Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1 — States And Elections Clause

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Article I, Section 4, Clause 1:

The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

By its terms, Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, referred to as the Elections Clause, contemplates that state legislatures will establish the times, places, and manner of holding elections for the House of Representatives and the Senate, subject to Congress making or altering such state regulations (except as to the place of choosing Senators).[1](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn1art1 " U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. See Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) ( “[I]t is well settled that the Elections Clause grants Congress ‘the power to override state regulations’ by establishing uniform rules for federal elections binding on the States.’” (quoting U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832–33 (1995))). ") The Supreme Court has interpreted the Elections Clause expansively, enabling states “to provide a complete code for congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registration, supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and making and publication of election returns.” [2](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn2art1 " Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932) ") The Court has further recognized the states’ ability to establish sanctions for violating election laws[3](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn3art1 " Id. at 369. ") as well as authority over recounts[4](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn4art1 " Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 24, 25 (1972). ") and primaries.[5](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn5art1 " United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 320 (1941). ") The Elections Clause, however, does not govern voter qualifications, which under Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, and the Seventeenth Amendment must be the same as the “Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislatures.” [6](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn6art1 " U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. amend. XVII. See also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013) ( “Prescribing voting qualifications, therefore, ‘forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government’ by the Elections Clause, which is ‘expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the manner of elections.’” (quoting The Federalist No. 60 (Alexander Hamilton))). ") Similarly, the authority of states to establish the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives” does not include authority to impose additional qualification requirements to be a Member of the House of Representatives or a Senator, which are governed by the Constitution’s Qualification Clauses at Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 for Members of the House and at Article I, Section 3, Clause 3 for the Senate.[7](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn7art1 " U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 3. See United States Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) ")

State authority to regulate the times, places, and manner of holding congressional elections has been described by the Court as the ability “to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental rights involved.” [8](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn8art1 " Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932). ") The Court has upheld a variety of state laws designed to ensure that elections are fair and honest and orderly.[9](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn9art1 " See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (restrictions on independent candidacies requiring early commitment prior to party primaries); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972) (recount for Senatorial election); Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (requirement that minor party candidate demonstrate substantial support—1% of votes cast in the primary election—before being placed on ballot for general election). The Court, however, has held that courts should not modify election rules if the election is imminent and “'[n]o bright line separates permissible election-related regulation from unconstitutional infringements.’” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 5 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 (1997)). In Purcell v. Gonzalez, the Court observed that “the imminence of the election and the inadequate time to resolve the factual disputes” required the Court to “of necessity allow the election to proceed without an injunction suspending the voter identification rules.” Purcell, 549 U.S. at 5–6. See also Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., No. 19A1016, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 2020) (per curiam) (noting that “lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the election rules on the eve of the election” ) (citing Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam); Frank v. Walker, 574 U.S. 929 (2014); Veasey v. Perry, 574 U.S. 951 (2014)). ") But the Court distinguished state laws that go beyond “protection of the integrity and regularity of the election process,” and instead operate to disadvantage a particular class of candidates[10](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn10art1 " U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 835 (1995) ") or negate the need for a general election.[11](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn11art1 " Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (explaining that the Elections Clause “is a default provision; it invests the State with responsibility for the mechanics of congressional elections, but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices” ); see id. at 74 (holding that a Louisiana statute that deemed the winner of the primary to be the winner of the general election void and preempted by federal law which set the date of the election for federal offices). ") The Court noted that the Elections Clause does not allow states to set term limits, which the Court viewed as “disadvantaging a particular class of candidates and evading the dictates of the Qualifications Clause,” [12](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn12art1 " U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 832 (1995) ( “Petitioners make the related argument that Amendment 73 merely regulates the “Manner” of elections and that the amendment is therefore a permissible exercise of state power under Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 (the Elections Clause) to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner” of elections. We cannot agree.” ). ") or ballot labels identifying candidates who disregarded voters’ instructions on term limits or declined to pledge support for them.[13](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn13art1 " Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001). ") In its 1995 decision in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, the Court explained: “[T]he Framers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints.” [14](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn14art1 " Thornton, 514 U.S. at 833–34. See also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (states have an interest in “seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently” ); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 217 (1986) ( “the power to regulate the time, place, and manner of elections does not justify, without more, the abridgment of fundamental rights.” ); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983) (states may adopt “generally applicable and evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself.” ). ")

The Supreme Court has held that Article I, Section 4, Clause 1, provides for Congress, not the courts, to regulate how states exercise their authority over Senate and House elections,[15](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn15art1 " Rucho v. Common Cause, No. 18-422, slip op. (U.S. June 2019). See also Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 392 (1880) ( “The power of Congress . . . is paramount, and may be exercised at any time, and to any extent which it deems expedient.” ). ") although courts may hear cases concerning claims of one-person, one-vote violations and racial gerrymandering.[16](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-1/section-4/clause-1/states-and-elections-clause#fn16art1 " Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932). ") For example, in its 2019 Rucho v. Common Cause decision, the Court held that partisan gerrymandering claims—claims that one political party has