CRS Reports

U.S.-South Korea Alliance: Issues for Congress

Dec 10, 2019

FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act: Selected Military Personnel Issues

Each year, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) provides authorization of appropriations for a range of Department of Defense (DOD) and national security programs and related activities. New or clarified defense policies, organizational reform, and directed reports to Congress are often included. For FY2020, the House-passed (H.R. 2500) and Senate-passed (S. 1790) NDAA bills address or attempt to resolve high-profile military personnel issues. Some are required annual authorizations, such as end-strengths; some are updates or modifications to existing programs; and some are issues identified in certain military personnel programs. In the House-passed and Senate-passed FY2020 NDAA bills, both houses consider authorized end-strengths identical to the Administration’s FY2020 budget proposal. Compared to FY2019, both bills would increase active duty end-strength by <1% to 1,339,500. The authorized Selected Reserves end-strength would decrease by 2% to 807,800. With regard to military pay, the House bill would direct a 3.1% increase in basic pay, which is equal to the automatic adjustment amount directed by statutory formula (37 U.S.C. §1009). Because the Senate bill lacks a similar provision, it would allow the automatic adjustment amount directed by statutory formula (3.1%) to go into effect in calendar year 2020. Congress is considering modifications to several existing personnel programs, including extension of DOD Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) privileges to Foreign Service Officers on mandatory home leave; repeal of the Survivor Benefit Plan (SPB) and Veterans Affairs’ Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (DIC) offset requirement (i.e., the widows’ tax); modification of DOD workplace and command climate surveys to include questions relating to experiences with supremacist activity, extremist activity, or racism; expansion of Special Victim Counsel services for victims of domestic violence; prohibition of gender-segregated Marine Corps recruit training; expansion of spouse employment and education programs, including reimbursement for relicensing costs associated with military relocations; clarified roles and responsibilities for senior military medical leaders assigned to the Defense Health Agency or a service medical department; and expansion of TRICARE coverage for certain reproductive health services. As part of the oversight process, Congress is also considering several provisions to address selected congressional items of interest, such as DOD review of service records of certain World War I veterans for potential eligibility for a posthumously awarded Medal of Honor; a new DOD advisory committee to oversee the Board of Correction of Military Records and the Discharge Review Board; a feasibility study on the creation of a database to track domestic violence military protective orders and reporting to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System; transparency on military medical malpractice, including the ability for servicemembers to file certain tort claims against the United States; and limitations on the reductions of military medical personnel.

Dec 9, 2019

Repurchase Agreements (Repos): A Primer

Dec 9, 2019

Agency-Related Nonprofit Research Foundations and Corporations

Federal research and development (R&D) has played a significant role in strengthening the innovative capacity of the United States to achieve goals such as economic competitiveness, national security, improved healthcare, and protection of the environment. The results of federal R&D have led to scientific breakthroughs and new technologies with broad social and economic impacts, including artificial intelligence, the internet, and magnetic resonance imaging. The global landscape for innovation is rapidly evolving—the pace of innovation has increased and the composition of R&D funding has changed (e.g., public versus private funding and the U.S. share of global R&D has declined). These changes have led some to call for new approaches and the expansion of existing federal authorities to help the United States maintain its leadership in innovation, research, and technology. Over the years, Congress has created several agency-related nonprofit research foundations and corporations to advance the R&D needs of the federal government. The stated goals and potential benefits of these quasi-governmental entities include: (1) providing a flexible and efficient mechanism for establishing public-private R&D partnerships; (2) enabling the solicitation, acceptance, and use of private donations to supplement the work performed with federal R&D funds; (3) increasing technology transfer and the commercialization of federally funded R&D; (4) improving the ability of federal agencies to attract and retain scientific talent; and (5) enhancing public education and awareness regarding the role and value of federal R&D. This report provides an overview of the purpose and intent, governance structure, and federal funding associated with selected congressionally mandated, agency-related nonprofit research foundations and corporations: the Foundation for the National Institutes of Health, the National Foundation for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Reagan-Udall Foundation for the Food and Drug Administration, the Foundation for Food and Agriculture Research, the Henry M. Jackson Foundation for the Advancement of Military Medicine and the nonprofit research and education corporations associated with the Department of Veterans Affairs. The report also identifies potential issues for consideration related to oversight of existing agency-related nonprofit research foundations and corporations as well as potential issues for consideration should Congress elect to establish additional ones. Specifically, while government agencies are, with certain exceptions, subject to management laws and regulations designed to ensure accountability, transparency, and fairness, agency-related research foundations and corporations are generally exempt from them. This situation may raise questions about how Congress and federal agencies can protect the public interest and ensure confidence in the decisionmaking of such entities. Additionally, recent concerns that some have raised related to conflict of interest, the potential for industry influence, and questions about effectiveness may prompt further examination of these entities. Among the options that Congress might consider are: crafting a broad, general nonprofit research foundation authority that federal science agencies could draw on to create an entity that meets their specific needs; examining the existing authorities of individual federal science agencies and, as appropriate, supplementing those authorities to increase the flexibility of an agency to enter into public-private partnerships; creating additional agency-related nonprofit research foundations on a case-by-case basis, tailored to the specific needs of particular federal science agencies; and maintaining the status quo, i.e., allowing agency-related nonprofit research foundations and corporations that currently exist to continue, and requiring other federal agencies to use their existing authorities to enter into public-private R&D partnerships and transfer federal technologies to the marketplace.

Dec 9, 2019

Demand for Broadband in Rural Areas: Implications for Universal Access

As of 2019, over 20 million Americans—predominantly those living in rural areas—lacked access to high speed broadband service according to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Federal subsidies underwritten by taxpayer funds and long-distance telephone subscriber fees have injected billions of dollars into rural broadband markets over the past decade—mostly on the supply side in the form of grants, loans, and direct support to broadband providers. Yet, adoption rates have leveled off after more than a decade of rapid growth, even as broadband providers have extended service to remote and hard-to-serve areas. The overall share of U.S. adults using the internet has not grown significantly since 2013, according to the Pew Research Center—a trend reflected in rural broadband subscription rates, which continue to lag significantly behind rates in urban areas. Observers note that weak demand in nascent broadband markets makes it more difficult for federal agencies to elicit private-sector program participation and investment in high-cost, high-risk rural areas. Even in subsidized markets, broadband infrastructure buildout ultimately rests on business decisions made in the private sector. On average, rural areas are less wealthy than urbanized areas, and have older populations with lower educational attainment—factors which negatively correlate with demand for broadband service. Related barriers to adoption, such as lower perceived value, affordability, computer ownership, and computer literacy, have persisted over many years. Markets tend to be highly localized. Those with favorable geography and demographic profiles often have higher demand, and thus present relatively attractive investment opportunities, for broadband providers. However, the federal government has found it difficult to incentivize sustained private-sector investment in more isolated and sparsely populated locales where it is clear that new or upgraded service will be costly to provide, and may fail to attract a large number of new paying subscribers. Overall, current federal spending on affordability and adoption programs amounts to less than one-quarter of total spending for rural broadband expansion. The FCC’s Lifeline program reduces monthly subscription costs for qualifying low-income households, but enrollment rates are comparatively low. No major federal programs currently support consumer outreach and education, although certain federal grants may use funds for related activities. Other programs to support broadband buildout to schools, clinics, and other community institutions have improved access for residents of rural areas, but it is not clear that these programs have affected overall market demand. Broadband advocates frequently identify broadband enabled services like telemedicine and precision agriculture as potential demand drivers. However, lower rates of health insurance coverage in rural areas and certain state regulations limiting Medicaid reimbursement for telemedicine services may depress demand growth and private sector investment in broadband. Likewise, high up-front costs and unfamiliarity have hindered adoption of precision agriculture technology by small producers in isolated rural areas. Federal broadband programs have generally been agnostic to the demand side of rural broadband markets, based on the implicit assumption that demand for broadband service will quickly emerge as broadband providers extend new or upgraded service to these locales. Program rules typically require broadband providers to extend service availability to a certain area within a certain timeframe, but they generally do not require them to achieve specific market development goals for adoption and usage. The FCC has expressed concern that some subsidized providers may lack incentive to develop markets in their service areas. Options for congressional consideration include measures to address obstacles to adoption and additional incentives for private sector investment in the rural broadband sector. These may include expansion of end-user subsidies, both within the broadband sector and other sectors that utilize broadband-enabled technologies. Congress may also consider measures to encourage broadband providers to increase investment in persistently underserved rural areas and more aggressively develop nascent broadband markets. These may include adjustment to subsidy rates and program rules, including introduction of adoption milestones for subsidy recipients. Additionally, Congress may consider measures to increase education and outreach.

Dec 9, 2019

Court Battle for Fintech Bank Charters to Continue

Dec 6, 2019

Medical Product Innovation and Regulation: Benefits and Risks

Dec 4, 2019

Veterans Health Administration: Behavioral Health Services

Dec 3, 2019

Industrial Loan Companies and Fintech in Banking

Nov 29, 2019

NATO: Key Issues for the 117th Congress

Nov 27, 2019

Surprise Billing in Private Health Insurance: Overview and Federal Policy Considerations

Nov 25, 2019

Amazon Protest of the Department of Defense's JEDI Cloud Contract Award to Microsoft

Nov 22, 2019

Impeachment and the Constitution

The Constitution grants Congress authority to impeach and remove the President, Vice President, and other federal “civil officers” for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Impeachment is one of the various checks and balances created by the Constitution, a crucial tool for holding government officers accountable for violations of the law and abuse of power. Responsibility and authority to determine whether to impeach an individual rests in the hands of the House of Representatives. Should a simple majority of the House approve articles of impeachment, the matter is then presented to the Senate, to which the Constitution provides the sole power to try an impeachment. A conviction on any one of the articles of impeachment requires the support of a two-thirds majority of the Senators present and results in that individual’s removal from office. The Senate also has discretion to vote to disqualify that official from holding a federal office in the future. The Constitution imposes several additional requirements on the impeachment process. When conducting an impeachment trial, Senators must be “on oath or affirmation,” and the right to a jury trial does not extend to impeachment proceedings. If the President is impeached and tried in the Senate, the Chief Justice of the United States presides at the trial. The Constitution bars the President from using the pardon power to shield individuals from impeachment or removal from office. Understanding the historical practices of Congress with regard to impeachment is central to fleshing out the meaning of the Constitution’s impeachment clauses. While much of constitutional law is developed through jurisprudence analyzing the text of the Constitution and applying prior judicial precedents, the Constitution’s meaning is also shaped by institutional practices and political norms. In fact, the power of impeachment is largely immune from judicial review, meaning that Congress’s choices in this arena are unlikely to be overturned by the courts. For that reason, examining the history of actual impeachments is crucial to understanding the meaning of the Constitution’s impeachment provisions. One major recurring question about the impeachment remedy is the definition of “high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” At least at the time of ratification of the Constitution, the phrase appears understood to have applied to uniquely “political” offenses, or misdeeds committed by public officials against the state. Such misconduct simply resists a full delineation, however, as the possible range of potential misdeeds in office cannot be determined in advance. Instead, the type of behavior that merits impeachment is worked out over time through the political process. While this report focuses on the constitutional considerations relevant to impeachment, there are various other important questions that arise in any impeachment proceeding. For a consideration of the legal issues surrounding access to information from the executive branch in an impeachment investigation, see CRS Report R45983, Congressional Access to Information in an Impeachment Investigation, by Todd Garvey. For discussion of the House procedures used in impeachment investigations, see CRS Report R45769, The Impeachment Process in the House of Representatives, by Elizabeth Rybicki and Michael Greene.

