CRS Reports

Dairy Provisions in USMCA

Mar 26, 2019

Congressional Participation in Litigation: Article III and Legislative Standing

Mar 26, 2019

FY2020 Defense Budget Request: An Overview

Mar 25, 2019

Data Protection Law: An Overview

Recent high-profile data breaches and other concerns about how third parties protect the privacy of individuals in the digital age have raised national concerns over legal protections of Americans’ electronic data. Intentional intrusions into government and private computer networks and inadequate corporate privacy and cybersecurity practices have exposed the personal information of millions of Americans to unwanted recipients. At the same time, internet connectivity has increased and varied in form in recent years. Americans now transmit their personal data on the internet at an exponentially higher rate than in the past, and their data are collected, cultivated, and maintained by a growing number of both “consumer facing” and “behind the scenes” actors such as data brokers. As a consequence, the privacy, cybersecurity and protection of personal data have emerged as a major issue for congressional consideration. Despite the rise in interest in data protection, the legislative paradigms governing cybersecurity and data privacy are complex and technical, and lack uniformity at the federal level. The constitutional “right to privacy” developed over the course of the 20th century, but this right generally guards only against government intrusions and does little to shield the average internet user from private actors. At the federal statutory level, there are a number of statutes that protect individuals’ personal data or concern cybersecurity, including the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, and others. And a number of different agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), enforce these laws. But these statutes primarily regulate certain industries and subcategories of data. The FTC fills in some of the statutory gaps by enforcing a broad prohibition against unfair and deceptive data protection practices. But no single federal law comprehensively regulates the collection and use of consumers’ personal data. Seeking a more fulsome data protection system, some governments—such as California and the European Union (EU)—have recently enacted privacy laws regulating nearly all forms of personal data within their jurisdictional reach. Some argue that Congress should consider creating similar protections in federal law, but others have criticized the EU and California approaches as being overly prescriptive and burdensome. Should the 116th Congress consider a comprehensive federal data protection law, its legislative proposals may involve numerous decision points and legal considerations. Points of consideration may include the conceptual framework of the law (i.e., whether it is prescriptive or outcome-based), the scope of the law and its definition of protected information, and the role of the FTC or other federal enforcement agency. Further, if Congress wants to allow individuals to enforce data protection laws and seek remedies for the violations of such laws in court, it must account for standing requirements in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Federal preemption also raises complex legal questions—not only of whether to preempt state law, but what form of preemption Congress should employ. Finally, from a First Amendment perspective, Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that while some privacy, cybersecurity, or data security regulations are permissible, any federal law that restricts protected speech, particularly if it targets specific speakers or content, may be subject to more stringent review by a reviewing court.

Mar 25, 2019

Defense Primer: Active Component Enlisted Recruiting

Mar 25, 2019

Delegation of Federal Aviation Administration Certification Authorities to Aviation Manufacturers

Mar 25, 2019

Attaching a Price to Greenhouse Gas Emissions with a Carbon Tax or Emissions Fee: Considerations and Potential Impacts

The U.S. Fourth National Climate Assessment, released in 2018, concluded that “the impacts of global climate change are already being felt in the United States and are projected to intensify in the future—but the severity of future impacts will depend largely on actions taken to reduce greenhouse gas [GHG] emissions and to adapt to the changes that will occur.” Members of Congress and stakeholders articulate a wide range of perspectives over what to do, if anything, about GHG emissions, future climate change, and related impacts. If Congress were to consider establishing a program to reduce GHG emissions, one option would be to attach a price to GHG emissions with a carbon tax or GHG emissions fee. In the 115th Congress, Members introduced nine bills to establish a carbon tax or emissions fee program. However, many Members have expressed their opposition to such an approach. In particular, in the 115th Congress, the House passed a resolution “expressing the sense of Congress that a carbon tax would be detrimental to the United States economy.” Multiple economic studies have estimated the emission reductions that particular carbon tax would achieve. For example, a 2018 study analyzed various impacts of four carbon tax rate scenarios: a $25/metric ton of CO2 and $50/metric ton of CO2 carbon tax, increasing annually by 1% and 5%. The study concluded that each of the scenarios would likely achieve the U.S. GHG emission reduction target pledged under the international Paris Agreement (at least in terms of CO2 emissions). A carbon tax system would generate a new revenue stream, the magnitude of which would depend on the scope and rate of the tax, among other factors. In 2018, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated that a $25/metric ton carbon tax would yield approximately $100 billion in its first year. CBO projected that federal revenue would total $3.5 trillion in FY2019. Policymakers would face challenging decisions regarding the distribution of the new carbon tax revenues. Congress could apply revenues to support a range of policy objectives but would encounter trade-offs among the objectives. The central trade-offs involve minimizing economy-wide costs, lessening the costs borne by specific groups—particularly low-income households and displaced workers in certain industries (e.g., coal mining)—and supporting other policy objectives. A primary argument against a carbon tax regards it potential economy-wide impacts, often measured as impacts to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP). Some may argue that projected impacts should be compared with the climate benefits achieved from the program as well as the estimated costs of taking no action. The potential impacts would depend on a number of factors, including the program’s magnitude and design and, most importantly, the use of carbon tax revenues. In general, economic literature finds that some of the revenue applications would reduce the economy-wide costs from a carbon tax but may not eliminate them entirely. In addition, some studies cite particular economic modeling scenarios in which certain carbon tax revenue applications produce a net increase in GDP compared to a baseline scenario. These scenarios involve using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in other tax rates (e.g., corporate income or payroll taxes). Although economic models generally indicate that these particular revenue applications would yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall, the models also find that lower-income households would likely face a disproportionate impact under such an approach. As lower-income households spend a greater proportion of their income on energy needs (electricity, gasoline), these households are expected to experience disproportionate impacts from a carbon tax if revenues were not recycled back to them in some fashion (e.g., lump-sum distribution). A price on GHG emissions could create a competitive disadvantage for some industries, particularly “emission-intensive, trade-exposed industries.” Policymakers have several options to address this concern, including establishing a “border carbon adjustment” program, which would levy a fee on imports from countries without comparable GHG reduction programs. Alternatively, policymakers could allocate (indefinitely or for a period of time) some of the carbon tax revenues to selected industry sectors or businesses. Relatedly, a carbon tax system is projected to disproportionately impact fossil fuel industries, particularly coal, and the communities that rely on their employment. To alleviate these impacts, policymakers may consider using some of the revenue to provide transition assistance to employees or affected communities.

