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CRS Reports

Congressional Research Service reports providing nonpartisan analysis of major federal policy issues.

4,930 reports indexed · sourced from EveryCRSReport.com

R43923Foreign Affairs

The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy: Issues for the 114th Congress

Congress established the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) through the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 (P.L. 94-282). The act states, “The primary function of the OSTP Director is to provide, within the Executive Office of the President [EOP], advice on the scientific, engineering, and technological aspects of issues that require attention at the highest level of Government.” Further, “The Office shall serve as a source of scientific and technological analysis and judgment for the President with respect to major policies, plans, and programs of the Federal Government.” The OSTP Director is appointed by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, and may also be appointed Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST). The APST manages the National Science and Technology Council, an interagency body established by Executive Order 12881 that coordinates science and technology policy across the federal government. The APST also co-chairs the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, a council established by Executive Order 13539 and composed of external advisors who provide advice to the President. In the Obama Administration, John Holdren is both the OSTP Director and the APST. OSTP is engaged in several activities of potential interest to the 114th Congress. Since FY2011, Congress has restricted OSTP’s ability to use appropriated funds “to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company” unless authorized to do so by a subsequent law. The 114th Congress may continue its interest in the participation of OSTP in China-related activities. OSTP plays a role in ensuring the scientific integrity of research conducted and supported by the federal government, as well as in the communication of scientific and technical information developed and analyzed by federal scientists and engineers. The 114th Congress may continue congressional consideration of the extent to which OSTP oversees these activities. OSTP has taken actions to provide greater public access to the results of federally funded research and development. In February 2013, OSTP Director Holdren issued a memorandum requiring federal agencies investing at least $100 million per year in research and development to develop policies allowing the general public access to the results of this investment. These policies are in the process of being released and implemented and may spur additional congressional oversight. Finally, OSTP has inventoried federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education investments and developed a strategic plan for them. In his FY2015 and FY2014 budget requests, the President proposed reorganizations of federal STEM education programs. The extent and success of this reorganization may further focus congressional attention on OSTP’s role as a coordinator of cross-agency science and technology activities.

May 5, 2015

IF10185African Affairs

Ethiopia: An Overview

May 5, 2015

R44022Appropriations

The Future of Internet Governance: Should the U.S. Relinquish Its Authority Over ICANN?

The report provides background information on Domain Name System and the role of the U.S. government. This report discusses the U.S. government limited authority over the Internet's domain name system, primarily through the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) functions contract between the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN).

May 5, 2015

IF10155

Somalia

May 5, 2015

R44019National Defense

Fact Sheet: Selected Highlights of H.R. 1735, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2016

This report includes a fact sheet based on the draft bill and committee report (H.Rept. 114-102) and is designed as a time-urgent product offering Members the best available information about the bill pending publication of a CRS report on the FY2016 Defense Authorization and Appropriations legislation.

May 5, 2015

IF10219Health Policy

Opioid Treatment Programs and Related Federal Regulations

May 4, 2015

R43414Aging Policy

Older Americans Act: Background and Overview

May 4, 2015

IF10218

South Sudan

May 1, 2015

R43287Energy Policy

Columbia River Treaty Review

The Columbia River Treaty (CRT, or Treaty) is an international agreement between the United States and Canada for the cooperative development and operation of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin to provide for flood control and power. The Treaty was the result of more than 20 years of negotiations between the two countries and was ratified in 1961. Implementation began in 1964. The Treaty provided for the construction and operation of three dams in Canada and one dam in the United States whose reservoir extends into Canada. Together, these dams more than doubled the amount of reservoir storage available in the basin and provided significant flood protection benefits. In exchange for these benefits, the United States agreed to provide Canada with lump-sum cash payments and a portion of downstream hydropower benefits that are attributable to Canadian operations under the CRT, known as the “Canadian Entitlement.” Some have estimated the Canadian Entitlement to be worth as much as $335 million annually. The CRT has no specific end date, and most of its provisions would continue indefinitely without action by the United States or Canada. Beginning in September 2024, either nation can terminate most provisions of the Treaty with at least 10 years’ written notice (i.e., starting as early as 2014). If the CRT is not terminated or modified, most of its provisions would continue, with the exception of its flood control provisions (which are scheduled to transition automatically to “called-upon” operations at that time, meaning the United States would request and compensate Canada for flood control operations as necessary). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bonneville Power Administration, in their joint role as the U.S. Entity overseeing the Treaty, undertook a review of the CRT from 2009 to 2013. Based on studies and stakeholder input, they provided a Regional Recommendation to the State Department in December 2013. They recommended continuing the Treaty with certain modifications. Among other things, these included rebalancing the CRT’s hydropower provisions, further delineating called-upon flood control operations after 2024, and incorporating into the Treaty flows to benefit Columbia River fisheries. The State Department currently is leading a federal interagency review process to determine the U.S. approach to Treaty review. Perspectives on the CRT and its review vary. Some believe the Treaty should include stronger provisions related to tribal resources and flows for fisheries that were not in the original Treaty; others disagree and focus on the perceived need to adjust the Canadian Entitlement to reflect actual hydropower benefits. For its part, the Canadian Entity (the Province of British Columbia) released in March 2013 a recommendation to continue the CRT with modifications “within the Treaty framework.” It disputed several assumptions and recommendations in the U.S. Entity’s review process. Since early 2014, the U.S. approach to CRT negotiations with Canada has been under review by a federal Interagency Policy Committee, coordinated by the State Department. To date, there has been no official U.S. position or timeline announced by the committee or the State Department. In an April 2015 letter to President Obama, the Northwest congressional delegation urged the Administration to move forward with Treaty negotiations. If the executive branch comes to an agreement regarding modification of the CRT, the Senate may be asked to weigh in on future versions of the Treaty pursuant to its advice and consent role. In addition, both houses of Congress may weigh in on CRT review and negotiation activities through their oversight roles.

