CRS Reports

A-76 Competitions in the Department of Defense

Dec 22, 2016

International Trade and Finance: Overview and Issues for the 115th Congress

The U.S. Constitution grants authority to Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Congress exercises this authority in numerous ways, including through oversight of trade policy and consideration of legislation to implement trade agreements and authorize trade programs. Policy issues cover areas such as U.S. trade negotiations; U.S. trade and economic relations with specific regions and countries; international institutions focused on trade; tariff and nontariff barriers; worker dislocation due to trade liberalization; enforcement of trade laws; import and export policies; international investment; economic sanctions; and other trade-related functions of the federal government. Congress also has authority over U.S. financial commitments to international financial institutions and oversight responsibilities for trade- and finance-related agencies of the U.S. government. Major Actions in the 114th Congress The 114th Congress passed legislation that: renewed Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) through July 1, 2021 (subject to passage of an extension disapproval resolution in 2018), allowing implementing legislation for trade agreements to be considered under expedited legislative procedures, provided that certain statutory requirements are met; reauthorized Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), the Export-Import Bank (Ex-Im Bank), and several U.S. trade preference programs on a multi-year basis; reauthorized the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP); and authorized U.S. participation in quota and governance reforms at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Additionally, Congress continued its oversight of the Administration’s ongoing trade agreements and negotiations, and maintained economic sanctions against Iran, Cuba, Russia, and other countries, among other actions. Members also introduced a range of legislation on international trade and finance issues. Possible Issues in the 115th Congress During the 2016 presidential election campaign, U.S. trade policy and trade agreements received significant attention, particularly regarding the impact of trade agreements on the U.S. economy and workers. Among the more potentially prominent international trade and finance issues the 115th Congress may consider are: the effects of trade on the U.S. economy, jobs, and manufacturing, as well as policies that support U.S. workers and industries adversely affected by trade agreements; the future of U.S. trade policy in Asia, given President-elect Donald Trump’s November 2016 statement he intends to “issue our notification of intent to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP); the status of negotiations for the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (T-TIP) FTA with the European Union (EU); proposals to renegotiate or withdraw from existing FTAs, including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or launch new bilateral trade negotiations, such as with the United Kingdom; oversight of World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements and negotiations, including the completed Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) and expansion of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), as well as potential agreements on environmental goods and trade in services; U.S.-China trade relations, including investment issues, intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, currency issues, and market access liberalization; responses to currency manipulation and the enforcement of U.S. trade laws; international finance and investment issues, including oversight of international financial institutions (IFIs), the creation of development and infrastructure banks by emerging economies, and U.S. negotiations on new bilateral investment treaties (BITs), notably with China and India; and oversight of international trade and finance policies to support development and/or foreign policy goals, including sanctions on Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Russia, and other countries.

Dec 21, 2016

Department of Education’s Withdrawal of Its Recognition of ACICS as an Accrediting Agency

On December 12, 2016, the Secretary of Education (the Secretary) upheld a previous decision made by a Department of Education (ED) official to withdraw recognition of the Accrediting Council for Independent Colleges and Schools (ACICS) as an accrediting agency for purposes of institutional participation in the federal student aid programs authorized under Title IV of the Higher Education Act (HEA). The complete effects of the Secretary’s recognition withdrawal are currently unknown; however, approximately 900 separate locations of institutions of higher education (IHEs), enrolling approximately 600,000 students, potentially risk the loss of their Title IV eligibility should they not obtain accreditation from another ED-recognized accrediting agency. This CRS Insight discusses the potential effects of the Secretary’s withdrawal of ACICS’s recognition. ED’s Accrediting Agency Recognition Process and Timeline To participate in Title IV federal student aid programs, IHEs must, among other requirements, be accredited by an ED-recognized accrediting agency (hereinafter “Title IV accreditor”). To achieve ED recognition, agencies must show they meet a variety of federal standards, illustrating that they are a reliable authority regarding institutional quality. Should an agency fail to satisfy the recognition standards, the Secretary may withdraw recognition of the agency. HEA Section 498(h)(2) specifies that upon the withdrawal of an agency’s recognition, IHEs accredited by the agency may continue to participate in the Title IV programs for up to 18 months under provisional certification. Under provisional certification, ED may place additional conditions on the IHEs’ participation (e.g., additional reporting requirements) in the Title IV programs. During the 18-month period, IHEs must also become accredited by another Title IV accreditor to maintain Title IV eligibility beyond this time frame. Should the Secretary withdraw recognition from an accrediting agency, the accrediting agency may contest the Secretary’s decision in federal court. The recognition withdrawal becomes effective immediately, and the 18-month provisional certification for the IHEs it accredits begins on the date of the Secretary’s withdrawal decision, unless stayed (delayed) by a court. Implications for IHEs The Secretary withdrew recognition of ACICS, finding “pervasive noncompliance” with multiple recognition standards. Areas of concern included the level of rigor and lax enforcement of ACICS’s accreditation standards. ACICS is contesting the Secretary’s decision, but its request for a stay of the decision was denied by a court. Thus, the 18-month provisional certification period for ACICS-accredited IHEs is effective as of December 12, 2016, and ACICS-accredited IHEs must become accredited by another Title IV accreditor within 18 months of that date to continue Title IV participation. For the duration of provisional certification, ED will require ACICS-accredited institutions to meet a variety of additional Title IV participation conditions. For instance, IHEs will be restricted from making major changes (e.g., opening new locations) without ED approval, and will be prohibited from disbursing Title IV funds to students newly enrolled in programs that, as a result of ACICS’s loss of recognition, no longer meet requirements that would permit them to sit for a licensing or certification exam. Also, IHEs that do not meet certain milestones toward obtaining accreditation from another Title IV accreditor will be subject to additional Title IV participation conditions. For example, IHEs without an application in process with another Title IV accreditor within 180 days of the Secretary’s withdrawal of ACICS’s recognition will be ineligible to receive Title IV funds for any student that enrolls after those 180 days. The extent to which ACICS-accredited IHEs will be able to obtain accreditation by another Title IV accreditor within 18 months is uncertain. ED officials speculate that 5 or 6 (out of 37) Title IV accreditors could feasibly accredit ACICS-accredited IHEs and that higher-performing IHEs may be able to attain accreditation within 18 months. However, they also speculate that IHEs with poorer performance may have difficulty obtaining accreditation within 18 months. Moreover, for a Title IV accreditor to accredit an IHE that is accredited by ACICS but subject to a pending or final ACICS action to suspend, revoke, withdraw, or terminate its accreditation, the new accreditor must justify its decision to ED. Another institutional Title IV participation requirement is that an IHE must be authorized to provide a postsecondary education within the state in which it is located. As a condition of authorization, many states require that IHEs be accredited by a Title IV accreditor, although authorization requirements vary by state. With loss of Title IV accreditation, some IHEs in some states may immediately lose their state authorization and, thus, Title IV participation. Some states have already taken action to ensure that IHEs within their borders do not immediately lose state authorization, and consequently, Title IV eligibility. Often, when IHEs lose accreditation, and thus, Title IV eligibility, they close or significantly curtail operations. Implications for Students The extent to which students may be immediately affected by new provisional certification requirements placed on IHEs as a result of ED’s withdrawal of ACICS’s recognition is unclear. Many of the new provisional certification requirements with which IHEs must comply in the near future may have minimal immediate consequences for enrolled students (e.g., additional institutional disclosure requirements); however, new provisional certification requirements with which IHEs must comply later on may have larger impacts. For instance, IHEs without an application in-process with another Title IV accreditor within 180 days of ACICS’s loss of recognition will become ineligible to receive Title IV program funds for its students, which may affect those students’ ability to continue their educational program. For students who attend IHEs in states requiring accreditation by a Title IV accreditor for state authorization, the extent to which they may be affected by the withdrawal of ACICS’s recognition will largely depend on state law. For students who attend IHEs in states that do not require accreditation from a Title IV accreditor for state authorization, the IHEs would still need to become accredited by a Title IV accreditor within 18 months; otherwise, they would lose eligibility to participate in the Title IV programs and students would lose access to Title IV aid.

Dec 21, 2016

OSM Finalizes the Stream Protection Rule

On December 19, 2016, the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (OSM) of the Department of the Interior promulgated a rule to improve implementation of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) and reduce impacts of coal mining operations on groundwater and surface water, fish, wildlife, and related environmental values. The rule, called the Stream Protection Rule, was published in the Federal Register on December 20. It is effective on January 19, 2017. Development of the Stream Protection Rule has been underway since 2009 and has been contentious throughout the rulemaking process. Critics in the coal mining industry and some Members of Congress have argued that a new nationwide rule is not needed and that the rule will impose costs that will greatly affect the viability of the coal mining industry in the United States. Many state regulators contend that OSM failed to coordinate and consult with states during the rule’s development and that the rule undermines their primary role in implementing SMCRA. At the same time, some environmental advocacy groups that have generally supported efforts to strengthen regulation of coal mining operations contend that the rule is not strong enough (for example, that it will not fully protect ephemeral streams or prohibit controversial mountaintop coal mining practices). The rule’s background and development are described in CRS Report R44150, The Office of Surface Mining’s Proposed Stream Protection Rule: An Overview. OSM asserts that updated rules—revising rules that were promulgated in 1983—are needed to reflect current science, technology, and modern mining practices. Further, OSM contends that revised rules are needed to strike a better balance between “protection of the environment and agricultural productivity and the Nation’s needs for coal as an essential source of energy,” which is one of the purposes of SMCRA, while providing greater regulatory certainty to the mining industry. The final rule announced on December 19 is intended to improve SMCRA’s implementation in several ways. According to the Final Environmental Impact Statement: It will provide objective standards to clearly define the point at which adverse mining-related impacts to both groundwater and surface water reach an unacceptable level. It will ensure that adequate pre-mining data are collected to establish a comprehensive baseline for evaluating effects of mining and that effective monitoring of groundwater and surface water will occur during and after both mining and reclamation. It will ensure protection or restoration of streams and related resources, including headwater streams that are important to maintaining the ecological health and productivity of downstream waters. It will ensure that permittees and regulatory authorities make use of advances in information, technology, and science. It will ensure that land disturbed by surface coal mining operations is restored to a condition capable of supporting the uses that it was capable of supporting before any mining. It updates OSM’s regulations concerning compliance with the Endangered Species Act. OSM estimates that the rule’s benefits to streams and forests will include improved water quality in 263 miles of streams per year downstream of mine-sites and improved reforestation of nearly 2,500 acres of mined land per year. In terms of economic impacts, OSM estimates that the rule will result in an average annual net employment gain of 156 fulltime equivalents (an annual reduction of 124 fulltime equivalents in coal production employment combined with an average annual gain of 280 fulltime equivalents related to implementation of the rule). Further, OSM estimates that total industry compliance costs would average $81 million per year during 2020-2040 (0.1% or less of aggregate annual industry revenues), and that the rule will result in an average annual 0.08% reduction in coal production during that same period, equating to 700,000 tons of coal. Industry critics dispute OSM’s estimates of compliance costs and employment impacts, and they argue that adverse effects on coal production will be greater than OSM states. The Preamble to the final rule presents OSM’s responses to these and other criticisms of the rule and rulemaking process. The final rule closely resembles the July 2015 proposed rule, with some changes, but the modifications are unlikely to satisfy either those who argued that the proposal went too far, or others who sought a more environmentally protective rule. Congressional interest in OSM’s efforts to develop new SMCRA implementing rules has been strong for some time. Senate and House authorizing and appropriations committees held hearings to examine the proposed rule and its development. Legislation to halt or re-direct OSM’s activities concerning the Stream Protection Rule also was introduced, and in January 2016, the House passed one such bill, the STREAM Act (H.R. 1644). Some now say that OSM’s multi-year efforts to revise the SMCRA regulations and release a final rule before the conclusion of the Obama Administration were largely for naught. Statements issued by some congressional leaders soon after release of the final rule on December 19, including by Senate Majority Leader McConnell and House Natural Resources Committee Chairman Bishop, indicated their intention for the 115th Congress to overturn the rule under procedures of the Congressional Review Act, which established a special parliamentary mechanism whereby Congress can disapprove a final rule promulgated by a federal agency, or to work with the Interior Department beginning in 2017 to issue a new rule. If the final rule were overturned by legislation, Executive Branch action, or legal challenge, existing rules (i.e., rules promulgated in 1983) would remain in place, unless or until a new rule or agency guidance were issued.

