CRS Reports

The Appointment Process for U.S. Circuit and District Court Nominations: An Overview

In recent decades, the process for appointing judges to the U.S. circuit courts of appeals and the U.S. district courts has been of continuing Senate interest. The responsibility for making these appointments is shared by the President and the Senate. Pursuant to the Constitution’s Appointments Clause, the President nominates persons to fill federal judgeships, with the appointment of each nominee also requiring Senate confirmation. Although not mentioned in the Constitution, an important role is also played midway in the appointment process by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Presidential Selection of Nominees The need for a President to make a circuit or district court nomination typically arises when a judgeship becomes or soon will become vacant. With almost no formal restrictions on whom the President may consider, an informal requirement is that judicial candidates are expected to meet a high standard of professional qualification. By custom, candidates whom the President considers for district judgeships are typically identified by home state Senators if the latter are of the President’s party, with such Senators, however, generally exerting less influence over the selection of circuit nominees. Another customary expectation is that the Administration, before the President selects a nominee, will consult both home state Senators, regardless of their party, to determine the acceptability to them of the candidate under consideration. In recent Administrations, the pre-nomination evaluation of judicial candidates has been performed jointly by staff in the White House Counsel’s Office and the Department of Justice. Candidate finalists also undergo a confidential background investigation by the FBI and an independent evaluation by a committee of the American Bar Association. The selection process is completed when the President, approving of a candidate, signs a nomination message, which is then sent to the Senate. Consideration by Senate Judiciary Committee Once received by the Senate, the judicial nomination is referred to the Judiciary Committee, where professional staff initiate their own investigation into the nominee’s background and qualifications. Also, during this pre-hearing phase, the committee, through its “blue slip” procedure, seeks the assessment of home state Senators regarding whether they approve having the committee consider and take action on the nominee. Next in the process is the confirmation hearing, where judicial nominees engage in a question and answer session with members of the Judiciary Committee. Questions from Senators may focus, among other things, on a nominee’s qualifications, understanding of how to interpret the law, previous experiences, and the role of judges. The committee, when it ultimately votes on a nomination, has three reporting options—to report favorably, unfavorably, or without recommendation. Only on rare occasions has the committee voted to reject a judicial nomination or to report it other than favorably. Senate Floor Consideration Customarily, most circuit or district court nominations have reached confirmation under the terms of unanimous consent agreements. On this procedural track, the Senate by unanimous consent not only takes up nominations for floor consideration, but also arranges for them to either receive up-or-down confirmation votes or be confirmed simply by unanimous consent. If a roll call vote is asked for, a simple majority of Senators voting, with a minimal quorum of 51 being present, is required to approve a nomination. For a minority of judicial nominations, however, particularly those facing strong opposition, the procedural track, for moving forward without unanimous consent, customarily has involved the Senate voting on cloture motions to bring floor debate on them to a close. On November 21, 2013, the Senate, by a 52-48 vote, reinterpreted its rules to lower the number of votes needed to close debate on most nominations from three-fifths of the Senate to a simple majority of those voting. Since then, the cloture motion has become the invariable procedural tool used to reach confirmation votes for circuit and district court nominations. Nominations Not Confirmed Judicial nominations sometimes fail to be confirmed. This occurs most often when, upon a Senate adjournment or recess of more than 30 days, nominations then in committee or on the Senate’s Executive Calendar are returned to the President.

Oct 22, 2014

Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2015 Appropriations

This report discusses various policy aspects of the Agriculture appropriations bill for FY2015, which funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), except for the Forest Service.

Oct 22, 2014

House and Senate Floor and Committee Action to Reauthorize the Elementary and Secondary Education Act: 1966 to Present

The report provides vote information on comprehensive Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) reauthorization bills that have been considered in the committees of jurisdiction or on the House or Senate floors since the enactment of No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).

Oct 22, 2014

The Farm Safety Net: In Brief

This report discusses the several programs operated by The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) that supplement the income of farmers and ranchers in times of low farm prices and natural disasters. The programs are collectively called the farm safety net.

Oct 21, 2014

A New Authorization for Use of Military Force Against the Islamic State: Comparison of Current Proposals in Brief

This report discusses the President's constitutional authority to use military force against the armed offensive of the Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIL or ISIS) in northern and western Iraq and northeastern Syria. It also covers current proposals for action under congressional authorizations for use of military force (AUMFs).

Oct 21, 2014

History of the Clery Act: Fact Sheet

This report summarizes legislative changes that have been made to the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (Clery Act, 20 U.S.C. 1092) since it was originally enacted as Title II of the Student Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-542).

Oct 20, 2014

Selected Recently Expired Individual Tax Provisions ("Extenders"): In Brief

This report briefly summarizes and discusses items categorized as individual tax provisions. These and other temporary tax provisions that are regularly extended for one or two years are often referred to as "tax extenders."

Oct 17, 2014

Recently Expired Charitable Tax Provisions ("Tax Extenders"): In Brief

This report discusses the four charitable tax provisions are discussed in this report: the enhanced charitable deduction for contributions of food inventory; tax-free distributions from individual retirement accounts for charitable purposes; basis adjustment to stock of S corporations making charitable contributions of property; and special rules for contributions of capital gain real property for conservation purposes.

Oct 17, 2014

Child Welfare and Child Support: The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (P.L. 113-183)

The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act (H.R. 4980), an omnibus bill that includes both child welfare and child support provisions, was signed into law on September 29, 2014, as P.L. 113-183. The bill received broad congressional support, passing the House by voice vote (under suspension of the rules) on July 23, 2014, and the Senate by unanimous consent on September 18, 2014. P.L. 113-183 amends the federal foster care program to require state child welfare agencies to develop and implement procedures for identifying, documenting in agency records, and determining appropriate services for certain children or youth who are victims of sex trafficking, or at risk of victimization. State child welfare agencies must also report to law enforcement and the U.S Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which administers child welfare programs, about such victims. In addition, HHS must establish a national advisory committee on child sex trafficking that must, among other responsibilities, develop policies on improving the nation’s response to domestic sex trafficking. P.L. 113-183 also includes provisions to direct child welfare agencies to develop protocols on locating children missing from care. The law also seeks to ensure children in foster care have the opportunity to participate in activities that are appropriate to their age and stage of development. It requires changes in state foster home licensing law to enable foster caregivers to apply a “reasonable and prudent parenting” standard when determining whether a child in foster care may participate in activities; and directs state child welfare agencies to provide training to caregivers on using this standard. Other provisions in the law seek to ensure permanent adult connections for older children and better aid their transition to successful adulthood. Under the new law, states are not permitted to assign a permanency plan of “another planned permanent living arrangement” (APPLA) to any child under the age of 16, and must take additional steps to support permanency for children age 16 or older who are assigned that permanency plan. Further, children in foster care who are age 14 or older must be consulted in the development of, and about any revisions to, their case and permanency plans. They must also be made aware of their rights while in care, including the right to receive critical documents (e.g., birth certificate, Social Security card) when they “age out” of care. P.L. 113-183 separately extends funding authority for Adoption Incentive Payments for three years (FY2014-FY2016). It phases in a revised incentive structure that allows states to earn incentive payments for both adoptions and exits from foster care to legal guardianship, places additional focus on finding permanent homes for older children, and strengthens the way state performance is gauged under the program. The law requires 30% of any state savings (resulting from broadening federal eligibility for adoption assistance) to be used for family strengthening services, including post-adoption services. It also includes provisions to ensure continued federal assistance under the Title IV-E program for eligible children who, following the death or incapacitation of their legal guardian, are placed with previously named successor guardians. Separately, the law appropriates $15 million to continue Family Connection Grants for one year. These grants are intended to strengthen children’s connections to their parents and other relatives. The child support provisions in P.L. 113-183 are designed to improve child support collections in cases where the custodial parent and child live in one country and the noncustodial parent lives in another country. It ensures that the United States is compliant with any multilateral child support enforcement treaties and, as part of this, requires states to update their Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) law to incorporate any amendments adopted as of September 2008 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Further, P.L. 113-183 facilitates greater access to the Federal Parent Locator Service (FPLS) by foreign countries and tribal governments as part of improving child support collections. It also requires HHS to submit a report to Congress that includes policy options aimed at improving the CSE program. In addition, P.L. 113-183 includes provisions to support standardizing data exchange of child support-related information, and require electronic processing of income withholding for child support. Effective dates vary by provision of the law. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that enactment of H.R. 4980 would reduce overall direct federal spending by $19 million across 11 years (FY2014-FY2024).

Oct 16, 2014

Conflict Minerals and Resource Extraction: Dodd-Frank, SEC Regulations, and Legal Challenges

This report discusses the two sections of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) that require the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) to issue regulations to make public the involvement of U.S. companies in conflict minerals and in resource extraction payments.

Oct 15, 2014

The Pacific Alliance: A Trade Integration Initiative in Latin America

The Pacific Alliance is a regional integration initiative formed by Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru on April 28, 2011. Its main purpose is for members to form a regional trading bloc and forge stronger economic ties with the Asia-Pacific region. This report provides an overview of the structure of the Pacific Alliance, events leading up to its creation, and the economic significance of the Member countries.

Oct 9, 2014

Multiemployer Defined Benefit (DB) Pension Plans: A Primer and Analysis of Policy Options

This report discusses the nature of multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans, and issues regarding their financial solvency.