May 1, 2015

R44032

Patents and Regulatory Exclusivities: Issues in Pharmaceutical Innovation and Competition

Patents and regulatory exclusivities have each been the subject of congressional interest in recent years. Patents, which are administered by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), allow for a uniform 20-year term of protection for a variety of inventions. In contrast, regulatory exclusivities apply to drugs and biologic medicines regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Federal legislation establishes a complex range of regulatory exclusivities applicable to, among other subjects, new chemical entities, orphan drugs, and generic drugs. In general, these intellectual property rights require the FDA to protect an approved drug from competing applications for a set period of time. Patents and regulatory exclusivities each create intellectual property rights for their proprietors, but operate through distinct mechanisms. Patents must be enforced through litigation in federal court and may be invalidated during judicial proceedings. In contrast, the FDA ordinarily maintains regulatory exclusivities through agency procedures, without the intervention of the rights holder. Unlike patents, regulatory exclusivities may restrict the sale of public domain medicines. And although patents traditionally provided a longer term of protection, more recently enacted regulatory exclusivities tend to have more comparable durations. The patent system has traditionally served as the primary innovation incentive for new medicines. But recent legislative trends may elevate the regulatory exclusivity from a supplemental protection scheme to the primary driver of innovation within the pharmaceutical industry. For example, the Generating Antibiotics Incentives Now (GAIN) Act and the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act created regulatory exclusivities of 10 to 12 years, respectively, for certain products. Legislation introduced most recently before the 113th Congress, the MODDERN Cures Act, H.R. 3116, would have continued to expand the role of regulatory exclusivities. That unenacted legislation would have effectively allowed brand-name pharmaceutical firms, in certain circumstances, to exchange their patents for a 15-year period of regulatory exclusivity. While proponents of the legislation believe it would provide a more certain and effective innovation incentive for the pharmaceutical industry, others assert that it significantly expands intellectual property rights and represents a windfall for the brand-name drug industry. These proposals have been placed before the 114th Congress in the form of a discussion draft of the 21st Century Cures Act. Congress has several options as it considers the relationship between patents and regulatory exclusivities. If the current situation is deemed satisfactory, then no action need be taken. Other options include rationalizing the various terms of protection and scope of rights that regulatory exclusivities provide. Congress may also consider providing distinct names for the regulatory exclusivities and ensuring that these rights do not remove safe and effective medicines from the public domain.

May 1, 2015

R44010National Defense

Defense Acquisitions: How and Where DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars

The Department of Defense (DOD) has long relied on contractors to provide the U.S. military with a wide range of goods and services, including weapons, food, uniforms, and operational support. Without contractor support, the United States would be currently unable to arm and field an effective fighting force. Understanding costs and trends associated with contractor support could provide Congress more information upon which to make budget decisions and weigh the relative costs and benefits of different military operations—including contingency operations and maintaining bases around the world. Obligations occur when agencies enter into contracts, employ personnel, or otherwise commit to spending money. The federal government tracks money obligated on federal contracts through a database called the Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS). There is no public database that tracks DOD contract outlays (money spent) as comprehensively as obligations. Total DOD Contract Obligations In FY2014, DOD obligated more money on federal contracts ($285 billion) than all other government agencies combined. DOD’s obligations were equal to 8% of federal spending. Services accounted for 45% of total DOD contract obligations, goods for 45%, and research and development (R&D) for 10%. This distribution is in contrast to the rest of the federal government, which obligated a significantly larger portion of contracting dollars on services (68%), than on goods (22%) or research and development (9%). According to FPDS data, from FY2000 to FY2014, DOD contract obligations increased from $190 billion to $290 billion (FY2015 dollars). However, the increase in spending has not been steady. DOD contract obligations over the last 15 years are marked by a steep increase of $260 billion from FY2000 to FY2008 (averaging 11% annual increases), followed by a substantial drop of $160 billion (averaging 7% annual decreases) from FY2008 to FY2014. This boom-and-bust trend of DOD contract obligations, which makes budget cutting more difficult due to relatively large budget swings, is in marked contrast to the rest of the federal government, which has had more gradual increases and less drastic contract spending cuts. For almost 20 years, DOD has dedicated an ever-smaller share of its contracting dollars to R&D, with such contracts dropping from 18% of total contract obligations in FY1998 to 10% in FY2014. Understanding the Limitation of FPDS Data Decision-makers should be cautious when using obligation data from FPDS to develop policy or otherwise draw conclusions. In some cases, the data itself may not be reliable. For example, according to DOD officials, the data in FPDS over-represents FY2008 obligations by $13 billion and under-represents FY2009 obligations by the same amount. Depending on the query, understanding and pulling reports from FPDS can be confusing and difficult to interpret. In some instances, a query for particular data may return differing results, depending on the type of query used. Despite the limitations of FPDS, imperfect data is sometimes better than no data. A number of foreign observers have noted that despite its shortcomings, FPDS data is substantially better than what is available in virtually any other country in the world. FPDS data can be used to identify some broad trends and rough estimations, or to gather information about specific contracts. Understanding the limitations of data—knowing when, how, and to what extent to rely on data—could help policymakers incorporate FPDS data more effectively into their decision-making process. GSA is undertaking a multi-year effort to improve the reliability and usefulness of the information contained in FPDS and other federal government information systems. This effort, if successful, could significantly improve DOD’s ability to engage in evidence- and data-based decision-making. This report examines (1) how much money DOD obligates on contracts, (2) what DOD is buying, and (3) where that money is being spent. This report also examines the extent to which these data are sufficiently reliable to use as a factor when developing policy or analyzing government operations.

Apr 30, 2015

IF10217Agricultural Policy

Federal Efforts to Control Invasive Plant and Animal Species

Apr 30, 2015

R44013Economic Policy

Corporate Tax Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS): An Examination of the Data

Congress and the Obama Administration have expressed interest in addressing multinational corporations’ ability to shift profits into low- and no-tax countries with little corresponding change in business operations. Several factors appear to be driving this interest. Economists have estimated that profit shifting results in significant tax revenue losses annually, implying that reducing the practice could help address deficit and debt concerns. Profit shifting and base erosion are also believed to distort the allocation of capital as investment decisions are overly influenced by taxes. Fairness concerns have also been raised. If multinational corporations can avoid or reduce their taxes, other taxpayers (including domestically focused businesses and individuals) may perceive the tax system as unfair. At the same time, policymakers are also concerned that American corporations could be unintentionally harmed if careful consideration is not given to the proper way to reduce profit shifting. Consistent with the findings of existing research, the analysis presented in this report provides indications that the magnitude of profit shifting may be significant. For example, of the $1.2 trillion in overseas profits American companies reported earning in 2012, $600 billion was attributed to seven “tax haven” or “tax preferred” countries: Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Singapore, Switzerland, and the U.K. Caribbean Islands. The Netherlands was the most popular location to report profits, accounting for 14.1% of all overseas earnings of American companies. Further analysis reveals that the share of profits reported is significantly disproportional to the amount of hiring and investment made by American companies in these countries. Data on the foreign direct investment (FDI) positions of American companies are also analyzed. Examining FDI data allows for an indirect investigation into the degree of profit shifting. The FDI data show that the same seven “tax haven” or “tax preferred” countries accounted for nearly half (47%) of the worldwide FDI position of the United States. The data also show that an increasing share of FDI is being held via holding companies. The report discusses that some of the increased use of holding companies may be tax motivated. Lastly, data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations (UN) on the location of the FDI positions of all countries indicate that profit shifting is likely an international issue. Several policy options for addressing base erosion and profit shifting are briefly discussed. Included in the discussion are the tradeoffs and considerations involved in moving closer to either a pure worldwide tax system or a pure territorial tax system. The adoption of a minimum tax or a formula apportionment system is also discussed, as well as the effects of modifying current tax policy such as broadening the definition of Subpart F income or reducing corporate tax rates. The report concludes with a discussion of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) plan, which may have implications for American corporations even if the U.S. does not adopt the OECD’s recommendations. This report is intended to assist Congress as it considers what, if any, action to take to curb profit shifting. It is one of several CRS products related to the subject of profit shifting. Where appropriate, reference is made to related CRS products that discuss the more technical issues in the international corporate tax debate.

