U.S. Restrictions on Relations with Burma

Summary

Major changes in Burma’s political situation have precipitated a broad discussion in Congress, the Obama Administration, and elsewhere about the appropriate role for U.S. restrictions on relations with Burma (Myanmar). These discussions are examining U.S. policy toward Burma in general, the appropriate framework for analyzing the current situation in Burma, and what adjustments to make on U.S. restrictions on relations with Burma. On May 17, 2016, President Obama continued the national emergency with respect to Burma to extend some of the restrictions, as well as renew past presidential waivers of other restrictions. In addition, on that same day, the State Department and Treasury Department announced some changes in the implementation of the existing restrictions.

Between 1989 and 2008, Congress passed several laws placing political and economic sanctions on Burma’s military junta as part of a policy to foster the reestablishment of democratically-elected civilian government, promote the protection of human rights, and identify individuals responsible for repression in Burma and hold them accountable for their actions. In 2011, Burma’s military junta, known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) transferred power to a mixed civilian/military government led by the SPDC’s ex-Prime Minister General Thein Sein. Over the next five years, Congress and the Obama Administration waived or ended some of the sanctions on Burma in part in response to political and economic reforms undertaken by the Thein Sein government.

In November 2015, Burma held nationwide parliamentary elections, from which Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), emerged with an absolute majority in both chambers of Burma’s Union Parliament. The NLD-led Union Parliament chose Htin Kyaw, a long-standing NLD member and close friend of Aung San Suu Kyi, as President. Aung San Suu Kyi was subsequently appointed to the newly-created position of State Counselor, as well as Foreign Minister.

While the NLD controls the Union Parliament and the executive branch, the Burmese military, or Tatmadaw, continue to exercise significant power under the provisions of Burma’s 2008 constitution. For example, 25% of the seats in both chambers of the Union Parliament are military officers appointed by the Tatmadaw’s Commander in Chief Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, creating a voting bloc that can prevent any changes in the constitution. In addition, the Tatmadaw engages in active fighting with several ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in a continuation of a nearly six decade-old low grade civil war. As such, it is uncertain if the NLD-led government will have the ability to address its top priorities—national reconciliation and peace; further democratic reforms; respect for human rights; and greater prosperity for the Burmese people.