Oct 7, 2014

Agriculture in the WTO Bali Ministerial Agreement

At the World Trade Organization's (WTO's) Ninth Ministerial Conference in Bali, Indonesia, December 3-7, 2013, ministers adopted the so-called Bali Package — a series of decisions aimed at streamlining trade (referred to as trade facilitation), allowing developing countries more options for providing food security, boosting least-developed-country trade, and helping development more generally. This report focuses on aspects of the Bali Package that deal with and are specific to agriculture.

Oct 6, 2014

Child Welfare: Profiles of Current and Former Older Foster Youth Based on the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD)

This report provides summary and detailed data about current and former foster youth, as reported by states to U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) via the National Youth in Transition Database (NYTD).

Oct 6, 2014

Ozone Air Quality Standards: EPA's 2015 Revision

This report discusses the standard-setting process, the specifics of the current and most recent reviews, and issues that may be raised as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) brings the current review of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for ground-level ozone to completion.

Oct 3, 2014

Drug Enforcement in the United States: History, Policy, and Trends

The federal government prohibits the manufacturing, distribution, and possession of many intoxicating substances that are solely intended for recreational use (notable exceptions are alcohol and tobacco); however, the federal government also allows for and controls the medical use of many intoxicants. Federal authority to control these substances primarily resides with the Attorney General of the United States. Over the last decade, the United States has shifted its stated drug control policy toward a comprehensive approach; one that focuses on prevention, treatment, and enforcement. In order to restrict and reduce availability of illicit drugs in the United States, a practice referred to as “supply reduction,” the federal government continues to place emphasis on domestic drug enforcement. According to the most recent drug control budget (FY2015) released by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), approximately 60% of all federal drug control spending is dedicated to supply reduction, with approximately 37% of the total budget dedicated to domestic law enforcement. Federal agencies, primarily the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), enforce federal controlled substances laws in all states and territories, but the majority of drug crimes known to U.S. law enforcement are dealt with at the state level. In the United States in 2012, the DEA arrested 30,476 suspects for federal drug offenses while state and local law enforcement arrested 1,328,457 suspects for drug offenses. In many cases, federal agencies assist state and local agencies with drug arrests, and suspects are referred for state prosecution, and vice-versa. Most drug arrests are made by state and local law enforcement, and most of these arrests are for possession rather than sale or manufacture. In contrast, most federal drug arrests are for trafficking offenses rather than possession. Over the last 25 years the majority of DEA’s arrests have been for cocaine-related offenses. Trends in federal drug enforcement may reflect the nation’s changing drug problems and changes in the federal response to these problems. They also may reflect the federal government’s priorities. Drug cases represent the second highest category of criminal cases filed by U.S. Attorneys; however, federal drug cases have steadily declined over the last decade. This report focuses on domestic drug enforcement. It outlines historic development and major changes in U.S. drug enforcement to help provide an understanding of how and why certain laws and policies were implemented and how these developments and changes shaped current drug enforcement policy. In the 19th century federal, state, and local governments were generally not involved in restricting or regulating drug distribution and use, but this changed substantially in the 20th century as domestic law enforcement became the primary means of controlling the nation’s substance abuse problems.

Oct 2, 2014

Supplemental Appropriations for Disaster Assistance: Summary Data and Analysis

The federal government has provided a significant amount of money through supplemental appropriations to state, local, and tribal governments to help them repair, rebuild, and recover from catastrophic incidents. For example, Congress provided roughly $120 billion for the 2005 and 2008 Gulf Coast hurricane seasons and $50 billion for Hurricane Sandy recovery. Congressional interest in disaster assistance has always been high given the associated costs. Additional issues associated with disaster assistance have been contentious. These issues include increasing disagreements over the appropriate role of the federal government in providing assistance including whether some of the federal burden for disaster assistance should be shifted to states and localities, the appropriate use of supplemental appropriations to pay for disaster relief, reducing federal costs by eliminating unrelated spending in disaster funding bills, creating alternative funding methods such as a rainy-day fund or a contingency fund, the use of offsets for disaster assistance, altering policies that would limit the number of declarations issued each year, and converting some or all disaster assistance to disaster loans. This report provides summary information on supplemental appropriations legislation enacted since FY2000 after significant large-scale disasters. It includes funds appropriated to various departments and agencies. The funds cited in this report were provided by Congress in response to major disasters declared under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act and include appropriations and loan authority for disaster relief, repair of federal facilities, and hazard mitigation activities directed at reducing the impact of future disasters. Disaster assistance provided for agricultural disasters, counterterrorism, law enforcement, and national security appropriations are generally authorized by an authority separate from the Stafford Act and are not included in this report. Unless otherwise noted, this report does not take into account rescissions or transfers after Congress appropriated the funds for disaster assistance. As demonstrated in Table 2, since FY2000, Congress has appropriated roughly $265 billion to various federal agencies to help states and localities recover from various large-scale disasters, repair federal facilities, and pay for hazard mitigation projects. In addition to the summary information on supplemental appropriations, this report also examines the influence the Budget Control Act has on disaster assistance. Additionally, this report frames the debate policymakers have had over the years concerning supplemental disaster assistance. Some argue that the current method of relying primarily on supplemental appropriations to fund disaster response and recovery to large scale events is functioning well and should not be changed. Others argue that the federal government should increase the amount of funding provided to states, tribal governments, and localities for major disasters. Still others argue that policy options that reduce federal costs for major disasters or reduce the number of supplemental appropriations needed (or both) should be pursued. This report concludes with policy questions that may help frame future discussions concerning supplemental funding for disaster assistance. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Oct 1, 2014

Congressional Power to Create Federal Courts: A Legal Overview

This report provides an overview of this often difficult and misunderstood area of law, beginning with a discussion of the various types of federal tribunals. The report continues by noting the rationales for why Congress established the breadth of different courts that exist today and concludes with a discussion of the various factors and relevant issues that limit Congress's discretion in establishing federal courts.

Oct 1, 2014

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): Frequently Asked Questions

On June 15, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced that certain individuals who were brought to the United States as children and meet other criteria would be considered for relief from removal for two years, subject to renewal, under an initiative known as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA. Among the eligibility requirements, an individual must have been under age 16 at the time of his or her entry into the United States; must have been continuously resident in the United States since June 15, 2007; and must not have been in lawful immigration status on June 15, 2012. To request consideration of DACA, an individual must file specified forms with DHS’s U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and pay associated fees. USCIS’s decision on a DACA request is discretionary. The agency makes determinations on a case-by-case basis. Individuals granted DACA may receive employment authorization. DACA recipients are not granted a lawful immigration status and are not put on a pathway to a lawful immigration status. USCIS began accepting DACA requests on August 15, 2012, and issued its first approvals in September 2012. Prior to that, from June 15, 2012, to August 15, 2012, DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) granted deferred action under the DACA process in some cases. Cumulatively, through June 2014, more than 580,000 DACA requests have been approved. The period of deferred action under the DACA program expires after two years unless it is renewed. Individuals granted deferred action under the DACA initiative may request renewal of their deferral for another two years, in accordance with USCIS procedures. To be considered for a renewal, a DACA recipient must satisfy certain requirements concerning continuous U.S. residence, departures from the country, and criminal history. To request a renewal, an individual must file specified forms with USCIS and pay associated fees. The agency advises individuals to request a DACA renewal 120 days before the expiration date of their current period of deferred action. USCIS’s decision on a DACA renewal request, like on an initial DACA request, is discretionary. For a discussion of related legislation, commonly referred to as the DREAM Act, that seeks to enable certain unauthorized aliens who entered the United States as children to obtain legal immigration status, see CRS Report RL33863, Unauthorized Alien Students: Issues and “DREAM Act” Legislation.

Sep 30, 2014

Federal Pell Grant Program of the Higher Education Act: How the Program Works and Recent Legislative Changes

