirical data on historical terrorist attacks in the United States may, therefore, continue to play an important role in resource allocation to reduce risk. This report presents several risk assessment and related grant program options for congressional consideration: (1) maintain the status quo in the inextricably linked areas of risk assessment and grant allocation, (2) draft a national impact assessment to understand return on investment of the approximately $12 billion of HSGP spent by FY2008, (3) enhance the transparency of the risk allocation methodology to state and local governments, and (4) develop a comprehensive and long-term strategy for managing, assessing and mitigating risk. To achieve these goals, the department could opt to consider procedural or organizational changes. Possible approaches are discussed in the report’s final section. This report may be updated.

Feb 2, 2007

Tax Benefits for Families: Adoption

Feb 1, 2007

Unauthorized Alien Students: Issues and “DREAM Act” Legislation

Jan 30, 2007

Arms Control and Nonproliferation: A Catalog of Treaties and Agreements

Jan 29, 2007

Speakers of the House: Elections, 1913-2007

Jan 29, 2007

Foreign Investor Visas: Policies and Issues

Jan 29, 2007

Genetic Testing: Scientific Background for Policymakers

Jan 26, 2007

Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has helped 3.69 million Afghan refugees return to Afghanistan since March 2002, marking the largest assisted return operation in its history. In addition, more than 1.11 million refugees have returned to Afghanistan without availing themselves of UNHCR’s assistance, bringing the total number of returnees to at least 4.8 million. Despite the massive returns, possibly 3.5 million registered and unregistered Afghans still remain in these two countries of asylum—up to 2.46 million in Pakistan and more than 900,000 in Iran—making Afghans the second-largest refugee population in the world. These numbers are far greater than the initial working assumption in 2002 of 3.5 million refugees; in fact, the total is believed to be more than 8 million. The United States spent approximately $332.37 million between FY 2002 and FY 2005 on humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees and returnees through the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM). It continues to provide support to refugees and returnees. The 110th Congress faces several relevant challenges. The safe and voluntary return of refugees to Afghanistan is not only a major part of the U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, but also an important indicator of its success. To the extent that refugees continue to return, it can be seen that Afghans are taking part in the future of their country. It is becoming more difficult, however, to encourage refugees to return. Those who were most capable of returning did so in the early years; those who remain have progressively less to return to—houses, livelihoods, family—in Afghanistan. Furthermore, maintaining the high pace of returns will require greater levels of reintegration assistance to anchor returnees in their homes and help them reestablish their lives in Afghanistan. Security will also be a major factor in population displacement within and across borders. The status of Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran has also been somewhat controversial in recent years as these governments want all Afghan refugees to return to Afghanistan. Officials in Pakistan have become concerned that the concentrations of Afghans in the country pose a security and crime risk, as individuals and goods are smuggled across the border. At the same time, however, many observers argue that Afghan labor migration may be beneficial to both Iran and Pakistan—which take advantage of cheap and effective immigrant labor—as well as Afghanistan, whose citizens benefit heavily from remittances sent in from abroad. To cut off this source of income for many poor Afghans could have disastrous consequences—not only humanitarian, but in the security sphere as well, as more than a million Afghans along the Afghan-Pakistan border are deprived of livelihoods and resort to other means to feed their families. Reportedly, many Afghans cross the border regularly, without documentation, and Islamabad does not appear to have the resources to control this flow. A future challenge will thus be to balance reasonable concerns about security with the importance of Afghanistan’s labor plans in the regional economies and the forces that drive its migration patterns. It remains to be seen what effect the Pakistani government’s recently announced plans for controlling and securing the Afghan border, through the construction of fences and planting of landmines, will have on refugee movements. This report will be updated.

Jan 26, 2007

U.S. Immigration Policy on Temporary Admissions

Jan 25, 2007

“State Representation” in Appointments to Federal Courts of Appeals

Jan 24, 2007

Domestic Food Assistance: Legislative Issues in the 110th Congress

Jan 24, 2007

The Constitutionality of Awarding the Delegate for the District of Columbia a Vote in the House of Representatives or the Committee of the Whole

Jan 24, 2007