CRS Reports

The Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions (ESRP)

The employer shared responsibility provisions (ESRP), which often are referred to as the employer mandate, generally incentivize large employers to offer adequate and affordable health insurance coverage to their full-time employees and full-time employees’ dependents. If an applicable large employer fails to offer health insurance or offers substandard coverage to its employees, the employer may be subject to a penalty (i.e., assessment payment). All common-law employers, including government entities (such as federal, state, local, or Indian tribal government entities), are responsible for annually determining whether they are considered an applicable large employer (ALE), which is generally an employer that has at least 50 full-time employees (including full-time equivalent employees, which are a representation of non-full-time employees as full-time employees). If an employer qualifies as an ALE in a given year, then it will be subject to the ESRP in the subsequent year, meaning it will have to offer adequate, affordable health insurance coverage to generally all of its full-time employees (and their dependents) or it will risk being subject to one of two penalties. Regardless of penalty type, a penalty will be triggered only if at least one full-time employee receives financial assistance through an exchange. These types of financial assistance generally are not available to employees who were offered affordable and adequate coverage by their employer. If an employer does not qualify as an ALE, then it will not be subject to the ESRP and will not face a penalty for failing to offer health insurance coverage to its full-time employees. Which potential ESRP penalty an ALE may be subject to is contingent upon whether an ALE offered appropriate health insurance to enough of its full-time employees (and their dependents). If an ALE offered appropriate health insurance to 95% or more of its full-time employees (and their dependents) and at least one employee received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy through a health insurance exchange, then the employer may be subject a penalty that is the lesser of (1) an amount based on the number of people who received financial assistance through an exchange or (2) an amount based on the number of the firm’s full-time employees. If an ALE did not offer appropriate health insurance coverage to its full-time employees (or offered appropriate coverage to less than 95% of its full-time employees and their dependents) and at least one employee received a premium tax credit or cost-sharing subsidy through a health insurance exchange, then the employer may be subject to a penalty based on the number of the firm’s full-time employees.

Jan 9, 2019

The 2019-2020 Iran Crisis and U.S. Military Deployments

Jan 9, 2019

Introduction to U.S. Economy: GDP and Economic Growth

Jan 8, 2019

U.S. Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing, and Other Illicit Financial Threats

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to Financial Services: The Federal Reserve

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to U.S. Economy: The Business Cycle and Growth

Jan 8, 2019

Introduction to Financial Services: Systemic Risk

Jan 8, 2019

Funding U.S.-Mexico Border Barrier Construction: Current Issues

Jan 3, 2019

Targeting Illicit Finance: The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s “Financial Institution Advisory Program”

Jan 2, 2019

The SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act (P.L.115-271): Medicare Provisions

On October 24, 2018, President Trump signed into law the Substance Use-Disorder Prevention That Promotes Opioid Recovery and Treatment for Patients and Communities Act (SUPPORT Act; P.L. 115-271). The conference report on the bill was approved by the House 393-8 on September 28, 2018, and it cleared the Senate 98-1 on October 3, 2018. The law was enacted in response to growing concerns among the U.S. public and lawmakers about increasing numbers of drug overdose deaths. Opioid overdose deaths, in particular, have increased significantly since 2002. In 2015, an estimated 33,091 Americans died of opioid-related overdoses, almost three times as many as in 2002, around the beginning of the opioid epidemic in the United States. In 2016, that number had increased to 42,249. In October 2017, President Trump declared the opioid epidemic a public health emergency. The SUPPORT Act is a sweeping measure designed to address widespread overprescribing and abuse of opioids in the United States. The act includes provisions to bolster law enforcement, public health, and health care financing and coverage, including under Medicare and Medicaid. It imposes tighter oversight of opioid production and distribution; requires additional reporting and safeguards to address fraud; alters programs related to the provision of support to children in the child welfare system because of their parent’s or caregiver’s opioid use; and limits coverage of prescription opioids. It also expands coverage of and access to opioid addiction treatment services. In addition, the act authorizes programs to expand consumer education on opioid use and train additional providers to treat individuals with opioid use disorders (OUDs). The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecast that the SUPPORT Act would increase the on-budget deficit by $1,001 million over 5 years (FY2019-2023) but reduce the on-budget deficit by $52 million over 10 years (FY2019-FY2028). The SUPPORT Act is one of several recent laws aimed at addressing the opioid epidemic. The 114th Congress enacted the Comprehensive Addiction and Recovery Act of 2016 (CARA; P.L. 114-198). CARA addressed substance use issues broadly, targeting the opioid crisis predominantly through public health and law enforcement strategies. The 21st Century Cures Act (Cures Act; P.L. 114-255), also enacted in 2016, authorized new funding for medical research, amended the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) drug approval process, and authorized additional funding to combat opioid addiction, among other provisions. The SUPPORT Act consists of eight titles. The Congressional Research Service is publishing a series of reports on this law, organized by title. This report provides a section-by-section description of Medicare provisions in Titles II and VI, as well as one Medicare budget offset in Title IV. Among significant Medicare changes, the law creates a Medicare bundled payment for an incident of medication-assisted treatment (MAT), which combines medications with counseling and behavioral therapies to provide a holistic approach to treating OUD and makes federally registered opioid treatment programs (OTPs) approved Medicare providers. It also requires private insurers that offer Medicare Part D prescription drug plans to implement “lock-in” programs, starting in CY2022, that limit the number of pharmacies and prescribers used by enrollees identified as at risk of opioid abuse. This report is intended to reflect the SUPPORT Act at enactment (i.e., October 24, 2018); it does not track the act’s implementation or funding. This report will not be updated.