Apr 30, 2015

R44011Agricultural Policy

Invasive Species: Control Options and Issues for Congress

For the first few centuries after the arrival of Europeans in North America, plants and animals of many species were sent between the two land masses. The transfer of non-natives consisted not only of intentional westbound species ranging from pigs to dandelions but also of intentional eastbound species such as grey squirrels and tomatoes. And for those centuries, the remaining non-native species crossing the Atlantic, uninvited and often unwelcome, were ignored if they were noticed at all. They were joined by various species arriving deliberately or accidentally from Asia and Africa. The national focus on invasive species arose in the 19th century, primarily owing to losses in agriculture (due to weeds or plant diseases), the leading industry of the time. A few recently arrived invasive species, and estimates of adverse economic impacts exceeding $100 billion annually have sharpened that focus. Very broadly, the unanswered question regarding invasive species concerns whose responsibility it is to ensure economic integrity and ecological stability in response to the actual or potential impacts of invasive species, and at what cost. As this report shows, the current answer is not simple. It may depend on answers to many other questions: Is the introduction deliberate or accidental? Does it affect agriculture? By what pathway does the new species arrive? Is the potential harm from the species already known? Is the species already established in one area of the country? Finally, if the answers to any of these questions are unsatisfactory, what changes should be made? The specific issue before Congress is whether new legislative authorities and funding are needed to address issues of invasive species and their increasing economic and ecological impacts on such disparate matters as power-plant operations, grazing lands, and coral fishes. Such legislation could affect domestic and international trade, tourism, industries dependent on importing non-native species, those dependent on keeping them out, and finally, the variety of natural resources that have little direct economic value and yet affect the lives of a broad segment of the public. In the century or so of congressional responses to invasive species, the usual approach has been an ad hoc attack on the particular problem, from impure seed stocks to Asian carp in the Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal. A few notable attempts have begun to address specific pathways by which invasives arrive (e.g., ship ballast water), but no current law addresses the broad, general concern over non-native species and the variety of paths by which they enter this country. A 1998 executive order took a step in bringing together some of the current authorities and resources to address a problem that has expanded with both increasing world trade and travel and decreasing transit time for humans and cargo. Multiple bills have been introduced on this subject in recent Congresses. There are two basic approaches to limiting the spread of invasive species: a species-by-species assessment of the risks or benefits of admitting or excluding species, and a policy based on controlling pathways of entry in which vigilance is maintained on incoming ballast tanks, cargo holds, packing materials, and similar vehicles for unwanted organisms. These two approaches may complement each other. Policymakers also may emphasize prevention over post hoc control or vice-versa, or they may adopt a combination of the two approaches.

Apr 30, 2015

R44012

Tax Expenditures: Overview and Analysis

Tax expenditures—revenue losses associated with targeted provisions that move the income tax away from a “theoretical normal” tax system—are a long-standing feature of the U.S. tax code. In some ways, tax expenditures resemble direct spending programs. They both have similar budgetary effects and provide incentives that alter the allocation of resources. Hence, tax expenditures, like direct spending, are one of the ways that the federal government plays a role in shaping the economy. Tax expenditures, however, do not regularly receive the same level of scrutiny as direct spending programs. Also, unlike direct spending programs, the revenue loss associated with most tax expenditures is only limited by eligibility—much like mandatory spending programs. A consequence of the limited oversight placed on tax expenditures is that activities may be supported by tax expenditures that have insufficient political support for funding through a direct spending program. During the last 40 years, the level of tax expenditures has varied both as a function of taxes collected and as a share of the economy. One possible explanation for this variability is that tax reform historically reduces the scope of tax expenditures, which otherwise grow. Growth in tax expenditures has exceeded that of discretionary spending, but not mandatory spending, over the same time period. The revenue loss from tax expenditures is concentrated among a limited number of provisions, with 66% of the revenue loss attributed to the top 10 tax expenditures against the individual income tax. In addition, the benefits of tax expenditures against the individual income tax are concentrated among upper-income taxpayers. A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis of selected tax expenditures found that 51% of the benefits went to the top 20% of taxpayers. Tax expenditures are a common target when base-broadening tax reform is pursued—like with the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514). This may be the result of tax expenditures being defined as being outside the normal tax code—making them a clear source for base-broadening. However, there are impediments to base broadening by eliminating or reducing tax expenditures, as some may serve important purposes, others are important for distributional reasons, and many are technically difficult to change or are broadly used by the public and quite popular.

Apr 30, 2015

IF10215

Mexico’s Recent Immigration Enforcement Efforts

Apr 29, 2015

IF10163Economic Policy

Cybersecurity and Information Sharing

Apr 29, 2015

R44006American Law

Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 114th Congress

A surprising number of federal crimes carry mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment; that is, they are punishably by imprisonment for a term of not less than some number of years. During the 114th Congress, Members have introduced a number of related proposals. Some would expand the scope of existing mandatory minimum sentencing provisions; others would contract their reach. The most sweeping proposal is that of Representative Scott (VA) (H.R. 706) and Senator Paul (S. 353), which impacts mandatory minimum sentencing across the board, allowing federal courts to disregard statutory mandatory minimum sentencing requirements in order to avoid conflicts with general sentencing standards. Other proposals are more narrowly drawn, and speak to a particular class of crime. Representative Polis (H.R. 1013), for example, has suggested decriminalizing marijuana, thereby eliminating the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions now associated with marijuana. Several bills, including those offered by Senators Cornyn (S. 178), Feinstein (S. 140), and Kirk (S. 572), as well as those offered by Representatives Poe (H.R. 181, H.R. 296), Granger (H.R. 1201), and Wagner (H.R. 285), would clarify or expand the coverage of a number of federal sex trafficking offenses, in one way or another, thereby increasing the number of defendants facing mandatory minimum sentences. While proposals relating to sex trafficking would largely increase the number of mandatory minimum sentences imposed, most of the proposals relating to drug trafficking would have the opposite impact. Senator Lee’s S. 502 and Representative Labrador’s H.R. 920, for instance, would reduce the mandatory minimum sentences that accompany a number of drug trafficking offenses. The same bills would expand the so-called safety valve which allows a court to sentence certain low-level drug offenders below the otherwise applicable mandatory minimum sentence. Finally, Representative Scott’s H.R. 1255 would eliminate the distinction between powder and crack cocaine, and as a consequence potentially reduce the number of defendants subject to the more severe drug trafficking mandatory minimums. Firearms legislation is more varied. Existing law imposes a series of mandatory minimum sentences when a firearm is associated with the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). Representative Scott’s H.R. 1254 would convert all of Section 924(c)’s mandatory minimums (not-less-than) to statutory maximums (not-more-than). Senator McCain’s S. 847 and Representative McSally’s H.R. 1588, on the other hand, would make Section 924(c)’s mandatory minimums available not only in cases involving crimes of violence or drug trafficking, but also those involving the smuggling of aliens. Many of the proposals in the 114th Congress built upon earlier offerings in the 113th Congress, as described in CRS Report R43296, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 113th Congress, by Charles Doyle.