Nov 20, 2019

Army Future Vertical Lift (FVL) Program

Nov 20, 2019

FEMA Individual Assistance Programs: An Overview

Nov 19, 2019

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership: Status and Recent Developments

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a prospective trade agreement between the ten members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and five of their major FTA partners—Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea. On November 4, 2019, a Joint Leaders Statement was issued following the conclusion of the 3rd RCEP Summit, held on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Thailand. According to the statement, 15 of the original 16 Asian countries participating in RCEP have concluded “text-based negotiations for all 20 chapters” and “essentially all” market access issues. India, the primary holdout in recent negotiations, announced its withdrawal from the pact, though indicated it may consider rejoining. Despite India’s announcement, the other RCEP members indicated that they aim to sign the deal in 2020. The text or exact details of the agreement are not yet public, limiting analysis of its implications, though some members have released general summaries. RCEP moves forward following entry into force of recent “mega-regional” and bilateral trade deals, including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP or TPP-11) and the EU-Japan free trade agreement (FTA), whose membership covers significant shares of the global economy and trade. Seven members of RCEP are also members of TPP-11 (Figure 1). Although RCEP is not considered likely to be as comprehensive as other agreements in terms of the scope and depth of prospective commitments, its current members constitute about 30% of global trade and GDP, giving it the potential to restructure some trade patterns in Asia. As these initiatives advance without U.S. participation, Congress may consider how U.S. commercial interests in the region, as well as the U.S. role in shaping trade rules and economic integration efforts in the Indo-Pacific and globally, could be affected. Figure 1. Asian Members of Regional Trade Initiatives / Source: Created by CRS. History and Scope of RCEP Talks RCEP negotiations formally began in 2012 to harmonize and build on existing “ASEAN plus one” FTAs. It was also to mark the first trade agreement among some of the major participating economies with China and India. RCEP members aim to achieve a “modern, comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial” agreement, which is comprised of 20 chapters on trade in goods, services, investment, standards and technical regulations, intellectual property rights (IPR), and e-commerce, among other issues. RCEP, if concluded, would be the world’s largest regional trade agreement, that, not including India covers about 30% of the world’s population, global trade, and GDP (Figure 2). Some observers have characterized RCEP potential commitments as “shallow” and less comprehensive compared to the scope of other agreements, such as TPP-11, which includes rules on state-owned enterprises (SOEs), labor and environment, and other nontariff issues. Additionally, RCEP’s diverse membership has given rise to provisions for “special and differential treatment” that offer potential flexibility in the commitments for less-developed member countries. Other trade experts view RCEP as a complementary initiative that could deepen regional integration and serve as a “stepping-stone for members to subsequently join higher-standards agreements when they are economically and politically ready.” At the same time, despite a relatively less comprehensive agenda, some analysts view RCEP as potentially among the most wide-ranging agreements negotiated by ASEAN countries. By some estimates, RCEP could yield sizable economic benefits driven by the expected new market access commitments. The agreement’s impact will ultimately depend on the final terms. Figure 2. Comparative Economic Indicators of Major Trade Deals in Asia / Source: CRS calculations based on IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics and World Bank, World Development Indicators. Notes: TPP-11 and RCEP include seven overlapping members. India is not included in the RCEP figures. Recent Developments After the United States withdrew from TPP in early 2017, RCEP attracted renewed interest as some experts and officials in participating countries characterized the agreement as a potential alternative to TPP. The subsequent conclusion of TPP-11 following U.S. withdrawal, as well as the escalation in the U.S.-China trade dispute, motivated RCEP members to advance their efforts, in part as a statement in support of the rules-based trading system. Talks have progressed slowly, however, largely owing to the disparate levels of economic development among members. While China and some developing country members reportedly have sought to keep negotiations focused on market access and tariff reduction, Japan, among the pact’s most economically developed members, and some other TPP-11 members, have sought a more comprehensive deal covering advanced services, investment, and IPR. India’s announced withdrawal from RCEP, although seen as a setback for the agreement, was not unexpected. Some observers have perceived Indian negotiators as “dragging their feet” on matching the tariff concessions of others. Within India, backlash grew against RCEP amid concerns of imports flooding India’s domestic market and a potential increase in India’s trade deficit with China, a country some officials regard as a strategic competitor. Whether India’s exit from RCEP is permanent remains ambiguous: after announcing withdrawal, Indian officials stated that India would consider rejoining if “all Indian demands are met,” in particular related to services. Implications for U.S. Trade Policy Some view U.S. withdrawal from regional initiatives like TPP-11 as affecting the United States’ ability to shape regional and global trade rules, in part to influence the economic practices of China. RCEP, if formed, could provide an alternate trade agreement vehicle through which China could benefit economically without having to conform to certain provisions. For example, such provisions include requiring reforms to its industrial policies or more robust IP protections. Chinese firms facing pressure from U.S. tariffs have reportedly begun shifting manufacturing to ASEAN countries, while maintaining sourcing networks in China, a trend that could continue or accelerate under RCEP. Some analysts note that China’s increased involvement in RCEP may also be symbolically important for Beijing, which is attempting to cast itself as a regional leader in trade liberalization. Although RCEP has largely been an ASEAN-led initiative, some officials involved in the negotiations have expressed concerns that without India to serve as a counterweight, further RCEP negotiations may be dominated by China. RCEP also could shift regional trade in ways that could impact U.S. commercial activity and strategic interests more broadly. Early analyses have generally concluded that RCEP could lead to some reduced U.S. commercial activity in the region if (i) members shift trade to U.S. competitors, and (ii) supply chains reorient to capitalize on RCEP’s tariff reductions and single set of rules of origin across members. One study by the Obama Administration identified several U.S. industries in the Japanese market “at risk of increased competitive pressure” from China due to tariff liberalization under RCEP. Further, formation of trade rules in Asia that may not reflect U.S. negotiating priorities, such as approaches to e-commerce or IPR, could disadvantage U.S. competitiveness abroad. Some analysts also view the potential for further intra-Asian integration under RCEP, along with TPP-11, as leading to reduced U.S. geopolitical influence in the region.

Nov 19, 2019

Military Funding for Border Barriers: Catalogue of Interagency Decisionmaking

The Department of Defense (DOD, or the Department) has contributed $6.1 billion to the construction of new and replacement barriers along the U.S.-Mexico border in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) by invoking a mixture of statutory and nonstatutory authorities. Congressional concerns surrounding the use of these authorities and the further possibility that DOD’s actions may jeopardize legislative control of appropriations has generated interest about the decisionmaking process that drove the Department’s funding decisions. DOD has not generally made internal and interagency communications related to these processes directly available to congressional staff. However, various letters, memoranda, and explanatory declarations from key decisionmakers have been released into the public record (primarily as the result of ongoing litigation) that provide a more complete picture of the issues the Department considered, along with its final determinations on border barrier funding. This report provides a chronological summary of internal and interagency communications related to DOD’s border wall funding processes since approximately April 2018 as described chiefly through court exhibits and declarations in legal proceedings. Due to the technical difficulty of accessing legal records, CRS has made all relevant open source materials accessible to congressional staff via hyperlinks. A comprehensive set of legal citations has also been provided in the accompanying tables.