Jan 2, 2019

U.S. Sanctions on Russia: An Overview

Jan 2, 2019

Overview of U.S. International Food Assistance

Dec 31, 2018

U.S.-South Korea (KORUS) FTA and Bilateral Trade Relations

Dec 28, 2018

Drug Shortages: Causes, FDA Authority, and Policy Options

Dec 27, 2018

Permanent Employment-Based Immigration and the Per-country Ceiling

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) specifies a complex set of categories and numerical limits for admitting lawful permanent residents (LPRs) to the United States that includes economic priorities among the admission criteria. These priorities are addressed primarily through the employment-based immigration system, which consists of five preference categories. Each preference category has specific eligibility criteria; numerical limits; and, in some cases, distinct application processes. The INA allocates 140,000 visas annually for all five employment-based LPR categories, roughly 12% of the 1.1 million LPRs admitted in FY2017. The INA further limits each immigrant-sending country to an annual maximum of 7% of all employment-based LPR admissions, known as the per-country ceiling, or “cap.” Prospective employment-based immigrants follow two administrative processing trajectories depending on whether they apply from overseas as “new arrivals” seeking LPR status or from within the United States seeking to adjust to LPR status from a temporary status that they currently possess. While some prospective employment-based immigrants can self-petition, most require U.S. employers to petition on their behalf. In both cases, the Department of State (DOS) is responsible for allocating the correct number of employment-based immigrant “visa numbers” or slots, according to numerical limits and the per-country ceiling specified in the INA. This report reviews the employment-based immigration process by examining six pools of pending petitions and applications, representing prospective employment-based immigrants and any accompanying family members at different stages of the LPR process. While four of these pools represent administrative processing queues, two result from the INA’s numerical limitations on employment-based immigration and the per-country ceiling. These latter two pools of foreign nationals, who have been approved as employment-based immigrants but must wait for statutorily limited visa numbers, totaled in excess of 900,000 as of mid-2018. Most originate from India, followed by China and the Philippines. Some employers maintain that they continue to need skilled foreign workers to remain internationally competitive and to keep their firms in the United States. Proponents of increasing employment-based immigration levels argue that it is vital for economic growth. Opponents cite the lack of compelling evidence of labor shortages and argue that the presence of foreign workers can negatively impact wages and working conditions in the United States. With this statutory and economic backdrop, the policy option of revising or eliminating the per-country ceiling on employment-based LPRs has been proposed repeatedly in Congress. Some argue that eliminating the per-country ceiling would increase the flow of high-skilled immigrants from countries such as India and China, who are often employed in the U.S. technology sector, without increasing the total annual admission of employment-based LPRs. Currently, nationals from India in particular, and to a lesser extent China and the Philippines, face lengthy queues and inordinately long waits to receive LPR status. Many of those waiting for employment-based LPR status are already employed in the United States on temporary visas, a potentially exploitative situation that some argue incentivizes immigrant-sponsoring employers to continue to recruit foreign nationals primarily from these countries for temporary employment. Others counter that the statutory per-country ceiling restrains the dominance of a handful of employment-based immigrant-sending countries and preserves the diversity of immigrant flows.

