CRS Reports

Congressional Research Service reports providing nonpartisan analysis of major federal policy issues.

4,930 reports indexed · sourced from EveryCRSReport.com

Active Opioid Legislation in the House: In Brief

This report briefly summarizes opioid-related bills that were considered during "Opioid Week" (the week of May 9, 2016) The summaries in this report may be useful illustrations of the range of approaches Members of Congress have proposed to address the problem of opioid addiction.

May 13, 2016

R44501Asian Affairs

Terrorism in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is home to more than 620 million people and around 15% of the world’s Muslim population. The region has faced the threat of terrorism for decades, but threats in Southeast Asia have never been considered as great as threats in some other regions. The rise of the Islamic State, however, poses new, heightened challenges for Southeast Asian governments, and for U.S. policy towards the vibrant and strategically important region. Southeast Asia has numerous dynamic economies and three Muslim-majority states, including the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation, Indonesia, which also is the world’s third largest democracy (by population) after India and the United States, respectively. Although the mainstream of Islamic practice across the region is comparatively tolerant of other religions, Southeast Asia is also home to several longstanding and sometimes violent separatist movements, as well as pockets of Islamist radicalism, which have led to instances of violence over the past 30 years. These were particularly acute during the 2000s, when several attacks in Indonesia killed hundreds of Indonesians and dozens of Westerners. The threat seemingly eased in the late 2000s-early 2010s, with the success of some Southeast Asian governments’ efforts to combat violent militancy and degrade some of the region’s foremost terrorist groups. The Islamic State’s rise, however, raises new challenges for Southeast Asia. Several Southeast Asian governments, including Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have intensified counterterror efforts since 2014, outlawing calls for support of the Islamic State and strengthening policing and border-control efforts. Nevertheless, the challenges that governments in the region face were exemplified in January 2016 by a violent attack in Jakarta, Indonesia, that killed eight people, including four civilians. There are several factors that characterize the terrorism threat in Southeast Asia. The region’s largest Muslim-majority nations, Indonesia and Malaysia, have long been known for moderate forms of Islam and the protection of religious diversity—policies that have widespread popular support but which raise resentments among small numbers of conservative actors. In other Southeast Asian countries with substantial Muslim populations, such as the Philippines and Thailand, simmering resentments in Muslim-majority regions have been fed by perceived cultural and economic repression, leading to separatist movements that have posed threats to domestic groups—and in the case of the Philippines, to Western targets. Threats are evolving with the rise of the Islamic State, which has conducted extensive recruitment in Indonesia’s national language (called “Bahasa Indonesia”) and in the Malay language widely spoken in the region. Though the number of Southeast Asians who have traveled to the Middle East to fight with the Islamic State is considerably lower than numbers from other regions, such as Europe, North Africa, and South Asia, observers estimate that hundreds of Southeast Asians have joined the fight, raising concerns that battle-trained individuals may return to the region and conduct attacks. It is difficult to estimate the number of fighters with precision. Southeast Asia’s borders are comparatively porous, raising concerns about trans-border threats that may lead to attacks in third-party states, such as Singapore. This raises the issue of border controls, an important factor for addressing terrorism. Governments in the region have sought better coordination and intelligence sharing—efforts that have been supported by the United States. The threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia has implications for numerous U.S. interests, as the region has had growing prominence in U.S. foreign-policy initiatives under the Obama Administration’s “strategic rebalance” to the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. security relations with several Southeast Asian countries have deepened against the backdrop of rising strategic competition with China. This report focuses on Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, and Singapore. The United States has offered counterterrorism assistance to several Southeast Asian nations. These include helping Indonesia create a centralized antiterrorism unit and providing U.S. troops on the Southern Philippine island of Basilan to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines combat violent groups in the country’s deep South. Congress may wish to evaluate the effectiveness of such assistance, and examine funding levels for counterterrorism assistance. Congress may also wish to consider the relationship between counterterrorism assistance and other U.S. goals in the region, including the development of human rights and civil society in Southeast Asia. This report will be updated periodically.

May 12, 2016

R44497Intelligence and National Security

Fact Sheet: Selected Highlights of the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4909)

This Fact Sheet summarizes selected highlights of H.R. 4909, the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) reported by the House Armed Services Committee on May 4, 2016 (H.Rept. 114-537). Congressional action on the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has been fundamentally shaped by the legally binding caps on discretionary spending for defense programs and for non-defense programs, which were established by P.L. 114-74, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (BBA). A central issue before Congress is the extent to which Congress and the President will approve Department of Defense (DOD) funding for FY2017 that (1) exceeds the relevant BBA cap; and (2) is exempt from that spending cap because it is classified as funding for so-called Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The 2015 BBA increased binding caps on defense and non-defense discretionary appropriations for FY2016 and FY2017, which originally had been codified by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 (P.L. 112-25). Those spending caps are enforced by a process of “sequestration.

May 12, 2016

IF10208Economic Policy

The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio

May 11, 2016

R44494Economic Policy

The Alternative Minimum Tax for Individuals: In Brief

Suppress for publication In addition to raising revenue, the individual income tax has been used as a vehicle to promote various social and economic goals. This has been accomplished by according preferential tax treatment to certain items of income and expense. The net result, however, has been an erosion of the individual income tax base. By utilizing the preferences and incentives in the tax code, some individuals can substantially reduce their income taxes. To make sure that everyone paid at least some taxes and still preserve the economic and social incentives in the tax code, Congress, in 1969, enacted the predecessor to the current individual alternative minimum tax (AMT). Since then, the federal individual income tax has consisted of two parallel tax systems—the regular income tax and the AMT. Since its inception, the value and effectiveness of the minimum tax has been the subject of congressional debate, and it has been modified numerous times. This report provides a brief history and overview of the alternative minimum tax for individuals (AMT). While the AMT is not the subject of current legislative activity, that may change if efforts to reform the tax code move forward. The report will be updated as legislative action warrants.

May 10, 2016

R44496Constitutional Questions

Military Officer Personnel Management: Key Concepts and Statutory Provisions

Congress and the executive branch are currently considering changes to the officer personnel management system. Some of these proposed changes would require changes to the laws, including provision enacted by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) and the Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA). Contemporary debates over officer personnel management policy often revolve around the fundamental questions of “what type of officers do we need to win the next war?” and “what skills does the officer corps need to enable the military services to perform their missions?” These questions are implicitly oriented towards future events. Their answers are therefore somewhat speculative. Still, contemporary trends and military history can provide valuable insight. Additionally, a set of broader questions can help focus the analysis: What will be the key security interests and priorities of the United States in the future? What conflicts will likely arise in the pursuit of these interests? What opponents will we face in these conflicts? How will they fight? What military strategy will the United States employ to secure its interests? How will we fight? What knowledge, skills, and abilities must the officer corps possess to effectively carry out these roles and missions? How do we attract and retain individuals with the necessary potential for service as officers? How should the officer corps be prepared so it can effectively adapt to unforeseen crises and contingencies? Given limited resources, what are the most critical areas for improvement? Where should the nation accept risk? Policymakers often have divergent answers to these questions and thus come to different conclusions about the most appropriate officer personnel management policies. Examples of diverging views can be found in debates on the criteria for accepting or rejecting people for military service; required training and education over the course of a career; assignments to be emphasized; distribution of officers by grade; retention of experienced and talented individuals; and the criteria for selecting individuals for promotion and for separation. In the exercise of its constitutional authority over the armed forces, Congress has enacted an array of laws governing military officer personnel management and periodically changes these laws as it deems appropriate. This report provides an overview of selected concepts and statutory provisions that shape and define officer appointments, assignments, grade structure, promotions, and separations. It also provides a set of questions that policymakers may wish to consider when discussing proposed changes to current law.

May 10, 2016

R44465Appropriations

Energy and Water Development: FY2017 Appropriations

The Energy and Water Development appropriations bill provides funding for civil works projects of the Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and Central Utah Project (CUP), and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and several other independent agencies. DOE typically accounts for about 80% of the bill’s total funding. President Obama’s FY2017 discretionary appropriations request for agencies in the Energy and Water Development bill totaled $37.55 billion, as calculated by the House and Senate appropriations committees. That amount is 0.6% above the $37.32 billion appropriated for FY2016. (The Administration proposed $2.26 billion in new mandatory funding for DOE in addition to the FY2017 discretionary funding request.) FY2017 funding for the Corps would be cut by 22.9%, and Reclamation and CUP by 17.2%, from their FY2016 levels. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved its version of the FY2017 Energy and Water Development appropriations bill on April 14, 2016 (S. 2804, S.Rept. 114-236), and the House Appropriations Committee completed action on April 19, 2016 (H.R. 5055, H.Rept. 114-532). As passed by committee, the Senate bill would increase budget authority for energy and water programs by $823.5 million over the request (2.2%), and the House bill would provide an increase of $12.7 million over the request (0.03%). Major Energy and Water Development funding highlights for FY2017 include Proposed Corps and Reclamation Budgets. The Administration requested similar funding levels for the Corps and Reclamation as sought in FY2016, which are substantially lower than the final FY2016 levels approved by Congress. The proposed reductions were largely rejected by the House and Senate committees. Definition of “Fill Material” Under the Clean Water Act. The Senate Appropriations Committee voted to prohibit the Corps during FY2017 from changing the definition of “fill material” in relation to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The Administration objected to the restriction. California Drought and Central Valley Project Operations. The House proposed changes that would aim to increase water supplies to users facing curtailed allocations from Reclamation. 40% Requested Boost for Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. The Administration requested an increase of $829.2 million (40.1%) in discretionary funding for DOE’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EERE) for FY2017, for total discretionary funding of $2.898 billion. The House and Senate committees did not approve the proposed increase. Nuclear Waste “Consent-Based Siting.” The Administration proposed to triple funding in FY2017 for DOE to develop a consent-based nuclear waste siting program. The House Appropriations Committee rejected the consent-based siting request, instead providing $170 million for a proposed waste repository at Yucca Mountain, NV. The Senate panel approved most of the Administration request. Surplus Plutonium Disposition. Construction of the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF), which would make fuel for nuclear reactors out of surplus weapons plutonium, would be terminated beginning in FY2017 by the Administration’s budget request. The Senate Appropriations Committee approved the Administration halt, while the House panel voted to continue construction.