Sep 29, 2014

India-U.S. Economic Relations: In Brief

Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R43741 Summary As the world’s 3rd largest economy, India is an important trade and economic partner for the United States. The upcoming September 29-30 visit by recently elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi, his first to Washington, DC, has heightened congressional interest in the current status of the relationship. Modi’s visit provides the Obama Administration with an opportunity to advance the U.S.-India strategic partnership, including by discussing ways to foster greater trade and investment between the two nations. May 2014 parliamentary elections in India brought a new government into power, led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Prime Minister Modi. Prime Minister Modi’s victory was widely seen as a mandate for the new government to pursue economic policies similar to those Modi implemented during his 15 years as Chief Minister of India’s Gujarat state. Although merchandise trade between India and the United States has grown rapidly over the last five years, each nation contends that some aspects of the other’s economic and trade policies hinder greater trade and investment growth. For example, the Obama Administration considers India’s intellectual property rights (IPR) protection as inadequate, and its localization policies as non-tariff trade barriers. The Indian government considers current U.S. laws on visas for temporary foreign workers and payroll taxes as non-tariff trade barriers that discriminate against Indian workers. While both governments maintain that their policies are compliant with international agreements and respond to domestic needs, these perceptions continue to create tension in bilateral relations. India and the United States also differ on issues about the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other proposed trade agreements. On July 31, 2014, India withheld its support of a protocol that would ratify the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) agreed upon by all WTO members in December 2013. Its policy is to wait until the WTO members engaged in negotiations for a final agreement on food security—a decision criticized by the United States and other nations. Subsequently, India has called for the permanent solution of the food security issue in conjunction with the implementation of the TFA by the end of 2014. While India and the United States have expressed support for a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), ongoing negotiations are seemingly stalled after each nation decided to revise its model BIT agreements. In addition, the two nations are pursuing regional trade agreements (RTAs) in the Asia-Pacific. India is a party to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations and the United States is taking a leading role in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. The report also covers other issues in bilateral relations, including India’s membership in the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program; defense trade; civil nuclear cooperation; and India’s potential membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). For further information, see also CRS Report R43679, India’s New Government and Implications for U.S. Interests, by K. Alan Kronstadt; CRS In Focus IF00037, India’s Domestic Political Setting (In Focus), by K. Alan Kronstadt; and CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and Ian F. Fergusson. This report will be updated as circumstances require. India-U.S. Economic Relations: In Brief Overview 1 Trends in Bilateral Trade and Investment 2 Trade in Goods and Services 2 Foreign Direct Investment 3 Bilateral Issues 3 Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 3 Localization Barriers and Indigenous Innovation Policies 5 Visas and U.S. Immigration Policies 6 Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) 7 Totalization Agreement 7 Generalized System of Preferences 8 Defense Trade 9 Civil Nuclear Cooperation 10 Trade Agreements and Institutions 10 WTO Issues 10 Regional Trade Agreements 11 APEC Membership for India 11 U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum 12 Tables Table 1.India-U.S. Bilateral Merchandise Trade, 2009-2013 2 Contacts Author Contact Information 12 Acknowledgments 12 Overview The United States and India have been pursuing a “strategic partnership” since 2004, and a Fifth Strategic Dialogue session was held in New Delhi in mid-2014. Economic and trade relations are a key facet of this engagement. A May 2014 parliamentary election seated a new Indian government led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who is slated to make his inaugural visit to Washington, DC, on September 29-30, 2014. Modi has a reputation as a pro-business leader, and top U.S. officials express eagerness to engage India’s new government and re-energize what some see as a flagging relationship. On Capitol Hill, some Members of both chambers took positive note of India’s democratic exercise and its new government, and expressed recognition of the importance of the bilateral relationship. S.Res. 571, introduced on September 18, 2014, designates the final day of September as “United States and India Partnership Day” and calls the U.S.-India relationship “a special and permanent bond.” Many view the deepening of the U.S.-India partnership as a landmark geopolitical shift away from the Cold War-era in which the two countries were mostly estranged. Today, the U.S. government considers strengthening of diplomatic, economic, and security ties with India a crucial aspect of efforts to foster a stable and prosperous Asia in the 21st century. In the words of Secretary of State John Kerry, the partnership “is on the cusp of an historic transformation,” and “the world’s oldest democracy and the world’s largest democracy can forge a new era of shared prosperity and security for hundreds of millions of people in India, across Asia and the world.” Bilateral economic and trade relations, as well as India’s role in international trade bodies, represent major pillars of the still relatively new major power friendship. The U.S. government aspires to reach $500 billion in annual bilateral goods and services trade with India by 2024, a more than five-fold increase from the $97 billion total in 2013. The relationship also supports employment in both countries. India is the world’s second most populous nation (after China) and its third largest economy (in terms of purchasing power parity), having recently supplanted Japan in share of global GDP. However, the country is also in the midst of its worst economic slowdown since the 1990s, with two full years of sub-5% annual growth and persistently high inflation. Experts generally agree that, for India’s international influence to continue to grow—and thus further boost its attractiveness as a U.S. partner—the country’s negative economic trends need to be reversed. U.S. officials have lauded Modi’s efforts to create a more stable and tax-friendly investment climate in India’s western state of Gujarat during his 15-year tenure as chief minister. One of Modi’s key lieutenants, Finance Minister Arun Jaitley, has vowed that luring both foreign and domestic investment into fast-tracked major projects in infrastructure and skills development would be the primary goal of the new government. This approach was central to the “Gujarat miracle” that Modi may seek to recreate at the national level. High hopes that India and the United States would more effectively resolve outstanding issues and pursue new initiatives have been moderated in recent years. Some observers saw a notable cooling of U.S.-India ties after 2013 following a serious diplomatic dispute triggered by the arrest of Indian consular official Devyani Khobragade in New York. There are also serious disagreements over intellectual property rights protection, multilateral trade negotiations, U.S. immigration law, and stalled efforts to initiate civil nuclear cooperation, among others. Although considerable optimism exists about the potential for Prime Minister Modi to substantively alter India’s approach to trade and investment policies, many U.S. business leaders are seeking positive changes in India’s business environment. While the United States welcomed the scrapping of the statist Planning Commission and moves toward establishing a new goods and services tax, Modi has yet to demonstrate that he will significantly scale back his predecessor’s legacy of restrictive land-use regulations, food subsidies, and other investment-deterring policies. After four months in office, some observers fear he will squander his strong mandate if major reforms are not initiated soon. Trends in Bilateral Trade and Investment Trade in Goods and Services Bilateral merchandise trade flows between India and the United States have grown rapidly over the last five years according to both Indian and U.S. trade data. Official U.S. trade data reports total trade with India increased 69.2% between 2009 and 2013, while India’s trade data (as reported by Global Trade Atlas) indicates bilateral total trade growth of 78.3% over the same five-year period. However, India’s trade figures show a significantly smaller trade surplus with the United States than U.S. trade figures. According to USITC, India was the eighteenth largest export market for U.S. goods in 2013, and the tenth largest source of U.S. merchandise imports. Table 1.India-U.S. Bilateral Merchandise Trade, 2009-2013 (in billions of U.S. dollars) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 U.S. Figures Exports to India 16.462 19.223 21.628 22.336 21.842 Imports from India 21.176 29.531 36.167 40.518 41.845 Total Trade 37.638 48.754 57.795 62.854 63.687 Trade Balance -4.714 -10.308 -14.540 -18.183 -20.003 Indian Figures Exports to U.S. 18.187 23.545 33.263 36.086 38.612 Imports from U.S. 16.627 19.109 23.424 25.115 23.457 Total Trade 34.814 42.654 56.687 61.201 62.069 Trade Balance 1.560 4.436 9.839 10.971 15.155 Source: USITC, Global Trade Atlas. Trade in services has steadily increased over the past five years, with U.S. service exports rising from $9.977 billion in 2009 to $13.470 billion in 2013, and U.S. service imports from India rising from $12.222 billion in 2009 to $19.041 billion in 2013. Travel has made up over half of U.S. service exports to India for the last five years, while telecom, computer services, and information technology services have comprised over half of U.S. service imports from India. Foreign Direct Investment The United States is the 6th largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in India, contributing 5.4% of India’s FDI inflows cumulatively between July 2000 and July 2014, according to India’s Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) reports U.S. FDI in India reached $24.3 billion in 2013. India’s FDI in the United States was $7.2 billion as of 2013, about 0.26% of total FDI in the United States. Bilateral Issues Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) The treatment of IPR is a major trade issue between India and the United States. While both countries adhere to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), their views differ on the approach to IPR protection. In 2014, India remained on the Priority Watch List of the “Special 301” annual report by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) for its inadequate IPR protection and enforcement. While USTR acknowledged some improvements in India’s IPR legal framework and enforcement system, USTR also noted challenges in India’s patent regime, digital and physical copyright piracy prevention, trade secrets protection, and IPR enforcement. USTR also announced plans to conduct an “out-of-cycle review” of India to address identified IPR challenges. The Obama Administration and some Members of Congress have expressed concerns about recent legal and regulatory developments in India’s patent regime, which the USTR states have raised “serious questions about the innovation climate in India.... ” In 2005, India amended its patent laws to comply with the TRIPS Agreement, reintroducing product patents for pharmaceuticals, food, and chemicals. Since 2012, India has denied or revoked patents for certain foreign drugs because they did not meet its patentability standards. An April 2013 Indian Supreme Court decision confirmed that, under India’s Patent Law, pharmaceuticals and certain other technologies—though they meet internationally recognized patentability criteria—must meet India’s requirement of “enhanced efficiency” to be patentable. From India’s perspective, the “enhanced efficiency” requirement protects against companies making minor modifications of their patented products to extend the life of their patents (a practice known as “evergreening”). The United States expresses concern that such requirements may have the effect of limiting the “patentability of potentially beneficial innovations ... ,” including drugs with “fewer side effects, decreased toxicity, improved delivery systems, or temperature or storage stability.” In addition, the Indian government has issued compulsory licenses for pharmaceuticals and other products, and India’s National Manufacturing Policy has promoted compulsory licensing of patented products to encourage clean energy technology transfer. The TRIPS Agreement permits members to grant compulsory licenses for patented devices, subject to certain conditions, including providing compensation to the owner of the patent. India asserts that its actions reflect an effort to balance IPR protections with the need to provide affordable access to medicines for its 1.2 billion people. USTR continues to monitor India’s IPR situation, and has called for greater transparency and stakeholder input in the issuing of compulsory licenses. In June 2013, numerous Members of Congress sent the Administration several letters expressing concern over India’s IPR regime. A letter from 169 Members of Congress stated that, “U.S. companies have suffered from a whole host of IP [intellectual property] issues in areas, including information technology, renewable energy, and biopharmaceuticals,” and the “U.S. Government must send a strong signal to the Indian Government that these actions are inconsistent with India’s international obligations, set a bad precedent, and undermine the culture of innovation.... ” India’s ambassador to the United States responded in a letter to Congress that India’s IPR enforcement, including for compulsory licensing, is consistent with the TRIPS Agreement. In the 113th Congress, legislation was introduced to make ineligible for GSP benefits any country failing to provide adequate and effective IPR protection (H.R. 3167). Localization Barriers and Indigenous Innovation Policies The Obama Administration has expressed concern about a trend in India toward localization barriers to trade and indigenous innovation policies. While some localization measures may serve data privacy or security objectives, according to the USTR, such measures can be discriminatory and serve as trade and investment barriers. Localization measures also can further a country’s “indigenous innovation” policy goals. These issues are prominent in current U.S. trade negotiations. In November 2011, India issued a “National Manufacturing Policy” to develop its manufacturing base and boost employment. The policy calls for greater local content requirements in government procurement in certain sectors, such as information and communications technology (ICT) and clean energy. India’s Preferential Market Access mandate, which is based on this policy and currently imposes local content requirements for government procurement related to electronic products, has been a particular source of friction with the United States. Other localization examples include a requirement for telecommunication equipment vendors to test all imported ICT equipment in laboratories in India beginning in July 2014; and the Indian National Security Council proposal in February 2014 that electronic communications between users in India remain in India and be stored locally on Indian servers. In February 2013, the