Wolf v. Boettcher

Citations

• 64 Ill. 316

Syllabus

<p>1. Trespass de bonis asportatis—when a natural person is liable to the action. Where a natural person is plaintiff in an execution, and the goods and chattels of a person other than the defendant in the execution are seized and sold under it, the plaintiff in the execution is not liable to an action of trespass de bonis asportatis by such person, unless he interfered with the levy or assented to what had been done by the officer.</p> <p>2. It is a general rule that when a sheriff or constable makes himself liable as a trespasser, in the execution of a writ, all who direct, request, advise, aid or abet, are joint trespassers with him, and responsible for all damages.</p> <p>3. If a person sue out an execution, and give a bond of indemnity to the sheriff' to induce him to sell the goods of another, this is a sufficient interference to subject him to an action. So, also, if he adopt the acts of the officer by receiving the goods or money.</p> <p>4. Same—of the intent. In such action, no question of intent is involved.</p> <p>5. Same—liability of a township to the action. A town, organized under the township organization laws of this State, having an execution in its favor against A, can make itself liable for the taking of the goods of B, under the execution, in any of the ways by which a natural person may render himself liable for such a trespass.</p> <p>6. Although it was once doubted whether an action of trespass or trover, or an action on the case for malfeasance, would lie against a corporation, it is now well settled in England, as well as in this State and New York, that such an action maybe maintained against corporations, as well as actions on the case for non-feasance.</p> <p>7. Presumption. It is a general intendment of the law that every writ or process is purchased by the party in whose favor it issues.</p>