Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n

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Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association, 505 U.S. 88 (1992), is a United States labor law case of the United States Supreme Court . The Court determined that federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations preempted various Illinois provisions for licensing workers who handled hazardous waste materials.

Contents

• 1 Facts

• 2 Judgment

• 3 Concurrence

• 4 Dissent

• 5 See also

• 6 References

• 7 Further reading

• 8 External links

Facts

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gade_v._National_Solid_Wastes_Management_Ass%27n&action=edit&section=1 "Edit section: Facts")

The National Solid Wastes Management Association , a business group, sought an injunction against two Illinois statutes requiring workers get training and pass exams to handle hazardous waste. It argued these statutes were preempted by the Occupational Safety and Health Act and Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations implementing a requirement of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 which also standards to train workers who handle hazardous wastes. The claim was brought against petitioner Gade's predecessor as director of the state environmental protection agency.

The District Court held that the state acts were not preempted because they protected public safety and promoted job safety, but it invalidated some provisions of the acts.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the OSH Act preempts any state law that "constitutes, in a direct, clear and substantial way, regulation of worker health and safety," unless the Secretary of Labor has explicitly approved the law pursuant to § 18 of the OSH Act. In remanding, the court did not consider which, if any, of the provisions would be pre-empted.

Judgment

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Gade_v._National_Solid_Wastes_Management_Ass%27n&action=edit&section=2 "Edit section: Judgment")

O'Connor J , writing for the majority, reiterated the ways in which federal law can preempt state law.

Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and "is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." _Jones v. Rath Packing Co. _, 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977); _Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. _, 463 U.S. 85, 95, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2899, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983); _Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta _, 458 U.S. 141, 152-153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982). Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is " 'so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,' " id., at 153, 102 S.Ct., at 3022 (quoting _Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp. _, 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)), and conflict pre-emption, where "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," _Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul _, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217-1218, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." _Hines v. Davidowitz _, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941); _Felder v. Casey _, 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2306, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988); _Perez v. Campbell _, 402 U.S. 637, 649, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1711, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971).

Our ultimate task in any pre-emption case is to determine whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole. Looking to "the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy," _Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux _, 481 U.S. 41, 51, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1555, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), we hold that nonapproved state regulation of occupational safety and health issues for which a federal standard is in effect is impliedly pre-empted as in conflict with the full purposes and objectives of the OSH Act. _Hines v. Davidowitz _, supra. The design of the statute persuades us that Congress intended to subject employers and employees to only one set of regulations, be it federal or state, and that the only way a State may regulate an OSHA-regulated occupational safety and health issue is pursuant to an approved state plan that displaces the federal standards.

...

1. This state law is an occupational safety and health standard within the meaning of the OSH Act, regardless of whether it has another, nonoccupational purpose, based on the criterion that it directly, substantially, and specifically regulates occupational safety and health. In assessing a state law's impact on the federal scheme,

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