May 6, 2016

R44489Agricultural Policy

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP): Key Provisions and Issues for Congress

The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) among 12 Asia-Pacific countries, with both economic and strategic significance for the United States. The proposed agreement is perhaps the most ambitious FTA undertaken by the United States in terms of its size, the breadth and depth of its commitments, its potential evolution, and its geo-political significance. Signed on February 4, 2016, after several years of negotiations, if implemented, TPP would be the largest FTA in which the United States participates, and would eliminate trade barriers and establish new trade rules and disciplines on a range of issues among TPP partners not found in previous U.S. FTAs or the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, the TPP is designed to better integrate the United States into the growing Asia-Pacific region and has become the economic centerpiece of the Administration’s “rebalance” to the region. Congress would need to enact implementing legislation for the agreement to enter into force for the United States. Such legislation would be considered under Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) procedures, unless Congress determines the Administration has not met TPA requirements. TPP Members Currently, the TPP includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam, which together comprise 40% of the world’s GDP. TPP is envisioned as a “living agreement,” potentially addressing new issues and open to future members, including as a possible vehicle to advance a wider Asia-Pacific free trade area. The United States currently has FTAs with six TPP partner countries. Japan is the largest economy and trading partner without an existing U.S. FTA. Malaysia and Vietnam also stand out among TPP countries without existing U.S. FTAs, given the rapid growth in U.S. trade with the two nations over the past three decades and their generally higher level of trade restrictions. Potential Outcomes of TPP The TPP would provide several principal trade liberalization and rules-based outcomes for the United States. These include the following: lower tariff and nontariff barriers on U.S. goods through eventual elimination of all tariffs on industrial products and most tariffs and quotas on agricultural products; greater service sector liberalization with enhanced disciplines, such as nondiscriminatory and minimum standard of treatment, along with certain exceptions; additional intellectual property rights protections in patent, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets; first specific data protection provisions for biologic drugs and new criminal penalties for cybertheft of trade secrets; investment protections that guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment, minimum standard of treatment and other provisions to protect foreign investment, balanced by provisions to protect a state’s right to regulate in the public interest; enforceable provisions designed to provide minimum standards of labor and environmental protection in TPP countries; commitments, without an enforcement mechanism, to avoid currency manipulation, provide transparency and reporting concerning monetary policy, and engage in regulatory dialogue among TPP parties; digital trade commitments to promote the free flow of data and to prevent data localization, except for data localization in financial services, alongside commitments on privacy and exceptions for legitimate public policy purposes; enhanced regulatory transparency and due process provisions in standards-setting; and the most expansive disciplines on state-owned enterprises ever in a U.S. FTA or the WTO, albeit with exceptions, to advance fair competition with private firms based on commercial considerations. TPP Debate Views on the likely effects of the agreement vary. Proponents argue that the TPP is in the national interest and has the potential to boost economic growth and jobs through expanded trade and investment opportunities in what many see as the world’s most economically vibrant region. Opponents of TPP voice concerns over possible job loss and competition in import-sensitive industries. Other concerns include how a TPP agreement might limit the government’s ability to regulate in areas such as health, food safety, and the environment. The Obama Administration and others have argued that the strategic value of a TPP agreement parallels its economic value, while others argue that past trade pacts have had a limited impact on broad foreign policy dynamics. In analyzing the agreement and its implementing legislation, Congress may consider the agreement from several of these perspectives, as well as how the TPP promotes progress on U.S. trade negotiating objectives.

May 4, 2016

R44486Education Policy

FY2016 State Grants Under Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA)

May 3, 2016

R44488Economic Policy

Overview of Commercial (Depository) Banking and Industry Conditions

A commercial bank is an institution that obtains either a federal or state charter that allows it to accept federally insured deposits and pay interest to depositors. In addition, the charter allows banks to make residential and commercial mortgage loans; to provide check cashing and clearing services; to underwrite securities that include U.S. Treasuries, municipal bonds, commercial paper, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issuances; and to conduct other activities as defined by statute, namely the National Banking Act. Commercial banks are limited in what they can do. For example, the Glass-Steagall Act separates commercial banking (i.e., activities that are permissible for depository institutions with a bank charter) from investment banking (i.e., activities that are permissible for brokerage firms, which do not include taking deposits or providing loans). Congressional interest in the financial conditions of depository banks, or the commercial banking industry, has increased in light of the financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2009, which resulted in a large increase in the number of distressed institutions. Providing credit during the financial crisis was difficult for the banking system. Thus, an analysis of post-financial crisis trends that pertain to lending activity may provide some useful insights about recovery of the banking system. The financial condition of the banking industry can be examined in terms of profitability, lending activity, and capitalization levels (to buffer against the financial risks). This report focuses primarily on profitability and lending activity levels. Issues related to higher bank capitalization requirements are discussed in CRS Report R42744, U.S. Implementation of the Basel Capital Regulatory Framework, by Darryl E. Getter. The banking system generally has substantially more small banks (i.e., those with $1 billion or less in assets) relative to larger size banks. For several decades, bank assets have increased while the number of banking institutions has decreased. The banking industry continues consolidating, with more of the industry’s assets held by a smaller number of institutions. Generally speaking, by most measures, the health of the banking system has improved since 2009. There are fewer problem banks since the peak in 2011, as well as fewer bank failures in comparison to the peak amount of failures in 2010. The return on assets (RoA) and return on equity (RoE) for the banking industry, expressed as percentages, have rebounded since the financial crisis. Although RoA and RoE have not returned to pre-recessionary levels, the range of percentages that should be associated with optimal performance of the banking system is subjective. The banking system currently has increased its capital reserves that have been designated to buffer against unforeseen macroeconomic and financial shocks. The banking system also has loan-loss reserves to sufficiently cover losses expected to be uncollectible. For loans that are noncurrent (delinquent) but have not yet gone into default, however, the banking system still needs to rebuild this loan-loss capacity if such loans do become uncollectible. Hence, news of industry profitability should be tempered by the news that aggregate loan-loss provisions still must increase to sufficiently buffer against noncurrent loans.

May 3, 2016

R44487Internet and Telecommunications Policy

Federal Lifeline Program: Frequently Asked Questions

The Federal Lifeline Program, established by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1985, is one of four programs supported under the Universal Service Fund. The Program was originally designed to assist eligible low-income households to subsidize the monthly service charges incurred for voice telephone usage and was limited to one fixed line per household. In 2005 the Program was modified to cover the choice between either a fixed line or a mobile/wireless option. Concern over the division between those who use and have access to broadband versus those who do not, known as the digital divide, prompted the FCC to once again modify the Lifeline program to cover access to broadband. On March 31, 2016, the FCC adopted an Order to expand the Lifeline Program to support mobile and fixed broadband Internet access services on a stand-alone basis, or with a bundled voice service. Households must meet a needs-based criteria for eligibility. The program provides assistance to only one line per household in the form of a monthly subsidy of, in most cases, $9.25. This subsidy solely covers costs associated with network access (minutes of use), not the costs associated with devices, and is given not to the subscriber, but to the household-selected service provider. This subsidy is then in turn passed on to the subscriber. The Lifeline program is available to eligible low-income consumers in every state, territory, commonwealth, and on tribal lands.

May 2, 2016

R44485Aging Policy

Older Americans Act: 2016 Reauthorization

First enacted in 1965, the Older Americans Act (OAA) was created in response to concern by policymakers about a lack of community social services for older individuals. Since then, the OAA has been reauthorized and amended numerous times. The last OAA reauthorization occurred in 2006, when the Older Americans Act Amendments of 2006 (P.L. 109-365) was enacted, which extended the act’s authorizations of appropriations through FY2011 (authorizations of appropriations for most OAA programs expired on September 30, 2011). OAA-authorized activities have continued to receive funding for FY2012 through FY2016. Today the OAA supports a wide range of social services and programs for individuals aged 60 years or older. These services and programs include supportive services, congregate nutrition services (i.e., meals served at group sites such as senior centers, community centers, schools, churches, or senior housing complexes), home-delivered nutrition services, family caregiver support, community service employment, the Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program, and services to prevent the abuse, neglect, and exploitation of older persons. Except for Title V, Community Service Employment for Older Americans (CSEOA), all programs are administered by the Administration on Aging (AOA) in the Administration for Community Living (ACL) within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Title V is administered by the Department of Labor’s (DOL’s) Employment and Training Administration. In the 114th Congress, both the House and the Senate have considered bipartisan legislation to reauthorize the OAA. On July 16, 2015, the Senate passed S. 192, the Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2015. The House took up S. 192 and passed the bill with an amendment on March 21, 2016. The Senate passed S. 192, as amended by the House on April 7, 2016. On April 19, 2016, President Barack Obama signed P.L. 114-144, the Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016. Key reauthorization issues for policymakers and stakeholders included changes to the Title III statutory funding formula for certain programs, statutory language for discretionary authorizations of appropriations, and constraints on discretionary appropriations in the current budgetary climate that have curbed interest in amending the act to establish new programs or activities. This report provides information on the status of bipartisan legislation to reauthorize the OAA and key issues, followed by a brief summary of that act’s historical development. Next, it provides a section-by-section summary of P.L. 114-144, the Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016.

May 2, 2016

R44483Asian Affairs

China’s Natural Gas: Uncertainty for Markets

China could potentially be a much larger producer and consumer of natural gas than it is now. Despite China’s pollution problems and international environmental commitments, the role of natural gas in China’s energy mix remains relatively low, particularly compared to the United States. China has announced big plans for its natural gas development and use, but the changes will require significant investment in exploration, production, infrastructure, and consumption. With a slowing economy, China may not be in a position in the short-term to undertake these investments. China’s natural gas plans have implications for a number of issues in which Congress has expressed a strong interest. Those issues include the prospects for U.S. hydrocarbon exports to China, prospects for U.S. energy companies’ investments in China, Chinese investment in the U.S. energy sector, China’s ability to meet its global commitments to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to combat climate change, and China’s plans for disputed waters in the South China Sea, which may contain hydrocarbon resources, among other topics. In the 114th Congress, Members have expressed interest in Chinese policy related to natural gas in hearings, such as the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources’ January 2015 hearing on S. 33, The LNG Permitting Certainty and Transparency Act, and the same committee’s February 2015 hearing on The Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request for the U.S. Department of Energy. China’s energy sector, including its natural gas industry, is controlled by the government via the National Development and Reform Commission’s National Energy Administration and other regulatory and planning bodies. There are three main national energy companies—China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec), and China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC). The first two are among the world’s largest energy companies. These companies are the primary actors domestically and internationally. China has made significant strides in diversifying its natural gas supplies. Domestic production rose 164% from 2004 to 2014, to 135 billion cubic meters (BCM). Natural gas imports, which did not begin until 2006, grew from one BCM that year to over 58 BCM in 2014. With its imports split almost evenly between pipeline and liquefied natural gas (LNG), China is the fourth largest natural gas importer in the world, with Turkmenistan supplying just under half of its imports. Growth in China’s demand for natural gas has slowed in recent years. State media reported that annual consumption in 2015 was 191 BCM, up 3.7% from 2014. This represented the lowest rate of annual growth in a decade. China’s government expects its overall energy consumption to grow in 2016, and for natural gas to rise to 6.2% of primary energy needs, from 6% in 2014. Part of the slowdown in consumption growth is attributed to the slowing economy. In November 2015, China cut natural gas prices to spur demand.