Nov 18, 2019

Boeing-Airbus Subsidy Dispute: Recent Developments

Nov 18, 2019

Big Data in Financial Services: Privacy and Security Regulation

Congress has shown interest in data privacy and security issues in the financial services industry, including an upcoming House Financial Services task force hearing. Recent data breaches at large financial institutions and credit reporting agencies have increased concern about the privacy and security of the large amounts of consumer financial information (known increasingly as big data) that companies gather, use, and store. Some of this information is public, whereas other information is considered personal and nonpublic. No single law provides a framework for regulating data privacy in the United States. Instead, myriad laws cover different industries. In the financial services industry, several federal and state laws cover data privacy; most comprehensively, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA; P.L. 106-102) directs financial regulators to implement disclosure requirements and security measures to safeguard private information. This Insight summarizes GLBA’s regulatory implementation and discusses policy issues for Congress. GLBA and the Financial Regulators GLBA provides a framework for regulating data privacy and security practices in the financial services industry. This framework is built upon two pillars: (1) privacy standards that impose disclosure limitations on financial institutions concerning consumers’ information and (2) security standards that require institutions to implement certain practices to safeguard the information from unauthorized access, use, and disclosure. The two major rules for implementing this framework are known as the Privacy Rule (Regulation P) and the Safeguards Rule, respectively. These rules are promulgated, supervised, and enforced by different government agencies, and in some cases different agencies have rulemaking and supervisory authority over the same entity. Rulemaking Rulemaking authority to implement the Privacy Rule through Regulation P is vested in four agencies. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has the rulemaking authority for the Safeguards Rule. Table 1 provides a crosswalk of the federal agencies and who they may regulate under each rule. Table 1. Rulemaking Authority for GLBA Federal Regulator Privacy Rule Safeguards Rule Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) Depository and nonbank financial institutions involving consumer financial products or services in the CFPB’s jurisdiction None Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Securities companies None Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Futures-related companies None Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Motor vehicle dealers Financial institutions significantly engaged in financial activities (e.g., bank and nonbank lenders, real estate appraisers, professional tax preparers, courier services, credit reporting agencies, and ATM operators) Source: 15. U.S.C. §6804; 12 C.F.R. §1016.1(b). Regulation P requires financial institutions to provide initial, annual, and revised privacy policy notices to customers and set the conditions for when a financial institution may or may not disclose nonpublic personal information. The Safeguards Rule requires financial institutions to design and implement a safeguards program and identify and assess the risks to customer information in each relevant area of the company’s operation, including service providers and changes in the firm’s operations. Supervision and Enforcement Agencies responsible for privacy and safeguard rulemaking are sometimes not the same agencies responsible for implementing these rules for a particular entity. For instance, as discussed in Table 1, the FTC has rulemaking authority for the Safeguards Rule; however, supervisory authority for the rule is shared among the banking and credit union regulators. Further, most of the financial regulators have some supervisory or enforcement authority to ensure that the institutions in their respective jurisdictions comply with the Privacy and Safeguards Rules (see Table 2). Table 2. Supervision and Enforcement Authority for GLBA Federal Regulator Privacy Rule Safeguards Rule CFPB Supervision and enforcement authority over depository and nonbank financial institutions involving consumer financial products or services in the CFPB’s jurisdiction None Depository agencies Supervision and enforcement authority over banks or credit unions in their jurisdiction Supervision and enforcement authority over banks or credit unions in their jurisdiction SEC Enforcement authority over brokers, dealers, and investment advisors or companies in their jurisdiction Enforcement authority over securities companies in their jurisdiction FTC Enforcement authority over other entities not covered above by another federal regulator, such as motor vehicle dealers or other nonfinancial companies Enforcement authority over other entities not covered above by another federal regulator, such as nonbank consumer financial institutions or other nonfinancial companies Source: 15. U.S.C. §6805. Note: The depository agencies include the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve, and the National Credit Union Administration. Potential Policy Considerations for Congress The fact that several regulators implement, supervise, and enforce GLBA provisions has raised questions over the “patchwork” of regulatory standards for consumer privacy and security. As Congress continues to explore this issue, a few policy considerations may be informative: Data Security Standards—One area of debate is whether data security standards should be prescriptive and government defined or flexible and outcome based. Some argue that a prescriptive approach can be inflexible and harm innovation, but others argue that an outcome-based approach might lead to institutions having to comply with a wide range of data standards. For instance, the FTC recently submitted proposed amendments to the Privacy and Safeguards Rules to provide more certainty to financial institutions and to better protect consumers. Two commissioners dissented over the amendments to the Safeguards Rule, raising caution over the impact more prescriptive cybersecurity standards might have on innovation. Financial Data and Consumer Redress—GLBA covers only nonpublic personal information held by financial institutions significantly engaged in financial activities. However, as the industry’s data use has grown, some have debated whether the law covers all sensitive individual financial information. For example, data brokers can compile public and private data from different sources, much of which may not be subject to GLBA’s provision, but combining these data might reveal financially sensitive information about a consumer. Further, consumers have a limited ability to know, control, or correct financial data, which can make it difficult to obtain redress for violations such as data breaches.

Nov 15, 2019

FY2020 Appropriations for Agricultural Conservation

The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the Forest Service. The FY2020 consolidated appropriations bills passed by the House and Senate (H.R. 3055) include funding for conservation programs and activities at USDA, among other departments. Differences between the two versions remain to be resolved. In the absence of enacted full-year appropriations, Congress passed a continuing resolution (P.L. 116-59, Division A) through November 21, 2019. Agricultural conservation programs include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Most conservation program funding is mandatory and is authorized in omnibus farm bills. Other conservation programs—mostly technical assistance—are discretionary spending funded through annual appropriations. The largest discretionary conservation program is the Conservation Operations (CO) account, which funds conservation planning and implementation assistance on private agricultural lands across the country. The CO account is administered by the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) and funds more than half of the agency’s total staff positions. The FY2020 House- and Senate-passed bills would increase funding for CO by $10.1 million and $15.7 million, respectively, above FY2019 levels to $829.6 million and $835.2 million, respectively. A decline in funding for CO over time has resulted in declining NRCS staffing levels. Reduced staff could impact NRCS’s ability to administer farm bill conservation programs and provide technical assistance to farmers and ranchers. Other shifts in staffing to the Farm Production and Conservation (FPAC) Business Center have also impacted total staffing levels, though it is difficult to evaluate how these transfers have impacted the agency’s overall operations relative to the decline in overall funding. Other discretionary spending is primarily for watershed programs. The largest—Watershed and Flood Prevention Operations (WFPO)—was funded at $150 million in FY2019. The House- and Senate-passed bills would increase WFPO funding to $155 million and $175 million, respectively. Most mandatory conservation programs are authorized in omnibus farm bills and do not require an annual appropriation. However, previous Congresses have reduced mandatory conservation program funding through Changes in Mandatory Program Spending (CHIMPS) in the annual agricultural appropriations law every year between FY2003 and FY2018. The Trump administration requested CHIMPS to two mandatory conservation programs for FY2020, but neither the House- nor the Senate-passed appropriations bills include reductions to mandatory conservation programs. Agriculture appropriations bills may also include policy-related provisions that direct how the executive branch should carry out the appropriations. The FY2020 House- and Senate-passed bills both include policy provisions for conservation programs that range from reports to Congress to suggested natural resource priorities.

Nov 15, 2019

The World Bank

Nov 14, 2019

Defense Primer: Arlington National Cemetery

Nov 14, 2019

Applicability of Federal Requirements to Selected Health Coverage Arrangements: An Overview

Nov 13, 2019

Applicability of Federal Requirements to Selected Health Coverage Arrangements

Federal health insurance requirements generally apply to health plans sold in the private health insurance market in the United States (i.e., individual coverage, small- and large-group coverage, and self-insured plans). However, not all private health coverage arrangements comply with these requirements. This includes exempted health coverage arrangements and noncompliant health coverage arrangements, as termed for purposes of this report. This report identifies and describes arrangements in these two categories. It is intended to help congressional policymakers better understand the scope of such arrangements available to individuals in the United States and to provide information about the limits of the application of federal health insurance requirements. The arrangements described in this report can be divided into two categories: Exempted Health Coverage Arrangements: Those that meet a federal definition of health insurance but are exempt from compliance with some or all applicable federal health insurance requirements. Such arrangements include the following: Group health plans covering fewer than two current employees, including retiree-only plans, are exempt from all federal health insurance requirements. Health plans in their provision of excepted benefits (e.g., auto liability insurance, limited-scope dental and vision benefits, and specific disease coverage) are exempt from all federal health insurance requirements. Short-term, limited-duration insurance (i.e., coverage generally sold in the individual market that must have a specified expiration date that is less than 12 months after the original effective date of the contract and that cannot be renewed or extended for longer than 36 months) is exempt from complying with all federal health insurance requirements. Student health insurance coverage (i.e., individual health insurance coverage that meets specified conditions and that may be provided only to students enrolled in an institution of higher education and their dependents) is exempt from complying with some federal health insurance requirements if such coverage is fully insured and is exempt from all federal health insurance requirements if the student health plan is self-insured. Self-insured, nonfederal governmental plans (e.g., group health plans sponsored by states, counties, school districts, and municipalities) may elect to exempt the plan from some federal requirements. Grandfathered plans (i.e., group health plans or health insurance coverage in which at least one individual was enrolled as of enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act [ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended] and which have continued to meet specified conditions) are exempt from some federal requirements. Transitional plans (i.e., individual and small-group market plans that meet certain requirements and are in states that have continuously opted to exempt them, per federal guidance) are exempt from some federal requirements. Noncompliant Health Coverage Arrangements: Those that the federal government has not explicitly exempted from compliance with federal health insurance requirements and that do not necessarily comply with those requirements. Such arrangements include the following: Health care sharing ministries (i.e., faith-based organizations that share resources for medical needs among their members) do not currently and have not historically complied with federal health insurance requirements. Certain types of farm bureau coverage (i.e., health coverage offered by a farm bureau in the three states with a law that specifies that such coverage is not considered insurance and is not subject to the state’s insurance laws) do not comply with federal health insurance requirements. The report includes a brief description of each arrangement, its status with respect to complying with federal health insurance requirements, and the history of its status. The report also includes information about whether and how the arrangements are subject to state regulatory authority. Where available, estimates of enrollment in an arrangement are provided.

Nov 13, 2019

Bolivia’s October 2020 General Elections

Nov 12, 2019

Election Security: States’ Spending of FY2018 and FY2020 HAVA Payments

Nov 12, 2019

The Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) in Social Security: Proposals for a New Proportional Formula

Nov 8, 2019

Poverty in the United States in 2018: In Brief

In 2018, approximately 38.1 million people, or 11.8% of the population, had incomes below the official definition of poverty in the United States. Poverty statistics provide a measure of economic hardship. The official definition of poverty for the United States uses dollar amounts called poverty thresholds that vary by family size and the members’ ages. Families with incomes below their respective thresholds are considered to be in poverty. The poverty rate (the percentage that was in poverty) fell from 12.3% in 2017. This was the fourth consecutive year since the most recent recession that the poverty rate has fallen. The poverty rate for female-householder families in 2018 (24.9%, down 1.3 percentage points from the previous year) was higher than that for male-householder families (12.7%) or married-couple families (4.7%), neither of which registered a decline from 2017. Of the three age groups—children under 18, the working-age population, and those age 65 and older—the 65-and-older population used to have the highest poverty rates, but now has the lowest: 28.5% of the aged population was poor in 1966, but 9.7% was poor in 2018. People under 18, in contrast, had the highest poverty rate of the three age groups: 16.2% of this population was poor in 2018. From 2017 to 2018, poverty rates fell among children (from 17.4% to 16.2%) and the working-age population (from 11.1% to 10.7%), but not among the aged population (9.7% in 2018). Poverty was not equally prevalent in all parts of the country. The poverty rate for Mississippi (19.7%) appeared highest but was in a statistical tie with New Mexico (19.5%). New Hampshire’s poverty rate (7.6%) was lowest in 2018. Criticisms of the official poverty measure have inspired poverty measurement research and eventually led to the development of the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM). The SPM uses different definitions of needs and resources than the official measure. The SPM includes the effects of taxes and in-kind benefits (such as housing, energy, and food assistance) on poverty, while the official measure does not. Because some types of tax credits are used to assist the poor (as are other forms of assistance), the SPM may be of interest to policymakers. The poverty rate under the SPM (12.8%) was about 1 percentage point higher in 2018 than the official poverty rate (11.8%). Under the SPM, the profile of the poverty population is slightly different than under the official measure. Compared with the official measure, poverty rates under the SPM were lower for children (13.7% compared with 16.2%) and higher for working-age adults (12.2% compared with 10.7%) and the 65-and-older population (13.6% compared with 9.7%). While the SPM reflects more current measurement methods, the official measure provides a comparison of the poor population over a longer time period, including some years before many current antipoverty assistance programs had been developed. In developing poverty-related legislation and conducting oversight on programs that aid the low-income population, policymakers may be interested in these historical trends.