Mar 22, 2019

Export Controls: Key Challenges

Mar 22, 2019

U.S. Health Care Coverage and Spending

Mar 21, 2019

A Low-Yield, Submarine-Launched Nuclear Warhead: Overview of the Expert Debate

Mar 21, 2019

Older Americans Act: Senior Community Service Employment Program

The Senior Community Service Employment Program (SCSEP) authorizes the Department of Labor (DOL) to make grants to support part-time community service employment opportunities for eligible individuals age 55 or over. In FY2019, appropriations for SCSEP programs were $400 million and supported approximately 41,000 positions. DOL may also refer to the SCSEP program as Community Service Employment for Older Americans (CSEOA) SCSEP is authorized by Title V of the Older Americans Act (OAA). The Older Americans Act Reauthorization Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-144) authorized appropriations for OAA programs for FY2017 through FY2019. In FY2019, SCSEP appropriations accounted for about 20% of the funding under the OAA. The bulk of SCSEP appropriations support two primary grant streams: one to national nonprofit organizations and one to state agencies. In the most recent program year, approximately 78% of formula grant funds were allocated to national grantees and about 22% were allocated to state grantees. Both the national organizations and state grantees subgrant funds to host agencies that provide the actual community service employment opportunities to participants. Host agencies are responsible for recruiting eligible participants. To be eligible for the program, prospective participants must be at least age 55, low-income, and unemployed. Federal law requires host agencies to give preference to prospective participants who demonstrate additional barriers to employment such as having a disability or being at risk of homelessness. Program participants work part-time in community service jobs, including employment at schools, libraries, social service organizations, or senior-serving organizations. Program participants earn the higher of minimum wage or the typical wage for the job in which they are employed. An individual may typically participate in the program for a cumulative total of no more than 48 months. During orientation, participants receive an assessment of their skills, interests, capabilities, and needs. This assessment informs the development of an individual employment plan (IEP). A participant’s IEP is updated throughout their participation in the program. Grantees are subject to a performance accountability system. Performance metrics generally relate to participants’ unsubsidized employment and earnings after exiting the program. In addition to outcome-based metrics, grantees are also assessed on participants’ total number of hours of service and whether the grantee served participants with barriers to employment. Grantees that do not meet negotiated levels of performance may become ineligible for subsequent grants.

Mar 21, 2019

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) FY2019 Appropriations

Mar 20, 2019

Title X Family Planning Program: 2019 Final Rule

Mar 20, 2019

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: Origins, Evolution, and Use