United States requested formal consultations in the WTO challenging India’s local content requirements and government subsidies for the production of certain solar panel products, alleging that such actions restrict U.S. market access in India. Consultations between India and the United States in early 2014 did not resolve the dispute, and the dispute is proceeding through the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. Visas and U.S. Immigration Policies The granting of temporary visas for Indian nationals to work in the United States is a top trade concern for India. In particular, two visa categories—H-1B visas for professional specialty workers and L visas for intra-company transferees—are often topics of discussion between the two countries. Citizens of India accounted for 65% of all H-1B and 29% of all L-1 visas issued in FY2013; more than any other country. Current law generally limits annual H-1B admissions to 65,000, but most H-1B workers are exempted from the cap. In recent years, applications for new H-1B workers have routinely exceeded the numerical limits. The L intra-company transferee visa was established for companies that have offices abroad to transfer key personnel freely within the organization. There is no limit on the number of L-1 visas that can be issued and no labor market tests are required. The 113th Congress has considered legislation that would make revisions to the H-1B and L visa categories. Legislative proposals that Congress has considered include streamlining application procedures; requiring employers to make efforts to recruit U.S. workers; extending labor protections to foreign workers; giving foreign workers more flexibility to change jobs; and allowing these workers to apply for lawful permanent resident (LPR) status while seeking or renewing temporary visas. None of the provisions in these bills are specific to any country. While the WTO views the employment of temporary foreign workers as the importation of services and therefore a trade issue, some congressional committees see it as an immigration issue. Most recently, in March 2012, in a letter to former USTR Ron Kirk, the then-Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Committee asked the USTR to assure that “your office will not negotiate immigration provisions with respect to ... trade agreements.” India would like an increase in the number of H-1B and L-1 visas made available to Indian workers. India is particularly concerned about a provision in S. 744 that it sees as limiting market access to Indian companies offering technical and professional services. However, an unnamed “senior administration official” said that S. 744 would increase the number of Indian university graduates who could work in the United States. At this point in time, there appears to be a consensus that action on S. 744 is unlikely. Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Support for a U.S.-India BIT (or Bilateral Investment Promotion Agreement, BIPA, as it is called in New Delhi) has increased in recent years. Potential investors in India and the United States maintain such a treaty would reduce uncertainties and so facilitate investment flows, especially if accompanied by reform measures to further open the Indian market. India and the United States began BIT negotiations in August 2009. Key U.S. issues in the ongoing talks include reducing restrictions on foreign investment and ensuring adequate investor protection, such as through access to binding and neutral investor-state arbitration. India placed negotiations on hold in January 2013 pending a review of its model BIT after the United States placed a hold on talks while it conducted a similar of its own model BIT, which concluded in April 2012. In September 2013, President Obama and then-Indian Prime Minister Singh reaffirmed their commitment to concluding a high-standard BIT. The United States and India held technical discussions on the BIT in February 2014. Totalization Agreement Another element of U.S. policy that India would like to see changed is the deduction of social security taxes from the pay of Indian nationals temporarily working in the United States. Under U.S. tax law, Indian nationals working in the United States under temporary work visas must pay social security taxes although they may be ineligible to collect social security benefits because the duration of their employment in the United States is less than 10 years. The President may enter into an international Social Security (i.e., totalization) agreement with a foreign country to coordinate the collection of payroll taxes and the payment of benefits under each country’s Social Security system for workers who split their careers between the two countries. Generally, totalization agreements allow workers (and their employers) to contribute only to the foreign system if the worker is employed in that country for five or more years, or only to the employee’s home system if the worker is employed in the foreign country for less than five years. Totalization agreements also allow workers who divide their careers between the two countries to combine earnings credits under both systems to qualify for benefits if they lack sufficient coverage under either system. Totalization agreements also waive the following two conditions for receiving social security: (1) a foreign national’s benefits are suspended if he or she is outside the United States for more than six consecutive months; and (2) to receive payments outside the United States, generally a foreign national dependent/survivor must have lived in the United States for at least five years in the same relationship with the worker. The United States has entered into totalization agreements with 25 countries. While totalization agreements are subject to congressional review, Congress has never rejected a Social Security agreement. India would like to negotiate a totalization agreement with the United States. According to Indian officials, the lack of a totalization agreement discourages Indian nationals from accepting jobs in the United States, increases the cost of hiring Indian nationals (who seek higher salaries to offset the lost social security taxes), and operates as a non-tariff market barrier for Indian companies considering entry into the U.S. market. Generalized System of Preferences The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program expired on August 1, 2013, after Congress did not extend the program beyond the date stipulated in Section 1 of P.L. 112-40. The U.S. GSP program (Title V of the Trade Act of 1974) provides non-reciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated beneficiary developing countries (BDCs). India has been a BDC in the U.S. GSP program since its implementation in 1976, and was the top BDC beneficiary in 2013 in terms of volume of GSP-qualifying trade ($2.5 billion). One of the main issues in the current renewal debate is whether to continue to provide BDC status to nations that are classified as upper-middle-income countries or account for more than 0.25% of world trade. India meets both of those conditions. In addition, some Members have advocated eliminating or reducing India’s GSP benefits in response to India stance on a number of trade issues. During USTR Froman’s confirmation hearing, several Senators asked if India should continue to receive GSP benefits given its IPR policies and opposition to U.S. stances on a number of multilateral issues. Indian officials maintain that they have been targeted for GSP eligibility review in the past as punishment for advocating for their own national development goals in multilateral talks. Defense Trade Security cooperation between India and the United States is a major pillar of the decade-old partnership, and increased bilateral defense ties are perceived as a possible hedge against or counterbalance to growing Chinese influence in Asia. India’s military is the world’s third-largest, and New Delhi is seeking to transform it into one with advanced technology and global reach, reportedly planning up to $100 billion on new procurements over the next decade to update its mostly Soviet-era arsenal. India has become the world’s largest “open” defense market, accounting for about 10% of the $63 billion in global sales in 2013. It imported nearly $2 billion worth of U.S. military hardware in 2013, making it the largest U.S. export market. The two nations have signed defense contracts worth more than $9 billion since 2008, up from $500 million in all previous years combined. However, Russia continues to be India’s key supplier, accounting for 75% of the value of all Indian defense imports from 2002-2013 (Israel is a distant second at 6% and the United States ranks third, accounting for 5%). New Delhi requests increased co-production and technology sharing in its defense procurements. Washington promises to find sales under this model while also urging reform in India’s defense offsets policy. At present, Maryland-based Lockheed Martin and India’s Tata Corporation are co-manufacturing C-130 aircraft components in a deal that the Obama Administration views as a model for further joint partnerships. While in India in August 2014, Secretary of Defense Hagel offered to jointly develop a new version of the U.S.-made Javelin anti-tank missile and vowed to share with India advanced electromagnetic catapult technology for use in India’s aircraft carriers. High-level engagement on the bilateral Defense Trade and Technology Initiative (DTTI) is a top-tier priority for U.S. defense planners. India’s new government has already sought to lift FDI limits in the defense production sector from the 26% to 49%, an effort that failed under the previous government. This proposed increase—welcomed by the U.S. government, although a disappointment for those hoping that majority share would be permitted—could lure more foreign investment by promising greater repatriated profits, and could also make it easier for investors to decline technology-sharing requests. Civil Nuclear Cooperation Obstacles to initiating bilateral nuclear energy cooperation remain a source of frustration for both U.S. officials and for U.S. companies eager to enter the Indian market. More than nine years after President George W. Bush’s landmark reversal of U.S. nonproliferation policy and offer of full civilian nuclear cooperation with India—a country that is neither a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty nor a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—U.S. firms remain unwilling to enter an Indian market regulated by strict liability laws. The Bush Administration initiative, endorsed by Congress in 2008, came with the promised benefits of new opportunities for trade and investment, including job creation in the United States. Some observers see France and Russia—both with state-owned nuclear power companies that have done business with India in the past—as better poised to build nuclear reactors in India, although their governments also view India’s liability law as overly restrictive. In August 2014, China became the most recent potential supplier vying for a stake in the Indian market. India signed the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC, which has yet to enter into force) in 2010. However, India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill, adopted by its Parliament the same year, may not be consistent with the CSC, due to provisions which make reactor suppliers, in addition to operators, liable for damages caused by a reactor accident. Pennsylvania-based Westinghouse received an “Authorization to Proceed” with implementation of a “pre-Early Works Agreement” with India’s state-run nuclear power corporation in late 2013. However, in the absence of any signs that Indian law will be amended, future progress may continue to be slow and halting. Trade Agreements and Institutions WTO Issues India and United States, as members of the WTO, are involved in WTO negotiations to liberalize trade through the removal of barriers and establishment of enhanced trade rules and disciplines. India’s position on implementation of the WTO “Bali package”—an agreement reached at the WTO Ministerial in December 2013 consisting of new commitments on trade facilitation, agriculture, and development—is a source of friction between India and the United States. The Bali package represented a significant breakthrough from the longstanding impasse in the WTO Doha Round. The Doha Round, which began in 2001, has struggled with persistent differences between developed countries (including the United States) and emerging economies (including India) on major trade issues. The growing economic weight of India and other emerging economies has changed the dynamics of the WTO, as these countries are increasingly more assertive in pursuing their own interests in multilateral negotiations. One of the commitments of the Bali package is the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA), which includes binding provisions for expediting the movement, release, and clearance of goods at the border. WTO members were to begin the TFA implementation process by notifying the WTO no later than July 31, 2014, of the trade facilitation commitments that they plan to implement upon the TFA’s entry into force. However, in July 2014, India withheld its support for the TFA Protocol of Amendment until the WTO concludes a final agreement on public stockholding for food security purposes. The United States sought safeguards in the food security agreement to ensure that public stockholding programs do not act as subsidies that distort trade, while India sought to ensure its flexibility to address food security issues. As part of the December 2013 Bali package, members agreed to a four-year interim agreement that would shield India and other developing countries from WTO legal challenges for exceeding their domestic support limits under the WTO Agriculture Agreement, while they developed a permanent solution on public stockholding by 2017. Presently, India opposes TFA implementation until a permanent solution is reached on stockholding, and calls for both the permanent solution and the TFA to be concluded by end-2014. Countries objected to India’s reversal of its agreement to the December 2013 Bali package, and said that, by doing so, India had “ruptured trust” in the future of the Bali negotiations. Regional Trade Agreements India and the United States do not have Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) or a bilateral trade agreement at present. India and the United States are currently pursuing different paths for the establishment of a regional trade agreement (RTA) in the Asia-Pacific. India is one of 16 countries negotiating the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), while the United States is negotiating with 11 other countries to form a proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). RCEP and the TPP reportedly are being negotiated as “living agreements,” which could incorporate new members and address new issues as they emerge. While some observers view RCEP and TPP as alternative models for regional economic integration, others see the two RTAs as potentially complementary frameworks. RCEP and the TPP are also considered pathways for the possible formation of the “Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific” (FTAAP) envisioned by APEC ministers in November 2009. APEC Membership for India India has sought membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) for nearly two decades, but the existing APEC members have decided not to accept new members at this time. India’s lack of APEC membership may become an issue if India seeks to join the proposed TPP, as it is assumed by some that APEC membership is a prerequisite for TPP membership. U.S.-India Trade Policy Forum The Trade Policy Forum (TPF) was established in 2005 as the primary mechanism to resolve India-U.S. trade and investment issues. Chaired by the U.S. Trade Representative and the Indian Minister of Commerce and Industry, it contains five focus groups: agriculture; innovation; investment services; tariffs; and non-tariff barriers. Active between 2005 and 2010, the Trade Policy Fo

