Amendment 14 — Power Of States To Regulate Procedures
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Commentary
Fourteenth Amendment , Section 1:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
In general, as long as parties receive sufficient notice,[1](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn1amd14 " See . ") an opportunity to defend their protected interests,[2](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn2amd14 " See . ") and any other required procedural safeguards,[3](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn3amd14 " See ; . ") the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not specify the particular forms of procedure to be used in state courts.[4](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn4amd14 " Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 631 (1916); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900). A state “is free to regulate procedure of its courts in accordance with it own conception of policy and fairness unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 263 (1904); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897); Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167, 176, (1912). The power of a state to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them and to deny access to its courts is also subject to restrictions imposed by the Contract, Full Faith and Credit, and Privileges and Immunities Clauses of the Constitution. Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). ") The states may regulate the manner in which rights may be enforced and wrongs remedied,[5](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn5amd14 " Insurance Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 158 (1931); Iowa Cent. Ry. v. Iowa, 160 U.S. 389, 393 (1896); Honeyman v. Hanan, 302 U.S. 375 (1937). See also Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972). ") and may create courts and endow them with such jurisdiction as, in the judgment of their legislatures, seems appropriate.[6](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn6amd14 " Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Snell, 193 U.S. 30, 36 (1904). ") Whether legislative action in such matters is deemed to be wise or proves efficient, whether it causes hardship for a particular litigant, or perpetuates or supplants ancient forms of procedure, are issues that ordinarily do not implicate the Fourteenth Amendment . The Supreme Court has explained that the function of the Fourteenth Amendment is negative rather than affirmative[7](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn7amd14 " The Court has, however, imposed some restrictions on state procedures that require substantial reorientation of process. While this is more generally true in the context of criminal cases, in which the appellate process and post-conviction remedial process have been subject to considerable revision in the treatment of indigents, some requirements have also been imposed in civil cases. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74–79 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). Review has been restrained with regard to details. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. at 64–69. ") and in no way obligates the states to adopt specific measures of reform.[8](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn8amd14 " Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 112 (1921). Thus the Fourteenth Amendment does not constrain the states to accept modern doctrines of equity, or adopt a combined system of law and equity procedure, or dispense with all necessity for form and method in pleading, or give untrammeled liberty to amend pleadings. Note that the Supreme Court did once grant review to determine whether due process required the states to provide some form of post-conviction remedy to assert federal constitutional violations, a review that was mooted when the state enacted such a process. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336 (1965). When a state, however, through its legal system exerts a monopoly over the pacific settlement of private disputes, as with the dissolution of marriage, due process may well impose affirmative obligations on that state. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–77 (1971). ")
A state may impose certain conditions on the right to institute litigation. However, foreclosure of all access to the courts through imposition of financial barriers is subject to constitutional scrutiny and must be justified by a state interest of suitable importance. Thus, the Court has upheld a state law that denied access to the courts to persons instituting stockholders’ derivative actions unless reasonable security for the costs and fees incurred by the corporation is first tendered.[9](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn9amd14 " Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Nor did the retroactive application of this statutory requirement to actions pending at the time of its adoption violate due process as long as no new liability for expenses incurred before enactment was imposed thereby and the only effect thereof was to stay such proceedings until the security was furnished. ") The Court has also held that a state, as the price of opening its tribunals to a nonresident plaintiff, may impose the condition that the nonresident stand ready to answer all cross actions filed and accept any in personam judgments obtained by a resident defendant through service of process or appropriate pleading upon the plaintiff’s attorney of record.[10](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn10amd14 " Young Co. v. McNeal-Edwards Co., 283 U.S. 398 (1931); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938). ") For similar reasons, the Court did not deem arbitrary or unreasonable a requirement for a chemical analysis as a condition precedent to a suit to recover for damages to crops from allegedly deficient fertilizers, where other evidence was also allowed.[11](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn11amd14 " Jones v. Union Guano Co., 264 U.S. 171 (1924). ") By contrast, where a state has monopolized the avenues for settling disputes between persons by prescribing judicial resolution, and where a dispute involves a fundamental interest, such as marriage and its dissolution, the state may not deny access to persons unable to pay its fees.[12](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn12amd14 " Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). See also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (state-mandated paternity suit); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (parental status termination proceeding); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (permanent termination of parental custody). ")
Just as a state may condition the right to institute litigation, it may also establish terms for raising certain defenses. For instance, the Court has held that a state may validly provide that a person sued in a possessory action cannot bring an action to try title until after judgment is rendered and he has paid the judgment.[13](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn13amd14 " Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915). ") A state may limit available defenses in an action to evict tenants for nonpayment of rent to the issue of payment and leave the tenants to other remedial actions at law on a claim that the landlord had failed to maintain the premises.[14](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn14amd14 " Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 64–69 (1972). See also Bianchi v. Morales, 262 U.S. 170 (1923) (upholding mortgage law providing for summary foreclosure of a mortgage without allowing any defense except payment). ") A state may also provide that the doctrines of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow servant do not bar recovery in certain employment-related accidents; the Court has held that no person has a vested right in such defenses.[15](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn15amd14 " Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29, 34 (1917); Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 55 (1919); Herron v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91 (1931). See also Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 280–83 (1980) (state interest in fashioning its own tort law permits it to provide immunity defenses for its employees and thus defeat recovery). ") Similarly, a nonresident defendant in a suit begun by foreign attachment cannot challenge the validity of a statute that requires him to give bail or security for the discharge of the seized property before permitting him an opportunity to appear and defend, even if he has no resources or credit other than the property attached.[16](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn16amd14 " Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). ")
Once a suit is underway, the amendment of pleadings is largely within the discretion of the trial court and, absent a gross abuse of discretion, there is no ground for reversal. Thus, in one case, the Court found no denial of due process in rendition of a foreclosure decree without leave to file a supplementary answer that sought to raise a meritless defense.[17](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn17amd14 " Sawyer v. Piper, 189 U.S. 154 (1903). ")
The Due Process Clause allows states significant discretion in whether to provide for jury trials or appeals in civil cases. Unlike in criminal trials,[18](https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/amendment-14/power-of-states-to-regulate-procedures#fn18amd14 " Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See also . ") the Court has not deemed jury trials essenti
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