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) provides the President broad authority to regulate a variety of economic transactions following a declaration of national emergency. IEEPA, like the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) from which it branched, sits at the center of the modern U.S. sanctions regime. Changes in the use of IEEPA powers since the act’s enactment in 1977 have caused some to question whether the statute’s oversight provisions are robust enough given the sweeping economic powers it confers upon the President upon declaration of a state of emergency. Over the course of the twentieth century, Congress delegated increasing amounts of emergency power to the President by statute. The Trading with the Enemy Act was one such statute. Congress passed TWEA in 1917 to regulate international transactions with enemy powers following the U.S. entry into the First World War. Congress expanded the act during the 1930s to allow the President to declare a national emergency in times of peace and assume sweeping powers over both domestic and international transactions. Between 1945 and the early 1970s, TWEA became a critically important means to impose sanctions as part of U.S. Cold War strategy. Presidents used TWEA to block international financial transactions, seize U.S.-based assets held by foreign nationals, restrict exports, modify regulations to deter the hoarding of gold, limit foreign direct investment in U.S. companies, and impose tariffs on all imports into the United States. Following committee investigations that discovered that the United States had been in a state of emergency for more than 40 years, Congress passed the National Emergencies Act (NEA) in 1976 and IEEPA in 1977. The pair of statutes placed new limits on presidential emergency powers. Both included reporting requirements to increase transparency and track costs, and the NEA required the President to annually assess and extend, if appropriate, the emergency. However, some experts argue that the renewal process has become pro forma. The NEA also afforded Congress the means to terminate a national emergency by adopting a concurrent resolution in each chamber. A decision by the Supreme Court, in a landmark immigration case, however, found the use of concurrent resolutions to terminate an executive action unconstitutional. Congress amended the statute to require a joint resolution, significantly increasing the difficulty of terminating an emergency. Like TWEA, IEEPA has become an important means to impose economic-based sanctions since its enactment; like TWEA, Presidents have frequently used IEEPA to restrict a variety of international transactions; and like TWEA, the subjects of the restrictions, the frequency of use, and the duration of emergencies have expanded over time. Initially, Presidents targeted foreign states or their governments. Over the years, however, presidential administrations have increasingly used IEEPA to target individuals, groups, and non-state actors such as terrorists and persons who engage in malicious cyber-enabled activities. As of March 1, 2019, Presidents had declared 54 national emergencies invoking IEEPA, 29 of which are still ongoing. Typically, national emergencies invoking IEEPA last nearly a decade, although some have lasted significantly longer--the first state of emergency declared under the NEA and IEEPA, which was declared in response to the taking of U.S. embassy staff as hostages by Iran in 1979, may soon enter its fifth decade. IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions. Despite these broad powers, Congress has never attempted to terminate a national emergency invoking IEEPA. Instead, Congress has directed the President on numerous occasions to use IEEPA authorities to impose sanctions. Congress may want to consider whether IEEPA appropriately balances the need for swift action in a time of crisis with Congress’ duty to oversee executive action. Congress may also want to consider IEEPA’s role in implementing its influence in U.S. foreign policy and national security decision-making.

Mar 20, 2019

Employer Tax Credit for Paid Family and Medical Leave

Mar 20, 2019

The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) of 2018

Mar 20, 2019

VAWA Reauthorization: Substantive Criminal Law Proposals

Mar 20, 2019

Federal Disaster Assistance for Agriculture

Mar 19, 2019

Evaluating DOD Strategy: Key Findings of the National Defense Strategy Commission

Mar 19, 2019

Russia’s Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline to Germany Halted

Mar 18, 2019

Federal Regional Commissions and Authorities: Overview of Structure and Activities

Mar 18, 2019

Supreme Court Once Again Considers Partisan Gerrymandering: Implications and Legislative Options

Mar 18, 2019

Online Political Advertising: Disclaimers and Policy Issues

Mar 18, 2019

Army Corps of Engineers: FY2020 Appropriations

Mar 15, 2019

Low Interest Rates, Part 3: Potential Causes