Dec 20, 2016

Introduction to U.S. Economy: Productivity

Dec 19, 2016

Poverty and Economic Opportunity

Dec 19, 2016

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2008-2015

This report provides Congress with official, unclassified, quantitative data on conventional arms transfers to developing nations by the United States and foreign countries for the preceding eight calendar years for use in its policy oversight functions. All agreement and delivery data in this report for the United States are government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) transactions. Similar data are provided on worldwide conventional arms transfers by all government suppliers, but the principal focus is the level of arms transfers by major weapons supplying governments to nations in the developing world. Developing nations continue to be the primary focus of foreign arms sales activity by weapons suppliers. During the years 2008-2011, the value of arms transfer agreements with developing nations comprised 80.39% of all such agreements worldwide. More recently, arms transfer agreements with developing nations constituted 80.92% of all such agreements globally from 2012-2015, and 81.70% of these agreements in 2015. The value of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations in 2015 was $65.2 billion. In 2015, the value of all arms deliveries to developing nations was $33.6 billion. Recently, from 2012 to 2015, the United States and Russia were predominant the arms market in the developing world, with both nations either ranking first or second in all but the most recent in these four years in the value of arms transfer agreements. From 2012 to 2015, the United States made nearly $86 billion in such agreements, 33.38%of all these agreements (expressed in current dollars). Russia made $48.6 billion, 18.94% of these agreements. During this same period, collectively, the United States and Russia made 52% of all arms transfer agreements with developing nations, ($134 billion in current dollars). In 2015, the United States ranked first in arms transfer agreements with developing nations with $26.7 billion or 41% of these agreements. In second place was France with $15.2 billion or 23.30% of such agreements. In 2015, the United States ranked first in the value of arms deliveries to developing nations at $11.9 billion, or 35.42% of all such deliveries. Russia and France tied for second in these deliveries at $6.2 billion each and each representing 18.45%. In worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2015—to both developed and developing nations—the United States was predominant, ranking first with $40.2 billion in such agreements or 50.29% of all such agreements. France ranked second in worldwide arms transfer agreements in 2015 with $15.3 billion in such global agreements or 19.16%. The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide in 2015 was $79.9 billion. In 2015, Qatar ranked first among all developing nations weapons purchasers concluding $17.5 billion in the value of arms transfer agreements. Egypt ranked second, concluding $11.9 billion in such agreements. Saudi Arabia ranked third with $8.6 billion in such agreements.

Dec 19, 2016

Introduction to Veterans Health Care

Dec 16, 2016

U.S. Policy on Cuban Migrants: In Brief

The Obama Administration’s efforts to normalize relations with Cuba focused attention on U.S. policies on immigration and federal assistance that apply to Cuban migrants in the United States—a set of policies that afford Cuban nationals unique immigration privileges. The November 2016 death of Cuba’s Fidel Castro may lead to further consideration of these issues. “Normal” immigration from Cuba to the United States has not existed since the Cuban Revolution of 1959 brought Fidel Castro to power. For more than 50 years, the majority of Cubans who have entered the United States have done so through special humanitarian provisions of federal law. U.S. policy on Cuban migration has been shaped by a 1966 law known as the Cuban Adjustment Act, as amended, and U.S.-Cuban migration agreements signed in the mid-1990s, operating in conjunction with the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Among the special immigration policies presently in place is a so-called “wet foot/dry foot” policy toward Cuban migrants who try to reach the U.S. shore by sea. “Wet foot” refers to Cubans who do not reach the United States. They are returned to Cuba unless they cite a well-founded fear of persecution, in which case, they are considered for resettlement in third countries. “Dry foot” is a reference to Cubans who successfully reach the U.S. shore and are generally permitted to stay in the country. After one year, these individuals can apply to become U.S. lawful permanent residents (LPRs) under the Cuban Adjustment Act. In addition to entering the United States under special policies and becoming LPRs through the Cuban Adjustment Act, Cubans can gain permanent admission to the United States through certain standard immigration pathways set forth in the INA. They can be sponsored for U.S. permanent residence by eligible U.S.-based relatives who are U.S. citizens or LPRs through the U.S. family-based immigration system. They can also apply for asylum from within the United States or at a U.S. port of entry, or they can be considered for refugee status abroad. Persons granted asylum or admitted to the United States as refugees can apply for LPR status after one year. Special provisions of law also make Cuban migrants in the United States eligible for federal assistance. The Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980 defines the term “Cuban and Haitian entrant” for purposes of eligibility for federal assistance. It makes these entrants eligible for the same resettlement assistance as refugees. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, as amended, makes Cuban and Haitian entrants eligible for certain federal public benefits to the same extent as refugees. The steps taken by the Obama Administration to normalize relations with Cuba have raised questions about the possibility of future changes to U.S. policy toward Cuban migrants through either executive or congressional action. Regarding the latter, legislation was introduced in the 114th Congress to repeal the Cuban Adjustment Act and eliminate the special treatment that Cuban entrants receive with respect to federal refugee resettlement assistance and other federal assistance. It remains to be seen whether Congress will act on any such measures. For an overview of current issues in U.S.-Cuban relations, see CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress.

Dec 16, 2016

The African Union (AU): Key Issues and U.S.-AU Relations

U.S. relations with the African Union (AU), an intergovernmental organization to which all African countries except Morocco belong, have strengthened over the past decade. U.S.-AU cooperation has traditionally focused on peace operations and conflict prevention and mitigation. U.S. aid for AU democracy-strengthening initiatives is another key focus of engagement. Other areas of cooperation include economic development, health, governance, peace and security capacity building, and criminal justice. Direct U.S. aid to the AU Commission (AUC, the organization’s secretariat), which oversees AU program activity, is moderate; most U.S. aid in support of AU goals is provided on a bilateral basis or sub-regional basis. Consequently, such aid may not always be accounted for in analyses of U.S. support for the AU. President George W. Bush formally recognized the AU as an international organization in 2005, and a U.S. mission to the AU was established in 2006, making the United States the first non-African country to have an accredited diplomatic mission to the AU. In 2007, the first AU ambassador to the United States was accredited. In 2010, an agreement on U.S. aid for the AU was signed and in 2013, the AU and the United States established annual partnership dialogues and extended the 2010 aid agreement. Later in 2013, President Obama met with the AUC Chairperson, marking the first exchange between an AUC chair and a U.S. president. In 2015, President Obama addressed the African Union at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, becoming the first U.S. president to do so. How the Trump Administration and the 115th Congress may view and potentially engage with the AU has yet to be determined. The AU was established in 2002 as the successor to the now-defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU). The aim of the AU is to promote continental economic integration and socioeconomic development through shared political and economic institutions and the planned creation of a common African market. Other key AU goals include greater political and economic unity, peace and security, and stability within Africa; advocacy of common African positions in international forums; strengthened democratic governance and rule of law; respect for human rights; and gender equality and social justice, among others. The current AUC chair is Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma of South Africa. Her priorities have centered on conflict resolution, support for transitional aid in post-conflict countries, AU monitoring of African elections, and efforts to boost economic growth and increase AU finance resources, among other goals. In July 2016, Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure was extended until January 2017 after the AU Assembly (comprising heads of state and government) failed to agree on a successor. The Assembly also decided in July 2016 to impose a 0.2% levy on imports into Africa to fund AU programs and AU-led peacekeeping missions, to facilitate the intra-regional movement of persons through the expanded use of AU passports, and to speed the creation of a Continental Free Trade Area. It also addressed several country-level crises. Key AU challenges include organizational, technical, and skilled personnel capacity gaps and limited financial resources. Political tensions among member states, uneven commitment to AU goals and mandates across the region, and sovereignty concerns have also inhibited AU effectiveness. The AU’s top decisionmaking organ is an Assembly of heads of state and government. Its decisions are overseen by an Executive Council, made up of AU members’ foreign affairs ministers. Other notable AU institutions include the Peace and Security Council (PSC), which manages the AU’s efforts to prevent and resolve conflicts, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Planning and Coordinating Agency, which manages economic programs and projects. The AU is also endeavoring to address violations of international human rights law through an expansion of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, a nascent continental court with a mandate to protect human rights and freedoms.

Dec 16, 2016

Military Construction: Process and Outcomes

Military installations often provide the most tangible evidence of the economic impact of the Department of Defense (DOD) on local communities. and demonstrate American commitment to foreign countries. Congress provides DOD with a military construction appropriation of several billion dollars annually and authorizes the Secretary of Defense and the military departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy to plan, program, design, and build the runways, piers, warehouses, barracks, schools, hospitals, child development centers, and other facilities needed to support U.S. military forces at home and overseas. This military base footprint, from the largest base to the smallest reserve center, reflects both a federal investment in local communities and a local investment in national defense. This report outlines the end-to-end military construction process by which DOD and Congress act together to build that footprint, beginning with the realization of the need for a facility and ending with its dedication and the opening of its doors for occupancy. The process encompasses several steps: determination of need by the local installation commander and engineering office, vetting and prioritization of construction projects within the military chain of command and the military department, consolidation and budgeting within the Office of the Secretary of Defense to create the infrastructure construction portion of the multi-year Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), inclusion of the final budget year list of projects in the President’s annual budget request to Congress, review and adjustment of the list by the congressional defense committees, consideration and passage of the necessary appropriation and authorization bills and their enactment by the President, and execution of the approved construction program by the military services’ executive agents – Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Army Corps of Engineers (ACE).

Dec 14, 2016

Financial Challenges of Operating Nuclear Power Plants in the United States

Some of the 60 operating nuclear power plants (comprising 99 nuclear reactors) in the United States have experienced financial stress in recent years due to a combination of low wholesale electricity prices and escalating costs. Six nuclear reactors have permanently shut down during the past five years, and 19 others have announced their intention to close or have been identified as “at-risk” of closure by financial consultants and ratings agencies. Generally, U.S. nuclear plants are located in one of two market areas: (1) competitive—where the value of electricity fluctuates based on supply-side price offers that are generally a function of fuel (e.g., natural gas) costs and demand-side price bids, and (2) cost-of-service—where the value of electricity is set at a rate based on regulator-approved costs, operating expenses, and a reasonable investment return. Most of the U.S. plants considered vulnerable to shut down before expiration of their operating licenses are “merchant plants” that sell all or most of their power into competitive wholesale power markets. The price paid to merchant plants for electric power varies by location and is influenced by the price-setting fuel (usually natural gas and coal), transmission congestion, and other factors. Wholesale electricity prices in certain locations have fallen and electricity sales revenue may be below the fuel and operating and maintenance (O&M) costs of some plants, not considering capital expenditures that may also be incurred. CRS analysis of third-party data indicates that 19 of 33 power plants operating in competitive power markets may incur fuel and O&M costs that exceed electricity revenues for each plant in 2016. However, this number declines to seven in 2017 due to rising forward electricity prices as reported by Bloomberg. While merchant generators do have other revenue sources (i.e., capacity payments where available, power purchase agreements, and hedging positions) and additional costs (e.g., capital), CRS was not able to locate plant-specific information about these revenues and costs that would allow for a holistic financial assessment at the plant level. The nuclear power industry and its supporters have proposed that Congress take action to prevent currently operating U.S. reactors from shutting down before their licenses expire. Supporters contend that nuclear power should be valued as a domestic source of highly reliable, low-carbon electricity. However, opponents contend that nuclear power suffers from too many drawbacks and that federal incentives should focus instead on renewable energy and efficiency. Nuclear power plants annually provide about 20% of total U.S. electricity generation. To date, all of the policy action related to financial support for existing nuclear plants has been at the state level. New York has implemented a Clean Energy Standard (CES) that includes payments to qualified nuclear power plants in the state starting at approximately $17 per megawatt-hour in 2017. The CES has been challenged on legal grounds. A similar program was recently approved by the Illinois legislature, and Ohio has also considered nuclear support. Since each nuclear power plant is subject to a unique combination of financial variables, federal-level incentives are challenged because some nuclear plants are expected to continue operating without federal financial support. Should Congress choose to debate financial incentives for existing nuclear plants, several options may be considered. Tax incentives based on capital investment or electricity production could potentially provide financial support for existing nuclear plants. Establishing a carbon price—carbon tax, cap-and-trade, emissions regulations—could also provide some financial assistance to nuclear power, depending on how a carbon price mechanism was designed and implemented. Finally, Congress could authorize and require the federal government to enter into power purchase agreements with nuclear power plants that would provide a guaranteed price for nuclear-generated electricity. Additionally, the nuclear industry has been advocating that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) institute changes to electricity price formation in competitive power markets.