Sep 26, 2014

Fire Management Assistance Grants: Frequently Asked Questions

Section 420 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288) authorizes the President to “declare” a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG). This authority has been delegated to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Regional Administrators. Once issued, the FMAG declaration authorizes various forms of federal assistance such as the provision of equipment, personnel, and grants to state, local, and tribal governments for the control, management, and mitigation of any fire on certain public or private forest land or grassland that might become a major disaster. The current FMAG system was established by regulation in October of 2001. Prior to that time, the program was known as the Fire Suppression Assistance Program. However, the program was administered in similar fashion with the FEMA Regional Administrators working with the requesting state and the “Principal Advisor,” as well as consulting with FEMA leadership prior to the announcement of Stafford Act assistance under Section 420. This report answers frequently asked questions about FMAGs. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Sep 25, 2014

Unaccompanied Alien Children: Demographics in Brief

The number of children coming to the United States who are not accompanied by parents or legal guardians and who lack proper immigration documents has raised complex and competing sets of humanitarian concerns and immigration control issues. This report focuses on the demographics of unaccompanied alien children while they are in removal proceedings. Overwhelmingly, the children are coming from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The median age of unaccompanied children has decreased from 17 years in FY2011 to 16 years during the first seven months of FY2014. A greater share of males than females are represented among this population. However, females have steadily increased in total numbers and as a percentage of the flow since FY2011. The median age of females has dropped from 17 years in FY2011—the year that was the median age across all groups of children—to 15 years in the first seven months of FY2014.

Sep 24, 2014

Revision of the Nutrition Facts Label: Proposed Rules

Sep 23, 2014

Climate Summit 2014: Warm-Up for 2015

This report discusses Climate Summit 2014, its context, and its impact on future international climate initiatives.

Sep 22, 2014

Temporary Professional, Managerial, and Skilled Foreign Workers: Policy and Trends

Sep 22, 2014

Customer Choice and the Power Industry of the Future

This report will begin to explore the issues, discussing what forms a transition from today's electric power grid to a grid of the future could take, and suggest questions that Congress may want to address. The United States seems to be at a turning point in the history of the electric power sector, some have advocated for the electric utility industry model to be reinvented under a "Utility 2.0" paradigm, wherein the modern needs of society for electric power and services become the driving force behind utility investments.

Sep 22, 2014

Implementation of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA, P.L. 111-353)

This report documents the scheduled timeline for action on selected FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) provisions, as specified in the enacted law, and FDA-reported actions taken to date, based on available FDA press releases and publicly available progress reports.

Sep 22, 2014

The No Fly List: Procedural Due Process and Hurdles to Litigation

This report provides an overview of the operation of the government's watchlists, examine some of the legal issues implicated by challenges to the No Fly list, and describe recent case law on the matter.

Sep 18, 2014

Poverty: Major Themes in Past Debates and Current Proposals

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the War on Poverty, but poverty remains a difficult policy challenge. The Obama Administration and some in Congress have offered proposals that seek to address poverty, with the proposals differing considerably in their focus and content. However, the themes reflected in these proposals echo prior efforts to address the issue of poverty. The terms “poverty” and “welfare” (commonly thought of as cash assistance for the poor) are often intertwined, but federal policies affecting poverty are broader than a single program or set of programs. In fact, the social insurance program of Social Security may be the nation’s most important antipoverty program. The incidence and character of poverty is affected by many facets of public life. Over the last century, several watershed events have affected federal policies for the poor. These include the enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935, creating the first federal social insurance and federal-state public assistance programs; President Johnson’s War on Poverty launched in 1964 that sought to address the “causes, not just the consequences of poverty” and began a period of expansion of services and noncash benefits for the poor; the “welfare reform” debates that began in 1969 and lasted until the mid-1990s, as societal expectations for single mothers shifted from staying home with children to work; and the culmination of these debates in the mid-1990s with the twin policies of requiring parents receiving assistance to work and “making work pay” for low wage-earning parents. Most recently, the Affordable Care Act expanded health care coverage, particularly for lower-income persons. As federal antipoverty policy evolved—and some approaches were adopted, while others were not—certain overarching themes have recurred, including the following: Universal policies versus need-tested benefits: should policies be designed to benefit everyone, or be targeted on those with financial need? Income, services, or employment strategies: which of these strategies is most effective in reducing poverty? Work and other behavioral requirements: should conditions be placed on the receipt of assistance, and what behaviors should those conditions reinforce? Concepts of federalism: what is the appropriate balance between the federal, state and local governments in designing and implementing programs? Coordination and related policies: how can multiple programs work together to avoid overlap and duplication? Experimentation: how can we determine effectiveness? Budget considerations: what do programs cost, and how are these costs balanced against other federal priorities? The current congressional proposals and those of the Obama Administration, as well as future proposals, can be analyzed through the framework of these recurring major themes.

Sep 18, 2014

Proposed Train and Equip Authorities for Syria: In Brief

This report presents the President's requests for authority and funding for the Department of Defense to provide overt assistance, including possible military training and weapons, to vetted members of the Syrian opposition and other vetted Syrians for select purposes are the subject of close congressional consideration.