May 2, 2016

R44484Domestic Social Policy

Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions Authored by Judge Merrick Garland

May 2, 2016

R44481Intelligence and National Security

Encryption and the “Going Dark” Debate

Changing technology presents opportunities and challenges for U.S. law enforcement. Some technological advances have arguably opened a treasure trove of information for investigators and analysts; others have presented unique hurdles. While some feel that law enforcement now has more information available to them than ever before, others contend that law enforcement is “going dark” as their investigative capabilities are outpaced by the speed of technological change. These hurdles for law enforcement include strong, end-to-end (or what law enforcement has sometimes called “warrant-proof”) encryption; provider limits on data retention; bounds on companies’ technological capabilities to provide specific data points to law enforcement; tools facilitating anonymity online; and a landscape of mixed wireless, cellular, and other networks through which individuals and information are constantly passing. As such, law enforcement cannot access certain information they otherwise may be authorized to obtain. Much of the current debate surrounds how strong encryption contributes to the going dark issue, and thus it is the focus of this report. The tension between law enforcement capabilities and technological change has received congressional attention for several decades. For instance, in the 1990s the “crypto wars” pitted the government against technology companies, and this tension was highlighted by proposals to build in back doors to certain encrypted communications devices as well as to restrict the export of strong encryption code. In addition, Congress passed the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA; P.L. 103-414) in 1994 to help law enforcement maintain their ability to execute authorized electronic surveillance as telecommunications providers turned to digital and wireless technology. The going dark debate originally focused on data in motion, or law enforcement’s ability to intercept real-time communications. However, more recent technology changes have impacted law enforcement capabilities to access not only communications but stored content, or data at rest. As such, a central element of the debate now involves determining what types of information law enforcement is able to access and under what circumstances. Cell phones have advanced from being purely cellular telecommunications devices into mobile computers that happen to have phone capabilities; concurrently, the scope of data produced by and saved on these devices has morphed. In addition to voice communications, this range of data can include call detail records, Global Positioning System (GPS) location points, data stored on the devices (including emails and photos), and data stored in the “cloud.” Some of these data can be obtained directly from telecommunications providers or individuals, and some may be obtained without going through such a middle man. The Administration has taken steps to urge the technology community to develop a means to assist law enforcement in accessing encrypted data and has taken steps to bolster law enforcement capabilities. In addition, policymakers have been evaluating whether legislation may be a necessary or appropriate element in the current debate on going dark—particularly on the encryption aspect. A range of legislative options exist that could impact law enforcement capabilities or resources. Legislation could also place certain requirements on technology companies or individuals utilizing certain communications systems and devices. In debating these options, policymakers may consider a number of questions, including the following: How effective might mandating law enforcement access to products or services manufactured, sold, or otherwise used in the United States be, given the borderless nature of modern communications? Is it possible to create a system with sufficiently narrow and protected access points that these points can only be entered by authorized entities and not exploited by others? What is the appropriate balance for personal privacy and data security with national security? What precedents might be set for U.S. companies operating both domestically and internationally if the United States mandates the ability for law enforcement to access encrypted data and communications?

Apr 29, 2016

R44460American Law

Zika Response Funding: In Brief

This report presents the Administration's request for supplemental appropriations for the Zika response. It includes sections outlining Congressional actions, the emergency supplemental appropriations request for Zika response efforts -- by both U.S. health and human services agencies and international assistance programs -- and information about unobligated Ebola response funds.

Apr 28, 2016

R44480Constitutional Questions

Clean Power Plan: Legal Background and Pending Litigation in West Virginia v. EPA

This report provides legal background on the Clean Power Plan rule (CPP) to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), its Clean Air Act (CAA) framework under Section 111, and climate-related lawsuits that have preceded the present litigation over the CPP. It then gives an overview of the participants in the current litigation, including two groups of Members of Congress, who have offered briefs in support of the petitioners and the respondents, respectively. This report explains the major events in the litigation as of the date of publication, including the Supreme Court stay, and the likely timetable of events in the near term.

Apr 27, 2016

R44479American Law

Judge Merrick Garland: His Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court

On March 16, 2016, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) to fill the vacancy on the Supreme Court created by the unexpected death of Justice Antonin Scalia in February. Judge Garland was appointed to the D.C. Circuit by President Clinton in 1997, and is currently its chief judge, an administrative position that rotates among the active judges on the circuit. Prior to his appointment to the bench, Judge Garland served in the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, where he notably oversaw the prosecution of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing case, as well as other cases. It remains to be seen whether or how the Senate might proceed in considering Judge Garland’s nomination; however, the nomination generally remains effective until it is withdrawn or this term of Congress ends, whichever occurs first. This report provides an overview of Judge Garland’s jurisprudence and discusses what the impact on the Court might be if he, or a judge of a similar judicial approach, were to be confirmed to succeed Justice Scalia. In particular, the report focuses upon those areas of law where Justice Scalia can be seen to have influenced the High Court’s approach to certain issues, or served as a fifth and deciding vote on the Court, with a view toward how Judge Garland might approach those same issues if he were to be confirmed. The report begins with his views on two overarching issues—the role of the judiciary and statutory interpretation. It then addresses 14 separate areas of law, which are arranged in alphabetical order from “administrative law” to “takings.” The report includes one table which notes the cases where the Supreme Court has reviewed majority opinions written or joined by Judge Garland. Another table, in the appendix to the report, identifies Judge Garland’s colleagues on the D.C. Circuit and lists notable cases involving Judge Garland and that colleague. A separate report, CRS Report R44484, Majority, Concurring, and Dissenting Opinions Authored by Judge Merrick Garland, coordinated by R. Chuck Mason, lists all opinions authored by Judge Garland during his tenure on the D.C. Circuit. Other CRS products discuss various issues related to the vacancy on the Supreme Court. For an overview of available products, see CRS Legal Sidebar WSLG1526, Vacancy on the Supreme Court: CRS Products, by Kate M. Manuel and Andrew Nolan.

Apr 27, 2016

R44478Appropriations

FY2017 Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations: Status and Issues

This report provides a brief summary of the general scope of the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill, congressional action with regard to the FY2017 bill, key issues and controversial topics that have previously arisen for the bill, and a list of additional resources.

Apr 26, 2016

IN10450

Private Flood Insurance in the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)

This report briefly discusses federal law regarding flood insurance. By law or regulation, federal agencies, federally-regulated lending institutions, and government-sponsored enterprises must require certain property owners to purchase flood insurance as a condition of any mortgage that these entities make, guarantee, or purchase.

Apr 25, 2016

IN10413CRS Insights

Climate Change Paris Agreement Opens for Signature

On April 22, 2016, 175 out of 196 Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change signed the new international Paris Agreement to address greenhouse-gas-induced climate change. No international agreement has attracted as many signatures on a single day. In addition, 15 nations—all perceiving themselves as particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change—deposited their instruments of ratification as well (Barbados, Belize, Fiji, Grenada, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Nauru, Palau, Palestine, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Somalia, and Tuvalu). Ten announced intentions to deposit their instruments during 2016: Australia, Argentina, Cameroon, Canada, China, France, Mali, Mexico, Philippines, and the United States. Brazil, the European Union, and the Russian Federation pledged to work through their domestic processes to deposit their instruments as quickly as possible. Delegations of 195 nations plus the European Union adopted the Paris Agreement on December 12, 2015. The Paris Agreement creates a structure for nations to pledge every five years to abate their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, to adapt to climate change, and to cooperate to these ends, including financial and other support. A single framework to promote transparency and track progress of Parties’ efforts applies, for the first time, to all Parties—whether rich or poor. The Parties also adopted a Decision to give effect to the Paris Agreement. Both the Decision and the Agreement (hereinafter capitalized) are intended to be legally binding on Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the new Agreement, respectively, though not all provisions within them are mandatory. Both are subsidiary to the UNFCCC, which the United States ratified with the advice and consent of the Senate (Treaty Document 102-38, October 7, 1992). The UNFCCC entered into force in 1994. Whether the new Paris Agreement or Decision would require Senate advice and consent depends on the content of the agreements. If either were to contain new legal obligations on the United States, it would favor requiring Senate consent to ratification. However, the United States and other Parties to the UNFCCC accepted many legally binding obligations when they ratified the Convention, including control of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, preparation to adapt to climate change, international cooperation and support, and regular reporting of emissions and actions with international review. Some have argued that the Paris Agreement does not require more of the United States than it is already obligated to do under the UNFCCC, while others have argued that it does. Purpose and Post-2050 Balance of Emissions and Removals The agreement states that it aims to hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change. This purpose is stated as enhancing the implementation of the UNFCCC, including its objective to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level to avoid dangerous anthropogenic interference in the climate system. In order to achieve this “long-term temperature goal,” Parties aim to make their GHG emissions peak as soon as possible and then to reduce them rapidly “so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of this century.” In other words, the Agreement envisions achieving net zero anthropogenic emissions. While this is arguably synonymous with the UNFCCC’s objective of stabilizing GHG atmospheric concentrations, the Agreement puts a timeframe on the objective for the first time. However, as a collective objective, the Agreement provides no means to hold an individual Party accountable if the objective were not met. Mitigation and Adaptation The Agreement and Decision establish a single framework under which all Parties would: communicate every five years and undertake “ambitious” Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to mitigating GHG emissions, participate in a single “transparency framework” that includes communicating their GHG inventories and implementation of their obligations, including financial support provided or received, not less than biennially (with exceptions to a few, least developed states), and be subject to international review of their implementation. All Parties will eventually be subject to common procedures and guidelines. However, while developed country Parties (not defined) must provide NDCs stated as economy-wide, absolute GHG reduction targets, developing country Parties are exhorted to enhance their NDCs and move toward similar targets over time, in light of their national circumstances. Further, flexibility in the transparency framework is allowed to developing countries, depending on their capacities, regarding the scope, frequency, and detail of their reporting. The administrative Secretariat of the Convention will record the NDCs and other key reports in a public registry. The Agreement also requires “as appropriate” that Parties prepare and communicate their plans to adapt to climate change. Adaptation communications, too, will be recorded in a public registry. A committee will, in a facilitative and non-punitive manner, address compliance issues under the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement contains provisions for voluntary withdrawal of Parties. The Agreement permits Parties voluntarily to participate in cooperative approaches (implicitly, emissions markets) that “involve the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes.” Finance The Agreement reiterates the obligation in the UNFCCC to provide financial support to developing country Parties to implement their mitigation efforts, calling for it to be continuous and enhanced. It uses exhortatory language to restate the collective pledge in the 2009 Copenhagen Accord, of $100 billion annually by 2020, and calls for a “progression beyond previous efforts.” For the first time under the UNFCCC, the Agreement encourages all Parties to provide financial support. In addition, in the Decision, the Parties agreed to set, prior to their 2025 meeting, a new, collective, quantified goal for mobilizing financial resources of not less than $100 billion annually to assist developing country Parties. The Decision strongly urges developed country Parties to scale up their current financial support—in particular to significantly increase their support for adaptation. The Agreement recognizes that “enhanced support” will allow for “higher ambition” in the actions of developing country Parties. Five-Year Assessments In 2023 and every five years thereafter, the Parties are to perform a “global stocktake” to review implementation of the Paris Agreement and progress toward the purpose of the Agreement and the long-term net zero anthropogenic emissions goal.