Dec 14, 2016

Department of Defense Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E): Appropriations Structure

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) in support of its mission requirements. The work funded by these appropriations plays a central role in the nation’s security and an important role in U.S. global leadership in science and technology. DOD alone accounts for nearly half of all federal R&D appropriations ($65.5 billion of $135.8 billion, or 48.2%, in FY2015). In its annual congressional budget requests, DOD presents its RDT&E requests by organization and by its own unique taxonomy aligned to the character of the work to be performed. More than 95% of DOD RDT&E funding is provided under Title IV of the annual defense appropriations act. These funds are appropriated for RDT&E in the Army, Navy, Air Force, a Defense-wide RDT&E account, and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation. RDT&E funding is also provided for the Defense Health Program in Title VI; the Chemical Agents and Munitions Destruction Program in Title VI; and previously the National Defense Sealift Fund in Title V, though the President’s FY2017 budget does not request RDT&E funds for this purpose. In addition, some of the funds appropriated to the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Fund (JIDF, formerly the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Fund) are used for RDT&E though the fund does not contain an RDT&E line item. In some years, RDT&E funds also have been requested and appropriated as part of DOD’s separate funding to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO, formerly the Global War on Terror (GWOT)). These funds have typically been appropriated for specific activities identified in Title IV. Finally, some OCO funds have been appropriated for transfer funds (e.g., the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF), Iraqi Security Forces Fund, Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, and Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund) which can be used to support RDT&E activities, among other things, subject to certain limitations. Parsing RDT&E funding by the character of the work, DOD has established seven categories identified by a budget activity code (numbers 6.1-6.7) and a description. Budget activity code 6.1 is for basic research; 6.2 is for applied research; 6.3 is for advanced technology development; 6.4 is for advanced component development and prototypes; 6.5 is for systems development and demonstration; 6.6 is for RDT&E management support; and 6.7 is for operational system development. DOD uses crosswalks to report its RDT&E funding to the Office of Management and Budget and to the National Science Foundation. These crosswalks use different taxonomies than DOD’s for accounting for R&D funding.

Dec 13, 2016

Commercial Space Industry Launches a New Phase

Rockets, satellites, and the services they provide, once the domain of governments, are increasingly launched and managed by privately owned companies. Although private aerospace firms have contracted with federal agencies since the onset of the Space Age six decades ago, U.S. government policy has sought to spur innovation and drive down costs by expanding the roles of satellite manufacturers and commercial launch providers. Global spending on space activity reached an estimated $323 billion in 2015. Of this amount, nearly 40% was generated by commercial space products and services and 37% by commercial infrastructure and support industries. The U.S. government—including national security agencies and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—accounted for about 14% of global spending; government spending by other countries was responsible for the remaining 10%. The satellite and launch vehicle supply chains are global, with a small number of manufacturers. In 2015, global satellite manufacturing revenues were $6 billion; launches booked $2.6 billion in revenue. Ground stations—the largest part of the commercial space infrastructure—generated more than $100 billion in revenue, largely from geolocation and navigation equipment. The face of the U.S. space industry is changing with a government shift toward use of fixed price contracts for commercial services, new entrants with new launch products, and an increase in the use of smaller satellites: NASA’s commercial cargo program and other federal contracts are supporting the growth of the commercial launch industry, with less expensive rockets, some of which are planned to be reusable. Many of the new space-related companies are attracting rising levels of venture capital. Aggressive pricing by U.S. entrants is cutting into the international launch market once dominated by foreign providers. A renewed interest in low-cost satellites, some of which are small enough to be held in one hand, is prompting a range of start-ups and providing new accessibility to space by educational institutions, small businesses, and individual researchers. In order to spur innovation and growth, the commercial space industry has been purposely insulated from some types of federal regulation often applied to other industries. Nevertheless, three broad federal issues will affect the industry’s future development. One is the structure of federal regulation and management; those responsibilities currently are dispersed among many agencies, and there is congressional interest in reorganizing commercial space functions at NASA and the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Transportation, and State. A second issue is the extent to which U.S. export controls are hampering U.S. satellite industry sales abroad. Export controls have recently been revamped to enable export of more commercial space products and services, but impediments may remain to reestablishing U.S. space product competitiveness. A third concern is that new Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulations allowing wireless communication providers to share spectrum previously dedicated to satellite transmissions may result in interference. The commission has pledged to continue studying the issue.

Dec 12, 2016

"Fiscal Space" and the Federal Budget

This report discusses plans for the federal budget and the concept of "fiscal space," or the amount of room available for additional government borrowing.

Dec 9, 2016

The Federal Budget Deficit and the Business Cycle

This report discusses the annual federal budget deficit, which has fallen significantly over the course of the current economic expansion, from a high of 9.8% of gross domestic product (GDP) in FY2009 to 3.2% of GDP in FY2016

Dec 9, 2016

Has the U.S. Government Ever “Defaulted”?

During recent debt limit episodes, federal officials have contended that if the debt limit were to constrain the government’s ability to meet its obligations, that would be an unprecedented blemish on the nation’s credit. For example, the U.S. Treasury has asserted that “(f)ailing to increase the debt limit would have catastrophic economic consequences. It would cause the government to default on its legal obligations” or that it “would represent an irresponsible retreat from a core American value: we are a nation that honors all of its commitments. It would cause the government to default on its legal obligations.” Failure to pay obligations on time is regarded as a central indicator of default, although default may be triggered by a wide range of contractual provisions. More generally, the concept of default stems from contract law, and thus may be ambiguous because contract terms may be private or contracts may be incomplete, in that the consequences of some contingencies are left unspecified. For instance, the terms under which Treasury securities are offered lack any mention of payment delays or nonpayment. The ambiguity of the term “default” leads many third parties to develop their own definitions to monitor compliance with promises to pay. The U.S. Treasury in some historical instances was unable to pay all its obligations on time or made payments on terms that disappointed creditors. Those instances resulted from extraordinary stresses on public finances. Over time, the United States has managed its finances so that its credit history compares favorably to nearly all other advanced countries. This report examines three episodes in the federal government’s fiscal history when some have questioned the public credit of the U.S. government. During the War of 1812, the federal government eventually became unable to meet its obligations. Shortly before that war, Congress had declined to renew the charter of the first Bank of the United States, leaving the government without a fiscal agent. In addition, President Jefferson and Treasury Secretary Gallatin had dismantled the administrative machinery needed to collect internal revenues, leaving Treasury revenues heavily dependent on customs income. In 1814, military expenses and lagging revenue left the U.S. Treasury unable to meet all of its obligations, including some interest payments on federal debt. The end of that war, the establishment of the second Bank of the United States, and the rebound of tariff revenues put federal finances on a sounder foundation. In March 1933, newly inaugurated President Franklin Roosevelt soon took steps to suspend the gold standard, as one measure to address severe disinflation, a collapse of the banking system, and other consequences of the Great Depression. While the Supreme Court upheld actions that suspended the gold standard, others contended that the cancellation of gold clauses in federal bond contracts amounted to a restructuring of debt. Although the cancellation of gold clauses in 1933-1934 had no discernable effect on the U.S. Treasury’s ability to borrow, holders of Treasury securities lost money relative to what they had expected to receive. More recently, when the U.S. Treasury failed to make timely payments to some small investors in the spring of 1979, some dubbed the incident a “mini-default.” While the payment delays inconvenienced many investors, the stability of the wider market in Treasury securities was never at risk. Shifts in monetary policy, as constraining inflation became a policy priority, provide a stronger explanation for changes in yields in federal securities. Moreover, payment delays were not uncommon at that time, when automatic data processing was at a relatively primitive stage. Other countries that defaulted in the 1930s or in the 19th century apparently suffered no lasting damage to their ability to borrow. Nonetheless, the prominent role of U.S. Treasury securities in global and domestic financial arrangements implies that systematic delays in Treasury payments now could have serious consequences.

Dec 8, 2016

The U.S. Income Distribution: Trends and Issues

Income inequality—that is, the extent to which individuals’ or households’ incomes differ—has increased in the United States since the 1970s. Rising income inequality over this time period is driven largely by relatively rapid income growth at the top of the income distribution. For example, in 1975, the average income of households in the top fifth of income distribution was 10.3 times as large as average household income in the bottom fifth of the distribution; in 2015, average top incomes were 16.3 times as large as those at the bottom. The pace and pattern of distributional change, however, was not constant over this time period: From the mid-1970s to 2000, incomes grew, on average, for households in each quintile (i.e., each fifth of the distribution). Income inequality increased significantly because incomes rose more rapidly for the top quintile (i.e., the top fifth or top 20% of the distribution). Between 2000 and 2015, average incomes rose at relatively modest rates for the top two quintiles (i.e., the top 40% of the distribution) and fell for the bottom three quintiles (i.e., bottom 60%). The net effect was that income inequality continued to rise, but at a slower rate. In 2015, black and Hispanic households were disproportionately in lower income quintiles (although less so than in recent decades), whereas white and Asian households were disproportionately in higher income quintiles. Over recent decades, income inequality has also increased in most other advanced economies, although most others have more equal income distributions than the United States today and did not experience as much of an increase in inequality as the United States has recently. Households do not necessarily stay in a given quintile from year to year. A new job or profitable investment can propel a household from a lower quintile to a higher one over time; likewise, income loss can result in movement down the distributional ranks. Such movement throughout the income distribution over time is called income mobility. Mobility can be measured in different ways and over different time frames. This report considers analyses of mobility over the short-term, the longer-term, and across generations. In general, data from governmental sources reveal three broad trends: (1) households and individuals are not perfectly mobile, that is, their current distributional rank is related to past rankings; (2) mobility is greater over longer time periods; and (3) overall income mobility has not decreased significantly in recent decades. Economists have identified several factors that are likely to have contributed to widening inequality since the 1970s. The relative importance of each factor depends on how and over what time period inequality is measured. Labor income has become less equal because some factors have tended to curb wage growth of lower- and middle-income workers relative to higher income workers. These factors include technological change, globalization, declining unionization, and minimum wage fluctuations. Other changes aided by globalization and technological change, such as economies of scale, winner-takes-all markets, and the superstar phenomenon may have boosted wages for very high-wage workers. Change in pay dynamics and social norms may help explain the rise in CEO pay. The distribution of financial wealth has grown more unequal over time, which affects income inequality through the capital income that wealth generates. The changing demographic composition of households has also contributed to income distribution patterns. Over time, there has been an increase in two earner households, single headed households, and marriages between couples with more similar earnings or educational attainment. Research has investigated the link between income inequality and economic growth. In theory, greater inequality could increase or decrease growth through many channels, and vice versa. Empirically, studies have tried to tease out the relationship between the two across a large number of countries over time. Those studies tend to find stronger evidence that inequality reduces growth in developing countries, which may be of limited relevance to the United States.

Dec 8, 2016

Dakota Access Pipeline: Siting Controversy

This report discusses the Dakota Access Pipeline including background on the project and information about siting approval, as well as opposition and litigation against the pipeline.

