Wetherill v. Lefferts

Citations

• 254 Pa. 484
• 98 A. 1074
• 1916 Pa. LEXIS 756

Syllabus

<p>Wills — Life estates — Rule in Shelley’s Case — “Son”—Word of purchase — Residuary clauses — Construction—Intention—Act of June 4 1879, P. L. 88, Sec. 2.</p> <p>1. The word “son” is primarily a word of purchase and when there is nothing in the context of the will indicating any intention on the part of the testator to use it as a word of limitation the first taker receives a life estate only.</p> <p>2. Where a testator specifically devised certain real estate to a nephew “for and during the term of his natural life, with remainder in fee to his eldest son and his heirs,” the inheritance in remainder was not to the descendants of the devisee for life as heirs but as purchasers, the rule in Shelley’s Case did not apply, and such devise failed by reason of the death of the devisee for life without issue.</p> <p>3. In such a case where*a subsequent clause of the will distributed the remainder of the estate among certain residuary devisees, there is no merit in the contention that the residuary devisees were entitled under the Act of -June 4,1879, P. L. 88, Sec. 2, to the property comprised in the devise to the nephew, but the intention of the testator was that the residuary devisees should take only what was left after the distribution of the real estate which had been Specifically devised to the nephew and nothing more, and testator’s heirs at law were entitled to the property devised to the nephew.</p> <p>4. In such case, aside from testator’s intention, the void devise, having formed a part of the residuary estate, disposed of by certain clauses of the will, could not fall back into that estate.</p>