Apr 29, 2015

R44005Constitutional Questions

Questions of the Privileges of the House: An Analysis

The first section of this report provides information on raising and considering questions of House privileges to provide assistance in anticipating potential House action. The second part focuses on the content of questions in an effort to provide guidance as to what the Speaker may determine constitutes a valid question. The final section provides extensive data on questions raised in the past two decades.

Apr 28, 2015

R44004Appropriations

DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy: FY2016 Appropriations

Apr 28, 2015

R44008Education Policy

Preschool Development Grants and Race to the Top-Early Learning Challenge Grants: A Primer

The importance of children’s early learning experiences to their development and later success in school and the workforce has become a subject of increasing interest to the public, Members of Congress, and the Administration. During recent congresses many bills have been introduced that would provide funding to states aiming to facilitate improvements in the quality of, and access to, early childhood education programs. This report focuses on two early childhood initiatives—Race to the Top-Early Learning Challenge (RTT-ELC) grants and Preschool Development Grants (PDG). Both programs are administered jointly by the U.S. Department of Education (ED) and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). In addition to background and information on these programs, the report provides data on states that received grants under one or both of these programs. PDG is a new program that is intended to build on the RTT-ELC grants program. The PDG program focuses specifically on expanding access to high-quality preschool for four-year-olds from low-income families; in contrast, the RTT-ELC program focuses more broadly on building comprehensive statewide systems to support high-quality preschool, as well as increasing access to preschool for high-need children. The Administration has requested $750 million in FY2016 funding for PDG; it received funding of $250 million in both FY2014 and FY2015. In its FY2016 budget request the Administration stated that this FY2016 investment would build on FY2014 and FY2015 funding by helping to lay the groundwork to ensure that states are ready to participate in the Administration’s planned larger Preschool for All initiative—which is intended to provide high-quality preschool to all low- and moderate-income children. Prior to the start of the PDG program, ED and HHS awarded three rounds of RTT-ELC grants in December 2011 ($500 million), 2012 ($133 million), and 2013 ($370 million). Nine states received RTT-ELC grants in 2011 (Phase 1), five states in 2012 (Phase 2), and six states in 2013 (Phase 3). On December 10, 2014, ED and HHS awarded PDG grants to 18 states from FY2014 funding. Grants are divided into two separate funding streams. States with fewer than 10% of their four-year-olds in state-funded preschool that have not received an RTT-ELC grant were eligible to apply for FY2014 PDG-Preschool Development Grants. Five states received these grants. States with more than 10% of their four-year-olds in state-funded preschool or that had received an RTT-ELC grant were eligible to apply for FY2014 PDG-Preschool Expansion Grants. Thirteen states received these grants.

Apr 27, 2015

R44003African Affairs

European Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessments, Responses, and Issues for the United States

The rising number of U.S. and European citizens traveling to fight with rebel and terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq has emerged as a growing concern for U.S. and European leaders, including Members of Congress. Several deadly terrorist attacks in Europe over the past year—including the killing of 17 people in Paris in January 2015—have heightened the perception that these individuals could pose a serious security threat. Increasingly, terrorist suspects in Europe appear to have spent time with groups fighting in the Middle East, especially with the Islamic State organization (also known as ISIL or ISIS). Others, like the gunman who murdered two individuals in Copenhagen in February 2015, seem to have been inspired by Islamist extremist propaganda. U.S. intelligence suggests that more than 20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the Syria-Iraq region, including at least 3,400 Westerners, since 2011. The vast majority of Western fighters are thought to be from Europe, although roughly 150 Americans have traveled or attempted to travel to Syria. U.S. authorities estimate that a handful of Americans have died in the conflict; they also assert that military operations against the Islamic State group since August 2014 have killed thousands of fighters, including an unknown number of foreigners. European governments have employed a mix of security measures and prevention efforts to address the potential foreign fighter threat. These have included increasing surveillance; prohibiting travel; countering terrorist recruitment and incitement to terrorism via the Internet and social media; and strengthening counter-radicalization programs. Steps are also being taken by the 28-member European Union (EU) to better combat the possible threat given the bloc’s largely open internal borders (which permit individuals to travel without passport checks among most European countries). EU leaders have emphasized the need to enhance information-sharing among national and EU authorities, strengthen external border controls, and improve existing counter-radicalization efforts, particularly online. Nevertheless, European countries and the EU face a range of challenges in stemming the flow of fighters to Syria and Iraq and keeping track of those who go and return. Prosecuting such individuals is difficult in many European countries because most existing laws require a high level of proof that a suspect has actually engaged in terrorism abroad or has returned to commit a terrorist act. Due to ongoing resource constraints, even those governments with far-reaching legal authority to detain terrorist suspects have found it difficult to identify and monitor a growing number of potential assailants. Furthermore, implementation of several EU-wide measures under discussion could be slowed by national sovereignty concerns, long-standing law enforcement barriers to sharing sensitive information, and strong EU data privacy and protection rights. U.S. officials and analysts contend that the potential foreign fighter threat underscores the importance of close law enforcement ties with key European allies and existing U.S.-EU information-sharing arrangements, including those related to tracking terrorist financing and sharing airline passenger data. Some U.S. policymakers, including several Members of Congress, have expressed particular worries about European fighters in Syria and Iraq because the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP) permits short-term visa-free travel to the United States for citizens of most European countries. At the same time, many point out that the VWP’s existing security controls require VWP travelers to provide advanced biographic information to U.S. authorities and may help limit travel by known violent extremists. In the 113th Congress, several pieces of legislation were introduced on the VWP, ranging from proposals to limit or suspend the program to those that sought to strengthen the security of the VWP further. In the 114th Congress, two proposals—H.R. 158 and S. 542—largely aim to enhance the VWP’s security components to better guard against potential terrorist threats. For additional information, see CRS Report RS22030, U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, by Kristin Archick, and CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by Alison Siskin.