Dec 8, 2016

State Programs for “Coal Ash” Disposal in the WIIN Act

On December 8, 2016, the House passed the Water Infrastructure Improvements for the Nation Act (WIIN Act; as a substitute amendment to S. 612). Section 2301 of the WIIN Act would amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act (commonly referred to by its 1976 amendment, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, or RCRA). Section 2301 would establish a framework for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to approve state programs implementing federal standards applicable to the disposal of coal combustion residuals (CCR, or “coal ash”) generated by electric utilities. Currently under RCRA, those federal standards are enforceable primarily by citizen lawsuits. Some members of the regulated community have expressed concern over the uncertainty associated with enforcement by citizen suit. Others have expressed concern that, absent some mechanism to encourage states to implement the federal standards, enforcement by citizen suit is inadequate to ensure that risks associated with CCR disposal are consistently addressed. Proponents of Section 2301 assert that the RCRA amendment could address those concerns, which have been contentious for some time. Background On April 15, 2015, EPA issued a final rule establishing federal standards for CCR disposal. The standards, at 40 C.F.R. Part 257, Subpart D, went into effect October 19, 2015. (See CRS Insight IN10583, Overview of EPA Standards for “Coal Ash” Disposal.) EPA promulgated the standards under existing RCRA authorities that require the agency to establish criteria necessary to distinguish between sanitary landfills and open dumps. (See the “Statutory Authority” section, page 21310 of the preamble to EPA’s final rule.) Waste management practices that constitute open dumping are prohibited under RCRA Section 4005(a). In accordance with its long-standing interpretation of RCRA’s authorities, EPA asserts that it can neither enforce its CCR disposal standards nor direct states to implement them. Instead, requirements related to RCRA’s open dumping prohibition are enforceable by states or citizens under RCRA’s citizen suit authority. Alternatively, states could adopt and enforce the federal regulations under their independent enforcement authority. (See the “Implementation” section, page 21309 of the preamble.) Owner/operators of CCR disposal facilities that do not comply with applicable federal standards would violate RCRA’s open dumping prohibition. However, unless the facility is in a state that adopted the federal standards, its non-compliance would be subject to some enforcement action via citizen suit. EPA encourages states to adopt and implement standards at least as stringent as EPA’s to ensure that risks associated with improper CCR disposal are addressed. Specifically, EPA recommends that states revise their existing Solid Waste Management Plans (SWMP) to demonstrate how they will ensure compliance with RCRA’s open dumping prohibition with respect to CCR disposal. Under existing procedures established in RCRA, EPA could approve a state SWMP that implements CCR disposal standards that meet or exceed the federal criteria. EPA anticipates that a facility operating in accord with an EPA-approved SWMP will be able to beneficially use that fact if a citizen suit is brought to enforce the federal criteria. State CCR Disposal Programs Under Section 2301 Section 2301 of the WIIN Act would establish state/EPA programs to control CCR disposal that would be similar to programs currently used to regulate municipal solid waste (MSW) landfills. The program to regulate MSW landfills was established according to directives and authorities in the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA; P.L. 98-616). In the debate leading up to HSWA, Congress recognized that it may not be practical to regulate certain wastes under the federal hazardous waste management program (established under RCRA Subtitle C) but that excluding such waste does not mean its disposal poses no hazard. HSWA amendments to RCRA Subtitle D provided new mechanisms (apart from citizen suits) to enforce the open dumping prohibition at facilities that may accept hazardous household waste (HHW). Specifically, HSWA added Section 4010 to Subtitle D, which includes directive to EPA to revise existing sanitary landfill criteria (in 40 C.F.R. 257) to establish criteria applicable to disposal facilities that may receive HHW. EPA then promulgated MSW landfill criteria in 49 C.F.R. Part 258. To ensure compliance with those criteria, HSWA also amended the RCRA provisions prohibiting open dumping by adding Section 4005(c), which directed states to implement permit programs to assure facility compliance with the MSW landfill criteria; directed EPA to determine whether each state’s program was adequate; and allowed EPA to use existing RCRA authorities in Subtitle C (related to inspection and federal enforcement) to enforce the open dumping prohibition (i.e., enforce the MSW landfill criteria) in states without an approved permit program. Currently, all states regulate MSW landfills in accordance with permit programs approved by EPA. That approval indicates that the state provided documentation to EPA that demonstrates it adopted and can enforce landfill standards that are at least as protective as the federal standards. That is, a state regulatory program implemented in accordance with standards approved by EPA is one that would not violate the RCRA open dumping prohibition. Section 2301 would amend RCRA’s open dumping provisions in a similar way to implement CCR disposal standards. Key provisions in Section 2301 would add a Section 4005(d) to RCRA that would establish a process for states to seek and EPA to approve a state’s program regulating CCR disposal, conditioned on EPA determining that the state would implement requirements at least as protective as applicable federal standards; specify conditions under which EPA could withdraw approval of state programs; explicitly allow EPA to use existing authorities in RCRA to enforce the open dumping prohibition in states that do not have or choose not to seek an EPA-approved program to regulate CCR; and specify that a disposal unit operating in accordance with an EPA-approved state CCR permit program would be a sanitary landfill (i.e., not an open dump). Sponsors of the proposed amendment to RCRA say that it may encourage safe disposal of CCR and protect utilities from lawsuits. This is similar to EPA’s assertion that state adoption of CCR regulatory programs, implemented via an EPA-approved SWMP, would also reduce risks from CCR disposal and protect facilities from citizen suits.

Dec 8, 2016

Congressional Involvement in the Design of Circulating Coins

Dec 7, 2016

Generic Drugs and GDUFA Reauthorization: In Brief

A generic drug is a lower-cost copy of a brand-name chemical drug. Marketing of the generic drug becomes possible only when the brand-name—also called innovator—drug is no longer protected from market competition by patent and other protections, called regulatory exclusivity. Prior to marketing, the sponsor of a brand-name drug must submit to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) clinical data in a new drug application (NDA) to support the claim that the drug is safe and effective for its intended use. The FDA uses the information in the NDA as a basis for approving or denying the sponsor’s application. Once a drug is approved, the brand-name manufacturer has free rein in setting the drug price due to a government-sanctioned monopoly for a defined period of time. This enables the company to recoup its research and development expenses, allow further R&D investment, as well as provide a profit to stock holders. The branded drug is protected from market competition by (1) patents issued by the U.S. Patent Office and (2) regulatory exclusivity granted by the FDA following enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-417), also called the Hatch-Waxman Act. These congressionally established incentives allow the brand name company to charge a much higher price for the drug product than the cost of manufacture. In one extreme example, the annual price for a patient taking the cancer drug Gleevec would be $216—including a 50% profit—far lower than the current annual price of $107,799 in the United States. The Hatch-Waxman Act amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA) allowing a generic drug manufacturer to submit an abbreviated NDA (ANDA) to the FDA for premarket review. In the ANDA, the generic company establishes that its drug product is chemically the same as the already approved drug and thereby relies on the FDA’s previous finding of safety and effectiveness for the approved drug. Because the generic sponsor does not perform costly animal and clinical research—and usually does not pay for expensive advertising, marketing, and promotion—the generic drug company is able to sell its drug product at a lower price compared with the branded drug product. The cost of a generic drug is, on average, about 85% lower than the brand name product. According to FDA, the success of the Hatch-Waxman Act led to significant regulatory challenges for the agency. FDA’s resources did not keep pace with the increasing number of ANDAs, resulting in delayed approvals of generic drugs, “a major concern for the generics industry, FDA, consumers, and payers alike.” In March 2012, median review time for generic drug applications was approximately 31 months and FDA had a backlog of over 2,500 ANDAs. In addition, FDA had to conduct more inspections as the number of manufacturing facilities grew, “with the greatest increase coming from foreign facilities.” To expedite ANDA reviews and provide resources for more inspections, FDA had proposed generic drug user fees in each annual budget request to Congress beginning with the FY2008 request. Such fees became possible when the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA, P.L. 112-144) became law in July 2012. Title III of FDASIA, the Generic Drug User Fee Amendments (GDUFA), authorized FDA to collect fees from industry for agency activities associated with generic drugs. Under what is now called GDUFA I, such fees are allowed to be collected from October 2012 through September 2017. Between October 2015 and August 2016, FDA held negotiation sessions with industry on GDUFA reauthorization. In October 2016, FDA posted on its website the draft agreement—GDUFA II—setting fees and FDA performance goals for FY2018 through FY2022. A final GDUFA II recommendation will be submitted to Congress by January 15, 2017.

Dec 6, 2016

EPA's Mid-Term Evaluation of Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards

This report discusses the standards set by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for fuel economy and greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions for new light-duty vehicles (defined generally as passenger cars and light trucks).

Dec 6, 2016

An Introduction to Judicial Review of Federal Agency Action

This report provides a broad overview of the issues that may be relevant to any number of present and future challenges to agency action in federal court.

Dec 5, 2016

Colombia Adopts Revised Peace Accord: What Next?

In an effort to end a half century of armed conflict between the largest leftist insurgent group in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Colombian government, a revised peace accord was signed in November 2016 by President Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC’s leader, known as Timochenko. On November 30, 2016, the new accord was “ratified” by the Colombian Congress, first by the Colombian Senate by a vote of 75-0 (out of 101 Senators) and a day later by the lower house by a vote of 130-0 (out of 166). Congressional opponents either did not vote or walked out, and debate lasted for more than 10 hours in each chamber. Despite ratification of the agreement, Colombia’s way forward remains uncertain for implementing the 310-page accord. Background Colombian voters surprised many on October 2, 2016, when, by a margin of 54,000 votes (out of 13 million cast) they rejected the original peace accord negotiated over four years of talks between the Santos government and the FARC held in Havana. The razor-thin margin revealed polarization over how to resolve the decades-long violent insurgency, fueled by the drug trade and other illicit businesses. Peace accord critics, led by popular former President, and now Senator, Álvaro Uribe, mobilized a campaign to reject the accord. The No campaign highlighted many perceived weaknesses, such as inadequate punishment for FARC violations, lack of an appropriate appeal for forgiveness from FARC fighters, and overly generous guarantees for FARC’s future political role. After the first accord was rejected, the Santos government met with opposition leaders and negotiated with the FARC to hammer out a revised accord over 41 days. Although the No campaign leaders largely rejected the changes agreed to by the FARC, the Colombian government asserted that the modifications had been significant, touching 56 of 57 categories of changes that opponents set forth. (Opponents provided some 500 proposals critical of the earlier accord, which the Santos government divided into 57 chapters). The immediate concern is security, specifically whether the current cease-fire will collapse or deteriorate. Some observers maintain that a swiftly affirmed and enacted peace accord that leads to FARC forces disarming and reintegrating into rural communities will reduce violence and have many benefits, including enhanced economic growth. Critics of the new accord contend that the Santos Administration gave too many concessions to the FARC, especially in allowing the FARC’s top leadership to enter politics and avoid prison. Legal Complexities and Who Pays for Peace? A vexing issue for supporters of the peace deal is when the demobilization and disarmament of the FARC can begin. The Colombian Congress must enact a series of laws to implement the new accord, but an amnesty law must first be adopted to trigger disarmament. Without a law that provides amnesty for rank-and-file fighters who committed political crimes, the FARC will not continue to move into concentration zones agreed to in the bilateral cease-fire. (These zones are mapped in Figure 1). A path for expedited passage of the many laws related to the peace accord had been created for the first agreement if popularly approved. Colombia’s Constitutional Court is poised to determine if such “fast track” terms can apply to the congressionally sanctioned November accord. Opponents of the peace process led by Senator Uribe have been strengthened and are likely to attack the recently ratified agreement during the lead-up to the March 2018 legislative and presidential elections, which begins in spring 2017. Some analysts estimated the total cost for implementing the original peace accord with the FARC would reach $30 billion over a decade, and the new accord is unlikely to cost less. The Colombian people will shoulder most of that cost, although international organizations and the United Nations and other donors will provide some support for implementation. Some analysts ask if FARC resources will materialize to compensate FARC victims or if those hidden profits will remain out of reach, despite a proviso in the new accord that requires the FARC to provide a full accounting. Peace Colombia, the assistance program proposed by the Obama Administration, had foreseen a peace accord with the insurgents. The initiative was designed to help Colombia secure peace with $450 million of support, $391 million of which was requested in the FY2017 congressional budget justification. A continuing resolution enacted by the U.S. Congress in September 2016 funds aid programs in Colombia at slightly below the FY2016 level ($300.1 million) through December 9, 2016. Should the 114th Congress pass another (temporary) continuing resolution, the final assistance level for Colombia may remain unclear until after the new U.S. administration and the 115th Congress take office. Issues for U.S. Policymakers The United States has backed Colombia’s struggle to end insurgencies of both left-wing guerrilla organizations and right-wing paramilitaries through support of negotiated peace agreements. Under Plan Colombia and its successor strategies, Congress appropriated more than $10 billion of bilateral foreign assistance between FY2000 and FY2016 to help improve Colombia’s security situation and strengthen its democracy. (See CRS Report R43813, Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations.) Some analysts maintain that Plan Colombia exemplified an approach to nation-building that worked, whereas critics counter that U.S. assistance provided to Plan Colombia allowed for human rights abuses and over-militarization. Most observers laud the large reduction in Colombia’s homicide and kidnapping rates and significant reduction in terrorist acts; some maintain that security improvements outpaced progress in counternarcotics. Data from the U.S. government indicate Colombia’s production of cocaine has increased rapidly since 2014, raising concerns among U.S. policymakers interested in reducing the flow of illegal drugs. Potentially slow implementation of the peace accord, they say, may undermine FARC’s anticipated cooperation in reducing Colombian illicit drug exports. Figure 1. FARC Demobilization Encampments and Hamlet Zones / Source: Santiago Cárdenas H. “Mindefensa dice que las zonas de concentración pasa de 31 a 28,” El Colombiano, August 26, 2016. Notes: Originally, 31 encampment and hamlet zones had been chosen for the FARC’s disarmament and demobilization. In a press conference on August 28, 2016, Minister of Defense Luis Carlos Villegas announced that modifications had been made to the encampment and hamlet zones. The 23 hamlet zones were reduced to 22, and the 8 encampment zones were reduced to 6.

