Wilt v. Reed Electric Co.

Citations

• 187 Pa. 424
• 41 A. 317
• 1898 Pa. LEXIS 1106

Syllabus

<p>Receivers — Attachment for contempt — Appeal—Practice, Supreme Court.</p> <p>On appeal from decree making absolute a rule to show cause why an-attachment should not issue for contempt in refusing to turn over property to a receiver, only such facts as are undisputed can be considered.</p> <p>Receivers — Possession—Secret process — Attachment for contempt.</p> <p>An inventor assigned patents to a corporation, and agreed to work and carry on for the corporation a secret process necessary in its business. It was agreed between the parties that the process should be reduced to writing and sealed and deposited in a bank, the paper to be opened only on the happening of certain contingencies; and that the inventor should occupy, without the presence of other parties, the place where the secret process was to be carried on, and that in case of default in payment of royalties the secret process and all the chemicals, machinery and apparatus used in the process should revert to the inventor. The corporation became embarrassed, defaulted in the payment of royalties, and went into the hands of a receiver. The inventor refused to permit the receiver to have access to or possession of a portion of the company’s building where the secret process was worked until he could remove his property therefrom, on the ground that if access were given the secret process would be revealed. The court directed that an attachment should issue against the inventor unless he gave up possession of the entire building to the receiver. In the order the court further directed that the receiver should not permit any one to examine the property connected with the secret process, and that he should not disclose any information which he himself might obtain in reference to the process. Held, (1) that the decree was erroneous inasmuch as it gave no adequate protection to the owner of the secret process; .(2) that the owner of the process was entitled to a reasonable time, not less than thirty days, with