Santosky v. Kramer

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1982 United States Supreme Court case

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), is a Supreme Court case involving the burden of proof for the revocation of parental rights . The case arose when the Ulster County, New York , Department of Social Services sought to revoke John Santosky II and Annie Santosky's parental rights to their three children. Under Section 622 of the New York State Family Court Act, the state was permitted to revoke parental rights to a natural child if, after a fair preponderance of the evidence , a court found "permanent neglect". The New York State Family Court found such neglect by using the "fair preponderance" standard. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the burden of proof used.

In a 5–4 opinion written by Associate Justice Harry Blackmun , the Supreme Court of the United States reversed and vacated the Appellate Division's ruling, holding that states seeking to sever parental rights irrevocably must show at least clear and convincing evidence of neglect. Justice William Rehnquist , joined by three others, dissented, on the grounds that the majority's focus on a single aspect of the law disregarded the fairness of the scheme as a whole.

Background

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Due Process and the 14th Amendment

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Main article: Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

The Supreme Court has previously held that citizens have certain fundamental rights upon which the government cannot infringe, unless the deprivation of that right is necessary to achieve a compelling government interest . This doctrine, arising from the "liberty clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment , is known as substantive due process . The right to privacy was found to be fundamental under this doctrine, and a number of rights to choice came out of it, such as in _Roe v. Wade _, where the Court found a right to have an abortion and in _Meyer v. Nebraska _, where the court found a parental right to raise their children as they wish. In _Griswold v. Connecticut _ the Court extended this doctrine to the right to procure contraception. Substantive due process was further expanded to encompass children with _In re Gault _ establishing that children have a right to procedural due process when the state attempts to take custody of them.

Procedural due process , arising from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is minimally the right to notice and a hearing, but has been held to include in some circumstances rights to counsel and rights to confrontation. Procedural due process is required any time a person faces the deprivation of life, liberty, or property. As substantive due process arises from the liberty clause, a deprivation of a substantive due process right is a deprivation of liberty and thus requires procedural due process.

The deprivation of rights secured by substantive due process requires some amount of procedural due process, but procedural due process can range from an administrative hearing to a jury trial. In _Mathews v. Eldridge _, the Court explained the level of due process required for the termination of Social Security benefits and, in doing so, established a method for determining the level of procedural due process required in depriving a person of life, liberty, or property.

The Court did so by balancing state interests against the procedural due process rights of an individual. The Mathews test takes into account three factors: "the private interests affected by the proceeding", "the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure", and "the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure."

Facts of the Case

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The Ulster County Department of Social Services received reports from neighbors and physicians of Tina Santosky regarding her injuries: a broken femur, bruises, and cuts. Suspecting child abuse, Bernhardt S. Kramer, the Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated parental neglect proceedings and removed Tina Santosky from the custody of her parents, John and Annie Santosky, in November 1973. 10 months later, the Santoskys' second child, John II, was removed after he was found to be suffering from malnutrition. On that same day, Annie Santosky gave birth to Jed, the couple's third child. Three days after Jed's birth, he was removed from their custody and placed in a foster home.

About four years later, Kramer petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to revoke parental rights. Under section 622 of the New York State Family Court Act, Kramer was only required to satisfy a "fair preponderance of the evidence" burden and show that permanent neglect is more likely than not. The Santoskys challenged the constitutionality of this burden, but the Family Court rejected their challenge and found permanent neglect under the fair preponderance standard.

The Santoskys appealed, and the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Family Court. Their next appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was dismissed as lacking a substantial constitutional question. The Santoskys appealed again, and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.

At oral argument, Martin Guggenheim argued for the petitioners that the burden of proof under New York law was unconstitutional, stating "[T]he Constitution requires that the finder of fact be reasonably convinced that the result of permanent destruction of the family is appropriate before the state may force such an irrevocable and fundamental deprivation of liberty on an individual." Respondents argued that raising the burden of proof would not have affected the outcome of the case, and that "if the Court should raise the burden, it would frustrate a specific intent of the legislature."

Opinion of the Court

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Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court

Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Harry Blackmun held that natural parents have a right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment , and that the burden of proof used by New York State was not stringent enough to satisfy the constitutional requirements of the Due Process Clause . In striking down New York's burden, the Court utilized the Mathews test to determine what burden of proof was due.

The Mathews test employed consists of three considerations: the private interests affected, the risk posed by erroneous judgement, and the government interest affected. The Court found that private interests were substantially affected by the law noting that "[w]hen the State initiates a parental rights termination proceeding, it seeks not merely to infringe that fundamental liberty interest, but to end it" and that such a termination was irreversible. In analyzing the second factor, the Court stated that the interests of the parents an

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