The Alien Tort Statute (ATS): A Primer

Summary

Passed by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been described as a provision “unlike any other in American law” and “unknown to any other legal system in the world.” In its current form, the complete text of the statute provides: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” While just one sentence, the ATS has been the subject of intense interest in recent decades, as it has evolved from a little-known jurisdictional provision to a prominent vehicle for foreign nationals to seek redress in U.S. courts for injuries caused by human rights offenses and acts of terrorism.

The ATS has its historical roots in founding-era efforts to give the federal government supremacy over the nation’s power of foreign affairs and to avoid international conflict arising from disputes about the treatment of aliens in the United States. Although it has been part of U.S. law since 1789, the ATS was rarely used for nearly two centuries. In 1980, that long dormancy came to an end when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rendered a landmark decision, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, which held that the ATS permits claims for violations of modern international human rights law.

Filártiga caused an explosion of ATS litigation in the decades that followed, but the Supreme Court has placed outer limits on ATS jurisdiction in two more recent decisions. In a 2004 case, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court held that the ATS allows federal courts to hear only a “narrow set” of claims for violations of international law. And in 2013, the Supreme Court held in Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. that the statute does not provide jurisdiction for claims between foreign plaintiffs and defendants involving matters arising entirely outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. Lower courts’ interpretations of these decisions are still evolving—and, in some cases, conflicting, but many observers agree that Sosa and Kiobel have significantly narrowed the scope of the ATS.

In April 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, an ATS case against one the largest financial institutions in the Middle East. The plaintiffs in Jesner allege that Arab Bank maintained accounts for known terrorists; accepted donations that it knew would be used to fund terrorist activity; and distributed millions of dollars to families of suicide bombers in so-called “martyrdom” payments. The Second Circuit dismissed the case on the ground that the “law of nations” that is actionable under the ATS does not impose liability on corporate entities. But every other U.S. court of appeals to consider the issue has reached the opposite conclusion, holding that corporate liability is available under the ATS. The Supreme Court ostensibly granted certiorari in Jesner to resolve this circuit split over the question of corporate liability.

Jesner has generated significant attention among observers, including some Members of Congress. Senators Whitehouse and Graham filed an amici brief advocating for reversal of the Second Circuit’s decision. The Senators’ brief argues that the ATS serves as part of a larger legislative scheme to address terrorism, and that a limitation on corporate liability would create gaps in the United States’ legal framework for combating terrorism. The Solicitor General also filed an amicus brief on behalf of the United States arguing that Jesner was wrongly decided. However, the Solicitor General’s brief suggests that the case may be dismissed on other grounds by recommending that it be remanded to the Second Circuit for consideration of whether the claims are sufficiently connected to the United States to satisfy Kiobel’s presumption against extraterritoriality.