Adams v. Tanner

Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a Washington state law that prohibited employment agencies was unconstitutional.

Contents

• 1 Facts

• 2 Judgment

  • 2.1 Majority

  • 2.2 Dissent

• 3 Importance

  • 3.1 International Labour Organization policy

  • 3.2 Supreme Court policy

• 4 See also

• 5 Notes

• 6 External links

Facts

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Washington voters passed a ballot initiative, supported by the then Federal Department of Labor, to prohibit private employment agencies charging fees to people seeking work. It read as follows,

Section 1. The welfare of the State of Washington depends on the welfare of its workers, and demands that they be protected from conditions that result in their being liable to imposition and extortion.

The State of Washington therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that the system of collecting fees from the workers for furnishing them with employment, or with information leading thereto, results frequently in their becoming the victims of imposition and extortion, and is therefore detrimental to the welfare of the state.

Section 2. It shall be unlawful for any employment agent, his representative, or any other person to demand or receive either directly or indirectly from any person seeking employment, or from any person on his or her behalf, any remuneration or fee whatsoever for furnishing him or her with employment or with information leading thereto.

Section 3. For each and every violation of any of the provisions of this act, the penalty shall be a fine of not more than $100 and imprisonment for not more than thirty days.

Judgment

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Majority

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Chief Justice White, Justices Day, Van Devanter, Pitney and McReynold held that a ban would breach the principle of due process of law in the deprivation of liberty and property. The ban was arbitrary and oppressive. Mr Justice Reynold said,

there is nothing inherently immoral or dangerous to public welfare in acting as paid representative of another to find a position in which he can earn an honest living. On the contrary, such service is useful, commendable, and in great demand. (at 593)

Dissent

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Brandeis J 's dissent was notable as one of the first attempts to rely on policy documents in support of a judicial decision.

Justice Brandeis (with whom Justice Holmes, Clarke and McKenna dissented) laid out in his dissenting judgment why employment agency activities were a legitimate concern. He highlighted sources from US Labor Department giving examples of abuse, attempts in over thirty states to regulate and have free public agencies compete. He stated how all methods short of abolition had ultimately failed (601-9).

In this period, the practice of charging destitute workers upfront fees for finding work was widespread. People might give up their last pennies for the chance of work. Sometimes, agencies made no effort to place the worker, or the work would last a few days and the employer would then split the next fee with the agent to bring in fresh replacements. Justice Brandeis cited from a report to a 1912 Congress Committee.

To declare the statute of a state, enacted in the exercise of the police power, invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment is a matter of such seriousness that I state the reasons for my dissent from the opinion of the court. The statute of the State of Washington commonly known as the "Abolishing Employment Offices Measure" was proposed by Initiative Petition No. 8, filed July 3, 1914, and was adopted November 3, 1914, at the general election, 162,054 votes being cast for the measure and 144,544 against it. In terms, the act merely prohibits the taking of fees from those seeking employment.

Plaintiffs, who are proprietors of private employment agencies in the City of Spokane, assert that this statute, if enforced, would compel them to discontinue business, and would thus, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, deprive them of their liberty and property without due process of law. The act leaves the plaintiffs free to collect fees from employers, and it appears that private employment offices thus restricted are still carrying on business. But even if it should prove, as plaintiffs allege, that their business could not live without collecting fees from employees, that fact would not necessarily render the act invalid. Private employment agencies are a business properly subject to police regulation and control. _Brazee v. Michigan _, 241 U. S. 340. And this Court has made it clear that a statute enacted to promote health, safety, morals, or the public welfare may be valid, although it will compel discontinuance of existing businesses in whole or in part. Statutes prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor present the most familiar example of such a prohibition. But where, as here, no question of interstate commerce is involved, this Court has sustained also statutes or municipal ordinances which compelled discontinuance of such business as (a) of manufacturing and selling oleomargarine, _Powell v. Pennsylvania _, 127 U. S. 678; (b) of selling cigarettes, _Austin v. Tennessee _, 179 U. S. 343; (c) of selling futures in grain or other commodities, _Booth v. Illinois _, 184 U. S. 425; (d) of selling stocks on margin, _Otis v. Parker _, 187 U. S. 606; (e) of keeping billiard halls, _Murphy v. California _, 225 U. S. 623; (f) of selling trading stamps, _Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co. _, 240 U. S. 342, 240 U. S. 368.

These cases show that the scope of the police power is not limited to regulation, as distinguished from prohibition. They show also that the power of the state exists equally whether the end sought to be attained is the promotion of health, safety, or morals or is the prevention of fraud or the prevention of general demoralization.

"If the state thinks that an admitted evil cannot be prevented except by prohibiting a calling or transaction not in itself necessarily objectionable, the courts cannot interfere unless, in looking at the substance of the matter, they can see that it 'is a clear, unmistakable infringement of rights secured by the fundamental law.'"

_Otis v. Parker _, 187 U. S. 606, 187 U. S. 609; _Booth v. Illinois _, 184 U. S. 425, 184 U. S. 429. Or, as it is so frequently expressed, the action of the legislature is final unless the measure adopted appears clearly to be arbitrary or unreasonable, or to have no real or substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. Whether a measure relating to the public welfare is arbitrary or unreasonable, whether it has no substantial relation to the end proposed, is obviously not to be determined by assumptions or by a priori reasoning. The judgment should be based upon a consideration of relevant facts, actual or possible – ex facto jus oritur. That ancient rule must prevail in order that we may have a system of living law.

It is necessary to inquire, therefore: what was the evil which the people of Washington sought to correct? Why was the particular remedy embodied in the statute adopted? And, incidentally, what has been the experience, if any, of other states or countries in this connection? But these inquiries are entered upon not for the purpose of determining whether the remedy adopted was wise, or even for the purpose of determining what the facts actually were. The decision of such questions lies with the legislative branch of the government. _Powell v. Pennsylvania _, 127 U. S. 678, 127 U. S. 685. The sole purpose of the inquiries is to enable this Court to decide whether, in view of the facts, actual or possible, the action of the State of Washington was so clearly arbitrary or so unreasonable that it could not be taken "by a free government without a violation of fundamental rights." See _McCray v. United States _, 195 U. S. 27, 195 U. S. 64.

1. The Evils

The evils with which the people of Washington were confronted arose partly from the abuses incident to the system of private employment agencies and partly from its inadequacy.

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