Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic

Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993) is a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that Section 1985(3) of The Civil Rights Act of 1871 does not provide a federal cause of action against persons obstructing access to abortion clinics. Alexandria Health Clinic, along with several other abortion clinics, sued to prevent Jayne Bray and other anti-abortion protesters from blocking the entrance to clinics in Washington D.C.

Alexandria Women's Health Clinic claimed that the protesters violated Section 1985 of The Civil Rights Act of 1871, which prohibits two or more people on a highway or other premises from depriving “any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.”

Contents

• 1 Background

  • 1.1 Facts of the Case

  • 1.2 Lower Court Rulings

  • 1.3 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) - Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

  • 1.4 Prior Supreme Court decisions

    • 1.4.1 Griffin v. Breckenridge

    • 1.4.2 Carpenters v. Scott

• 2 Supreme Court

  • 2.1 Opinion of the Court

  • 2.2 Concurrences

  • 2.3 Dissents

• 3 Subsequent Developments

  • 3.1 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, Western N.Y

  • 3.2 Christian Legal Soc. Chapter v. Martinez

  • 3.3 Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization

• 4 References

• 5 External links

Background

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Facts of the Case

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Bray_v._Alexandria_Women%27s_Health_Clinic&action=edit&section=2 "Edit section: Facts of the Case")

An action was brought against Operation Rescue, an organization of members who oppose abortion, by clinics that perform abortions and organizations that support abortions and whose members may wish to use an abortion clinic. Operation Rescue organizes anti-abortion demonstrations in which participants trespass on, and obstruct general access to, the premises of abortion clinics. The clinics sued to enjoin Operation Rescue from conducting demonstrations at abortion clinics in the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area.

Operation Rescue asserted that its members had not violated section 1985(3), claiming that the statute requires a class-based, discriminatory animus underlying the action. The clinics countered that the actions of the protesters demonstrated a discriminatory animus against women.

Lower Court Rulings

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Alexandria Health Clinic argued that the protesters were present to deny women their right to abortion and their right to interstate travel.

Following an expedited trial, the District Court ruled that petitioners had violated section 1985(3) by conspiring to deprive women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. The court also ruled for respondents on their pendent state-law claims of trespass and public nuisance. The court ordered the protesters to pay the clinics’ attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim.

The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court decision in National Organization for Women v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D. Va. 1989) The court found that Bray and others had blocked access to the clinics, therefore depriving women seeking abortions of the right to interstate travel.

42 U.S.C. 1985(3) - Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Bray_v._Alexandria_Women%27s_Health_Clinic&action=edit&section=4 "Edit section: 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) - Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights")

Section 1985's subsection 3 forbids Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. It establishes that if two or more persons within the United States act for the purpose of directly or indirectly depriving any person or class of persons of equal protections or privileges under the law, the injured party or parties may have a cause of action for damages against one or more of the conspirators.

Prior Supreme Court decisions

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Griffin v. Breckenridge

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Bray_v._Alexandria_Women%27s_Health_Clinic&action=edit&section=6 "Edit section: Griffin v. Breckenridge")

In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the court held that the defendants had violated the petitioners' constitutionally protected right to travel. The case involved black plaintiffs who had been stopped and assaulted and beaten with a deadly weapon while they were riding in a car. It was claimed that the purpose of the attack was to prevent the plaintiffs from enjoying equal protection under the laws of the United States and the state of Mississippi.

The court found that there is nothing inherent in the wording of Section 1985 that requires state action, noting that an element of companion section 1983 is that the deprivation complained of must have been inflicted under color of state law and that to read any such requirement into 1985 (3) would thus deprive that section of all independent effect. Additionally, based on legislative history, the court concluded that "...the language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action."

The case is commonly cited for the four essential elements that it identified as being required to support a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3):

1. Conspiracy
2. A purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.
3. Action in furtherance of the object of [the] conspiracy,
4. An injury to person or property" or a deprivation of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.

Carpenters v. Scott

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Bray_v._Alexandria_Women%27s_Health_Clinic&action=edit&section=7 "Edit section: Carpenters v. Scott")

In Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825 (1983), A construction company had hired nonunion workers for a project, resulting in the organization of a citizen protest against the company. During the protest at the construction site, company employees were assaulted and beaten, and construction equipment was burned and destroyed, delaying construction and causing the company to default on its contract.

The court reaffirmed the Griffin finding that section 1983 does not require state action when applied to rights that themselves do not require state action. The court addressed the specific question of whether a section 1985(3) claim can be made against individuals with respect to rights that are prohibitions of certain state actions. rights that in themselves require state action must necessarily present a claim of state involvement.

The construction company's claim was denied. The court held that a conspiracy to infringe First Amendment rights requires proof that the State is involved in the conspiracy or that the aim of the conspiracy is to influence the activity of the State. It also found that this case did not present the kind of animus that § 1985(3) requires.

Supreme Court

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Opinion of the Court

(https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Bray_v._Alexandria_Women%27s_Health_Clinic&action=edit&section=9 "Edit section: Opinion of the Court")

By a 5 to 3 majority, the Supreme Court held that Section 1945(3) does not provide a cause of action for protesters blocking entrance to an abortion clinic.

In the decision delivered by Justice Antonin Scalia , the court rejected the claim that "women who want abortions" is a class that could satisfy the suggestion in Griffin that discrimination as contemplated under Section 1984(s) could extend beyond the issue of race. The rationale was that if "women who want an abortion" is a class requiring protection, then it would necessarily follow that "people who want to engage in any activity that we seek to prevent" would qualify for similar protection under the statute.

The court concluded this would convert the statute into the "general federal tort law" that the animus requirement seeks to avoid, finding that the conspiracy, "... must aim at a deprivation of the equal e

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