Dec 5, 2016

Fidel Castro’s Death: Implications for Cuba and U.S. Policy

The death of Cuba’s former long-time ruler Fidel Castro on November 25, 2016, raises questions regarding Cuba’s economic and political situation and the future of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The revolutionary leader overthrew an unpopular dictatorship in 1959, but ended up imposing a communist regime that led to some social progress yet also resulted in severe human rights abuses and a feeble economy. For a small island nation, Cuba played an oversized role in international affairs under Castro’s rule through its support for revolutionary movements abroad and its strong opposition to the United States. While Fidel Castro’s historical legacy is significant—regardless of whether one views him positively or negatively—he has not held formal power since he stepped down in 2006 for health reasons and was succeeded by his brother Raúl Castro, Cuba’s long-time defense minister. Raúl has concentrated on making changes to Cuba’s economic model by introducing some market-oriented reforms, but he has kept tight control over the political system. Even after stepping down, Fidel continued to author essays published in Cuban media that cast a shadow on Raúl’s rule. Many Cubans reportedly believe that Fidel encouraged so-called hardliners in Cuba’s Communist Party (PCC) and government bureaucracy to slow the pace of reforms. With Fidel’s passing, some Cuban entrepreneurs hope that the pace of reforms might accelerate. Fidel’s death points to the generational change that has already begun in the Cuban government and a passing of the older generation of so-called históricos of the 1959 revolution. Raúl’s government imposed two five-year term limits for top officials. Accordingly, Raúl has said that he will step down as president in February 2018 at the end of his second term when he would be 86 years of age. Most observers believe that current First Vice President Miguel Díaz-Canel (currently aged 56), a former minister of higher education, will succeed Raúl as president, marking a transition to the first Cuban government not headed by a Castro in 62 years. U.S. Policy Implications Upon Fidel’s passing, President Obama issued a statement extending condolences to Fidel’s family and extending “a hand of friendship to the Cuban people.” He said that “history will record and judge the enormous impact of this singular figure on the people and world around him.” The President acknowledged that while the United States and Cuba have had profound political disagreements, his Administration has “worked hard to put the past behind us, pursuing a future in which the relationship between our two countries is defined not by our differences but by the many things that we share as neighbors and friends.... ” Opponents of the Obama Administration’s policy of engagement with Cuba, including some Members of Congress, criticized the President’s statement, maintaining that it disregarded the significant human rights abuses under Castro. While the Administration has been pursuing a policy of engagement and normalization of relations, it has not refrained from speaking out on human rights. During his March 2016 trip to Cuba, the President asserted in a televised speech that “citizens should be free to speak their mind without fear.” Statements from President-elect Trump suggest that he might reverse some of the Obama Administration’s Cuba policy changes. After Fidel’s death, the President-elect issued a statement referring to Castro as a “brutal dictator who oppressed his own people for nearly six decades.” This was followed by a longer message on November 28 maintaining: “If Cuba is unwilling to make a better deal for the Cuban people, the Cuban/American people and the U.S. as a whole, I will terminate [the] deal.” At this juncture, it remains unclear what actions might be taken by the incoming Administration. During the electoral campaign, candidate Trump said he would cancel or reverse President Obama’s policy on Cuba unless Cuba took action to improve political and religious freedom and free political prisoners. Since President Obama’s policy shift on Cuba was done largely by executive action, President-elect Trump could reverse many of those policies, which have included the reestablishment of diplomatic relations (July 2015), the rescission of Cuba’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism (May 2015), and an increase in travel and commerce with Cuba. This third step involved a series of regulatory changes to the economic embargo by the Treasury and Commerce Departments. The Administration could decide to reverse some or all these changes or to ease or tighten other aspects of the embargo regulations. The Administration also could make changes to other aspects of bilateral government-to-government cooperation and dialogues that have occurred under the Obama Administration. These include a variety of agreements and dialogues on such issues as telecommunications, science and technology, U.S. property claims, environmental protection, human rights, migration, law enforcement, civil aviation, and maritime borders. Opinion polls have shown that the policy of engagement has largely been popular, including within parts of the Cuban American community in South Florida, which could make it difficult for the incoming Administration to reverse the U.S. policy completely. Burgeoning U.S. business linkages, particularly in the travel industry and telecommunications sectors, also could make it difficult to reverse current policy. Given that much of the economic embargo on Cuba remains in place (and can be lifted only by Congress), the Administration could choose to let the changes that have already been made remain, but refrain from approving any additional easing of restrictions pending economic or political changes in Cuba. Historically, Congress has played an active role in shaping policy toward Cuba, including the enactment of legislation strengthening and at times easing U.S. economic sanctions. Looking ahead, the 115th Congress may continue to maintain an active oversight and legislative interest in Cuba, with some Members advocating continued engagement and normalization of relations and others advocating tightening or introducing new economic sanctions. The human rights situation in Cuba is likely to remain a key concern. For more on Cuba, see CRS In Focus IF10045, Cuba: President Obama’s New Policy Approach; CRS Report R43926, Cuba: Issues for the 114th Congress; CRS Report R44119, U.S. Agricultural Trade with Cuba: Current Limitations and Future Prospects; CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances; and CRS Report R43888, Cuba Sanctions: Legislative Restrictions Limiting the Normalization of Relations.

Dec 2, 2016

Waiver of Statutory Qualifications Relating to Prior Military Service of the Secretary of Defense

This report discusses the status of the Secretary of Defense, who has authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense, as a civilian appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.

Dec 1, 2016

U.S. Stakeholders Critical of U.S.-Mexico Sugar Agreements

Nov 30, 2016

Long-Term Care Services for Veterans

The Veterans Health Administration (VHA), an operating unit of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), is a direct service provider of health care, similar in many ways to a large private sector health care system. In addition to providing inpatient, outpatient, and a range of other medical care services, the VHA provides and purchases long-term care services. The VA is one of two federal payers of long-term care services (the other being Medicaid). Since the 1960s, the VA has been authorized to provide nursing home care to eligible veterans in various settings, including VA facilities, private nursing facilities contracted by the VA, and state veterans homes (P.L. 88-450). These nursing home benefits were further expanded in subsequent legislation (P.L. 91-101 and P.L. 93-82). In 1999, the Veterans Millennium Health Care and Benefits Act (P.L. 106-117) required the VA to provide such benefits to veterans needing nursing home care due to one of their service-connected conditions, as well as veterans who overall have a service-connected disability rating of 70% or more, who need the care for any condition, service-connected or not. In addition, the law required the VA to maintain staffing and level of services for institutional care not less than the FY1998 level; the law also required non-institutional long-term care services as part of the VA medical benefits package. About 9.1 million veterans (43% of all veterans) were estimated to be enrolled in the VHA in FY2016. Although the overall number of veterans in the United States has declined since FY2000, the number of veterans enrolled in the VHA has increased significantly in that same time period. In FY2000, just over 4.9 million veterans were enrolled in the VHA; by FY2016 that number was estimated to have increased 86%, to 9.1 million enrollees. This increase is due, in part, to the growing number of veterans with service-connected disabilities, as well as more liberal enrollment policies. Among veterans with a service-connected disability, the proportion who have a disability rated as 70% or more service-connected (and therefore eligible for VA paid nursing home care) has also increased. VA long-term care programs are administered at the VA facility level, with some variability in how programs are administered. Each VA facility offers certain mandatory programs and may offer several optional programs as well. Eligibility for VA long-term care programs depends on eligibility for VA health care, which is based primarily on “veteran status” resulting from military service. Once enrolled, veterans’ eligibility for long-term care services depends on several factors, including veterans’ need for the service (as determined by the VA), whether the service is institutional or non-institutional, and (for certain programs), veterans’ service-connected status. Institutional settings may include both inpatient acute care and nursing home care. However, the majority of VA long-term care provided in institutional settings occurs in nursing home facilities, such as VA Community Living Centers (CLCs), community nursing homes, and state veterans homes. Non-institutional care includes outpatient and ambulatory care settings, as well as care that occurs in the home or another community-based setting. Non-institutional services include home-based primary care, community residential care, geriatric evaluation, palliative care, adult day health care, homemaker/home health aide care, respite care, home skilled care, home hospice, and veteran-directed home and community-based services and medical foster homes (at some facilities). Some long-term care services are provided directly by VA staff, whereas others are purchased from providers outside of the VA. Long-term care expenditures are a small but not insignificant part of the VHA total medical care budget, at just over one-tenth of the VHA’s budget. In FY2015, the VHA spent $7.4 billion (13% of its total appropriated funding for medical care, which was $55.8 billion) for veterans’ long-term care. Institutional care accounted for almost $5.3 billion, or 71% of VA’s total long-term care spending, while non-institutional care accounted for $2.1 billion, or 29%. The majority of VHA institutional care spending (64%) was for VA Community Living Centers (CLCs), nursing facilities owned and operated by the VA. This report provides an overview of VA long-term care services, including legislative highlights, eligibility, organizational structure, descriptions of services (both institutional and non-institutional care), and expenditures. The report also describes three key issues for Congress when considering the VA and its long-term care financing and delivery system: Veterans’ access to long-term care services. Settings where services are provided and the appropriate balance between institutional and non-institutional care. Veteran’s health coverage options and federal coordination.

Nov 28, 2016

Financial Innovation: “Fintech”

Nov 23, 2016

Oil and Natural Gas Industry Tax Preferences

Nov 23, 2016

CCDBG Act of 2014: Key Provisions and Implementation Status

Nov 22, 2016

Five-Year Program for Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing: Status and Issues in Brief

Under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, as amended (OCSLA; 43 U.S.C. §1331 ff.), the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) must prepare and maintain forward-looking five-year plans—referred to by BOEM as five-year programs—for proposed public oil and gas lease sales on the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS). On November 18, 2016, BOEM released its proposed final program for the period from mid-2017 through mid-2022. The history, legal and economic framework, and process for developing the program are discussed in CRS Report R44504, The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management’s Five-Year Program for Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing: History and Proposed Program for 2017-2022. The following discussion briefly summarizes the status of the 2017-2022 program, discusses selected issues of congressional interest, and considers the role of Congress in shaping the program.

Nov 21, 2016

Can a New Administration Undo a Previous Administration’s Regulations?

Following the election of Donald J. Trump on November 8, 2016, questions have been raised as to whether and how a new President’s administration can amend or repeal regulations issued by the previous administration. In short, once a rule has been finalized, a new administration would be required to undergo the rulemaking process to change or repeal all or part of the rule. If a rule has not yet been finalized, however, a new President may be able, immediately upon taking office, to prevent the rule from being issued. In addition to these administrative actions, Congress can also take legislative action to overturn rules. Changing or Repealing Previously Issued Rules Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), “rulemaking” is defined as “formulating, amending, or repealing a rule,” meaning that an agency must follow the rulemaking procedures set forth by the APA and other statutory and executive order requirements to change or repeal a rule. (For more on these procedures, see CRS Report RL32240, The Federal Rulemaking Process: An Overview, coordinated by Maeve P. Carey.) Under the APA’s rulemaking procedures, agencies are generally required to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register, allow “interested persons” an opportunity to comment on the proposed rule, and, after considering those comments, publish the final rule. Furthermore, in most cases, the final rule may not become effective until at least 30 days after its publication. Sometimes Congress has required agencies to undertake additional or alternative procedures to issue rules. Such procedures are not addressed here, but also may be required for an agency to amend or repeal a previously issued rule. Alternatively, a new President and Congress may be able to overturn a regulation issued by the previous administration more expeditiously by using the Congressional Review Act (CRA). (See CRS In Focus IF10023, The Congressional Review Act (CRA), by Alissa M. Dolan, Maeve P. Carey, and Christopher M. Davis.) The CRA, enacted in 1996, was intended to assert congressional control over agency rulemaking by establishing a special set of expedited or “fast track” legislative procedures for this purpose, primarily in the Senate. In short, if both houses of Congress pass a joint resolution of disapproval under the CRA, the resolution would be sent to the President for signature. If the President signs the disapproval resolution, the rule would no longer have effect, would be treated as though it had never been in effect, and the issuing agency would be prohibited from issuing a rule that is “substantially the same” as the nullified rule. (For more information about the CRA, see CRS Report R43992, The Congressional Review Act: Frequently Asked Questions, by Maeve P. Carey, Alissa M. Dolan, and Christopher M. Davis.) Regulatory Moratoria and Postponements Although rulemaking procedures are required to amend or repeal rules that have already been finalized, Presidents have more authority over rules that have not yet been finalized. One approach previous Presidents have used to control rulemaking at the start of their administrations has been the imposition of a moratorium on regulations under development—i.e., those that have not yet been published as final rules in the Federal Register. Such moratoria have essentially put a halt on rulemaking activities within the department and instructed departments and agencies to postpone the effective dates of rules that were issued at the end of the previous President’s term. Importantly, however, such moratoria do not generally apply to rules that are required under statute or by a judicial decision. Ronald Reagan Administration On January 29, 1981, shortly after taking office, President Ronald Reagan issued a memorandum to the heads of the Cabinet departments and the EPA Administrator directing them to take certain actions that would give the new administration time to implement a “new regulatory oversight process,” particularly for “last-minute decisions” made by the previous administration. Specifically, the memorandum said that agencies must, to the extent permitted by law, (1) publish a notice in the Federal Register postponing for 60 days the effective date of all final rules that were scheduled to take effect during the next 60 days, and (2) refrain from promulgating any new final rules. Executive Order 12291, issued a few weeks later, contained another moratorium on rulemaking that supplemented the January 29 memorandum. William Clinton Administration On January 22, 1993, Leon E. Panetta, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the incoming William Clinton Administration, sent a memorandum to the heads and acting heads of Cabinet departments and independent agencies requesting them to (1) not send proposed or final rules to the Office of the Federal Register for publication until they had been approved by an agency head appointed by President Clinton and confirmed by the Senate, and (2) withdraw from the Office of the Federal Register all regulations that had not been published in the Federal Register and that could be withdrawn under existing procedures. George W. Bush Administration On January 20, 2001, Andrew H. Card, Jr., assistant to President George W. Bush and White House Chief of Staff, sent a memorandum to the heads and acting heads of all executive departments and agencies generally directing them to (1) not send proposed or final rules to the Office of the Federal Register, (2) withdraw from the Office rules that had not yet been published in the Federal Register, and (3) postpone for 60 days the effective dates of rules that had been published but had not yet taken effect. Barack Obama Administration On January 20, 2009, Rahm Emanuel, Assistant to President Barack Obama and Chief of Staff, sent a memorandum to the heads of executive departments and agencies requesting that they generally (1) not send proposed or final rules to the Office of the Federal Register, (2) withdraw from the Office rules that had not yet been published in the Federal Register, and (3) “consider” postponing for 60 days the effective dates of rules that had been published in the Federal Register but had not yet taken effect. For additional information on these moratoria and the practice of “midnight rulemaking,” under which Presidents often increase rulemaking activity in the final months of their administration, see CRS Report R42612, Midnight Rulemaking: Background and Options for Congress, by Maeve P. Carey.