Apr 25, 2016

R44477Appropriations

Department of Education Funding: Key Concepts and FAQ

Like most federal agencies, the Department of Education (ED) receives funds in support of its mission through various federal budget and appropriations processes. However, the processes by which ED receives and expends funds can be complicated. For example, ED receives both mandatory and discretionary appropriations, expends funds through formula and competitive grants, forward funds some accounts while providing appropriations at the start of the fiscal year to others, and subsidizes student loan costs (direct loans and loan guarantees). As such, analyzing ED’s budget requires an understanding of a broad range of federal budget and appropriations concepts. This report provides an introduction to these concepts as they are used specifically in the context of the congressional appropriations process for ED. Accordingly, the first section of this report provides an introduction to key terms and concepts in the federal budget and appropriations process for ED. It includes definitions and explanations of terms ranging from budget authority to transfers. The second section answers frequently asked questions (FAQs) about federal funding for ED or education in general. These are as follows: How much funding does the Department of Education receive annually? How much does the federal government spend on education? Where can I find information about the President’s budget request and congressional appropriations for the Department of Education? How much ED funding is in the congressional budget resolution? What is the difference between the amounts in appropriations bills and report language? What happens to education funding if annual appropriations are not enacted before the start of the federal fiscal year? What happens if an ED program authorization “expires”? The third section includes a brief description of, and links to, reports and documents that provide more information about budget and appropriations concepts.

Apr 22, 2016

R44475Economic Policy

EB-5 Immigrant Investor Visa

The immigrant investor visa was created in 1990 to benefit the U.S. economy through employment creation and an influx of foreign capital into the United States. The visa is also referred to as the EB-5 visa because it is the fifth employment preference immigrant visa category. The EB-5 visa provides lawful permanent residence (i.e., LPR status) to foreign nationals who invest a specified amount of capital in a new commercial enterprise in the United States and create at least 10 jobs. The foreign nationals must invest $1,000,000, or $500,000 if they invest in a rural area or an area with high unemployment (referred to as targeted employment areas or TEAs). There are approximately 10,000 visas available annually for foreign national investors and their family members (7.1% of the worldwide employment-based visas are allotted to immigrant investors and their derivatives). In FY2015, there were 9,764 EB-5 visas used, with 93% going to investors from Asia. More specifically, 84% were granted to investors from China and 3% were granted to those from Vietnam. In general, an individual receiving an EB-5 visa is granted conditional residence status. After approximately two years the foreign national must apply to remove the conditionality (i.e., convert to full-LPR status). If the foreign national has met the visa requirements (i.e., invested and sustained the required money and created the required jobs), the foreign national receives full LPR status. If the foreign national investor has not met the requirements or does not apply to have the conditional status removed, his or her conditional LPR status is terminated, and, generally, the foreign national is required to leave the United States, or will be placed in removal proceedings. In 1992, Congress established the Regional Center (Pilot) Program, which created an additional pathway to LPR status through the EB-5 visa category. Regional centers are “any economic unit, public or private, which [are] involved with the promotion of economic growth, including increased export sales, improved regional productivity, job creation, and increased domestic capital investment.” The program allows foreign national investors to pool their investment in a regional center to fund a broad range of projects within a specific geographic area. The investment requirement for regional center investors is the same as for standard EB-5 investors. As the use of EB-5 visas has grown, so has the use of the Regional Center Program. In FY2014, 97% of all EB-5 visas were issued based on investments in regional centers. Unlike the standard EB-5 visa category, which does not expire, the Regional Center Program is set to expire on September 30, 2016. Different policy issues surrounding the EB-5 visa have been debated. Proponents of the EB-5 visa contend that providing visas to foreign investors benefits the U.S. economy, in light of the potential economic growth and job creation it can create. Others argue that the EB-5 visa allows wealthy individuals to buy their way into the United States. In addition, some EB-5 stakeholders have voiced concerns over the delays in processing EB-5 applications and possible effects on investors and time sensitive projects. Furthermore, some have questioned whether U.S. Citizen and Immigration Services (USCIS) has the expertise to administer the EB-5 program, given its embedded business components. The Department of Homeland Security’s Office of the Inspector General (DHS OIG) has recommended that USCIS work with other federal agencies that do have such expertise, while USCIS has reported that it has taken steps internally to address this issue. USCIS has also struggled to measure the efficacy of the EB-5 category (e.g., its economic impact). USCIS methodology for reporting investments and jobs created has been called into question by both the DHS OIG and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). Furthermore, some have highlighted possible fraud and threats to national security that the visa category presents. In comparison to other immigrant visas, the EB-5 visa faces additional risks of fraud that stem from its investment components. Such risks are associated with the difficulty in verifying that investors’ funds are obtained lawfully and the visa’s potential for large monetary gains, which could motivate individuals to take advantage of investors and can make the visa susceptible to the appearance of favoritism. USCIS has reported improvements in its fraud detection but also feels certain statutory limitations have restricted what it can do. Additionally, GAO believes that improved data collection by USCIS could assist in detecting fraud and keeping visa holders and regional centers accountable. Lastly, the authority of states to designate TEAs has raised concerns. Some have pointed to the inconsistency in TEA designation practices across states and how it could allow for possible gerrymandering (i.e., all development occurs in an area that by itself would not be considered a TEA). Others contend that the current regulations allow states to determine what area fits their economic needs and allow for the accommodation of commuting patterns. In addition to the issues discussed above, Congress may consider whether the Regional Center Program should be allowed to expire, be reauthorized, or made permanent, given its expiration on September 30, 2016. In addition, Congress may consider whether any modifications should be made to the EB-5 visa category or the Regional Center Program. Legislation has been introduced in the 114th Congress that would, among other provisions, amend the program to try to address concerns about fraud, and change the manner in which TEAs are determined. Other bills would create an EB-5-like visa category for foreign national entrepreneurs who do not have their own capital but have received capital from qualified sources, such as venture capitalists.

Apr 22, 2016

IF10394Foreign Affairs

Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)

Apr 21, 2016

R44473Economic Policy

What’s on Television? The Intersection of Communications and Copyright Policies

In the 1940s and 1950s, watching television meant tuning into one of a few broadcast television stations, with the help of an antenna, to watch a program at a prescheduled time. Over subsequent decades, cable and satellite operators emerged to enable households unable to receive over-the-air signals to watch the retransmitted signals of broadcast television stations. More recently, some viewers have taken to watching TV programming on their computers, tablets, mobile phones, and other Internet-connected devices at times of their own choosing, dispensing with television stations and cable and satellite operators altogether. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), Congress, and the courts have overseen this evolution by applying a combination of communications and copyright laws to regulate the distribution of television programming. These laws are intended to achieve three policy goals: protecting the property rights of content owners to encourage the production of television programs; promoting competition among distributors of video programming; and enabling broadcast television stations to serve the local communities to which they are licensed by the FCC. The regulatory structure intended to accomplish these goals was established in copyright and communications laws and regulations adopted by Congress and the FCC in the 1970s. These laws and regulations grant broadcast stations exclusive rights to carry programming under certain conditions; allow content owners to control the use of copyrighted content except in certain circumstances; and assign cable and satellite operators both obligations and rights with respect to the stations whose signals they retransmit. This structure has come under increasing stress as firms offer alternative ways to watch television programming, upsetting established relationships and raising questions about whether the key public policy goals defined by Congress can still be achieved. In particular, firms offering television programming to consumers over the Internet, known as online video distributors (OVDs), are not covered by some of the laws and regulations governing video distribution by providers that rely on their own facilities, such as cable and satellite operators. Station owners, meanwhile, are concerned that relationships between OVDs and broadcast networks could adversely affect stations’ revenues. Both the House Judiciary Committee and the House Energy and Commerce Committee have announced plans to review and update copyright and communications laws, respectively, while the FCC is considering how and whether to apply its regulations governing the distribution of television signals to a new era. At the same time, federal courts have reached conflicting conclusions as to how copyright laws apply to video programming in the new world of online video distribution. Because of the intertwined relationship between copyright and communications laws, major reform of the regulatory structure governing the distribution of television signals is likely to require Congress or the courts to consider how these two bodies of law intersect.

Apr 20, 2016

R44474Foreign Affairs

Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform and Issues for Congress

This report is designed to assist Congress as it evaluates the many different defense reform proposals suggested by the variety of stakeholders and institutions within the U.S. national security community.

Apr 20, 2016

IF10393Foreign Affairs

TPP: Rules of Origin

Apr 20, 2016

R44472Energy Policy

Funding for Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) at DOE: In Brief

to be suppressed Carbon capture and sequestration (or storage)—known as CCS The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (P.L. 111-5; enacted February 17, 2009, hereinafter referred to as the Recovery Act). research and development Administration’s FY2017 budget proposal, in Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows funding from FY2010 through FY2016, including Recovery Act funding. Fossil Energy Research and Development (1) FutureGen; (2) the Clean Coal Power Initiative (CCPI); (3) Industrial Carbon Capture and Storage (ICCS); and (4) Site Characterization, Training, and Program Direction. FY2017 DOE budget proposal for Fossil Energy R&D, and compares it to the FY2016 enacted amount. On the left side of Table 2, enacted funding for FY2016 is shown in the current organizational structure. On the right side of Table 2, FY2016 enacted funding and FY2017 proposed funding are compared in the proposed restructuring scheme

Apr 19, 2016

TE10009Energy Policy

Pipelines: Securing the Veins of the American Economy

Apr 19, 2016

IF10353Energy Policy

Mosquitoes, Zika Virus, and Transmission Ecology

Apr 18, 2016

R44470Appropriations

Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies: FY2017 Appropriations

The Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill includes funding for most of the Department of the Interior (DOI) and for agencies within other departments—including the Forest Service within the Department of Agriculture and the Indian Health Service within the Department of Health and Human Services. It also provides funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), arts and cultural agencies, and numerous other entities. For FY2017, the President requested $33.13 billion for the approximately 30 agencies and entities typically funded in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations law. For the 10 major DOI agencies in Title I of the bill, the request was $12.24 billion, or 36.9% of the total requested. For EPA, funded by Title II of the bill, the request was $8.27 billion, or 25.0% of the total. For the 20 agencies and other entities funded in Title III of the bill, the request was $12.62 billion, or 38.1% of the total. The President’s request of $33.13 billion would be an increase of $907.6 million (2.8%) compared to the total FY2016 enacted appropriations of $32.23 billion in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), Division G. The FY2016 total included $452.0 million for the Payments in Lieu of Taxes (PILT) program, which compensates counties and local governments for nontaxable lands within their jurisdictions. The FY2017 request did not include funding for PILT because the President proposed to fund this program through mandatory appropriations. In addition, the President’s request included a proposal for a new adjustment to the discretionary spending limits in law that would provide an additional $1.15 billion for wildfire suppression for FY2017. FY2016 enacted appropriations did not include such a discretionary cap adjustment. Under the President’s proposal, the total for each of the three titles of the bill would increase by varying amounts over FY2016 enacted appropriations. DOI agencies would receive an increase of $225.8 million (1.9%), funding for EPA would increase by $127.3 million (1.6%), and the total for all Related Agencies in Title III would increase by $554.5 million (4.6%).