Nov 8, 2019

Contaminants of Emerging Concern under the Clean Water Act

Recent decades have seen increased national attention to the presence of “emerging contaminants” or “contaminants of emerging concern” (CECs) in surface water and groundwater. Although there is no federal statutory or regulatory definition of CECs, generally, the term refers to unregulated substances detected in the environment that may present a risk to human health, aquatic life, or the environment and for which the scientific understanding of potential risks is evolving. CECs can include many different types of manufactured chemicals and substances—such as those in pharmaceuticals, industrial chemicals, agricultural products, and microplastics—as well as naturally occurring substances, such as algal toxins. Data on CECs that would help determine their risk to humans and aquatic life or other aspects of the environment are often limited. Increased monitoring and detections of one particular group of chemicals, per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS), has recently heightened public and congressional interest in these CECs and has also prompted a broader discussion about how CECs are identified, detected, and regulated and whether additional actions should be taken to protect human health and the environment. While several statutes provide authorities to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and states to address CECs, this report examines authorities available under the Clean Water Act (CWA)—which Congress established to restore and protect the quality of the nation’s surface waters. EPA has several CWA authorities it may use to address CECs, although it faces some challenges in doing so. Under the CWA, a primary mechanism to control contaminants in surface waters is through permits. The statute prohibits the discharge of pollutants from any point source (i.e., a discrete conveyance) to waters of the United States without a permit. The CWA authorizes EPA and states to limit or prohibit discharges of pollutants in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits they issue. These permits incorporate technology-based and water-quality-based requirements. The CWA authorizes EPA and states to address CECs through technology-based effluent limitations using national Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards (ELGs) or by setting technology-based effluent limits in NPDES permits on a case-by-case basis. The CWA requires EPA to publish ELGs, which are the required minimum standards for industrial wastewater discharges. The CWA also requires EPA to annually review all existing ELGs and to publish a biennial plan that includes a schedule for review and revision of promulgated ELGs, identifies categories of sources discharging toxic or nonconventional pollutants that do not have ELGs, and establishes a schedule for promulgating ELGs for any newly identified categories. In cases where EPA has not established an ELG for a particular industrial category or type of facility, or where pollutants or processes were not considered when an ELG was developed, the permitting authority (EPA or states) may still impose technology-based effluent limits on a case-by-case basis. Although EPA and states have these authorities available to address CECs, there are some challenges to doing so, including a lack of data available to support new ELGs or updates to existing ELGs. Agency officials stated that it is difficult for the agency to keep pace with the growth of new chemicals in commerce. The CWA also authorizes EPA and states to address CECs through water-quality-based requirements. States are required to adopt water quality standards for waters of the United States and review them at least once every three years. The CWA requires EPA to publish, and “from time to time thereafter revise” water quality criteria that reflect the latest scientific knowledge. States use EPA’s criteria as guidance in developing their water quality standards. The CWA directs states to adopt criteria to protect their water bodies’ designated uses and to also adopt criteria for all pollutants on the Toxic Pollutant List, for which EPA has published criteria. Once a state adopts water quality criteria for a contaminant as part of its water quality standards, several CWA tools are available to the state for achieving them. The primary tool is to establish water-quality-based effluent limitations in NPDES permits. Although EPA and states have authority to address CECs through water-quality-based requirements, they often lack data needed to support development of criteria or water-quality-based effluent limitations. The CWA also authorizes EPA to designate contaminants as toxic pollutants or as hazardous substances, which may trigger other actions under the CWA and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. Recent congressional interest in CECs has focused on addressing one particular group of CECs—PFAS—and on addressing them through other statutes. However, in the 116th Congress, H.R. 3616 and H.Amdt. 537, Section 330A, of the House-passed version of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020 (H.R. 2500), would direct EPA to add PFAS to the CWA Toxic Pollutant List and publish ELGs that establish effluent limitations and standards for PFAS within specified time frames.

Nov 7, 2019

National Flood Insurance Program: The Current Rating Structure and Risk Rating 2.0

The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is the primary source of flood insurance coverage for residential properties in the United States, with more than five million policies in over 22,000 communities in 56 states and jurisdictions. FEMA is planning to introduce the biggest change to the way the NFIP calculates flood insurance premiums, known as Risk Rating 2.0, since the inception of the NFIP in 1968. The new premium rates are scheduled to go into effect on October 1, 2021, for all NFIP policies across the country. Risk Rating 2.0 will continue the overall policy of phasing out NFIP subsidies, which began with the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 and continued with the Homeowner Flood Insurance Affordability Act of 2014. Under the change, premiums for individual properties will be tied to their actual flood risk. Because the limitations on annual premium increases are set in statute, Risk Rating 2.0 will not be able to increase rates faster than the existing limit for primary residences of 5%-18% per year. According to FEMA, Risk Rating 2.0 will reflect an individual property’s risk, reflect more types of flood risk in rates, use the latest actuarial practices to set risk-based rates, provide rates that are easier to understand for agents and policyholders, and reduce complexity for agents to generate a flood insurance quote. The NFIP’s current rating structure follows general insurance practices in effect at the time that the NFIP was established and has not fundamentally changed since the 1970s. The current NFIP rating structure uses several basic characteristics to classify properties based on flood risks. Structures are evaluated by their flood zone on a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM), occupancy type, and the elevation of the structure. FEMA uses a nationwide rating system that combines flood zones across many geographic areas, and calculates expected losses for groups of structures that are similar in flood risk and key structural aspects, assigning the same rate to all policies in a group. According to FEMA, flood zones will no longer be used in calculating a property’s flood insurance premium following the introduction of Risk Rating 2.0. Instead, the premium will be calculated based on the specific features of an individual property, including structural variables such as the foundation type of the structure, the height of the lowest floor of the structure relative to base flood elevation, and the replacement cost value of the structure. The current rating system includes two sources of flood risk: the 1%-annual-chance fluvial (river) flood and the 1%-annual-chance coastal flood. As proposed, Risk Rating 2.0 will incorporate a broader range of flood frequencies and sources than the current system, as well as geographical variables such as the distance to water, the type and size of nearest bodies of water, and the elevation of the property relative to the flooding source. According to FEMA, although flood zones on a FIRM will not be used to calculate a property’s flood insurance premium, flood zones will still be used for floodplain management purposes, and the boundary of the Special Flood Hazard Area will still be required for the mandatory purchase requirement.

Nov 7, 2019

Precision-Guided Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress

Over the years, the U.S. military has become reliant on precision-guided munitions (PGMs) to execute military operations. PGMs are used in ground, air, and naval operations. Defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as “[a] guided weapon intended to destroy a point target and minimize collateral damage,” PGMs can include air- and ship-launched missiles, multiple launched rockets, and guided bombs. These munitions typically use radio signals from the global positioning system (GPS), laser guidance, and inertial navigation systems (INS)—using gyroscopes—to improve a weapon’s accuracy to reportedly less than 3 meters (approximately 10 feet). Precision munitions were introduced to military operations during World War II; however, they first demonstrated their utility operationally during the Vietnam War and gained prominence in Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Since the 1990s, due in part to their ability to minimize collateral damage, PGMs have become critical components in U.S operations, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria. The proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems is likely to increase the operational utility of PGMs. In particular, peer competitors like China and Russia have developed sophisticated air defenses and anti-ship missiles that increase the risk to U.S. forces entering and operating in these regions. Using advanced guidance systems, PGMs can be launched at long ranges to attack an enemy without risking U.S. forces. As a result, DOD has argued it requires longer range munitions to meet these new threats. The Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all use PGMs. In FY2020, DOD requested approximately$5.6 billion for more than 70,000 weapons in 13 munitions programs. DOD projects requesting $4.4 billion for 34,000 weapons in FY2021, $3.3 billion for 25,000 weapons in FY2022, $3.8 billion for 25,000 weapons in FY2023, and $3.4 billion for 16,000 weapons in FY2024. Previously DOD obligated $1.96 billion for 13,985 weapons in FY2015, $2.98 billion for 35,067 weapons in FY2016, $3.63 billion for 44,446 weapons in FY2017, and $5.05 billion for 68,988 weapons in FY2018. In FY2019, Congress authorized $4.69 billion for 61,907 weapons. Current PGM programs can be categorized as air-launched, ground-launched, or naval-launched. Air-Launched: Paveway Laser Guided Bomb, Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Small Diameter Bomb, Small Diameter Bomb II, Hellfire Missile, Joint Air-to-Ground Missile, Joint Air-to-Surface Strike Missile (JASSM), Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM), and Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile. Ground-Launched: Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS), Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and Precision Strike Missile (PrSM); Naval PGMs: Tomahawk Cruise Missile, Standard Missile-6 (SM-6), and Naval Strike Missile. Congress may consider several issues regarding PGMs, including planned procurement quantities and stockpile assessments, defense industrial base production capacity, development timelines, supply chain security, affordability and cost-effectiveness, and emerging factors that may affect PGM programs.