Apr 27, 2015

R44001Constitutional Questions

Introducing a House Bill or Resolution

Apr 24, 2015

IF10214

Bangladesh

Apr 24, 2015

R44002Economic Policy

Cash Versus Accrual Accounting: Tax Policy Considerations

Two methods of accounting are generally available to businesses: cash basis and accrual basis accounting. Under cash basis accounting, revenue and expenses are recognized and recorded when cash is actually paid or received. Under accrual basis accounting, revenue is recorded when it is earned and expenses are reported when they are incurred, regardless of when payment is actually made or received. On the one hand, the cash basis method is simpler and arguably less administratively burdensome on businesses. On the other hand, cash accounting may result in a less accurate measure of economic income and allow for a deferral of tax liability. The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) considers cash accounting a departure from “normal income tax law” and thus classifies it as a tax expenditure. Current tax law requires that most companies with average gross receipts in excess of $5 million use the accrual basis of accounting. Some companies are allowed to use either the cash or accrual basis methods of accounting for tax purposes. Examples of companies that may be excepted from using accrual basis tax accounting regardless of total average gross receipts include sole proprietors and certain qualified Personal Service Corporations (PSCs) in such fields as health, law, engineering, accounting, performing arts, and consulting firms, as well as farms that are not corporations or do not have a corporate partner. Some Members of Congress and the Administration have put forth proposals that would expand the number of firms allowed to use cash accounting by increasing the average gross receipts limit test. The Tax Reform Act of 2014 (H.R. 1) introduced in the 113th Congress would have expanded cash accounting by increasing the average gross receipts limit test to $10 million, but it would have also restricted the use of cash accounting for certain other firms. Although allowed to use cash accounting under current law, certain partnerships, subchapter S corporations, and PSCs with average gross receipts in excess of $10 million would not have been allowed to use cash accounting under the provisions of H.R. 1. Also introduced in the 113th Congress, the Small Business Accounting and Tax Simplification Act (H.R. 947), Start-up Jobs and Innovation Act (S. 1658), and Small Business Tax Certainty and Growth Act (S. 1085) would have all allowed certain firms with average gross receipts of $10 million or less to use cash accounting. Similarly, S. 341 introduced in the 114th Congress would raise the average gross receipts test limit to $10 million. The President’s FY2016 budget proposal also calls for expansion of cash accounting by changing the threshold from $5 million to $25 million. This report provides a brief explanation of cash and accrual accounting. It then examines the legislative history surrounding the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-514), which set most of the current policies related to cash accounting for tax purposes. It also discusses recent policy proposals to change accounting requirements for tax purposes. The report concludes by discussing a number of policy considerations Congress may find useful.

Apr 24, 2015

IF10033Foreign Affairs

Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and International Trade

Apr 23, 2015

R43949Appropriations

Federal Financing for the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP)

The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is a means-tested program that provides health coverage to targeted low-income children and pregnant women in families that have annual income above Medicaid eligibility levels but have no health insurance. CHIP is jointly financed by the federal government and the states, and the states are responsible for administering CHIP. The federal government pays about 70% of CHIP expenditures, and the federal government’s share of CHIP expenditures (including both services and administration) is determined by the enhanced federal medical assistance percentage (E-FMAP) rate. In FY2015, the E-FMAP rate ranges from 65% (13 states) to 82% (Mississippi). The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) included a provision to increase the E-FMAP rate by 23 percentage points for most CHIP expenditures from FY2016 through FY2019. The federal appropriation for CHIP is provided in statute. From this federal appropriation, states receive CHIP allotments, which are the federal funds allocated to each state and the territories for the federal share of their CHIP expenditures. In addition, if a state has a shortfall in federal CHIP funding, there are a few sources of shortfall funding, such as the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, redistribution funds, and Medicaid funds. FY2015 was the final year for which federal CHIP funding was provided in statute, but the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA; P.L. 114-10) extended federal CHIP funding, among other provisions. Specifically, P.L. 114-10 extended CHIP funding for two additional years (i.e., through FY2017) and maintained the current allotment formula with the 23 percentage point increase to the E-FMAP. The bill also extended the qualifying state option, the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, and outreach and enrollment grants. With FY2017 now being the final year for which federal CHIP funding is provided in statute, Congress’s action or inaction over the next couple of years will determine the future of CHIP and of health coverage for CHIP children. In considering the future of CHIP, Congress has a number of policy options, including extending federal CHIP funding and continuing the program or letting CHIP funding expire. Even though federal CHIP funding is set to expire after FY2017, under current law the ACA maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement for children is in place through FY2019. The MOE provision requires states to maintain income eligibility levels for CHIP children through September 30, 2019, as a condition for receiving federal Medicaid payments (notwithstanding the lack of corresponding federal CHIP appropriations for FY2018 and FY2019). If federal CHIP funding expires, the MOE requirement would impact CHIP Medicaid expansion programs and separate CHIP programs differently. States with CHIP Medicaid expansion programs must continue to cover their CHIP children once federal funding is no longer available. However, states with separate CHIP programs would not be required to continue coverage. This report provides an overview of CHIP financing, beginning with an explanation of the federal matching rate. It describes various aspects of federal CHIP funding, such as the federal appropriation, state allotments, the Child Enrollment Contingency Fund, redistribution funds, outreach and enrollment grants, and performance bonus payments. The report ends with a section about the future of CHIP funding, including the options for extending CHIP funding and what could happen if federal funding expires.

Apr 23, 2015

R44000Foreign Affairs

Cyprus: Reunification Proving Elusive

This report provides information and analysis relevant for Congress on the following: Assessments of U.S.-Turkey relations, Turkish foreign policy, and Turkey's strategic orientation.

Apr 23, 2015

R43539Health Policy

Commemorations in Congress: Options for Honoring Individuals, Groups, and Events

This report summarizes the evolution of commemorative legislation as well as the laws, rules, and procedures that have been adopted to control the types of commemoratives considered and enacted.