Dec 21, 2018

Defense Primer: Commanding U.S. Military Operations

Dec 20, 2018

Funding for ACA-Established Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF) Expires in FY2019

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA, P.L. 111-148, as amended) authorized the establishment of a private, nonprofit, tax-exempt corporation called the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI, or the Institute). This built on provisions in prior law that expanded the federal government’s role in the oversight and funding of comparative effectiveness research. The American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 (ARRA, P.L. 111-5) provided a total of $1.1 billion for comparative effectiveness research; required an Institute of Medicine (IOM, now the National Academy of Medicine) report with recommendations on national comparative effectiveness research priorities; and created the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research (FCCCER), an interagency advisory group. FCCCER was required to report to the President and the Congress annually on federal comparative effectiveness research activities, and was terminated upon enactment of the ACA. PCORI is responsible for coordinating and supporting comparative clinical effectiveness research, which is broadly defined in law to mean “research evaluating and comparing health outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or more ... health care interventions ... being used in the treatment, management, and diagnosis of, or prevention of illness or injury.” Health care interventions include a wide range of things, for example, care management and delivery, medical devices, diagnostic tools, pharmaceuticals, and integrative health practices. PCORI was required to identify national priorities for research, and an agenda to carry out the priorities, including attention to chronic conditions, gaps in evidence, quality of care, patient health and well-being, and the effect on national expenditures associated with interventions or conditions, among other concerns. In addition, PCORI can enter into contracts with federal agencies as well as with academic, private sector research, or study-conducting entities for the management of funding and conduct of research. The ACA also required the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) to broadly disseminate research findings that are published by PCORI and other government-funded comparative effectiveness research entities, to create information tools, to and develop a publicly available database of government-funded evidence (Public Health Service Act [PHSA] Section 937). Dissemination materials must identify researchers; describe research methodology, limitations, and subpopulation-specific considerations; and must not include practice guidelines or recommendations for payment, coverage, or treatment. AHRQ has to support training of researchers and building of data capacity in coordination with other federal health programs; in addition, other federal agencies are broadly authorized to contract with PCORI for the conduct and support of relevant research. The Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF) The ACA created a 10-year, multibillion dollar trust fund—the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Trust Fund (PCORTF)—to support comparative effectiveness research, and specifically to fund PCORI and its research activities. Funding for PCORTF expires in FY2019. The law provided annual funding to the PCORTF over the period FY2010-FY2019 from the following three sources: (1) annual appropriations, (2) fees on health insurance and self-insured plans, and (3) transfers from the Medicare Part A and Part B trust funds (26 U.S.C. §9511). Three Sources of PCORTF Funds Specifically, the ACA appropriated the following amounts to the PCORTF: (1) $10 million for FY2010, (2) $50 million for FY2011, and (3) $150 million for each of FY2012 through FY2019. In addition, for each of FY2013 through FY2019, the ACA appropriated an amount equivalent to the net revenues from a new fee that the law imposes on health insurance policies and self-insured plans. For policy/plan years ending during FY2013, the fee equals $1 multiplied by the number of covered lives. For policy/plan years ending during each subsequent fiscal year through FY2019, the fee equals $2 multiplied by the number of covered lives. Finally, transfers to PCORTF from the Medicare Part A and Part B trust funds are calculated by multiplying the average number of individuals entitled to benefits under Medicare Part A, or enrolled in Medicare Part B, by $1 (for FY2013) or by $2 (for each of FY2014 through FY2019). Allocation of PCORTF Funds For each of FY2011 through FY2019, the ACA requires 80% of the PCORTF funds to be made available to PCORI and the remaining 20% of funds to be transferred to the Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary for carrying out PHSA Section 937. Of the total amount transferred to HHS, 80% is to be distributed to AHRQ to carry out the dissemination activities authorized under PHSA Section 937. Beginning in the FY2018 budget request, the President proposed to incorporate AHRQ under the National Institutes of Health (NIH) by creating a new institute, the National Institute for Research on Safety and Quality (NIRSQ). Although this proposed change has not been adopted by Congress and AHRQ has continued to be its own stand-alone agency, for FY2018 and FY2019, the funds that are in fact going to AHRQ are shown as going to NIRSQ. Table 1 shows the allocation of PCORTF funds through FY2019. Table 1. Distribution of PCORTF Funding Millions of Dollars, by Fiscal Year Funding Recipient 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 (Est.) 2019 (Est.) PCORI 120 289 376 396 469 476 499 622 HHS 30 72 94 99 117 119 125 155 AHRQ (non-add) (24) (58) (75) (80) (94) (95) — — NIH/NIRSQ (non-add) — (100) (124) Office of the Secretary (non-add) (6) (14) (19) (19) (23) (24) (25) (31) Total 150 361 470 495 586 595 624 777 Source: CRS calculations using data provided in Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government, Appendix (FY2013-FY2019).