Nov 21, 2016

Haiti: Cholera, the United Nations, and Hurricane Matthew

Nov 17, 2016

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) Transitional Reinsurance Program

Section 1341 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA; P.L. 111-148, as amended) establishes a transitional reinsurance program that is designed to provide payment to non-grandfathered, non-group market health plans (also known as individual market health plans) that enroll high-risk enrollees for 2014 through 2016. Under the program, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) collects reinsurance contributions from health insurers and from third-party administrators on behalf of group health plans. The Secretary then uses those contributions to make reinsurance payments to health insurers who enroll high-cost enrollees (statutes required the HHS Secretary to determine how high-risk enrollees are identified, and the Secretary in turn defined high-risk enrollees as high-cost enrollees) in their non-group market plans both inside and outside of the exchanges (also known as the marketplaces). That is, contributions are distributive in which they are collected from most non-group and group health insurers, but payments are made only to eligible non-group market health plans. Reinsurance is an extension of insurance and further acts as a risk transfer and risk spreading mechanism. The availability of reinsurance allows insurers to reduce their risk exposure and can affect the availability and affordability of health insurance coverage. That is, the availability of reinsurance may be one of many factors an insurer considers in assessing potential exposure to loss in a certain market. This may impact whether or not to enter a market, what types of products to offer, and what premiums to set. To mitigate the financial risk and uncertainty insurers may face in the early years of ACA implementation as a result of the ACA’s private health insurance market reforms, the ACA establishes three risk-mitigation programs (the transitional reinsurance program, the permanent risk adjustment program, and the temporary risk corridors program). Prior to ACA implementation, little information was available regarding health care usage and demand for the previously uninsured, as well as any pent-up demand due to the lack of health insurance coverage. Accordingly, to limit their risk exposure in offering plans on the non-group market, insurers would likely raise premiums to the extent possible to protect themselves against the potentially high cost associated with delayed care. However, some of the new ACA market reforms limit the degree to which insurers may vary premiums. The transitional reinsurance program is designed to mitigate the financial risk associated with individuals who had delayed needed health care while they were uninsured. Under the program, the HHS Secretary collects reinsurance contributions from most non-group and group health plans and then uses those contributions to make reinsurance payments only to non-group market health plans with high-cost enrollees. The programs cover a portion of the claims costs for these enrollees based on payment parameters set by the HHS Secretary. This report provides an overview of one of the three risk-mitigation programs, the transitional reinsurance program. The program’s aim is to offset the expenditures associated with high-cost individuals. The first section of the report provides background information on reinsurance and the ACA risk-mitigation programs. The second section describes the components of the transitional reinsurance program, as well as the amounts currently collected and remitted through the program. The third section discusses questions, including those raised by a recent Government Accountability Office report, regarding the scope of HHS’s authority to administer the transitional reinsurance program. The last section briefly summarizes relevant legislation regarding the transitional reinsurance program. Finally, the report includes a table in the Appendix that summarizes key aspects of the transitional reinsurance program.

Nov 16, 2016

Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR): Background and Selected Issues

The Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR) was established at the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1978 to address congressional concerns about an “undue concentration” of federal research and development (R&D) funding in certain states. The program is designed to help institutions in eligible states build infrastructure, research capabilities, and training and human resource capacities to enable them to compete more successfully for open federal R&D funding awards. Eligibility for NSF EPSCOR funding is limited to states (including some territories and the District of Columbia) that received 0.75% or less of total NSF research and related activities (RRA) funds over the most recent three-year period. EPSCoR awards are made through merit-based proposal reviews. EPSCoR funding and program reach have increased over the years. Congress first appropriated funding for the NSF EPSCoR program in FY1979 at a level of around $1 million. EPSCoR and EPSCoR-like programs are now active at five agencies and have a collective annual program budget of over $500 million. In addition to NSF, agencies with active programs include the Department of Energy (DOE), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH, whose program is called the Institutional Development Award [IDeA] program). In FY2015, program budgets were $273 million at NIH, $166 million at NSF, $34 million at USDA, $18 million at NASA, and $10 million at DOE. While these programs vary in some operations and policies, their common focus is to help eligible states build R&D capacity and improve their ability to compete for federal R&D funding. The EPSCoR Interagency Coordinating Committee (EICC), chaired by NSF, was formed in 1992 to help integrate the activities of EPSCOR and EPSCOR-like programs across the agencies and to create a unified effort. While EPSCoR was originally proposed as a short-term effort for certain states, it has grown in size and scope, generating debate among stakeholders about program goals and policies. As the programs have evolved, a number of assessments have been conducted to evaluate EPSCoR’s challenges and success, and to inform future directions. These assessments, and research literature, have repeatedly raised some broad issues. For instance, an overarching concern is finding an appropriate balance between supporting research development equitably across states while also supporting high-quality science through the merit review process. Common topics of discussion among stakeholders include the expansion and focus of EPSCoR goals, program coordination among federal agencies, criteria for state eligibility and graduation from the program, and metrics for assessing EPSCoR’s success. Congress has a long-standing interest in the EPSCoR program. Some Members of Congress have questioned the fairness of the program, which is unique at NSF in its state-targeted approach. Additionally, some have expressed concern that the EPSCoR approach does not fit within the broader merit-based grant-making process at NSF. Others Members of Congress have supported the program, stating that it has been successful in contributing to research of national interest, helping to balance federal R&D funding among states, and providing broader research education opportunities to create a skilled workforce. In the 114th Congress, legislation and amendments have been introduced both in support of the program (e.g., promoting long-term awards and naming it an established—rather than experimental—program) and in opposition (e.g., prohibiting the use of any funding for EPSCoR programs).

Nov 15, 2016

China and the Hong Kong High Court Issue Decisions on Legislative Council Controversy (Update)

On November 7, 2016, China’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) issued a decision concerning the oaths that Hong Kong officials, including legislators, must take before assuming office. Eight days later, Hong Kong’s High Court determined that two “pro-democracy” members-elect of Hong Kong’s Legislative Council (Legco), Sixtus Baggio Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching, had “declined” to take the required oath on October 12, 2016, and are therefore “disqualified from assuming the office of a member of the Legco.” The NPCSC and High Court decisions may lead to efforts to invalidate the oaths taken by 13 other Legco members. With China having guaranteed Hong Kong a “high degree of autonomy” for 50 years after Hong Kong’s return to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, the decisions raise questions about the autonomy of Hong Kong’s judicial system and the future of democracy in Hong Kong. This growing controversy may be of interest to Congress as the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 USC 66, P.L. 102-383) states that it is U.S. policy to support democratization in Hong Kong and the preservation of its “high degree of autonomy.” Specifics of the NPCSC’s Decision The NPCSC’s decision, purportedly interpreting Article 104 of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China (Basic Law), mandates that all Hong Kong public officials who are required to take an oath of office must “accurately, completely and solemnly read out the oath prescribed by law.” Failure to do so, the NPCSC states, “shall be treated as declining to take the oath.” According to the decision, “no arrangement shall be made for retaking the oath.” The decision concludes with the statement, “An oath taker who makes a false oath, or, who, after taking the oath, engages in conduct in breach of the oath, shall bear legal responsibility in accordance with the law.” The High Court Decision The High Court’s ruling did not rely on the NPCSC’s decision, focusing instead on the events of October 12, 2016, and the requirements of Hong Kong’s Oaths and Declarations Ordinance (ODO). Justice Thomas Au Hing-cheung ruled that Leung and Yau, by mispronouncing or modifying words in the prescribed text and other actions, had “declined” to take the oaths “as requested” and, under the ODO, must be disqualified from becoming Legco members. Legco’s Oath Controversy Following Legco elections of September 4, 2016, the 70 Legco members-elect attempted to take their oaths of office on October 12, 2016, but five of those oaths were ruled invalid by the Legco President. The oaths given by Leung Chung-hang and Yau Wai-ching were particularly controversial because each member-elect held up a banner saying, “Hong Kong is not China,” and substituted what some consider vulgar or profane language for certain words in the prescribed oath (including “China”). Legco President Leung initially ruled that all five Legco members-elect would be allowed to retake their oaths during the next Legco session scheduled for October 19, 2016. Two members-elect (Edward Yiu Chung-yin and Wong Ting-kwong) were able to retake their oaths successfully, but Legco’s “pro-establishment” members staged a walkout—thereby denying the necessary quorum—before the other three (Lau Siu-lai, Leung Chung-hang, and Yau Wai-ching) could retake their oaths. On October 18, Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying and Justice Secretary Rimsky Yuen Kwok-keung filed a suit in Hong Kong’s High Court to prohibit Leung and Yau from retaking their oaths. After the High Court accepted the case, President Leung reversed his decision to allow Leung and Yau to retake their oaths, indicating that he would wait until the High Court has issued its ruling. Leung and Yau, with the support of some of Legco’s “pro-democracy” members, have attempted to enter the Legco chambers in an effort to retake their oaths, resulting in the disruption of Legco proceedings. Lau Siu-lai was able to retake her oath on November 2, 2016. Implications of the NPCSC and High Court Decisions The timing and content of the NPCSC’s decision complicated an already complex legal controversy in Hong Kong. By issuing its decision prior to the High Court’s releasing its judgement, the NPCSC appeared to be trying to influence the ruling of Hong Kong’s judicial system. In addition, some legal analysts assert that the decision went beyond interpreting the Basic Law, and effectively amended the Basic Law and Hong Kong’s ODO. The High Court ruling has set new standards for deeming oaths invalid, and created a precedent for prohibiting the retaking of oaths. A Hong Kong taxi association has filed a case with the High Court to invalidate the oaths of eight more “pro-democracy” Legco members. In addition, the NPCSC decision may increase local support for Hong Kong’s political parties that advocate greater autonomy, self-determination, and independence from China. Hong Kong’s Legco controversy will most likely continue, as Leung and Yau contemplate appealing the High Court’s judgement to the Court of Final Appeal, and others consider challenging the oaths taken by “pro-establishment” Legco members and Chief Executive Leung. Reactions to the NPCSC Decision and High Court Ruling Reactions in Hong Kong generally fell along expected political divisions in the city, with Chief Executive Leung and the “pro-establishment” Legco members welcoming the NPCSC decision and the High Court ruling, and the “pro-democracy” Legco members opposing both decisions. An estimated 8,000-13,000 people marched to China’s Liaison Office in Hong Kong on the evening of the NPCSC decision. Hong Kong police used batons and tear gas to disperse the protesters. On November 8, 2016, over 3,000 Hong Kong lawyers staged a silent march to Hong Kong’s Court of Final Appeal in opposition to the NPCSC’s decision. An estimated 28,500 people rallied on November 13, 2016, in support of the NPCSC decision. In response to the NPCSC’s decision, a spokesperson for the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong posted a statement on Twitter saying, “It is unfortunate that this particular situation was not resolved within Hong Kong’s Legislative Council or within its well-respected courts.”