Apr 22, 2015

IF10149Foreign Affairs

African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)

Apr 22, 2015

IF10049Foreign Affairs

Debates over “Currency Manipulation”

Apr 22, 2015

R43861Health Policy

The Use of Modified Adjusted Gross Income (MAGI) in Federal Health Programs

Apr 22, 2015

R43998Agricultural Policy

U.S. Sugar Program Fundamentals

Apr 22, 2015

R43999Economic Policy

An Analysis of the Regulatory Burden on Small Banks

Since the financial crisis, policymakers have focused on addressing the failures that led to turmoil and ensuring that the financial system and the economy are better positioned to withstand future market disruptions. Some believe that the actions taken to realize these goals have been beneficial; others argue that the pendulum of regulation has swung too far and that the additional regulation has stymied economic growth and reduced consumers’ access to credit. Much of the debate has centered on how new regulation has affected small banks. A central question about the regulation of small banks is whether an appropriate tradeoff has been struck between the benefits and costs of regulation. The benefits of financial regulation include protecting consumers from fraud, discrimination, and abuse; ensuring that banks are less likely to fail; and promoting stability in the financial system. The costs associated with government regulation and its implementation is referred to as regulatory burden. The concept of regulatory burden can be contrasted with the phrase unduly burdensome, which refers to the relationship between benefits and costs. Some would consider a regulation to be unduly burdensome if costs exceed benefits or if the same benefits could be achieved at lower costs. The presence of regulatory burden does not mean that a regulation is unduly burdensome. Critics who believe that regulation is unduly burdensome point to the significant decline in the number of small banks over time. There could be other factors driving consolidation, however. For example, mergers are the largest cause of consolidation, and could occur when banks are financially strong or weak. Of the 14 “major” rules issued by banking regulators pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act (P.L. 111-203), 13 either include an exemption for small banks or are tailored to reduce the cost for small banks to comply. In addition, during the rulemaking process, financial regulators are required to consider the effect of rules on small banks. Supervision and enforcement are also structured to pose less of a burden on small banks than larger banks, such as by requiring less frequent bank examinations for certain small banks. This report provides several examples that could be offered to counter views that there is a “one-size-fits-all” approach to bank regulation and that new regulation has increased regulatory burden relative to large banks. If small banks are facing unduly burdensome regulation, it is either in absolute terms or because small banks have less capacity for regulatory compliance than large banks do. Quantifying the magnitude of regulatory burden has been a challenge for researchers because, among other reasons, federal statute does not require regulators to make quantitative estimates for all rules that they issue and because banks do not track the compliance costs spread throughout their operations. The difficulty in accurately assessing regulatory burden and in determining whether the burden rises to being unduly burdensome can make it challenging for policymakers to make informed judgments about the merits of proposals to provide regulatory relief. The status quo is best characterized as applying ad hoc exemptions to certain regulations for banks based on their size and volume of activity, and most legislative proposals would adjust those exemption levels. Alternatives to the status quo range from regulating all banks in the same way, regardless of size, to implementing a separate regulatory regime for small and large banks, with various approaches in between. A focus on taxpayer protection and avoiding regulatory arbitrage would argue in favor of regulating all banks consistently. Rationales for regulating small banks differently from large banks include the systemic risk posed by large banks, economies of scale to regulatory compliance, a lack of critical mass of small banks to which some regulations would be relevant, and a desire by some policymakers to promote small banks.

Apr 22, 2015

R43920

National Health Service Corps: Changes in Funding and Impact on Recruitment

The National Health Service Corps (NHSC) recruits and places trained individuals in underserved communities to provide health care services at approved sites. In exchange for a two-year service commitment in federally designated health professional shortage areas (HPSAs), individuals receive scholarships or loan repayments. NHSC clinicians may fulfill their service commitment at approved Federally Qualified Health Centers (FQHCs), FQHC Look-Alikes, Rural Health Clinics, Critical Access Hospitals, and other approved sites. The primary objective of the NHSC is to increase the availability of primary care services to underserved populations. The NHSC offers scholarships, loan repayments, and loan forgiveness to individuals in selected health professions. In FY2015, an estimated 8,495 NHSC clinicians will provide medical, dental, and other health care services to 8.9 million individuals in underserved communities. Also, in FY2015, the NHSC will award an estimated 2,272 new loan repayment agreements; 1,629 continuing loan repayment agreements; 100 student to service loan repayments; 464 state loan repayments; 163 new scholarships; and 14 continuing scholarships to individuals in various health professions. The NHSC was established in the Emergency Health Personnel Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-623), and it has been amended and reauthorized several times since its inception. Most recently, Congress revised the NHSC in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA; P.L. 111-148) by amending statutory authorities associated with part-time service, teaching credits toward service obligations, and exclusions from an individual’s gross income for those payments from state loan repayment or loan forgiveness programs that seek to increase health care access in HPSAs or other designated underserved areas. The NHSC is based within the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), an agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The ACA created a new Community Health Center Fund (CHCF) and required that a total of $1.5 billion in mandatory CHCF appropriations be transferred to the NHSC over the course of FY2011 through FY2015. Prior to the ACA, Congress had appropriated funds for the NHSC solely through the discretionary appropriations process for the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (Labor-HHS-ED). Since FY2012, in the absence of discretionary funding, the CHCF has been the NHSC’s only funding source. On April 16, 2015, the President signed P.L. 114-10, Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act (MACRA), which amends the ACA to extend mandatory funding for the NHSC from FY2015 through FY2017. Total NHSC funding, regardless of the source, affects the size of the NHSC health workforce that is available to provide health services in underserved areas. This report briefly summarizes the NHSC programs, describes recent trends in clinician service, reviews funding trends for FY2009 through FY2015, and includes data from the President’s FY2016 budget.

Apr 22, 2015

R43997Energy Policy

Deferred Maintenance of Federal Land Management Agencies: FY2005-FY2014 Estimates

