World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson

(Redirected from World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson )

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), is a United States Supreme Court case involving strict products liability , personal injury and various procedural issues and considerations. The 1980 opinion, written by Justice Byron White , is included in the first-year civil procedure curriculum at nearly every American law school for its focus on personal jurisdiction .

Contents

• 1 Background

  • 1.1 Accident

  • 1.2 Lawsuit

• 2 Issue

• 3 Lower courts' decisions

• 4 Supreme Court decision

• 5 Subsequent litigation

• 6 See also

• 7 References

• 8 External links

Background

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=World-Wide_Volkswagen_Corp._v._Woodson&action=edit&section=1 "Edit section: Background")

Accident

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=World-Wide_Volkswagen_Corp._v._Woodson&action=edit&section=2 "Edit section: Accident")

Harry and Kay Robinson purchased a new Audi 100 LS automobile from Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. in Massena , New York , in 1976. The following year, as Kay Robinson passed through Oklahoma on Interstate 44 en route to the Robinsons' new home in Arizona , the Audi was struck from the rear by a drunk driver in a 1971 Ford Torino . The impact of the collision itself did not directly injure any of the Robinsons, but the crash resulted in the Audi's doors jamming shut and a puncture in the car's gas tank . A fire then severely burned the trapped Kay Robinson and her two children riding in the Audi, Eva and Sam.

Lawsuit

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=World-Wide_Volkswagen_Corp._v._Woodson&action=edit&section=3 "Edit section: Lawsuit")

The Robinsons did not bring a suit against Lloyd Hull, the drunk driver . He had no insurance or assets and was therefore judgment proof . The Robinsons claimed that a product defect in the car led to the injuries they sustained—specifically, the Audi's gas tank was located beneath the trunk , in an area that the Robinsons claimed was susceptible to being punctured and igniting in a rear-end collision . They brought suit against the automobile’s manufacturer (Audi), its importer (Volkswagen of America), its regional distributor (World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.), and its retailer dealer (Seaway Volkswagen).

The Robinsons' Oklahoma attorney brought the lawsuit in state court in Creek County, Oklahoma , the county in which the accident had occurred. Creek County was at that time known as home to some of the most plaintiff sympathetic juries in the country. However, since the lawsuit met requirements for concurrent jurisdiction in both state and federal court, Audi and Volkswagen would have had the ability to ask for the case to be removed from state court in Creek County and taken directly to federal court . One of the factors which governs concurrent jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship , or whether a defendant and plaintiff are from the same state. In the case of multiple defendants, if one defendants' state citizenship matches the plaintiff's, concurrent federal jurisdiction does not apply and the case cannot be removed to federal court unless the case concerns a matter of federal law. It has therefore been stated that the reason the Robinsons' attorney added the New York regional distributor and New York dealership as defendants was to prevent Audi and Volkswagen from being able to remove the case from what was generally seen as a Creek County pro-plaintiffs' jury to what would be a federal court jury in Tulsa that might be more sympathetic to the car manufacturers' case. The Robinsons had not yet completed a move to Arizona, so they were still considered to be legal residents of New York.

The Robinsons first sued only Volkswagen of America , World-Wide, and Seaway. They later amended the suit to include Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft (Volkswagen AG ), the German parent company. A second amendment was included after they learned during formal discovery that Audi NSU Auto Union Aktiengesellschaft (Audi AG) was the manufacturing parent company rather than Volkswagen AG; they substituted Audi AG for Volkswagen AG.

When they were brought in as defendants in the case, World-Wide and Seaway claimed that Oklahoma’s exercise of personal or in personam jurisdiction over them would offend the limitations on states' jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States ; they asked to be removed from the suit. Audi and Volkswagen, which sold cars in the state of Oklahoma, did not attempt to assert that the Oklahoma state court had no jurisdiction over them.

Issue

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=World-Wide_Volkswagen_Corp._v._Woodson&action=edit&section=4 "Edit section: Issue")

Whether Seaway Volkswagen and Worldwide Volkswagen had sufficient minimum contacts with Oklahoma, such that these defendants would be subject to the jurisdiction of the Oklahoma state courts.

Lower courts' decisions

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=World-Wide_Volkswagen_Corp._v._Woodson&action=edit&section=5 "Edit section: Lower courts' decisions")

The United States Supreme Court excerpts the reasoning of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in affirming that Oklahoma's long-arm statute provides for jurisdiction over World Wide and Seaway. "...the product being sold and distributed by the petitioners [World-Wide and Seaway] is by its very design and purpose so mobile that petitioners can foresee its possible use in Oklahoma. This is especially true of the distributor [Seaway], who has the exclusive right to distribute such automobile in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. The evidence presented below demonstrated that goods sold and distributed by the petitioners were used in the State of Oklahoma, and under the facts we believe it reasonable to infer, given the retail value of the automobile, that the petitioners derive substantial income from automobiles which from time to time are used in the State of Oklahoma. This being the case, we hold that under the facts presented, the trial court was justified in concluding that the petitioners derive substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in this State."

The emphasis on "substantial revenue" comes from the relevant long-arm statute, since repealed, stating that a court can exercise jurisdiction over persons (corporate or natural) who cause injury in Oklahoma and derive, "...substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state..."

The district court rejected World-Wide and Seaway's constitutional claim and reaffirmed that original ruling in denying petitioners’

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