Interest rates have been unusually low by historical standards since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, as discussed in CRS Insight IN11044, Low Interest Rates, Part 1: Economic and Fiscal Implications, by Marc Labonte. This Insight discusses various theories of why rates have been low. Nominal Versus Real Rates Part of the reason why nominal interest rates (the stated rate familiar to most people) have been low is because inflation has been low since the crisis. Because inflation erodes the value of the return to an investment, it is common to adjust interest rates for inflation. Even when this adjustment is made, the resulting real interest rates are still low by historical standards, as discussed in Part 1. The rest of this Insight focuses on explanations of why real rates have been low. Low inflation may also be affecting real rates. Investors and households may now expect that inflation will remain low in the future. If they perceive there to be less risk of future inflation, they may demand less compensation to protect against inflation risk, resulting in lower real interest rates. The fact that real rates were high in the 1980s after inflation became high permits inference that this phenomenon may now be working in reverse. Potential Causes As Part I discussed, both short-term and long-term interest rates have been low since the crisis. The Federal Reserve’s monetary policy decisions are the main determinant of short-term interest rates, as discussed in CRS Insight IN11056, Low Interest Rates, Part 2: Implications for the Federal Reserve, by Marc Labonte. If the Fed were keeping rates artificially low, however, inflation would be expected to rise, but it has not. Moreover, monetary policy has much less influence on long-term rates, suggesting some broader economic forces are at work. Economists have identified two trends in particular that could explain why rates fell to unusually low levels during the crisis. First, an increase in risk aversion caused a “flight to safety”—there was relatively more demand for safer assets such as Treasury securities, driving down those rates, and less demand for riskier assets with higher rates. If a higher percentage of total credit is extended to lower-risk borrowers, then average interest rates would be lower. Some have argued that new financial regulations after the crisis could also be limiting the availability of credit to higher-risk borrowers (which would require a higher interest rate to match that risk). Second, firms and households reduced borrowing (called deleveraging) during the crisis after having become overextended. This decline in demand would put downward pressure on interest rates. In contrast, the federal government increased its borrowing at the same time as it increased the budget deficit in response to the crisis, and this would be expected to put upward pressure on interest rates. Because of the depth of the financial crisis and the sluggishness of the initial recovery, low rates were unsurprising in the early stages of the recovery. But risk aversion and deleveraging would presumably be temporary factors. More puzzling is why interest rates have remained low as the recovery has strengthened. Economic growth has accelerated since 2017, and unemployment has been below 5% since 2016. Nevertheless, based on market data, investors expect low interest rates to persist. Real interest rates represent the price at which savers are willing to lend funds to borrowers, and they are generally determined by market supply and demand. They can fall because the supply of saving rises or the demand for borrowing falls. Business investment, which relies on borrowing, has been low in this expansion. Low investment may be related to the long-term decline in productivity growth and economic growth, which could also be pushing down rates. One reason economic growth is lower is because of the aging population; higher savings by the baby boomers, as they enter an age where their savings rate peaks, could also be pushing down rates. As discussed in Part 1, interest rates have also been low abroad in recent years. Low economic growth and aging effects are more pronounced abroad than in the United States. Global economic conditions could push down U.S. interest rates through international capital flows. If interest rates are lower in the rest of the world than in the United States, economic theory predicts that foreigners would buy U.S. assets, placing downward pressure on U.S. interest rates and upward pressure on the dollar. Both the increase in the value of the dollar since 2014 and the large U.S. current account deficit (which is equal to net foreign capital inflows) support this theory. One prominent explanation for low interest rates worldwide is the “global savings glut,” in which former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke posits that the supply of savings has outpaced investment demand in the last decade in both advanced and emerging economies. Notably, many emerging economies have saved through official reserve accumulation of U.S. securities, particularly Treasury securities, by foreign governments or central banks. Official holdings of Treasury securities increased from $0.9 trillion in 2003 to $4 trillion in 2018. However, all of the increase in official holdings had occurred by 2012, and holdings have hovered around $4 trillion since. Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers has combined the decline in interest rates with many of the causes laid out above into an overall explanation of economic conditions in which he calls secular stagnation. A key implication of his theory is that persistently low interest rates are a sign that the private economy cannot generate sufficient, sustained economic growth on its own. Future Prospects The explanations discussed above suggest that low interest rates could potentially reverse if or when these phenomena reverse. For example, baby boomer retirements and the resultant drawdown of their retirement savings could put upward pressure on interest rates. The continuation of the U.S. economic expansion could put further upward pressure on rates. Growth could pick up or savings could fall in the rest of the world. In response to improving economic conditions, investors could become less risk averse. Alternatively, were the U.S. or world economy to reenter a recession, cyclical forces would likely push rates temporarily lower.