Nov 6, 2019

Iraq: Protests and the Future of U.S. Partnership

Mass protests and state violence against some protestors have shaken Iraq since October 2019, with more than 260 Iraqis reported dead and thousands more injured in demonstrations and isolated clashes in Baghdad and southern Iraq. Protestors and some prominent political figures have demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abd Al Mahdi and his cabinet, channeling nationalist, nonsectarian sentiment and a range of frustrations into potent rejections of the post-2003 political order. Current protests are reiterating past demonstrators’ concerns (with louder critiques of Iranian interference in some cases), but the scope and endurance of the protests are unprecedented in Iraq’s recent history. U.S. officials have not publicly taken positions on the demonstrators’ specific transition demands, but protestors’ calls for improved governance, reliable local services, more trustworthy and capable security forces, and greater economic opportunity broadly correspond to stated U.S. goals. The nature, duration, and response to the protests are deepening U.S. concerns about Iraq’s stability. Related future developments could complicate U.S. efforts to partner with Iraq’s government as Iraq recovers from the war with the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS/ISIL) and seeks to maintain its sovereignty. Congress is considering President Donald Trump’s requests for additional military and civilian aid for Iraq without certainty about what Iraq’s future governing arrangements will be or how change might affect U.S. interests. Iraqi Perspectives and Proposed Solutions The prime minister and some Iraqi officials acknowledge shortcomings in the current political system, but express concern that a period of potentially violent uncertainty could accompany a sudden transition. Other Iraqi officials, Iran’s Supreme Leader, and Iran-aligned Iraqi militia leaders contend that the protest movement is a foreign-backed conspiracy. These critics have pledged to defend their interests, especially in light of some protestors’ isolated attacks on various party headquarters, an Iranian diplomatic facility, and some security forces and militia personnel. Iran reportedly is working to delay and shape transition arrangements to preserve its interests and those of its Iraqi partners. Leaders of Iraq’s Shia Muslim religious establishment have expressed solidarity with the protestors, called for officials to enact reforms, urged demonstrators to reject violence, rejected foreign interference, and condemned killings of civilians. Iraqi Kurdish leaders have recognized protestors’ concerns and criticized repressive violence, while convening to unify positions on reforms that some Kurds fear could undermine the federally recognized Kurdistan region’s rights under Iraq’s constitution. Arrests and official discouragement reportedly have limited the spread of protests to areas of western Iraq predominantly inhabited by Sunni Arabs. The prime minister and Iraqi legislators have approved a range of measures in response to protestors’ demands, but protestors largely have rejected the measures as insufficient, with many insisting on a sweeping transition. President Barham Salih has proposed revisions to the electoral system followed by elections and has acknowledged the prime minister’s willingness to resign if dominant political blocs agree on a replacement. Amendments to Iraq’s electoral law will require parliamentary approval, and legislators may be disinclined to offer support, having won their seats in May 2018 elections. New elections under a revamped system could introduce new political currents and leaders, but fiscal pressures and the limited capacity of some state institutions may present lasting hurdles to reform. Some 2019 polling suggests that many Iraqis may share protestors’ stated concerns about the status quo, but close observers of Iraqi politics express some skepticism that the leading political forces will find consensus easily on transition arrangements. Iraqis continue to differ over implementation of key provisions of the existing constitution and have formed successive governments since 2005 only after extended and contentious negotiations among elites and establishment groups. Many elite stakeholders are targets of protestors’ ire, but they remain the likely arbiters of proposed remedies to the protestors’ demands. Iran and the United States previously have used pressure and mediation to shape negotiations among Iraqi elites, but now are contending with new dynamics introduced by the nationalist protest movement. U.S. Responses and Outlook The impasse in Iraq presents dilemmas for the Administration and Congress as they contemplate how best to promote Iraq’s unity and stability, prevent an IS resurgence, and limit Iranian influence. As Iraqis debate their political future, Congress may seek the Trump Administration’s views about the prospects for different outcomes in Iraq and their possible implications for U.S. military operations, patterns of U.S. assistance, and regional security. On November 1, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said “the Government of Iraq should listen to the legitimate demands made by the Iraqi people who have taken to the streets to have their voices heard.” He reiterated that the U.S. government has “called on all sides to reject violence” and called for restrictions on the press and expression to end. On November 6, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad said in a statement, “There is no path forward based on suppression of the will of the Iraqi people.” Leading Iraqi officials endorse the continued presence of U.S. military forces in Iraq, in spite of calls from some Iraqis, especially Iran-aligned voices, for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. The United States has sought Iraq’s cooperation in its maximum pressure campaign against Iran, but has acknowledged limits on Iraq’s ability to cut some ties to its neighbor. U.S. officials welcome Iraqi efforts to assert more state control over militias, but have not encouraged Iraqi counterparts to confront pro-Iranian armed groups forcefully. Many Iraqis appear to view incremental change as unlikely to resolve their concerns, but they also appear to differ in their preferences for the scope and pace of systemic change. Systemic reform might present new opportunities for U.S.-Iraq partnership, but also might further empower Iraqis who seek to minimize U.S. influence and/or weaken bilateral ties. Maintenance of the political status quo despite Iraqi domestic opposition also presents risks. If, for example, the United States continues to cooperate with an increasingly unpopular Iraqi governing elite that remains unresponsive to citizens’ demands, then options for pursuing U.S. interests could become more limited or costly. Confrontations resulting from continued paralysis or repressive measures could jeopardize Iraq’s hard-won security gains.

Nov 6, 2019

Unauthorized Childhood Arrivals, DACA, and Related Legislation

On June 4, 2019, the House passed the American Dream and Promise Act of 2019 (H.R. 6) on a vote of 237 to 187. Title I of the bill, the Dream Act of 2019, would establish a process for certain unauthorized immigrants who entered the United States as children (known as unauthorized childhood arrivals) to obtain lawful permanent immigration status. This vote on H.R. 6 was the latest in a line of House and Senate floor votes on legislation to grant some type of immigration relief to unauthorized childhood arrivals. As commonly used, the term “unauthorized childhood arrivals” encompasses both individuals who entered the United States unlawfully, and individuals who entered legally but then lost legal status by violating the terms of a temporary visa. There is no single set of requirements that defines an unauthorized childhood arrival. Individual bills include their own criteria. Legislation on unauthorized childhood arrivals dates to 2001. The earliest bills, which received Senate committee action in the 107th and 108th Congresses, only addressed unauthorized childhood arrivals. More recent proposals receiving legislative action have combined provisions on unauthorized childhood arrivals with other immigration provisions—in some cases, these have been major bills to reform the immigration system, such as Senate-passed S. 744 in the 113th Congress. None of these bills have been enacted into law. Most measures on unauthorized childhood arrivals that have seen legislative action have proposed mechanisms for eligible individuals to become lawful permanent residents (LPRs), typically through a two-stage process. Criteria to obtain a conditional or temporary status (stage 1) commonly include continuous presence in the United States for a minimum number of years prior to the date of the bill’s enactment, initial entry into the United States as a minor, and satisfaction of specified educational requirements. Criteria to become a full-fledged LPR (stage 2) typically include satisfaction of additional educational requirements or service in the Armed Forces, or, in some cases, employment. Proposals to grant legal immigration status to unauthorized childhood arrivals also require applicants to clear criminal and security-related ineligibility criteria. In June 2012, following unsuccessful efforts in the 111th Congress to enact legislation to grant LPR status to unauthorized childhood arrivals, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative. Under this initiative, eligible unauthorized childhood arrivals could receive renewable two-year protection from removal and work authorization. The eligibility criteria for an initial grant of DACA were broadly similar to those in earlier bills on unauthorized childhood arrivals and included continuous residence in the United States since June 2007, initial U.S. entry before age 16, and satisfaction of educational requirements or service in the Armed Forces. In September 2017, Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced that DACA was being terminated. Due to court rulings to date, however, past recipients continue to be able to request DACA. The U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear arguments on the DACA rescission on November 12, 2019. According to USCIS data, there were approximately 669,080 active DACA recipients as of April 30, 2019, and the total number of individuals who had ever been granted DACA was 822,063 as of July 31, 2019. These DACA recipient numbers can be compared to estimates of the DACA-eligible population. The Migration Policy Institute has estimated that as of 2018, 1,302,000 individuals met the original DACA eligibility requirements and an additional 356,000 met the age, residence, and immigration status criteria but not the educational requirements. It remains to be seen whether H.R. 6, as passed by the House, or another measure to grant legal status to unauthorized childhood arrivals will be enacted into law.

Nov 6, 2019

Federal Regional Commissions and Authorities: Structural Features and Function

This report describes the structure, activities, legislative history, and funding history of seven federal regional commissions and authorities: the Appalachian Regional Commission; the Delta Regional Authority; the Denali Commission; the Northern Border Regional Commission; the Northern Great Plains Regional Authority; the Southeast Crescent Regional Commission; and the Southwest Border Regional Commission. All seven regional commissions and authorities are broadly modeled after the Appalachian Regional Commission structure, which is composed of a federal co-chair appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, and the member state governors, of which one is appointed the state co-chair. This structure is broadly replicated in the other commissions and authorities, albeit with notable variations and exceptions to local contexts. In addition, the service areas for all of the federal regional commissions and authorities are defined in statute and thus can only be amended or modified through congressional action. While the service areas for the federal regional commissions and authorities have shifted over time, those jurisdictions have not changed radically in their respective service lives. Of the seven federal regional commissions and authorities, four could be considered active: the Appalachian Regional Commission; the Delta Regional Authority; the Denali Commission; and the Northern Border Regional Commission. The four active regional commissions and authority received $15 million to $165 million in congressional appropriations in FY2019 for their various activities. Each of the four functioning regional commissions and authority engage in economic development to varying extents, and address multiple programmatic activities in their respective service areas. These activities may include, but are not limited to: basic infrastructure; energy; ecology/environment and natural resources; workforce/labor; and business development. Though they are federally-chartered, receive congressional appropriations for their administration and activities, and include an appointed federal representative in their respective leadership structures (the federal co-chair and his/her alternate, as applicable), the federal regional commissions and authorities are quasi-governmental partnerships between the federal government and the constituent state(s) of a given authority or commission. This partnership structure, which also typically includes substantial input and efforts at the sub-state level, represents a unique federal approach to economic development and a potentially flexible mechanism for coordinating strategic economic development goals to local, state, and multi-state/regional priorities and contexts. Congress has expressed interest in the federal regional commissions and authorities pursuant to its appropriations and oversight authority, as well as its interest in facilitating economic development programming. Given relevant congressional interest, the federal regional commissions and authorities provide a model of functioning economic development approaches that are place-based, intergovernmental, and multifaceted in their programmatic orientation (e.g., infrastructure, energy, environment/ecology, workforce, business development).

