Amendment 7 — Identifying Civil Cases Requiring A Jury Trial

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Seventh Amendment :

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

The Seventh Amendment grants a right to a jury trial in “Suits at common law,” which the Supreme Court has long interpreted as “limited to rights and remedies peculiarly legal in their nature, and such as it was proper to assert in courts of law and by the appropriate modes and proceedings of courts of law.” [1](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn1amd7 " Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253, 262 (1856). ") The drafters of the Seventh Amendment used the term “common law” to clarify that the Amendment does not provide a right to a jury in civil suits involving the types of equitable rights and remedies that courts enforced at the time of the Amendment’s framing.[2](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn2amd7 " Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830); Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 133 (1881). Formerly, the Amendment did not apply to cases where recovery of money damages was incidental to equitable relief even though damages might have been recovered in an action at law. Clark v. Wooster, 119 U.S. 322, 325 (1886); Pease v. Rathbun-Jones Eng’g Co., 243 U.S. 273, 279 (1917). But see Dairy Queen v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (legal claims must be tried before equitable ones). ")

Two unanimous decisions, in which the Supreme Court held that civil juries were required, illustrate the Court’s treatment of this distinction. In the first suit, a landlord sought to recover, based on District of Columbia statutes, possession of real property from a tenant allegedly behind on rent. The Court reasoned that whether “a close equivalent to [the statute in question] existed in England in 1791 [was] irrelevant for Seventh Amendment purposes.” [3](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn3amd7 " Pernell v. Southall Realty Co., 416 U.S. 363, 375 (1974). ") Instead, the Court stated that its Seventh Amendment precedents “require[d] trial by jury in actions unheard of at common law, provided that the action involves rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced in an action at law, rather than in an action at equity or admiralty.” [4](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn4amd7 " Id. ") The statutory cause of action, the Court found, had several analogs in the common law, all of which involved a right to trial by jury.[5](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn5amd7 " Id. at 375–76. ") In a second case, the plaintiff sought damages for alleged racial discrimination in the rental of housing in violation of federal law, arguing that the Seventh Amendment was inapplicable to new causes of action Congress created. The Court disagreed: “The Seventh Amendment does apply to actions enforcing statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the statute creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the ordinary courts of law.” [6](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn6amd7 " Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194–95 (1974) (reasoning that “[a] damage action under the statute sounds basically in tort-the statute merely defines a new legal duty and authorizes the court to compensate a plaintiff for the injury caused by the defendants’ wrongful breach” such that “this cause of action is analogous to a number of tort actions recognized at common law.” See also Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Loc. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990) (suit against union for back pay for breach of duty of fair representation is a suit for compensatory damages, hence plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial); Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Loc. 71, 502 U.S. 93 (1991) (similar suit against union for money damages entitles union member to jury trial; a claim for injunctive relief was incidental to the damages claim); Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, 523 U.S. 340 (1998) (jury trial required for copyright action with close analog at common law, even though the relief sought is not actual damages but statutory damages based on what is “just” ). ")

In SEC v. Jarkesy,[7](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn7amd7 " SEC v. Jarkesy, No. 22-859, slip op. at 27 (U.S. June 27, 2024). The Supreme Court affirmed a Fifth Circuit decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the Court’s opinion. Id. For additional discussion on SEC v. Jarkesy, see . ") the Supreme Court provided additional guidance on how to determine whether an action constitutes a Suit[] at common law[8](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn8amd7 " U.S. Const. amend. VII ( “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.” ). ") for Seventh Amendment purposes. In Jarkesy, the Court held that George Jarkesy, Jr., a defendant in a Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) fraud action for civil penalties, had a right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment . The Court identified two pertinent factors for whether an action was covered by the Seventh Amendment : (1) whether the action was akin to a common law cause of action and (2) whether the remedy was the type that could only be obtained in a court of law.[9](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn9amd7 " Jarkesy, slip op. at 9. ") Because the civil penalties in Jarkesy were designed “to punish and deter, not to compensate,” they were, according to the Court, the “type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.” [10](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn10amd7 " Id. at 11 (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987)). ") Turning to the nature of federal securities fraud actions, the Court reasoned that because securities fraud actions, like common law fraud actions, address “misrepresenting or concealing material facts” [11](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn11amd7 " Id. ") and because Congress and the SEC had adopted common law fraud concepts into federal securities fraud law,[12](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn12amd7 " Id. at 11-12. ") the securities fraud actions were “legal in nature.” [13](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn13amd7 " Id. at 13. (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989)). Discussing the similarities between securities fraud actions and common law fraud, the Court noted that “both target the same basic concept: misrepresenting or concealing material facts.” Id. at 11. ") As such, the case constituted a “Suit[] at common law” for Seventh Amendment purposes, entitling Jarkesy to a jury trial.

In contrast, the Court has upheld the lack of a jury provision in certain actions on the ground that the suit in question was not a suit at common law within the meaning of the Amendment, or that the issues raised were not particularly legal in nature.[14](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn14amd7 " Such actions or issues include, for example: (1) enforcement of claims against the United States, McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880); see also Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 388 (1943); (2) suit under a territorial statute authorizing a special nonjury tribunal to hear claims against a municipality having no legal obligation, but based on moral obligation only, Guthrie Nat’l Bank v. Guthrie, 173 U.S. 528, 534 (1899); see also United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427, 439 (1896); New Orleans v. Clark, 95 U.S. 644, 653 (1877); (3) cancellation of a naturalization certificate for fraud, Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27 (1913); (4) reversal of an order to deport an alien, Gee Wah Lee v. United States, 25 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 608 (1928); (5) damages for patent infringement, Filer & Stowell Co. v. Diamond Iron Works, 270 F. 489 (2d Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 256 U.S. 691 (1921); (6) reversal of an award under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 45 (1932); (7) reversal of a decision of customs appraisers on the value of imports, Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 329 (1890); (8) a summary disposition by referee in bankruptcy of issues regarding voidable preferences as asserted and proved by the trustee, Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966); (9) a determination by a judge in calculating just compensation in a federal eminent domain proceeding of the issue as to whether the condemned lands were originally within the scope of the government’s project or were adjacent lands later added to the plan, United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970); and (10) fair use determinations in copyright cases, Google v. Oracle, No. 18-956, slip op. at 20–21 (U.S. Apr. 2021). ") When there is no direct historical antecedent dating to the Amendment’s adoption, the court may also consider whether existing precedent and the sound administration of justice favor resolution by judges or juries.[15](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-7/identifying-civil-cases-requiring-a-jury-trial#fn15amd7 " See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389–90 (1996) (holding that patent construction is exclusively within the court’s province, taking into account, among other considerations, whether “as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in question” ). ")

The Seventh Amendment does not apply to cases in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in which the court conducts a trial without a jury.[16](https://www.law.corn