Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1 — Detention Authority

prev | next

Article II, Section 2, Clause 1:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

During a military action in Afghanistan pursuant to the congressional authorization for the use of force, a United States citizen, Yaser Hamdi, was taken prisoner. The Executive Branch argued that it had plenary authority under Article II to hold such an “enemy combatant” for the duration of hostilities, and to deny him meaningful recourse to the federal courts. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court agreed that the President was authorized to detain a United States citizen seized in Afghanistan, although a majority of the Court appeared to reject the notion that such power was inherent in the Presidency, relying instead on statutory grounds.[1](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn1art2 " 542 U.S. 507 (2004). There was no opinion of the Court. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Justice Anthony Kennedy and Justice Stephen Breyer, avoided ruling on the Executive Branch argument that such detentions could be authorized by its Article II powers alone, and relied instead on the “Authorization for Use of Military Force” passed by Congress. Justice Clarence Thomas also found that the Executive Branch had the power to detain the petitioner, although his dissenting opinion found that such detentions were authorized by Article II in addition to the authorization statute. Id. at 579, 587 (Thomas, J. dissenting). Justice David Souter, joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, rejected the argument that the Congress had authorized such detention of American citizens in light of the requirement for express statutory authority found in the Non-Detention Act and the fact that the government was not treating the petitioner as a prisoner of war. Id. at 548–551 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to Pub. L. No. 92–128 (1971), 85 Stat. 347 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a)) and Third Geneva Convention art. 4, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3320, T.I.A. S. No. 3364 (1949)). Justice Antonin Scalia, joined with Justice John Paul Stevens, denied that such congressional authorization was possible without a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 553 (Scalia, J. dissenting). ") However, the Court did find that the government may not detain the petitioner indefinitely for purposes of interrogation,[2](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn2art2 " Id. at 521. ") and must afford him the opportunity to offer evidence that he is not an enemy combatant.[3](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn3art2 " At a minimum, the petitioner must be given notice of the asserted factual basis for holding him, must be given a fair chance to rebut that evidence before a neutral decisionmaker, and must be allowed to consult an attorney. 542 U.S. at 533, 539. Justices Souter and Ginsburg, concurring in the result, agreed the case should be remanded for due process reasons. Id. at 553. ")

In Rasul v. Bush,[4](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn4art2 " 542 U.S. 466 (2004). ") the Court rejected an Executive Branch argument that foreign prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay were outside of federal court jurisdiction. The Court distinguished earlier case law arising during World War II that denied habeas corpus petitions from German citizens who had been captured and tried overseas by United States military tribunals.[5](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn5art2 " Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950). ") In Rasul, the Court noted that the Guantanamo petitioners were not citizens of a country at war with the United States,[6](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn6art2 " The petitioners were Australians and Kuwaitis. ") had not been afforded any form of tribunal, and were being held in a territory over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction and control.[7](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn7art2 " Rasul, 542 U.S. at 467. ") In addition, the Court found that statutory grounds existed for the extension of habeas corpus to these prisoners.[8](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn8art2 " The Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 2241—which had previously been construed to require the presence of a petitioner in a district court’s jurisdiction—was now satisfied by the presence of a jailor-custodian. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Ct., 410 U.S. 484 (1973). Another “enemy combatant” case, this one involving an American citizen arrested on American soil, was remanded after the Court found that a federal court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was limited to jurisdiction over the immediate custodian of a petitioner. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (federal court’s jurisdiction over Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld not sufficient to satisfy presence requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). In Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), the Court held that the federal habeas statute— 28 U.S.C. § 2241—applied to American citizens held by the Multinational Force—Iraq, an international coalition force operating in Iraq and composed of twenty-six different nations, including the United States. The Court concluded that the habeas statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command, even when those forces are acting as part of a multinational coalition. ") —which had previously been construed to require the presence of a petitioner in a district court’s jurisdiction—was now satisfied by the presence of a jailor-custodian. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Ct., 410 U.S. 484 (1973). Another “enemy combatant” case, this one involving an American citizen arrested on American soil, was remanded after the Court found that a federal court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was limited to jurisdiction over the immediate custodian of a petitioner. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (federal court’s jurisdiction over Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld not sufficient to satisfy presence requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). In Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008), the Court held that the federal habeas statute— 28 U.S.C. § 2241—applied to American citizens held by the Multinational Force—Iraq, an international coalition force operating in Iraq and composed of twenty-six different nations, including the United States. The Court concluded that the habeas statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command, even when those forces are acting as part of a multinational coalition.

In response to Rasul, Congress amended the habeas statute to eliminate all federal habeas jurisdiction over detainees, whether its basis was statutory or constitutional.[9](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn9art2 " Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.

, § 1005(e)(1) (providing that “no court . . . shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by . . . an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay” ). After the Court decided, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), that this language of the Detainee Treatment Act did not apply to detainees whose cases were pending at the time of enactment, the language was amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–366, to also apply to pending cases where a detainee had been determined to be an enemy combatant. ")

109-148

, § 1005(e)(1) (providing that “no court . . . shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by . . . an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay” ). After the Court decided, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), that this language of the Detainee Treatment Act did not apply to detainees whose cases were pending at the time of enactment, the language was amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109 –366, to also apply to pending cases where a detainee had been determined to be an enemy combatant. This amendment was challenged in Boumediene v. Bush,[10](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn10art2 " 553 U.S. 723 (2008). ") as a violation of the Suspension Clause.[11](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-2/section-2/clause-1/detention-authority#fn11art2 " U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” In Boumediene, the government argued only that the Suspension Clause did not apply to