Agostini v. Felton

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Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States . In this case, the Court overruled its decision in _Aguilar v. Felton _ (1985), now finding that it was not a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment for a state-sponsored education initiative to allow public school teachers to instruct at religious schools, so long as the material was secular and neutral in nature and no "excessive entanglement" between government and religion was apparent. This case is noteworthy in a broader sense as a sign of evolving judicial standards surrounding the First Amendment, and the changes that have occurred in modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

Contents

• 1 Background

• 2 Arguments

• 3 Decision

• 4 Dissent

• 5 See also

• 6 References

• 7 Further reading

• 8 External links

Background

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In 1965, Congress enacted Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act with the goal of providing adequate education to all children in the United States, regardless of individual economic conditions. This service, abbreviated as Title I, distributed federal funds to state governments, which, in turn, disbursed the funds to local education agencies. This funding was to be put towards providing remedial education services for low-income students who were at significant risk of failing to meet state academic performance standards. By law, these education services were to be provided to eligible students, whether enrolled in public school or not. Further, the services offered to children attending private schools were to be "equitable in comparison" to the services offered to children attending public school. All educational services were to be of a secular, neutral, and non-ideological nature.

In 1966, the Board of Education of the City of New York ("Board") applied for Title I funding. In the eligible districts in New York City, 10% of schoolchildren attend private school, and of those 10%, 90% attended schools of a particular religious ideology. To prevent First Amendment complications, the Board arranged to bus private school attendees to public schools for after-school instruction. This plan failed, and another one was adopted, which failed as well. The Board then moved on to a plan whereby public school teachers would be permitted to provide instruction in the private school buildings themselves. A number of stipulations were attached to this, aimed at preventing a violation of the Establishment Clause, including mandatory surprise visits by state-employed supervisors and removal of all religious articles from the room to be used for Title I instruction. This plan was reviewed by the Supreme Court in _Aguilar v. Felton _, where it was deemed to create a constitutionally impermissible "entanglement" between government and religion. The District Court, on remand , issued an injunction, enjoining the Board from following a Title I plan that violated the decision.

After the Court's decision in Aguilar, the Board had to devise a new plan to provide Title I services without creating a conflict between Church and State. This plan involved spending over $100,000,000 in leasing property and vehicles to provide areas for public school teachers to instruct their students. This money, incurred annually over a series of years, had to be deducted from the Title 1 grant before the grant money was to be used for actual services provided, resulting in a net decrease in available funds for remedial education. In 1995, the Board, along with a group of parents of eligible parochial school attendees, filed motions in District Court, seeking an exemption from the Aguilar decision under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). This rule states, in part, that an exemption from a final judgment may be granted if it is found that it is, "no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." They argued that cases decided by the Supreme Court between Aguilar and 1995 had eroded the meaning of Aguilar, and that it was no longer good law. The District Court appeared sympathetic, and said that they were pursuing the appropriate method of relief, but denied the motion, noting that Aguilar was still in effect and it was unable to offer the exemption the Board sought. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard arguments on April 15, 1997. Acting Solicitor General Walter Dellinger appeared on behalf of the Secretary of Education , and Corporation Counsel of New York City Paul A. Crotty argued for the city. The respondents were represented by Stanley Geller, the former president of the National Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, who had previously argued Aguilar before the Supreme Court.

Arguments

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The petitioners argument for relief revolved around three primary points.

1. The tremendous costs involved with running their Title I program in accordance with Aguilar constituted a substantial change of fact. They argued that, because these costs were not expected to be so high at the start, it was now imprudent to force them to continue in this fashion. The respondents countered by saying that the costs of implementing the program were, in fact, known when Aguilar was decided, which would mean that no change in circumstances had occurred.
2. Prevailing agreement in the judiciary had turned against Aguilar, with a majority of Justices having expressed their opinion that Aguilar should be reversed or, at least, reconsidered.
3. Subsequent Establishment Clause rulings by the Supreme Court had undermined the legal basis upon which Aguilar was decided. The argument was that, if the case's decision had been so considerably weakened over the years, it was no longer good law and should be reversed.

Decision

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On June 23, 1997, Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the court. The decision was generally divided along ideological lines, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia , Thomas , and Kennedy joining the majority, and Justices Stevens , Souter , Ginsburg and Breyer dissenting.

The Court accepted the respondents' argument that there was no substantial change in factual circumstances. While there was obviously an increase in Board expenditures in maintaining their program, the Court noted that cost increases were not only predicted in Aguilar, they had been practically guaranteed. Furthermore, since the applicable case law had not changed since the Aguilar decision, there was nothing the Court could see as constituting a substantial change in factual circumstances.

On the second argument, the Court again sided with the respondents. It noted that, indeed, five of the Justices had advocated a reconsideration of Aguilar when deciding another case. However, the Court said, this did not necessarily mean there had been a change in their jurisprudence or reasoning, because Aguilar's propriety was not in question when those comments were made. The Court stated that the views of its members, outside of a judgment to this effect, did not constitute a change in Establishment Clause law.

The third argument is given the most examination by the Court. In order to determine if decisions subsequent to Aguilar have actually undermined it or the basis for its findings, the Court examines the cases and the changes in views since that decision was made. The Court notes that it has moved away from the

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