Committee Controls of Agency Decisions

Summary

Congress has a long history of subjecting certain types of executive agency decisions to

committee

control, either by committees or subcommittees. Especially with the beginning of World War II, the

executive branch agreed to committee controls as an accommodation that allowed Congress to

delegate authority and funds broadly while using committees to monitor the use of that discretionary

authority. These committee-agency arrangements took the form of different procedures: simply

notifying the committee, obtaining committee approval, "coming into agreement" understandings,

and using the congressional distinction between authorization and appropriation to exercise

committee controls.

By the 1930s, the White House and the Justice Department began to object to

committee-approval arrangements as an encroachment into executive duties and a violation of

separation of powers. Litigation in the 1970s, supported by the Administration, resulted in the

Supreme Court's decision INS v. Chadha (1983), striking down every form

of legislative veto:

two-house, one-house, committee, subcommittee, and chairman. The Court ruled that whenever

Congress intends to exercise control over any action outside the legislative branch, it must comply

with the regular constitutional requirements for lawmaking: action by both houses (bicameralism)

and submission of a bill or joint resolution to the President for his signature or veto (Presentation

Clause).

Notwithstanding this decision, agencies continue to fashion accommodations that settle some

decisions at the level of committees and subcommittees. This type of arrangement is seen frequently

in reprogramming procedures, where agencies seek committee/subcommittee approval before

shifting certain types of funds within an appropriations account. A number of committee vetoes are

also used outside the reprogramming process.

This report explains how and why committee vetoes originated, the constitutional objections

raised by the executive branch, the Court's decision in Chadha , and the continuation of

committee

review procedures since that time. For a brief six-page treatment, see CRS Report RS22132(pdf) ,

Legislative Vetoes After Chadha , by Louis Fisher. This report will be updated as events

warrant.