Nov 6, 2019

Defense Primer: U.S. Precision-Guided Munitions

Nov 6, 2019

Legalization Framework Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)

The population of unlawfully present aliens in the United States numbers between ten million and twelve million, according to recent estimates. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) takes three primary approaches to regulating this population: removal, deterrence, and—to a lesser extent—legalization. Legalization, as used here, means the granting of a lawful immigration status to an unlawfully present alien so that he or she is no longer subject to removal under the INA. Put differently, an unlawfully present alien “legalizes” by obtaining lawful permanent resident status (LPR or “green card” status) or any other status (such as a nonimmigrant status) that extinguishes the statutory basis for his or her removal. The INA takes a generally restrictive approach to legalization. During much of the 20th century, a statutory provision called “registry” allowed unlawfully present aliens to obtain LPR status based on their long-standing presence in the United States. If unlawfully present aliens had entered the United States before a fixed cutoff date and satisfied other requirements, such as a lack of certain types of criminal convictions, they could apply to the Attorney General for LPR status. The registry statute is now effectively obsolete because its cutoff date, which Congress last updated in 1986, remains fixed at 1972. The most consequential body of legalization principles in the INA governs when unlawfully present aliens may obtain LPR status through qualifying family relationships or on other qualifying grounds. In general, the INA imposes barriers to the acquisition of LPR status for unlawfully present aliens who come within one of the three major categories that the law uses to select aliens for immigration to the United States: family-based immigrants, employment-based immigrants, and diversity immigrants. Specifically, most unlawfully present aliens who come within these categories must pursue LPR status by departing the United States to apply for an immigrant visa abroad (rather than applying to adjust status within the United States), and their departure typically triggers a ten-year bar on readmission to the United States. There are important exceptions to this general framework, however. In particular, an alien who overstays a nonimmigrant visa and then becomes the immediate relative of a U.S. citizen (through marriage, for example) may generally apply to adjust to LPR status without leaving the country and without facing any time bars on admission. Other INA provisions allow for legalization on hardship or humanitarian grounds. Cancellation of removal allows for legalization where the removal of an unlawfully present alien would cause hardship to immediate relatives who are U.S. citizens or LPRs, but the hardship must be “exceptional and extremely unusual.” Cancellation of removal also is generally only available as a defense in removal proceedings (aliens cannot apply for it affirmatively), is subject to an annual cap, and, among other requirements, is only available to unlawfully present aliens who have been in the United States for at least ten years. As for humanitarian relief, asylum creates a pathway to LPR status for unlawfully present aliens who have a well-founded fear of persecution or suffered past persecution in their countries of origin. However, aliens generally must apply for asylum within one year of arriving in the United States (unless an exception applies), so asylum is not available to most unlawfully present aliens who have been in the country for long periods of time. Subsidiary protections from persecution and torture—withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)—do not have the one-year application deadline, but they offer more limited relief that arguably does not qualify as lawful immigration status. Separately, a series of nonimmigrant statuses, including the U visa, offer the prospect of lawful immigration status to unlawfully present aliens who are victims or witnesses of certain crimes. U.S. immigration law has also taken other approaches to legalization, separate and apart from the narrow legalization provisions in the INA. First, Congress occasionally has enacted ad hoc legalization laws that, rather than reforming the INA’s generally applicable provisions going forward, have offered one-time relief or relief only for discrete populations. Second, executive branch agencies have exercised enforcement discretion to grant unlawfully present aliens discretionary reprieves from removal, such as deferred action or the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative, which have conferred a weaker form of protection than lawful immigration status. This weaker form of protection is sometimes known as “quasi-legal status” and, although it typically confers work authorization and gives an unlawfully present alien an assurance that immigration authorities will not pursue his or her removal during a certain time, it does not extinguish the statutory basis for the alien’s removal.

Nov 5, 2019

Using the Power of the Purse to Change Policy: SCOTUS Case on ACA Risk Corridors Asks Important Appropriations Law Question

Nov 1, 2019

Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR): Background and Analysis of Bank Data

Capital allows banks to withstand losses (to a point) without failing, and regulators require banks to hold certain minimum amounts. These requirements are generally expressed as ratios between balance sheet items, and banks (particularly small banks) indicate that reporting those ratios can be difficult. Capital ratios fall into one of two main types—simpler leverage ratios and more complex risk-weighted ratios. A leverage ratio treats all assets the same, whereas a risk-weighted ratio assigns assets a risk weight to account for the likelihood of losses. In response to concerns that small banks faced unnecessarily burdensome capital requirements, Congress mandated further tailoring of capital rules in Section 201 of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-174) and created the Community Bank Leverage Ratio (CBLR). Under the provision, a bank with less than $10 billion in assets that meets certain risk-profile criteria will have the option to meet a CBLR requirement instead of the existing, more complex risk-weighted requirements. Because most small banks currently hold enough capital to meet the CBLR option, Section 201 will allow many small banks to opt out of requirements to meet and report more complex ratios. Section 201 grants the federal bank regulatory agencies—the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)—discretion over certain aspects of CBLR implementation, including setting the exact ratio; the provision mandated a range between 8% and 10%. In November 2018, the regulators proposed 9%, arguing this threshold supports safety and stability while providing regulatory relief to small banks. Bank proponents criticized this decision and advocated an 8% threshold, arguing that 9% is too high and withholds the exemption’s benefits from banks with appropriately small risks. Despite the criticism, the bank regulators announced in a joint press release on October 29, 2019, they had finalized the rule with a 9% threshold. Questions related to how much riskier bank portfolios will be if they are only subject to a leverage ratio (rather than a combination of leverage and risk-based ratios) and how high the threshold must be to mitigate those risks are matters of debate. Riskier assets generally offer greater rates of return to compensate investors for bearing more risk. Without risk weighting, banks would have an incentive to hold riskier assets to earn higher returns. In addition, a leverage ratio alone may not fully reflect a bank’s riskiness because a bank with a high concentration of very risky assets could have a similar ratio to a bank with a high concentration of very safe assets. Risk-based ratios can address these problems, however, they can create misallocations across asset classes and involve complexity related to compliance. Of the 5,352 FDIC-insured depository institutions in the United States at the end of the second quarter of 2019, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that 5,078 (about 95%) would meet the size and risk-profile criteria necessary to qualify for the CBLR option. Under the regulator-set risk-profile criteria, nonqualifying banks are on average larger, have larger off-balance-sheet exposures, and have risk-based capital ratios that are about a quarter lower than qualifying banks. Of the 5,078 banks that qualify based on size and risk criteria, CRS estimates 4,440 (or 83% of all U.S. banks) would exceed a 9% threshold and would be eligible to enter the CBLR regime without having to hold additional capital. If the threshold were set at 8%, an additional 515 banks (9.6%) would exceed the lower threshold. Thus, the difference between 8% or 9% would, depending on perspective, provide appropriate regulatory relief to or remove important safeguards from almost 10% of the nation’s banks, which collectively hold about 2% of total U.S. banking industry assets. Banks that would be CBLR compliant at a 9% threshold are similar in size, activities, and off-balance-sheet exposures to 8% threshold banks. However, the latter group’s risk-based ratios are about half the level of the former’s.

Nov 1, 2019

Foreign STEM Students in the United States

Nov 1, 2019

Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSAs)

Oct 31, 2019

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974

Oct 30, 2019

Congressional Access to Information in an Impeachment Investigation

Committee investigations in the House of Representatives can serve several objectives. Most often, an investigation seeks to gather information either to review past legislation or develop future legislation, or to enable a committee to conduct oversight of another branch of government. These inquiries may be called legislative investigations because their legal authority derives implicitly from the House’s general legislative power. Much more rarely, a House committee may carry out an investigation to determine whether there are grounds to impeach a federal official—a form of inquiry known as an impeachment investigation. While the labels “legislative investigation” and “impeachment investigation” provide some context to the objective or purpose of a House inquiry, an investigation may not always fall neatly into one of these categories. This ambiguity has been a topic of interest to many during the various ongoing House committee investigations concerning President Trump. On September 24, 2019, Speaker Pelosi announced that these investigations constitute an “official impeachment inquiry.” Although these committee investigations into allegations of presidential misconduct are proceeding, in the Speaker’s words, under the “umbrella of [an] impeachment inquiry,” most appear to blend lawmaking, oversight, and impeachment purposes. However an investigation is labeled, because the Constitution provides the House with the “sole Power of Impeachment,” implementation of the impeachment power, including any ancillary investigative powers, would appear textually committed to the discretion of the House. Yet the House has not established a single, uniform approach to starting impeachment investigations. The process has instead evolved, generally tracking changes the House has made to its committee structure and the investigative authorities conferred to its committees. Although impeachment investigations have often been authorized by a House resolution, they have also been conducted without an explicit authorization. There are still other examples where the House provided express authorization only after a committee had engaged in a “preliminary” impeachment investigation. An impeachment investigation may be more likely—relative to a traditional legislative investigation—to obtain certain categories of information, especially from the executive branch. For example, it is possible that the significance of an exercise of the impeachment power, in conjunction with a resulting increase in political and public pressure, may itself affect the Executive’s compliance decisions. But an impeachment investigation may also have legal impacts. If, in the face of a dispute with the executive branch over access to information, the House chose to seek judicial enforcement of an investigative demand, there appear to be at least three potential ways in which the impeachment power could, relative to a legislative investigation, provide the House with a stronger legal position. An impeachment investigation may (1) improve the likelihood of a court authorizing committee access to grand jury materials; (2) relieve any possible limitations imposed by the requirement that a committee act with a “legislative purpose”; and (3) improve the likelihood that a committee will be able to overcome privilege assertions such as executive privilege. In the past, executive noncompliance with an impeachment investigation has also prompted the investigating committee to recommend to the House an article of impeachment for contempt of Congress. That said, a congressional committee engaged in a legislative investigation could arguably obtain much of the same information as it would during an impeachment inquiry, as both legislative and impeachment investigations constitute an exercise of significant constitutional authority. As a result, while an impeachment investigation may very well increase the House’s access to information, House committees may have substantial authority to obtain the information they seek even without reliance on the impeachment power.