Mar 15, 2019

Trump Administration’s Proposed Removal of Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) Benefits for India and Turkey

On March 4, 2019, President Trump notified Congress of his intent to terminate India’s and Turkey’s eligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a U.S. trade program that provides nonreciprocal, duty-free tariff treatment to certain products imported from designated beneficiary developing countries (BDCs), in order to grow and develop their economies. Potential eligibility changes are subject to annual review and public notice and comment. The President’s determination on India arose from a review of the country’s market access practices; for Turkey, it was due to the country’s increased level of economic development. By law, the President must notify Congress at least 60 days before a GSP status change may take effect. Congress may hold hearings, work with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) on alternative strategies, and/or enact legislation to modify or reverse the President’s determination. In 2018, India was the largest BDC (representing over 25% of U.S. imports under GSP); Turkey was the sixth-largest (Figure 1). Top U.S. GSP imports from India include chemicals, auto parts, and tableware; those from Turkey include gold necklaces, monumental and building stone (i.e., granite), and candy. GSP removal would raise prices for U.S. imports; it would reinstitute U.S. tariffs, which, for instance, range between 1% and 7% on the top 15 U.S. GSP imports from India, and between 1.9% and 5.5% on the top 15 U.S. GSP imports from Turkey. U.S. trading relationships with these countries have broader U.S. strategic significance; India is a “strategic partner” and Turkey is a NATO ally. Figure 1. U.S. Bilateral Trade with India and Turkey / Source: CRS, using trade data from the U.S. International Trade Commission. Note: Trade data are for “imports for consumption” and “domestic exports.” GSP Eligibility Reviews and Recommendations Enacted in 1974, GSP is reauthorized until December 31, 2020 (P.L. 115-141). Other advanced countries have similar programs. Under GSP, the President may designate countries as BDCs based on specific criteria (19 U.S.C. 2462). BDCs are subject to periodic reviews with the criteria, as requested by interested stakeholders, or at the initiative of the GSP Subcommittee of the USTR-led interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC). In October 2017, USTR announced a new “proactive” process for ensuring BDCs’ compliance with the eligibility criteria. Drawing from TPSC advice, the President may grant, suspend, or terminate GSP country designation at any time, but must notify Congress at least 60 days before taking action. Reviews of India’s and Turkey’s eligibility commenced in 2018. Interested stakeholders submitted comments in the Federal Register and testified at USTR-led hearings. Both India and Turkey requested continuation of their eligibility. Regarding India, the President determined “after intensive [bilateral] engagement ... India has not assured the United States that it will provide equitable and reasonable access to the markets of India”—a GSP eligibility criterion. This determination followed a review of India’s market access practices by the GSP Subcommittee. One basis for review were petitions that USTR accepted from U.S. dairy exporters and medical technology producers, asserting that India had not provided “equitable and reasonable access to its market.” The GSP Subcommittee also initiated a review based on concerns raised in the 2018 National Trade Estimate Report on Trade Barriers that India “has implemented a wide array of trade barriers that create serious negative effects on U.S. commerce.” As for Turkey, the President’s determination was based on the country’s increased level of economic development, another GSP eligibility criterion. The President said, “in the four and a half decades since Turkey’s designation as a GSP [BDC], Turkey’s economy has grown and diversified.” Turkey was also the subject of a GSP country practice review launched in August 2018 on its market access policies due to tariff increases on U.S. products in retaliation for the U.S. national security-based “Section 232” tariffs on steel (25%) and aluminum (10%). Bilateral Trade Relations The President’s decision may add to current frictions in U.S. bilateral trade and economic relations with India and Turkey, which were respectively, the 9th- and 32nd-largest U.S. goods trading partners (two-way trade) in 2018. These countries represent potential growing markets for U.S. trade and investment, but tariff and nontariff barriers have constrained expansion of economic ties. President Trump blames India’s “unfair” trading practices for the U.S. trade deficit with India. Calling India “a very high-tariff nation,” he has criticized tariff imbalances, for instance, on motorcycles, which were previously subject to a 100% tariff by India (now 50%), compared to tariffs of 0% to 2.4% by the United States. India’s broader pattern of tariff hikes, including on consumer electronic products, elevates U.S. concern. The “Section 232” tariffs are a source of friction for India and Turkey, neither of whom are exempt from the tariffs. While India has delayed applying retaliatory tariffs in hopes of a bilateral resolution to the issue, Turkey applied retaliatory tariffs in June 2018. The U.S.-Turkish tit-for-tat dynamic of tariffs escalated in August 2018, amid bilateral differences over Turkey’s continued detention of a U.S. pastor (who was subsequently released). India and Turkey are challenging the Section 232 tariffs at the World Trade Organization (WTO), where the United States is challenging retaliatory action by some trading partners, including Turkey. The United States and India have been in “intensive” negotiations to address bilateral trade frictions. India offered what it viewed as “a very meaningful way forward on almost all the US requests,” including proposals to open up its agriculture, milk, and poultry markets in response to the GSP review, but failed to allay U.S. concerns. Reportedly, a sticking point was India’s price controls on medical devices. India’s new e-commerce restrictions and data localization requirements add to frictions. Some Members of Congress and industry groups previously called for terminating India’s GSP eligibility under the program’s IPR criterion due to long-standing concerns about the country’s IPR regime. Following the President’s announcement, India’s Secretary of Commerce asserted that the “economic value of GSP benefits are very moderate” and GSP withdrawal “will not have a significant impact” on India’s U.S. exports. He said U.S.-Indian relations “remain strong ... and discussions will go on.” India reportedly plans to treat Section 232 tariffs and GSP issues separately. Turkey’s Trade Minister criticized the decision but stated that Turkey planned to continue efforts to increase its U.S. trade to $75 billion “without losing any momentum.” Some observers question whether the U.S. move might have been timed partly to try to get Turkey to abandon its purchase of Russian air defense systems. (See CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations In Brief, by Jim Zanotti and Clayton Thomas.) Outlook and Issues for Congress Terminating India’s and Turkey’s GSP eligibility would increase tariffs on U.S. merchandise imports from these countries, raising costs for U.S. importers, including consumers and producers who use these imports as inputs. Yet, termination (or its prospect) could incentivize resolution of bilateral trade differences. For instance, a U.S. business group critical of India’s trading practices asserted, “With the built-in lag of 60 days before these changes go into effect, India still has time to change course and make progress at the negotiation table before its trade benefits are impacted.” India’s general election in April 2019 may complicate any such negotiations. Potential issues for Congress include the following: Would GSP eligibility termination help or hinder bilateral economic and diplomatic ties, and efforts to resolve bilateral trade frictions? Given the Trump Administration’s focus on greater reciprocity in U.S. trade relations, how should the United States expand and strengthen trade and investment ties with India and Turkey? Is there potential for broader trade agreement negotiations? What issues does treatment of India and Turkey present for GSP in the context of a potential reauthorization debate? See CRS Report RL33663, Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): Overview and Issues for Congress, by Vivian C. Jones; CRS In Focus IF10384, U.S.-India Trade Relations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar and K. Alan Kronstadt; and CRS In Focus IF10961, U.S.-Turkey Trade Relations, by Shayerah Ilias Akhtar.

Mar 15, 2019

Huawei v. United States: The Bill of Attainder Clause and Huawei’s Lawsuit Against the United States

