Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 — Historical Background On Appropriations Clause

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Article I, Section 9, Clause 7:

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

The Appropriations Clause makes part of American constitutional law a regular practice of British Parliaments dating from at least the Glorious Revolution of the late seventeenth century. Parliament’s function of granting its consent to raise revenue as a supplement to the Monarch’s ordinary revenue sources had by then been an established and powerful tool.. ") However, prior to the Glorious Revolution, Parliament does not seem to have regularly directed its attention to decisions of how voted sums would be used. (dating regular use of clauses of appropriation to 1688). However, members of Parliament maintained that they had the authority to legislate expenditure decisions even before the practice became more common. See 3 Anchitell Grey, Debates of the House of Commons 446–47 (1763) (statement of William Sacheverell, M.P.) (asserting, during 1675 debate in the Grand Committee of Supply, precedent for clauses of appropriation in supply bills dating from the 13th century). ") The view of King Charles II’s chief ministers in the decades prior to the Glorious Revolution, for example, was that the Monarch was the “master of his own money” and that his ministers had discretion to apply voted sums “to defray any casual expenses, of any nature” whatsoever.. ") The ministers viewed a 1665 supply bill passed by the House of Commons, for example, as “not fit for [a] monarchy” because it included a clause of appropriation, that is, legislative language stating that sums the bill raised could be used only for the costs of war against the Dutch Republic., reprinted in 5 Statutes of the Realm 573 (John Raithby ed., 1819) (reciting that “noe moneyes leavyable by this Act be issued out of the Exchequer dureing this Warr but by such Order or Warrant mentioning that the moneyes payable by such Order or Warrant are for the service of Your Majestie in the said Warr respectively” ). ") However, when King William III and Queen Mary II jointly assumed the throne in 1689, they recognized Parliament’s power to legislate supply and expenditure. (dated under the Old Style calendar), reprinted in 6 Statutes of the Realm 143 (John Raithby ed., 1819) (listing among Parliament’s ancient rights and liberties the rule that “levying Money for or to the Use of the Crowne” by pretense “of Prerogative without Grant of Parlyament for longer time or in other manner then the same is or shall be granted is Illegall” ). ") Thereafter, clauses of appropriations became common features of parliamentary legislation.. ")

When the American states framed new systems of government after Independence, most state constitutions made legislative authorization a prerequisite for drawing any funds from a state treasury.; Md. Const. or Form of Gov’t of 1776, at X – XI (specifying that the House of Delegates would originate all “money bills,” a term defined to include all bills “appropriating money in the treasury” or otherwise providing supplies “for the support of the government” ); Mass. Const. of 1780, ch. 2, § 1, art. XI ( “No moneys shall be issued out of the treasury of this Commonwealth, and disposed of . . . but by warrant, under the hand of the Governour for the time being, with the advice and consent of the council, for the necessary defence and support of the Commonwealth; and for the protection and preservation the inhabitants thereof, agreeably to the act and resolves of the general court.” ); N.H. Const. of 1783, pt. 2, reprinted in The Perpetual Laws of the State of New-Hampshire 16 (John Melcher ed., 1789) (substantially similar language to that of Massachusetts Constitution of 1780); N.C. Const. of 1776, § 19 ( “That the governor for the time being, shall have the power to draw for and apply such sums of money as shall be voted by the general assembly for the contingencies of government, and be accountable to them for the same” ); Pa. Const. of 1776, § 20 (providing that the president and the president’s council “may draw upon the treasury for such sums as shall be appropriated by the house” ); S.C. Const. of 1778, art. XVI (directing that no “money be drawn out of the public treasury but by the legislative authority of the state” ). ") No state constitution in effect in 1787 expressly allowed a person to draw money from the state treasury without legislative authorization.. ") The states framed the Articles of Confederation to include a similar appropriating function for the Confederation Congress,. ") albeit one that drew from a common treasury supplied by taxes laid and levied by states rather than by the Confederation Congress itself.

Perhaps owing to the pedigree then enjoyed by the view that a legislature should be solely endowed with the authority to identify the purposes for which public money may be spent, the Appropriations Clause itself attracted little debate at the Constitutional Convention of 1787. The Framers debated only whether the Senate—then conceived as a body whose members the states would elect—would have the power to originate or amend, among others, appropriations bills.. ") The first proposal in the Convention that mentioned Congress’s appropriations function stated that “all Bills for raising or appropriating money” shall “originate in the first Branch of the Legislature, and shall not be altered or amended by the second Branch....” This first proposal continued: “and that no money shall be drawn from the public Treasury but in pursuance of appropriations to be originated in the first Branch.” The delegates ultimately removed limitations on Senate origination and amendment of appropriations bills in the Constitution before submitting the Constitution to the states for ratification.. ")

The Appropriations Clause occasionally figured in arguments advanced on either side of ratification. Those favoring ratification cited the Clause as a way to ensure that expenditure decisions would be made by legislators, the officials who under the new Constitution would be most accountable to the people. (Nov. 28, 1787 convention statement of Thomas McKean) (contending that because the Appropriations Clause would settle responsibility for disbursements on Congress and the Statements and Accounts Clause would require disclosure of disbursements, the people could “judge of the conduct of their rulers and, if they see cause to object to the use or the excess of the sums raised, they may express their wishes or disapprobation to the legislature in petitions or remonstrances” ); 6 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Massachusetts 1322 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2000) (similar argument in January 23, 1788 convention statement of James Bowdoin); see also Brutus, Virginia J. (Dec. 6, 1787), reprinted in 8 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution: Virginia 215 (John P. Kaminski et al. …