United States v. Lopez

Jump to content

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1995 United States Supreme Court case

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), is a landmark case of the United States Supreme Court that struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA), determining that it was not a valid exercise of Congress 's power to regulate interstate commerce. It was the first case since 1937 in which the Court held that Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause .

The case arose from a San Antonio high school student's challenge to the GFSZA, which banned possession of handguns within 1,000 feet (300 meters) of a school. In a majority decision joined by four other justices, Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that Lopez's possession of the gun was not economic activity and its scope was not sufficiently cabined, and so was outside the broad reach of the Commerce Clause. After the Lopez decision, the GFSZA was amended to specifically only apply to guns that had been moved via interstate or foreign commerce.

Though it did not reverse any past ruling about the meaning of the Commerce Clause, Lopez raised serious questions as to how far the Court might be willing to go in curbing Congress's commerce powers. This decision was a slight return to the original commerce clause precedent set in _Gibbons v. Ogden _ in which Justice Marshall held that federal law may control state law only when necessary to effectively exercise an enumerated power, and it may not otherwise deny the states' authority to govern in the same area. The Court would later further limit congressional powers under the Commerce Clause in _United States v. Morrison _ (2000).

Background

[(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=United_States_v._Lopez&action=edit&section=1 "Edit section: Background")
]

Alfonso Lopez, Jr. was a 12th-grade student at Edison High School in San Antonio , Texas . On March 10, 1992, he carried a concealed .38 caliber revolver , along with five cartridges , into the school. The gun was not loaded; Lopez claimed that he was to deliver the weapon to another person, a service for which he would receive $40. School authorities received an anonymous tip that Lopez was carrying the weapon, to which Lopez admitted when confronted. The next day, he was charged with violating the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (the "Act"), 18 U.S.C.  § 922(q) .

Lopez moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that §922(q) of the Act was "unconstitutional as it is beyond the power of Congress to legislate control over our public schools." The trial court denied the motion, ruling that §922(q) was "a constitutional exercise of Congress' well defined power to regulate activities in and affecting commerce, and the 'business' of elementary, middle and high schools...affects interstate commerce ."

Lopez was tried and convicted and served in prison for 6 months and 2 years supervised release. He appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals , claiming that §922(q) exceeded Congress's power to legislate under the Commerce Clause . The Fifth Circuit agreed and reversed his conviction, holding that "section 922(q), in the full reach of its terms, is invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause." The Court of Appeals noted that the legislative history of the Act did not justify it as an exercise of the Commerce Clause power of Congress, suggesting that a new version of the Act which recited more of a nexus with interstate commerce might be devised, although what that nexus might be, is difficult to harmonize with the text of the decision, as the Court clearly stated that the situation posed only a "trivial impact" upon commerce. Justice Harlan's claim of non-triviality was made despite the contention in Wickard v. Filburn stemming from an alleged alteration of national wheat prices caused by harvesting an excess 239 bushels of wheat grown as feed for livestock; relative to 941,970 bushels of wheat produced domestically in 1941.

The United States government filed a petition for _certiorari _, whereby the Court has discretion to hear or to decline a particular case, for Supreme Court review and the Court accepted the case.

To sustain the Act, the government was obligated to show that §922(q) was a valid exercise of the Congressional Commerce Clause power, i.e. that the section regulated a matter which "affected" (or "substantially affected") interstate commerce.

The government's principal argument was that the possession of a firearm in an educational environment would most likely lead to a violent crime , which in turn would affect the general economic condition in two ways. First, because violent crime causes harm and creates expense, it raises insurance costs, which are spread throughout the economy; and second, by limiting the willingness to travel in the area perceived to be unsafe. The government also argued that the presence of firearms within a school would be seen as dangerous, resulting in students' being scared and disturbed; this would, in turn, inhibit learning; and this, in turn, would lead to a weaker national economy since education is clearly a crucial element of the nation's financial health.

Supreme Court decision

[(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=United_States_v._Lopez&action=edit&section=2 "Edit section: Supreme Court decision")
]

In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that while Congress had broad lawmaking authority under the Commerce Clause, the power was limited, and did not extend so far from "commerce" as to authorize the regulation of the carrying of handguns , of aggregate effect.

Chief Justice Rehnquist , delivering the opinion of the Court, identified the three broad categories of activity that Congress could regulate under the Commerce Clause:

• The use of channels of interstate commerce

• The instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities

• Activities that substantially affect or substantially relate to interstate commerce

He said they had summarily dismissed any consideration of the first two categories and concluded that the resolution of the case depended only on consideration of the third category—regulation of activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The Court essentially concluded that in no way was the carrying of handguns a commercial activity or even related to any sort of economic enterprise, even under the most extravagant definitions.

The opinion rejected the government's argument that because crime negatively impacted education, Congress might have reasonably concluded that crime in schools substantially affects commerce.

The Court reasoned that if Congress could regulate something so far removed from commerce, then it could regulate anything, and since the Constitution clearly creates Congress as a body with enumerated powers, this could not be so. Rehnquist concluded:

To uphold the Government's contentions here, we have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States. Admittedly, some of our prior cases have taken long steps down that road, giving great deference to congressional action. The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, and that there never will be a distinction between what is truly na

…