Sep 16, 2014

Dairy Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79)

The 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79), which was signed into law on February 7, 2014, makes significant changes to the structure of U.S. dairy support programs, including the elimination of several major price and income support programs from the 2008 farm bill (P.L. 110-246), the extension of several smaller dairy programs, and the addition of two new programs. Three of the principal dairy support programs under the 2008 farm bill—the Dairy Product Price Support Program (DPPSP), the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program, and the Dairy Export Incentives Program (DEIP)—are eliminated. These programs are replaced by two new support programs that are authorized for the five-year period of the 2014 farm bill, FY2014-FY2018—the Margin Protection Program (MPP) and the Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP). The MPP is a voluntary program that makes a payment to participating farmers when a formula-based national margin—referred to as the Actual Dairy Production Margin (ADPM) and calculated as the national average farm price for all milk minus a national-average feed cost ration—falls below a producer-selected insured margin that can range from $4.00 per hundredweight (cwt.) to $8.00/cwt. in $0.50/cwt. increments. According to USDA final rules (released August 29, 2014), MPP payments are based on a farm-level production history and a producer-selected coverage level that ranges from 25% to 90%—the product of these two items yields the covered production history (CPH). Producers must pay an annual administrative fee of $100 for each participating dairy operation, and a premium that rises steadily for higher margin protection levels starting at the $4.50/cwt. margin level. The minimum $4.00/cwt. margin is fully subsidized and has no farmer-paid premium. The premium structure is further divided based on the volume of CPH—lower premiums are charged for the first 4 million pounds (lbs.) of CPH, higher premiums are charged on CPH above 4 million lbs. As an incentive to encourage participation by smaller dairy operations (with CPH under 4 million lbs.), premiums will be reduced by 25% across the board for all margin protection levels except the $8.00/cwt. level during calendar 2014 and 2015. The DPDP requires USDA to procure and distribute certain dairy products when the ADPM falls below $4.00/cwt. for two consecutive months. DPDP dairy product distribution is required to target individuals from low-income groups and not be allowed for resale into commercial markets. Purchases and distribution under the DPDP end after three months or if the U.S. price for certain dairy products is significantly above world prices. Several programs from the 2008 farm bill were extended through FY2018 including the Dairy Forward Pricing Program, the Dairy Indemnity Program, and certain provisions to augment the development of export markets under the National Dairy Promotion and Research Program (i.e., the dairy check off program). In addition, the final bill adopted a provision that requires USDA to adhere to standard rulemaking procedures. Separately, federal milk marketing orders have permanent statutory authority and continue intact, as does the Livestock Gross Margin for Dairy Cattle program (LGM-D) and the suite of Dairy Import Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) that limit access to the U.S. domestic market by lower-priced foreign dairy products. The permanent Dairy Price Support Program contained in the Agricultural Act of 1949 (P.L. 81-439) is suspended but would be reactivated should MPP expire at the end of FY2018 without replacement or extension.

Sep 15, 2014

Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Programs

This report analyzes the special immigrant visa (SIV) classifications for Iraqis and Afghans within the context of both the larger Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) special immigrant category and selected other permanent admissions categories. It discusses the legislative changes to the individual Iraqi and Afghan special immigrant programs since their initial authorization, provides statistics on visa issuance, and considers challenges facing the programs today.

Sep 12, 2014

Delayed Federal Grant Closeout: Issues and Impact

Federal outlays for grants to state and local governments have grown from $15.4 billion in 1940 (in constant FY2009 dollars) to $509.7 billion in 2013 (in constant FY2009 dollars). The number of congressionally authorized grant programs has also increased over time, with over 2,179 congressionally authorized grant programs currently being administered by federal agencies. Recently, congressional interest has focused on the efficient and effective management of federal grant programs. A recent congressional hearing evaluated the impact of alleged inefficient grant management which, according to a GAO report, resulted in more than $794 million in undisbursed federal grant funds in expired grant accounts. GAO concluded that federal agencies needed to improve the timeliness of federal grant closeouts to address the undisbursed funds issue. However, there may be underlying causes, other than inefficient grant management, that might help to explain why undisbursed funds may end up in expired grant accounts. Furthermore, it is possible, if not likely, that the estimated amount of undisbursed funds in expired grant accounts may be inflated. While the undisbursed grant funds identified by GAO represent significantly less than 1% of annual outlays for grants to state and local governments, the existence of undisbursed grant funds in expired grant accounts is an indicator of a systemic grants management challenge; suggesting a lack of coordination between the financial and program management of federal grants. This report is designed to assist Congress in its oversight of federal grants-in-aid programs by first providing a summary of relevant processes and authorities and then analyzing the causes of undisbursed grant funds in expired grant accounts. The report also presents congressional options to reform federal grant administration to increase the timeliness, reliability, and comprehensiveness of grant management-related information. The analysis contained in this report concludes that delays in federal grant closeout may be attributed to unclear guidance from federal agencies; that the ability of a federal agency to reprogram undisbursed grant funds in expired accounts may be limited by the type of budget authority for that particular grant program; and that federal agencies struggle to reconcile grant administration systems and grant management systems. Among other potential consequences of this disconnect, inadequate reconciliation of grant management systems could result in inflated estimates of the amount of undisbursed grant funds in expired accounts and increasing the likelihood of inefficient administration of federal grants.

Sep 12, 2014

Diplomatic and Embassy Security Funding Before and After the Benghazi Attacks

Congressional investigations into the September 11, 2012, attacks on U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya, have focused on a number of issues, including the extent to which overall funding levels may have played a role in the security measures in place at that U.S. facility. While several factors may have been involved in the Benghazi situation, this report focuses only on funding for security of U.S. diplomatic personnel and facilities abroad, hereinafter referred to in this report as diplomatic/embassy security. (For other CRS reports on the Benghazi attacks and a list of CRS experts, go to CRS.gov and search “Benghazi.”) The report of the Accountability Review Board for Benghazi (ARB) report highlighted the funding complexities at the Department of State: For many years the State Department has been engaged in a struggle to obtain the resources necessary to carry out its work, with varying degrees of success. This has brought about a deep sense of the importance of husbanding resources to meet the highest priorities, laudable in the extreme in any government department. But it has also had the effect of conditioning a few State Department managers to favor restricting the use of resources as a general orientation. Experienced leadership, close coordination and agility, timely informed decision making, and adequate funding and personnel resources are essential.... One overall conclusion in this [ARB] report is that Congress must do its part to meet this challenge and provide necessary resources to the State Department to address security risks and meet mission imperatives. (Department of State, Accountability Review Board for Benghazi Attack of September 2012, December 19, 2012, p. 3. Available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization.202446.pdf.) Other post-Benghazi reports have pointed out how security funding for overseas staff and posts depends on the designation of the facility as office space, warehouse, or residence, and whether a facility is considered by State Department officials as permanent, temporary, or interim. Even the definition of each of those designations may differ within the Department of State. Further, some reports suggest that the inability to get more funds to improve security—whether because Congress does not appropriate enough, delays passing budgets, or because the Department of State is unwilling or unable to fully fund resource requests from its overseas posts—may contribute to an attitude by officials in the field that a combination of elevated threat and restricted resources to meet that threat should not be questioned. In that case, security officers requesting more funds simply may give up. This report presents a history and analysis of the requested and actual funding for diplomatic/embassy security since FY2008—what actually became available for the Department of State to spend after rescissions, sequestration, and transfers. It also provides funding data that was requested by the Administration, passed by the House of Representatives, passed by the Senate, and enacted by Congress for the two accounts that provide the bulk of the funding: the Worldwide Security Protection (WSP) and Worldwide Security Upgrades (WSU). Combined, these two subaccounts in most years comprise more than 90% of the funding available for diplomatic/embassy security. This report will continue to track diplomatic/embassy security appropriations and will be updated as changes occur.

Sep 10, 2014

U.S. Military Action Against the Islamic State: Answers to Frequently Asked Legal Questions

This report addresses select legal questions raised by the use of military force against the Islamic State (IS). Questions addressed in this report include potential sources (and limitations) of presidential authority to use military force against the Islamic State without congressional authorization; the potential relevance of the 2002 Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (2002 Iraq AUMF; P.L. 107-243) and the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (2001 AUMF; P.L.107-40); the applicability of the United Nations Charter to ongoing U.S. military strikes in Iraq and any prospective strikes against IS forces in Syria; and the constraints imposed by the War Powers Resolution upon U.S. military action that has not been authorized by Congress.

Sep 9, 2014

Klamath Basin Settlement Agreements

Sep 9, 2014

Authorization of Appropriations: Procedural and Legal Issues

To provide funding for discretionary spending programs of the government, Congress generally uses an annual appropriations process. Under congressional rules, when making decisions about the funding of individual items or programs, however, Congress may be constrained by the terms of previously enacted legislation. The way in which the House and Senate interpret and apply this concept under their respective rules and precedents creates a distinction between authorized and unauthorized appropriations. This report provides a brief explanation of this distinction, and its significance for understanding how appropriations and other legislation work in conjunction to determine how agencies may spend appropriated funds. The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the “power of the purse” by prohibiting expenditures “but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” As a result, legislation to provide for government expenditures must adhere to the same requirements and conditions imposed on the law-making process as any other measure. The Constitution does not, however, prescribe specific practices or procedures. Instead, the manner in which the House and Senate have chosen to exercise this authority is a construct of congressional rules and practices, which have evolved pursuant to the constitutional authority of each chamber to “determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” One effect of these rules has been the formalization of funding decisions as a two-step process, in which separate legislation to establish or continue federal agencies, programs, policies, projects, or activities, is presumed to be enacted first, and is subsequently followed by legislation that provides funding. Another effect of these rules has been a distinction between those appropriations authorized by law and those not authorized by law. Under the rules of the House and Senate, this distinction is largely based on technical issues related to the precedents of the respective chamber; the existence of legislation defining the legal authority for particular federal agencies, programs, policies, projects, or activities; and the relationship of such authority to the applicable appropriation. In most cases, an appropriation is said to be authorized when it follows explicit language defining the legal authority for a federal agency, program, policy, project, or activity that will be applicable in the same fiscal year for which the appropriation is to be enacted. In contrast, an appropriation is said to be unauthorized when no such authority has been enacted or, if previously enacted, has terminated or expired. There is no constitutional or general statutory requirement that an appropriation must be preceded by a specific act that authorized the appropriation. According to the Government Accountability Office, “The existence of a statute (organic legislation) imposing substantive functions upon an agency that require funding for their performance is itself sufficient legal authorization for the necessary appropriations.” An authorizing statute that establishes a federal agency often creates statutory duties and obligations for that federal agency (including the responsibility to conduct certain activities such as enforcement of the particular law that the agency is charged with administering). If an authorization of appropriations expires, or if Congress fails to appropriate sufficient funds without explicitly denying their use for a particular purpose, those statutory obligations still exist even though the agency may lack sufficient funds to satisfy them.