Mar 14, 2019

Army Corps of Engineers: Continuing Authorities Programs

Mar 13, 2019

History and Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 1965

Mar 12, 2019

The CREATES Act of 2019 and Lowering Drug Prices: Legal Background and Overview

Mar 12, 2019

United States European Command: Overview and Key Issues

Mar 12, 2019

Cameroon

Mar 12, 2019

Access to Broadband Networks: Net Neutrality

Mar 11, 2019

Data Flows, Online Privacy, and Trade Policy

“Cross-border data flows” refers to the movement or transfer of information between computer servers across national borders. Such data flows enable people to transmit information for online communication, track global supply chains, share research, provide cross-border services, and support technological innovation. Ensuring open cross-border data flows has been an objective of Congress in recent trade agreements and in broader U.S. international trade policy. The free flow of personal data, however, has raised security and privacy concerns. U.S. trade policy has traditionally sought to balance the need for cross-border data flows, which often include personal data, with online privacy and security. Some stakeholders, including some Members of Congress, believe that U.S. policy should better protect personal data privacy and security, and have introduced legislation to set a national policy. Other policymakers and analysts are concerned about increasing foreign barriers to U.S. digital trade, including data flows. Recent incidents of private information being shared or exposed have heightened public awareness of the risks posed to personal data stored online. Consumers’ personal online data is valued by organizations for a variety of reasons, such as analyzing marketing information and easing the efficiency of transactions. Concerns are likely to grow as the amount of online data organizations collect and the level of global data flows expand. As Congress assesses policy options, it may further explore the link between cross-border data flows, online privacy, and trade policy; the trade implications of a comprehensive data privacy policy; and the U.S. role in establishing best practices and binding trade rules that seek to balance public policy priorities. There is no globally accepted standard or definition of data privacy in the online world, and there are no comprehensive binding multilateral rules specifically about cross-border data flows and privacy. Several international organizations, including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), G-20, and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, have sought to develop best practice guidelines or principles related to privacy and cross-border data flows, although none are legally binding. U.S. and other recent trade agreements are establishing new enforceable trade rules and disciplines. Countries vary in their data policies and laws; some focus on limiting access to online information by restricting the flow of data beyond a country’s borders, aiming to protect domestic interests (e.g., constituents’ privacy). However, these policies can also act as protectionist measures. The EU and China, two top U.S. trading partners, have established prescriptive rules on cross-border data flows and personal data from different perspectives. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is driven by privacy concerns; China is focused on security. Their policies affect U.S. firms seeking to do business in those regions, as well as in other markets that emulate the EU and Chinese approaches. Unlike the EU or China, the United States does not broadly restrict cross-border data flows and has traditionally regulated privacy at a sectoral level to cover data, such as health records. U.S. trade policy has sought to balance the goals of consumer privacy, security, and open commerce. The proposed United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) represents the Trump Administration’s first attempt to include negotiated trade rules and disciplines on privacy, cross-border data flows, and security in a trade agreement. While the United States and other countries work to define their respective national privacy strategies, many stakeholders seek a more global approach that would allow interoperability between differing national regimes to facilitate and remove discriminatory trade barriers to cross-border data flows; this could offer an opportunity for the United States to lead the global conversation. Although Congress has examined issues surrounding online privacy and has considered multiple bills, there is not yet consensus on a comprehensive U.S. online data privacy policy. Congress may weigh in as the Administration seeks to define U.S. policy on data privacy and engages in international negotiations on cross-border data flows.

Mar 11, 2019

The U.S. Trade Deficit: An Overview

Mar 8, 2019

2018 Farm Bill Primer: What Is the Farm Bill?

Mar 8, 2019

Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Mandated Sales and Reform

The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), administered by the Department of Energy (DOE), has played a role in U.S. energy policy for over 40 years. Over that time, its primary focus has changed from its original intent as world oil market conditions have changed. Originally intended to offset the market power of cartels and prevent economic damage from oil supply disruption, it has become primarily a tool for combatting the fuel market effects of domestic natural disasters like hurricanes. Most recently, U.S. net imports of oil and petroleum products have decreased as a result of the increase in domestic oil production. Because of lower reliance on imports, some stakeholders see less need for an oil stockpile, and view the SPR more as a mechanism for providing funding for a wide variety of legislative purposes, ranging from health care, to highways, and general purpose revenues. Over this period, the SPR has expanded its potential usefulness to cover all of these purposes. As a member of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and a participant in the International Energy Program established by the IEA, the United States, as are all net-importer nations in the IEA, is required to hold the equivalent of 90 days of its net imports of oil and petroleum products as a reserve stock. As a result of relatively stable U.S. oil consumption and rapidly increasing production, and declining net imports, available oil stocks held in the SPR now are almost double the 90-day requirement. While the SPR has recently seen relatively little use in combatting oil supply disruptions caused by political and military instability, or even natural disasters, it has provided a source of funding for a variety of legislative initiatives. These mandated sales from the SPR have committed almost 260 million barrels of oil for sale by FY2027, leaving less than 400 million barrels of uncommitted oil reserves. Determining whether further reductions can be made from the reserve while maintaining its ability to carry out its designed purpose is a key energy policy question. The extreme variant of this question is whether a reserve is required at all, or whether privately held stocks, as practiced by most European countries, are adequate to meet international commitments. Legislation in the 115th Congress, H.R. 6511, sought to maintain the SPR facility and infrastructure, while reducing operating and maintenance costs, by renting unused storage capacity in the reserve to private companies and foreign nations. As of this writing, no bills have been introduced in the 116th Congress modifying the SPR.