Apr 15, 2016

R44463American Law

Air Force B-21 Long Range Strike Bomber

The Department of Defense is developing a new long-range bomber aircraft, the B-21 (previously known as LRS-B), and proposes to acquire 100 of them. B-21s would initially replace aging B-1 and B-52 bombers, and would possibly replace B-2s in the future. B-21 development was highly classified until the summer of 2015, when the Air Force revealed initial details of the aircraft and the program. Although technical specifications and other data remain out of public view, many details of the budget, acquisition strategy, procurement quantities, and other aspects of the B-21 program are now in the public arena. The Administration’s FY2017 budget request includes $1.4 billion for further development of the B-21. As a new and large defense program that involves issues of defense and nuclear policy, as well as significant expenditures, the B-21 is likely to be subject to significant congressional interest. Some material in this report previously appeared in CRS Insight IN10351, Long Range Strike Bomber Begins to Emerge, and in CRS Insight IN10384, Air Force Bomber Contract Awarded.

Apr 14, 2016

R44468

General Policy Statements: Legal Overview

Agencies frequently use guidance documents to set regulatory policy. While “legislative rules” carry the force of law and are required to undergo the notice and comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), guidance documents are exempt from these constraints and can be issued more swiftly than legislative rules. The issuance of such guidance documents, however, has not escaped criticism. Some have argued that agencies use guidance documents to effectively change the law or expand the scope of their delegated regulatory authorities. This report focuses on agency use and judicial review of one type of guidance document: general statements of policy. Judicial review of challenges to agency policy statements often turns on whether the agency document is actually a legislative rule. Pursuant to congressionally delegated authority, agencies promulgate legislative rules that carry the force and effect of law. General statements of policy are not legally binding; rather, they are issued in order to advise the public about the manner in which the agency intends to exercise its discretionary authority. While these analytical categories might seem relatively clear, distinguishing between the two in practice can be difficult. Courts often frame the inquiry as to whether the agency has established a binding norm on the public or itself, although a variety of heuristics are applied, ranging from a somewhat formalistic analysis of relevant legal consequences to a more functional focus on a statement’s practical effects. In addition, the question of whether a given agency document is properly identified as a legislative rule or policy statement has a significant impact on a federal court’s willingness to engage in judicial review of the agency action. Unlike legislative rules, which may be immediately reviewable once they are finalized, policy statements often cannot be challenged until the agency takes further action to implement or enforce the policy. The Supreme Court, however, has provided only limited guidance in determining whether and when policy statements are reviewable, and as a result, lower courts have not adopted a uniform approach to the reviewability question. In light of the difficulty in distinguishing between legislative rules and policy statements, questions have been raised concerning whether some judicial tests to make this determination are consistent with Supreme Court doctrine. The Court has made clear that the judiciary may not impose procedural requirements on agencies beyond the text of the APA. The applicable legal test governing agency use of policy statements, whether imposed by courts or Congress, has important implications for the executive branch and the public. One approach might grant agencies flexibility to issue policy statements in order to increase public knowledge of agency priorities, but risks permitting agencies to effectively bind the public without going through notice and comment procedures. An alternative might be to require heightened procedures when agencies issue policy statements, but this approach risks less overall notice to the public about agency intentions. Finally, although the relevant Supreme Court tests do not entirely preclude federal courts from deferring to an agency’s statutory interpretation contained in statements of policy, such documents usually do not receive Chevron deference. The weight that a reviewing court is willing to give to an agency’s interpretation of the law is an important aspect of judicial review. Indeed, the level of deference accorded to an agency interpretation can sometimes determine the outcome of a challenge to agency action. Interpretations reached through formal processes that have the force and effect of law are most likely to qualify for Chevron deference. In contrast, interpretations reached through informal processes, and which are neither binding nor precedential, are unlikely to be eligible for Chevron deference.

Apr 14, 2016

R44462Internet and Telecommunications Policy

The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA): Frequently Asked Questions

Federal agencies rely on information technology (IT) to conduct their work, requiring extensive investments in both updating existing IT and developing new IT. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has reported that the federal government budgets more than $80 billion each year for IT investment, but that these investments often incur “multi-million dollar cost overruns and years-long schedule delays,” may contribute little to mission-related outcomes, and in some cases fail altogether. The Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act (FITARA) (P.L. 113-291) was enacted on December 19, 2014, to address this problem. FITARA outlines seven areas of reform to how federal agencies purchase and manage their information technology (IT) assets, including— enhancing the authority of agency chief information officers (CIOs); improving transparency and risk management of IT investments; setting forth a process for agency IT portfolio review; refocusing the Federal Data Center Consolidation Initiative (FDCCI) from only consolidation to optimization; expanding the training and use of “IT Cadres,” as initially outlined in the “25 Point Implementation Plan to Reform Federal Information Management Technology” issued by the CIO of the United States; maximizing the benefits of the Federal Strategic Sourcing Initiative (FSSI); and creating a govemment-wide software purchasing program, in conjunction with the General Services Administration. Not all federal agencies are covered by FITARA. Generally, agencies identified in the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, as well as their subordinate divisions and offices, are subject to the requirements of FITARA. The Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community, and portions of other agencies that operate systems related to national security are subject to only certain portions of FITARA. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published guidance to implement the requirements of FITARA in June 2015 (OMB Memorandum M-15-14). In addition to implementing FITARA, this guidance also harmonizes the requirements of FITARA with existing laws, primarily the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-106) and the E-Government Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-347). The OMB also monitors agency implementation of FITARA. Congress also monitors the progress of FITARA implementation through audits conducted by GAO and hearings by relevant House and Senate committees. Since FITARA was signed into law, the Senate and House have each held two hearings on overall agency FITARA implementation. OMB has imposed an April 30, 2016, deadline for agencies to submit updated FITARA common baseline self-assessments.

Apr 14, 2016

R44467Crime Policy

Federal Support for Drug Courts: In Brief

The United States has gradually shifted its formal drug policy from a punishment-focused model toward a more comprehensive approach—one that focuses on prevention, treatment, and enforcement. The proliferation of drug courts in American criminal justice fits this more comprehensive model. These specialized court programs are designed to divert certain defendants and offenders away from traditional criminal justice sanctions such as incarceration while reducing overall costs and helping these defendants and offenders with substance abuse issues. Drug courts present an alternative to the traditional court process for some criminal defendants and offenders—namely those who are considered nonviolent and are known to abuse drugs and/or alcohol. While there are additional specialized goals for certain types of drug courts, the overall goals of adult and juvenile drug courts are to reduce recidivism and substance abuse among nonviolent offenders. Drug court programs may exist at various points in the justice system, but they are most often employed post-arrest as an alternative to traditional criminal justice processing. The federal government has demonstrated growing support for the drug court model primarily through financial support of drug court programs, research, and various drug court initiatives. Each year, the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Administration (SAMHSA) distribute grants to states and localities to support the creation and enhancement of drug courts. In FY2016, over $100 million in federal funding was appropriated for drug courts. In a time of rising heroin abuse, policymakers may debate whether drug courts could be an effective tool in efforts to address both heroin and prescription drug abuse. Policy options include, but are not limited to, increasing federal funding for drug courts and reauthorizing (with or without amendments) the Drug Court Discretionary Grant Program (Drug Courts Program). Further, Congress may wish to maintain the exclusion of violent offenders from the Drug Courts Program, or to broaden the pool of eligible offenders that may participate in BJA-funded drug court programs to include both violent and nonviolent offenders.

Apr 14, 2016

R44459Transportation Policy

Highway Bridge Conditions: Issues for Congress

Of the 612,000 public road bridges in the United States, about 59,000 (10%) were classified as structurally deficient in 2015, and another 84,000 (14%) were classified as functionally obsolete. These figures—along with events such as the July 20, 2015, washout of the Interstate-10 Bridge near Desert Center, CA, and the partial closure of the Arlington Memorial Bridge, which connects Washington, DC, to Northern Virginia—have led to claims that the United States is experiencing a crisis with respect to deficient bridges. Federal data do not substantiate this assertion. The numbers of bridges classified as structurally deficient or functionally obsolete have fallen consistently since at least 2000, and the proportion of all highway bridges falling into one or the other category is the lowest in decades. The vast majority of structurally deficient bridges, roughly four out of five, are in rural areas. These bridges tend to be small and relatively lightly traveled. Structurally deficient bridges in urban areas, while far fewer, are generally much larger and, therefore, more expensive to fix: 55% of the deck area of structurally deficient bridges is on urban bridges. Bridges on roads carrying heavy traffic loads, particularly Interstate Highway bridges, are generally in better condition than those on more lightly traveled routes. Federal funding for bridge building, reconstruction, and repair is authorized in surface transportation acts. The most recent authorization is the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), which was enacted on December 4, 2015. The FAST Act funds federal highway programs from FY2016 through FY2020 at a level about 2.4% above FY2015 levels, adjusted for expected inflation. The law did not authorize a program dedicated to highway bridges, but it made bridge projects broadly eligible for federal funding under the largest of the highway formula programs and eligible on a case-by-case basis under other programs. Bridges that are damaged by natural disasters or catastrophic events also may be eligible for Emergency Relief Program funds. The condition of roads, in particular urban roads, has not experienced the same degree of improvement as the condition of bridges. This disparity raises the policy question of what priority should go to bridge repairs as opposed to roadway repairs. Congress has implicitly addressed this issue by giving states greater flexibility to use federal funding for roads or for bridges, at their discretion. Laws enacted in 2012 and again in 2015 have given states near-total authority to determine which projects to fund with federal highway funds, within broad guidelines established by Congress. As it oversees implementation of the FAST Act over the next few years, Congress may want to evaluate whether states are making sufficient progress in reducing the number of structurally deficient and functionally obsolete bridges and whether future laws should reestablish specific requirements for bridge spending.

Apr 13, 2016

R44457

Surveillance of Foreigners Outside the United States Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush authorized the National Security Agency to conduct a Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) to “intercept international communications into and out of the United States” by “persons linked to al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations.” After the TSP activities were concluded in 2007, Congress enacted the Protect America Act (PAA, P.L. 110-55), which established a mechanism for the acquisition, via a joint certification by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General (AG), but without an individualized court order, of foreign intelligence information concerning a person reasonably believed to be outside the United States. This temporary authority ultimately expired after approximately six months, on February 16, 2008. Several months later, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-261), which created separate procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons and U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States under a new Title VII of FISA. Title VII of FISA was reauthorized in late 2012 (P.L. 112-238); this authority now sunsets on December 31, 2017. Significant details about the use and implementation of Section 702 of Title VII, which provides procedures for targeting non-U.S. persons who are abroad, became known to the public following reports in the media beginning in summer 2013. According to a partially declassified 2011 opinion from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), the National Security Agency (NSA) collected 250 million Internet communications per year under Section 702. Of these communications, 91% were acquired “directly from Internet Service Providers,” using a mechanism referred to as “PRISM collection.” The other 9% were acquired through what NSA calls “upstream collection,” meaning acquisition while Internet traffic is in transit from one unspecified location to another. In 2015, Congress enacted the USA FREEDOM Act (P.L. 114-23) to reauthorize and amend various portions of FISA. While most of the amendments dealt with portions of FISA that were unrelated to Section 702, the act did include authority to continue surveillance of a non-U.S. person for 72 hours after the target is reasonably believed to be within the United States, but only if a lapse in surveillance of the target would pose a threat of death or serious bodily harm. A traditional FISA order for electronic surveillance must be obtained to continue surveillance after that period.