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: The Department of Defense

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: U.S. Defense Industrial Base

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: Procurement

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: National and Defense Intelligence

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: Intelligence Support to Military Operations

Dec 20, 2018

Introduction to Bank Regulation: Supervision

Dec 20, 2018

Defense Primer: U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense

Dec 19, 2018

Defense Primer: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

Dec 19, 2018

Defense Primer: Budgeting for National and Defense Intelligence

Dec 19, 2018

International Approaches to Digital Currencies

Since Bitcoin was introduced a decade ago, about 2,100 cryptocurrencies have been developed. Cryptocurrencies are digital representations of value that have no status as legal tender and are administered using distributed ledger technology, running on a network of independent, peer-to-peer computers. Cryptocurrencies are controversial. Some think they will revolutionize the international payments system for the better; others are skeptical of the business model, calling it a scam. The interest and debate surrounding cryptocurrencies has led some central banks to examine whether the technology underpinning cryptocurrencies could be used to create digital versions of fiat currencies, which would have legal status in their jurisdiction of issue. Governments around the world are taking different approaches to cryptocurrencies and digital fiat currencies, an area of increasing focus for international organizations and forums underpinning the global economy. As Congress considers issues related to digital currencies, including whether to regulate further the cryptocurrency industry, the approaches taken by other governments and international bodies may be of interest. National Approaches to Cryptocurrencies Cryptocurrencies span borders and are international in nature, but governments around the world have responded differently to the proliferation of cryptocurrencies. Three types of responses have generally taken shape. First, some governments, such as Malta, Singapore, and Switzerland, are active cryptocurrency hubs; they have been attracting and developing cryptocurrency industries in their countries. Second, some governments, such as China, India, and South Korea, have banned the use of cryptocurrencies or specific activities associated with cryptocurrencies. Third, some governments, including many European countries and the United States, are seeking balance between financial innovation and risk-management through regulation of cryptocurrencies. National Approaches to Digital Fiat Currencies To date, one country, Venezuela, which is mired in a serious economic crisis, has issued a digital fiat currency, and there are serious questions about the new currency’s success and operational viability. A few small countries are in the process of launching digital fiat currencies. Some countries, including China and Sweden, are researching the costs and benefits of these currencies, and Iran and Russia are considering them as a way to evade U.S. sanctions. Many central banks in major economies, including in the United States and the Eurozone, have argued against issuing a digital fiat currency at this time. International Bodies’ Engagement on Digital Currencies Many international organizations and forums are examining the implications of cryptocurrencies and, in some cases, are starting to make policy recommendations. They have examined a range of issues, including the utility of digital currencies for improving the international payments systems, the possible threats digital currencies may or may not pose to international financial stability, the divergence of national-level cryptocurrency regulations and whether international regulatory coordination is desirable, how cryptocurrencies should be treated in bank prudential regulation, and how to adapt international recommendations to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in light of cryptocurrencies. Possible Questions for Congress In November 2018, the Department of the Treasury announced it is developing a report on cryptocurrency regulation, including a legislative framework for Congress to consider in 2019. How do U.S. current regulations, and the proposed regulations when they are released, compare to other countries’ regulations? Some governments are actively developing cryptocurrency industries. Should the United States follow suit, or risk losing market share in the industry? Alternatively, some governments are tightly restricting, or even banning, cryptocurrency activities to protect consumers. In the United States, do consumers have adequate protections in terms of cryptocurrencies? Has the Federal Reserve adequately assessed the potential benefits and costs of developing a digital U.S. dollar relying on distributed ledger technology? How does the U.S. position on digital fiat currencies compare to other countries’ calculations? What are the potential future impacts on the role of the dollar as a reserve currency? What types of digital currency policies is the Trump Administration advocating at various international organizations? How do international recommendations and standards fit with U.S. regulations?