Mar 8, 2019

WaterSense® Program: Congressional Authorization

Mar 8, 2019

Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA): An Overview

Mar 7, 2019

The February 2019 Trump-Kim Hanoi Summit

Overview On February 27 and 28, President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un met in Hanoi to discuss North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, as well as the establishment of a new relationship between the two countries. The two leaders had held one prior summit, in Singapore, in June 2018. The Hanoi summit ended earlier than scheduled, with the cancelation of both a lunch and a ceremony to sign a joint statement. President Trump and U.S. officials said that the two leaders parted amicably, and that they expected dialogue would resume at a later date. An article in North Korea’s state-run media also presented the summit in a positive light and mentioned that the two leaders agreed to “continue productive dialogues.” South Korean President Moon Jae-in offered to help the United States and North Korea narrow their differences. The United States and North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, DPRK) each attributed the summit’s breakdown to their inability to resolve differences over the scope and sequencing of concessions, specifically DPRK denuclearization measures in exchange for sanctions relief. North Korea’s Nuclear and Missile Programs Several issues stymied a summit agreement on next steps for denuclearization. Denuclearization Definition: The two sides do not appear to have an understanding on the definition of complete denuclearization, a goal Kim Jong-un has committed to in several settings. Fissile Material Production Facilities: In a post-summit press conference, North Korean officials said they had offered to shut down fissile material production facilities, which can be used to make plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU), at the Yongbyon nuclear complex. However, this step would not necessarily have ended North Korea’s ability to produce all nuclear weapons material. U.S. intelligence community reports have said there are additional uranium enrichment plants outside of Yongbyon. Before the summit, U.S. negotiator Stephen Biegun said that disclosure of enrichment sites other than Yongbyon was to be a key part of negotiations. President Trump in his post-summit remarks referred to a lack of agreement on North Korea’s disclosing a second uranium enrichment plant. Declaration: Another possible sticking point is whether and when North Korea will declare all of its nuclear weapons related stocks (plutonium, HEU, and warheads) and related facilities (including those outside of Yongbyon). Inspections: In his press conference following the summit, DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho said that North Korea had proposed that technical inspectors from the United States come to Yongbyon to monitor the shuttering of fissile material production facilities there. The U.S. response is unknown. Missiles: It is unclear whether the DPRK’s ballistic missile program was discussed in Hanoi. Sanctions The two sides appeared to be far apart on the issue of sanctions relief. President Trump stated that North Korea demanded the removal of sanctions “in their entirety.” DPRK Foreign Minister Ri claimed that they had only asked for relief from United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions imposed since 2016 that target North Korea’s export of coal, iron, and other minerals; imports of petroleum; and other sectoral industries. This sanctions relief would leave in place only sanctions that restrict imports of arms, dual-use items, and luxury goods. The 2016-2017 sanctions are considered the most likely to isolate North Korea’s economy if fully enforced. In the period between the Singapore and Hanoi summits, Biegun suggested that sanctions relief could be implemented as an incremental incentive and reward as North Korea, also incrementally, moves toward verifiable denuclearization. Relieving sanctions could keep all parties engaged, provide momentum for the diplomatic process, and help build trust between Pyongyang and Seoul, which would like to implement a range of inter-Korean projects but cannot under the current sanctions regime. Some critics of this approach contend that easing sanctions in the 2016-2017 UNSC resolutions would, in essence, end the multilateral sanctions regime that may have been central to bringing North Korea to the negotiating table. Some Members of Congress, after the Hanoi summit, called on the Trump Administration to resume using the legislative tools already in place to strengthen and broaden sanctions to include, for example, banks in China that conduct business for North Korea. For example, in the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act of 2016 (P.L. 114-122), Congress provided a statement of the goals to be achieved before relieving the pressures of sanctions, including an end to North Korea’s currency counterfeiting, money laundering, compliance with all U.N. Security Council requirements, return of abductees of foreign nations, and improved conditions in DPRK political prison camps. U.S. and U.N. sanctions are imposed on North Korea to address a broad range of behavior; comprehensive sanctions relief in response to denuclearization could be seen to diminish the importance of the other rationales for sanctions. Other Issues Missile and nuclear testing. According Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Kim promised to maintain the moratorium on nuclear and missile tests that North Korea has had in place since late November 2017. Satellite imagery reveals that in recent weeks North Korea has started restoring structures at its Sohae missile and satellite launch site. Peace declaration and liaison offices. The United States and North Korea were expected to issue in Hanoi a declaration formally ending the Korean War and to announce the exchange of diplomatic liaison offices. After the summit, a senior State Department official involved in the negotiations said “... our view is that all these pieces [including denuclearization] fit together and ... have to move in parallel.” U.S.-South Korea military exercises. On March 2, the United States and South Korea announced a permanent halt to large-scale U.S.-South Korean military exercises and their replacement with smaller exercises. President Trump cited the exercises’ cost as the reason for their cessation. Prior to Trump’s original suspension of the exercises after the Singapore summit, U.S. defense officials often said that the annual large-scale exercises were critical to maintaining military readiness. According to the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea, over the past year North Korea has continued to hold its own military exercises “on a scale consistent with recent years.”

Mar 6, 2019

China Primer: Uyghurs

Mar 6, 2019

U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation: From the Mérida Initiative to the Bicentennial Framework

Mar 6, 2019

Overview of the 2018 Farm Bill Energy Title Programs

Mar 6, 2019

Reauthorizing Highway and Transit Funding Programs

Mar 6, 2019

UPDATE: Will the FTC Need to Rethink its Enforcement Playbook? Third Circuit Considers FTC’s Ability to Sue Based on Past Conduct