Each of the four major federal land management agencies maintains tens of thousands of diverse assets, including roads, bridges, buildings, and water management structures. These agencies are the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), National Park Service (NPS), and Forest Service (FS). Congress and the Administration continue to focus on the agencies’ deferred maintenance in regard to these assets—in essence, the cost of any maintenance that was not done when it should have been or was scheduled to be. Deferred maintenance is often called the maintenance backlog. In FY2014, the most recent year for which these estimates are available, the four agencies had a combined deferred maintenance estimated at between $16.31 billion and $21.43 billion, with a mid-range figure of $18.87 billion calculated by the Congressional Research Service. This figure includes $11.50 billion (61%) in deferred maintenance for NPS, $5.10 billion (27%) for FS, $1.53 billion (8%) for FWS, and $0.74 billion (4%) for BLM. The estimates reflect project costs but exclude indirect costs. Over the past decade (FY2005-FY2014), the total deferred maintenance for the four agencies increased by $1.33 billion in current dollars, from $17.54 billion to $18.87 billion, or 8%. Both the BLM and NPS estimates increased, whereas the FWS and FS estimates decreased. By contrast, in constant dollars the total deferred maintenance estimate for the four agencies decreased from FY2005 to FY2014 by $4.53 billion, from $23.40 billion to $18.87 billion, or 19%. The BLM estimate increased, and estimates for the other three agencies decreased. In each fiscal year, NPS had the largest portion of the total deferred maintenance, considerably more than any other agency. FS consistently had the second-largest share, followed by FWS and then BLM. Throughout the past decade, the asset class that included roads typically comprised the largest portion of each agency’s deferred maintenance. Congressional debate has focused on varied issues, including the level and sources of funds needed to reduce deferred maintenance, whether agencies are efficiently using existing funding, how to balance the maintenance of existing infrastructure with the acquisition of new assets, whether disposal of assets is desirable given limited funding, and the priority of maintaining infrastructure relative to other government functions. Still other questions relate to why deferred maintenance estimates have fluctuated over time. These fluctuations are likely the result of many factors, among them the following: Agencies have refined methods of defining and quantifying the maintenance needs of their assets. Levels of funding for maintenance, including funding to address the maintenance backlog, vary from year to year. The asset portfolios of the agencies change, with acquisitions and disposals affecting the number, type, size, age, and location of agency assets. Economic conditions, including costs of services and products, fluctuate. The extent to which these and other factors affected changes in each agency’s maintenance backlog over the past decade is not entirely clear. In some cases, comprehensive information is not readily available or has not been examined.

Apr 21, 2015

R43937Health Policy

Federal Health Centers: An Overview

Apr 21, 2015

R43330Appropriations

The Indian Health Service (IHS): An Overview

Apr 21, 2015

IF10052Foreign Affairs

U.S. International Investment Agreements (IIAs)

Apr 20, 2015

IF10156Asian Affairs

U.S. Trade Policy: Background and Current Issues

Apr 20, 2015

R43996Intelligence and National Security

Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Comparison of H.R. 1560 and H.R. 1731

This report compares provisions in two bills in the House of Representatives that address information sharing and related activities in cybersecurity.

Apr 20, 2015

R43995Appropriations

Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies: FY2015 Appropriations

This report discusses the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies appropriations bill, which provides funding for the planning, design, construction, alteration, and improvement of facilities used by active and reserve military components worldwide.

Apr 20, 2015

R41705Economic Policy

The National Institutes of Health (NIH): Background and Congressional Issues

The National Institutes of Health (NIH) is the focal point for federal health research. An agency of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), it uses its $30 billion budget to support more than 300,000 scientists and research personnel working at over 2,500 institutions across the United States and abroad, as well as to conduct biomedical and behavioral research and research training at its own facilities. The agency consists of the Office of the Director, in charge of overall policy and program coordination, and 27 institutes and centers, each of which focuses on particular diseases or research areas in human health. A range of basic and clinical research is funded through a highly competitive system of peer-reviewed grants and contracts. The congressional authorization committees and appropriation committees face many issues in working with NIH to set research priorities in the face of tight budgets. The last time Congress addressed NIH with comprehensive legislation was in December 2006, when it passed the NIH Reform Act (P.L. 109-482). While the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) provides the statutory basis for NIH programs, it is primarily through appropriations report language, not budget line items or earmarks, that Congress gives direction to NIH and allows a voice for advocacy groups. Congress accepts, for the most part, the priorities established through the agency’s complex process of weighing scientific opportunity and public health needs. Congress doubled the NIH budget over a five-year period from its FY1998 base of $13.7 billion to the FY2003 level of $27.1 billion. Since then, the growth rate of the NIH budget has been below the rate of inflation, which for biomedical research in FY2015 is estimated to be 2.2%. An exception occurred when the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009 provided NIH with an additional $10.4 billion to be spent over the two-year period of FY2009 through FY2010. The FY2013 appropriation provided an increase of almost $70 million for the NIH Office of the Director, but it also required an across-the-board rescission of 0.2% for all accounts. In addition, a March 1, 2013, sequestration order and a transfer of funding under the authority of the HHS Secretary further reduced FY2013 amounts for NIH by $1.553 billion and $173 million, respectively, leaving the agency with an FY2013 program level budget of $29.151 billion. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76), provided an NIH program level total of $30.151 billion, a $1 billion increase over the FY2013 post-sequester level. The NIH program level in FY2015 is $30.311 billion. The President’s FY2016 budget requests an NIH program level total of $31.311 billion, an increase of $1 billion (3.3%) over the FY2015 level. Challenges facing the agency and the research enterprise, all aggravated by restrained budgets, include attracting and keeping young scientists in research careers; improving the translation of research results into useful medical interventions through more efficient clinical research; creating opportunities for transdisciplinary research that cuts across institute boundaries to exploit the newest scientific discoveries; and managing the portfolio of extramural and intramural research with strategic planning, openness, and public accountability. Also of concern is the position of U.S. biomedical research compared with the investments being made by other countries. A January 2015 study found that the total U.S. (public and private) share of global biomedical research funding declined from 57% in 2004 to 44% in 2012 while Asia, particularly China, tripled its investment from $2.6 billion (2004) to $9.7 billion (2012). Globally, the United States continues to be the top supporter of both public and industry medical research.

Apr 17, 2015

IF10192Agricultural Policy

WTO Disciplines of Domestic Support for Agriculture

Apr 17, 2015

R43993Domestic Social Policy

Unemployment Insurance: Legislative Issues in the 114th Congress

Apr 17, 2015

R43992Legislative Process

The Congressional Review Act: Frequently Asked Questions

The Congressional Review Act (CRA) is an oversight tool that Congress may use to overturn a rule issued by a federal agency. The CRA was included as part of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), which was signed into law on March 29, 1996. The CRA requires agencies to report on their rulemaking activities to Congress and provides Congress with a special set of procedures under which to consider legislation to overturn those rules. Under the CRA, before a rule can take effect, an agency must submit a report to each house of Congress and the Comptroller General containing a copy of the rule; a concise general statement relating to the rule, including whether it is a major rule; and the proposed effective date of the rule. Upon receipt of the report in Congress, Members of Congress have specified time periods in which to submit and take action on a joint resolution of disapproval. If both houses pass the resolution, it is sent to the President for signature or veto. If the President were to veto the resolution, Congress could vote to override the veto. If a joint resolution of disapproval is submitted within the CRA-specified deadline, passed by Congress, and signed by the President, the CRA states that the “rule shall not take effect (or continue).” That is, the rule would be deemed not to have had any effect at any time. Even provisions that had become effective would be retroactively negated. Furthermore, if a joint resolution of disapproval were enacted, the CRA provides that a rule may not be issued in “substantially the same form” as the disapproved rule unless it is specifically authorized by a subsequent law. The CRA does not define what would constitute a rule that is “substantially the same” as a nullified rule. Additionally, the CRA prohibits judicial review of any “determination, finding, action, or omission under this chapter.” This report discusses the most frequently asked questions received by the Congressional Research Service about the CRA. It addresses questions relating to the applicability of the act; the submission requirements with which agencies must comply; the procedural requirements that must be met in order to file and act upon a CRA joint resolution of disapproval; and the legal effect of a successful CRA joint resolution of disapproval. This report also discusses potential advantages and disadvantages of using the CRA to disapprove rules, as well as other options available to Congress to conduct oversight of agency rulemaking. For further questions not addressed here, please contact one of the authors: Maeve P. Carey (questions regarding history of and agency compliance with the CRA); Christopher M. Davis (questions regarding congressional procedures and day counts under the CRA); or Alissa M. Dolan (questions regarding legal issues under the CRA).