Dec 19, 2018

DHS’s Cybersecurity Mission—An Overview

Dec 19, 2018

Congress’s Authority to Influence and Control Executive Branch Agencies

The Constitution neither establishes administrative agencies nor explicitly prescribes the manner by which they may be created. Even so, the Supreme Court has generally recognized that Congress has broad constitutional authority to establish and shape the federal bureaucracy. Congress may use its Article I lawmaking powers to create federal agencies and individual offices within those agencies, design agencies’ basic structures and operations, and prescribe, subject to certain constitutional limitations, how those holding agency offices are appointed and removed. Congress also may enumerate the powers, duties, and functions to be exercised by agencies, as well as directly counteract, through later legislation, certain agency actions implementing delegated authority. The most potent tools of congressional control over agencies, including those addressing the structuring, empowering, regulating, and funding of agencies, typically require enactment of legislation. Such legislation must comport with constitutional requirements related to bicameralism (i.e., it must be approved by both houses of Congress) and presentment (i.e., it must be presented to the President for signature). The constitutional process to enact effective legislation requires the support of the House, Senate, and the President, unless the support in both houses is sufficient to override the President’s veto. There also are many non-statutory tools (i.e., tools not requiring legislative enactment to exercise) that may be used by the House, Senate, congressional committees, or individual Members of Congress to influence and control agency action. In some cases, non-statutory measures, such as impeachment and removal, Senate advice and consent to appointments or the ratification of treaties, and committee issuance of subpoenas, can impose legal consequences. Others, however, such as House resolutions of inquiry, may not be used to bind agencies or agency officials and rely for their effectiveness on their ability to persuade or influence.

Dec 19, 2018

Defense Primer: Department of Defense Contractors

Dec 19, 2018

Defense Primer: The Berry and Kissell Amendments

Dec 18, 2018

Defense Primer: Cyberspace Operations

Dec 18, 2018

Defense Primer: Operations in the Information Environment

Dec 18, 2018

Defense Primer: Regular Military Compensation

Dec 17, 2018

Defense Primer: Military Pay Raise

Dec 17, 2018

Defense Primer: Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP)

Dec 17, 2018

Defense Primer: President’s Constitutional Authority with Regard to the Armed Forces

Dec 17, 2018

The International Monetary Fund

Dec 14, 2018

Cybersecurity: A Primer

Dec 14, 2018

2018 World Bank Capital Increase Proposal

Dec 14, 2018

Introduction to Bank Regulation: Credit Unions and Community Banks: A Comparison

Dec 14, 2018

Defense Primer: Military Health System

Dec 13, 2018

Defense Primer: Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)

Dec 13, 2018

Defense Primer: Personnel Tempo (PERSTEMPO)

Dec 12, 2018

Defense Primer: Reserve Forces

Dec 12, 2018

Defense Primer: Strategic Nuclear Forces

Dec 11, 2018

Authority to Launch Nuclear Forces

Dec 11, 2018

Lifting the Earmark Moratorium: Frequently Asked Questions

While the term earmark has been used historically to describe various types of congressional spending actions, since the 110th Congress (2007-2008) House and Senate rules have defined an earmark as any congressionally directed spending, tax benefit, or tariff benefit that would benefit an entity or a specific state, locality, or congressional district. In the 112th Congress (2011-2012), the House and Senate began observing what has been referred to as an earmark moratorium or earmark ban. The moratorium does not exist in House or Senate chamber rules, however, and therefore is not enforced by points of order. Instead, the moratorium has been established by party rules and committee protocols and is enforced by chamber and committee leadership through their agenda-setting power. In recent years, some Members have expressed interest in lifting the earmark moratorium. Whether or not the earmark moratorium is lifted, the House and Senate continue to have formal earmark disclosure rules that were implemented in the 110th Congress with the stated intention of bringing more transparency to earmarking. These rules generally prohibit consideration of certain legislation unless information is provided about any earmarks included in the legislation. House and Senate rules require that any Member submitting an earmark request provide a written statement that includes the name of the Member, the name and address of the earmark recipient, and a certification that the Member has no financial interest in the earmark. House and Senate rules require that committees determine whether a provision constitutes an earmark, and committees must compile and make accessible certain earmark-related information. If Congress were to lift the current earmark ban, it might also choose to institute any number of policies or restrictions to govern the use of congressional earmarks. These policies or restrictions might be instituted through formal amendments to the House and Senate standing rules, by standing order, or by enacting new law. Such policies might also be instituted through party rules or leadership and committee practices and protocols. Some policies might seek to add more transparency to the earmarking process or prohibit certain types of entities from receiving earmarks. Restrictions might be implemented related to the purposes for which an earmark could be used or limiting the amount of federal dollars that might be spent on earmarks. Other policy approaches might potentially involve the executive branch or the congressional support agencies.