Mar 6, 2019

PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act: Expiring Authorities

Mar 6, 2019

U.S.-UK Trade Relations

Mar 5, 2019

Section 199A Deduction for Pass-Through Business Income: An Overview

Mar 5, 2019

Congress Faces Calls to Extend Funding for Special Diabetes Programs

Under the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33), Congress amended the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to create two special diabetes programs. The first—the Special Diabetes Program for Type I Diabetes (PHSA §330B; U.S.C. 42 §254c-2) provides funding for the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to award grants to study type I diabetes. The second—the Special Diabetes Program for Indians (PHSA §330C; U.S.C. 42 §254c-3)—provides funding to the Indian Health Service (IHS) to award grants for activities related to preventing and treating diabetes for American Indians and Alaska Natives who receive services at IHS-funded facilities. This Insight describes both programs and their funding histories. An estimated 9.4% of the U.S. population has diabetes (type 1 and type 2), and diabetes was the seventh leading cause of death in 2016. Diabetes disproportionately affects certain subpopulations, especially American Indians and Alaska Natives, who have the highest prevalence among racial/ethnic groups. The special diabetes programs are aimed at two subpopulations of those with diabetes: people with type 1 diabetes and American Indians and Alaska Natives. Program Funding Since enactment, both programs have received direct (i.e., mandatory) appropriations. Both NIH and IHS generally receive their funding through annual discretionary appropriations. For both agencies, the special diabetes programs represent one of the only direct (i.e., mandatory) budget authorities. The amount directly appropriated to both programs has increased over time. Initially, they were each funded at $30 million in FY1998. This amount increased to $150 million annually for each program beginning in FY2004. Most recently, funding was extended in Section 50902 of the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-123), which provided each with $150 million for each of FY2018 and FY2019. Under current law, no new funding for these programs will be available after September 30, 2019; however, previously appropriated funds are available until expended. The NIH Program Type 1 diabetes is an autoimmune disease, where a person’s pancreas cannot create insulin—the hormone that regulates blood sugar levels. People with type 1 diabetes must take daily insulin and monitor their blood sugar levels. Even with proper management, people with type 1 diabetes face increased risk of serious complications such as cardiovascular disease, renal disease, and diabetic coma. In 2015, about 5% of the estimated 23.1 million people with diabetes had type 1 diabetes. Unlike type 2 diabetes which is often linked to lifestyle factors and is more commonly diagnosed in adults, type 1 diabetes is more commonly diagnosed in children and adolescents and has no known cause. The Special Diabetes Program for Type 1 Diabetes provides funds to NIH’s National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney Diseases (NIDDK) for research into the prevention and cure of type 1 diabetes. The program is the only disease-specific direct funding authority for NIH. NIDDK collaborates with other NIH institutions and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to implement the program. In total, NIH spent $1.17 billion on diabetes research (both type 1 and type 2) in FY2018 (most recent data available). The Special Diabetes Program for Type 1 Diabetes represented about 13% of total funding on all NIH diabetes research activities. Notably, NIH does not categorize its research funding for diabetes by type (1 or 2). Therefore, the percentage of total type 1 diabetes research funding that the Special Program for Type 1 Diabetes accounts for cannot be determined by CRS. In its FY2019 Congressional Budget Justification, NIDDK specifies how the $150 million appropriated in FY2019 is allocated among six scientific goals, including one related to preventing and reversing the disease and another on developing pancreatic cell replacement therapies. NIDDK reports that the funding has helped researchers identify genes and environmental factors linked with type 1 diabetes, improve blood tests to assess risk of developing the disease, and support clinical trials on therapeutics to prevent and treat the disease. A 2011 program evaluation stated that it “has catalyzed and synergized the efforts of a wide range of NIH and HHS components to combat type 1 diabetes and complications, making it a model trans-NIH and trans-HHS program.” The IHS Program American Indians and Alaska Natives have high rates of diabetes. Prior to the inception of the Special Diabetes Program for Indians (SDPI), these rates had been increasing over time. The SDPI program was enacted to reduce both new cases of diabetes and the rates of complications among the IHS’s diabetic population. Although diabetes rates among the IHS service population remain high, they have not increased since 2011, which some advocates and the IHS attribute to the program. SDPI provides grants to fund more than 300 programs administered by Indian Tribes and Tribal Organizations that undertake evidence based-community programs to prevent and treat diabetes. It supports activities such as nutrition and exercise counseling that seek to prevent diabetes and activities to monitor diabetes related complications, such as foot and eye screening. The program also provides support for IHS’s diabetes surveillance efforts. IHS funds health services, but the needs for services generally exceed available funding. For example, IHS data indicate that it denied or deferred referrals for more than 92,000 services in FY2016. As part of IHS’s strategy to manage resources, it focuses on prevention of common conditions among its service population, including diabetes. IHS’s prevention efforts may complement SDPI programs, as both can be used to support wellness and nutrition programs. Policy Considerations Congress may face a number of policy questions with regard to the two diabetes programs. These include the following: Should program funding be extended? Can some or all of program activities be undertaken using the NIH and IHS discretionary appropriations? Do the activities funded under these program supplement or duplicate other agency activities? Are there advantages or drawbacks to disease-specific funding authorities? If program funding is extended, is the program’s current funding level appropriate? As noted above, funding for these programs has not increased since FY2004. During this time period, the cost of research has increased, as has the size of the IHS service population and the cost of medical care.

Mar 5, 2019

Guatemalan President's Dispute with the U.N. Commission Against Impunity (CICIG)

Mar 5, 2019