Apr 13, 2016

R44456Energy Policy

Central Valley Project (CVP) Operations: In Brief

California is in its fifth year of drought. Rain and snowstorms in Northern and Central California in the winter of 2015-2016 improved hydrologic conditions but did not eliminate the state’s ongoing drought. As of March 29, 2016, approximately 73% of the state was suffering from severe drought conditions. This figure represents an improvement from one year ago, when 93% of the state fell under the severe drought designation. The stress on water supplies due to the drought has resulted in cutbacks in water deliveries to districts receiving water from federal and state facilities, in particular the federal Central Valley Project (CVP, operated by the Bureau of Reclamation within the Department of the Interior) and the State Water Project (SWP, operated by the state of California). These cutbacks are continuing in 2016, although their exact magnitude has yet to be finalized. In 2015, California Governor Jerry Brown mandated a 25% reduction in water use for nonagricultural users. In November 2015, Governor Brown directed the State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) to extend restrictions if drought conditions persisted. The SWRCB extended and revised emergency conservation regulations on February 2, 2016. A drought declaration made by Governor Brown on January 17, 2014, also remains in effect. On April 1, 2016, the Bureau of Reclamation announced its initial allocations for CVP contractors for the 2016 water year. Despite the improved precipitation and water supplies in 2016, especially in the northern and central parts of the state, some CVP contractors (in particular those south of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers’ Delta) are projected to see a fourth straight year of significant curtailments to their water supplies. Several bills proposed to address drought in the 114th Congress (as well as in previous Congresses) have included, among other approaches, CVP-related provisions that would alter the Bureau of Reclamation’s authorities to operate the project. The ongoing cutbacks to CVP contractors during a time of increased precipitation have caused some to criticize the Bureau of Reclamation and question the extent to which other factors beyond drought (e.g., restrictions to protect endangered species and other regulatory requirements) are the underlying cause of water shortages. Some supporters of the CVP-related provisions in these bills contend that the provisions would make available needed water for agriculture and municipal contractors. Opponents argue that the provisions would undercut environmental regulations, result in harm to fish and wildlife, and potentially lower water quality. Opponents further contend that operations related to protecting endangered species are guided by science and should not be altered to increase water supplies. This report provides an abbreviated summary of hydrologic conditions (including precipitation and reservoir levels) in California as of early April 2016 and their effect on water deliveries, in particular those related to the federal CVP. The report also provides a table specifying initial water allocation estimates for water contractors associated with the CVP in recent years (see Table 1). In addition, it includes a summary of some of the issues pertaining to CVP operations that are being debated in the 114th Congress.

Apr 13, 2016

IF10388Economic Policy

Higher Oil Prices?

Apr 13, 2016

IF10386Economic Policy

Oil Prices and the Value of the Dollar

Apr 12, 2016

R44461Appropriations

Allocation of Funds Under Title I-A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) was comprehensively reauthorized by the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA; P.L. 114-95) on December 10, 2015. The Title I-A program is the largest grant program authorized under the ESEA and is funded at $14.9 billion for FY2016. It is designed to provide supplementary educational and related services to low-achieving and other students attending pre-kindergarten through grade 12 schools with relatively high concentrations of students from low-income families. Under current law, the U.S. Department of Education (ED) determines Title I-A grants to local educational agencies (LEAs) based on four separate funding formulas: Basic Grants, Concentration Grants, Targeted Grants, and Education Finance Incentive Grants (EFIG). Annual appropriations bills specify portions of each year’s Title I-A appropriation to be allocated to LEAs and states under each of the four formulas. In FY2016, an estimated 43% of Title I-A appropriations were allocated through the Basic Grant formula, 9% through the Concentration Grant formula, and 24% through each of the Targeted Grant and EFIG formulas. Once funds reach LEAs, the amounts allocated under the four formulas are combined and used jointly. For each formula, a maximum grant is calculated by multiplying a “formula child count,” consisting primarily of estimated numbers of school-age children in poor families, by an “expenditure factor” based on state average per pupil expenditures for public K-12 education. In some formulas, additional factors are multiplied by the formula child count and expenditure factor. These maximum grants are then reduced to equal the level of available appropriations for each formula, taking into account a variety of state and LEA minimum grant and “hold harmless” provisions. In general, LEAs must have a minimum number of formula children and/or a minimum formula child rate to be eligible to receive a grant under a specific Title I-A formula. Some LEAs may qualify for a grant under only one formula, while other LEAs may be eligible to receive grants under multiple formulas. This report provides a detailed discussion of each of the four Title I-A formulas used to determine grants. Table A-1 in Appendix A offers an overview of the key elements included in the four formulas. Appendix B provides an overview of Title I-A appropriations levels in recent years.

Apr 12, 2016

R44454Appropriations

Defense: FY2017 Budget Request, Authorization, and Appropriations

The Administration requested $523.9 billion to cover the FY2017 discretionary “base budget” of the Department of Defense (DOD). This request is $2.2 billion, or approximately 1%, higher than the corresponding appropriation for FY2016. In addition to the base budget request, the Administration requested $58.8 billion—including $3.4 billion for the European Reassurance Initiative—in discretionary funding for Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO). The total discretionary funding request of $609.9 billion, combined with $9.6 billion in mandatory spending, brought the Administration’s total FY2017 National Defense budget request to $619.5 billion. In shaping the FY2017 budget, DOD officials stated that they emphasized innovation and other ways to increase the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces while complying with the budget caps. The request aims to field a force that can deter the most technologically advanced potential adversaries using conventional weapons, without assuming that U.S. forces would match the size of enemy forces, by modernizing its equipment and changing its organization rather than by enlarging their numbers. Congressional deliberations on the FY2017 defense budget may be influenced, in part, by the broader budget discussions about the binding annual caps on discretionary appropriations (through FY2021) established by the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011(P.L. 112-25). One particular issue for Congress is whether the FY2017 allocation for OCO funding provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act (BBA) of 2015 (P.L. 114-74 ) allows for a higher total appropriation for the DOD than the Administration proposed. A second issue—one that may delay work on all FY2017 appropriations bills, including those that fund DOD—is the demand by some members of Congress that the increased non-defense spending allowed by the BBA be offset, in part, by reductions in mandatory spending. To balance competing priorities within the FY2017 defense budget cap, as amended by the BBA, the Administration requested slightly more funding for Operation and Maintenance, and slightly less for procurement compared with FY2016 base budget DOD appropriations. The request proposes $135.3 billion in base funding for military personnel programs plus another $3.6 billion in OCO, for a total of $138.8 billion. DOD has proposed some compensation changes alongside the FY2017 budget that are intended to generate savings. TRICARE Modernization proposals and amendments to the retirement system are projected to have some initial implementation costs, while savings are expected to accrue in subsequent years. Army officials emphasized that the service’s FY2017 budget request prioritized readiness over modernization. Within the Army’s modernization budget, helicopter programs were reduced more than new types of ground vehicles and upgrades to some types already in service. The FY2017 budget would fund only one major effort for the Marine Corps to develop a new vehicle intended for front-line combat, seeking $158.7 million to continue development of the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, an 8-wheeled amphibious troop carrier intended to replace AAV-7 tracked amphibious troop carriers. The Army and Marine Corps have a combined $735.4 million procurement request in 2017 for 2,020 Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, and the Army is seeking $184.2 million to complete production of 29 prototype Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicles slated for shakedown testing at government test sites. The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy’s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. Concerns over the current and future size and capability of the Navy have intensified with the recent shift in the international security environment to a situation featuring renewed great power competition. The Navy’s proposed FY2017 budget requests funding for the procurement of seven new ships—two Virginia-class attack submarines, two DDG-51 class destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships, and one LHA-6 class amphibious assault ship. The Navy’s FY2017-FY2021 five-year shipbuilding plan includes a total of 38 new ships, compared to the five-year plan sent to Congress in 2015, which projected funding of 48 new ships in FY2016-FY2020. When looking at the various services’ plans for acquiring aviation systems, one theme becomes clear: deferral. The Army and Air Force have chosen to delay their previously-planned aircraft purchases, and the Navy funds only 2 F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets while including 14 more on their Unfunded Requirements List. The President’s FY2017 budget continues to fund a wide range of programs intended to sustain and modernize U.S. nuclear weapons. The DOD budget includes nearly $4.7 billion in funding to upgrade and replace U.S. nuclear weapons delivery systems. In addition, the Administration requested $9.1 billion to develop and deploy ballistic missile defense capabilities, which is a decrease of about $700 million from the FY2016 enacted level of $9.8 billion. The request includes $7.5 billion for the Missile Defense Agency and the remainder primarily for the Army Patriot missile defense program. For FY2017 the Administration’s request includes $7.1 billion for Air Force national security space programs, an increase of about $100 million above the FY2016 enacted level. DOD has stated this budget request allows the United States to maintain supremacy in space and provides communications, navigation, missile warning, space situational awareness, and environmental monitoring. Intelligence has remained proportionally constant to defense spending—consistently representing roughly 10-11% of national defense spending—and the FY2017 request of $70.3 billion continues that trend.

