Article 3, Section 1 — Inherent Powers Over Contempt And Sanctions

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Article III, Section 1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that federal courts possess inherent authority to punish contempt—i.e., disobedience of a court order or obstruction of justice—and to impose other sanctions on parties or attorneys who engage in misconduct.

The Court’s contempt decisions have often distinguished between criminal and civil contempt.[1](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn1art3 " But see United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). A civil contempt has been traditionally viewed as the refusal of a person in a civil case to obey a mandatory order. It is incomplete in nature, may be purged by obedience to the court order, and does not involve a sentence for a definite period. The classic criminal contempt is one where the act of contempt has been completed, punishment is imposed to vindicate the authority of the court, and a person cannot by subsequent action purge himself of such contempt. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441–443 (1911); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925). See also Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 327–328 (1904). ") Whether a contempt is civil or criminal can be of great importance. For instance, criminal contempt implicates procedural rights attendant to prosecutions, while civil contempt does not.[2](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn2art3 " Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994); Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966). ") In Ex parte Grossman, while holding that the President may pardon a criminal contempt, Chief Justice William Howard Taft noted in dicta that the pardon power did not extend to civil contempt.[3](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn3art3 " 267 U.S. 87, 119–120 (1925). In an analogous case, the Court was emphatic in a dictum that Congress cannot require a jury trial where the contemnor has failed to perform a positive act for the relief of private parties. Michaelson v. United States ex rel. Chicago, S.P., M. & Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924). But see Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968). ") In Turner v. Rogers, the Court held that the Due Process Clause does not grant an indigent defendant a right to state-appointed counsel at a civil contempt proceeding.[4](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn4art3 " 564 U.S. 431 (2011); cf. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (holding that a state may place the burden of proving inability to pay child support on a defendant faced with civil contempt). ") Notwithstanding the importance of distinguishing between the two types of contempt, there have been instances where defendants have been charged with both civil and criminal contempt for the same act.[5](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn5art3 " See United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 299. ")

The history of the contempt powers of the American Judiciary is marked by two trends: a shrinking of the courts’ power to punish a person summarily and a multiplying of the due process requirements that must be met when finding an individual to be in contempt.[6](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn6art3 " Many of the limitations placed on the inferior federal courts have been issued on the basis of the Supreme Court’s supervisory power over them rather than upon a constitutional foundation, while, of course, the limitations imposed on state courts necessarily are on constitutional dimensions. Indeed, it is often the case that a limitation that is applied to an inferior federal court as a superintending measure is then transformed into a constitutional limitation and applied to state courts. Compare Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), with Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). The limitations then bind both federal and state courts alike. Therefore, in this section, Supreme Court constitutional limitations on state court contempt powers are cited without restriction for equal application to federal courts. ") The power of the courts of the United States to punish contempts of their authority had its origin in the law and practice of England where disobedience of court orders was regarded as contempt of the King himself and attachment was a prerogative process derived from presumed contempt of the sovereign.[7](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn7art3 " Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L.Q. Rev. 184, 194–195 (1908). ") By the latter part of the eighteenth century, summary power to punish was extended to all contempts whether committed in or out of court.[8](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn8art3 " Fox, The Summary Power to Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. Rev. 238, 252 (1909). ") In the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789 broadly conferred power on all courts of the United States “to punish by fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.” [9](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn9art3 " 1 Stat. 83, § 17 (1789). ") The abuse of this extensive power led to the passage of the Act of 1831, which limited the power of the federal courts to punish contempts to misbehavior in the presence of the courts “or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,” misbehavior of officers of courts in their official capacity, and disobedience or resistance to any lawful writ, process or order of the court.[10](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn10art3 " 18 U.S.C. § 401. Judge James H. Peck of the Federal District Court of Missouri was impeached for abuse of the contempt power, but was acquitted by the Senate. For a summary of the Peck impeachment and the background of the Act of 1831, see Felix Frankfurter & James Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in ‘Inferior’ Federal Courts: A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1024–1028 (1924). ")

Writing for the Court to sustain the Act of 1831 in Ex parte Robinson, Justice Stephen Field described the nature of the contempt power as follows:

The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power.[11](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn11art3 " 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874). ")

While he expressed doubts concerning the validity of the 1831 Act as applied to the Supreme Court, Justice Field declared that there could be no question of its validity as applied to the lower courts because they are created by Congress and their “powers and duties depend upon the act calling them into existence, or subsequent acts extending or limiting their jurisdiction.” [12](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn12art3 " Id. at 511. ") With the passage of time, later adjudications, especially after 1890, came to place more emphasis on the inherent power of courts to punish contempts than upon the power of Congress to regulate summary attachment.

By 1911, the Court was saying that the contempt power must be exercised by a court without referring the issues of fact or law to another tribunal or to a jury in the same tribunal.[13](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn13art3 " Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911). See also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895). ") In Michaelson v. United States, the Court narrowly interpreted sections of the Clayton Act relating to punishment for contempt of court by disobedience of injunctions in labor disputes.[14](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn14art3 " 266 U.S. 42 (1924). ") The sections in question provided for a jury upon the demand of the accused in contempt cases where the acts committed in violation of district court orders also constituted a crime. Although Justice George Sutherland reaffirmed earlier rulings establishing the authority of Congress to regulate the contempt power, he went on to qualify this authority and declared that “the attributes which inhere in the power [to punish contempt] and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered practically inoperative.” [15](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn15art3 " Id. at 66. ") The Court mentioned specifically “the power to deal summarily with contempt committed in the presence of the courts or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,” and the power to enforce mandatory decrees by coercive means.[16](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn16art3 " Id. at 65–66. ") The Court has held that this latter power to enforce includes the authority to appoint private counsel to prosecute a criminal contempt.[17](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/inherent-powers-over-contempt-and-sanctions#fn17art3 " Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 793–801 (1987). However, the Court, invoking its supervisory power, instructed the lower federal courts first to request the United States Attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt and only if refused should they appoint a private lawyer. Id. at 801–802. Still using its supervisory power, the Court held that the district court had erred in appointing counsel for a party that was the beneficiary of the court order; disinterested counsel had to be appointed. Id. at 802–08. Justice Antonin Scalia contended that the power to prosecute is not comprehended within Article III judicial power and that federal judges had no power, inherent or otherwise, to initiate a prosecution for contempt or to appoint counsel to pursue it. Id. at 815. See also United States v. Providence J. Co., <a href="/supremecourt/text/485/693" aria-label="48