Woods v. Irwin

Citations

• 141 Pa. 278
• 21 A. 603
• 1891 Pa. LEXIS 1069

Syllabus

<p>[To be reported.]</p> <p>1. When a petition for the opening of a judgment has been met by an answer denying some of the facts alleged and demanding proof of the others, a decree granting the relief prayed for will be irregular, if the record does not show either that the petition was supported by proofs or that the plaintiff: consented to the hearing without them.'</p> <p>2. Creditors of a decedent’s estate, not alleging fraud or collusion, have no standing to ask that a judgment confessed by the executor be opened on the ground that the debt was barred by the statute of limitations at the time of the confession, even though the estate be insolvent and their dividends out of it would be reduced thereby.</p> <p>3. It is not a fraud in law for an executor to confess a judgment for a bona-fide debt barred by the statute; if sued therefor, he has a right to plead the statute, but is not bound to do so; and other creditors have no right to interfere except for fraud or collusion against them: dicta in Lewis v. Rogers, 16 Pa. 18, and Clark v. Douglass, 62 Pa. 408, explained.</p> <p>4. A judgment should not be oponed for the solo purpose of affording an opportunity to plead tlio statute of limitations to a defendant who has already had his day in court: such cases as Herman v. Einker, 106 Pa. 121; Sossong v. Rosar, 112 Pa. 197 ; and Ellinger’s App., 114 Pa. 505, rest upon the fact that the defendants therein had had no hearing.</p> <p>5. The plea of the statute, though no longer an object of animadversion, is not yet the object of favor; speaking for myself, I cannot regard the statute, unaided by any equitable conditions or circumstances, as other than a dishonest defence, for which alone a judgment should never he opened: Per Mr. Justice Mitcheix.</p>