Apr 12, 2016

R44452Foreign Affairs

The Selective Service System and Draft Registration: Issues for Congress

The Military Selective Service Act (MSSA), first enacted as the Selective Service Act of 1948, provides the statutory authority for the Federal government to maintain a Selective Service System (SSS) as an independent federal agency responsible for delivering appropriately qualified civilian men for induction into the Armed Forces of the United States as authorized by Congress. The annual budget for the agency is just under $23 million and the budget has remained stable at about $25 million in current dollars since the 1980s. One of the SSS’s main functions is to maintain a database of registrants in case of a draft. The agency stores approximately 78 million records in order to verify registration status and eligibility for certain benefits that require certification of registration for eligibility. The SSS has a staff of approximately 125 full-time employees, which is complemented by a corps of volunteers and military reservists. The MSSA requires most males between the ages of 18 and 26 who are citizens or residents of the United States to register with Selective Service. Women in the United States have never been required to register for the draft. Men who fail to register may be subject to criminal penalties, loss of eligibility for certain federal or state employment opportunities and education benefits, and denial of security clearances. Documented or undocumented immigrants who fail to register may not be able to obtain United States citizenship. Registration compliance rates were as high as 95% in 2015. While individuals may still register at U.S. post offices, the SSS attributes high compliance rates to a system of automatic electronic registration supported by state legislation and interagency cooperation. Throughout most of the 20th century the U.S. government has, by law, obligated most male residents to register for a draft administered by an agency of the federal government. The Federal government has episodically used draft calls and lotteries to mobilize military manpower from the time of the Civil War until June 30, 1973 when the statutory induction authority expired and the military transitioned to an all-volunteer force. However, the SSS is charged with maintaining the capacity to draft young men if and when Congress authorizes conscription. The MSSA does not currently authorize the use of a draft for induction into the Armed Forces. When the draft has been implemented, it has been met by some public resistance. Such resistance to the draft drives much of the opposition toward maintaining the SSS and the registration requirement. Even some who are not opposed to the government’s use of conscription in a time of national need are opposed to maintaining the current SSS agency infrastructure. They argue that a stand-alone agency is unnecessary and expensive and that there are a number of alternatives that could more effectively and efficiently enable the country to reestablish conscription, if necessary. Others counter that, at the cost of $23 million annually, maintaining the SSS is a relatively inexpensive insurance policy should the draft need to be quickly reinstated. They also argue that maintaining the SSS sends a signal to potential adversaries that the United States is willing to draw on its full national resources for armed conflict if necessary. Some are concerned that the registration requirements are inequitable, arguing that it is unfair to men that women can voluntarily serve in all military occupations but are exempt from the registration requirement and the prospect of being drafted. In additional, statutory penalties impose hardships on certain groups, particularly those with fewer financial resources who also might be least aware of their obligation to register. Some contend that MSSA and associated statute should be amended to remove penalties for failing to register. Others argue that weakening or removing penalties would cause registration compliance rates to fall to unacceptably low levels. In response to these issues, Congress may consider a number of options for amending, repealing, or maintaining the MSSA and associated statutes.

Apr 11, 2016

R44451Environmental Policy

U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emission Trends and the Role of the Clean Power Plan

Recent international negotiations and domestic policy developments have generated interest in current and projected U.S. greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels. GHG emissions are generated throughout the United States from millions of discrete sources. Of the GHG source categories, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from fossil fuel combustion account for the largest percentage (76%) of total U.S. GHG emissions. The electric power sector contributes the largest percentage (36%) of CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. In the context of international climate change negotiations, President Obama announced, on separate occasions, U.S. GHG emission reduction goals for both 2020 and 2025: 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 and 26% to 28% below 2005 levels by 2025. In 2014, U.S. GHG levels were 7.5% below 2005 levels. Whether the United States achieves its goals would likely depend, to some degree, on CO2 emissions from power plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) promulgated standards for CO2 emissions from existing electric power plants on August 3, 2015. The rule, known as the Clean Power Plan (CPP), is the subject of ongoing litigation involving a number of entities. On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court stayed the rule for the duration of the litigation. Multiple factors generally impact CO2 emission levels from the electric power sector. Some factors are listed below in no particular order: Economic growth/recession, Relative prices of energy sources for electricity—particularly natural gas—and renewable energy sources, Electricity generation portfolio (i.e., the ratio of electricity generation from coal, natural gas, and renewable energy sources), National and/or state policy developments (e.g., CPP implementation), and Demand-side efficiency improvements (e.g., commercial and residential electricity use). Recent changes in the electric power sector may be informative. Between 1975 and 2010, electricity generation and CO2 emissions from the electric power sector generally increased. While electricity generation remained relatively flat after 2010, CO2 emissions from the electric power sector decreased. Electricity generation in 2015 was essentially equivalent to generation in 2005, whereas the CO2 emissions in 2015 were 19% below 2005 levels. Recent changes in the U.S. electricity generation portfolio played a key role in the CO2 emission decrease. The electricity portfolio affects CO2 emission levels because different sources of electricity generation produce different rates of CO2 emissions per unit of electricity (zero in the case of some renewables). For example, between 2005 and 2015: coal’s contribution to total electricity generation decreased from 50% to 33%, natural gas’s contribution to total electricity generation increased from 19% to 33%, and renewable energy’s contribution to total electricity generation increased from 2% to 7%. If implemented, the CPP would likely play a role in shaping the electricity generation portfolio. Modeling results indicate that the CPP would have a significant impact on future CO2 emission levels from electricity generation. Under the models’ baseline scenarios, power sector CO2 emissions in 2030 would decrease by 10% to 17% compared to 2005 levels. Under the models’ CPP implementation scenarios, power sector CO2 emissions in 2030 would decrease by 26% to 40% compared to 2005 levels. If the CPP is not implemented, questions remain as to whether existing policies and trends in electricity generation would continue to lower CO2 emissions. In December 2015, Congress extended and modified the production tax credit and the investment tax credit for specific renewable energy technologies (e.g., wind and solar). This development will likely impact the electricity generation portfolio (compared to baseline), but at least one analysis suggests that the extensions would not be a substitute for CPP implementation. Accurately forecasting future CO2 emission levels is a complex and challenging endeavor. A comparison of actual CO2 emissions (from energy use) between 1990 and 2014 with selected emission projections illustrates this difficulty. In general, actual emissions have remained well below projections. The more recent projections, which do not include CPP implementation, indicate that CO2 emissions will remain relatively flat over the next decade.

Apr 11, 2016

R44458African Affairs

Closing Space: Restrictions on Civil Society Around the World and U.S. Responses

Civil society organizations (CSOs) around the world are confronting ever stricter limitations on their ability to operate, a phenomenon often referred to “closing space” for civil society work. From restrictions on the types of funding they are allowed to receive to draconian registration requirements, the measures targeting CSOs are increasingly putting pressure on the entire civil society sector in certain countries. These restrictions are most commonly imposed by governments seeking to limit the influence of nongovernmental actors, though restrictions are also being imposed by a broad range of governments, including democratic allies. Increasing awareness of this phenomenon has elevated concerns among civil society advocates and some policymakers, including in Congress. Congress has also shaped U.S. policy toward civil society through funding, legislation, hearings, and oversight activities. Many experts assess that the closure of civil society space is likely to continue. Some experts and advocates warn that, even in already restrictive environments, civil society actors could face new or additional repressive action, particularly when civil society engages in politically charged or sensitive issues. This will likely impact the ability of donors’—including the United States government, private donors, foundations, and international partners—to work with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) abroad. Closing space for civil society could also impact broader U.S. engagement on the freedoms of assembly, association, and expression. The United States has long supported civil society abroad, which is often viewed as an important component of sustainable democracy and economic growth. The United States is the largest financial supporter of civil society in the world, according to a recent White House fact sheet, with more than $3.2 billion invested to strengthen civil society since 2010. Civil society groups are also in many cases the implementers of U.S. foreign assistance programs. Many experts view the results of the United States’ efforts to support civil society as mixed. In the face of the rapid geographic and substantive expansion of measures designed to close civil society space, the Obama Administration is credited for launching the Stand with Civil Society initiative in 2013, a global call to action to support, defend, and sustain civil society. This effort saw Presidential attention to the effort through speeches and a Presidential Memorandum. The Administration has also devoted specific funding and programmatic responses to address the closing space phenomenon. While advocates generally praise the Administration for raising the profile of the closing space issue, some experts question whether the Administration’s actions have fully matched its rhetoric, or whether the policies and structures put into place under the initiative are sustainable. Policy responses to the problem of closing space are complicated by a number of factors, including various competing interests in the policy process, such as balancing support for civil society with U.S. willingness to confront important bilateral partners, possible impacts on other programs or objectives, and the availability of suitable tools or sufficient leverage. Congress has at times treated the promotion of vibrant civil societies abroad as a key element of U.S. foreign policy and has taken action to support civil society through a range of activities, including legislation. While many such provisions are country- or issue-specific, others are global in scope. Congress may choose to further consider legislation, oversight activities—such as reporting, hearings, or direct engagement—and U.S. funding on this issue.

Apr 8, 2016

IF10383Environmental Policy

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA): FY2017 President’s Budget Request

Apr 6, 2016

IN10471CRS Insights

Brazil in Crisis

Brazil is in the midst of deepening economic and political crises that are closely intertwined and unlikely to be resolved quickly. This report briefly examines the political situation and discusses public opinion regarding the Rousseff Administration.

Apr 6, 2016

IN10472Appropriations

U.S. Crude Oil Exports to International Destinations

On December 18, 2015, Congress passed H.R. 2029—the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016—which was enacted and became P.L. 114-113. A provision contained in P.L. 114-113 repealed a 40-year prohibition on the export of crude oil produced in the United States. (See CRS Report R44403, Crude Oil Exports and Related Provisions in P.L. 114-113: In Brief.) Removing this prohibition and its associated restrictions provides producers, shippers, and traders with more options to market and sell crude oil to international markets when market conditions support such transactions. Prior to removing export restrictions, exemptions resulted in approximately 500,000 barrels per day of crude oil exported—nearly all to Canada—during 2015. Since the export prohibition was repealed, Energy Information Administration (EIA) data indicate that U.S. crude oil export volumes declined, although industry trade data indicate that crude oil has been exported to destinations that were previously not allowed and monthly export volumes to these international markets have increased steadily since the restrictions were removed. (See CRS Report R43442, U.S. Crude Oil Export Policy: Background and Considerations.) U.S. Crude Oil Export Volumes EIA weekly data report that for the week ended December 18, 2015, 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude oil was exported from the United States. For the week that ended on March 25, 2016, crude oil export volumes were estimated at 387,000 bpd. One possible reason for this export volume decline is the narrowing price differential between domestic and international crude oils that has reduced the financial attractiveness of exporting U.S. crude. (See R44403.) According to industry data consultancy ClipperData, waterborne exports—not including modes such as pipeline, rail, or truck—of U.S. crude oil from December 19, 2015, through March 31, 2016, totaled approximately 34.4 million barrels, approximately 334,000 bpd. Most (approximately two-thirds) of those barrels were eligible for export prior to enactment of P.L. 114-113 and would likely have been exported had the restrictions remained in effect. For example, exports to Canada and exports of processed condensate were allowed within the previous crude oil export regulatory framework. Other crude oil exports outside of these categories represent non-condensate crude oil exports that have been enabled by the prohibition repeal. See Figure 1. Figure 1. U.S. Waterborne Crude Oil Exports December 19, 2015–March 31, 2016 / Source: CRS, with data from ClipperData. According to ClipperData approximately 12.8 million barrels of non-condensate crude oil, approximately 124,000 bpd, have been exported to destinations that were prohibited prior to enactment of P.L. 114-113. This export volume is within the 0 to 2 million bpd range estimated by EIA in a September 2015 study that analyzed the effects of removing export restrictions. Export volumes to date have been on the lower end of the range and this can generally be explained by two factors. First, the financial attractiveness of exporting U.S. crude oil has been limited by the relatively narrow price differential among domestic and international benchmark prices. However, benchmark price differentials are not the only condition that might motivate exports. Regional price dynamics and low-cost shipping opportunities could result in conditions that support crude oil exports. Second, global refiners may still be getting comfortable with acquiring and processing U.S. crude oil and it may take some time for global refiners to integrate U.S. crude oil into their feedstock mix. Monthly export data appears to support this conclusion: monthly non-condensate, non-Canada crude oil export volumes have increased from 1.2 million barrels in January to 9.4 million barrels in March. See Figure 2. Figure 2. Non-Condensate U.S. Crude Oil Exports (Excluding Canada) January–March 2016 / Source: CRS with data from ClipperData. Export Destinations Through March 31, 2016, approximately 12.8 million barrels of non-condensate crude oil—including crude oil grades such as Eagle Ford, West Texas Intermediate, and Gulf Coast sour blend—has been exported and either has been delivered or is in transit to 10 destinations that were previously prohibited. Regional destinations for U.S. crude oil include Europe, Asia, the Mediterranean, and the Caribbean. Approximately 30% of these exports have been delivered and 70% was in transit. Figure 3 indicates export volumes to each destination. Figure 3. Non-Condensate U.S. Crude Oil Destinations (Excluding Canada) January–March 2016 / Source: CRS with data from ClipperData. Notes: Projected destinations are subject to change due to transactions that can occur during transit. Policy Considerations During the congressional debate about removing crude oil export restrictions, several policy issues were considered, such as price impacts and production volumes. Regarding price impacts, there was concern that gasoline prices for consumers could potentially rise if crude oil exports were allowed. However, price information to date does not suggest such a relationship between gasoline prices and crude oil exports. EIA price statistics indicate that during the week prior to enactment of P.L. 114-113, retail gasoline was priced at $2.14 per gallon. Prices declined to $1.83 per gallon in mid-February, and have since risen to $2.17 per gallon for the week ending March 28, 2016. Additionally, there was concern expressed about increasing production volumes with the potential for associated environmental impacts that might result from allowing crude oil exports. Data available to date do not support such a concern and EIA data indicate that U.S. crude oil production has declined since December 2015. This dynamic could potentially change in the future should crude oil prices and production profitability increase, production levels rise, or regional oversupply of certain crude oil types start to occur. Oversupply conditions generally result in price differentials, which could create economic incentives to export and thus motivate additional production activity. P.L. 114-113 includes a provision that allows the President to impose restrictions should it be determined that crude exports result in domestic oil prices above global prices and adverse employment effects. (See R44403.) While the current data do not suggest any negative economic, gasoline price, or employment effects resulting from the export prohibition repeal, unrestricted U.S. crude oil exports have only been allowed for a short period and it may take some time for such relationships, if any, to be evident.

