Bowsher v. Synar

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1986 United States Supreme Court case

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), was a United States Supreme Court case that struck down the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act as an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power by Congress because the law empowered Congress to terminate the United States comptroller general for certain specified reasons, including "inefficiency, 'neglect of duty,' or 'malfeasance.'" The named defendant in the original case was Comptroller General Charles Arthur Bowsher and the constitutional challenge was brought forth by Oklahoma congressman Mike Synar .

Background

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Under the Gramm–Rudman–Hollings Act, allowable deficit levels were calculated in consideration of the eventual elimination of the federal deficit. If the budget exceeded the allowable deficit, across-the-board cuts were required. Directors of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) were required to report to the comptroller general regarding their recommendations for how much must be cut. The comptroller general then evaluated these reports, made his own conclusion, and reported his conclusions to the President, who was required to issue a "sequestration " order effecting the reductions recommended by the comptroller general, unless Congress made the cuts in other ways within a specified amount of time.

The comptroller general was to be appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, and could only be removed by impeachment or a joint resolution of Congress. The district court ruled that this violated the separation of powers principle by creating a "here-and-now subservience" of the comptroller general to Congress, and could not be reconciled with the Supreme Court precedent in _Humphrey's Executor v. United States _, which had reaffirmed the core holding of _Myers v. United States _ that the President alone had the power of removal over purely executive officers.

Supreme Court

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Majority

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The Supreme Court ruled that Congress cannot retain removal authority over an executive officer, based on The Decision of 1789 , _Myers v. United States _ and _INS v. Chadha _. The Court rejected the argument that the comptroller general is independent of Congress, and invalidated the "assignment" of executive powers to an officer that was not subject to presidential control.

The Court's formalist reasoning was similar to other 1980s separation of powers cases:

[B]y placing the responsibility for the execution of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into executive function.

Congress gave itself for cause removal authority over the comptroller general, not only by impeachment, but also by joint resolution. The Court noted the broad grounds for removal including "inefficiency" and "neglect of duty", while impeachment of executive officers is limited by the Constitution to "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors". The Court included a footnote to explain that this did not overturn _Humphrey's Executor v. United States _.

If Congress were to retain removal power over executive officers it would give them control over law execution, similar to the legislative veto that was held unconstitutional in Chadha: "Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked."

The comptroller general's function under the Act is the "very essence" of the execution of the laws since (1) it entails interpreting the Act to determine precisely what kind of budgetary calculations are required and (2) the comptroller general commands the President to carry out, without variation, his directive regarding the budget resolutions.

Dissent

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Justice White's dissent argued that the act should have been upheld. He argued that determining the level of spending by the federal government is a legislative function, not an executive one. Even if the power were executive, White did not see anything wrong with delegating that power to an agent as long as Congress could influence him only by a means that is subject to Presentment Clause and Bicameralism Clause requirements, which the act satisfied, since the comptroller general could be influenced by Congress only through a joint resolution.

See also

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• List of United States Supreme Court cases, volume 478

• List of United States Supreme Court cases

• Lists of United States Supreme Court cases by volume

• List of United States Supreme Court cases by the Rehnquist Court

• _Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha _ (1983)

References

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1. ↑ "Bowsher v. Synar" . Oxford Reference. Retrieved June 17, 2021.
2. ↑ Bowsher, at 478 U.S. 714, 720 (1986)
3. ↑ 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986)
4. ↑ Robinson, Glen O. (1988). "Independent Agencies: Form and Substance in Executive Prerogative" . Duke Law Journal. 37 (2): 239.
5. ↑ "ArtI.S1.3.2 Functional and Formalist Approaches to Separation of Powers" . Constitution Annotated.
6. ↑ Elliott, E. (January 1, 1987). "Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar" . Yale Journal on Regulation. 4 (2): 320. ISSN  0741-9457 .
7. ↑ Entin, Jonathan L. (2015). "The Curious Case of the Pompous Postmaster: Myers v. United States" . Case Western Reserve Law Review. 65 (4): 1077.
8. ↑ Rosenberg, Morton (1989). "Congress's Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration's Theory of the Unitary Executive" (PDF). George Washington Law Review. 57: 641.
9. ↑ Bowsher (quoting Chadha)478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)
10. ↑ "U.S. Reports: Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)" . Library of Congress. Retrieved June 17, 2021.

External links

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• Text of Bowsher v. Synar, 478 [U.S.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Un

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