Article 3, Section 1 — Habeas Review

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Article III, Section 1:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Federal courts can hear challenges to state criminal convictions pursuant to petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. While early Supreme Court cases interpreted that authority narrowly, subsequent cases allowed for broader federal review of state court convictions. More recently, however, the Court has adopted a more limited approach to habeas review, and Congress has also enacted legislation limiting federal habeas review of state convictions.

At English common law, the writ of habeas corpus was available to attack pretrial detention and confinement by executive order; it could not be used to question the conviction of a person pursuant to the judgment of a court with jurisdiction over the person. In early cases, the Supreme Court applied the common law understanding of the writ.[1](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn1art3 " Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Marshall, C.J.); cf. Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876). But see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 404–415 (1963). The expansive language used when Congress in 1867 extended the habeas power of federal courts to state prisoners “restrained of . . . liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States . . . ,” could have encouraged an expansion of the writ to persons convicted after trial. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 385. ") After the Civil War, the Court adopted a broader view of when a court lacked jurisdiction over a petitioner. Thus, in the 1874 case, Ex Parte Lange, a person who had already completed one sentence on a conviction was released from custody on a second sentence on the ground that the court had lost jurisdiction upon completion of the first sentence.[2](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn2art3 " Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874). ") In the 1880s, the Court held that the constitutionality of the statute upon which a charge was based could be examined on habeas, because an unconstitutional statute was said to deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction.[3](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn3art3 " Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). ") Other cases expanded the want-of-jurisdiction rationale.[4](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn4art3 " Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887); but see Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876); Ex parte Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885). It is possible that the Court expanded the office of the writ because its reviewing power over federal convictions was closely limited. Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in ‘Inferior’ Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 1010, 1016–1023 (1924). Once such review was granted, the Court began to restrict the use of the writ. E.g., Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420 (1912); In re Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178 (1906); In re Morgan, 203 U.S. 96 (1906). ")

The Court started developing its modern approach to the writ of habeas corpus in the 1915 case Frank v. Mangum,[5](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn5art3 " 237 U.S. 309 (1915). ") in which the Court reviewed on habeas a murder conviction in a trial in which there was substantial evidence of mob domination of the judicial process. This issue had been considered and rejected by the state appeals court. The Supreme Court indicated that, though it might initially have had jurisdiction, the trial court could have lost it if mob domination rendered the proceedings lacking in due process. The Court further held that, in order to determine if there had been a denial of due process, a habeas court should examine the totality of the process, including the appellate proceedings. Because the state appellate court had reviewed fully and rejected Frank’s claim of mob domination, the Court held he had been afforded an adequate corrective process for any denial of rights, and his custody did not violate the Constitution.[6](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn6art3 " Id. ") Eight years later, in Moore v. Dempsey,[7](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn7art3 " 261 U.S. 86 (1923). ") a case involving another conviction in a trial in which the court was alleged to have been influenced by a mob and in which the state appellate court had heard and rejected Moore’s contentions, the Court directed that the federal district judge himself determine the merits of the petitioner’s allegations.

In later cases, the Court abandoned its emphasis upon want of jurisdiction and held that the writ was available to consider constitutional claims as well as questions of jurisdiction.[8](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn8art3 " Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941). See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). ") The landmark case was Brown v. Allen,[9](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn9art3 " 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Brown coincided with the extension of most of the Bill of Rights to the states by way of incorporation and expansive interpretation of federal constitutional rights; previously, there was not a substantial corpus of federal rights to protect through habeas. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 297–99 (1992) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), Justice William Brennan, for the Court, and Justice John Harlan, in dissent, engaged in a lengthy, informed historical debate about the legitimacy of Brown and its premises. Compare id. at 401–24, with id. at 450–61. See the material gathered and cited in L. Hand, The Bill of Rights (1958); H. Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental Law: Selected Essays 1220–1248 (1961). ") in which the Court laid down several principles of statutory construction of the habeas statute. First, all federal constitutional questions raised by state prisoners are cognizable in federal habeas. Second, a federal court is not bound by state court judgments on federal questions, even though the state courts may have fully and fairly considered the issues. Third, a federal habeas court may inquire into issues of fact as well as of law, although the federal court may defer to the state court if the prisoner received an adequate hearing. Fourth, new evidentiary hearings must be held when there are unusual circumstances, when there is a “vital flaw” in the state proceedings, or when the state court record is incomplete or otherwise inadequate.

The Supreme Court authorized almost plenary federal habeas review of state court convictions in its famous “1963 trilogy.” [10](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn10art3 " Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). These cases dealt, respectively, with the treatment to be accorded a habeas petition in the three principal categories in which they come to the federal court: when a state court has rejected petitioner’s claims on the merits, when a state court has refused to hear petitioner’s claims on the merits because she has failed properly or timely to present them, or when the petition is a second or later petition raising either old or new, or mixed, claims. Of course, as will be demonstrated infra, these cases have now been largely drained of their force. ") First, in Townsend v. Sain, the Court dealt with the established principle that a federal habeas court is empowered, where a prisoner alleges facts which if proved would entitle him to relief, to relitigate facts, to receive evidence and try the facts anew, and sought to lay down broad guidelines as to when district courts must hold a hearing and find facts.[11](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn11art3 " Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 310–12 (1963). If the district judge concluded that the habeas applicant was afforded a full and fair hearing by the state court resulting in reliable findings, the Court said, he may, and ordinarily should, defer to the state factfinding. Id. at 318. Under the 1966 statutory revision, a habeas court must generally presume correct a state court’s written findings of fact from a hearing to which the petitioner was a party. A state finding cannot be set aside merely on a preponderance of the evidence and the federal court granting the writ must include in its opinion the reason it found the state findings not fairly supported by the record or the existence of one or more listed factors justifying disregard of the factfinding. Pub. L. No. 89-711, 80 Stat. 1105 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991); Burden v. Zant, 498 U.S. 433 (1991). The presumption of correctness does not apply to questions of law or to mixed questions of law and fact. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110–16 (1985). However, in Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277 (1992), the Justices argued inconclusively whether deferential review of questions of law or especially of law and fact should be adopted. ") The Court stated: “Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceeding.” [12](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/habeas-review#fn12art3 " Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963). The Court was unanimous on the statement, but it divided 5-4 on application. ") To “particularize” this general test, the