Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York

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Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), is an opinion given by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court overruled _Monroe v. Pape _ by holding that a local government is a "person" subject to suit under Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code : Civil action for deprivation of rights. Additionally, the Court held that §1983 claims against municipal entities must be based on implementation of a policy or custom.

Contents

• 1 Background

• 2 Analysis

• 3 Holding

• 4 Concurrence

• 5 Dissent

• 6 Arguments made by the parties

• 7 Significance

• 8 Subsequent case law

• 9 Aftermath

  • 9.1 Other U.S. Supreme Court cases analyzing Monell

• 10 Scholarship discussing Monell

  • 10.1 Treatises

  • 10.2 Law Review articles

• 11 References

• 12 External links

Background

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Monell_v._Department_of_Social_Services_of_the_City_of_New_York&action=edit&section=1 "Edit section: Background")

The case began in July 1971 as a challenge to the New York City Board of Education's forced maternity leave policies. Monell was a part of a class of women employees of the Dept. of Social Services and Board of Education of the city of New York who were compelled to take maternity leave before such leaves were required for medical reasons. The women sued the Dept. and its Commissioner, the Board and its Chancellor, and the city of New York and its Mayor. The District Court found that petitioners' constitutional rights had been violated, but ruled that petitioners' claims for injunctive relief were mooted by a supervening change in the official maternity leave policy, and that under Monroe v. Pape, petitioners were barred recovering back pay from the city. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to consider whether local governmental officials and/or local independent school boards are "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 when equitable relief in the nature of back pay is sought against them in their official capacities.

Analysis

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Monell_v._Department_of_Social_Services_of_the_City_of_New_York&action=edit&section=2 "Edit section: Analysis")

First, the Court undertook a fresh review of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now codified as 42 U.S.C. §1983 that _Monroe v. Pape _ relied upon in holding that municipal entities were not "persons" subject to §1983. The Court examined the vote on Section 1 of § 1983, (2) the Sherman Amendment and its vote, (3) the text and vote on the first conference report, and (4) the text and vote on the second conference report. The Court found that Congress did intend for municipal entities to be included among those "persons" to whom § 1983 applies, and that Congress at this time would not have thought the statute unconstitutional as applied to local governments. The Court wrote that the Monroe Court misinterpreted the meaning of §1983, and that were §1983 unconstitutional as applied to municipal entities, it would also be unconstitutional as applied to municipal officers. The Court noted that 1871 Congress clearly intended §1983 to apply to such officers and agreed that they could be subject to liability under §1983, and that the Act was also clearly intended to provide a remedy against all forms of official violation of constitutional rights.

Second, in overruling Monroe v. Pape, the Court considered that Monroe departed from prior practice insofar as it completely immunized municipal entities from liability under §1983. Reasoning that there was no principled distinction between school boards and other municipal entities, the Court found that its many cases that held school boards liable were inconsistent with Monroe, and were a further indication that Monroe should be overruled. The Court wrote that immunizing school boards against liability under §1983 would be contrary to instances where Congress refused to immunize school boards from federal jurisdiction under §1983, and that municipalities could not have arranged their affairs so as to be able to violate constitutional rights indefinitely, and therefore could not have a reliance interest in absolute immunity.

Third, the Court, in analyzing the legislative history, found that Congress did not intend for a municipality to by held liable under §1983 solely because it employed a tortfeasor, and that therefore a local government could not be held liable under respondeat superior.

The court reasoned that since there was no clear statement in the legislative history justifying the excluding municipalities as "persons" under §1983, such entities could be sued directly under §1983 for policies or customs that violated the U.S. Constitution.

Holding

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The United States Supreme Court held that a local government is a "person" that can be sued under §1983: civil action for deprivation of rights. The Court, however, required that a §1983 claim against a municipal entity be based on the implementation or execution of a "a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that party's officers". Additionally, the Court held that municipal entities "may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels". Local governments may not, however, be sued under 1983 for an injury solely by its employees or agents–in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under §1983 on a _respondeat superior _ theory. Justice Brennan drafted the majority opinion.

Concurrence

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Monell_v._Department_of_Social_Services_of_the_City_of_New_York&action=edit&section=4 "Edit section: Concurrence")

Justice Powell was prompted to write by "the gravity of overruling part of so important a decision". Powell noted that the considerations of _stare decisis _ operated in both directions in this case, and that this case was different than the usual case where the Court is asked to overrule a precedent, reasoning that on the one hand, there are cases ruling that municipal entities are not "persons" under the statute, but on the other hand cases holding school boards liable. Powell also wrote that there were still substantial line-drawing issues regarding what constitutes a policy or custom.

Dissent

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Monell_v._Department_of_Social_Services_of_the_City_of_New_York&action=edit&section=5 "Edit section: Dissent")

Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that adequate justification for overruling _Monroe '_s interpretation of §1983's legislative history did not exist. Noting that Congress did not amend §1983 after Monroe, Rehnquist wrote that the Court should not overrule the earlier decision unless it was beyond a doubt that the Monroe Court made a mistake, and that at most the evidence of such a mistake in earlier interpretation of the legislative history was unclear.

Arguments made by the parties

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Monell_v._Department_of_So

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