Sep 9, 2014

Offices of Inspectors General and Law Enforcement Authority: In Brief

Federal inspectors general (IGs) have been granted substantial independence and powers to combat waste, fraud, and abuse within designated federal departments and agencies. To execute their missions, offices of inspector general (OIGs) conduct and publish audits and investigations—among other duties. Established by public law as permanent, nonpartisan, and independent offices, OIGs exist in more than 70 federal agencies, including all departments and larger agencies, along with numerous boards and commissions and other entities. Many OIGs have been vested with law enforcement authority to assist their investigations. This report provides background on federal offices of inspectors general and their law enforcement authorities in investigations. In this report, law enforcement authority is generally defined as having the legal authority to carry a firearm while engaged in official duties; make an arrest without a warrant while engaged in official duties; and seek and execute warrants for arrest, search of premises, or seizure of evidence. This report identifies the laws and regulations that vest certain OIGs with law enforcement authority, which permits the use of guns and ammunition. This report also describes some of the requirements and expectations of OIGs that have law enforcement authority, and includes some reasons that OIGs have expressed a need for law enforcement authority.

Sep 8, 2014

Asylum and Gang Violence: Legal Overview

The recent increase in the number of unaccompanied alien children (UACs) apprehended at the border between Mexico and the United States has raised questions about the role that gang-related violence in Central America may play in determining whether such children are eligible for refugee status and asylum. Only aliens who are “refugees,” as that term is defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), qualify for potential refugee status or asylum (two forms of discretionary relief that could enable UACs to enter or remain in the United States). The INA’s definition, in turn, generally encompasses individuals outside their home country who are unable or unwilling to return to that country because of “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” However, key terms within this definition—including persecution and particular social group—are not defined by statute or regulation. Instead, they have been construed by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the highest administrative tribunal for interpreting and applying immigration law, through a process of case-by-case adjudication, with the federal courts generally deferring to the BIA’s interpretation insofar as it is based on a “permissible construction” of the INA. These cases center upon eligibility for asylum, because denials of applications for refugee status cannot be appealed. Denials of asylum by immigration judges in the course of formal removal proceedings, in contrast, may be appealed to the BIA and the federal courts of appeals. Persecution has been construed to mean the infliction of harm by the government, or an entity the government is unable or unwilling to control, “upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive ..., in a manner condemned by civilized governments.” A showing of past persecution establishes a rebuttable presumption that the alien has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Otherwise, aliens must prove they subjectively fear persecution, and there is a “reasonable possibility” they would suffer persecution if returned to their home country. Such a “reasonable possibility” can exist when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place. This persecution must also be “on account of” a protected ground (e.g., race). The REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13) amended the INA to require that a protected ground “was or will be at least one central reason” for the persecution. However, central reason has been construed to mean a reason that is more than “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason,” not as the only or primary reason. Most protected grounds (i.e., race, religion, nationality, political opinion) are fairly straightforward in their definition, if not in their application in specific cases. Particular social group, however, has been construed in various ways by the BIA over the years. When considered by the BIA or appellate courts in light of how the INA’s definition of refugee is construed, claims to asylum based on gang-related violence frequently (although not inevitably) fail. In some cases, this is because the harm experienced or feared by the alien is seen not as persecution, but as generalized lawlessness or criminal activity. In other cases, persecution has been found to be lacking because governmental ineffectiveness in controlling the gangs is distinguished from inability or unwillingness to control them. In yet other cases, any persecution that is found is seen as lacking the requisite connection to a protected ground, and instead arising from activities “typical” to gangs, such as extortion and recruitment of new members. The particular social group articulated by the alien (e.g., former gang members, recruits) may also been seen as lacking a “common, immutable characteristic,” social visibility (now, social distinction), or particularity.

Sep 5, 2014

Protection of Trade Secrets: Overview of Current Law and Legislation

A trade secret is confidential, commercially valuable information that provides a company with a competitive advantage, such as customer lists, methods of production, marketing strategies, pricing information, and chemical formulae. (Well-known examples of trade secrets include the formula for Coca-Cola, the recipe for Kentucky Fried Chicken, and the algorithm used by Google’s search engine.) To succeed in the global marketplace, U.S. firms depend upon their trade secrets, which increasingly are becoming their most valuable intangible assets. However, U.S. companies annually suffer billions of dollars in losses due to the theft of their trade secrets by employees, corporate competitors, and even foreign governments. Stealing trade secrets has increasingly involved the use of cyberspace, advanced computer technologies, and mobile communication devices, thus making the theft relatively anonymous and difficult to detect. The Chinese and Russian governments have been particularly active and persistent perpetrators of economic espionage with respect to U.S. trade secrets and proprietary information. In contrast to other types of intellectual property (trademarks, patents, and copyrights) that are governed primarily by federal law, trade secret protection is primarily a matter of state law. Thus, trade secret owners have more limited legal recourse when their rights are violated. State law provides trade secret owners with the power to file civil lawsuits against misappropriators. A federal criminal statute, the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), allows U.S. Attorneys to prosecute anyone who engages in “economic espionage” or the “theft of trade secrets.” The EEA’s “economic espionage” provision punishes those who misappropriate trade secrets with the intent or knowledge that the offense will benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent. The EEA’s “theft of trade secrets” prohibition is of more general application, involving the intentional theft of a trade secret related to a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, with the intent or knowledge that such action will injure the trade secret owner. In addition to criminal enforcement of the statute, the EEA authorizes the Attorney General to bring a civil action to obtain injunctive relief against any violation of the EEA. However, because the U.S. Department of Justice and its Federal Bureau of Investigation have limited investigative and prosecutorial resources, as well as competing enforcement priorities, some observers assert that the federal government cannot adequately protect U.S. trade secrets from domestic and foreign threats. They have urged Congress to adopt a comprehensive, federal trade secret law in order to promote uniformity in trade secret law throughout the United States and to more effectively deal with trade secret theft that crosses state and international borders (a challenging problem for state courts to address). Among other things, they support the establishment of a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation, to allow U.S. companies to obtain monetary and injunctive relief when their trade secret assets are stolen. Several bills have been introduced in the 113th Congress related to trade secret misappropriation, including S. 884 (Deter Cyber Theft Act); H.R. 2281, S. 1111 (Cyber Economic Espionage Accountability Act); S. 1770 (Future of American Innovation and Research (FAIR) Act of 2013); H.R. 2466 (Private Right of Action Against Theft of Trade Secrets Act of 2013); S. 2384 (Deter Cyber Theft Act of 2014); S. 2267 (Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2014); H.Res. 643; H.R. 5103 (Chinese Communist Economic Espionage Sanctions Act); and H.R. 5233 (Trade Secrets Protection Act of 2014). As of the date of this report, none of these proposals has been enacted.

Sep 5, 2014

The Take Care Clause and Executive Discretion in the Enforcement of Law

The Take Care Clause would appear to stand for two, at times diametrically opposed propositions—one imposing a “duty” upon the President and the other viewing the Clause as a source of Presidential “power.” Primarily, the Take Care Clause has been interpreted as placing an obligation on both the President and those under his supervision to comply with and execute clear statutory directives as enacted by Congress. However, the Supreme Court has also construed the Clause as ensuring Presidential control over the enforcement of federal law. As a result, courts generally will not review Presidential enforcement decisions, including the decision of whether to initiate a criminal prosecution or administrative enforcement action in response to a violation of federal law. In situations where an agency refrains from bringing an enforcement action, courts have historically been cautious in reviewing the agency determination—generally holding that these nonenforcement decisions are “committed to agency discretion” and therefore not subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. The seminal case on this topic is Heckler v. Chaney, in which the Supreme Court held that an “agency’s decision not to take enforcement action should be presumed immune from judicial review.” However, the Court also clearly indicated that the presumption against judicial review of agency nonenforcement decisions may be overcome in a variety of specific situations. For example, a court may review an agency nonenforcement determination “where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers,” or where the agency has “’consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” As such, it would appear that Congress may overcome the presumption of nonreviewability and restrict executive discretion through statute by expressly providing “meaningful standards” for the manner in which the agency may exercise its enforcement powers. Nevertheless, legislation that can be characterized as significantly restricting the exercise of executive branch enforcement decisions, in either the criminal, civil, or administrative context, could raise questions under the separation of powers.