Nov 15, 2016

Introduction to U.S. Economy: Personal Income

Nov 14, 2016

Antiquities Act: Scope of Authority for Modification of National Monuments

The Antiquities Act of 1906 authorizes the President to declare, by proclamation, that objects of historic or scientific interest on federal lands are designated as national monuments. Over the course of more than a century, Presidents have cited the Antiquities Act as authority for protecting well over 100 land and marine areas, totaling hundreds of millions of acres, as national monuments. National monuments generally are reserved and protected from certain uses such as mineral leasing or mining, although management terms may vary by monument. Partly because of such restrictions, some presidential proclamations of national monuments—and proposals for such proclamations—have led to controversy. Once a President has proclaimed a national monument on federal land, later Presidents or Congresses may want to abolish, diminish, or otherwise change the monument. Congress has clear authority to do so, largely under the Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall have Power to ... make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” Congress has used its authority to abolish or to remove acreage from national monuments on several occasions. It appears that presidential authority may be more constrained. No President has ever abolished or revoked a national monument proclamation, so the existence or scope of any such authority has not been tested in courts. However, some legal analyses since at least the 1930s have concluded that the Antiquities Act, by its terms, does not authorize the President to repeal proclamations, and that the President also lacks implied authority to do so. Under this view, once a President has applied the Antiquities Act to protect objects of historic or scientific interest, only Congress can undo that protection. On the other hand, Presidents have deleted acres from national monuments, proclaiming that the deleted acres do not meet the Antiquities Act’s standard that the protected area be the “smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected.” Presidents also can modify the management of national monuments, although the outer boundaries of this authority, too, appear to be untested. Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), executive branch officials other than the President are barred from modifying or revoking any withdrawal creating national monuments under the Antiquities Act.

Nov 14, 2016

Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education: FY2017 Appropriations

This report provides an overview of actions taken by Congress and the President to provide FY2017 appropriations for accounts funded by the Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies (LHHS) appropriations bill. This bill provides funding for all accounts funded through the annual appropriations process at the Departments of Labor (DOL) and Education (ED). It provides annual appropriations for most agencies within the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), with certain exceptions (e.g., the Food and Drug Administration is funded via the Agriculture bill). The LHHS bill also provides funds for more than a dozen related agencies, including the Social Security Administration (SSA). As of the date of this report, FY2017 annual appropriations for LHHS have not been enacted into law. The House and Senate appropriations committees have reported their respective versions of the LHHS bill to their parent chambers, but neither of these bills has received floor consideration. FY2017 Continuing Resolution: Temporary funding for LHHS has been provided by a continuing resolution (CR) that was enacted on September 29, 2016 (H.R. 5325, Division C; P.L. 114-223). With limited exceptions, the CR generally funds discretionary LHHS programs through December 9, 2016, at FY2016 levels minus a reduction of about one-half of one percent (-0.496%). FY2017 House LHHS Action: The House Appropriations Committee’s version of the FY2017 LHHS appropriations bill was ordered reported by the full committee on July 14, 2016, by a vote of 31-19, and reported to the House on July 22, 2016 (H.R. 5926). This bill would provide $170.2 billion in discretionary LHHS funds, the same amount as FY2016. This amount is 1.3% less than the FY2017 President’s request. In addition, the House committee bill would provide an estimated $760.6 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $930.9 billion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding is as follows: DOL: $11.8 billion, 2.8% less than FY2016. HHS: $77.2 billion, 2.3% more than FY2016. ED: $67.0 billion, 1.6% less than FY2016. Related Agencies: $14.2 billion, 2.5% less than FY2016. FY2017 Senate LHHS Action: The Senate Appropriations Committee reported its version of the FY2017 LHHS appropriations bill on June 9, 2016 (S. 3040) by a vote of 29-1. This bill would provide $171.6 billion in discretionary LHHS funds. This is 0.8% more than FY2016, and 0.5% less than the FY2017 President’s request. In addition, the Senate committee bill would provide an estimated $760.6 billion in mandatory funding, for a combined total of $932.2 billion for LHHS as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding is as follows: DOL: $12.0 billion, 1.1% less than FY2016. HHS: $76.8 billion, 1.9% more than FY2016. ED: $67.8 billion, 0.3% less than FY2016. Related Agencies: $14.9 billion, 1.8% more than FY2016. FY2017 President’s Budget Request: On February 9, 2016, the Obama Administration released the FY2017 President’s budget. The President requested $172.5 billion in discretionary funding for accounts funded by the LHHS bill, which is an increase of 1.3% from FY2016 levels. In addition, the President requested $760.6 billion in annually appropriated mandatory funding, for a total of $933.1 billion for the LHHS bill as a whole. The distribution of discretionary funding is as follows: DOL: $12.8 billion, 5.2% more than FY2016. HHS: $74.7 billion, 0.9% less than FY2016. ED: $69.4 billion, 2.0% more than FY2016. Related Agencies: $15.6 billion, 6.4% more than FY2016.

Nov 10, 2016

Gun Control: FY2017 Appropriations for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and Other Initiatives

The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is the lead federal agency charged with administering and enforcing federal laws related to firearms and explosives commerce. ATF is also responsible for investigating arson cases with a federal nexus, and criminal cases involving the diversion of alcohol and tobacco from legal channels of commerce. As an agency within the Department of Justice (DOJ), ATF is funded through an annual appropriation in the Departments of Commerce and Justice, Science, and Related Agencies (CJS) Appropriations Act. The Administration’s FY2017 budget request included $1.306 billion for ATF. This amount was $66.1 million above the FY2016 appropriation. This proposed increase included $11.8 million in technical and base adjustments to anticipate inflation and other variable costs and $54.3 million in budget enhancements. As part of President Barack Obama’s gun safety initiative, these budget enhancements include $35.6 million for ATF to hire 80 additional special agents and 120 industry operations investigators; $4 million (including 8 positions) to upgrade the National Integrated Ballistics Information Network (NIBIN) hardware and software; $5.7 million and 22 positions to process firearms and explosives licenses and National Firearms Act (NFA) applications, and expand the use of firearms trace data by ATF and other federal and state law enforcement agencies; and $9 million to integrate ATF’s case management systems into a single system. The FY2017 budget request called for the repeal of two limitations that prevent ATF from (1) requiring federal firearms licensees (FFLs) to inventory their gun stocks prior to inspection and (2) changing an administrative definition of “curios and relics.” This report includes an appendix that provides a legislative history for several ATF funding limitations related to gun control. It also includes discussion of year-to-year data trends that could affect ATF workloads, such as the number and type of FFLs, growth in the civilian gun stock, and firearms-related violent crime. In addition, the President’s gun safety initiative includes $35 million for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to address an increase in firearms background checks through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS); $55 million for grants to state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities under the National Criminal History Improvement Program (NCHIP) and NICS Amendments Record Improvement Program (NARIP, P.L. 110-180); and $10 million for gun violence research. NICS was established in November 1998 by the FBI to facilitate an electronic background check process to determine firearms eligibility of unlicensed, private persons seeking to acquire firearms from FFLs, or firearms permits and licenses from state authorities. Through both NCHIP and NARIP, the DOJ Office of Justice Programs provides grants to states, tribes, and territories to improve NICS access to records on persons prohibited from acquiring firearms under federal or state law. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported a bill (S. 2837) that would have provided ATF with $1.259 billion for FY2017. On June 7, 2016, The House Committee on Appropriations reported a bill (H.R. 5393) that would have provided ATF with $1.258 billion for FY2017. Report language indicates that both bills would have fully supported the FBI and NICS. The Senate bill would have provided $75 million for NCHIP and NARIP grants; the House bill would have provided $73 million. Neither Committee included funding for gun violence research in the reported Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services (HHS), and Education Appropriations bills (S. 3040 and H.R. 5926). Both Committees included limitations in these bills that would continue to prohibit the use of appropriated funding to advocate or promote gun control. On September 29, 2016, President Obama signed into law a Continuing Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 114-203), which funds most of the federal government through December 9, 2016 at the same levels as appropriated for FY2016. This continuing resolution also extends the long-standing gun control limitations discussed above through that date.

Nov 9, 2016

Intelligence Community Programs, Management, and Enduring Issues

Congress’s and the American public’s ability to oversee and understand how intelligence dollars are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process. Yet, total spending on the Intelligence Community (IC) programs discussed in this report equates to approximately $70 billion dollars—roughly 10% of national defense spending. This report is designed to shed light on the IC budget—in terms of its programs, management, and enduring issues—using unclassified materials available in the public domain. This report focuses those IC programs, grouped, for the most part, under two labels: (1) the National Intelligence Program (NIP), and (2) the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Nevertheless, the combined NIP and MIP budgets do not encompass the total of U.S. intelligence-related spending. Intelligence-related programs that are not part of the IC include, for example, the large Office of Intelligence within the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) division. The ICE Office of Intelligence is not included in the IC because, theoretically, ICE activities primarily support the DHS mission to protect the homeland. This report explains the management structure for the NIP and MIP to include their two separate budget processes and the roles of the Director of National Intelligence and the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence). The concluding section of this report considers the ability of the U.S. government to make the best use of its intelligence-related resources when: (1) total intelligence spending is impossible to calculate; (2) its management and oversight is completely decentralized; and (3) IC funding alone is largely divided into two categories (NIP and MIP)–managed within the executive branch separately, justified to Congress separately, and overseen by separate congressional committees. The Appendices are designed, in a number of cases, to provide quick reference tables summarizing the more detailed information available in the body of the report. Appendix A provides a summary of intelligence disciplines. Appendix B provides very brief explanations of NIP and MIP subordinate programs. Appendix C examines two unique and relatively obscure NIP programs, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Retirement and Disability System and the IC’s Community Management Account. Appendix D briefly describes a program called the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP). Appendix E provides a summary table of management hats. (Senior executives are often referred to as dual-hatted, triple-hatted, and so on, when they are charged with a number of different roles and responsibilities and associated titles.) Appendix F provides a summary table comparing the IPPBE and PPBE budget systems. Appendix G provides a figure illustrating the ways in which the IPPBE and PPBE are integrated. Appendix H provides a list of IC-related acronyms, many of which are commonly used in this report. For more on IC spending trends, see CRS Report R44381, Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues, by Anne Daugherty Miles.

Nov 8, 2016

The Terrorist Screening Database and Preventing Terrorist Travel

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government developed a unified regimen to identify and list known or suspected terrorists. The regimen has received repeated congressional attention, and this report briefly discusses for congressional policymakers how the U.S. government fashions and uses the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) to achieve such an end. It also discusses how the federal government engages in two travel-related screening processes—visa screening and air passenger screening. Both processes involve subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database. The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) The TSDB lies at the heart of federal efforts to identify and share information among U.S. law enforcement about identified people who may pose terrorism-related threats to the United States. It is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency organization created by presidential directive in 2003 and administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The TSDB includes biographic identifiers for those known either to have or be suspected of having ties to terrorism. In some instances it also includes biometric information on such people. It stores hundreds of thousands of unique identities. Portions of the TSDB are exported to data systems in federal agencies that perform screening activities such as background checks, reviewing the records of passport and visa applicants, official encounters with travelers at U.S. border crossings, and air passenger screening. Foreign Nationals Traveling to the United States Two broad classes of foreign nationals are issued visas under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): immigrants and nonimmigrants. Many visitors, however, enter the United States without visas through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Under the VWP, foreign nationals from 38 countries with agreements with the United States—including most countries in the European Union—do not need visas to enter the United States for short-term business or tourism and are instead vetted using biographic information to authenticate and screen individuals. Screening Aliens Department of State (DOS) consular officers check the background of all visa applicants in “lookout” databases that draw on TSDB information and other counterterrorism information such as the material housed in the National Counterterrorism Center’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. DOS specifically uses the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which surpassed 42.5 million records in 2012. Aliens entering through the VWP have been vetted through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), which checks them against the TSDB. In addition, before an international flight bound for the United States departs from a foreign airport, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers screen the passenger manifest. CBP inspectors also perform background checks and admissibility reviews at the ports of entry that draw on information from the TSDB. Screening at the Transportation Security Administration The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. A cornerstone of TSA’s risk-based initiatives is the PreCheck program. PreCheck is TSA’s latest version of a trusted traveler program that has been modeled after CBP programs. Under the PreCheck regimen, participants are vetted through a background check process (including screening against terrorist watchlist information). At selected airports, they are processed through expedited screening lanes, where they can keep shoes on and keep liquids and laptops inside carry-on bags. All passengers flying to or from U.S. airports are vetted using the TSA’s Secure Flight program. Secure Flight involves information from the TSDB housed in the No Fly List, Selectee List, and Expanded Selectee List to vet passenger name records. The No Fly List includes identities of individuals who may present a threat to civil aviation and national security. Listed individuals are not allowed to board a commercial aircraft flying into, out of, over, or within U.S. airspace; this also includes point-to-point international flights operated by U.S. carriers. The Selectee List includes individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being allowed to board a commercial aircraft. The Expanded Selectee List was created as an extra security measure in response to a failed attempt to trigger an explosive by a foreign terrorist onboard a U.S.-bound flight on December 25, 2009. It screens against all TSDB records that include a person’s first and last name and date of birth that are not already on the No Fly or Selectee lists.