Oct 25, 2019

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Hazard Mitigation Assistance

Introduction The majority of funding in the United States for both pre- and post-disaster mitigation comes from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which defines mitigation as “any sustained action to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to people and property from natural hazards and their effects.” Mitigation actions have a long-term impact, as opposed to actions that are associated with immediate preparedness, response, and recovery activities. Mitigation has been shown to save money. A recent study by the Multihazard Mitigation Council found that society saves $6 for every dollar spent on mitigation funded through major federal mitigation grants. FEMA administers three hazard mitigation grant programs, which it collectively refers to as Hazard Mitigation Assistance (HMA): the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP); the Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) Grant Program; and the Flood Mitigation Assistance (FMA) Grant Program. Eligible applicants include state and local governments and federally-recognized tribes. Certain nonprofit organizations may apply for HMGP. Individuals may not apply for HMA funding, but they may benefit from a community application. Applicants to all three programs must have FEMA-approved hazard mitigation plans. Eligible activities differ for the three programs. The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) The Hazard Mitigation Grant Program is authorized by Section 404 of the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. §5170c). HMGP assistance is triggered by a major disaster declaration from the President or a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) and is funded through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The key purpose of the HMGP program is to ensure that the reconstruction process following a disaster addresses opportunities to include mitigation measures to reduce the loss of life and property from future disasters. HMGP funding is awarded as a formula grant to a state based on the estimated total federal assistance per major disaster declaration or FMAG, subject to a sliding scale formula (42 U.S.C. §5170c(a) and 44 C.F.R. §206.432(b)). HMGP funding normally does not exceed 15% of the estimated total aggregate federal grant amount, but states with an approved Enhanced State Mitigation Plan in effect before the disaster are eligible for HMGP funding of 20% of such amount. States can use HMGP funds for any eligible activity for any type of hazard and are not limited to the hazard or area for which the grant was awarded. HMGP funds may be used to pay up to 75% of eligible activity costs. Funding from other federal sources cannot be used for the 25% share, with one exception—funding provided under the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program. The Pre-Disaster Mitigation Grant Program (PDM) Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) funding is authorized by Section 203 of the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. §5133), with the goal of reducing overall risk to the population and structures from future hazard events, while also reducing reliance on federal funding to respond to future disasters. The PDM program is now funded through the DRF, although until FY2019 the amount available for PDM was appropriated annually to a separate account. Through FY2019, FEMA has awarded PDM grants competitively. In P.L. 116-6, Congress made $250 million available for PDM in FY2019, which will make funds available in a manner similar to previous years. In FY2019, each state, jurisdiction, and tribe is eligible to receive an allocation of $575,000. Of the total appropriation, $20 million will be set aside for federally-recognized Native American tribal applicants, with the balance of the funds distributed on a competitive basis. No applicant may receive more than 15% of the appropriated funding. Federal funding is generally available for up to 75% of the eligible activity costs; however, small, impoverished communities may be eligible for up to a 90% federal cost share. Future Changes to Pre-Disaster Mitigation Funding Funding for pre-disaster mitigation changed significantly with the passage of the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 (DRRA, Division D of P.L. 115-254). DRRA authorized a new source of funding for pre-disaster mitigation, to be called the National Public Infrastructure Pre-Disaster Mitigation Fund (NPIPDM). For each major disaster declaration, the President may set aside from the DRF an amount equal to 6% of the estimated aggregate amount of the grants to be made pursuant to the following sections of the Stafford Act: 403 (essential assistance) 406 (repair, restoration, and replacement of damaged facilities) 407 (debris removal) 408 (federal assistance to individuals and households) 410 (unemployment assistance) 416 (crisis counseling assistance and training) 428 (public assistance program alternative program procedures) The funds from this 6% set-aside will go to the NPIPDM, which may increase the focus on funding projects that improve community resilience before a disaster occurs. FEMA anticipates that the NPIPDM will receive $300-$500 million per year on average. There is potential for significantly increased funding following a year with many big disasters, but funding could also be less in a year with few disasters. FEMA has the discretion to shape the new pre-disaster mitigation approach. FEMA has announced plans to replace the PDM program with a new program called Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC), which is to be funded from the NPIPDM and is to replace PDM. It is not yet clear how FEMA will implement BRIC; the target date for the first BRIC application period to open is October 2020. The Flood Mitigation Assistance Grant Program (FMA) To reduce comprehensive flood risk, FEMA also operates a Flood Mitigation Assistance Grant Program funded through revenue collected by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), with the goal of mitigating NFIP-insured flood-damaged properties to reduce or eliminate NFIP claims. FMA funding is only available to communities which participate in the NFIP. Congress allows FEMA to withdraw funds from the National Flood Insurance Fund, and use those funds to operate the NFIP, but the spending authority to use these offsetting collections for FMA must be authorized in appropriations acts (42 U.S.C. §4017(f)). In FY2019, $160 million will be available for FMA funding. Generally, federal funding is available for up to 75% of eligible costs. However, FEMA may contribute up to 90% for repetitive loss properties and up to 100% for severe repetitive loss properties.

Oct 24, 2019

China’s Corporate Social Credit System

Oct 24, 2019

Dam Safety Overview and the Federal Role

Dams provide various services, including flood control, hydroelectric power, recreation, navigation, and water supply, but they require maintenance, and sometimes rehabilitation and repair, to ensure public and economic safety. Dam failure or incidents can endanger lives and property, as well as result in loss of services provided by the dam. Federal government agencies reported owning 3% of the more than 90,000 dams listed in the National Inventory of Dams (NID), including some of the largest dams in the United States. The majority of NID-listed dams are owned by private entities, nonfederal governments, and public utilities. Although states have regulatory authority for over 69% of NID-listed dams, the federal government plays a key role in dam safety policies for both federal and nonfederal dams. Congress has expressed interest in dam safety over several decades, often prompted by critical events such as the 2017 near failure of Oroville Dam’s spillway in California. Dam failures in the 1970s that resulted in the loss of life and billions of dollars of property damage spurred Congress and the executive branch to establish the NID, the National Dam Safety Program (NDSP), and other federal activities. These programs and activities have increased safety inspections, emergency planning, rehabilitation, and repair. Since the late 1990s, some federal agency dam safety programs have shifted from a standards-based approach to a risk-management approach. A risk-management approach seeks to mitigate failure of dams and related structures through inspection programs, risk reduction measures, and rehabilitation and repair, and it prioritizes structures whose failure would pose the greatest threat to life and property. Responsibility for dam safety is distributed among federal agencies, nonfederal agencies, and private dam owners. The Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) NDSP facilitates collaboration among these stakeholders. The National Dam Safety Program Act, as amended (Section 215 of the Water Resources Development Act of 1996; P.L. 104-303; 33 U.S.C. §§467f et seq.), authorizes the NDSP at $13.4 million annually. In FY2019, Congress appropriated $9.2 million for the program, which provided training and $6.8 million in state grants, among other activities. The federal government is directly responsible for maintaining the safety of federally owned dams. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation own 42% of federal dams, including many large dams. The remaining federal dams are owned by the Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of Defense, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Tennessee Valley Authority, Department of Energy, and International Boundary and Water Commission. Congress has provided various authorities for these agencies to conduct dam safety activities, rehabilitation, and repair. Congress also has enacted legislation authorizing the federal government to regulate or rehabilitate and repair certain nonfederal dams. A number of federal agencies regulate dams associated with hydropower projects, mining activities, and nuclear facilities and materials. Selected nonfederal dams may be eligible for rehabilitation and repair assistance from the Natural Resources Conservation Service, USACE, and FEMA. For example, in 2016, the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; P.L. 114-322) authorized FEMA to administer a high hazard dam rehabilitation grant program to provide funding assistance for the repair, removal, or rehabilitation of certain nonfederal dams. Congress may consider how to address the structural integrity of dam infrastructure and mitigate the risk of dam safety incidents, either within a broader infrastructure investment effort or as an exclusive area of interest. Congress may reexamine the federal role for dam safety, while considering that most of the nation’s dams are nonfederal. Congress may reevaluate the level and allocation of appropriations to federal dam safety programs, rehabilitation and repair for federal dams, and financial assistance for nonfederal dam safety programs and dams. In addition, Congress may maintain or amend policies for disclosure of dam safety information when considering the federal role in both providing dam safety risk and response information to the public while also maintaining security of these structures.

Oct 24, 2019

Overview of Continuing Appropriations for FY2020 (P.L. 116-59)

This report provides an analysis of the continuing appropriations provisions for FY2020 included in Division A (Continuing Appropriations Act, 2020) of H.R. 4378. The legislation also included a separate Division B (Health and Human Services Extenders and Other Matters), which extended multiple federal health care programs that were otherwise set to expire September 30, 2019, and provided for some adjustments to additional health programs. This report examines only Division A, the continuing resolution (CR) portion of the legislation. On September 27, 2019, the President signed H.R. 4378 into law (P.L. 116-59). Division A of H.R. 4378 was termed a CR because it provided temporary authority for federal agencies and programs to continue spending in FY2020 in the same manner as a resolution enacted separately for that purpose. It provides temporary funding for the programs and activities covered by all 12 of the regular appropriations bills, since none of them had been enacted prior to the start of FY2020. These provisions provide continuing budget authority for projects and activities funded in FY2019 by that fiscal year’s applicable appropriations acts, with some exceptions. It includes both budget authority that is subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits on defense and nondefense spending and also budget authority that is effectively exempt from those limits, such as that designated for “Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism.” Funding under the terms of the CR is effective October 1, 2019, through November 21, 2019—roughly the first seven weeks of the fiscal year. The CR generally provides budget authority for FY2020 for most projects and activities at the rate at which they were funded during FY2019. Although it is effective only through November 21, the cost estimate prepared by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides an annualized projection of the discretionary budget authority provided in the measure. As provided in P.L. 116-59, the amount subject to the statutory discretionary spending limits is approximately $1.253 trillion. When spending that is effectively not subject to those limits (Overseas Contingency Operations, disaster relief, emergency requirements, and program integrity adjustments) is also included, the CBO estimate is $1.345 trillion. CRs frequently include provisions that are specific to certain agencies, accounts, or programs. These include provisions that designate exceptions to the general funding rate formula or otherwise single out a program, activity, or purpose for which any referenced funding is extended (typically referred to as “anomalies”), as well as provisions that have the effect of creating new law or changing existing law (including the renewal of expiring provisions of law). The CR includes a number of such provisions, each of which is briefly summarized in this report. CRS appropriations experts for each of these provisions are indicated in the accompanying footnotes and Table 1. Congressional clients may also access CRS Report R42638, Appropriations: CRS Experts. For general information on the content of CRs and historical data on CRs enacted between FY1977 and FY2019, see CRS Report R42647, Continuing Resolutions: Overview of Components and Practices.