Sep 4, 2014

A Primer on the Reviewability of Agency Delay and Enforcement Discretion

Congress regularly authorizes and requires administrative agencies to implement and enforce regulatory programs. As such, agencies routinely make decisions about when to promulgate regulations and when to enforce statutory requirements against parties who violate the law. During the 113th Congress, the Obama Administration announced that certain federal agencies would not enforce specific aspects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) for a period of time in order to allow the public to further prepare for proper compliance with the law in the future. This has led to numerous questions regarding how courts treat administrative delays of regulatory programs. When can a suit be brought to force the agency to apply the law? It is important to distinguish between two distinct types of agency delays: (1) delays resulting from when an agency fails to meet a statutory deadline for promulgating rules or completing particular adjudications, and (2) affirmative decisions to withhold enforcement of a provision of law on the public at large. The former arises in a scenario in which Congress has enacted a statute that expressly requires an agency to take a specific action by a certain date that the agency fails to meet. Because agencies can often struggle to meet tight congressional deadlines imposed by laws, courts have established a balancing test, known as the TRAC test, to determine whether the agency should be compelled to take action. The second type of delay occurs in a scenario in which an agency refuses, for a period of time, to enforce a statutory prohibition or requirement that Congress has imposed on third parties. This type of delay is generally implemented by announcing a period of non-enforcement during which the agency will not pursue or punish non-compliance with the law. Courts determine whether these delays are reviewable in court by following the Supreme Court’s holding in Heckler v. Chaney. This report will discuss the general legal principles applied in determining whether administrative delays are reviewable in court in these two different contexts and then address whether the procedures outlined in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are applicable to these delays.

Sep 4, 2014

Rural Development Provisions in the 2014 Farm Bill (P.L. 113-79)

While many legislative proposals introduced in a given Congress may have implications for rural America, Congress has generally expressed concern with economic development of rural communities within the context of periodic omnibus farm bills, most recently in Title VI of the Agricultural Act of 2014 (P.L. 113-79). Congress uses farm bills to address emerging rural issues as well as to reauthorize and/or amend a wide range of rural programs administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA) three rural development mission agencies: Rural Housing Service, Rural Business-Cooperative Service, and Rural Utilities Service. Title VI of the 2014 farm bill addresses a wide range of policy issues concerning rural America, many of which were also addressed in the 2008 farm bill. These issues included provisions such as equity capital development in rural areas, regional economic planning and development, essential community facilities, water and wastewater infrastructure needs, value-added agricultural development, and broadband telecommunications development. The 2014 farm bill expands high-speed broadband access in rural areas through a new rural gigabit network pilot program, establishes new criteria for prioritizing broadband loans, creates a new rural energy savings program, establishes a program for strategic economic and community development, and consolidates several existing business development grants into a broader program of business development grants. The bill also authorizes $150 million in mandatory spending for pending rural development loans and grants, primarily water and wastewater infrastructure projects. A side-by-side comparison of the final bill with the House- and Senate-passed provisions is provided at the end of the report. The 2014 farm bill authorizes USDA to prioritize otherwise eligible applications that support multijurisdictional strategic economic and community development. The provision reserves 20% of a fiscal year’s appropriation for community facilities, water and wastewater projects, and rural business development for such strategic economic development projects. The bill authorizes a new Rural Energy Savings Program that will provide 0% interest rate loans to eligible borrowers to implement energy efficiency measures. The bill also authorizes appropriations of $10 million annually (FY2014-FY2018) for a new Rural Gigabit Network Pilot program for “ultra-high speed” broadband connectivity, and amends through FY2018 many long-standing programs funded through annual appropriations—water and waste disposal grants, technical assistance for rural water systems, emergency community water assistance, business opportunity grants, water assistance to Native villages in Alaska, community facilities for tribal colleges, and distance learning and telemedicine, to name a few. Most of these programs received authorized funding at levels generally lower than authorized by the 2008 farm bill.

Sep 4, 2014

Campaign Finance: Constitutionality of Limits on Contributions and Expenditures

Sep 4, 2014

The Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance: A Legal Overview

Article III of the Constitution established the judicial branch of the United States, staffing the branch with life-tenured and salary-protected judges. Amongst the powers of the federal judiciary is the power of “judicial review”—that is, the power to invalidate the acts of other branches of government and the states that contravene the Constitution. The Framers of the Constitution established this “countermajoritarian” role for the judiciary to help protect the written Constitution and its principles against incursions from the political branches. The power of judicial review is both a potent and controversial power, as American history has been replete with examples of outcry at when unelected federal judges invalidate the acts of a democratically elected branch of government. The potential for backlash to judicial review by the political branches has resulted in what late Professor Alexander Bickel termed a “countermajoritarian difficulty,” as the judiciary is needed to protect the basic principles of the Constitution, but is also necessarily dependent on the political branches to enforce the judiciary’s mandates. In other words, judicial review, while necessary to protect the mandates of the Constitution, is inherently antidemocratic, risking an erosion of the judiciary’s role in the American constitutional form of government. The prominent solution to the potential perils of the countermajoritarian difficulty, as espoused by Professor Bickel, is that the judiciary—and in particular the High Court—should exercise the “passive virtues,” a set of tools, such as the justiciability doctrines, with which a court can return an unsettled and controversial constitutional problem to the political realm for resolution. The logic of Bickel’s theory is that by “staying its hand” a court can avoid unnecessary entanglement in controversial and sensitive constitutional issues, while simultaneously allowing the judiciary to better gauge what is the appropriate constitutional principle animating a particular issue. Professor Bickel’s work has been built on by Professor Cass Sunstein, who has argued that when the Supreme Court does reach the merits of a constitutional question (as opposed to avoiding the question entirely), the Court should practice “judicial minimalism,”—that is, in deciding cases, judges should say no more than necessary to justify an outcome and leave as much as possible undecided. Sunstein justified his theories on the grounds that minimalism reduces burdens on the Supreme Court and promotes democratic dialogue on difficult constitutional law questions. The works of Professors Bickel and Sunstein are anchored in “deeply rooted” precedent from the Supreme Court in a doctrine called the constitutional avoidance doctrine. The doctrine was perhaps best articulated in a concurrence by Justice Louis Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, in which Justice Brandeis listed seven different loosely related rules that allow a court to avoid issuing broad rulings on matters of constitutional law. A host of recent cases from the Roberts Court on some of the most controversial legal issues currently facing the nation—including foreign surveillance, gay marriage, voting rights, the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers, affirmative action, and mandatory union dues—have deployed the Ashwander rules to avoid having the Supreme Court issue broad rulings on the Constitution. After providing general background on the power of judicial review and the major theories on the constitutional avoidance doctrine, this report explores the various rules that allow a court to avoid a ruling that invalidates a democratically enacted law and the logic behind those rules. The report concludes with an exploration of how the doctrine of constitutional avoidance has influenced some of the recent jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, criticisms of the doctrine, and the implications for Congress.

Sep 2, 2014

Special Immigrant Juveniles: In Brief

Abused, neglected, or abandoned children who also lack authorization under immigration law to reside in the United States (i.e., unauthorized aliens) raise complex immigration and child welfare concerns. In 1990, Congress created an avenue for unauthorized alien children who become dependents of the state juvenile courts to remain in the United States legally and permanently. Any child or youth under the age of 21 who was born in a foreign country; lives without legal authorization in the United States; has experienced abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and meets other specified eligibility criteria may be eligible for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status. Otherwise, unauthorized residents who are minors are subject to removal proceedings and deportation, as are all other unauthorized foreign nationals. The SIJ classification enables unauthorized juveniles who become dependents of the state juvenile court to become lawful permanent residents (LPR) under the Immigrant and Nationality Act (INA). If an LPR meets the naturalization requirements set in the INA, he or she can become a U.S. citizen. When Congress enacted provisions in the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, it altered the eligibility criteria for SIJ status as part of a package of amendments pertaining to unaccompanied alien children. Now, the recent increase in unaccompanied alien children arriving in the United States has cast a spotlight on SIJ status because these unaccompanied children may apply for, and some may obtain, LPR status through this provision. There has been a tenfold increase in the number of children requesting SIJ status between FY2005 and FY2013. In terms of approvals, the numbers have gone from 73 in FY2005 to 3,432 in FY2013. While the data do not differentiate among those unauthorized children who arrived unaccompanied by their parents and those who were removed from their parents because of abuse, abandonment, or neglect, many observers point to the similarity in the spiking trends of both categories. This report provides a brief explanation of the statutory basis of SIJ status and how it has evolved. It also presents statistics on the number of children who have applied for and received SIJ status since FY2005. The report concludes with a discussion of the applicability of SIJ status for unaccompanied alien children.

Aug 29, 2014

Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations

This report examines policy considerations for Congress in response to the recent influx of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) from Central American countries being apprehended at the U.S. border. The report also discusses current policy framework and the Obama Administration's diplomatic response.

Aug 28, 2014

Legal Issues with Federal Labeling of Genetically Engineered Food: In Brief

Aug 28, 2014

NATO's Wales Summit: Expected Outcomes and Key Challenges

This report provides an overview of the NATO's Wales summit's main agenda items and expected outcomes, highlighting key challenges, U.S. policy priorities, and potential issues for Congress.

Aug 26, 2014