Nov 7, 2016

Tax Provisions Expiring in 2016 (“Tax Extenders”)

In the past, Congress has regularly acted to extend expired or expiring temporary tax provisions. Collectively, these temporary tax provisions are often referred to as “tax extenders.” Most recently, in December 2015, Congress addressed tax extenders in the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (PATH Act), enacted as Division Q of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113). This legislation extended all of the 52 provisions that had expired at the end of 2014. Unlike past tax extenders legislation, however, a number of provisions that had expired at the end of 2014 were made permanent. Several others were extended through 2019. Many provisions were temporarily extended for two years, through 2016. Thirty-four temporary tax provisions are scheduled to expire at the end of 2016. Most of these provisions were extended for two years as part of the PATH Act. Options related to extenders in the 114th Congress include (1) extending all or some of the provisions set to expire in 2016 before the expiration date; or (2) allow these provisions to expire at the end of 2016 as scheduled. If temporary tax provisions are allowed to expire at the end of 2016, retroactive extensions may be considered in the first session of the 115th Congress. In the past, retroactive extensions have been common for expired temporary tax provisions. There are several reasons why Congress may choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary basis. Enacting provisions on a temporary basis provides legislators with an opportunity to evaluate the effectiveness of tax policies prior to expiration or extension. Temporary tax provisions may also be used to provide economic stimulus or disaster relief. Congress may also choose to enact tax provisions on a temporary rather than permanent basis due to budgetary considerations, as the foregone revenue from a temporary provision will generally be less than if it were permanent. The provisions set to expire at the end of 2016 are diverse in purpose. There are education- and housing-related provisions for individuals. For businesses, there are several provisions related to the territories, Indian tribes, and economic development, in addition to provisions for specific industries. There are also a number of energy-related tax provisions that are scheduled to expire at the end of 2016. As lawmakers consider whether to extend expiring tax provisions beyond 2016, cost is one factor. Since many provisions were made permanent in the PATH Act, a temporary extenders package for provisions expiring in 2016 would cost less than past extender packages. There are fewer provisions to extend, and many provisions with the largest revenue cost were made permanent in the PATH Act.

Nov 4, 2016

The National Science Foundation: FY2017 Appropriations Status and Funding History

The National Science Foundation (NSF) supports both basic research and education in the non-medical sciences and engineering. NSF is a major source of federal support for U.S. university research, especially in certain fields such as mathematics and computer science. It is also responsible for significant shares of the federal science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education program portfolio and federal STEM student aid and support. Overall, the Obama Administration seeks $7.964 billion for the NSF in FY2017, a $501 million (6.7%) increase over the FY2016 estimate of $7.463 billion. This request includes $7.564 billion in discretionary budget authority and $400 million in new one-time mandatory budget authority. NSF has six major appropriations accounts: Research and Related Activities (RRA), Education and Human Resources (EHR), Major Research Equipment and Facilities Construction (MREFC), Agency Operations and Award Management (AOAM), National Science Board (NSB), and Office of Inspector General (OIG). The FY2017 request would increase total budget authority in three accounts relative to the FY2016 estimate: RRA by $392 million (6.5%), EHR by $73 million (8.3%), and AOAM by $43 million (13%). The request would provide NSB and OIG with about the same amount as in FY2016 and decrease MREFC account funding by $7 million (3.6%). The new mandatory budget funding request is split between two accounts—RRA ($346 million) and EHR ($54 million). Mandatory funding is not usually part of NSF’s budget request for major accounts. As reported by the Senate, S. 2837 would provide a total of $7.510 billion to NSF for FY2017. This amount is $46 million (0.6%) above the FY2016 estimated funding level, $54 million (0.7%) below the FY2017 discretionary funding request, and $454 million (5.7%) below the request including new mandatory funding. The bill would keep funding for the major accounts nearly the same as the FY2016 estimate, except for MREFC, which would increase by $46 million (23%). As reported by the House, H.R. 5393 would provide a total of $7.406 billion to NSF for FY2017. This amount is $57 million (0.8%) below the FY2016 estimated funding level, $158 million (2.1%) below the President’s FY2017 discretionary funding request, and $558 million (7.5%) below the request including new mandatory funding. The bill would keep funding for the EHR, NSB, and OIG accounts nearly the same as in the FY2016 estimate, increase the RRA and AOAM accounts by $46 million (0.8%) and $10 million (3%), respectively, and decrease the MREFC account by $113 million (57%). The Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2017 (P.L. 114-223), provides funding for the NSF through December 9, 2016, at the FY2016 funding rate subject to a 0.496% across-the-board decrease. Overall growth in the NSF budget slowed after FY2003. Median annual growth in NSF funding was 9% between FY1953 and FY2003 and 3% between FY2004 and FY2016. Most of NSF’s funding supports scientific and technological research. Further, the portion of NSF spending that goes to research increased over the past decade. Within the NSF total, RRA has accounted for the lion’s share of growth in obligations since FY2003. Agency appropriations levels were last authorized in FY2010 and expired in FY2013; various reauthorization measures have been introduced in the 114th Congress that include proposed funding levels for FY2017.

Nov 4, 2016

Recent State Election Law Challenges: In Brief

During the final months and weeks leading up to the November 8, 2016, presidential election, courts across the country have ruled in numerous challenges to state election laws. For example, there have been recent court rulings affecting the laws regulating early voting, voter photo identification (ID) requirements, registration procedures, straight-party voting, and voter rolls. Accordingly, many such laws have been recently invalidated, enjoined, or altered. Others continue to be subject to litigation. Recent rulings in Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, and Texas are illustrative examples. In Michigan, a court preliminarily enjoined a 2016 law that ended the ability of voters to vote for a political party’s entire slate of candidates with a single notation—straight-party voting—concluding that it was likely that the challengers would succeed on the merits of their claims under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In North Carolina, a court invalidated several recent changes to that state’s election laws, including a voter photo ID law, holding that the laws were enacted with a racially discriminatory intent in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the VRA. In Ohio, a court held that a law setting forth the process for removing the names of inactive voters from the voter rolls violates the National Voter Registration Act, and in another case, upheld a law that eliminated a period of early voting and same-day registration, known as “Golden Week,” against a challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and Section 2 of the VRA. Finally, in contrast to the North Carolina ruling, a court declined to invalidate a Texas voter photo ID law, but required it to be administered on November 8, 2016, with modifications, holding that the law has a discriminatory effect on minority voting rights in violation of Section 2 of the VRA. These decisions are notable because of their impact on state election laws shortly before a presidential election and, in some cases, because they invalidated laws that were recently enacted. Furthermore, the rulings in North Carolina and Texas have drawn attention because the challenged state laws were held, in part, to violate Section 2 of the VRA, which in the past has generally been applied in the context of challenges to redistricting maps. Accordingly, the case law in this area is just beginning to develop. Likewise, questions of whether specific voter photo ID laws comply with the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and the VRA continue to be answered. Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Indiana voter photo ID law in 2008 against a facial challenge, some courts have found other state laws distinguishable or have evaluated such laws under Section 2 of the VRA. It is possible that the Supreme Court may ultimately decide to revisit this issue.

Nov 2, 2016

Policy Issues Involving Food Loss and Waste

Nov 2, 2016

Funding and Financing Highways and Public Transportation

For many years, federal surface transportation programs were funded almost entirely from taxes on motor fuels deposited in the Highway Trust Fund (HTF). Although there has been some modification to the tax system, the tax rates, which are fixed in terms of cents per gallon, have not been increased at the federal level since 1993. Prior to the recession that began in 2007, annual increases in driving, with a concomitant increase in fuel use, were sufficient in most years to keep revenue rising steadily. This is no longer the case. Although vehicle miles traveled have recently surpassed prerecession levels, future increases in fuel economy standards are expected to reduce motor fuel consumption and therefore fuel tax revenue in the years ahead. Congress has yet to address the surface transportation program’s fundamental revenue issues, and has given limited legislative consideration to raising fuel taxes in recent years. Instead, since 2008 Congress has financed the federal surface transportation program by supplementing fuel tax revenues with transfers from the U.S. Treasury general fund. The most recent reauthorization act, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; P.L. 114-94), was enacted on December 4, 2015, and authorized spending on federal highway and public transportation programs through September 30, 2020. The act provided $70 billion in general fund transfers to the HTF to support the programs over the five-year life of the act. This use of general fund transfers to supplement the HTF will have been the de facto funding policy for 12 years when the FAST Act expires at the end of FY2020. The FAST Act did not address funding of surface transportation programs over the longer term. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projections indicate that the HTF revenue shortfalls relative to spending will reemerge following expiration of the FAST Act. The trust fund financing system (which supports both federal highway and public transportation programs) faces a number of challenges. As Congress examines possible options for financing surface transportation infrastructure, it may consider several key points: Raising motor fuel taxes could provide the HTF with sufficient revenue to fully fund the program in the near term, but may not be a viable long-term solution due to expected declines in fuel consumption. Replacing the fuels tax with a mileage-based road user charge or vehicle miles traveled (VMT) charge would need to overcome a variety of financial, administrative, and privacy barriers, but could be a solution in the longer term. Treasury general fund transfers could continue to be used to make up for the HTF’s projected shortfalls but could require budget offsets of an equal amount. The political difficulty of adequately funding the HTF could lead Congress to consider altering the trust fund system or eliminating it altogether. This might involve a reallocation of responsibilities and obligations among federal, state, and local governments. Private investment and federal loans can meet some surface transportation needs, but many projects are not well suited to alternative financing. Tolling may be an effective way to finance specific roads, bridges, or tunnels that are likely to have heavy use and are located such that the tolls are difficult to evade, but tolls are unlikely to provide broad financial support for surface transportation programs.

Nov 1, 2016

Security Cooperation: Comparison of Proposed Provisions for the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)

During the lame duck session, the 114th Congress is expected to consider various provisions in the annual defense authorization bill that address U.S. security sector cooperation. If enacted, the FY2017 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) could significantly alter the way in which the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) engages and partners with foreign security forces. Policy Debate in Context Successive U.S. Administrations have emphasized the importance of strengthening foreign military partnerships to achieve shared security goals. Over time, the legal authorities underpinning some of these efforts have moved beyond the “traditional” suite of foreign assistance programs authorized in Title 22 (Foreign Relations) of the U.S. Code, which are overseen by the U.S. Department of State and often implemented by DOD. In support of such a shift, Congress has incrementally provided DOD with some 80 or more authorities, apart from those in Title 22, to interact with foreign security forces and defense ministries and respond to emerging threats. These authorities, enacted through NDAAs and amendments to Title 10 (Armed Services) of the U.S. Code, have enabled DOD to pursue a wider range of direct engagements with foreign partners—collectively described by DOD as “security cooperation.” These authorities, however, vary in scope, application, duration, and reporting requirements. Congress has also imposed limits based on country- or region-specific conditions and concerns. Proposals in the FY2017 NDAA In April 2016, DOD submitted 10 proposals to Congress, seeking to address what it describes as an unwieldy “patchwork” of security cooperation authorities. Responding to DOD’s proposals, both the House and Senate versions of the FY2017 NDAA (H.R. 4909 and S. 2943, respectively) contain provisions intended to bring greater coherence to DOD’s security cooperation enterprise. Central to these proposals is a new chapter in Title 10 on “Security Cooperation.” As part of the proposed changes, nearly 60 existing provisions in Title 10 or public law would be affected or modified. Proposals would also variously alter the statutorily required role of the State Department in overseeing and approving security cooperation programs. Some proposals would substantively change the scope of DOD’s existing authorities by expanding the purposes for which security cooperation is authorized; expanding authorized activities; broadening the geographical scope of security cooperation; increasing the types of foreign personnel that can benefit from DOD engagement; and changing funding limits and related provisions. S. 2943 contains some of the most far-reaching changes, particularly in its replacement of 10 U.S.C. 2282 (“Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Security Forces”) with a broader authority. S. 2943 would additionally offer new provisions, including several that aim to enable DOD to better manage security cooperation through a new funding mechanism called the “Security Cooperation Enhancement Fund”; improved workforce training through a “Security Cooperation Workforce Development Program”; enhanced budgeting transparency and reporting requirements to Congress; and required assessment, monitoring, and evaluation. Outlook Some of the proposed provisions in the FY2017 NDAA have broad appeal, while others have emerged as flashpoints in a larger debate over DOD’s role in security sector assistance. The FY2017 NDAA also raises questions over whether security cooperation policy architecture is adequately structured to meet current and evolving requirements and whether the mechanisms of congressional oversight are adequately tailored to current levels of activity. The FY2017 NDAA went to conference on July 8, 2016. The conference report, while not yet public, is expected to be brought before both the House and Senate when the 114th Congress returns from recess in November 2016. Beyond the FY2017 NDAA, many analysts anticipate that security cooperation issues will continue to feature on the policymaking agenda in the next Administration and the 115th Congress. For further reading on broader security sector assistance debates, see CRS Report R44444, Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense; CRS Report R44602, DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues; and CRS Report R44313, What Is “Building Partner Capacity?” Issues for Congress.

Nov 1, 2016