Dec 10, 2018

Cryptocurrency: The Economics of Money and Selected Policy Issues

Cryptocurrencies are digital money in electronic payment systems that generally do not require government backing or the involvement of an intermediary, such as a bank. Instead, users of the system validate payments using certain protocols. Since the 2008 invention of the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, cryptocurrencies have proliferated. In recent years, they experienced a rapid increase and subsequent decrease in value. One estimate found that, as of August 2018, there were nearly 1,900 different cryptocurrencies worth about $220 billion. Given this rapid growth and volatility, cryptocurrencies have drawn the attention of the public and policymakers. A particularly notable feature of cryptocurrencies is their potential to act as an alternative form of money. Historically, money has either had intrinsic value or derived value from government decree. Using money electronically generally has involved using the private ledgers and systems of at least one trusted intermediary. Cryptocurrencies, by contrast, generally employ user agreement, a network of users, and cryptographic protocols to achieve valid transfers of value. Cryptocurrency users typically use a pseudonymous address to identify each other and a passcode or private key to make changes to a public ledger in order to transfer value between accounts. Other computers in the network validate these transfers. Through this use of blockchain technology, cryptocurrency systems protect their public ledgers of accounts against manipulation, so that users can only send cryptocurrency to which they have access, thus allowing users to make valid transfers without a centralized, trusted intermediary. Money serves three interrelated economic functions: it is a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value. How well cryptocurrencies can serve those functions relative to existing money and payment systems likely will play a large part in determining cryptocurrencies’ future value and importance. Proponents of the technology argue cryptocurrency can effectively serve those functions and will be widely adopted. They contend that a decentralized system using cryptocurrencies ultimately will be more efficient and secure than existing monetary and payment systems. Skeptics doubt that cryptocurrencies can effectively act as money and achieve widespread use. They note various obstacles to extensive adoption of cryptocurrencies, including economic (e.g., existing trust in traditional systems and volatile cryptocurrency value), technological (e.g., scalability), and usability obstacles (e.g., access to equipment necessary to participate). In addition, skeptics assert that cryptocurrencies are currently overvalued and under-regulated. The invention and proliferation of cryptocurrencies present numerous risks and related policy issues. Cryptocurrencies, because they are pseudonymous and decentralized, could facilitate money laundering and other crimes, raising the issue of whether existing regulations appropriately guard against this possibility. Many consumers may lack familiarity with cryptocurrencies and how they work and derive value. In addition, although cryptocurrency ledgers appear safe from manipulation, individuals and exchanges have been hacked or targeted in scams involving cryptocurrencies. Accordingly, critics of cryptocurrencies have raised concerns that existing laws and regulations do not adequately protect consumers dealing in cryptocurrencies. At the same time, proponents of cryptocurrencies warn against over-regulating what they argue is a technology that will yield large benefits. Finally, if cryptocurrency becomes a widely used form of money, it could affect the ability of the Federal Reserve and other central banks to implement and transmit monetary policy, leading some observers to argue that central banks should develop their own digital currencies (as opposed to a cryptocurrency); others oppose this idea. The 115th Congress has shown significant interest in these and other issues relating to cryptocurrencies. For example, the House passed several bills (H.R. 2433, H.R. 5036, and H.R. 6069, and H.R. 6411) aimed at better understanding or regulating cryptocurrencies. The 116th Congress—and beyond—may continue to consider the numerous policy issues raised by the increasing use of cryptocurrencies.

