Criminal law in the Taney Court

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The Taney Court (the Supreme Court of the United States under Chief Justice Roger B. Taney , 1836–1864) heard thirty criminal law cases, approximately one per year. Notable cases include _Prigg v. Pennsylvania _ (1842), _United States v. Rogers _ (1846), _Ableman v. Booth _ (1858), _Ex parte Vallandigham _ (1861), and _United States v. Jackalow _ (1862).

Chief Justice Roger B. Taney

Like its predecessor , the Taney Court exercised only limited appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases. Like its predecessor, it heard original habeas petitions, writs of error from the state courts, and certificates of division from the circuit courts . In addition, unlike its predecessor, the Court heard two writs of error from the territorial courts and three prerogative writs of mandamus and prohibition in criminal matters. The Court denied every petition for a prerogative writ that it received, habeas or otherwise.

Contents

• 1 Background

• 2 Sources of jurisdiction

  • 2.1 Writs of error

    • 2.1.1 State courts

    • 2.1.2 Territorial courts

  • 2.2 Original habeas

  • 2.3 Certificates of division

  • 2.4 Other prerogative writs

• 3 Defining federal crimes

  • 3.1 Counterfeiting

  • 3.2 Indian country

  • 3.3 Naval timber

  • 3.4 Shipwreck theft

  • 3.5 Slave trading

• 4 Criminal procedure

  • 4.1 Constitutional issues

    • 4.1.1 Double jeopardy

    • 4.1.2 Vicinage

    • 4.1.3 Venue

  • 4.2 Evidence

    • 4.2.1 Best evidence

    • 4.2.2 Competence

  • 4.3 Other

    • 4.3.1 Sufficiency of an indictment

    • 4.3.2 External influence on jury

    • 4.3.3 Clemency

    • 4.3.4 Prosecutorial peremptory challenges

• 5 Footnotes

• 6 Notes

Background

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Main article: Criminal law in the Marshall Court

The basic structure of the federal criminal system remained the same during Chief Justice Taney's tenure as it had been during Chief Justice Marshall's tenure. The Judiciary Act of 1789 divided original jurisdiction for the trial of federal crimes between the United States district courts and the United States circuit courts . The district courts were given jurisdiction over all federal crimes "where no other punishment than whipping, not exceeding thirty stripes, a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, is to be inflicted." The circuit courts were given concurrent jurisdiction over these crimes, and exclusive jurisdiction over all other federal crimes. The circuit courts also exercised appellate jurisdiction over the district courts, but only in civil cases.

The Judiciary Act of 1789 also placed the responsibility for prosecuting federal crimes in the United States Attorney for each United States federal judicial district . The Act provided that "there shall be appointed in each district" a "person learned in the law to act as attorney for the United States in such district, who shall be sworn or affirmed to the faithful execution of his office, whose duty it shall be to prosecute in such district all delinquents for crimes and offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States."

Sources of jurisdiction

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In _Ex parte Gordon _ (1861), the Court summarized its jurisdiction in federal criminal cases thus:

[I]n criminal cases, the proceedings and judgment of the Circuit Court cannot be revised or controlled here, in any form of proceeding, either by writ of error or prohibition, and, consequently, we have no authority to examine them by a certiorari. And the only case in which this court is authorized even to express an opinion on the proceedings in a Circuit Court in a criminal case is, where the judges of the Circuit Court are opposed in opinion upon a question arising at the trial, and certify it to this court for its decision.

Writs of error

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Although the Supreme Court could not issue writs of error to examine criminal convictions in the lower federal courts, it could issue such writs with regard to the state courts and territorial courts.

State courts

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Four of the six criminal appeals from state courts involved slavery .

Pursuant to its power—under § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 —to review the judgments of state courts on federal questions by writs of error, the Marshall Court had twice reversed criminal convictions obtained pursuant to a criminal statute that violated the federal constitution.

The Taney Court continued this trend. In _Prigg v. Pennsylvania _ (1842), the Court invalidating a state kidnapping conviction as in conflict with the Fugitive Slave Clause , which the Court found to authorize self-help . In Thurlow v. Massachusetts (1847), known as the License Cases, the Court invalidated state liquor

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