Apr 6, 2016

IN10470CRS Insights

Federal Lifeline Program: Modernization and Reform

On March 31, 2016, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted an order to expand the scope of the Federal Lifeline program to provide subsidies for broadband adoption; enhance and expand mechanisms to streamline program administration; and further combat program fraud, waste, and abuse. Citing the need to close the digital divide, the division between those who use and have access to broadband versus those who do not, the FCC voted (3-2) to extend Lifeline program subsidies to cover high-speed broadband access. The Lifeline program is a needs-based program which traditionally supported access to either fixed or mobile voice services in low income households. The program will now be expanded to support mobile and fixed broadband Internet access services on a stand-alone basis, or with a bundled voice service. Background The FCC established the Federal Lifeline program in 1985 in response to concerns over the negative impact that the shifting of costs, as a result of the 1984 divestiture of AT&T and the growth of competition in telecommunications markets, would have on consumers’ telephone charges. These changes resulted in the subsequent restructuring of telephone industry costs and rate structure and a shifting of costs directly to consumers in the form of residential subscriber line charges. In the wake of these concerns, the FCC established the Lifeline program to prevent consumer drop-off and preserve the universal service goals of the 1934 Communications Act. The Federal Lifeline program is one of four programs supported under the Universal Service Fund (USF) and is designed to provide support to assist eligible households to pay the reoccurring monthly service charges associated with connection to the telecommunications network. Households must meet eligibility criteria, demonstrated by either having an income that is at or below 135% of the federal poverty guidelines or enrollment in certain needs-based programs (e.g., Medicaid). Support comes in the form of a $9.25 per month subsidy per subscriber ($34.25 for qualifying subscribers living on tribal lands) which is given not to the subscriber, but to the selected telecommunications provider. As the concept of telecommunications access has evolved, so has the Lifeline program. As initially implemented the program covered the minutes of use of the voice telecommunications network for one fixed line in an eligible household. In 2005, the FCC expanded the scope of the Lifeline program by giving subscribers the choice to select either a fixed line option or a mobile/wireless option. Requirements that the program only cover one line per eligible household and network access (i.e., minutes of use), not the physical device (i.e., the telephone instrument), remained. In the past decade whether the Lifeline program should once again “evolve” to become a vehicle to help support access to broadband became a major policy debate. Data showing the growing discrepancy in broadband adoption rates between low income and high income households, and the growing economic, social, and civic ramifications of the lack of access, prompted the FCC to incorporate broadband access into the Lifeline program. For example, according to the Pew Research Center’s Home Broadband 2015 Survey among non-broadband adopters, 33% cited the monthly subscription cost of service as the main reason they lacked broadband service at home. Further, of those adults with incomes of less than $20,000, 41% had home broadband service versus 90% for adults with incomes of more than $100,000. The 2016 Lifeline Order The basic goals of the Order, according to the FCC, are to modernize the Lifeline program to provide assistance to eligible low income consumers to connect to broadband service and to ensure that the monies spent are used efficiently and not subject to fraud, waste, and abuse. Some of the major provisions in the Order include expanding the program to provide support for stand-alone mobile or fixed broadband, as well as combined bundles of voice and broadband; setting minimum broadband and mobile voice standards for the packages of services offered by providers; adding a streamlined national provider designation process for a new category of national program providers; phasing down and eventually eliminating support, in most cases, for stand-alone voice service; establishing a non-binding yearly funding ceiling of $2.25 billion, indexed to inflation; narrowing the list of federal programs that may be used to validate program eligibility; establishing an independent National Eligibility Verifier to confirm subscriber eligibility; and increasing the amount and public publication of program data. These provisions will become effective after publication in the Federal Register. Congressional Role Debate over the scope of and the need for the Lifeline program has followed the program since its inception. There are numerous bills pending in the 114th Congress that would have a direct impact on the Lifeline program. These proposals range from those that would expand the program to cover broadband, set a fixed budget for the program, limit the program to fixed-voice telephone service, or eliminate the program altogether. The announced expansion of the program has once again brought the program under additional scrutiny. The policy debate over the design and expansion of the Lifeline program has continued with the release of the 2016 Lifeline Order. Among the issues that have been raised are: the impact that minimum broadband and voice standards may have on the ability of providers to offer services within the $9.25 per month subsidy and such standards’ potential for the need for subscriber co-pays; whether a firm budget cap should be established consistent with the other USF programs; the impact that a nationwide provider designation process, and the subsequent new category of non-state certified nationwide providers, could have on the role of state public utility commissions, state-wide universal fund programs and the potential for program abuse; the impact that the phase out of support for stand-alone voice services may have on current program subscribers; and the ramifications of shifting the subscriber verification eligibility from the provider to a national third party.

Apr 5, 2016

R44444American Law

Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense

The Department of State and the Department of Defense (DOD) have long shared responsibility for U.S. assistance to train, equip, and otherwise engage with foreign military and other security forces. The legal framework for such assistance emerged soon after World War II, when Congress charged the Secretary of State with responsibility for overseeing and providing general direction for military and other security assistance programs and the Secretary of Defense with responsibility for administering such programs. Over the years, congressional directives and executive actions have modified, shaped, and refined State Department and DOD roles and responsibilities. Changes in the legal framework through which security assistance to foreign forces—weapons, training, lethal and nonlethal military assistance, and military education and training—is provided have responded to a wide array of factors. Legal Authorization and Funding For most of the past half-century, Congress has authorized U.S. security assistance programs through Title 22 of the U.S. Code (Foreign Relations) and appropriated the bulk of security assistance funds through State Department accounts. DOD administers programs funded through several of these accounts under the Secretary of State’s direction and oversight. Beginning in the 1980s, however, and increasingly after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 (9/11), some policymakers have come to view the State Department authorities, or the funding allocated to them, as insufficient and too inflexible to respond to evolving and emerging security threats. As a result, Congress has increasingly provided DOD with the means to offer security assistance under authorities in either Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Armed Services) or the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), both funded as part of the DOD budget. (These are collectively known as “Title 10” authorities and referred to by DOD as “security cooperation.”) DOD security assistance and other security cooperation programs conducted under Title 10 authority and established prior to 9/11 include counternarcotics, counter-proliferation, humanitarian assistance, and assistance for training and equipping NATO forces. Title 10 statutes also provide authority for DOD to pay the expenses of foreign forces to enable them to participate in exercises, exchanges, and other military-to-military contacts. Post-9/11 DOD security cooperation authorities focus on counterterrorism assistance, and assistance to foreign forces in areas of conflict. Much of this assistance is for “building partner capacity” (BPC) to enable foreign forces to take greater responsibility for their own defense and for achieving mutual security goals in order to reduce U.S. costs. As part of the BPC effort, recent legislation provides DOD with authority to help strengthen foreign Ministries of Defense and related defense institutions. (Some of these DOD authorities require the concurrence [i.e., approval] of the Secretary of State.) Post-9/11 innovations include Congress’s establishment through NDAA authority of two joint State Department-DOD authorities with a lead role for the Secretary of State: (1) an Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund established in FY2011 and (2) the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), a pilot project established in FY2012 to address emerging threats. In FY2006, Congress created a DOD “joint formulation” BPC authority to address emerging counterterrorism threats, with DOD in the lead. To some analysts, the increase of Title 10 authorities and funding to DOD for BPC support to foreign military and other security forces contributes to the perceived “militarization” of U.S. foreign policy. For others, the increase of Title 10 authorities emerged from perceived gaps in existing authorities but has resulted in a confusing, inefficient “patchwork” of authorities and coordination arrangements that are not sufficient to meet all needs. Issues Covered in This Report Since the late 1940s, Congress has played an active role in shaping the legal and institutional construct for security assistance activities. As Congress continues to consider legislation governing security assistance and cooperation, and to conduct oversight of such programs, some Members may seek new ways to improve program effectiveness and address inefficiencies in planning and implementation. This report provides an overview of U.S. assistance to and engagement with foreign military and other security forces, focusing on Department of State and DOD roles. It lays out the historical evolution and current framework of the Department of State-DOD shared responsibility. It concludes with a brief overview of salient issues: how to assess effectiveness; whether and how to modify or change the statutory and institutional framework; how to reconcile institutional roles and available resources; how to provide appropriate transparency for oversight. The appendixes provide information on the history of the State-DOD shared responsibility, as well as details of selected State Department and DOD security assistance and cooperation statutes. Additional information on the DOD “Building Partner Capacity” programs and activities may be found in CRS Report R44313, What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress, coordinated by Kathleen J. McInnis.

Apr 4, 2016