Dec 7, 2018

Budget Issues Shaping the 2018 Farm Bill

The farm bill is an omnibus, multi-year law that governs an array of agricultural and food programs. It provides an opportunity for policymakers to periodically address a broad range of agricultural and food issues. The farm bill has typically undergone reauthorization about every five years. The 115th Congress has considered a new farm bill but has not enacted one to date. Both the House and the Senate passed versions of a 2018 farm bill (H.R. 2) in June 2018. Conference proceedings officially began in September 2018 but have not reached agreement. The farm bill provides an opportunity for Congress to choose how much support, if any, to provide for various agriculture and nutrition programs and how to allocate it among competing constituencies. Under congressional budgeting rules, many programs are assumed to continue beyond the end of a farm bill. From a budgetary perspective, this provides funding to reauthorize programs, reallocate funding to other programs, or be taken for deficit reduction. Budget for a 2018 Farm Bill (dollars in millions, FY2019-FY2028) CBO score Farm bill titles CBO baseline House-passed Senate-passed Commodities 61,151 +284 -408 Conservation 59,754 -795 +0 Trade 3,624 +470 +515 Nutrition 663,828 -1,426 +94 Credit -4,558 +0 +0 Rural Development 168 +0 -2,340 Research 604 +250 +685 Forestry 10 +0 +5 Energy 612 -517 +375 Horticulture 1,547 +10 +626 Crop Insurance 78,037 -161 -2 Miscellaneous 2,423 +566 +517 Subtotal 867,200 -1,320 +68 Increase in Revenue - +465 +68 Total 867,200 -1,785 0 Source: CRS, compiled using the CBO Baseline by Title (unpublished; April 2018), based on the CBO baseline (April 2018), and the CBO cost estimates for H.R. 2 as passed by the House and as passed by the Senate (July 24, 2018). The farm bill authorizes programs in two spending categories: mandatory spending and discretionary spending. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline is a projection at a particular point in time of future federal spending on mandatory programs under current law. When a new bill is proposed that would affect mandatory spending, the cost impact (score) is measured in relation to the baseline. Changes that increase spending relative to the baseline have a positive score; those that decrease spending relative to the baseline have a negative score. Federal budget rules such as “PayGo” may require budgetary offsets to balance new spending so that there is no increase in the federal deficit. Discretionary spending may be authorized in a farm bill but is not actually provided until budget decisions are made in a future annual appropriations act. Since 2000, farm bill budgets have varied: The 2002 farm bill increased overall spending, the 2008 farm bill was essentially budget neutral, the 2014 farm bill reduced spending, and the 2018 farm bill is projected to be essentially budget neutral. The April 2018 CBO baseline for farm bill programs, used as the official benchmark in 2018, contains $867 billion over FY2019-FY2028—77% of which stems from the nutrition title ($664 billion) and its largest program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. The remaining $203 billion baseline is for agricultural programs, mostly in crop insurance, farm commodity programs, and conservation. Other titles of the farm bill contribute about 1% of the baseline, some of which are funded primarily with discretionary spending. The budgetary impact of the 2018 farm bill proposals are measured relative to the CBO baseline—that is, what the 2014 farm bill (current law) would have spent had it continued. Relative to the baseline, the House-passed bill would reduce federal outlays by $1.8 billion over 10 years (-0.2%), and the Senate-passed bill would remain budget neutral (+0%) over the same 10-year period. These overall relatively small scores are the net result of sometimes relatively larger increases and reductions across individual titles. Some of the overall scores within a single title of the farm bill are the net result of sometimes large changes in individual programs that may reflect changes in the direction of policy. The House bill would achieve its overall 10-year net reduction primarily by reducing net outlays in four titles (Nutrition, Conservation, Energy, and Crop Insurance). It would increase spending by less than the total of these reductions across five other titles (Miscellaneous, Trade, Commodities, Research, and Horticulture). The Nutrition title has provisions that sum to a $22 billion reduction over 10 years (including those for work requirements) and provisions that would add to $20.6 billion in increased spending. Similarly, the Conservation title has provisions that sum to a $12.6 billion reduction (including repealing the Conservation Stewardship Program), as well as provisions that add spending totaling $11.8 billion. The Senate bill would achieve a budget-neutral outcome by reducing net spending primarily in the Rural Development title but also in the Commodities and Crop Insurance titles. It would increase spending across seven titles (Research, Horticulture, Miscellaneous, Trade, Energy, Nutrition, and Forestry). For some of the programs without baseline, both the House-passed and the Senate-passed bills would provide continuing funding and, in some cases, permanent baseline.

Dec 6, 2018