Terminiello v. City of Chicago

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Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a "breach of peace " ordinance of the City of Chicago that banned speech that "stirs the public to anger , invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest , or creates a disturbance" was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution .

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**Terminiello v. City of Chicago **

Contents

• 1 Background

• 2 Majority opinion

• 3 Dissenting opinions

  • 3.1 Vinson's dissent

  • 3.2 Frankfurter's dissent

  • 3.3 Jackson's dissent

• 4 Subsequent developments

• 5 See also

• 6 References

• 7 External links

Background

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Arthur Terminiello, a Catholic priest under suspension, gave a speech to the Christian Veterans of America in which he criticized various racial groups and made a number of inflammatory comments. There were approximately 800 people present in the auditorium during the speech and a crowd of approximately 1,000 people outside, protesting the speech. The Chicago Police Department was present, but was unable to maintain order completely.

Terminiello was later assessed a fine of $100 for violation of Chicago's breach of peace ordinance, which he appealed. Both the Illinois Appellate Court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari decide whether the ordinance violated his First Amendment free speech rights. The main argument before the Court was whether the speech constituted unprotected “fighting words.” However, the Court did not decide that issue, finding instead that the ordinance was unconstitutional "on its face" .

Majority opinion

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Justice William O. Douglas , writing for the majority, reversed Terminiello's conviction, holding that the ordinance as construed by the Illinois courts violated the right to freedom of speech (which was made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment).

Although Douglas acknowledged that freedom of speech was not limitless and did not apply to "fighting words " (citing _Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire _), he did not decide whether Terminiello's speech fell within this restriction. The Court first noted that the jury was instructed that a “breach of the peace” includes speech that angers people or causes unrest.

Douglas said that the purpose of free speech was to invite dispute and "may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea". Therefore, speech cannot be punished simply because it upsets people or creates annoyance. It is only unprotected if it creates a clear and present danger of serious harm, far beyond mere public disturbance. Any narrower view would allow the government to censor unpopular ideas and force “standardization” of thought":

Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. at pages 571-572, 62 S.Ct. at page 769, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. See _Bridges v. California _, 314 U.S. 252, 262, 193, 159 A.L.R. 1346; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373, 1253. There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups.

Relying heavily on _Stromberg v. California _, the Court found that the ordinance, as defined by the trial court, violated free speech by allowing conviction for speech that simply angers people, invites argument, or creates unrest. The Illinois courts' interpretation of the ordinance is binding, and it contains at least some unconstitutional provisions. Because the jury's general verdict could have been based on one of these invalid grounds, the conviction cannot stand.

Dissenting opinions

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Vinson's dissent

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Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson dissented on the ground that the jury instruction to which the majority of the Supreme Court objected had been affirmed by both appellate courts. He felt that the Illinois courts had construed the ordinance only as punishing fighting words and that petitioner's counsel had not previously objected to the instruction on constitutional grounds.

Frankfurter's dissent

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Justice Felix Frankfurter largely echoed the sentiments of Chief Justice Vinson, feeling that the majority was going out of its way to reverse Terminiello's fine, when such an action went against the balance of power between the federal and state courts . Frankfurter's dissent is a noted example of the "judicial restraint " theory of constitutional interpretation he was known for: [[7\

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