Oct 24, 2019

Diplomatic Security, Embassy Construction, and the Role of Congress

Oct 23, 2019

Federal Role in Responding to Potential Risks of Per- and Polyfluoroalkyl Substances (PFAS)

Per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) are a group of fluorinated compounds that have been used for various purposes, including numerous commercial, industrial, and U.S. military applications. Some common uses include food packaging, nonstick coatings, and stain-resistance fabrics, and as an ingredient in fire suppressants in Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) used at U.S. military installations, at civilian airports, and by state and local fire departments, and elsewhere. PFAS persist in the environment and in humans, and studies on several PFAS indicate that exposures above certain levels are associated with various adverse health effects. Some PFAS—primarily perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) and perfluorooctane sulfonate (PFOS)—have been detected in soil, surface water, groundwater, and drinking water in numerous locations. These detections—associated with releases from federal and industrial facilities, civilian airports, and fire department facilities—have prompted calls for increased federal action and authority to prevent and mitigate releases of and exposures to PFAS. Federal actions to address potential risks from PFAS have focused mostly on PFOS and PFOA because of past uses, prevalence in the environment, and availability of health effects research. These actions have been taken primarily under the authorities of the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA); the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA); and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and related Department of Defense (DOD) response authorities. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has used various authorities to address PFAS in commerce, public water supplies, and in the environment. Under TSCA, EPA has taken actions over recent decades to gather and assess existing information on the risks of PFOS, PFOA, and certain other PFAS. The agency has required manufacturers to develop new information to evaluate risks of various PFAS and has issued orders restricting the manufacture, processing, distribution, use, and/or disposal pending the development of new risk information. In addition, EPA worked with U.S. manufacturers as they voluntarily phased out production of PFOS, PFOA, and related substances. Under SDWA, EPA is evaluating PFOA and PFOS to determine whether national drinking water regulations are warranted. EPA plans to propose preliminary determinations in 2019. Among other actions, EPA has issued nonenforceable health advisory levels for PFOA and PFOS, intended to be protective over a lifetime of daily exposure, and has used SDWA emergency powers to issue enforcement orders to require responses to drinking water contamination by PFAS. DOD and other federal agencies have used CERCLA authorities to respond to releases of various PFAS at federal facilities, although such responses are not statutorily required. DOD administers the vast majority of federal facilities where PFAS has been detected. DOD has been responding to releases of PFOA and PFOS from the use of AFFF at active and decommissioned U.S. military installations under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program. DOD has been phasing out the use of AFFF that contains PFOA or PFOS to reduce the risks of future releases. Several federal agencies, including EPA and the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, have been evaluating potential health effects that may be associated with exposures to various PFAS. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration and the U.S. Department of Agriculture are addressing risks of PFAS in dairy milk, other foods, and food contact applications. Various stakeholders have urged federal agencies to act more quickly and broadly to address potential PFAS risks and to provide assistance to address contamination. In the 116th Congress, more than 40 bills, including House- and Senate-passed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) bills for FY2020 (H.R. 2500 and S. 1790), would address PFAS through various federal agencies and authorities (see Table 2). Among other PFAS provisions, H.R. 2500 would establish liability for PFAS response costs though designation of PFAS as hazardous substances, both under CERCLA and through the Clean Water Act, while S. 1790 would expand DOD response requirements to include releases of any pollutant or contaminant. Unlike H.R. 2500, S. 1790 would amend SDWA to direct EPA to issue drinking water standards for PFAS and for other purposes. Both bills would address PFAS under other statutes and new authorities. Several bills, including H.R. 2500 and S. 1790, would variously authorize funds to be appropriated to assist communities in addressing contaminated water supplies.

Oct 23, 2019

Financial Inclusion and Credit Access Policy Issues

Access to basic financial products and services is generally considered foundational for households to manage their financial affairs, improve their financial well-being, and graduate to wealth building activities in the future. Financial inclusion in three domains can be particularly important for households: access to bank and other payment accounts; access to the credit reporting system; and access to affordable short-term small-dollar credit. In the United States, robust consumer credit markets allow most consumers to access financial services and credit products to meet their needs in traditional financial markets. For example, the vast majority of consumers have a bank account, a credit score, a credit card, and other types of credit products. Some consumers—who tend to be younger adults, low- and moderate-income (LMI) or possess an imperfect credit repayment history—can find gaining access to these banking and credit products and services difficult. Currently, consumers tend to rely on family or community connections to get their first bank account, establish a credit history, and gain access to affordable and safe credit. For those excluded, consumers may find managing their financial lives expensive and difficult. Different barriers affect different populations. For some younger consumers, a lack of a co-signer might make it more difficult to build a credit report history or a lack of knowledge or familiarity with financial institutions may be a barrier to obtaining a bank account. For consumers living paycheck to paycheck, a bad credit history or a lack of money could serve as barriers to obtaining affordable credit or a bank account. For immigrants, the absence of a credit history in the United States or language differences could be critical access barriers. For consumers who do not have familiarity or access to the internet or mobile phones, a group in which older Americans may be overrepresented, technology can be a barrier to accessing financial products and services. Financial institutions may find serving these consumers expensive or difficult, given their business model and safety and soundness regulation requirements. For example, lower-balance or less credit-worthy consumers may generally be less profitable for banks to serve. Likewise, some consumers may lack a credit history, making it difficult for lenders to determine their credit risk on a future loan. New technology has the potential to lower the cost of financial products and expand access to underserved consumers. For example, alternative (nontraditional) data may be able to better price default risk for lenders, which could expand credit access or make credit less expensive for some consumers. In addition, internet-based mobile wallets may provide affordable access to payment services for unbanked consumers. Yet, relevant consumer protection and data security laws and regulations may need to be reconsidered or updated in response to these technological developments. Policymakers debate whether existing regulation can accommodate financial innovation or whether a new regulatory framework is needed. Given the importance of financial inclusion to financial well-being, and the challenges facing certain segments of the population, this topic is likely to continue to be the subject of congressional interest and legislative proposals. In general, political debates around how to best achieve financial inclusion for underserved consumers relate to whether policy changes could help expand consumers’ affordable access to these financial products and services. Disagreements exist about whether government programs or regulation should be used to directly support financial inclusion or whether laws and regulations make it more difficult for the private sector to create new or existing products targeted at serving underserved consumers.

Oct 21, 2019

Agriculture and Related Agencies: FY2020 Appropriations

The Agriculture appropriations bill funds the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) except for the U.S. Forest Service. It also funds the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and—in even-numbered fiscal years—the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Agriculture appropriations include both mandatory and discretionary spending. Discretionary amounts, though, are the primary focus during the bill’s development. The largest discretionary spending items are the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC); agricultural research; rural development; FDA; foreign food assistance and trade; farm assistance loans and salaries; food safety inspection; animal and plant health programs; and technical assistance for conservation programs. In the absence of an enacted full-year appropriation, FY2020 began on October 1, 2019, under a continuing resolution (P.L. 116-59, Division A). For the regular annual appropriation, the Trump Administration requested in March 2019 $19.2 billion for discretionary-funded accounts within the jurisdiction of Agriculture appropriations subcommittees. The request would be a reduction of $4.1 billion from FY2019 (-18%). On June 4, 2019, the House Appropriations Committee reported a stand-alone Agriculture appropriations bill (H.R. 3164, H.Rept. 116-107) by a vote of 29-21. On June 25, 2019, the House passed a five-bill minibus appropriation with Agriculture as Division B (H.R. 3055). The discretionary total of the House-passed Agriculture appropriations bill is $24.3 billion. This is $1 billion more (+4%) than the comparable amount that was enacted for FY2019 and $5.1 more (+27%) than the Administration’s request. On September 19, the Senate Appropriations Committee reported its Agriculture appropriations bill (S. 2522, S.Rept. 116-110) by a vote of 31-0. The discretionary total of the Senate-reported bill is $23.1 billion. This is $58 million more than the FY2019 appropriation (+0.3%), $4.2 billion more than the Administration’s request, and $893 million less than the House-passed bill on a comparable amount without CFTC (-3.7%). The primary components of the $1 billion increase in the House-passed bill from FY2019 include increases to rural development accounts by $412 million (+14%, primarily for rural water, broadband, and housing), a rural broadband pilot program by $393 million (+314%), foreign agricultural assistance by $377 million (+19%), departmental administration by $205 million (+53%, primarily for construction to renovate USDA headquarters), agricultural research programming by $197 million (+6%), and FDA appropriations by $185 million (+6%). Reductions in budget authority include decreases to agricultural research buildings and facilities funding by -$331 million, rescinding WIC carryover balances an additional -$300 million, and eliminating temporary funding for international food assistance by -$216 million (with a larger increase to the base appropriation, as noted above in foreign agricultural assistance). The primary differences that comprise the -$893 million difference in the Senate-reported bill from the House-passed bill include providing agricultural research $193 million more than in the House bill and department administration accounts $123 million more than in the House bill. These greater allowances are more than offset by providing rural development $407 million less than in the House bill (largely from rural water and waste disposal grants), rural broadband in the General Provisions title $518 million less than in the House bill, foreign agricultural assistance $159 million less than in the House bill, and FDA $105 million less than the House bill. Discretionary Agriculture Appropriations, by Title, FY2019-FY2020 / Source: CRS, using P.L. 116-6 (Division B), House-passed H.R. 3055 (Division B), and Senate-reported S. 2522. Note: FDA = Food and Drug Administration, CFTC = Commodity Futures Trading Commission. For comparability, includes CFTC in Related Agencies in all columns regardless of jurisdiction. The appropriation also carries mandatory spending that is largely determined in separate authorizing laws. These mandatory spending amounts total nearly $131 billion in the House-passed bill and $129 billion in the Senate-reported bill. Thus, the overall total of the FY2020 Agriculture appropriation would be about $155 billion in the House-passed bill and $152 billion in the Senate-reported bill. Policy provisions may also be included that affect how the appropriation is delivered. This year, these provisions include issues such as the relocation of USDA agencies, disaster programs, rural definitions, livestock regulations, nutrition programs, and dietary guidelines. Budget sequestration continues to affect mandatory agricultural spending accounts. Sequestration refers to automatic across-the-board reductions in spending authority. In FY2020, sequestration on mandatory spending accounts is 5.9% and totals about $1.4 billion for agriculture accounts. Recent budget acts have extended sequestration through FY2029.

Oct 18, 2019