Apr 17, 2015

R43991

HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach Notification Standards

The Privacy Rule, which was promulgated pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, comprises a set of federal standards governing the use of personal health information. The Privacy Rule generally applies to individually identifiable health information created and maintained by payers and providers of health care, collectively referred to as covered entities. The rule establishes certain individual rights, including the right to inspect and obtain a copy of one’s health information; describes the circumstances under which covered entities are permitted to use or disclose health information; and requires covered entities to put in place administrative, physical, and technical safeguards to protect health information from unauthorized access, use, or disclosure. Broadly speaking, the Privacy Rule prohibits a covered entity from using or disclosing “protected health information” (PHI) except as expressly permitted or, in two instances, required by the rule. The Privacy Rule describes a wide range of circumstances under which it is permissible to use or disclose PHI. In so doing, the rule seeks to preserve the discretion that health care professionals have traditionally exercised when using or disclosing patient information. For all uses or disclosures of PHI that are not otherwise permitted or required by the rule, a covered entity must obtain a patient’s written authorization. Under the Privacy Rule, covered entities generally may use or disclose PHI for the purposes of treatment, payment, and other routine health care operations. Under certain other circumstances, the rule requires covered entities to give individuals the opportunity to object to the use or disclosure of their PHI. The rule also permits the use or disclosure of PHI for various specified activities not directly connected to treatment (e.g., research, law enforcement, public health). The Privacy Rule does not specify the types of safeguards that need to be implemented to protect PHI from misuse. That is the purpose of the companion HIPAA Security Rule, under which each of the safeguards—administrative, physician, and technical—is composed of a number of standards. The security standards are designed to be scalable to the size and complexity of the covered entity, as well as technology-neutral. They include implementing security management policies and procedures, workforce security procedures, facility access controls, and controls on access to information technology (IT) systems. Each standard consists of one or more implementation specifications (i.e., detailed instructions for implementing the standard). Covered entities have considerable discretion and flexibility in how they implement the security standards. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act of 2009 included a series of modifications to the HIPAA privacy and security standards. Many of the changes were enacted to address the concerns of privacy advocates and other stakeholders. The HITECH Act created a notification requirement for breaches of unsecured (i.e., unencrypted) PHI, increased the civil monetary penalties for violating HIPAA, and expanded and strengthened enforcement activities by the Office for Civil Rights. It also made business associates of covered entities (i.e., companies and consultants with whom covered entities share PHI to help them operate) directly liable and subject to civil and criminal penalties for HIPAA violations.

Apr 17, 2015

IF10199

U.S.-Japan Relations

Apr 17, 2015

R43990

FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant Program: Background and Considerations for Congress

The Public Assistance Grant Program (PA Program) is administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and combines the authorities of multiple sections of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 93-288, as amended, the Stafford Act). The PA Program is only available for states and communities that have received a major or emergency disaster declaration through the Stafford Act (and in a more limited fashion, Fire Management Assistance Grants). The PA Program provides grant assistance for eligible purposes, including Emergency work, as authorized by Sections 403, 407, and 502 of the Stafford Act, which provide for the removal of debris and emergency protective measures, such as the establishment of temporary shelters and emergency power generation. Permanent work, as authorized by Section 406, which provides for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain private nonprofit organizations (PNPs). PNPs are generally eligible for permanent work assistance if they provide a governmental type of service, though PNPs not providing a “critical” service must first apply to the Small Business Administration for loan assistance for facility projects. At its discretion, FEMA may provide assistance for hazard mitigation measures that are not required by applicable codes and standards. As a condition of PA assistance, applicants must obtain and maintain insurance on their facilities for similar future disasters. Management costs, as authorized by Section 324, which reimburses some of the applicant’s administrative expenses incurred managing the totality of the PA Program’s projects and grants. FEMA will either award PA grants based on the estimated federal share of the total eligible cost of the project or award grants on the federal share of actual eligible costs evidenced through documentation from the applicant/grantee. The federal government provides a minimum of 75% of the cost of eligible assistance, and this cost-share can rise if certain criteria are met. The PA Program is appropriated for in the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). Between FY2000 and FY2013, PA accounted for approximately 47% of all federal spending from the DRF. During this period, the PA Program provided approximately $21.2 billion in federal grants for emergency work assistance, $30.2 billion in permanent work assistance, and $1.2 billion in management assistance. Approximately $6.6 billion of these grant amounts was provided to PNPs for both emergency and permanent work. The PA Program authorities were most recently significantly amended by the Sandy Recovery Improvement Act (Division B of P.L. 113-2, SRIA). SRIA established “alternative procedures” for PA Program assistance, which has allowed FEMA to implement a Public Assistance Alternative Procedures (PAAP) Pilot Program. These procedures revise a number of elements of the PA Program, such as allowing grants for large, permanent work projects (facility restoration projects over $120,000) to be based on fixed estimates, as opposed to actual cost basis; and increasing the federal share of eligible costs when debris is removed more quickly by applicants. Given the importance of PA Program assistance to communities recovering from disasters, and the amount of federal dollars spent on the assistance, Congress may consider several policy issues related to the PA Program. For example, Congress may consider Reviewing current FEMA policies implementing the authorizing statute and, when desired, codifying or overriding the policies through further clarification in law; Evaluating major forthcoming changes to the PA Program authorized by SRIA and an earlier law, the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-390); Weighing options for decreasing the improper use of PA assistance by applicants, perhaps by revising the conditions of management cost assistance or improving the collection of data in the PA Program; Expanding or restricting the eligibility of the PA Program, possibly to exclude certain PNPs from assistance or to grant assistance to privately owned facilities; Deciding if and how the PA Program should provide hazard mitigation assistance on facility restoration projects; and Defining the role of PA Program as it potentially overlaps with the disaster assistance authorities of other federal agencies.

Apr 16, 2015

R43989Economic Policy

Cybersecurity Issues for the Bulk Power System

Apr 16, 2015